

# **Globalisation, Public Opinion and the State**

## **Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia**

**Edited by Takashi Inoguchi  
and Ian Marsh**



**Routledge**  
Taylor & Francis Group

# Globalisation, Public Opinion and the State

‘Empirical studies of mass response to globalization are still lacking. This is especially true for systematic cross-national accounts. The volume edited by Marsh and Inoguchi fills this gap. It maps citizen attitudes in nine Asian and nine Western European countries, relying on the high quality Asia–Europe survey. Results show that a majority of citizens in the countries under study feel exposed to and talk about globalization – mostly in positive terms. However, this broadening of the focus of citizen attitudes does not affect the continuing importance of the nation state for attitude formation. Globalization broadens the context of citizens’ experience; it does not replace the older contexts. Students and scholars pursuing the subject will greatly benefit from this volume.’

*Hans-Dieter Klingemann is Professor Emeritus at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB) and Freie Universitaet Berlin, Germany*

This is first integrated book-length account of citizen responses to the new global order. Based on a comprehensive survey, administered at the end of 2000, in nine European and nine Asian countries, this book demonstrates the diverse responses to globalisation, within, and between, two of the world’s major – and most globally integrated – regions.

*Globalisation, Public Opinion and the State* is a pioneering empirical study, drawing on 18,000 interviews across these 18 European and Asian countries supported by the Japanese Ministry of Education. The Asia–Europe Survey is one of the largest of its kind ever conducted, and provides the book with a wealth of novel data on public opinion and social attitudes that identify the linkages between national/regional policy responses and the political and policy orientations of the publics affected.

The book uses theoretical insights to situate these public responses and reactions to globalisation; and it addresses one question in particular: do nation-states matter in how citizens come to view regional and global engagement? Rather than offering another theory about globalisation, this book presents much-needed empirical findings that help us decide between arguments about the public impact of globalisation cross-nationally. This book breaks new ground as there are no other comprehensive study in this field.

**Takashi Inoguchi** is Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo, and currently Professor of Political Science, Chuo University, Tokyo. He has published more than 70 books in English and Japanese; he recently co-authored *Political Cultures in Asia and Europe* (with Jean Blondel, Routledge 2006), and (co-editor) *American Democracy Promotion*. **Ian Marsh** holds the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) Chair of Government, and is Professor in the Graduate School of Government, University of Sydney; he is also Research Director for the Committee for Economic Development of Australia. His latest books include *Into the Future: the Neglect of the Long Term in Australian Politics*; and (as editor) *Australian Parties in Transition?*

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First published 2008  
by Routledge  
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada  
by Routledge  
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.

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*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

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*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*

A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-93501-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-39988-2 (hbk)

ISBN10: 0-203-93501-2 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978-0-415-39988-3 (hbk)

ISBN13: 978-0-203-93501-9 (ebk)

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# Preface

This study represents a pioneering effort to map the relationship between globalisation and public opinion. It covers the eighteen states that are arguably amongst those most affected by this development. Nine are in Europe and nine in Asia. Whether through the European Union or through the extension of the inter-regional trading system, these states have become deeply enmeshed in the world economy. They are also embedded in a host of other engagements through such developments as immigration and tourism and movements of refugees and students. Yet other interactions occur through the media, epidemics and a variety of trans-national issues such as terrorism and security, financial linkage and the environment. Many of these developments have a considerable provenance, but their intensity and combination arguably make the contemporary occurrence distinctive. Meantime, their substantive dimensions are all well documented and a by now voluminous literature offers varying assessments of their political significance. However, there has not hitherto been a comprehensive overview of citizen responses. This study aimed to fill that gap.

The project was initiated by Takashi Inoguchi and the contributors came to include scholars from Japan, Italy, Ireland and Australia – the project thus, albeit in a small way, exemplified its subject matter. Funding was generously provided by the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science's scientific research grant (#11102001) and the team gratefully acknowledges this support. It facilitated not only the very substantial survey whose results are reported here, but also a number of face-to-face meetings of team members. These occurred in the design, implementation and analysis phases of the project. Most were hosted by Professor Inoguchi at the University of Tokyo, and other team members much appreciate his good humour, his fine sense of cuisine and generous hospitality. We were also the fortunate beneficiaries of hospitality of the University of Siena, which was arranged by Professor Jean Blondel, and of two ECPR workshops. Our thanks to both institutions.

In addition to the present volume, two other studies have appeared based on the Asia–Europe Survey. These are, *Political Cultures in Asia and Europe, Citizens, States and Social Values* (by Jean Blondel and Takashi Inoguchi, Routledge, 2006) and *Citizens and the State* (by Takashi Inoguchi and Jean Blondel, Routledge, 2008). A fourth volume – *Democracy, Governance and Regionalism in*

*East and Southeast Asia* (edited by Ian Marsh) – also appeared in 2006, which drew partly on the data collected here but now in the context of broader political developments in Asia. Chapters in this volume were also authored by Inoguchi, Sinnott, Blondel and Marsh.

In carrying out the large-scale cross-national Asia–Europe Survey (ASES) from its genesis to fruition in this form, Takashi Inoguchi has received much animation, advice and assistance from many colleagues and friends: Ann-Catherine Jungar, Juergen Maier, Yves Schemeil, Pat Lyons, George Contogeorgis, Pierangelo Isernia, Andre Freire, Pedro Magalhaes, Ana Espirito Santo, Joan Font, Robert Lineira, Yukio Maeda, Ahn Chung-Si, Kang Won-Taek, Yusaku Horiuchi, Suzaina Kadir, Francis Loh, Johan Saravanamuttu, Chaiwat Khamchoo, Aaron Stern, Guo Dingping, Michael Hsiao and Renato Velasco, who all participated in the country profile conference in Tokyo in 2001 and provided most generously their insights and wisdom in analysing their national data, which helped us set our feet on the ground; Shiro Harada, Kazuya Yamamoto, Hideaki Uenohara, Ken Anno, Lucien Hotta and Urara Murai, who invariably made our computer life easier and faster; Kimiko Goko, Sakiko Doi, Kiyoko Hoshino, Naoko Sugihara, Yukari Tanihara and Misako Ishigaki, who heroically processed all correspondence and documents; Akihiko Tanaka, Nobuyuki Okubo and Kunio Saito, who secured our work space at the University of Tokyo and Chuo University, Tokyo; Japan Foundation, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan Center for Economic Research, The Murata Science Foundation, International Communications Fund, Japan Foundation Asia Center and Heiwa Nakajima Foundation, which helped us carry out survey-related works.

Ian Marsh would like particularly to acknowledge research assistance in bringing this project to completion, in particular exemplary help from Yayun Zhu and Adam Stebbing. Their contribution was essential and very much appreciated. Takashi Inoguchi would also like to record his appreciation for the cooperation accorded by Gallup International in Tokyo, in particular Ms Emiko Tomiie, Ms Satoko Mano and Ms Kaori Kojima.

# Acknowledgement

No collective work like this volume would not have been completed without commitment, compassion and cooperation on a sustained basis from many individuals and institutions throughout the world. The Ministry of Education and Science of Japan has given us solid support, enabling our large-scale survey through its scientific research grant scheme for 1999–2002 (#11102001). Without its generous support, this volume would not have been produced. The eighteen-country survey was carried out in a professional, masterly fashion by the Nippon Research Center and its local coalition members. Its head, Ms Emiko Tomiie deserves particular acclaim. The research team gave us precious knowledge and insights unique to local academics when we struggled to decipher many things from survey data generated from many countries in Asia and Europe. They are our teachers in many senses. They are: Ann-Catherine Jungar, Juergen Maier, Yves Schmeil, Pat Lyons, Geoge Contogeorgis, Pierangelo Isernia, Andre Freire, Pedro Mangalhaes, Ana Espirito Santo, Joan Font, Robert Lineira, Yukio Maeda, Ahn Chung-Si, Kang Won-Taek, Yusaku Horiuchi, Suzaina Kadir, Francis Loh, Johan Saravanamuttu, Chaiwat Khamchoo, Aaron Stern, Guo Dingping, Michael Hsiao and Renato Velasco. In Tokyo, Takashi Inoguchi acknowledges logistic help in computer use, in carrying out accounting work, in dealing with correspondence, in organizing so many conferences and meetings, and in getting things moving forward in general, from Shiro Harada, Kazuya Yamamoto, Hideaki Uenohara, Ken Anno, Lucien Hotta, Urara Murai, Kimiko Goko, Sakiko Doi, Kiyoko Hoshino, Naoko Sugihara, Yukari Tanihara and Misako Ishigaki. Ian Marsh acknowledges research assistance from Yayun Zhu and Adam Stebbing in Canberra and Sydney. They are our angels. The Japan Foundation, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, International Communications Fund, Japan Foundation Asia Center and Heiwa Nakajima Foundation helped us immensely to carry out survey-related works. The University of Tokyo and Chuo University helped us to secure space for the project. Akihiko Tanaka, Nobuyuki Okubo and Kunio Saito did so without charging much rent. The University of Siena hosted a very important questionnaire-drafting conference. The European Consortium for Political Research enabled us to carry out two workshops. Jean Blondel most

graciously and generously arranged all of these. Last but not least, we dedicate this volume to our partners, Kuniko Inoguchi and Lorine Marsh, who were both equanimous and magnanimous in seeing their respective partners who were at times so immersed with the project.

Takashi Inoguchi, Tokyo  
Ian Marsh, Sydney

# 1 Globalisation and public opinion in Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia

*Ian Marsh*

## **Introduction**

Globalisation is increasingly seen as a critical dynamic element in the life of citizens in the early twenty-first century. Yet what globalisation means to ordinary citizens and how they evaluate it is far from clear. Nor, indeed, is it clear how pervasive is its impact. Above all the controversies about its nature, spread and value, how the citizens of the countries of the contemporary world perceive it remains largely uncharted. There may be vocal and even furious declarations against globalisation in various corners of the (developed) world, but there is almost nothing about what the people, on the whole, feel on the topic.

It may be argued that the views of the people on the subject do not matter and that the ‘march of history’ towards a ‘globalised world’ will take place irrespective of whatever attitudes are held by citizens: if this was the case, there would be only anecdotal reasons for studying citizens’ attitudes. Yet such a position is not seriously tenable: it cannot be held as axiomatic that popular attitudes, on this or any other matter, do not have any impact, whatever is felt of the relationship between attitudes and behaviour. This is so in this particular context, as attitudes to globalisation are particularly likely to affect – indeed cannot but affect – the set of relationships which have existed previously between the citizens and the institutions with which these citizens are the most familiar and are expected to be most closely connected, that is the relationship between citizens and the state to which they belong.

Over and above what can be regarded as a controversy about power – namely whether the state is ‘on the way out’ and international structures of one kind or another are gaining – lies the question of the attitudes of citizens towards politics and the state. For instance, what is generally described as ‘state capacity’ depends ultimately, even if only in part, on the degree to which the state is able to ‘mobilise’ its citizens behind its policies and, in the specific context of globalisation, on the degree to which citizens hold views which are at variance with those which the government is holding. While it is not the aim here to examine such a question, this can of course be tackled only if it is preceded by an analysis of the attitudes of citizens to globalisation – and this is the object of this volume.



In order to start exploring the views of citizens, the nature of globalisation itself has to be explored: what does it consist of and how widely does it extend over human affairs? Is its perceived impact mostly derived from developments in the financial and economic area or are other fields, social, cultural or political, seen to be no less significant? The matter is far from being uncontroversial, both in terms of the scope of the concept and in terms of the relative importance of its component parts. Yet only if the question is given an adequate answer does it become possible to tackle two key matters which the study of the attitudes of citizens to globalisation poses. First, to what extent are citizens exposed to globalisation and how do they assess it? Second, what are the relationships, possibly reciprocal, between the exposure of citizens and their assessments of globalisation, on the one hand, and, on the other, a number of key elements of the political attitudes of citizens ranging from their feeling of identity to their participation in politics.

Strictly speaking, however, no truly satisfactory answer can be given to these questions unless longitudinal studies are available: yet such longitudinal studies do not exist, this study being a first attempt at assessing what are the attitudes of citizens to the globalisation process. One has therefore to rely on what is unquestionably an unsatisfactory substitute, namely asking citizens whether and where they experience a greater impact of globalisation currently than in the past. While this strategy had to be adopted in this research, it is to be hoped that further studies will gradually build the basis for the longitudinal analyses which are required.

There is yet another problem, but it is of a different and wholly ‘contingent’ character. Studies of the impact of globalisation on citizens must cover more than one country, especially in the current context in which longitudinal studies are precluded; on the other hand, worldwide studies are equally precluded. They would indeed be unwieldy; they would be even theoretically unsatisfactory. For it is not valuable to examine, at any rate in the first instance, citizens’ attitudes to globalisation in the context of states which are very weak. States are weak as a result of their very limited ability to mobilise resources and, among these resources, are those provided by the support of the citizens. Such cases would not therefore constitute satisfactory – indeed even useful – examples of what the relationship may be between globalisation and citizens.

One should on the contrary concentrate on countries in which the national and political life is well established, in other words where the authority and effectiveness of the state is (broadly speaking) established and respected. Countries of this kind are to be found in two regions of the globe only, the Western area and East and Southeast Asia. States in these two regions are also those whose citizens are, on most standard measures, most engaged in the global economy. Further, given that it is valuable to be able to draw comparisons from a substantial number of states which are typically regarded as having many similar characteristics, it follows that the best strategy consists of examining the impact of globalisation on the attitudes of citizens in Western Europe, on the one hand, and East and Southeast Asia, on the other. This is what is being done in

this study, which covers eighteen countries, nine from each of the two regions. These are, in Europe: Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Sweden, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland and in Asia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore. The following sections of this chapter look first at broad definitions of globalisation, then at developments in those domains where its affects have been most prominent. These determined the content and scope of the survey instrument on which this study is based (reprinted in Appendix 1). This introductory chapter concludes with a discussion of the way globalisation had figured in political discourse in individual states and of the political culture variables through which impacts on citizen's attitudes to politics and the state are assessed.

### **Definitions of globalisation**

Despite the flow of words devoted to the subject, globalisation remains an elusive phenomenon. As a set of processes many of its components are old. Trade, migration and capital movements were all features of the nineteenth century. The depression of the 1930s ended this outward-oriented phase but the 1945 Bretton Woods settlement provided the framework for its progressive renewal. World trade and capital movements revived in combination, in the West, with the emergence of the Keynesian social democratic state. Thereafter a variety of developments progressively extended the potential for and scope of trans-national economic engagement. At a monetary level, the fixed exchange rate system was broken in the 1970s. At the level of trade, Japan pioneered the development of an export-led growth strategy. The success of Japan's approach led to its imitation by other East and Southeast Asian states. Meantime, European integration, which began in 1949, progressively provided a framework for deepened economic relationships between member countries. Roughly parallel developments in communications and manufacturing technologies and, later, the end of the Cold War, all contributed to the distinctiveness of the contemporary phase in extended international linkage. Other cultural, political and social features, such as the development of US hegemony, also help to distinguish current dynamics. The complexity and interdependence of these elements makes the search for a universally accepted definition problematic.

Moreover, the question of the definition is highly controversial, as some view globalisation as a process restricted to the economic area, while others include cultural, social and political processes. Some see it as confined to rich countries and some ultimately as a truly worldwide development. Some see regional institutions as an aspect of globalisation and some as a defence against globalisation. There is thus ambiguity about substance, geography and politics.

Major surveys of globalisation have multiplied in recent years (Held and McGrew, 2002; Dicken, 2002; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). A glance at any of the principal readers on this topic suggests its scale and scope. One of the most widely cited, *Global Transformations* (Held *et al.*, 1999), is a study of nearly 500 pages with nine major sections covering the following topics: The

Territorial State; Organised Violence; Global Trade, Global Markets; Global Finance; Corporate Power and Global Production Networks; Migration; Culture; and the Environment. As the text makes clear, many aspects of globalisation are remote from daily experience and unlikely to register in everyday attitudes and awareness. Yet the subjects covered indicate the variety of areas where international developments have ‘penetrated’ what was formerly a more or less sovereign state political space.

Whether such developments register in the perceptions of citizens is another matter. Anthony Giddens defines globalisation in terms that leave it unclear whether or not to expect this outcome: ‘(Globalisation is) the intensification of world wide social relations ... in such a way that local happenings are determined by events occurring many miles away’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). In this reading, globalisation is a process leading to spatial and temporal shrinkage: it involves, amongst other features, a diminished distance between political and economic decision-making units. Through their increasingly temporal and spatial integration, local events are also increasingly critically affected, if not determined, by more remote happenings. How such developments are interpreted by individual citizens remains to be clarified.

Held *et al.* offer a more elaborate definition which nevertheless also emphasises systemic effects rather than an impact on citizen attitudes. Globalisation is

an historical process which engenders a shift in the spatial reach of networks and systems of social relations to transcontinental or interregional patterns of human organisation, activity and the exercise of social power ... it is a multi-dimensional phenomenon applicable to a variety of forms of social action – economic, political, legal, cultural, military and technological – and sites of social action such as the environment

(Held *et al.*, p. 258)

This definition points to the differentiated character of the forces – economic, political, cultural, technological and geographic – that might be impinging on nations and individuals.

This definition also distinguishes regional from transcontinental linkage, thus inviting attention to the degree to which regional sentiment might have developed independently of more cosmopolitan orientations. Moreover, this definition suggests that modes of linkage and impact can vary within particular domains of experience – but it again leaves open the question of individual interpretation, which can presumably be affected not just by the views of political elites but also by such factors as occupation, education or access to communications media. Finally, this definition suggests that globalisation is a process whose consequences can be observed with differing intensities at different sites. For example, reference to the environment invites attention to the extent to which this is seen as a global or at least a transnational, issue, distinct from one that is primarily local in character. A variety of economic, migration, cultural and other issues might be similarly regarded.

Held *et al.* invite attention to variations that are likely to occur in national and individual experience. Three dimensions of variation are specifically identified: first, geographical extent ('how much of the world is covered'); second, the intensity of flows and interactions ('how far have they become enmeshed with associated social relations within each country, area or locality'); and third, the impact of these flows ('on the activities and power of local and national actors'). This study will map some of these differences at least at the level of individual citizens.

## **Economic globalisation**

Economic forces are generally regarded as the primary motor of globalisation (Friedman, 2000, 2005). Indeed an assessment by an organization that is influential in business circles, the McKinsey Global Institute, implies that full economic integration as the (desirable) ultimate outcome:

Globalisation is the process by which the world's economy is transformed from a set of national and regional markets to one that operates without regard to national boundaries. The transformation is occurring through the accelerated availability of global capital and advances in computing and communications technologies. The change is associated with significant growth in the scale, mobility and integration of the world's capital markets, deregulation and the disappearance of trade barriers and the ability to leverage knowledge and talent world-wide through technological means.

(Fraser and Oppenheim, 1997; also Farrell, 2005)

Trade and finance have been the primary drivers of economic integration. The case for trade-based linkages draws on the oldest and perhaps the strongest economic 'law', that of comparative advantage. Of course market distortions can tip the balance of advantage in one direction; and comparative advantage is demonstrably not static, as the experience of the Asian states covered in this survey demonstrates. But open regional and/or global trade has demonstrably delivered considerable economic benefits to the countries in the two regions covered in this study. The liberalisation of capital markets has been a separate development. Whereas geography and non-tariff barriers continue to affect trade, they do not constrain capital markets. Capital markets have mushroomed since 1993 – from \$53 trillion in 1993 to \$118 trillion in 2003, that is an overall growth of 123 per cent and an annual average growth rate around 12 per cent. Proponents argue that the hedging of risk that these markets have facilitated underwrites the continued expansion of trade and investment.

Others ask whether the benefits of economic globalisation match the claims of enthusiasts. For example, Boyer and Drache (1997) question the likelihood of truly international 'markets' in all but a few areas. Fligstein (1997) notes that there is no single global financial market, rather 'the markets for currency, corporate equity, corporate debt, retail banking, government debt, insurance for companies and individuals, individual debt and debt for home ownership are

markets separated by firms and nations'. The only truly global markets involve currencies, government bonds and some futures for particular commodities. Further, Fligstein and Merand (2001) note that, in 1994, less than 10 per cent of the capital stock of any OECD country was owned by residents of any other country. There is an emerging, albeit conservative, literature on the 'varieties of capitalism' that complements these analyses (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In this perspective, national institutional patterns (such as labour markets, corporate governance, innovation systems), which are historically derived, determine many aspects of the organisation, approach and performance of business firms. In other words, linkage and integration will not drive institutional uniformity.

Indeed, reservations about the term of 'economic globalisation' as an accurate description of what is occurring and qualifications about whether this should be seen as a positive or at least 'neutral' economic process should also be noted. Hirst and Thompson (1997) have shown that the highest value activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) are concentrated in their home countries and that home country markets remain pre-eminent for individual firms (also Hirst, 2002). In another perspective, Fligstein and Merand (2001) argue that the aggregate economic data that are presented constitute evidence not of economic globalisation but of economic regionalisation. They argue that whilst Western Europe has consistently accounted for around half of world trade over the last few decades, European countries are trading more with each other than with the rest of the world. Inter-country trade amongst the eleven EU states has risen from around 60 per cent of foreign trade in 1980 to 69 per cent in 1999. Global trade engagement as a proportion of EU GDP represents around 9 per cent, roughly the same figure as that for the United States and Japan. Further, economic globalisation is mostly presented as the cause of increasing wealth in which all have the opportunity to share. Defenders of globalisation have often pointed to the theoretical gains from free trade, which is based on net gains. The effects on distributional issues, employment and job security either are assumed to follow from an efficiency maximisation approach or are seen as a set of independent policy goals. For example, Kapstein cites trade theorist and International Monetary Fund official, Anne Krueger: 'Any effort to analyse deeper integration ... must weigh proposals according to their impact on the economic efficiency of the world' (Krueger, 1995 cited by Kapstein, 2000; also Bhagwati, 2002; Irwin, 2002).

This approach has been questioned both in terms of the efficiency-first approach of trade theory and in the real-world patterns of global integration. Deeper economic integration differs substantially from the image of a free-trade model of world economic organisation; it consists of protectionist regimes and instruments, concentrated economic interests and powerful and weak states. Therborn makes it clear how such real-world complexities muddy the global trade arguments:

In spite of their strong free trade instincts, mainstream economists are increasingly recognising the ambiguous effects of trade. What is coming out

of this fairly intense economic debate might be termed a sociological insight, that trade liberalisation as well as protectionism have both losers and winners and that who is who does not follow from stylised assumptions of factor endowments, but depends on the country specific institutions of the free trade regime.

(2002, pp. 20–21)

More generally, some have seen globalisation as the cause of a (growing) divide between rich and poor, both within and between countries. The gross inequalities in the global distribution of income, the disparities of opportunity and the barriers imposed by rich countries on their poorer neighbours are all well documented (Kohli *et al.*, 2002; Scott, 2001). For his part, Robert Wade interprets ‘globalisation’ not as a neutral economic process (if such could exist) but rather as an exercise in power politics which aims at making hegemonic America’s particular liberal-capitalist ideology. Its ultimate objective is to shift the terms of the relationship between states and their citizens away from the social democratic settlement. The idea that society should shelter the individual from certain risks is being displaced in favour of individual responsibility for risk – this is, in effect, ‘a realignment of interests ... away from the protection of labour income ... towards the protection of capital income’ (Wade, 2000, p. 27; also Evans, 1997). Heightened job insecurity is a necessary, if indirect, consequence of these broader purposes. These diverse perspectives point not only to disagreements about the scope of globalisation as an economic process but also to a variety of interpretations of its positive or negative impacts. Later chapters explore how both aspects are assessed by ordinary citizens.

## **Language**

Wittgenstein observed: ‘The limits of my language are the limits of my world’ (cited in Kellner and Soeffner, 2003, p. 142). David Malouf (2003) expands this rather terse proposition:

It is all very well to regard language as simply a “means of communication”. It may be that for poor handlers of a language and for those to whom it is new and unfamiliar, who use it only for the most basic exchanges. But for most of us it is also a machine for thinking, for feeling, and what can be felt and thought in one language – the sensibility it embodies, the range of phenomena it can take in, the activities of mind as well as the objects and sensations it can deal with – is different, both in quality and kind, from one language to the next. The world of Chinese or Arabic is different from the world of German or French or English, as the worlds those European languages embody and refer to differ from one another. A language is the history and experience of the men and women who, in their complex dealings with the world, made it.

Citizens of the eighteen countries covered in this survey communicate through sixteen different languages. Only Britain and Ireland and Taiwan and China share a basic tongue. At a global level, Chinese is the 'first language' with the greatest number of native speakers (over one billion) followed by English (500 million), Arabic (450 million) and Spanish (380 million) (Gordon, 2005).

### **Culture and media**

If globalisation's immediate effect on nations and individuals occurs through economic interaction, cultural and media impacts may constitute an even more important domain. This is because of the potential impact of the media and mass market entertainment on individual attitudes. But the links between these variables is complex and the causal structure obscure. For example, at the level of primary awareness, 'local' cultures continue to shape citizen responses. Local cultures propagate norms of authority and justice, attitudes to particular ethnic identities and religious attachments. Some discount the likely impact of media exposure:

The global communications of television, the Internet and other media do not necessarily breach communal and particularistic boundaries and spaces. People receive foreign soap operas in their own homes or neighbourhood cafes, dubbed into their own language. They consume in terms of their own constructions of meaning and life worlds.

(Zubaida, 2002, p. 39)

But local cultures have also historically been open to transnational influence arguably as much via popular as elite levels (e.g. MacCulloch, 2005).

At an organisational level, global media and entertainment networks are increasingly important mechanisms of cultural interaction. Deregulation has at least partially freed the media industry from national jurisdictions: the global media systems thus form a new infrastructure of power, with seven international companies dominating the industry, AOL/Time Warner, Walt Disney, Sony, Vivendi, Bertelsman, Viacom and News, of which only two are effectively controlled outside the United States and all of which have a core presence in that country. Further, the US film studios, which dominate the manufacture of films, now derive a majority of their revenues from international markets: this has been the case since 1995. Seven US studios (Warner, Disney, Fox, Universal, Columbia, Paramount and MGM) have a world share of around 80 per cent of feature film production and 70 per cent of television features (Dale, 1997). Meanwhile, in a study of Taiwan, Michael Hsiao (2002) noted the popularity, at least in East Asia, of Japanese products as partially 'localised' mediators of American pop culture. English is not required for exposure to these experiences as dubbing is the norm.

Changes in news and entertainment formats also have an effect on the way events are presented. Presentation involves selection and is thus far from being



a neutral process from the perspective of the information and values that are communicated. For example, changes in news media in the 1990s have led to continuous or at least more frequent news bulletins, the global extension, via satellite platforms, of cable news services and the diversification of news into such categories as business, entertainment and sports (Hjvard, 2001).

Hjvard identifies three different ways in which communications media contribute to processes of globalisation, first, as channels of communication, second, as messengers of a world beyond the local and, third, as sources of a new social infrastructure. Other cultures are – if opaquely – visible as a frame of reference. How far such developments may fashion an international public opinion is unknown. The media – and the news media in particular – are not ‘objective’ agents: their selection of issues and images and the perspectives they propagate, make the media themselves active agents in these processes. Hjvard suggests that present outcomes are far distant from any transnational public sphere:

Due to the growth in transnational and global news media, public opinion formation occasionally transcends national borders and acquires a political momentum of its own at a global level. However, compared to the globalisation of politics, economy and culture, the public sphere and the formation of public opinion are still very much tied to a national level and oriented towards national political institutions.

In addition, the Internet has now emerged as a major potential communications platform. Whereas ownership of a satellite platform has been essential for communication companies to obtain global reach, the Internet bypasses such intermediaries and offers instantaneous interaction. With the Internet, language and content, not ownership of intermediate distribution platforms, determine access. According to the media research service, Global Reach (2005), only about 35 per cent of the global on-line population of 729 million are native English speakers, a third have an Asian language as their mother tongue of whom 14 per cent are Chinese speakers, 10 per cent Japanese and 4 per cent Korean. In Europe, Spanish speakers account for 9 per cent of the on-line population, German speakers for 7 per cent, Italians for 4 per cent, and French and Portuguese for 3 per cent each.

In sum, the permeability or solidity of national cultures is perhaps the fundamental issue determining the impact of a globalised media and of transnational cultural experience. Some anticipate an emerging cosmopolitanism (e.g. Norris, 2000). Some fear a fragmented populism (e.g. Sennett, 2002). Others foresee hostility between peoples based on cultural incomprehension. The ‘clash of cultures’ literature belongs to this latter category (Huntington, 1996). The potential for tension has also been explored by Benjamin Barber (1995), and in a popular form, by Thomas Friedman (2000). In contrast to Huntington, these authors anticipate more ambiguous outcomes. They foresee tension between socio-economic and cultural cleavages. The anticipated conflict is between ‘the forces of consumer



capitalism and retribalisation' (Holten, 1998, p. 172). Whereas Huntington sees incomprehension fuelling hostility between protagonists, Barber sees a more muddled overlap and interpenetration:

Iranian zealots keep one ear tuned to the Mullahs urging holy war and the other cocked to Rupert Murdoch's Star TV beaming in *Dynasty*, *Donohue* and *The Simpsons* ... Chinese entrepreneurs vie for the attention of party cadres in Beijing and simultaneously pursue KFC franchises ... The Russian Orthodox Church, even as it struggles to renew the ancient faith, has entered a joint venture with California business men to bottle and sell natural waters. Orthodox Hasids and brooding neo-Nazis have both turned to rock music to get their traditional messages out to the new generation.

(Barber, 1995, quoted in Holten, 1998, p. 173)

This survey established the extent to which ordinary citizens watch internationally derived television programming and how they assess its value.

### **Tourism, study and immigration**

Large-scale migrations were a significant feature of the nineteenth century. According to a World Bank study, in the first phase of globalisation (1870 to 1914), some 10 per cent of the world's population moved permanently to a new country; 1913 was the last year in which large numbers of Europeans moved to the new world. After the Second World War, the formation of the Soviet bloc staunchly flows from Eastern Europe and Russia. Immigration has subsequently experienced a relative decline: the total number of migrants living in countries not of their citizenship has been estimated at less than 2 per cent (World Bank, 2002, 10–11). Of the European countries covered in this survey, and on the basis of 1999 data, the highest levels of migration have been experienced in Sweden (5 per cent of the labour force and 11 per cent of the population), Germany (9 per cent of the labour force and around the same proportion of the population) and France (6 per cent of the labour force and 5 per cent of the population) and the lowest proportions are in Italy (3.6 and 2.5 per cent, respectively), Spain and Portugal (1.8 and around 1 per cent, respectively) (*The Economist*, 2 November 2002, A Survey of Migration, p. 4). Malaysia has the highest proportion of legal and illegal immigrants in Asia. Filipino migrants work in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and the Middle East and Indonesian migrants in Singapore and Malaysia.

If official migration has waned, tourism and studying abroad have waxed. Tourism has become a particularly important form of international engagement, although the impact remains problematic. Tourists can be insulated from local environments by the brevity and artifice of experiences. In aggregate terms, annual numbers of international tourists grew from 160 million in 1970, to 285 million in 1980, 455 million by 1990 and 703 million in 2002. The number is forecast to reach 1.5 billion by 2020 (World Tourism Organization, 2003); 80 per cent are involved in intra-regional travel and the balance in inter-regional travel.

Europe provided 58 per cent of tourists and Asia 18 per cent. Participation varied widely between countries. For example, some 10 per cent of Japanese (13.5 million people) travelled abroad in 1996 (Pharr, 2000, p. 184).

The number of students abroad in 2002 has been estimated at 1.8 million, which is projected to increase to around 8 million by 2025. This is a small proportion of the total number of secondary and tertiary students, but it constitutes a significant growth over the past decade. European and Asian states together contributed 75 per cent of this total with 694,000 students from Asia and 540,000 from Europe studying in other countries (OECD, 2003).

### **Is globalisation novel?**

Is any of this new? Globalisation or internationalisation is a continuing historic process whose modes have varied over time. The international propagation of the great religions (Christianity, Islam, Buddhism), the development of political empires (Spanish, British, Dutch) and the great ethnic migrations (Chinese, Jewish, Irish) might all be earlier aspects of what is now termed globalisation. The great mercantilist companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries prefigured the modern multi-nationals (Keay, 1991). Post-enlightenment internationalism has been particularly associated with trade and commerce. In the nineteenth century, the ideology of free trade competed for a time with that of imperialism or, in another perspective, operated as a form of imperialism (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953).

In a detailed analysis, Keohane and Nye (2000) show what is distinctive about contemporary developments. While many structural characteristics make the present experience of globalisation analogous to that of the nineteenth century, Keohane and Nye identify a number of novel elements: 'Globalism today is different from globalism of the nineteenth century when European imperialism provided much of its political structure, and higher transport and communication costs meant fewer people were directly involved.' Further, on an ideal plane, American liberal-democratic culture now predominates. On a social plane, as was noted earlier, whereas migration allowed individuals to move from less to more economically prosperous localities, migration flows are quite restricted in the twenty-first century. On an economic plane, although the share of world trade to world GDP in 1995 was roughly equal to the proportion in 1913 (15 versus 14 per cent), the composition of international trade has become significantly different in at least three respects: first, manufactured products and not agriculture constitute the largest segment and services trade is growing rapidly; second, a significant proportion of trade is inter-industry in character and the number of countries with very high ratios of trade to GDP is much larger; third, as Rodrik (1997) noted, the enhanced mobility of capital has increased its bargaining power relative to governments and unions even if in a particular case corporations choose not to exercise that power.

In sum, Keohane and Nye find three features that broadly distinguish contemporary experience. The first novel feature is the density of international

networks. Interdependencies and spillovers spread much further and move more swiftly. This is evident in the cases of technological innovations, financial crises and epidemics. Second, they see new levels of institutional velocity. This refers not to the speed of communications per se but rather to the speed of impact on organisations, networks and the linkages between networks. Finally, they see distinctive levels of transnational participation and much more complex patterns of interdependence. This covers the proliferation of international agencies, actors such as NGOs, industrial associations and international bureaucracies. In comparison with earlier periods, interactions have ‘thickened’, to use their metaphor.

## **States and globalisation**

The state naturally figures prominently in the developments which have just been surveyed. State authority is claimed by some to have been qualified by globalisation. This is partly the result of the growing role of international governance and partly the result of pressures for convergence of state welfare and economic strategies on neo-liberal lines. A third development, the spread of democratisation, might also figure as a balance to globalisation. These three aspects are briefly sketched.

### *International governance*

The development of economic and other forms of globalisation has been associated with new patterns of international governance. New institutions and forums have been established such as the World Environment Forum and older institutions have acquired new or enhanced functions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the World Bank, while the annual number of international treaties has also increased. Regional institutions, of which the European Union is the most elaborated, have developed; regional trading blocs, such as ASEAN plus 3, Mercosur and NAFTA have also been set up. International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have multiplied. According to the UN-funded Commission of Global Governance, there were in 1995 at least 29,000 international NGOs – that is, organisations operating in at least three countries (1995, p. 32). A number of high profile campaigns have been staged by organisations such as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, Amnesty International and *Medecins sans Frontieres*. An international land mines convention, concluded despite the opposition of the United States government, was attributed to the public campaign staged by some NGOs. These organisations are now recognised participants in official international forums. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) have documented their impact in a range of regulatory areas.

The extent to which such developments modify or qualify national sovereignty and the desirability of this development have been major issues in domestic politics in at least some states, such as the refusal of the United States to accept the authority of the International War Crimes Tribunal or to accede to

the Kyoto Treaty. Hirst and Held have debated the relative merits of seeking to influence international governance arrangements through action at the international (Held) or national (Hirst) levels (also Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Singer, 2002). Whatever the outcome of this issue, these developments together amount to a considerable extension of international governance arrangements. The survey results, reported in the following chapters, indicate how far they have also penetrated public awareness and whether and in what ways, they have modified respondents' understanding of the authority and role of their own national governments.

### ***Globalisation as a constraint on states***

In the first flush of the 'discovery' of globalisation, some argued that states were doomed (Ohmae, 1995; Wriston, 1992). Others contest this claim. They argue that states remain significant actors although differences persist about the extent to which they are constrained (surveys in Levi, 2002; Weiss, 1998, 2003; Held and McGrew, 2002). Limits on state capacity allegedly arise in at least three critical policy areas, macroeconomic sovereignty, industry policies and social welfare (Scharpf and Schmidt, 1999; Fligstein, 1997; but see Reiger and Leibfried, 1998; Rodrik, 2004). Wages policies are also held to be dysfunctional because globalisation marks a shift of power from labour and governments to capital. In a survey of the relevant literature, Suzanne Berger (2000) found that while macroeconomic sovereignty has been generally curbed, states retain wider flexibility in relation to fiscal policy. Wide variations are evident in levels of public spending, social spending and taxation among states (also Castles, 2004; but see Hay, 2001). In relation to the sustainability of the welfare state, Berger concluded: 'the empirical evidence suggests far greater resilience and capacity for adaptation within the format of universal social provision than [was implied by the pessimistic] readings of the new distribution of power within advanced industrial societies'.

For its part, some assert industry policy has been weakened partly because of the WTO and common regulatory frameworks such as competition policy. Emergency and anti-dumping measures remain legal under WTO rules, however, and these are more frequently resorted to by national authorities. Beyond such explicit barriers, states possess a variety of resources covering both formal rules and informal practices through which industrial structures can be deliberately patterned, such as in shaping national innovation systems, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), linking local firms to global supply chains and attracting centres of technological excellence (e.g. Lipsey *et al.*, 2005).

The 'varieties of capitalism' literature offers a conservative assessment of the way globalisation has affected state capacity. Stewart Wood (in Hall and Soskice, 2001) argues that a state can or should only pursue policies that 'conform to the institutional comparative advantage of its particular market economy' (p. 274). This analysis attributes decisive influence to capital. Further, its interests are interpreted as static in character, albeit (as a consequence of path

dependence) variable between countries. The general model has been criticised theoretically for its over-rigid determinism and its over-stylised categories (Crouch, 2005). In an alternative perspective, Fligstein argues:

Capitalist firms remain dependent on national governments and local labour forces to provide them with stable political conditions, infrastructure, trade protection, trade agreements, competition policies, privileged access to capital markets, and bailouts. Because of this interdependence societies have a continued right to make claims on firms.

Other authors have explored the various opportunities which states provide to firms through the creation of capabilities (West, 2003; Porter and Kettles, 2003).

Finally, some suggest that the rise of China and India marks a largely benign step-jump in the outlook for globalisation (e.g. Friedman, 2005). Others see their emergence as potentially a less happy moment in the international division of labour, with its associated implications for domestic politics. For example, Jonathan West (2005) has argued access to skills could speedily undermine well established national industries:

The key to China's growth is not cheap unskilled labour, it is cheap skilled labour. . . . China currently graduates 500,000 engineers every year and it is increasing this number. An engineer who would be paid \$150,000 a year in the US earns \$120 to \$150 a month in China . . . What this means is that China has a cost-structural advantage that is so great it is difficult to think of any product that can be made and transported in which China won't have a competitive advantage.

### ***Democratisation***

The era of American hegemony has been associated with the spread of at least electoral democracy. Amartya Sen has described 'democracy as a universal value' (1999; also, in a triumphalist key, Fukuyama, 1992). In 1974 there were only 39 democracies – 27 per cent of the number of countries (142). In 2000 there were, according to Diamond, 120 democracies – 63 per cent of the number of countries (192) (Diamond and Plattner, 2001, p. xiii). The emergence of democracy as an (almost) universal norm of legitimate governance is not widely acknowledged in much of the discussion of globalisation. It does not figure as an aspect of this process in some of the major readers (Held *et al.* 1999, but see Friedman, 2005, pp. 170–171). It is problematic as an aspect of globalisation since its effects involve the enhancement of local, not transnational influences. Yet democracy as both norm and practice seems no less a novel feature of contemporary experience than the more frequently discussed economic and cultural linkages. Other regime forms – communism, aristocracy, monarchy – have almost left the global stage. Those regimes that preserve these patterns often deploy democratic rhetoric to buttress their legitimacy. Of course the forms of

democracy vary widely: presidential, parliamentary, semi-presidential, federal, bi- or unicameral, etc. The universalisation of democracy invites attention to the degree to which sustaining political cultures have also grown, as well as to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of these political cultures (e.g. Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The 'civic culture' thesis implied a progressive move towards a common template, a finding that was belied by subsequent developments. Save for one or possibly two exceptions, all of the countries covered in this survey are (more or less) democratic.

Democratisation as an aspect of globalisation introduces a kind of paradox to the process. On the one hand, globalisation is about transcending political, geographic and temporal boundaries and a growing role of transnational technological, economic, cultural and other forces. On the other hand, democracy is about human rights, the enhanced standing of 'local' populations and consent as the basis of legitimacy.

### **Globalisation and citizen attitudes**

Attitudes to politics and the state are the particular concern of this study. In a survey of the varied impacts of globalisation, Suzanne Berger (2000) wondered if it would ultimately also weaken these connections. At one level globalisation might broaden the frame of reference of citizens; at another level, it might diminish the standing, authority and credibility of national political institutions. 'Globalisation destroys national control of information flows, hence weakens a government's ability to influence the public . . . . [It weakens] the vehicles for reaching common public understandings of national well-being.'

The various external forces and pressures and the various opportunities for broadened experience of other people, places and events that might induce such outcomes have been surveyed in earlier sections. But their impact on mass opinion is hard to anticipate. Even the most enthusiastic protagonists who interpret globalisation as a kind of tidal wave and an irresistible force do not discuss the contours of its likely impacts on attitudes to politics and the state. One test might be whether responses to particular issues that have attracted international attention are common between countries and regions.

But the situation concerning mass opinion is more complex. National political elites have also invoked globalisation to justify domestic policy changes and they are likely to be no less influential in shaping citizen views. But is this to count as an influence of globalisation or a testament to the continuing significance of states, or is it both at once? We return to this question in the last chapter. To be noted here, however, is the incidence and role of references to globalisation in elite rhetoric. In a survey of the use of globalisation and European integration in the rhetorics of European political elites, Hay and Rosamund (2002) suggest:

(What the evidence demonstrates is) the strategic nature of the appeal to globalisation as an external economic constraint (used here to legitimate

ongoing social and economic reform which clearly originates elsewhere) and the enduring national distinctiveness of discourses of external economic constraint.

Looking to member countries of the EU, the authors identified a variety of factors that were likely to lead to appeals to globalisation as a justification for policy change. For example, the authors suggested globalisation was likely to be offered as a reason for policy change ‘when the proposed domestic reforms were likely to prove unpopular and unpalatable’. They concluded:

What this (survey) perhaps serves to reinforce is that the deployment as political rhetoric of discourses of globalisation and European integration is both strategic and by no means homogenous, varying significantly from national context to national context and, indeed, from political party to political party (see also Schmidt, 2003).

The way globalisation has figured in elite political discourse has not been comprehensively mapped and a survey of the eighteen countries is of course beyond the scope of this study. Table 1.1 presents indicative quotations that illustrate its deployment in political rhetoric. This was based on a *Factiva* search of media reports involving globalisation and the names of individual leaders. The quotations listed were selected for their representativeness. The extent to which globalisation has figured in the rhetoric of national leaders in the way suggested by Hay and Rosamund is the first striking fact. This is nominated by all as a central imperative shaping the need for domestic policy adjustment. But views differ about the broader context. Amongst the leaders of the European states, Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor Brown of the UK offer the strongest endorsement of its positive nature. They nominate globalisation as the primary economic force and they enthusiastically champion a neo-liberal or market-based response as the right stance for governments. The other European leaders more or less endorse globalisation’s primacy as an economic force. But there are strong reservations on the part at least of the French, German and Swedish leadership about neo-liberal responses. All press for policy change but qualify their enthusiasm for unfettered market-based choice. Some also cast globalisation as, in some aspects at least, an American project against which the EU constitutes a buffer. More immediately, globalisation is also offered as a reason for proposed changes to reduce wages and/or benefits for particular groups of citizens – for example by Irish and German leaders.

Amongst Asian states, no leaders are as positive as those of the UK. Like their European counterparts, all endorse the primacy of economic globalisation. They nominate it as an imperative force to which citizens and governments must respond. But they also assert the need for vigorous, nationally based responses and they express reservations about the benign character of many of its wider impacts.



Table 1.1 Comments made by European and Asian political leaders on globalisation

Country	Date/Source	Comment
China	South China Morning Post 19/10/01	Former President Jiang: ‘‘Vulnerable’’ countries might suffer if globalisation became ‘‘irrational’’. . . . China will continue to promote economic growth and social progress . . . . In spite of rapid advancement of productive forces and science and technology worldwide, development has all along remained uneven, and what is more the North-South gap has kept widening instead of narrowing. Poverty and hunger have been a commonplace in developing countries. People are still plagued by regional conflicts, environmental degradation and transnational crimes, among others.’ Premier Wen (erstwhile Vice-premier): ‘Economic globalisation has been a key trend of today’s economic development in the world. . . . China will improve its market economic system and legal system in accordance with WTO rules and the nation’s actual conditions, further transforming the government functions and standardising the market order for establishing a unified domestic market for fair competition.’
	BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 24/3/02	President Hu: ‘China has to change its pattern of growth and improve its competitiveness in exports . . . to increase its exports of hi-tech products, value-added products and products using Chinese intellectual property rights . . . . Imports of advanced technology, management skills and foreign talent are of the same priority as self-innovation . . . . China must encourage its companies to invest overseas by granting them more rights.’
	AFX UK Focus 2/6/05	Premier Wen: ‘We must continue to deepen reforms and open wider to the outside world, actively take part in economic globalisation, and adhere to the open strategy of mutual benefit and mutual wins . . . . China’s development cannot be separated from the world.’
France	BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 13/12/05 <i>The Times</i> 13/11/02	The government of President Chirac provided two million pounds sponsorship for meeting of European Social Forum in Paris. 60,000 participants featured anti-globalisation campaign.

*continued*



Table 1.1 continued

	<i>Financial Times</i> 29/6/05	PM de Villepin: 'To get the most out of globalisation ... we must be able to defend our political, economic and social interests, presenting a united front .... This is imperative for security ... for growth and jobs ... for gaining control of our future: the cost of research investments is too heavy for a single country .... It is an imperative finally for the defence of our values .... Either we build this new political Europe or we design ourselves to making our continent a vast free-trade area, governed by the rules of competition.'
	<i>Financial Times</i> 3/1/06	President Chirac: '(We) must meet the challenge of globalisation by changing the way it raised funds for social welfare, including unemployment benefits, family assistance, pensions and healthcare .... (We must) make globalisation an asset for our growth and our jobs.'
Germany	<i>Financial Times</i> 5/8/05	Chancellor Schroder: 'Globalisation and population aging mean there is no alternative to (our proposed) welfare and labour market reforms.' (Agenda 2010: cuts in health and education spending. Also long term income support reduced and benefits withdrawn on refusing a job offer anywhere in Germany)
	<i>Financial Times</i> 28/10/05	Chancellor Schroder: 'We are confronted with a fundamental conflict. Should we elevate the market and never-ending liberalisation at the heart of our political action, or do we Europeans stick to our basic beliefs? ... The Anglo-Saxon economic model should not become the pattern for Europe.'
Ireland	<i>Irish Times</i> 5/11/98	PM Ahern asks National Economic and Social Council to develop framework for post 2000 national wage agreement in context of globalisation. Public sector pay deal needs to be restructured to reduce pressure on costs.
Italy	<i>Washington Post</i> 12/4/2006	Editorial focusing Berlusconi's defeat: '(He) portrayed himself as a pro-capitalist reformer ... but he did little to deregulate the Italian economy or reform social benefits .... (His) legacy may be the discredit of the very idea of free-market reforms.'
Japan	Dow Jones International News 7/6/02	PM Koizumi: 'Energising corporate activity is a prerequisite for strengthening the competitiveness of the Japanese economy and creating employment in an era of globalisation. It is important to lower effective tax rates and broaden the tax base.'

Table 1.1 continued

Malaysia	Dow Jones News Service 13/12/1997	PM Mahathir: 'Malaysia is paying a heavy price for being caught unawares by increasing globalisation . . . . What is not viable must be killed outright so the survivors can be free to consolidate their positions. People unnecessarily employed should be retired. As a doctor who once practiced surgery, I appreciate the need to amputate gangrenous legs to save the rest of the body.'
Singapore	Reuters News 13/2/2000	PM Goh: 'The world needs a new global order to increase the benefits of free trade and limit disadvantages . . . . The reality of globalisation is unstoppable . . . . What we urgently need is a new framework to sustain a global consensus on open markets and moderate its worst excesses.'
	<i>South China Morning Post</i> 20/8/2001	PM Goh: In National Day address outlined a five-point plan for a 'New Singapore' with less government involvement, the fostering of globally competitive businesses and a more entrepreneurial populace.
	<i>Bernama Daily Malaysian News</i> 19/9/01	Minister Mentor Lee: 'Globalisation would continue to be driven by technological advances . . . . Europe and Japan would lose out in the globalised market if they did not adapt the American corporate model which was the most productive and competitive.'
	<i>Business Times</i> 21/1/06	Senior Minister Goh: 'Globalisation is a positive sum game, not a zero sum venture as many believe . . . . If its full benefits are to be realised (countries) need to push on with reforms and liberalisation and acquire a globalised mindset.'
South Korea	Joins.com 21/12/2005	President Roh: 'Although we all understand that globalization is driving some people to the edge, we cannot protest against the inevitable . . . . While there may be reasons to oppose globalization, the process itself, whether right or wrong, was the flow of times . . . . (Instead of protesting), we should instead make efforts to come up with measures to take care of those adversely affected by globalisation.'
Spain	Europe Information 30/7/05	PM Zapatero: '(My government is committed to) strengthen the unity of Europe . . . . Our society has to be economically dynamic, innovative, in order to be able to compete in a globalised world.'

continued

Table 1.1 continued

Sweden	Reuters News 14/6/2001 <i>OECD Observer</i> 1/7/2005	PM Persson: 'The EU is one of the few institutions we can develop as a balance to US world domination.' PM Persson: 'Globalisation is both inevitable and desirable. Our task is to make it inclusive and sustainable, seizing the opportunities of open markets, while addressing the needs of those who risk being left behind.'
U.K.	<i>Daily Telegraph</i> 23/3/04  <i>The Herald</i> 23/6/2005  <i>Sunday Telegraph</i> 11/9/2005  <i>Financial Times</i> 29/9/05  <i>Independent</i> 27/10/05	PM Blair: 'The pace of change caused by globalisation is creating a deep and abiding insecurity ... But it is time to take on and defeat the resurgent voices of protectionism ... Globalisation brings great possibilities to people — new consumer goods, travel, tastes.' Chancellor Brown: 'In the last 8 years here in Britain, we have had to make and continue to make hard, long-term choices to achieve stability, growth and flexibility. Now to be globally competitive the EU must make these long-term choices too.' PM Blair: 'The emergence of China and India presents huge opportunities for Britain. But given their paid wages less than a tenth of those in Britain ... there will be great pressure on western economies to change. We need to reconfigure our businesses, which means difficult short-term dislocation. But the fact is, globalisation is a reality.' PM Blair's speech to Labour conference: Globalisation requires 'An open, liberal economy prepared constantly to change to remain competitive'. Those calling for ... debate of the pros and cons of globalisation might just as well call for discussion about whether autumn should follow summer ... Welfare systems and education and health services must be modernised and adapted.' PM Blair calls for liberalisation of EU services market.

This limited survey nevertheless illustrates the extent to which the ideas of globalisation have figured in the rhetoric of national leaders. Its importance and its ubiquity in political rhetoric is clear. Its presentation in this rhetoric is uniformly as an imperative force that requires domestic change and adaptation in response. But should this count as testament to the continued significance of states as sites for the formation of mass opinion? Further, how has this rhetoric influenced attitudes to the state? We return to this issue in the last chapter.

### **Mapping citizen attitudes**

This study explores the extent to which globalisation has figured in citizen attitudes to politics and the state. To do this, the survey mapped not only respondent's exposure to, and evaluations of, globalisation, but also their views on a number of dimensions of political culture. Political culture is a complex phenomenon. For example, Fuchs (2005) has decomposed the primary concept into three attitudinal constructs that are hierarchically related, namely: commitment to democratic values, support of the democratic regime of the country and support of the political authorities. This conception, which incorporates a wide range of variables, including measures of the incidence and depth of social capital, expands the political culture concept to include not just the persistence of regimes but also the quality and functioning of contemporary democracies. Political culture thus conceptualised is also appropriate for assessing the association between experiences of globalisation and attitudes to politics. The variables selected for attention in this study were identity, ideology, confidence, pride and participation. These expressive and evaluative variables are generally accepted to be critical in measuring attachment to the state as a 'community of sentiment'. They are the dispositional orientations that underlie more immediate political responses. Because of the focus on globalisation, the survey also probed citizen attitudes that were more directly cognitive in nature and that covered attachment to the state as a governmental apparatus. These covered such factors as policy preferences, concerns, perceptions of the causes issues, responsibility for responding to issues, and state impacts and performance.

### **The structure of this study**

This study is divided into three parts. The first part, Encountering and assessing globalisation, sets the stage for later analysis by exploring the meanings and scope of globalisation, some of its primary impacts on the countries covered in this survey, and citizen exposure to, and awareness of, this phenomenon. The second part, Encountering and responding to globalisation, explores the impacts of globalisation on a variety of dimensions of political culture: identity, ideology, policy preoccupations, confidence and participation. The final part explores the impacts of policy preferences on attitudes to globalisation.

Part I consists of four chapters. The following chapter analyses some of the main ways in which the states covered in this study are enmeshed in the various

forms of globalisation: broad variations between the two regions as well as within each region are noted. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 map the reactions of respondents. Chapter 3 is devoted to the ways in which these respondents are exposed to the process of globalisation. These range from purely passive forms, for instance watching television, through semi-active forms, for instance having parents and friends abroad, to truly active forms, for instance as a result of the work in which they are engaged. Variations among countries are noted. Chapter 4 is concerned with attitudes to the various aspects of globalisation, in general, between the two regions and across countries. The findings of that chapter are related to those of Chapter 3 in order to assess the extent to which exposure to globalisation appears to be related to evaluations of its impacts. Chapter 5 turns to citizen awareness and assessment of the organisations and institutions which are primarily associated with globalisation, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and multi-national companies.

Part II, Encountering and responding to globalisation, is devoted to the analysis of relationships between the findings on globalisation and a number of key dimensions of national political cultures, but the direction of the influence is not being assumed. In all cases, an attempt is made to examine the relationship with both the exposure and the evaluations of respondents that have been derived from Part I and to do so in the context of a battery of socio-demographic characteristics. Chapter 6 analyses attachments to national and supra-national identities amongst respondents to the survey and their assessments of the treatment of their country in trans-national contexts. The chapter also explores the extent to which there is an association between the strength and character of exposure to, and evaluations of, globalisation, and feelings of, national identity.

Chapter 7 asks whether there is an ideological dimension to globalisation. It assesses the extent to which the left–right scale, familiar in Western politics, is recognised by Asian respondents. It also explores the extent to which substantive values that cluster into distinct ideological orientations amongst Western respondents are also evident amongst Asian respondents.

Chapter 8 looks at respondents' views about policy and governmental effectiveness. Three aspects are covered. The first group of responses cover policy preoccupations and the evaluation of the government approach to these preoccupations. The second section looks at their attributions of responsibility for handling selected issues. The third section looks at the policy preferences of respondents. The impacts of exposure to, and evaluations of, globalisation on all these variables are also assessed. Chapter 9 explores the patterns of participation amongst citizens of the eighteen countries and the extent to which political participation in its various forms is related to exposure to, and evaluations of, globalisation.

The different aspects examined in Parts I and II are brought together in the concluding part, Part III. The penultimate chapter, Chapter 10, explores the extent to which policy attitudes influence attitudes to globalisation. The concluding chapter, Chapter 11, offers an overall assessment of the impact which

globalisation appears to have on the attitudes of citizens towards politics and the state and discusses the broader implications of the findings. Finally, Appendices describe 1, 2 and 3 the questionnaire and the methodology used to analyse the data from the survey.

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**Part I**

**Encountering and assessing  
globalisation**



## 2 The 'objective' impact of globalisation and its socio-political context

*Ian Marsh*

The previous chapter examined the various perspectives from which the concept of globalisation has been described in the specialist literature. This chapter aims at presenting a picture of the way in which globalisation has taken place 'objectively' in the countries covered by this study as well as of some of the most important social and political contextual differences which can be found within these nations.

Without presuming at any point that there is necessarily a causal relationship between the spread of globalisation and the specific socio-political characteristics of the countries concerned, on the one hand, and the way citizens encounter and assess this spread, on the other, one must at least have an impression of what this spread has been and of what these socio-political characteristics are: at a minimum, it is surely valuable to record whether that spread has been even or uneven between the regions and within the two regions and how large are the variations in many aspects of economic well-being and in key aspects of political and social life: the variations in these key aspects are indeed very large. Britain was the first nation to industrialise and China is the most recent. Britain is the oldest democracy, Taiwan and Korea are among the newest. European GDP per capita in 2002 (at PPP) was around \$US 25,000, Indonesia's was around US\$ 3,000 and China's US\$ 3,400 (*The Economist*, 19 April 2003, A Survey of South Korea, p. 6). Overall, these eighteen countries constitute together about 40 per cent of the world's population, but with the nine Asian states having jointly around 1.7 billion people and the European nine some 300 million only.

This chapter is divided into four parts. First, it looks at how globalisation appears to have affected the countries studied here, essentially in the economic field. A second section looks at differences in access to media and communications infrastructures and at their significance as shapers of opinion. In the third section, variations in individual experiences are explored covering such areas as income and education levels, tourism, studying abroad, encounters with immigrants and refugees. Finally, the considerable variation in the distributional and/or developmental roles adopted by states in the two regions are discussed: in particular, the ways in which political elites attempt to affect how citizens encounter globalisation and to influence citizen attitudes towards this development. These

varied differences constitute the decor, so to speak, in front of which globalisation is being perceived and reacted to by the citizens.

## **Economic links**

### ***International trade***

The states covered by this study are among those most engaged in external economic and other relationships in the world – whether through intra-regional linkage as in the case of those from Europe, or inter-regional linkage as in the case of those from Asia. Of the twenty countries with the largest world export market shares, fourteen are included in this survey. These are: Germany (8 per cent world export share), Japan (8 per cent), China (6 per cent), France (5 per cent), UK (5 per cent), Italy (4.5 per cent), Taiwan (3 per cent), Korea (3 per cent), Spain (2 per cent), Malaysia (2 per cent), Singapore (1.5 per cent), Sweden (1.5 per cent), Ireland (1.3 per cent) and Thailand (1.2 per cent) (*World Investment Report*, UN 2003, p. 15). In terms of engagement in trade, these states are among the most globalised.

The globalisation of the world economy has proceeded rapidly since the early 1990s. According to the World Bank, world trade as a share of world GDP increased from 22.5 to 27.4 per cent between 1989 and 1999 and the total value of world trade even grew by 12.5 per cent in 2000 over the 1999 level. In such a context, the contrast between the two regions is marked: while exports from Asia to the rest of the world in the same period grew by nearly 20 per cent, exports from Europe grew by only around 3 per cent. As Table 2.1 shows, trade has been the motor of economic development in the Asian states: this can be seen by considering the ratio of trade to GDP, which is high everywhere, except in Japan, because of the scale of the Japanese domestic economy and the lower levels of economic integration of the country in the Asian region. While that ratio is only 20 per cent in Japan, it is 71 per cent in Korea, which is one of the most developed economies of the region after Japan. China has a relatively low trade to GDP ratio of 39 per cent. Thailand (102 per cent), Malaysia (205 per cent) and the Philippines (104 per cent) all have trade to GDP ratios in excess of 100 per cent, pointing to the extent to which manufacturing operations in these states are based on assembly of imported components. Finally, Indonesia (68 per cent) also exhibits high levels of international engagement.

In Europe, only Ireland (160 per cent) exhibits a ratio of trade to GDP which is comparable with that of Southeast Asia. The remaining European states split into three rough bands. Greece (51 per cent), France (50 per cent) and Italy (50 per cent) constitute a first group: the domestic economies of these states remain relatively as significant as international trade to their overall prosperity. Spain (53 per cent), Germany (57 per cent) and the United Kingdom (57 per cent) constitute an intermediate group where trade is a very important component of GDP. Sweden (78 per cent) and Portugal (70 per cent) form the top category

Table 2.1 Average trade to GDP ratio

Countries	Trade to GDP ratio (%)	
	1996–2000	2001–2004
Asia		
Thailand	102	127
Singapore	–	–
Japan	20	21 <sup>a</sup>
Malaysia	205	213
Indonesia	68	59
Philippines	104	101
China	39	53
Taiwan	–	–
Korea, Republic	71	75
Europe		
Sweden	78	83
Ireland	160	162
Greece	51	51
Spain	53	57
United Kingdom	57	55
Portugal	70	69
France	50	52
Germany	57	68
Italy	50	53

Source: *World Development Indicators 2006* (World Bank).

Note

a Average of trade to GDP ratio from 2001 to 2003.

with high dependence on international and/or regional engagement for the extent of their economic activity.

At the level of regions and while states in both the EU and East and Southeast Asia have been notable participants in this expansion of trade, intra-European trade has grown much more rapidly than inter-regional trade. This is indicated in Table 2.2, which records the share of intra- and inter-regional trade flows in merchandise exports in 1999. The extent to which the export activity of the European states is intra-regional is immediately clear, with 69 per cent of total exports being absorbed by other European states. It is unclear to what extent this involves intermediate goods whose final destination is supra-regional or rather finished products that are consumed in the importing state. There is nonetheless a striking 22 per cent difference between this proportion and that of the Asian states (47 per cent). The Asian region, by contrast with Europe, has a much higher engagement with the North American market (26 per cent) and with the rest of the world (9 per cent). In general, Asia's economies used to depend to a far greater degree on inter-regional trade than European economies whose external orientation is largely intra-regional. However, since the mid-2000s the scale of Asia's intra-regional trade has surpassed that of its inter-regional trade.

Table 2.2 Intra-regional and inter-regional merchandise trade 1999

<i>Origin</i>	<i>Destination</i>				
	<i>North America</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Rest of World</i>	<i>Total</i>
North America	39.9	19.4	21.1	20.6	100.0
Western Europe	9.9	69.1	7.5	13.5	100.0
Asia	26.3	18.1	46.6	9.0	100.0

Source: *World Trade Organization Annual Report 2000* (Table III.3).

### ***Financial linkage***

Table 2.3 gives an indication of the extent to which the countries of the study are involved in international financial developments. A composite index is constructed on the basis of indices related to restrictions on foreign direct investment, freedom of capital movements, exchange controls and the scope and effectiveness of the legal structures underwriting international involvement. Despite substantial variations, these states are all more or less deeply involved in economic integration. Private capital also has a growing role in international capital markets: gross private capital flows as a share of GDP rose from 8.5 to 18.3 between 1989 and 1999, while foreign direct investment increased from 2 to 4.6 per cent as a share of GDP.

Financial market openness is a more recent phenomenon than trade openness. Its viability, in the absence of more elaborated regulatory arrangements, has been questioned (Stiglitz, 2002; Soros, 1998). It involves liberalised capital markets, floating exchange rate regimes and the development of matching regulatory and prudential arrangements. This type of international financial involvement spread gradually after the floating of the dollar by the United States in 1976. Liberalised foreign currency markets were adopted among the OECD economies from the late 1970s, but they did not spread to Asian states until after the financial crisis of 1997, as most Asian states previously used capital controls to enhance their development strategies and/or to buttress the government (Wade, 1990; Lingle, 1998). Following the financial crisis, US-led attempts to liberalise particular markets have extended (Cumings, 1999, for South Korea). Singapore is the most open of the Asian states. Three countries – Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan – display intermediate levels of openness and the remaining states for which data are available – South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand – retain some controls. Meanwhile, in Europe, Germany and Britain had the highest levels of openness, followed by Sweden, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, France and Italy. Greece was exceptional in Europe in having a level of openness equal to that of South Korea. The differences between Europe and Asia in this respect generally reflect differences in levels of economic development between the two regions.

In sum, and save for Japan, the eighteen states covered in this survey are the most integrated in inter-regional and/or intra-regional economic activity in the world. These developments have been variously caused by such factors as

Table 2.3 Indicators of global financial engagement

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Openness (as of 1988)</i>
<i>Asia</i>	
Thailand	5.5
Singapore	13.5
Japan	10.5
South Korea	8.0
Malaysia	11.0
Indonesia	10.0
Philippines	4.5
China	8.0
Taiwan	–
<i>Europe</i>	
Sweden	11.0
Ireland	10.5
Greece	8.0
Spain	12.0
United Kingdom	14.0
Portugal	9.5
France	11.0
Germany	14.0
Italy	11.5

Source: Dennis Quinn Index of Financial Openness.

Note

Thank you to Professor Dennis Quinn who kindly supplied these data.

the development of the EU, the internationalisation of production and the progressive liberalisation of trade and finance by individual states. National indices indicate the broad levels of openness or linkage that characterise particular states. By 2000, when a survey whose results are reported later was undertaken, economic integration (covering both trade and finance) had extended to embrace all of the countries included in this study.

### ***Foreign direct investment and multi-national corporations***

Multi-national corporations affect individuals as workers, consumers and citizens. Individuals may be employed directly by these organisations or engaged in firms with a supplier relationship to a multi-national. As consumers, individuals might become aware of these bodies through purchasing their products and recognising their brands. As citizens, they might come to their attention through media reports and the activities of NGOs, for instance the anti-globalisation movement or environmental bodies, but, while NGOs have been particularly active in some of their campaigns in Europe, their presence in Asia is much more muted (Tarrow, 2000).

Multi-nationals are key drivers of economic globalisation. Their growth is thus an important indicator. According to the World Investment Report (UNCTAD,



2003), there were 65,000 multi-nationals in 2001 with 850 000 foreign affiliates across the globe:

In 2001 foreign affiliates accounted for about 54 million employees, compared to 24 million in 1990; their sales of almost US\$19 trillion were more than twice as high as world exports in 2001, compared to 1990 when both were roughly equal; and the stock of outward FDI increased from US\$1.7 trillion to US\$6.6 trillion over the same period.

The importance of multi-nationals to their host economies is evident. The shares of foreign affiliates are also large in a number of countries, though not in all. They are especially large in Ireland (90 per cent, but in manufacturing only), in China and Malaysia (respectively 50 and 45 per cent) and in Sweden (39 per cent) (*World Investment Report*, 2003, pp. 15, 17). Multi-nationals are thus increasingly significant as independent co-ordinators of economic relationships: states and their dynamic advantages still influence corporate location decisions, but the internal production economics of particular multi-nationals increasingly influence patterns of trade as company production systems become more international (Dunning, 1997).

The growth of multi-nationals is due to a variety of factors, but not least to decisions of states. Policy liberalisation has been a particularly significant element as countries strive to attract foreign direct investment. *The World Investment Report* estimates that in 2001 there were 208 changes in the laws of 71 countries, which aimed at liberalising foreign investment. New bilateral investment and double tax treaties were also concluded. Technological change also accounts for the expansion of multi-nationals: as the cost and speed of information and communications reduces, the ability of companies to organise and co-ordinate economic relationships over larger geographic spaces and involving more complex activities has multiplied. Meantime, the same report states that.

value chains are becoming more fragmented as business functions are differentiated into ever more specialised activities. In many industries, transnational corporations have recently tended to focus more on the knowledge intensive, less tangible, functions of the value chain such as product definition, R and D, managerial services, and marketing and brand management. In consequence contract manufacturers have grown rapidly.

(p. 13)

In general, these developments reflect change in the dominant business model. According to Mark Singer (a Principal in the management consultant McKinsey's Silicon Valley Office):

In the industrial age companies were built on the principle, 'Do more and do it cheaper'. The means were vast scale and scope as well as rapid internal control. In the information age the watchwords are 'fewer, faster, less' – fewer assets, faster growth, and less activity managed under one roof. These are the

features of the networked organisation, a business model that may forever change the way companies compete.... Brought into existence by declining transaction costs, tightly linked supply chains, and Internet-based ordering platforms, these companies have devised a mode of interaction among themselves, their business partners and their customers that promotes ... collective learning in the organisation, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and to integrate multiple streams of technologies'.

Both the Asian and European regions are large recipients of foreign direct investment. The share of the Asia-Pacific states in total flows increased from 9 per cent in 2000 to 14 per cent in 2002. The *World Investment Report* calculates a Foreign Direct Investment Performance Index which compares the ratio of a country's share of global foreign direct investment with its share of global GDP. On this basis countries of the EU recorded the highest scores (average 1.7) and Japan the lowest (0.1). Eleven of the countries covered in this survey recorded scores above 1 and seven scores below 1. The states in this latter category were Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and the Philippines. Japan, Korea and Taiwan have all sought to restrict foreign investment in the interests of developing their own multi-nationals, although economic reversals led to a decrease of restrictions in all three countries, if to a different extent.

Twenty-five of the top 100 multi-nationals are based in the United States, while the eighteen countries studied here were the home base for fifty-eight others. There were sixteen of these in Japan, fourteen in the UK (including three with joint ownership), eleven in France, ten in Germany, three in Sweden, two in Italy, and one each in Korea, Malaysia and China. In total, the EU is host to forty-nine of the top 100 MNCs and East and Southeast Asia to nineteen. Meanwhile, East and Southeast Asia accounts for thirty three of the fifty largest companies from developing countries and for 74 per cent of their total foreign assets. The home country for fourteen of these companies was China, for six Singapore, for five Korea and Malaysia, for two Taiwan and for one the Philippines. Four Korean *chaebol* that had previously figured on the list were excluded in 2001 because of the restructuring then in progress. One of these firms, Daewoo, went bankrupt and was eventually taken over by General Motors. The other three, Sunkyong International, Hyundai and Samsung, remain large corporate entities.

In Asia, governments have generally championed economic globalisation and multi-nationals have been important agents for its realisation. Apart from Japan, Taiwan and Korea, the Asian states have relied heavily on foreign direct investment, which their governments have actively sought to attract. Following the financial crisis, foreign investment was allowed to expand in Korea. Taiwan also embarked on a large programme of privatisation (Weiss, 2003).

Although, as we noted, the anti-globalisation movement is weak in the Asian states, citizen awareness of MNCs and their influence has no doubt been fostered by such activities as NGO campaigns, international economic crises, and the expansion of manufacturing and services employment as a result of their investments. Moreover, advertising probably plays a part, as brands have become

'global' and prosaic consumer goods are transformed into 'lifestyle products' through a distinctive imagery promoting their products, as is the case with Coca Cola, Disney, Nike, Levis, CNN, Calvin Klein, Toyota and others (e.g. Survey of Global Brands, *The Economist*, 6 September 2001). Food chains have a place in this process. The most prominent fast-food brands are associated with American corporations, but a study of the impact of McDonalds' on local communities in a number of East Asian states concluded that influence flowed both ways and that McDonalds' adaptation to local communities was perhaps even more significant than its impact as a purveyor of American cultural norms (Watson, 1997).

## Communications and media

Table 2.4 documents the access to communications media in terms of television, telephone mainlines, Internet and mobile phones. Japan had the highest overall incidence of television penetration with about 72 per cent of the population owning a television set; penetration in Asia falls rapidly thereafter with Korea and Singapore recording television ownership levels above 30 per cent, China and Thailand above 20 per cent, and the last three (Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) above 10 per cent of their respective populations. Communal viewing will further spread access. The comparable incidence in Europe was: above 60 per cent

Table 2.4 Communication infrastructure for 2000

<i>Countries</i>	<i>(% of population)</i>				
	<i>Television sets</i>	<i>Telephone mainlines</i>	<i>Personal computers</i>	<i>Internet users</i>	<i>Mobile phones</i>
<i>Asia</i>					
Thailand	28	9	2	4	5
Singapore	30	48	48	32	68
Japan	72	59	31	30	53
Malaysia	17	20	10	22	21
Indonesia	15	3	1	9	2
Philippines	14	4	2	20	8
China	29	11	1	18	7
Korea, Republic	36	46	24	40	57
<i>Europe</i>					
Sweden	57	68	51	46	72
Ireland	40	42	36	18	66
Greece	49	53	7	9	56
Spain	59	42	14	14	61
United Kingdom	65	59	34	26	73
Portugal	63	43	30	16	66
France	63	58	40	14	49
Germany	59	61	34	30	59
Italy	49	47	18	23	74

Source: *World Development Indicators 2002* (World Bank).

in France, Britain and Portugal; above 50 per cent in Germany, Sweden and Spain; and above or around 40 per cent in Greece, Italy and Ireland. In the nine European countries covered in this survey viewers spent between 18 and 24 hours a week looking at television (*The Economist*, 28 September 2002, p. 104); there are no comparable figures for East and Southeast Asian countries.

Satellite and cable TV offer a particularly extensive international programming. The multi-channelling associated with satellite or cable TV invariably introduces services from other countries or specifically international services (CNN, BBC World): thus German cable TV offers access to around 400 channels. Cable has high penetration rates in China (90 million accounts), Korea and Taiwan. Satellite TV is also relatively freely available in China with dishes costing only approximately US\$60.

Other indicators of access to communications infrastructure show marked differences both between Europe and Asia and within each region. Thus Japan, UK, Sweden, Germany and France all had proportions of telephone mainlines equivalent to around 60 per cent or more of their populations. And, the penetration of mobile telephones in these nations is around or above 50 per cent. At the other extreme, in Indonesia, the Philippines, China and Thailand there were about 10 per cent of fixed telephone users, about 4 per cent of Internet users and about 8 per cent of mobile telephone users. Broadband connection also varied widely between the countries; 70 per cent of households were connected to broadband in South Korea, about 11 per cent in Japan and Sweden, 8 per cent in Germany, 6 per cent in Portugal and 4 per cent in Spain (*The Economist*, 19 April 2003, Supplement, p. 7).

Unlike the traditional international media, e-mail and the Internet provide relatively more active links: they create means of building virtual relationships with people from other countries, but they are also media where fluency in English can be an important limitation on access. Some states (Singapore, China) have attempted to censor Internet use by their residents although controls are apparently relatively easy to avoid (Rodan, 2003). National government strategies may also influence outcomes. For example, Korea and Singapore have deliberately sought to build the Internet literacy of their populations.

International news magazines also provide access to international perspectives and views. Periodicals such as *The Economist*, *Time*, the *Nikkei Weekly*, the *Far East Economic Review*, to cite only English language publications, are relatively widely read outside their home markets: the market research firm TNS has thus estimated the number of readers of *Time's International Edition* at around thirty million; *The Economist* has a worldwide circulation of around 838,000, of which 92,000 are in Asia and 178,000 in Continental Europe.

As noted in the last chapter, the large media companies are an important aspect of 'globalisation'. Their programming is widely disseminated through local outlets. On access to foreign-sourced entertainment in Thailand, Chaiwat and Stern (2005) comment:

Even for households without access to cable television or a satellite dish, Thai television stations regularly show American and Chinese films,

Chinese serials and American and Japanese cartoons. All these programmes are dubbed in Thai ... Foreign films are standard fare at Thai cinemas ... Thais have ready access to foreign entertainment media, an access driven by the popularity of these forms of entertainment, the powerful marketing tools used by large international media companies, and the openness of the Thai economy.

Such a pattern is likely to be repeated in many countries.

The impact of these experiences is much harder to assess. For example, Tomlinson (1999) has carefully surveyed both the power and limitations of this medium. While images transcend the limitations of time and space, Tomlinson asks if individuals will invest the necessary moral or emotional effort to refine or develop their judgements. Susan Sontag also questions the impact of television: 'An image is drained of its force by the way it is used, where and how often it is seen. Images shown on television are by definition images of which, sooner or later, one tires' (2003, pp. 94, 95).

The role of electronic media in the networking associated with international NGO activity, such as the anti-globalisation movement, has been widely noted (Levi and Olson, 2002). Norris (2002, pp. 207–211) illustrates the potential of the Internet in her account of the protest movement against the WTO at Seattle:

[The protests] brought together an alliance between labour and environmental activists – the so-called turtle-teamster partnership – along with a network of consumer advocates, anti-capitalists, and grass roots movements that set off a media feeding frenzy. Groups integrated the Internet into their strategies. For example, the International Civil Society website provided hourly updates about the major demonstrations in Seattle to a network of almost 700 NGOs in some 80 countries.

### **Variations in individual resources, capabilities and experiences**

Whatever similarities there may be in the process of globalisation in the two regions, the social characteristics of the population and the political system characteristics of the states differ appreciably. They differ somewhat more in the Asian region than, by and large, within the European region and indeed between the two regions.

#### ***Per capita income***

Differences in per capita income are very marked, especially within the Asian region. Table 2.5 indicates variations in average GDP per capita between the various states, on the basis of both aggregate and purchasing power parity, the latter indicator being more satisfactory given that it adjusts income levels to take

Table 2.5 Real GDP per capita and at PPP regionally

Countries	GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$)		GDP per capita, PPP (current 2000 international \$)	
	2000	2004	2000	2004
<b>Asia</b>				
Thailand	1,997	2,356	6,279	7,435
Singapore	22,768	24,164	23,612	25,804
Japan	37,409	38,609	26,220	26,884
Malaysia	3,927	4,290	8,926	9,444
Indonesia	800	906	3,028	3,316
Philippines	1,002	1,085	4,027	4,240
China	949	1,323	3,928	5,419
Taiwan	–	–	–	–
Korea, Rep.	10,884	12,752	16,172	18,840
Average	9,967	10,686	11,524	12,673
Standard deviation	13,435	13,895	9,289	9,721
<b>Europe</b>				
Sweden	27,012	28,858	25,900	27,150
Ireland	24,901	28,546	30,532	35,684
Greece	10,271	11,960	17,392	20,407
Spain	14,338	15,343	21,765	23,019
United Kingdom	24,074	26,363	26,332	28,326
Portugal	10,410	10,333	182,555	18,040
France	22,548	23,432	25,698	26,829
Germany	23,114	23,706	25,481	26,012
Italy	18,630	19,352	24,995	25,899
Average	19,478	20,877	24,039	25,719
Standard deviation	6,365	6,989	4,175	5,052

Source: *World Development Indicators 2006* (World Bank).

into account a comparable basket of goods in accordance with local price levels. Whereas the average annual income amongst the Asian states was about US\$12,000, it was about US\$24,000 in Europe. Moreover, the dispersion was much larger in Asia than in Europe: whereas Portugal, at US\$18,255, and Greece, at US\$17,392 had the lowest levels of annual per capita income adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) in Europe, in five of the Asian states the annual per capita income adjusted for PPP was under US\$9,000: these states are Malaysia, at about US\$8,900, Thailand at about US\$ 6,300, and Indonesia, the Philippines and China at between US\$3,000 and 4,000. At the other end of the scale, six European states had an annual per capita income adjusted for PPP of between US\$25,000 and 31,000, Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Sweden. The only Asian state in the same category was Japan. Meanwhile, however, income distribution data suggest the Asian states had achieved high levels of income equality: the Gini coefficient for East and Southeast Asia is around 0.3 compared with 0.5 or more for Latin America, South Asia or Africa.

**Education**

Education participation rates vary widely between the countries in this survey. As can be seen from Table 2.6, the range was, in 1999, among the Asian countries between 70 per cent of the relevant age cohort being in higher education in South Korea and 20 per cent in Thailand. The growth in the number of students studying abroad has been remarkable. As was noted in the last chapter, 540,000 Europeans studied in other countries in 2001. Of these France, Germany, Italy and, somewhat surprisingly in view of its population size, Greece contributed each between 42,000 (Italy) and 55,000 (Germany) or around 42 per cent of the total. Spain (26,000) and the UK (25,000) constituted an intermediate group. Ireland (15,000), Portugal (11,000) and Sweden (15,000) formed a third group.

The number of Asian students studying abroad was somewhat larger (694,000) (but a much smaller proportion of the total population of the nine countries examined here). Japan (55,000), Korea (71,000) and, not surprisingly, given its vast population, China (154,000) provided the greatest absolute numbers. Malaysia (33,000), Indonesia (32,000), Thailand (19,000) and Singapore (20,000) – in this last case, a very large proportion, given the small population size of the country – constituted an intermediate group. The Philippines had the smallest number (5,000), the data on Taiwan not being collected by the OECD.

*Table 2.6* Participation in tertiary education in 1999

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Participation in tertiary education (% of relevant age group)</i>
Asia	
Thailand	22
Singapore	39
Japan	41
South Korea	68
Malaysia	12
Indonesia	11
Philippines	29
China	6
Taiwan	–
Europe	
Sweden	50
Ireland	41
Greece	47
Spain	51
United Kingdom	52
Portugal	39
France	51
Germany	47
Italy	47

Source: *World Development Indicators 2001* (World Bank).

## Unemployment

Various studies suggest that unemployment and immigration can influence attitudes to economic globalisation (Swank and Betz, 2002; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Table 2.7 records average levels of unemployment for the states covered in this survey in the four years to 2000. In Asia, the highest unemployment rate, of about 8 per cent, was in the Philippines. In Korea, the unemployment rate was 4.5 per cent, and, as a consequence of the financial crisis, job tenure had become particularly precarious. According to *The Economist* (A Survey of Korea, 19 April, 2003, p. 7):

The Korea Labour Institute ... estimates that 26 per cent of Korean employees are *bichongkyu*, or 'atypical' workers using the OECD's definition of part-time and temporary jobs. That figure is similar to the average for rich countries. But it does not include the unusually high number of employees who work full-time on contracts that are continually rolled over but offer little job security and few fringe benefits. Counting these workers, the KLI reckons fewer than half of Korean employees have full-time jobs

Table 2.7 Average unemployment (1996–2000) and immigration rates (2000)

Countries	Unemployment rate (%)	Migration rate (% of population)
Asia		
Thailand	2.1	0.6
Singapore	3.3	33.6
Japan	3.9	1.3
Malaysia	2.9	6.3
Indonesia	6.0 <sup>a</sup>	0.2
Philippines	8.5	0.2
China	3.0	0.0
Taiwan	—	—
Korea, Republic	4.5	1.3
Europe		
Sweden	8.8	11.2
Ireland	9.0	8.1
Greece	10.5	5.0
Spain	19.2	3.2
United Kingdom	6.8	6.8
Portugal	5.9	2.3
France	12.0	10.6
Germany	9.1	9.0
Italy	11.6	2.8

Source: Unemployment rates are obtained from *World Development Indicators 2002* (World Bank). Immigration rates are from the *International Migration Report 2002* (United Nations Department of Economic and social Affairs).

Note

a Data only available for 1999 and 2000.



they can depend on.... As a result of the financial crisis, 100,000 workers lost their jobs in the banking sector alone.

Japan, Singapore and China had average unemployment rates of between 3 and 4 per cent. Three of the remaining states – Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore – experienced unemployment rates of only about 2 to 3 per cent. The financial crisis had a particular impact on Indonesia, but because of the relatively large proportion of the population still engaged in agriculture, the Indonesian rate (about 6 per cent) does not reflect the scale of the problem. In Europe, unemployment was generally higher. Spain had the highest unemployment rate at over 19 per cent. Three countries, Italy, France and Greece, have had rates in excess of 11 per cent. Three countries, Germany, Ireland and Spain, had average rates around 9 per cent and two, Britain and Portugal, had average rates around 6 per cent.

### ***Trade unions***

Labour movements are active in Europe, although they have declined generally since the Second World War and in particular since the 1980s. In Asia, labour movements are active in Korea, divided between an independent and government-sponsored organisation in Malaysia, weak in Thailand, where they cover about 3 per cent of the workforce, and Indonesia. They are an arm of the state in Singapore (Rodan, 1993).

### ***Immigration***

The extent of immigration varies from state to state in both regions, though, overall, immigration has been appreciably larger in Europe than in Asia (Table 2.7), the data relating to illegal immigrants being rather unreliable: thus, on some estimates, the Muslim population of France was about 9 per cent in 2001, but official data suggest a lower proportion (*The Economist*, 2 November 2002). Except in Malaysia and Singapore, immigration is low in the Asian region, with Malaysia having the highest proportion of foreign workers and its legal and illegal immigrant population having been estimated at 8 per cent (*The Economist*, op. cit.). Some estimates suggest foreign workers make up over half the growth of the less skilled workforce of Malaysia, a third of that of Thailand and 15 per cent of that of Japan, Korea or Taiwan (*The Economist*, op. cit.). Meanwhile, the Philippines has been a major source of temporary emigrants, particularly towards Europe, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. Approximately 7.4 million citizens or 9 per cent of the Filipino population live or work abroad. Their home remittances amounted to US\$7.6 billion in 2002 or about 16 per cent of current account receipts and 10 per cent of the GDP (*South China Morning Post*, 17 February 2004, p. A8). Patterns of settlement in Asia are to an extent traditional. The Chinese diaspora in Asia represents one loose network that has created trans-national networks based on family and community connections (East Asia Analytical Unit, 2003; Katzenstein, 2000). The spread of Japanese and

later Taiwanese and Korean investment to other regional states also extended the numbers living in other countries for long periods on account of their work (Abbeglen, 1994; Weiss, 2003).

The size of the immigrant share in the total population is much larger in Europe, with differences which are large, but diminishing, among the nine countries analysed here. Sweden, France, Ireland and Germany have the highest proportion of immigrants at about 8 per cent. At the other end of the scale Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain were previously countries of emigration and still have few immigrants, though the numbers are rising. The proximity of Spain and Italy to the North African coast and of Italy and Greece to the Balkans exposes these countries to illegal flows. Immigration grew in the 1990s, in particular from Eastern Europe, doubtless stimulated by the lure of economic prosperity and by the fear of civil war. Immigration is even becoming the main basis for population growth in Europe: the Greek census of 2001 thus found that, of the 1 million rise in population in the previous decade to 11 million, only 40,000 was due to natural causes. As is well known and not surprisingly, immigration has become a serious political issue in Europe, with a variety of parties campaigning for severe restrictions.

Immigration at the beginning of the twenty-first century was thus at a substantial level and growing in the countries examined here, but, despite ageing populations, the value of population growth by means of immigration tends to be contested in rich countries. This is in part because immigrants now come from a wider range of countries, religious practices are more diverse and customs in relation to food and dress are more varied. Refugee and illegal migrations have also raised particularly difficult issues of human rights.

### **State distributional and developmental strategies**

The states in the two regions differ in their political systems and the leaders of these states have championed differing strategies as the 'right' response to globalisation. Except for Japan, the liberal democratic framework is markedly more consolidated in European than in the East and Southeast Asian states. In three of these, Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia, liberal democratic institutions were introduced only in the 1990s. In a further two, the Philippines and Thailand, they were re-established at roughly the same period. In addition, representative political organisations are much less prevalent and much less embedded in the Asian states. Save for Japan, Taiwan and Malaysia, political parties are leader-based and lack continuity, branch structures or significant memberships and have contributed minimally to political socialisation. There are no significant Green parties in the Asian states. Interest organisations are also much less prevalent in Asia. Save for South Korea and Japan, trade unions are relatively underdeveloped. Lastly, the elite consensus about policy strategies, particularly in relation to industry development, is much stronger amongst the Asian states. If we follow Zaller's (1992) model of the impact of an elite consensus on popular opinion, this could be expected to have implications for broader public views.

European politics has experienced significant change in the last decades of the twentieth century. Social movements have grown since the 1960s and 1970s, while Inglehart (1997) suggested that post-materialist sentiments were emerging among citizens, but, at the same time, neo-liberalism came to prevail as a governing ideology. Parties and party systems, typically very solid, have encountered major difficulties while trade unions were almost everywhere in decline. Overall, however, the institutional environment for opinion formation can be expected to sustain more diverse viewpoints in Europe than in Asia.

The policies followed by the governments of the various states have an impact on globalisation. States can adopt more or less liberal strategies in relation to international engagement and, through welfare programmes, create more or less security for their citizens. Katzenstein's now classic study (1985) documented the contribution of welfare strategies to the liberal economic attitudes of citizens of the smaller European states, a viewpoint which has been corroborated in a number of empirical analyses (Svensson, 2002). By and large, East and Southeast Asian states have adopted rather different policies from the European states. Whereas the former have followed more or less pro-active developmental strategies, European states have been rather pro-active in relation to welfare, employment security and training strategies but, especially since the 1980s, much less so with respect to the economy.

### ***Developmental states in East and Southeast Asia***

As has been pointed out frequently, the Asian states covered in this survey pioneered export-led economic growth and were thus among the first beneficiaries of economic globalisation. Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have been regarded as classic 'developmental' states, with a number of institutions underscoring this approach to economic governance (Woo-Cummings, 1999; Brodsgaard and Young, 2000), although it is not clear how this state leadership role might adapt to the new economic, political and social environment that has emerged during the 1990s (Marsh *et al.*, 2005).

The strategy of state-led development that was broadly in place until the financial crisis of the late 1990s had five basic elements. First, it involved a 'soft' authoritarian political framework. Until the early 1990s, except for Japan, the states of the region had political structures which fitted this model. Second, state-led development entailed a meritocratic central bureaucracy with both the technical skill and the authority required to provide strategic leadership. Third, trade unions were weak or discouraged, while business adopted an increasingly active partnership role. Fourth, economic development was spurred by very high savings rates and closed capital markets (Weiss and Hobson, 1995; Evans, 1995). Fifth, developmental states tended to favour a relatively equal income distribution: Campos and Root (1996) noted the strategies of 'shared growth' which were regarded as having been an essential element of the approach of the Asian states (also Chu, 2001). The 1997 financial crisis did lead to wider income disparities in a number of states and damaged the nascent middle class, but

income gains still remained substantial. The states of Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, followed the same export-led developmental path: their political leadership uniformly promoted participation in global trade as the key to growth.

International financial liberalisation and the emergence of science-based industries both challenge earlier approaches to economic governance (Keller and Samuels, 2003; Kim and Leson, 2000; Doner and Ramsay, 2000, 2003). Moreover, especially in Taiwan and Korea, democratisation has injected new elements into the governance equation: these affect particularly inter-ministry co-ordination and executive-legislative relations. Meanwhile, economic recession has persisted in Japan since the early 1990s: Ronald Dore (2000) documented the dilemmas which economic success and globalisation posed for this hitherto highly integrated state. Only Singapore among what were formerly dubbed the 'Asian Tigers' maintains a governance strategy that approximates the earlier developmental model: this is facilitated by the authoritarian political structure.

The remaining Asian states, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and China, are all particularly dependent on exports for economic growth, but the first four of these states generally adopted this strategy only from the mid-1980s, and have lacked the institutional capacity of the East Asian states (Blondel *et al.*, 1999).

The financial crisis of 1997 had an obvious economic impact: it had a marked political impact as well, in particular in Thailand and in Indonesia. Meanwhile, welfare services are beginning to be set up. Only in Japan has this been the case for a long time, primarily in relation to unemployment; there have been moves to develop income security and unemployment support schemes in Taiwan and Korea as well (Ramesh, 2003). Elsewhere, however, such schemes are small or non-existent, although the role of the state in the provision of health and educational services is more developed (Ramesh, 2000).

Thus, in general, in the Asian states analysed here, while the form of state economic leadership does vary, its presence is pervasive. Elites have generally championed state economic involvement engagement and export-led development. Multi-national corporations have been welcomed: one of the aims of the survey is to examine to what extent these elite attitudes were generally supported in the population.

### ***Various kinds of welfare states in Europe***

Democratic norms of authority and power are new to most Asian states: they are more deeply rooted in Europe, but, in some cases, somewhat recently, as democracy was established in Spain, Greece and Portugal from the mid-1970s only. On the other hand, elite views about the economic and social role of the state are more diverse in Europe than in Asia, being nourished by long-established intellectual currents including social democratic Christian, Marxist, liberal and conservative traditions. Welfare states developed gradually as a result across

Europe. The increase in welfare expenditure in each state over the years is significant, but there are differences in levels of expenditure both among the Northern states (with Sweden, France and Germany in one category and Britain and Ireland in another) and between the Northern and Southern states.

In Northern Europe, there are manifest differences between the states both in terms of patterns of support and in terms of patterns of funding. State services and/or income support can figure more or less prominently in particular state strategies, with income tax or employer/employee contributions being the main source of funds. In 1993, tax revenues provided about 44 per cent of expenditure on welfare in Britain, 27 per cent in Germany and 20 per cent in France. Ireland is a special case in Northern Europe: it resembles the developmental states of East Asia, as the bipartisan governance strategy suggested (O'Hearn, 1998). Ireland's strong economic growth during the 1990s was based on a strategy of attracting inward foreign investment in new industries and on export growth, as data cited earlier on the share of foreign affiliates in local manufacturing output (90 per cent) indicated.

On the continent, distinctions are apparent between Germany, France and Sweden in patterns of both economic governance and social welfare. Germany has been described as a co-ordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001), France as a proto-developmental state (Loriaux, 2003) and Sweden is the classic social democratic state (Esping-Anderson, 1990). Sweden's traditional approach has had at least three elements: a solidaristic wages policy, an active labour market policy and a universal welfare state. Although economic reverse resulted in pressures on all these structures in the 1990s, only the first leg has been significantly affected (Stephens, 2000). According to Palan *et al.* (1996):

The extent of redistribution that takes place (in Sweden) ... is enormous. The welfare state acts not just as a safety net but is centred on the public provision of education and care, for the elderly, for the sick and the handicapped and for the children of working parents. The extent of transfer payments is so great in Sweden that they provide about 45 per cent of personal disposable income, with perhaps 60–70 per cent of Swedes dependent on the public sector for their livelihood.

In contrast with Sweden, the orientation of the German system is 'towards transfer payments rather than public services, and towards redistribution over the life cycle rather than across income groups'. France has the second highest level of spending on public pensions in Europe (12 per cent of GDP) but her other welfare arrangements are mainly occupationally based: employer and worker contributions make up 72 per cent of the welfare budget. For its part, Britain has combined economic liberalism in labour and other markets with sustained support for health and welfare systems (Scharpf, 2000; Pierson, 1994; Castles, 2004).

Data presented by Estevez-Abe *et al.* (2001) indicate the varying levels of employment and unemployment protection in six of the nine European states

covered in this survey (Sweden, Germany, Italy, France, Ireland and the UK) and Japan. On the basis of an overall employment protection index, Sweden attained top rank with a score of 0.94; three other states scored above 0.75 – Germany 0.84, Italy 0.81 and Japan 0.76. France was an intermediate case at 0.61 whilst Britain and Ireland exhibited the least employment protection (0.25 and 0.36, respectively). The rankings were somewhat different in the case of unemployment protection. The UK was again the lowest scoring state (0.11) followed by Italy (0.18). Japan (0.33) and Ireland (0.37) constituted intermediate cases. France (0.54), Sweden (0.63) and Germany (0.77) composed the top band. The arrangements of the European countries are thus diverse.

Swank (2003) finds that support for welfare programmes in established social democratic and conservative welfare states is consolidated through three reinforcing institutional features, the political opportunity structure, patterns of interest representation and the 'mental models' held and propagated by particular elites. The political opportunity structure is based on proportional voting systems which give voice to those who perceive themselves to be disadvantaged by globalisation. These are supported by corporatist approaches to interest integration, which encourage encompassing representation and give interest groups a strong voice in policy development. Production regimes and national political institutions reinforce egalitarian and inclusive values. In sum, 'social corporatism, inclusive electoral institutions and universalism promote cooperation, consensus and welfare state legitimacy' (Swank, p. 18).

These state policies have provided an institutional base for the development of public opinion favouring external involvement (Katzenstein, 1985, 2000; Scharpf, 2000). In strongly redistributive welfare states, support for this strategy is generally higher than in market or liberal states (Svallfors, 1997; Pierson, 1994; Vogel *et al.*, 2003). Yet substantial economic adjustment has had to be introduced and this has had a variable amount of success: welfare arrangements in Sweden, Germany, France and Italy are all judged to require further adaptation to changed international, domestic and technological circumstances (Scharpf, 1997; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Pierson, 2001).

The Southern European states have developed distinctive welfare systems, on the other hand, in part complicated by the existence of marked regional differences between north and south in Italy, and, in Spain, Greece and Portugal, and in part by the fact that these countries developed economically and socially later than in those of Northern Europe (Rhodes, 1997). In 1950 Italy was still primarily an agricultural economy with 44 per cent of the workforce in agriculture and a real GNP per capita 25 per cent of that of the United States; in 2002, it was among the top six economic powers. The strategy for economic development adopted in that country after the Second World War involved redeveloping the established industrial base of the north and favouring land reform and public investment to support unemployment in the south, where the average income is still appreciably lower and unemployment much higher than in the north, despite a post-war migration to the north of over four million people. Italy's welfare system offers considerable employment protection but little support for the

unemployed; on the other hand, public pensions absorb 14 per cent of GDP, the highest in Europe (*The Economist*, 8 February 2003, p. 49), while other welfare benefits are less generous than in the Northern Europe.

Industrialisation in Spain took off in the 1960s only and Spanish democracy was restored in the mid-1970s only. The socialist government which was elected in 1982 and remained in power until 1996 gradually introduced elements of a welfare state; yet, although public investment in education, health and welfare significantly increased, expenditure remains below the levels of Northern Europe. Portugal's path to democracy began in 1974, but full consolidation was achieved only by the mid-1980s, with the election of the first civilian president. As in Spain, a modern welfare state was gradually introduced from the 1970s. Social protection expenditure rose from about 50 per cent of the EU average in 1980 to about 80 per cent in 1997 (Freire *et al.*, 2002, pp. 5–6). Democracy was restored in Greece in 1974. After stagnating in the 1980s, the Greek economy grew rapidly in the 1990s, with an average economic growth of 4 per cent in the late 1990s and tourism contributing about 15 per cent of the GDP. Greece has markedly benefited from EU structural funds. Yet, as in the rest of Southern Europe, unemployment remained high (at about 10 per cent), especially among the young, but also with strong immigration, immigrants being some 5 per cent of the population. Thus, while the role of the state is large in the field of social welfare in particular, in Southern Europe as in Northern Europe, there are wide variations in the scope of programmes and the priorities for action between these countries, many of these priorities cutting across what is often alleged to be a North-South dividing line.

\* \* \*

While the countries covered in this study are all markedly affected by globalisation and while they belong to the two regions in which the 'modernisation' process, based on industrialisation and international trade, has been most successful, there are also marked differences, both between the two regions and within each region. Perhaps the fact that there should be differences between the two regions was to be expected. East and Southeast Asia has joined much later the 'club' of the 'developed' nations. To a large extent at least, the old division continues to be reflected in the fact that the policies of the governments, the philosophy of the state, so to speak, continue to be different in East and Southeast Asia from what they are in Western Europe. While European countries are, by and large, more concerned with social welfare programmes, East and Southeast Asian countries are more concerned with maintaining the pace of economic growth.

Yet the distinction between the two regions is less clear-cut than it seems. This is in part because a divide also exists in each region, between the North and the South, at least in terms of per capita income: the South of Europe has industrialised later while development in Southeast Asia has taken place after development in East Asia. Such a distinction is itself subject to exceptions, however,



Ireland in the North of Europe having been relatively less developed for a long time while Italy has been markedly more industrialised than the rest of Southern Europe. Similarly, in East and Southeast Asia, Singapore has advanced markedly more rapidly than the neighbouring countries and China, which straddles geographically between North and South, has been the last country of the area to participate in the move towards rapid industrialisation and international trade.

Whatever the differences between the two regions and within these regions, the eighteen countries which are analysed here both are particularly subjected to the process of globalisation and respond in an active manner to the effects of this globalisation process. The policies of the governments of these states are somewhat changing in the process. There is greater economic liberalisation; there are also moves, more successful so far in Europe than in Asia, designed to shield the countries to an extent from some of the effects of globalisation by creating regional institutions with economic and even to an extent social and political policy-making strength. In such a general context and given that the large majority of these states are now liberal democratic, it is manifestly essential to discover what the public at large thinks about the process of globalisation which has been going on at an apparently increasing pace in the course of the last decades of the twentieth century and on into the twenty-first century. This is the object of the next two chapters, and, to begin with, the aim of the coming chapter is to obtain a clearer view as to how far and in what ways the public in the eighteen countries 'encounters' globalisation.

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### 3 Exposure to globalisation

*Jean Blondel and Ian Marsh*

The first question which globalisation poses is whether citizens are in any way conscious of the occurrence of the phenomenon. However much that phenomenon is being discussed, not just in elite circles, but in much broader groups among the population, largely as a result of comments made in the media, it cannot be assumed that every member of every country, even every adult of every country, perceives that globalisation takes place. Yet any reaction to the very notion of globalisation depends necessarily on whether or not one is aware, if not of the occurrence of the phenomenon, at least to the possibility that the phenomenon might occur.

The matter is particularly serious and, before proceeding further, one needs to pause for two reasons. One reason has to do with the ‘consciousness’ of globalisation, for it cannot be altogether ruled out that some may react to that phenomenon without realising that they are doing so. Given that the question of globalisation is discussed in the media and given that the effect of the media may be, indeed is likely to be, affecting individuals in a subconscious manner, it cannot be assumed that only those who state what their views are about globalisation are affected by the matter; putting it differently, there may well be citizens who are positive or negative about characteristics of the society which result from globalisation without being aware of the link between these characteristics and globalisation. This view is somewhat reinforced by the second point, which was discussed in the previous two chapters, namely that what constitutes globalisation is unclear and, indeed, that experts do not agree about the boundaries of the phenomenon. As globalisation can touch not just economics, but also culture and politics, and as the ways in which and the extent to which these different aspects of society are ‘objectively’ affected by globalisation are far from clear, many citizens are likely to be only partly conscious of what the limits of globalisation may be in their country.

These difficulties cannot be fully resolved, admittedly: yet one must proceed. At a minimum, one will obtain some picture of the contours of the reactions to globalisation and, to begin with, a picture of what are the contours of the awareness of the phenomenon. To approach the matter carefully, two methodological devices are used in this study. One consists in presenting the questions to respondents in such a way that they are not forced to react by taking cues from the question itself: potential reactions are explored in a broad manner and,

to begin with, without mentioning the concept itself. The idea is to discover the experience which respondents may have had of developments whose roots may be beyond the borders of the state. The other methodological device consists in determining degrees of awareness. Globalisation may be encountered more or less passively or more or less actively. By finding out the extent to which a particular respondent tends to have encountered globalisation rather passively or rather actively, one can come closer to determining how conscious or unconscious this respondent is of the globalisation phenomenon. Finally, over and above these two methodological devices, it is important to remember that there may be, possibly always will be, an unconscious element in the reactions of respondents to globalisation and that conclusions about these reactions must therefore remain tentative and exploratory rather than definite.

Thus some, perhaps many, are likely to be unaware of the kind of developments which tend to be described as globalisation in the literature. The first step must therefore be to explore the extent to which respondents have personally experienced globalisation, how far they encountered it and what are the forms or types of these encounters. This is the object of the current chapter. In the first section, the forms which these encounters might take are examined as well as the extent to which these forms are spread among the respondents in the study as a whole. The second section considers how far one finds variations in the extent to which the different forms of encounter appear to occur in the two regions and among the eighteen countries analysed here. In the third section, these types of encounter are related to characteristics of the respondents themselves, specifically to their political knowledge and to such socio-demographic features as age, gender, level of education and religiosity.

### **Three main ways in which citizens encounter globalisation**

#### ***Encounters can result from truly 'active' behaviour, from the 'situation' of the respondent or from 'passively received' activities***

The previous two chapters showed how varied is the scope of globalisation. One needs therefore to look for indicators covering the different ways in which respondents may encounter globalisation in their daily life. It would appear at least possible for some encounters to result from the activities of the respondents: these may for instance have a job which places them in contact with the rest of the world. In other cases, respondents may be in 'situations' which force them, so to speak, to have some links with the outside world: this may be the case, for instance, of respondents who have family links with persons who live in other countries. Yet other encounters may be more 'passive' and result from what respondents merely 'receive', almost automatically, for instance from television programmes.

This suggests a division of the encounters into three broad rubrics. First, those encounters directly associated to activities of the respondents will include the type of work in which respondents are engaged: these are closely connected to the economic aspects of globalisation. As global production spreads and global trade

grows, a progressively expanding number of jobs might involve international contacts. The data on inter- and intra-regional trade, cited earlier, indicate the extent to which such linkages have already developed in both Asia and Europe. As these linkages grow, the people who are touched are likely to extend well beyond the occupants of high-level management jobs.

Encounters associated with the personal activities of respondents also include such modern developments as the Internet or e-mail, both of which give citizens opportunities to communicate with the rest of the world in ways which were not imagined by specialists of communication, Deutsch for instance, in the middle of the twentieth century (Deutsch, 1953). An even closer association with the rest of the world stems from more traditional, but also more elite-based, types of media, as the reading of foreign magazines and newspapers: it was thus pointed out earlier that the circulation of *The Economist* or *Time* was substantial beyond their countries of origin. Meanwhile, a well-developed telecommunications infrastructure is required for Internet access: this is indeed a feature of nearly all the countries covered in the survey. Some states (Singapore, China) have attempted to censor Internet use by their residents, but controls are apparently relatively easy to avoid, as was pointed out in the previous chapter (Rodan, 2003). National government strategies may also influence outcomes. For example, Korea, Singapore and Sweden have deliberately sought to build the Internet literacy of their populations.

Second, some encounters result from the fact that respondents live in a certain social situation. This is particularly the case when it comes to having friends abroad and even more to having family abroad. Friendships also develop as a result of personal activities, admittedly, for instance in a work context or, as has occurred since the late twentieth century, as a result of e-mail correspondence. The spread of Japanese and later of Taiwanese and Korean investment to other East and Southeast Asian states extends the numbers of nationals from these countries living in other countries for substantial periods on account of their work; similar trends are even more developed in the corporate sector in Europe. On the other hand, family links are less connected to personal activities, but tend to result directly from the fact that someone is born in a certain situation: for instance, the Chinese diaspora in Asia constitutes a loose network creating trans-national links through family and geographic connections.

Going to other countries is partly connected to the same kind of personal experience, although it is – as is the choice of friends – somewhat commanded by work. Tourism is obviously appreciably more directly the result of individual choices, though a variety of factors clearly influence individuals in the selection of the countries of destination; moreover, tourism can be – indeed is often likely to be – a contrived source of perspectives and images. Travellers can be insulated from local environments by the brevity and artifice of encounters. Yet tourism involves less mediated experience of another environment. Bauman (1998) equates the experience of a tourist to that of a vagabond. Finally, citizens find themselves more or less constrained by the language or languages they have at their disposal. In this context, knowing English is unquestionably an advantage, as English is clearly the vehicle by which much of what is global comes to be

disseminated throughout the world. Of course, the reasons why someone knows English are varied: English can be the mother tongue; someone may know English because he or she learnt it at school, on the basis of a decision with which he or she had little or nothing to do with; or someone may have learnt English as an adult on the basis of a deliberate desire to acquire more contacts or to obtain a better job. By and large, in the majority of cases, however, it is at school and as a result of decisions of parents and of the state that at least some knowledge of English is disseminated: it seems therefore to belong at least to a substantial extent to the same situational category as family and friends abroad.

Third, citizens also encounter globalisation in a passive manner. This is particularly the case with what they receive from most of the mass media and especially from television. Reactions to the role of television vary sharply, but, both in terms of entertainment and in terms of news, it provides citizens with views, however distorted and however limited, of some of the rest of the world. Little is personal in the information or impressions which individuals obtain as a result, but some information and some impressions of the outside world come to respondents in this way without these individuals actively choosing to receive that information or these impressions. This is naturally particularly the case with the entertainment programmes which television provides; but this is also the case with the news programmes, even with those which come from specialised news services such as CNN or BBC World. Individuals have somewhat greater opportunities to select with cable and satellite television, but, even in these cases, there is no choice as to what the content is to be.

***The indicators chosen in this survey to assess the extent to which respondents have encountered globalisation***

In order to determine whether encounters can indeed be divided in this way, eleven questions which could be expected to correspond to these three types of encounters were put to the respondents. Nine of these were part of a battery in which respondents had merely to reply whether a particular type of encounter applied to them or not; the other two questions were presented separately and gave respondents a more varied choice. The first nine questions were (Q. 305a to i):

- I have a family member or relatives living in other countries (Q. 305a);
- I have friends from other countries (Q. 305 b);
- I travelled abroad at least once in the past three years for business or holiday purposes (Q. 305 c);
- I use the Internet at home or school/work (Q. 305 d);
- I use e-mail to communicate with people in other countries (Q. 305 e);
- My job involves contacts with organisations or people in other countries (Q. 305 f);

I often watch foreign entertainment programmes on TV (Q. 305 g);  
I often watch foreign news programmes on TV (Q.3 05 h);  
I receive an international satellite or cable TV service (Q. 305i).

The tenth question related to foreign and international media (Q. 501c):

How often do you follow accounts of political or governmental affairs in the following media?

Foreign or international newspaper, magazine, radio or television?

- 1 Regularly
- 2 From time to time
- 3 Never.

The last question related to the use of English (Q. 503):

How well can you speak English:

- 1 None/not at all
- 2 Enough to understand signboard, product labels, etc., but cannot speak.
- 3 Enough to speak basic expressions required in daily life.
- 4 Enough to understand the general meaning of what is written.
- 5 Enough to read books at ease.
- 6 Native fluency.

***Responses do indeed divide mainly into three groups, corresponding respectively to 'personal activities', to the 'situation' of the interviewee and to 'passively received' messages***

The extent to which the answers to these eleven questions did indeed correspond to the different forms of encounters of citizens which were described earlier was investigated by means of factor analyses. A factor analysis was first undertaken with respect to the battery of nine questions administered in the same manner (Q. 305a to i). Three factors did emerge clearly and, in seven cases out of nine, the answers fell neatly into one factor, although the division was less marked in one of these. The three factors did indeed correspond to encounters linked to personal activities, to encounters resulting from the situation of the interviewee and to passively received messages.



As seven variables out of the nine of the battery are found to be almost exclusively associated with one factor and as these seven variables are found to be distributed within the three factors of the factor analysis, there is substantial evidence that there are three distinct ways in which respondents relate to globalisation. (1) Three of these variables are linked to personal activities: they are those which result from Internet and e-mail used to communicate with people in other countries, as well as, though a little less so, those resulting from one's job (Q. 305c, g and h). (2) There are two situational variables, those which result from having family abroad and, but also somewhat less so, from having friends abroad (Q. 305a and d). (3) There are two variables which result from passively received messages: these are two of the three television variables (Q. 305e and f). Interestingly, while the friends abroad variable is also partially related to the Internet, e-mail and job factor, the variables most strongly loaded to one factor only are the Internet variable (Q. 305d), the family abroad variable (Q. 305a) and the two foreign television variables (Q. 305e and f).

On the other hand, the responses to two of these nine variables, those concerned with travel abroad (Q. 305b) and from receiving satellite or cable television (Q. 305i) each fall into two factors; they therefore do not constitute a basis for distinguishing among the three types of encounters which have been examined in this chapter. Travel abroad is related both to the situation factor and to the personal activities factor: it was indeed suggested earlier that this might occur. The satellite and cable television variable is related to the personal activities factor and to the passively received messages factor: the purchase of a satellite or the renting of cable television is thus in part the result of a deliberate choice, and not merely a form of reception.

The battery of nine questions thus provides empirical support for distinguishing among three forms of encounters to globalisation; but two further variables remained, one of which is concerned with foreign magazines and television (Q. 501c) and the other with knowledge of English (Q. 503). The answers to these questions were therefore recoded to fit with the 'yes-no' format of the other nine questions: the factor analysis was then extended to them. The introduction of these two variables did not markedly alter the conclusions which were drawn from the analysis of the nine questions of the battery: three factors continue to emerge and the nine variables examined earlier still divide among these three factors in broadly the same manner, though generally with slightly lower loadings. The same seven variables were related to one factor only.

The two new variables differ from each other in terms of their relationship to these three factors. The foreign media variable is associated with the other media variables, even if not very strongly. The introduction of elite media in the picture does not alter significantly the character of the encounter which respondents have with the media; admittedly, the result may also be due to the fact that not just magazines and newspapers, but television was mentioned in the question. That variable can therefore be added and constitute an eighth variable

providing support for the distinction of encounters into three separate types. This is not the case of the knowledge of English variable (Q. 503), on the other hand, as it appears to relate to two factors, and thus fall in the same category as the travel abroad (Q. 305b) and the satellite or cable TV (Q. 305i) variables. Answers to that question even divide almost equally into all three factors if native speakers of English are excluded from the analysis, on the grounds that these are a very special group. The knowledge of English variable is thus, so to speak, polyvalent. It is linked to encounters relating to personal activities, such as jobs or Internet use, to situation encounters, such as those resulting from having family or friends abroad and to the passively received encounters, such as those resulting from the exposure to the media. It constitutes even less of an indicator of the type of encounters of globalisation of respondents than the other two variables which were found previously not to be associated mainly, let alone exclusively, with a single factor. Overall, therefore, while answers to three of the eleven variables are simultaneously associated with two or even three types of encounters, the other eight variables, being associated with a single factor, provide evidence that the distinction which was described earlier does indeed correspond to the way in which respondents of the survey relate to globalisation (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Relationship among the types of encounters (factor analyses)

	<i>Nine variables</i>			<i>Eleven variables</i>		
	<i>1 (personal activities)</i>	<i>2 (situational variables)</i>	<i>3 (passively received)</i>	<i>1 (personal activities)</i>	<i>2 (situational variables)</i>	<i>3 (passively received)</i>
Family abroad	-0.052	0.811	0.146	0.109	0.780	0.148
Travel abroad	0.457	0.568	0.023	0.420	0.580	-0.042
Friends abroad	0.336	0.718	0.110	0.288	0.728	0.084
Internet use	0.773	0.068	0.140	0.767	0.048	0.118
E-mail use	0.749	0.207	0.101	0.705	0.190	0.093
Jobs contacts	0.610	0.214	0.030	0.552	0.275	0.027
Foreign entertainment TV	0.144	0.141	0.827	0.101	0.134	0.776
Foreign news TV	0.049	0.142	0.837	0.007	0.098	0.832
Internet/ cable	0.432	-0.085	0.380	0.448	-0.066	0.288
Foreign paper, etc.				0.270	0.022	0.555
English spoken				0.365	0.311	0.231

***The proportions of respondents who encounter globalisation through different variables***

Most variables are thus associated with one type of encounter to globalisation. The relative weight of each of these variables must then be assessed and this can be achieved by considering the proportion of respondents who mention each encounter and, on this basis, by finding the average proportions of respondents who mention each type of encounter. This makes it possible to rank the three types of encounters and to determine, for instance, if encounters based on personal activities are more or less prevalent than encounters based on passively received information or encounters based on the situation in which the respondents find themselves. The proportion of respondents mentioning these variables does vary sharply from a minimum of 13 per cent to a maximum of 51 per cent. At the bottom, at 13 and 14 per cent, are the variables related to foreign contacts due to jobs and to foreign contacts due to e-mail. At the top, at 51 per cent, are the variables related to foreign entertainment on television and to the knowledge of English, but, in this last case, only if native speakers of English are included: if these are excluded, the proportion falls to 42 per cent. In all the other cases the proportions oscillate between 28 per cent (foreign contacts through Internet) and 44 per cent (reading foreign magazines or seeing foreign television). Thus, between nearly a third and slightly over two-fifths of the respondents mention a particular type of encounter, except for the fact that foreign contacts through jobs and foreign contacts through e-mail occur markedly less frequently.

Two general conclusions emerge. First, these encounters are truly numerous, since 34 per cent of the respondents, on average, mention them. Second, there is a large dispersion and that dispersion is not random: there are on the contrary sharp differences in the reactions of respondents to the three types of encounters which we have identified. Markedly fewer respondents mention personal activities (respectively 13, 14 and 28 per cent – the three lowest percentages), than mention the reception of messages, that is to say reading, listening to or viewing various forms of media (51, 39 and 44 per cent – the three highest percentages), while 37 per cent mention satellite and cable television. The situation encounters (family and friends abroad, as well as, to an extent, travel abroad) fall between the other two types, albeit nearer the top (36, 38 and 34 per cent); the score of the knowledge of English variable is also high, at 42 per cent if native speakers are excluded.

Respondents are thus more likely to encounter globalisation by means of the passive reception of the media (since 45 per cent, on average, mention the variables belonging to this type) or because of their situation (38 per cent on average) than as a result of personal activities (18 per cent on average). Yet, before proceeding further and assuming that the proportions which have just been indicated are in a sense a measure of the popularity of each of the three types of encounters of respondents, we need to examine whether the same ranking, in approximately the same proportions, is to be found at the level of

each of the two regions and indeed in each country. This is the object of the coming section of this chapter.

## Inter-regional and intra-regional variations

### *The proportions given to specific encounters vary somewhat*

In broad terms, the pattern which emerges from the separate examination of the two regions is not very different from the one which emerges from the overall analysis which we just conducted: there is no ‘clash of civilisations’ in terms of the encounters which respondents have with globalisation. In both East and Southeast Asia and in Western Europe, these encounters are distributed among the three factors which we identified earlier in broadly the same way as they have been found to be distributed in the two regions taken together. The broad distribution of the three types of encounters is also the same: in both regions, those encounters which are least numerous relate to personal activities, while both the situation and the passively received encounters are, in the two regions, those which are most mentioned by respondents (Table 3.2).

Within this common pattern, there is room for some variation, however. East and Southeast Asian respondents are less likely than Western Europeans to mention any encounters: on average, 30 per cent of the former do so as against 36 per cent of the latter. The gap is not very large, but it exists. Moreover, the range of the encounters mentioned varies rather more in East and Southeast Asia, where it is between 8 and 53 per cent, than in Western Europe, where it is between 17 and 52 per cent. That gap between the two sides is not very large either, but it does also exist.

Table 3.2 Distribution of encounter use (percentages)

	<i>Proportion of respondents who have had the relevant encounter:</i>		
	<i>All respondents</i>	<i>East and Southeast Asia</i>	<i>Western Europe</i>
Family abroad	36	29	44
Travel abroad	34	16	31
Friends abroad	38	24	52
Internet use	28	26	31
E-mail use	14	11	17
Jobs contacts	13	8	18
Foreign entertainment TV	51	53	49
Foreign news TV	39	45	33
Internet/cable	37	34	41
Foreign paper, etc.	44	45	42
English spoken: all	51	43	58
English spoken: not mother tongue	42	40	44

A close examination of the patterns of encounters reveals three significant sets of differences in the distribution of the answers. First, situation encounters (i.e. family and friends abroad, travel abroad) are those most mentioned by Western Europeans, where they reach 49 per cent of the respondents on average, appreciably more than the overall average of 36 per cent for the region; but this is not the case among the East and Southeast Asians, where they reach only 23 per cent on average, much less than the overall average of 30 per cent for the region. There are not only more respondents who have relatives abroad (44 v. 29 per cent); there are even more respondents who have travelled abroad (50 per cent) and have friends abroad (52 per cent) in Western Europe than in East and Southeast Asia (respectively 16 and 24 per cent). This contrast appears due to the fact that, as a region, Western Europe is more 'united' or, if one prefers, more 'compact' than East and Southeast Asia: the geographical closeness of the Western European countries, the large amount of immigration to the North of Europe of nationals from the South of Europe, both before and after the Second World War, and the opening up of the borders as a result of European integration have unquestionably markedly contributed to bringing the citizens of Western Europe closer to each other than has been the case with the citizens of East and Southeast Asia; there have simply been greater opportunities for situation encounters to occur in Western Europe than in East and Southeast Asia.

Second, and on the other hand, East and Southeast Asians encounter globalisation markedly more through what was referred to earlier as the passive reception of messages, in effect through the media, than do Western Europeans, except in the case of television reception by satellite or cable. There is no ostensible difference between the two sides (44 per cent in East and Southeast Asia against 42 per cent in Western Europe) in relation to four encounters (Q. 305e, f, i and 501c), but a difference emerges when it is related to the fact that the overall average for all encounters is lower in East and Southeast Asia, at 30 per cent, than in Western Europe, where it is 36 per cent. The fact that media encounters are more numerous seems to suggest more passivity in encountering globalisation on the Asian side than on the European side.

Third, this conclusion is confirmed when one considers encounters resulting from the personal activities of respondents. These types of encounters (Q. 305c, f and h) are mentioned appreciably less frequently in East and Southeast Asia than in Western Europe – in 16 per cent of the cases as against 22 per cent. Admittedly, this 6 per cent gap is equal to the overall gap between the two sides, but it contrasts with the fact that the messages received from the media are encountered by slightly more respondents from East and Southeast Asia than by respondents from Western Europe.

There is thus a clear ranking between the three types of encounters – personal activities, situations and passively received messages – in East and Southeast Asia, the average for each of these types of encounters being respectively 16, 23 and 44 per cent. The ranking is different in Western Europe, where passively received messages are, even if only fractionally, in the middle, the average for this type of encounters being 42 per cent, while the averages for the encounters

based on personal activities and on the situation in which respondents find themselves are respectively 22 and 47 per cent.

At a country level, the incidence of encounters is also quite varied. The results were scaled from  $-1$  to  $+1$ . The top three countries for work and web participation were Sweden, Germany and Singapore and the bottom three Greece, Indonesia and the Philippines. Similar results for family, friends and travel abroad were Ireland, Singapore and Sweden in the top group and Japan, China and Indonesia in the bottom group. In relation to foreign media, the top three countries in terms of respondent participation were Malaysia, Ireland and Singapore and the bottom three Germany, France and Italy. Thus respondents from Singapore, Ireland and Sweden participated in the top three in at least two of these measures of encounter, but only Indonesia figured more than once in the bottom three.

### ***Differences in the distribution of variables in the three factors***

Despite some differences in the extent to which respondents relate to the three types of encounters which we have identified, the eleven variables which are considered in this chapter are, as in the overall sample, divided into three factors in each of the two regions. Yet this does not mean that the variables are all located in the same way at regional level and inter-regionally: there are some variations.

These variations occur mainly on the Western European side, as, in that region, the situation factor is somewhat depleted and the overall picture is nearly reduced to being composed of two factors only: this is because the situation factor comes to include almost exclusively the family abroad variable and – but in part only – the friends abroad variable. Conversely, the personal activities factor expands to cover, not just the jobs, the Internet and the e-mail variables, but also, in part at least, travel abroad, knowledge of English and even to an extent friends abroad. This inflation may be due to the fact that, for Europeans, travel abroad and knowledge of English are in many cases associated with work and are therefore, in part at least, personal activities; as a matter of fact, the personal activities factor includes even to an extent the satellite and cable TV variable, although this variable is also partly linked to the media factor, which does remain primarily composed of the foreign entertainment on TV and the foreign news on TV variables.

In East and Southeast Asia, on the other hand, the three factors have a distinct character: family abroad, friends abroad and travel abroad, together with, by and large, knowledge of English, constitute one factor and jobs, Internet, e-mail and to an extent satellite and cable television constitute a second factor, while the other three media variables constitute the third. As a result, the one true similarity between encounters in the two regions concerns the media variables; the other variables combine or divide in a different manner in East and Southeast Asia and in Western Europe.

It still remains the case that, by and large, a majority of the variables, indeed as many as eight of them, are associated wholly or in large part with the same factors in the two regions; the other three variables – travel abroad, satellite and

Table 3.3 Relationship among the types of encounters in the two regions (factor analyses)

	<i>East and Southeast Asia</i>			<i>Western Europe</i>		
	<i>1 (personal activities)</i>	<i>2 (situational variables)</i>	<i>3 (passively received)</i>	<i>1 (personal activities)</i>	<i>2 (situational variables)</i>	<i>3 (passively received)</i>
Family abroad	-0.012	0.693	0.119	0.022	0.870	0.077
Travel abroad	0.307	0.558	0.002	0.588	0.295	0.126
Friends abroad	0.225	0.706	0.124	0.460	0.574	0.146
Internet use	0.698	0.092	0.172	0.791	-0.014	0.087
E-mail use	0.687	0.293	0.043	0.718	0.067	0.089
Jobs contacts	0.632	0.229	0.003	0.513	0.082	0.173
Foreign entertainment TV	0.094	0.093	0.768	0.153	0.205	0.749
Foreign news TV	0.014	0.173	0.785	-0.011	0.199	0.813
Internet/ cable	0.502	0.272	0.343	0.376	-0.133	0.450
Foreign paper, etc.	0.158	0.137	0.586	0.301	-0.061	0.540
English spoken: not mother tongue	0.090	0.518	0.271	0.601	0.097	0.217

cable television and knowledge of English – are indeed those which were identified earlier as being difficult to classify, since they tend to be associated with different factors in each region (Table 3.3).

### ***Intra-regional differences are large***

Inter-regional differences at first seem relatively small and turn out to be a little larger when one looks at the detailed picture: intra-regional differences, on the other hand, are ostensibly large, as the variations in the proportions of respondents who state that they have encountered globalisation are very marked. If one averages the positive answers given to each variable in each country, one can discover the size of the dispersion from country to country: that dispersion is large and indeed it is about the same among the countries of each of the two regions. These average positive responses to all eleven variables range, on the East and Southeast Asian side, between 13 per cent in Indonesia and 52 per cent in Singapore and, on the Western European side, between 22 per cent in Italy and 61 per cent in Ireland.

Moreover, not only is the dispersion large among the countries, but there are also appreciable differences in the structure of that dispersion in the two regions. In Western Europe, the spread is fairly regular; it is not in East and Southeast Asia. Thus Singapore ranks markedly above all the other countries of the region at 52 per cent, the next country in the range being Taiwan at 34 per cent; at that point, five countries of the region are bunched between 26 and 34 per cent. In Western Europe, on the other hand, the maximum gap between two countries is nine points (between Sweden and Britain) and there is no bunching.

The dispersion also has a clear geographical character in Western Europe; it appears to be based on population size in East and Southeast Asia. In Western Europe, the bottom four places are occupied by the four countries of Southern Europe, from Italy at 22 per cent to Portugal at 34 per cent, while the top four places are occupied by Northern European countries, from Ireland at 61 per cent to Germany at 44 per cent, France holding the middle position at 38 per cent. The distribution is not geographical in East and Southeast Asia: the country at the bottom of the range is Indonesia, which is followed by China and Japan. On the other hand, population size does appear to play a part: the three countries at the bottom of the range are the three most populous countries of the region, Indonesia, China and Japan, as if populous countries were those least likely to encounter globalisation. Meanwhile, Singapore is the country whose citizens are most affected by globalisation: indeed Singapore has the highest score for the region with respect to nine variables out of eleven, the Philippines scoring highest with respect to the other two, its citizens being most receptive to foreign information by satellite and cable and being most likely to have some knowledge of English, but Singapore being also equal first on this last variable if native speakers are included. In East and Southeast Asia, on balance, the smaller countries are the ones whose citizens encounter globalisation most and the smallest country, both in population and in area, Singapore, is the one whose citizens encounter globalisation most of all.

Meanwhile, however, the factor analyses performed for each country are in line with the most general conclusions drawn at the inter-regional level and subsequently confirmed, if to an extent only, at the regional level. In this respect, the picture at country level is merely a little more distant from the inter-regional and the regional pictures. The three-factor 'principle' continues to obtain, in the main, at the country level, except in two cases, those of Korea, where there are two factors only, and of Sweden, where there are four. Moreover, on the whole, the same variables are related to each other in the same factor in most cases.

The extent to which countries differ in terms of the composition of the three factors can be assessed by examining which variables are associated with each other in each factor. Out of the eleven variables analysed here, we had found, at the global level, one pair and two trios, with three variables straddling between two or even three factors. There were three variables; in the personal activities factor – the jobs, the Internet and the e-mail variables; two variables in the situation factor – the family abroad and, in part at least, the friends abroad variables; and three variables in the passively received messages factor – the foreign



entertainment on TV, the foreign news on TV and the foreign magazines and television variables. The distribution was found to be broadly the same at the level of each of the two regions: it is repeated at the level of individual countries.

These two trios and the pair are not found associated to each other in this way in every country, admittedly. The most widespread link is the one which relates to the two television variables, especially in East and Southeast Asia, although, in Europe, Sweden does not follow the general pattern. There are more exceptions with respect to the other pair and the other trio, especially with respect to the link between jobs, Internet and e-mail, which is far from occurring everywhere in Western Europe: one might indeed expect this to be the case with a trio rather than with a pair (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Links between types of encounters at the country level

	<i>Type 1</i>	<i>Type 2</i>	<i>Type 3</i>
<i>East and Southeast Asia</i>			
Japan	Fam Trav	E-m, Jobs	Media 1 & 2
South Korea (Only two factors)	Trav, Friends, E-m		Media 1 & 2, Internet
China	Fam, Trav, Friends, E-m, Jobs	Internet	Media 1 & 2
Taiwan	Fam, Trav, Friends, Jobs	Internet	Media 1 & 2, Cable
Singapore	Fam, Friends	Internet, E-m, Jobs	Media 1 & 2
Malaysia	Fam, Trav, Friends	Internet, E-m	Media 1 & 2
Indonesia	Fam, Friends	Internet, E-m, Jobs	Media 1 & 2
Thailand	Fam, Trav, Friends	Internet, E-m	Media 1 & 2
Philippines	Fam, Trav	Internet, E-m	Media 1 & 2
<i>Europe</i>			
United Kingdom	Fam, Media 1	Trav, Internet, E-m, Jobs	None clear
Ireland	Fam, Friends	Internet, E-m	Media 1 & 2
France	Fam, Friends	Internet, E-m	Media 1 & 2
Germany	Cable	Internet, E-m	Media 1 & 2
Sweden (four factors)	Fam, Friends, Media 2	E-m, Jobs	Media 1, Cable
Italy	Fam, Friends	Internet, E-m	Media 1 & 2, Cable
Spain	Fam, Friends	Internet	Media 1 & 2
Portugal	Fam	Internet, E-m, Jobs	Media 1 & 2, Cable
Greece	Fam, Trav, Friends	Internet, E-m	Media 1 & 2

Notes

Fam = Family; Trav = Travel; Friends = Friends abroad; Internet = Internet use; E-m = e-mail; Jobs = jobs abroad; Media 1 = entertainment. TV; Media 2 = news TV; Cable = having cable personally.

Moreover, the pair and the two trios do not always belong to a different factor, each of which they could be said to constitute the core. Even if one takes into account the fairly numerous cases in which one of these variables is divided between two factors, that core characteristic emerges only in five (or, by stretching the point somewhat, in six East and Southeast Asian countries and in three Western European countries): this means that, even if one excludes the two countries which have either two factors only (Korea) or four factors (Sweden), only half the countries of the study, most of which are in East and Southeast Asia, have a core of a pair or trio of variables in each of the three factors. The other cases are either constituted by countries in which a pair and a trio are in the same factor (five countries) or by countries in which one of the trios or the pair simply does not exist.

Meanwhile, the three remaining variables do not enter into the picture in any consistent manner: this was to be expected, admittedly, on the basis of what had been seen to be the case at the regional or inter-regional level. It was noted earlier that the variable related to travel (Q. 305 b), the variable related to the use of satellite or cable television (Q. 305 i) and, perhaps above all, the variable related to the knowledge of English (Q. 503) were not closely and exclusively connected to one factor at regional level. Not surprisingly, they are found, at the level of individual countries, not to be consistently connected with a particular factor.

Thus the surprise perhaps results from the fact that the pair and the two trios can be traced at least in a majority of countries and in one case in the large majority of countries. Admittedly, what remains unclear is why there should be more consistency among the East and Southeast Asian countries in this respect than among the Western European countries, although at least with respect to the pair, the difference between the attitudes of the respondents in the two regions is rather small. Yet the overall finding reinforces the main conclusion of the analysis at the level of the regions, namely that one can identify three distinct ways in which respondents encounter globalisation.

### **Encountering globalisation, political knowledge and socio-economic background**

Those who encounter globalisation by means of the characteristics which have been described in the course of this chapter do so as individuals, even if the situation in which they find themselves or the messages which they seem bound to receive from television do appear to render inevitable some of the encounters. These remain, even if only in part, individual occurrences. It would therefore seem that at least some link should exist between such individual characteristics as the political knowledge and the socio-economic background of respondents and the extent to which respondents encounter globalisation.

In order to tap the political knowledge of the respondents, the questionnaire had probed into both domestic and international knowledge by means of two questions: domestic knowledge was assessed by asking the name of the particular country's foreign minister (Q. 103) and international knowledge by asking

respondents to name as many as they could of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (Q. 104). The socio-economic variables (Q. 510 to 516) covered gender, education, age, religious practice, living standards and the distinction between public and private sector employment. A number of recodes were undertaken in order to reduce to three or at most four the number of categories in the variables being used: details of this recoding are given in the Appendix at the end of the chapter.

***Political knowledge is related, but apparently only in limited part, to the ways globalisation is encountered by respondents***

Political knowledge is regarded as an indicator of political sophistication and of political awareness. It represents ‘a mix of interest and attentiveness towards politics, understanding of relevant issues and events, and cognitive ability’ (Mondak, p. 60). First, it is expected that political knowledge will help citizens to understand better their interests as individuals and as members of groups. Second, knowledge has been found to increase the consistency of citizen views across issues and across time. Third, knowledge has been found to alter views on specific issues and to be less associated with generalised mistrust or alienation. Finally, political sophistication and awareness are associated with support for democratic values and enhanced participation. These results have been derived from samples in mature democracies, mainly the United States; whether they would hold in all these respects in the newer democracies of Asia or in its semi-democracies remains to be seen.

Overall, about half (53 per cent) the respondents stated that they did not know the name of the foreign minister of their country, 6 per cent gave a wrong name and two-fifths (41 per cent) gave the correct name. Meanwhile, 37 per cent of the respondents were unable to mention any country which was a permanent member of the Security Council, a further 17 per cent were able to mention no more than two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and 18 per cent mentioned all five correctly. The proportion of respondents who were unable to mention the name of the foreign minister of their country or to mention any permanent member of the Security Council was appreciably larger in East and Southeast Asia than in Western Europe (respectively 62 v. 45 per cent and 42 v. 31 per cent). The range of variations was somewhat over 50 per cent across the countries in both regions in both cases (see Appendix). As the two questions related to political knowledge were found to belong to a single factor, both overall and in each region, and as the question relating to the foreign minister led to an almost even split of the sample, the foreign minister question was selected to provide a measure of this knowledge.

There is a relationship, but it is modest, between the extent to which respondents are knowledgeable and the extent to which they mention having encountered globalisation by means of one or more of the eleven variables which were analysed in this chapter. On average, among those respondents

who knew the name of the foreign minister of their country, 47 per cent mentioned one of the forms of globalisation, while 39 per cent did not: there is thus an 8 per cent difference, but only an 8 per cent difference; it is therefore not as if those who are knowledgeable have all encountered globalisation. Moreover, the difference is appreciably more marked in Western Europe (nine points) than it is in East and Southeast Asia (two points): this means that knowledge appears to make more of a difference where the proportion of those who mention an encounter is larger, at 36 per cent, as we saw, *and* where the proportion of those who are knowledgeable about politics is also larger at 52 per cent – i.e. in Western Europe – than where these proportions are respectively 30 and 31 per cent – i.e. in East and Southeast Asia. It seems therefore that, the greater the knowledge and the greater the encounters with globalisation, the more political knowledge and encounters with globalisation go together.

Much was said throughout the first two sections of this chapter about the existence of three types of encounters, those relating to personal activities, to situations and to the reception of messages. Of the eleven variables which were analysed, eight were closely related to one factor and to only one, at least at the inter-regional level, in each of the two regions and in the majority of countries. Three personal activities encounters relate to the use of Internet and e-mail as well as from one's job (305c, g and h); two situation encounters relate to having family abroad and – but also somewhat less so – to having friends abroad (Q. 305a and d); and three received messages encounters relate to three of the four media variables (Q. 305e and f and Q. 501c). Some

*Table 3.5* Knowledge of foreign minister name and types of encounters in the two regions (percentages who had knowledge)

	<i>Encounters</i>					
	<i>All respondents</i>		<i>East and Southeast Asia</i>		<i>Western Europe</i>	
	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>
Family abroad	42	41	26	33	52	51
Travel abroad	51	36	33	30	57	46
Friends abroad	47	37	31	31	55	48
Internet use	47	39	33	30	57	59
E-mail use	48	40	30	31	59	50
Jobs contacts	54	39	39	34	61	50
Foreign entertainment	43	40	32	29	54	49
TV						
Foreign news TV	43	40	32	30	58	49
Internet/cable	48	37	36	28	59	47
Foreign paper, etc.	45	38	33	29	59	46
English spoken:	43	38	29	32	59	46
not mother tongue						

relationship does indeed exist between the various types of encounters and political knowledge: the relationship is stronger (with a difference of slightly over ten points) with respect to personal activities than it is with the other two types of encounters, where the difference is only four points in the case of received messages and five points in the case of situation encounters. That difference, however, is much less marked at the level of each of the two regions, except in that political knowledge does not appear to be almost related at all to these encounters (Table 3.5).

Political knowledge, as measured in the way it was undertaken in this study, does have therefore only a limited relationship with the extent to which respondents mention encounters with globalisation. The extent to which these encounters are relatively active or relatively passive appears to be more related to the extent of political knowledge. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the two phenomena, encountering globalisation and being politically knowledgeable, are only casually related. This does not mean that those who encounter globalisation do so accidentally, at any rate in those cases which have not been described as being primarily passive: some respondents may for instance actively seek a job which will put them in contact with developments occurring abroad. Yet this does not mean that they are knowledgeable politically about what goes on either in their country or abroad. It is interesting to note that when factor analyses are undertaken between both indicators of political knowledge (Q. 103 and Q. 104) and those variables which are related to each of the three types of encounters which were described throughout this chapter, the two knowledge variables form one factor and the indicators of encounters of globalisation form another (Table 3.6).

*Table 3.6* Knowledge and encounters with globalisation (factor analyses)

	<i>Factors</i>	
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
Knowledge of foreign minister	0.013	0.827
Knowledge of UN Security Council	0.064	0.826
Family abroad	0.841	-0.074
Friends abroad	0.812	0.159
Knowledge of foreign minister	0.016	0.850
Knowledge of UN Security Council	0.193	0.799
Internet use	0.796	0.109
E-mail use	0.852	0.001
Job contacts	0.649	0.112
Knowledge of foreign minister	-0.011	0.834
Knowledge of UN Security Council	0.126	0.818
Foreign entertainment TV	0.797	0.016
Foreign news TV	0.841	-0.026
Internet/cable	0.632	0.160

***Socio-economic background and encounters with globalisation:  
a relationship with major variations***

The respondents' encounters with globalisation are not closely, systematically and generally related to the socio-economic background of respondents either. There are marked differences among the six variables describing that background: while the linkages in the case of living standards and education are fairly close, they are widespread but somewhat less uniform in the case of age and more patchy in the case of gender and religious practice. There seems to be no relationship at all as far as the public-private employment distinction is concerned.

The relationship between the living standards of the respondents and the encounters which these respondents mention is particularly noticeable in terms of its almost total consistency across the eleven variables: the better-off respondents are more likely to have encountered globalisation than the less well-off. While this may not be surprising as a general finding, the extent to which it takes place is more widespread, especially in both regions, than might have been expected. There appears to be little difference between the two regions with respect to the extent of the relationship, although the difference between the social groups is more marked, in some cases at least, in Western Europe than in East and Southeast Asia.

There is also, in general, some relationship between the level of education of respondents and the extent to which these mention activities in which they may have experienced globalisation. As might have been expected, these experiences are more likely to have occurred among the more educated than among the less educated. Although the strength of the relationship is not identical with respect to all eleven variables, there is a movement in the same direction everywhere. There is also little difference between the two regions in this respect, although, in a few cases, the relationship appears more marked in Western Europe than in East and Southeast Asia.

There is less uniformity in the extent to which respondents of the various age groups mention having been involved in the activities which have been described in this chapter. Admittedly, the main pattern is for older respondents to have been less involved and for younger respondents to have been more involved in activities of this kind, but one can distinguish three patterns at the inter-regional level and indeed four, if differences between the two regions are taken into account. With respect to four variables (foreign entertainment on television, Internet use, e-mail use and knowledge of English) the trend for younger people to be more involved and for older people to be less involved in these activities is pronounced: such a result might indeed have been expected, especially as far as the last three variables are concerned. With respect to three variables (friends abroad, foreign news on television and jobs abroad), the tendency is the same, but much less marked; the move does also take place in both regions. With respect to two variables (family abroad and satellite and cable television), there is little difference between the age groups in either region. Finally, in two cases, over travel abroad and the use of foreign media, the trend

is different in the two regions. In the case of the travel abroad variable, there is a straightforward contrast, possibly due to the greater ease with which Western Europeans of all ages can visit different countries: while the young from Asia travel abroad less, those from Western Europe travel abroad more. In the case of the use of foreign media variable, which the young from East and Southeast Asia experience more, there is no such difference in Western Europe (Table 3.7).

Neither gender nor religiosity gives rise to the same level of relationship. Religiosity is related to three of the eleven variables only, those concerned with Internet use, with jobs which bring contacts abroad and with satellite and cable television; the most religious are less involved. Gender is related to four of the eleven variables on an inter-regional basis: men are more involved than women in using Internet, receiving foreign news on television, using e-mail and reading or viewing foreign media. In the seven other variables, no relationship can be traced; indeed, even with respect to the four variables where some difference emerges, it is small. There is little difference between the two regions, although, in Western Europe, but not in East and Southeast Asia, men are more involved than women in viewing foreign entertainment on television and, perhaps less surprisingly, in holding jobs which bring contacts abroad.

The socio-economic background of respondents is thus related in a number of ways to encounters which may have linked these respondents with globalisation, but that relationship is, in most cases at least, not very large. In particular, there does not seem to be a systematic link between any of the three types of encounter and the socio-economic background of respondents, except, and only to an extent, in so far as younger respondents and – but to a lesser

*Table 3.7* Socio-demographic variables and encounters with globalisation (percentages)

	<i>Proportions having or not having encountered globalisation</i>							
	<i>Socio-economic background</i>		<i>Living standards</i>		<i>Education</i>		<i>Age</i>	
	<i>Lowest</i>	<i>Highest</i>	<i>Lowest</i>	<i>Highest</i>	<i>Lowest</i>	<i>Highest</i>	<i>Oldest</i>	<i>Youngest</i>
Family abroad	16	11	16	23	8	10	15	11
Travel abroad	23	8	10	26	4	12	20	9
Friends abroad	20	8	12	25	4	12	18	9
Internet use	22	9	12	23	1	12	26	7
E-mail use	29	10	8	22	1	10	29	10
Jobs contacts	26	11	10	22	3	10	26	11
Foreign entertainment TV	16	9	16	25	5	14	15	10
Foreign news TV	16	10	15	23	7	11	15	11
Internet/cable	17	10	15	23	4	12	14	12
Foreign paper, etc.	17	10	15	24	5	12	17	9
English spoken: not mother tongue	16	7	14	28	2	10	19	6

extent – men are more involved in two of the personal activities, Internet use and e-mail use.

\* \* \*

Three main observations emerge from the examination of the extent to which respondents of the survey have been involved in activities which resulted in them encountering globalisation. The first is that many have been affected in this way: that a third of the respondents, on average, should have been involved in each of these activities is rather large, probably larger than might have been expected. The second observation is that the activities which lead to encounters with globalisation fall within three distinct types, not only in principle, but in reality. The personal activities involve rather more the individuals concerned; situation encounters tend to be given; and message reception is rather passive. Only three of the eleven variables which have been presented to respondents as potential indicators of encounters with globalisation do not fit neatly into one of the three groups, while, at the inter-regional and regional levels at least, the other eight are each associated with one of the three factors into which all the variables divide. The third observation is that, on balance, the distinction among three groups of variables and even the distinction between encountering or not encountering globalisation by means of these variables is not strongly related to the individual characteristics of respondents: neither their political knowledge nor even, in general, their socio-economic background is closely linked with having participated with these encounters, although there are, to be sure, some relationships.

Further and deeper analyses of personality characteristics will have to be undertaken before it becomes possible to determine with some degree of precision the origins of the distinction between those respondents who are and those who are not involved in the types of encounters which have been analysed here. Yet it does remain the case that respondents are involved in these encounters and that the division into the three forms of encounters obtains. It is therefore important to bear in mind these three forms as we move to the examination, in the coming chapter, of the reactions of respondents to the different ways in which modern developments appear, to elite observers at least, to render the world more global.



**Appendix**

Recodes undertaken for this chapter:

Educ 4 categ: Recode of Q. 510

<i>Original value</i>	<i>Recoded value</i>
1-2	1
3	2
4	3
5-7	4

Age collapsed: Recode of Q. 507

<i>Original value</i>	<i>Recoded value</i>
1-3	1
4-6	2
7-9	3
10-13	4

Living standards new: Recode of Q. 516

<i>Original value</i>	<i>Recoded value</i>
1-2	1
3	2
4-5	3

Publicv.private: Recode of Q. 513

<i>Original value</i>	<i>Recoded value</i>
1-3	1
4-5	2
6	3

Relpractice: Recode of Q. 504

<i>Original value</i>	<i>Recoded value</i>
1-2	1
3-4	2
5-6	3
7	4

Seccouncilonew: Recode of Q. 104

<i>Original value</i>	<i>Recoded value</i>
1-4	1
5-7	2

Foreign minister: Recode of Q. 103

<i>Original value</i>	<i>Recoded value</i>
1	1
2–3	2

The gender (Q. 506) question did not have to be recoded.

With respect to the foreign minister's name, the range of those who did not know or gave a wrong name was between 40 per cent in Japan and 96 per cent in Malaysia in East and Southeast Asia and between 13 per cent in Germany and 75 per cent in France in Western Europe. In relation to the Security Council, the proportions of respondents who were unable to mention the name of any country at all ranged between 18 per cent in China and 63 per cent in Singapore in East and Southeast Asia and between 12 per cent in Germany and 54 per cent in Greece in Western Europe; in order to obtain comparable overall per centages, if those able to mention at most the names of two of the five members of the Security Council are taken into account (55 per cent overall and 58 per cent in East and Southeast Asia as against 49 per cent in Western Europe), the range was between 26 per cent in China and 89 per cent in the Philippines in East and Southeast Asia and between 23 per cent in Germany and 71 per cent in Greece in Western Europe.

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## 4 How the public evaluates globalisation

*Jean Blondel and Ian Marsh*

As was pointed out in Chapter 1, and despite the truly large number of studies and publications on the subject, there has never been any wide-ranging examination of what the public thinks about globalisation, especially on a comparative basis. The purpose of this chapter is to begin to remedy this situation by examining how the public reacts to the various ways in which the process of globalisation is taking place.

As a matter of fact, of course, even if citizens react when asked what effect an aspect of the globalisation process may have had on their life, these reactions may be rather superficial. Experience is never ‘pure’ or ‘objective’: the awareness of the reactions which a process such as globalisation may have is inevitably shaped by a variety of internal and external filters. There are thus many degrees of awareness of these reactions. For example, the branded products of multi-national corporations may be recognised and popular, but consumer loyalty is also ephemeral: as the vast annual spending on advertising testifies, loyalties can be changed. Moreover, citizens are unlikely to grasp causal connections spontaneously. The perception that there are a wider variety of goods in shops is unlikely to be associated, at any rate generally, with judgements about the politics of trade liberalisation or about the power of multi-national corporations unless a plausible account of the linkage is also made.

On the other hand, deeper international encounters are likely to affect perspectives and views. The evidence reviewed in the previous two chapters suggests that countries and individuals are involved currently directly or immediately in trans-national encounters. The countries covered in this survey have been particularly affected. In Europe, as already noted, economic interaction is highly elaborated; such a connection also exists in Asia. Satellite and other media linkages are widely available in both Europe and Asia, while the Internet and e-mail open up new possibilities for interaction. Tourism and travel are growing in both regions, although, despite these developments, language remains perhaps the most important structural barrier.

This chapter aims at understanding where the public stands, at any rate in the countries which are analysed here, on the matters which are typically regarded as belonging to the process of globalisation. The first question which needs to be examined is the general pattern of citizens’ responses to the different ways in

which they might be affected by what is commonly regarded as globalisation: this is the object of the first section of this chapter. The second section then considers how far respondents hold positive, negative or neutral views about those aspects of globalisation which they recognise have an impact on their lives. Meanwhile, in each section, the links are examined, if there are any, between the encounters analysed in the previous chapter and reactions to the globalisation process. Finally, the third section considers whether the political knowledge and the socio-economic background of respondents appears associated with attitudes to globalisation.

### **How do respondents react to various aspects of globalisation**

The process of globalisation is typically regarded as affecting, not just economic life, but social, including cultural, and political life as well. A series of questions, corresponding to these aspects, was therefore asked of respondents of the survey. Since, however, as was pointed out in Chapter 1, there is a danger that respondents might give stereotyped answers, the abstract term globalisation itself was not used; on the contrary, questions referred to concrete ways in which the life of respondents might be affected.

In this survey, the analysis of awareness of and of attitudes to globalisation was conducted on the basis of eight questions touching on different fields on which globalisation could be expected to have an effect. The general problem was first presented to the respondents in the following manner:

It is said that we live in an age when all sorts of things (for example products, money, people and information) move around the world more than they used to. Please tell me whether this kind of movement has any effect on your own life in each of the following areas and whether the overall effect has been a good thing or a bad thing?

The eight questions were then asked successively. These are:

- Q. 301a What you can buy in the shops?
- Q. 301b The kind of food that is available in restaurants?
- Q. 301c The kind of people who live in your neighbourhood/community?
- Q. 301d Job security?
- Q. 301e More use of the English language and English expressions among people in your country ?
- Q. 301f Your standard of living?
- Q. 301g The films and television entertainment programmes available in your country?
- Q. 301h The kind of things that are reported in the news on television?

(Respondents could answer in one of the following five ways: (1) Has good effect; (2) Has bad effect; (3) Has effect but is neither good nor bad; (4) Has no effect; (5) Don't know).

***To what extent and in what ways do respondents feel affected by globalisation?***

The five options provide a means of assessing to what extent respondents feel affected by globalisation in its various forms. At one extreme are those who state that a particular aspect of their life has been affected, whether positively or negatively; at the other extreme are those who state that they do not know. In between, but nearer to the first group, are those who feel that there has indeed been an impact, but that that impact is ‘neither good nor bad’ and has been, in a sense, neutral, while those who feel that the aspect of globalisation concerned has had ‘no effect’ on their life are closer to those who do not know. It seems therefore reasonable to conclude that, with respect to each of the eight questions, those who belong to the first two groups are the most affected and are followed first by those who state that there has been an effect, but one which is ‘neither good nor bad’; then come those who feel that there has been ‘no effect’ on their life and finally those who do not know if there has been any effect.

On average, with respect to all eight questions, the first group – composed of both those who were either positive or negative on the nature of the effect – forms about half the respondents (48 per cent); the second group – composed of those who feel that the effect has been neither good nor bad – constitutes between a quarter and a third of the respondents (29 per cent); the third group – those who think that there has been no effect – are about a sixth (16 per cent) and the don’t knows are 6 per cent. Putting it differently, slightly over three-quarters of the respondents feel that these aspects of globalisation have had some effect, while slightly under a quarter either feel that these aspects of globalisation had no effect or do not know. There was little difference between the two regions.

There are some variations, on the other hand, but not very large ones, in the extent to which respondents state that each aspect of globalisation mentioned has had an effect on their life. The proportion of those who chose to answer that the effect was either positive or negative ranges from a minimum of 39 per cent in relation to the effect on people in the community (Q. 301c) to a maximum of 53 per cent in relation to the effect of the use of English (Q. 301e) (among the non-English speaking countries only) and of news on television (Q. 301h); the same two groups form between 46 and 52 per cent of the sample in the context of the other five questions. The neither good nor bad answers range between 26 and 33 per cent, the no effect answers between 12 and 22 per cent (the latter percentage being again with respect to the question about effect on people in the community) (Q. 301c), while the don’t knows form either 5 or 6 per cent of the respondents, except in relation to the effect on job security (Q. 301d), where it reaches, surprisingly perhaps, 9 per cent of the respondents. The questions on the effect on the community and on job security are the ones for which there is the greatest uncertainty in the minds of the respondents (28 per cent), while the question on the effect of news on television is the one for which the uncertainty is the smallest (17 per cent of the respondents).

*Table 4.1* Attitudes to the effect of globalisation (percentages)

	<i>Effect</i>			<i>No effect</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
	<i>Good</i>	<i>Bad</i>	<i>Neither good or bad</i>		
All	34	14	29	16	6
E. & S.E. Asia	36	12	31	16	6
W. Europe	33	17	27	17	6
Country range on the eight questions:					
E. & S.E. Asia	27–45	9–17	25–36	11–21	4–9
W. Europe	24–46	10–27	23–30	13–23	5–8

The size of these movements is similar at the regional level. The average proportion of those who state that the effect has been positive or negative is about the same in East and Southeast Asia and in Western Europe (48 v. 50 per cent) and the average percentage of those who state that the effect has been neither good nor bad is only marginally larger in East and Southeast Asia than it is in Western Europe (31 v. 27 per cent); the variations among those who answered that there has been no effect and among those who stated that they did not know are almost exactly the same in the two regions, being respectively 16 and 6 per cent in East and Southeast Asia and 17 and 6 per cent in Western Europe. Finally there were also variations in the proportions, at the regional level, of the answers given to each of the questions, but the range was about the same as at the inter-regional level.

There are, on the other hand, major variations at the country level in each of the regions, although the range is somewhat smaller in Western Europe than it is in East and Southeast Asia. Thus, on the answers of those who are neither positive nor negative about the effect of globalisation on their lives, the average range, from country to country, of the difference between those who feel and those who do not feel that that effect has been neither good nor bad is 21 per cent on average in East and Southeast Asia and 15 per cent in Western Europe; that average range between those who feel and those who do not feel that there has been no effect is also 21 per cent on average in East and Southeast Asia and 19 per cent in Western Europe; between those who say and those who do not say that they do not know, it is 12 per cent in East and Southeast Asia and 8 per cent in Western Europe (Table 4.1).

***How distinctly perceived are the aspects of globalisation***

The encounters with globalisation experienced by the respondents distributed fairly neatly among three factors: yet, although the eight questions which are discussed in this chapter divide sharply among those which are economic (job security and standard of living), those which concern the quality of life (food and neighbours) and those which relate to culture and the media (entertainment

and news on television), the reactions of respondents do not follow closely that distinction. A variety of factor analyses were conducted, at both the inter-regional level and at the regional levels: these resulted at most at identifying two factors only; in a number of cases, a single factor linked all eight questions. Admittedly, where two factors do emerge, the two variables concerned with food are fully in one factor, with the variable concerned with the neighbourhood being in part associated, while the film and television variables are in the other factor, with the variables concerned with the use of English and the standard of living in part associated; only the variable concerned with job security is wholly divided between the two factors. This configuration does suggest the existence of two poles, two gradations and of a middle position: one pole would be occupied by the two variables concerned with food, the other by the two variables concerned with films and television; the middle position would be occupied by the variable concerned with job security and the gradation would be constituted on the one hand by the variable concerned with the neighbourhood and, on the other, and nearer the middle position, by the variable concerned with the standard of living, and nearer the pole, by the variable concerned with the use of English. Such a representation suggests that the question of the effect of globalisation on job security is the one on which views relate most closely to views about other questions. Such a representation also seems to be the most realistic way of handling the problem of a possible distinction among the three elements in relation to the eight questions which are examined here (Table 4.2).

Yet even a tripartite division of this kind does not emerge in a significant manner in all the factor analyses and in particular at the level of both regions. At the inter-regional level, only one factor emerges if the answers to the eight questions are related to each other without being recoded: the division into two factors is found to occur only when, after recoding, positive and negative standpoints together are contrasted to all other standpoints; but only one factor emerges once more, if all the standpoints concerned with an effect are contrasted to the two standpoints which are concerned with none.

Moreover, the division is sharp between the two regions in this respect. While two factors emerge, with the characteristics described earlier, in East and Southeast Asia, there is only one, also with the characteristics described earlier, in Western Europe. This is so whether the questions are recoded or not and in whatever way they are recoded. There seems to be generally the kind of underlying distinction mentioned in previous paragraphs and reproduced in Table 4.1: but that distinction is more or less marked depending on the region and it can even be very faint in Western Europe. Perhaps this is due in that region to some 'contamination' in the answers to the battery of eight questions, but, if so, why this would be the case in Western Europe and not in East and Southeast Asia is not clear. Whatever the reason, the answers to the eight questions concerned with attitudes to the effect of globalisation on day-to-day life fall into one factor or at most two, in sharp contrast with the answers concerned with encounters of globalisation. What is surprising is perhaps not only that there should be one or

Table 4.2 Factor analysis of the eight types of effects of globalisation

<i>Effect type</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>East and Southeast Asia</i>		<i>Western Europe</i>
	<i>1 factor only</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1 factor only</i>
Shop buying	0.709	0.181	0.852	0.731
Restaurants	0.708	0.185	0.855	0.725
Neighbourhood	0.681	0.390	0.611	0.664
Job security	0.621	0.486	0.418	0.591
English use	0.629	0.653	0.226	0.616
Living standard	0.709	0.637	0.360	0.698
Entertainment on TV	0.718	0.794	0.188	0.713
News on TV	0.702	0.824	0.136	0.699

Positive and negative effects against all others

<i>Effect type</i>	<i>All</i>		<i>East and Southeast Asia</i>		<i>Western Europe</i>
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1 factor only</i>
Shop buying	0.141	0.831	0.133	0.828	0.685
Restaurants	0.152	0.826	0.146	0.826	0.686
Neighbourhood	0.307	0.589	0.336	0.586	0.600
Job security	0.434	0.378	0.416	0.437	0.537
English use	0.621	0.163	0.591	0.227	0.539
Living standard	0.530	0.354	0.588	0.352	0.626
Entertainment on TV	0.760	0.155	0.788	0.141	0.645
News on TV	0.7867	0.125	0.816	0.112	0.643

two factors when the eight variables concerned with the effect of globalisation are examined jointly, but that this should be the case while encounters with globalisation clearly give rise to three factors.

### ***Does a relationship emerge between reactions to possible effects perceived and encounters of globalisation by respondents?***

It seemed reasonable to hypothesise that citizens who had had encounters with globalisation would be more likely to be aware of globalisation and would consequently be more likely to perceive an effect on their life of the various aspects of globalisation mentioned in the eight questions examined here. One would therefore expect the don't know and the no effect responses to be proportionately less numerous among those who had encountered globalisation in one of the forms analysed in the previous chapter.

This is indeed what occurs, but in a modest manner only. Four of the eleven variables analysed in the previous chapter were selected; three were chosen as they represented the key distinctions to be found among the encounters and because



*Table 4.3* Encounters and effects on globalisation (average percentages for the eight types of effects)

<i>Type of encounter</i>	<i>Effect</i>									
	<i>Good</i>		<i>Bad</i>		<i>Neither good or bad</i>		<i>No effect</i>		<i>Don't know</i>	
	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>
Family abroad	38	32	15	14	28	27	15	17	5	6
Use of internet	40	32	13	14	30	15	14	18	4	6
Entertainment on TV	39	30	13	16	29	29	15	18	4	7
Contacts through jobs	39	34	15	14	29	29	14	17	4	6

they were the ‘leading’ variables in each of the three types of encounters – family abroad (Q. 305a), use of Internet (Q. 305c) and viewing entertainment on television (Q. 305e); because of its importance on social grounds, a fourth variable was chosen, that concerned with holding a job giving contacts abroad (Q. 305h). In all four cases, the proportion of don’t knows was only marginally smaller, on average, among those respondents who had encountered globalisation (respectively 5 v. 6 per cent, 4 v. 6 per cent, 4 v. 7 per cent and 4 v. 6 per cent); in all four cases, too, the proportion of respondents who said that there had been no effect was only marginally smaller among those respondents who had encountered globalisation (respectively 15 v. 17 per cent, 14 v. 18 per cent, 15 v. 18 per cent and 14 v. 17 per cent). Moreover, the proportion of those who stated that there had been a bad effect was again scarcely affected at all, while the proportion of those who said it had a good effect was larger in all four cases, a point to which we are now turning (Table 4.3).

## **Does globalisation have a positive or a negative effect?**

### *Being positive, negative or neutral about the effects of globalisation*

On average, a little more than three-quarters of the respondents (77 per cent), as we noted, feel that globalisation has an effect on their lives and this proportion is almost exactly the same in the two regions (78 and 77 per cent); as we also saw, between a quarter and a third of the sample (29 per cent) were neutral, as they stated that the effect was neither good nor bad: this leaves only half the respondents (48 per cent), also on average, holding a definite view about what the effect might be.

That half the respondents of the survey should have definite views about the effect of globalisation is remarkable; and it is remarkable that the proportion should be about the same in both regions. Conversely, this finding means that, even if globalisation is presented in terms of its concrete effects and not as an

abstract concept, half the respondents do not appear to believe that this should make any difference to their lives.

Moreover, over two-thirds among those who have a view about the effects of globalisation (71 per cent) feel, on average, that these effects are positive; in this case, too, that attitude is shared by respondents in each of the two regions, even if the proportion of positive answers is somewhat larger in East and Southeast Asia (75 per cent) than in Western Europe (66 per cent). Furthermore, it is almost universally the case for the proportion of those who hold positive views about globalisation to be larger than the proportion of those who hold negative views, both at the inter-regional level and at the level of each region: there is a single exception which touches Western Europe only. It relates to the effect of the spread of English (among countries where English is not the mothertongue) (Q. 301 e): while 25 per cent of Western Europeans feel that this effect has been positive, 27 per cent feel that it has been negative.

Although there is thus a single example and in one region only of a question to which negative answers about the effects of globalisation are more numerous than those which are positive, there are substantial variations from question to question in the ratio of positive to negative answers. At the inter-regional level, the two questions concerned with food (Q. 301a and b) and the question concerned with the standard of living (Q. 301f) have the highest ratios of positive to negative answers, ranging from 77 to 79 per cent; the lowest ratio, 59 per cent, is in the context of the question relating to the effect of globalisation on job security; this is followed by the effect of entertainment on films and television, at 63 per cent, and by the effect on the use of English at 68 per cent, while the answers to the questions on the effect on life in the community (Q. 301c) and on the effect of news on television (Q. 301h) are close to the average at 72 per cent. The proportions of neutral answers also vary somewhat around the average of 29 per cent, from a low of 26 per cent with respect to the effect of the use of English and to the effect on job security to a high of 33 per cent with respect to the effect on the life in the community.

At the level of each of the regions, some differences are rather marked, both within and between each region. The main contrast between the two regions concerns the effect of the use of English: while, as we noted earlier, the negative answers are more numerous than the positive answers among Western European respondents in this case (25 v. 27 per cent), this question is also the one to which East and Southeast Asian respondents give the largest amount of positive answers (83 per cent). With respect to the seven other questions, the dispersion is substantial, but not extreme, in Western Europe; in East and Southeast Asia, the ratio of positive to negative answers ranges from 82 per cent on news on television (Q. 301h) to 65 per cent on job security (Q. 302d), while, in Western Europe, that ratio ranges from 82 per cent on foods in shops (Q. 301a) to 52 per cent on job security (Q. 302d) (Table 4.4).

When one concentrates on those respondents who stated that these various aspects of globalisation had an effect on their lives, moreover, the structure of the relationship among the answers to the eight questions remains the same as the

*Table 4.4* Positive and negative answers to globalisation and encounters (percentages of positive answers among definite answers only)

<i>Effect type</i>	<i>Encounters</i>							
	<i>Family abroad</i>		<i>Internet use</i>		<i>Entertainment on TV</i>		<i>Job contacts</i>	
	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>
Shop buying	82	78	87	76	84	74	85	78
Restaurants	81	76	85	74	83	72	84	77
Neighbourhood	73	70	76	70	72	70	72	71
Job security	59	57	60	58	61	55	59	58
English use	67	69	70	67	73	63	65	69
Living standard	80	75	82	74	80	72	81	76
Entertainment on TV	64	63	69	61	70	56	65	63
News on TV	72	73	76	71	76	67	71	72
Average	72	70	76	69	75	66	73	71

one which was observed for the whole sample. Both when the definite positive and negative answers are contrasted jointly to the neither good nor bad answers and when the positive answers are contrasted to the negative answers alone, one finds two factors at the inter-regional level and in East and Southeast Asia and one factor only in Western Europe. The sole difference concerns the position of the answers which were referred to earlier as being in the middle: when there are two factors, the answers given to the effect on job security and on the standard of living are closely associated to the answers to the questions concerned with food and the effect on the community, while the answers given to the effect of the use of English are closely associated to the answers to the questions concerned with films and television: the question on job security ceases therefore to be a middle answer and even the small traces of a 'third' distinction which appeared at the level of the whole sample come to disappear, while, in Western Europe, the questions are viewed by respondents as being part of a single set of relationships and the question of possible contamination continues to arise.

***Substantial variations from country to country in the proportions of positive and negative answers***

As the reactions to each of the questions differ somewhat at both the inter-regional and the regional levels, one might expect substantial variations at the level of individual countries and in both regions. One might also expect East and Southeast Asian respondents to be generally more positive and Western European respondents to be rather more negative: this is indeed the case. There are four cases only when the negative answers are more numerous than the positive answers in East and Southeast Asia, while there are twelve in Western Europe.

*Table 4.5* Cases in which negative answers to globalisation are larger than positive answers (percentages)

	<i>E. &amp; S.E. Asia</i>	<i>W. Europe</i>
Shop buying	None	None
Restaurants	Thailand 22/18	None
Neighbourhood	None	None
Job security	Japan 11/6 S. Korea 26/21	United Kingdom 23/18 Italy 36/22 Spain 19/15 Portugal 29/24
English use	None	Germany 32/14 Sweden 27/25 Spain 25/15 Portugal 31/22 Greece 36/23
Living standard	None	None
Entertainment on TV	S. Korea 29/28	France 22/15 Spain 33/20
News on TV	None	Greece 38/19

In East and Southeast Asia, the four cases of respondents who felt more negative than positive are those of Thais about the effect on food served in restaurants (by 22 to 18 per cent) (Q. 301b), of Japanese and South Koreans about the effect on job security (respectively by 11 to 6 per cent and by 26 to 21 per cent) (Q. 301d) and of South Koreans about the effect of films and entertainment (by 29 to 28 per cent) (Q. 301g). In Western Europe, the twelve cases of respondents who felt more negative than positive are those of British, Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese about the effect on job security (respectively by 23 to 18 per cent, by 36 to 22 per cent, by 19 to 15 per cent and by 27 to 24 per cent) (Q. 301d), of Germans, Swedes, Spaniards, Portuguese and Greeks about the effect of the use of English (respectively by 32 to 14 per cent, by 27 to 25 per cent, by 25 to 15 per cent, by 31 to 22 per cent and by 36 to 23 per cent) (Q. 301e), of French and Spaniards about the effect of films and entertainment (respectively by 22 to 15 per cent and by 33 to 20 per cent) (Q. 301g) and of Greeks who felt the same about the effect of news on television (by 38 to 19 per cent) (Q. 301h) (Table 4.5).

Thus out of sixteen cases in which there are more negative than positive answers, six relate to the effect of globalisation on job security, mostly, but not exclusively, in Western Europe. Five cases relate to the effect of globalisation on the use of English, all in Western Europe. Four are concerned with the effect on films and television, both in relation to entertainment and in relation to news, three of which are in Western Europe. Finally, one case is that of the Thais who feel negative about the effect of globalisation on food in restaurants.

The Western European countries in which negative effects on job security tend to be felt are mostly from Southern Europe while the two East Asian countries concerned are Japan and South Korea, but, in the case of Japan, the minority is

very small on both sides – 11 to 6 per cent. The views of Northern Europeans are not very positive and tend to be evenly balanced between the two standpoints: this is the case for instance in Germany, where 24 per cent are positive but 23 per cent are negative, the corresponding figures in France being 25 and 22 per cent. The views of respondents from Southeast Asia tend on the contrary to be strongly positive: this is the case for instance in Malaysia where 42 per cent are positive and only 8 per cent are negative, the corresponding figures in Indonesia being 41 and 7 per cent. There is therefore here a striking difference in attitudes between the two regions in this respect, although it is also the case that, on both sides, only about half the respondents are definite in their standpoint.

There is also a striking difference in attitudes in the two regions with respect to the effect of the use of English. As we noted earlier, this is the question on which, overall, East and Southeast Asian respondents are most positive: this is the question, on the contrary, where, overall, Western Europeans are more negative than positive, admittedly by a small proportion, but this is also the question in which the respondents of five countries are more negative than positive. Given that seven countries only are at stake, since English is the mother-tongue in Britain and Ireland, only the French and the Italians feel that the use of English has more a positive than a negative effect: the French case (where 30 per cent are positive against 19 per cent who are negative) is indeed remarkable, given the fact that all French governments, of Right or Left, have extolled the importance of the French language and supported that language by their policies, to all intents and purposes against the spread of the English language.

There is also some difference between the two regions on what might be described as the cultural dimension. It is substantial at the overall regional level: the regional difference is large in relation to news on television (82 per cent in East and Southeast Asia against 62 per cent in Western Europe) (Q. 301g) and somewhat smaller on films and entertainment (69 per cent in East and Southeast Asia against 57 per cent in Western Europe) (Q. 301h). However, it is on the effect of films and entertainment that one finds three countries in which the proportion of negative answers is larger than that of positive answers, two in Western Europe, France (this time not surprisingly) and Spain, (respectively 22 to 15 per cent and 33 to 20 per cent), and one in East Asia, South Korea (29 to 28 per cent); on the effect of television the same situation occurs in one country only, Greece, this time by a large margin (38 to 19 per cent).

***Does a relationship emerge between attitudes to effects of globalisation and encounters of globalisation by respondents?***

In general and, indeed, almost in every case and in both regions, those who have encountered globalisation are somewhat more likely than those who have not encountered globalisation to have a definite attitude about the effect of globalisation and, if they have a definite attitude, to be positive about the effect. Again in order to assess whether the fact of having encountered one of the three types of globalisation, the three which represented most markedly the key distinctions

to be found among the encounters were selected – family abroad (Q. 305a), use of Internet (Q. 305c) and viewing entertainment on television (Q. 305e) –, while, because of its importance on social grounds, the variable concerned with holding a job giving contacts abroad was also chosen (Q. 305h). There were therefore forty-four cases in which a definite positive or negative attitude towards the effect of globalisation could be compared with a neither good nor bad attitude, as well as forty-four cases in which a positive attitude towards the effect of globalisation could be compared with a negative attitude.

At the inter-regional level, there are only two cases out of forty-four in which those who hold definite attitudes, whether positive or negative, are proportionately less numerous among those who encounter globalisation than among those who do not: they are both to be found among Internet users and they relate to the effect on the neighbourhood and on job security. There are also only five cases out of forty-four in which those who hold a positive attitude towards globalisation are proportionately less numerous among those who encounter globalisation than among those who do not: these are two cases among those who have family abroad and two cases among those who have a job with contacts abroad; these cases are concerned with the effect of the use of English and with the effect of news on television; the fifth case is to be found among those whose encounter is with entertainment on foreign television and it relates to job security. There appears to be at this level some effect of the type of encounter, as the difference between those who encounter globalisation and those who do not is markedly larger in the context of the use of Internet and in the context of receiving entertainment from foreign television than in the context of the use of Internet or of the fact of having a job with contacts abroad: this might therefore suggest that situation or passive encounters could be more related to positive attitudes to globalisation than encounters resulting from a truly positive activity of the respondent. Yet it is also the case that attitudes concerned with the effect on food and with the effect of television are more affected by encounters of all types than attitudes concerned with the effect on job security or with the effect of the use of English. It seems therefore difficult to conclude that particular types of encounters are unquestionably connected to greater or smaller variations in the relationship between encounters and attitudes. What seems only permissible to state is that encounters – of all types – are related to attitudes to globalisation, in that there are marginally fewer undecided respondents and that the effect of globalisation is also regarded as more positive among those who have than among those who do not have encounters with globalisation.

While there is thus a relationship between encountering globalisation and being more positive towards globalisation, one cannot, on the basis of a cross-sectional study such as this, conclude about the direction of such a relationship: it cannot therefore be claimed that the fact that someone has encountered globalisation leads to an increase in the probability that that person will have positive attitudes towards globalisation. There are situations where it would seem reasonable to draw such a conclusion: this would seem to be particularly the case among those who have family abroad, since this characteristic is likely to be a

'given' preceding in many cases holding views about globalisation; but this is far from being the case for other types of encounters of globalisation. Further studies on the subject, particularly longitudinal ones, are needed for a more clear-cut conclusion to emerge.

Whatever may be the reason why there are more positive than negative views about globalisation, there are respondents, in both regions and indeed in every country, who feel that globalisation, in its various forms, has a negative effect on their lives: but the proportion of these respondents is small, both overall and even on such sensitive subjects as the effect on job security, on the standard of living or on the cultural characteristics of society. Almost on every topic and almost in every country, the proportion of those who are positive about globalisation is larger than the proportion of those who are negative. Yet this has to be viewed in the context of the finding that only about half the respondents hold a definite view about these matters, as the other half either feels that whatever effect there is is neither good nor bad, that there is no effect at all or that they do not know. Moreover, there is also a general tendency, which varies in strength depending on the topic, but perhaps not according to the type of encounter, for positive attitudes to globalisation to be more marked among those who encounter globalisation than among those who do not.

### **Attitudes towards globalisation, political knowledge and socio-economic background**

Attitudes towards globalisation are personal: only in rare instances does the situation determine the relationship of the respondent with a particular encounter. Respondents do have a particular background, however, and it would seem rather unlikely that this background should not have some relationship with the attitudes which these respondents have towards globalisation, although we noticed in the previous chapter that the relationship between background and encounters was rather limited. It might also seem at least probable that there will be some relationship between the political knowledge of respondents and the attitudes which these hold towards globalisation. Thus, as in the last section of Chapter 3, this section examines successively the political knowledge and the socio-economic background of respondents on the same basis as in Chapter 3. Political knowledge is therefore assessed, as in Chapter 3, by asking respondents to give the name of the particular country's foreign minister (Q. 103). In this section, too, the socio-economic variables (Q. 510 to 516) cover gender, education, age, religious practice, living standards and the distinction between public and private sector employment, recoded as mentioned in the Appendix of Chapter 3.

#### ***Political knowledge is related in a rather peculiar manner to attitudes to globalisation***

It seems axiomatic that political knowledge should be an important instrument enabling citizens to handle political matters. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 3, whatever



the level of political knowledge of respondents, those who encounter globalisation differ only in a limited way from those who do not. This is also the case, and indeed more so, when the political knowledge of respondents is related to attitudes to globalisation. The relationship is not just limited; it occurs occasionally in the 'wrong' direction. The meaning of the relationship is therefore ostensibly not entirely straightforward.

It will be recalled that the analysis of attitudes, earlier in this chapter, was based not only on an examination of the answers given to the five options which respondents had at their disposal, but on the analysis of a series of recodes designed to concentrate on the possible contrast between those who state that there is an effect and those who do not, between those who give a definite answer and those who say that the effect is neither good nor bad and, finally, between those who give a positive answer and those who give a negative answer. That series of recodes made it possible to discover that those who state that there is an effect, those who give a definite answer and even more those who give a positive answer are to be found in greater proportions among the respondents who encounter globalisation than among those who do not.

The findings are rather different when the relationship between political knowledge and attitudes to globalisation is being examined. Briefly, while the respondents who have greater political knowledge are less likely to answer don't know to the questions which concern the possible effect of globalisation on the day-to-day lives of these respondents, the gap between those who have more political knowledge and those who have less seems to diminish as one concentrates the analysis gradually on the more definite types of answers, to end up distinguishing only between those who have positive attitudes to globalisation and those who have negative attitudes: ostensibly, the trend even appears reversed in this last case. Let us examine the difference between the two sides on the basis of four analyses of the relationship between political knowledge and attitudes towards globalisation, the first contrasting all other answers to don't know, the second contrasting answers stating that there is an effect to answers which state that there is none or are in the form of don't know, the third contrasting answers giving a definite answer to answers stating that the effect was neither good nor bad, and the fourth contrasting positive answers to negative answers. The average difference between the answers given by respondents who know the name of the foreign minister of their country and those who do not is 7 per cent in the case of all those who do not answer don't know; it is 1.6 per cent in the case of all those who state that there is an effect, whatever this effect may be; it is 0.6 per cent with respect to definite answers when these are opposed to neither good nor bad effect answers; and it is -0.6 per cent when the contrast is merely between those who think the effect is positive against those who think the effect is negative. Thus those who give a positive answer are to be found less, on average, among the more knowledgeable than among the less knowledgeable.

This result is a freak consequence of the recodes, however. The number of those who know the name of the foreign minister of their country is markedly



higher in Western Europe than it is in East and Southeast Asia, as was noted in Chapter 3 (62 v. 42 per cent): the weight of the Western European answers is therefore much larger when positive responses are compared only with negative responses than it is in the whole sample. This would not of course matter much if the direction of the answers was identical or even similar; yet the paradox is that the direction of the answers is indeed similar, but only at the margin: in both regions, those who know the name of the foreign minister of their country are more likely to have positive attitudes towards globalisation than those who have negative attitudes, but the gap between those who know the name of the foreign minister and those who do not is larger among East and Southeast Asian respondents, where it is 3.5 per cent on average, than among Western Europeans, where it is only 0.6 per cent. This very low figure for Western Europe results from the fact that, as we also know, Western European respondents who know the name of their foreign minister are markedly more negative than East and Southeast Asian respondents about the effect of the use of English than those who do not: those who know the name of the foreign minister in that region state by 58 to 40 per cent that the effect of the use of English is negative; this is coupled with the fact that knowledgeable Western European respondents are neutral about the effect of entertainment and of news on television, whereas knowledgeable East and Southeast Asian respondents are emphatically positive. The combination of these circumstances results in those respondents who know the name of their foreign minister being on average slightly less positive about the effect of globalisation than those who do not know that name.

There is another unexpected effect of the relationship between political knowledge and attitudes about the effect of globalisation. When definite answers about the effect of globalisation are taken together and contrasted to the answer that that effect is neither good nor bad, those East and Southeast Asian respondents who do not know the name of their foreign minister are less likely than those who do to give a definite answer by a margin of 6 per cent, while Western Europeans who know the name of their foreign minister are more likely to give a definite answer by a margin of 3 per cent (Table 4.6).

The relationship between political knowledge and attitudes about the effect of globalisation is therefore somewhat twisted. First, but among Western Europeans only, the effect of the use of English is viewed negatively among those who are politically knowledgeable; this trend does not only affect the overall result, but it shows that feelings about the use of English, in Western Europe, are very strong and are far from being limited to those who are less knowledgeable. To say the least, attitudes towards globalisation, with respect to this particular effect at least, as well as on cultural matters generally, are to an extent, at least in Western Europe, less positive among the better informed respondents than they are, perhaps surprisingly, about other effects of globalisation, for instance about such economic matters as job security or living standards.

Moreover, the findings relating to East and Southeast Asia suggest that some of the more knowledgeable in that region (but possibly in Western Europe as well) have considerable difficulty in ascertaining the nature of the effects of

Table 4.6 Name of foreign minister and attitudes to globalisation (percentages)

<i>Effect type</i>	<i>Respondents who give the name of the foreign minister and give a definitive answer to the effect or do not</i>			
	<i>East and Southeast Asia</i>		<i>Western Europe</i>	
	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>
Shop buying	57	61	72	70
Restaurants	55	59	73	68
Neighbourhood	45	53	59	58
Job security	59	65	67	64
English use	66	70	67	65
Living standard	53	62	63	59
Entertainment on TV	57	59	62	60
News on TV	63	64	64	61
Average	57	63	66	63

globalisation. As a result, despite the fact that, in that region and indeed in both regions, those who are more knowledgeable are likely to be more positive about these effects, many among the more knowledgeable also state that the effect is neither good nor bad, perhaps as a substitute for an answer which might have been 'has an effect but I do not know which'.

Thus, far from being a straightforward relationship linking a more positive attitude towards globalisation to greater political knowledge, the relationship between political knowledge and attitudes towards the effects of globalisation is complex. It shows that there are variations between the two regions, that some of the more knowledgeable have views which go against the general trend linking more knowledge with more positive attitudes and that some of those who have knowledge may also refrain from passing judgement on the nature of the effect. There is therefore a need for further studies which would be able to consider attitudes towards globalisation in a more detailed manner.

### ***Socio-economic background and attitudes about the effect of globalisation: a relationship with major variations***

The relationship between socio-economic variables and attitudes about the effect of globalisation is highly contrasted, more contrasted than almost any variable which has been examined in this study. If we concentrate on those who feel that the effects of globalisation are positive, and on an inter-regional basis, there is, on the one hand, almost no difference at all in the views which men and women have and those which respondents who are in public or private employment have about the effect of globalisation, while there is only very little relationship with respect to religiosity. On the other hand, there are substantial differences in relation to age (the older the respondent, the less positive), with respect to different levels of education (the more educated, the more positive) and, above all, among

*Table 4.7* Socio-demographic background and attitudes to globalisation (percentages of those who state that there is a good effect on their daily life)

	<i>Socio-economic background</i>					
	<i>Living standards</i>		<i>Education</i>		<i>Age</i>	
	<i>Lowest</i>	<i>Highest</i>	<i>Lowest</i>	<i>Highest</i>	<i>Youngest</i>	<i>Oldest</i>
Shop buying	33	52	29	47	45	34
Restaurants	29	51	25	43	42	31
Neighbourhood	22	32	26	28	28	27
Job security	22	31	23	28	31	18
English use	29	39	28	42	44	25
Living standard	24	47	29	43	41	29
Entertainment on TV	25	36	27	33	37	22
News on TV	32	44	32	39	42	31
Average	25	42	27	38	39	27

respondents with different living standards (the better off, the more positive). It is therefore on these three aspects of the socio-economic background that the analysis needs to concentrate (Table 4.7).

There is some similarity between attitudinal patterns linked to living standards and those linked to education: the relationship is particularly strong with respect to the effect of globalisation on food in general and in restaurants in particular; it is also particularly strong, in terms of the effect of globalisation on living standards as those who have higher living standards by opposition to those who do not, perhaps not surprisingly. Age gives rise to somewhat more different relationships: the younger age groups are particularly positive about the use of English and about entertainment on television, while there is almost no difference on the basis of age groups in relation to the effect on neighbours, as is indeed also the case among the better educated but not among the better off.

It is worth examining a little more closely the other aspects of the reactions of respondents with different levels of education, of different age groups and with different living standards. Variations in living standards are typically linear: those who have intermediate living standards are almost always in the middle in terms of attitudes. There is also a linear progression with respect to the proportion of don't knows in the different educational groups (they decrease as education is higher) and the different age groups (they increase as age increases); but this is not the case with the proportion of those who state that the effect is neither good nor bad: that proportion tends to be highest, in a majority of the cases, and to decline with age or with higher education.

We saw that the use of English is a sensitive issue which tends to divide the two regions: indeed, while in East and Southeast Asia, those who feel that the effect of the use of English is positive are in markedly larger proportions than those who feel that it is negative, on the other hand, in Western Europe and with respect to all three socio-economic groups examined here, there are fewer

respondents who are positive than are negative at one end of the range while the reverse is true at the other end of the range. Yet in both regions, the proportion of negative answers scarcely varies with higher living standards, better education or among the age groups: what does vary is the proportion of those who give positive answers. The overall variation is almost entirely due, and in both regions, to the fact that the proportion of don't knows and of those who feel that there is no effect declines with higher living standards and better education while it increases with age. In reality, of course, there is no movement, merely different distributions among the different groups. Yet it is difficult not to believe that education, better living standards and what might be described as the modern society may have the effect of leading more citizens, previously relatively unaware, in the direction of being in favour of globalisation.

The apparent relationship between political knowledge and socio-economic background, on the one hand, and, on the other, attitudes about the effect of globalisation on day-to-day life is thus varied and complex. Political knowledge does not uniformly result in a more positive attitude towards globalisation, but, on the contrary, to a variety of trends. Of the elements constituting the socio-economic background, while religiosity, gender and the fact of being in public or private employment have no apparent relationship with views about globalisation, education, living standards and age do have a substantial relationship with such views: they seem to suggest that modern society means, to a significant extent, agreeing with globalisation. Whether this impression constitutes a trend and, even more, whether the social background is in some ways the cause of such a development has to be left to further studies which would be able to benefit, in contrast with the present one, from being based on longitudinal analyses.

\* \* \*

There is little doubt that, on the whole, citizens of the countries under analysis in this study support the main tenets of globalisation. In particular, perhaps in contrast with what might have been expected, there are more positive than negative views about the effect of globalisation on job security, probably the most sensitive of all the issues raised by globalisation. There is much more doubt, in Western Europe at least, about some of the cultural aspects of the phenomenon, and, in particular, about the effect of the use of English. There are substantial differences between East and Southeast Asian respondents and Western European respondents on this issue, although these differences are in terms of the proportions of those who are in favour rather than in terms of a sharp contrast between the two regions.

A number of factors are related to these positive standpoints. Somewhat strangely, political knowledge does not appear to play a significant part in this respect, perhaps because some of the knowledgeable are, especially in Western Europe, ideologically opposed to globalisation. A number of socio-economic characteristics, younger age, better education and higher living standards are on the contrary closely associated with a positive view of the effect of the phenomenon.

Yet attitudes about globalisation are unexpected in one respect. Despite the fact that there are different aspects of the phenomenon and, more importantly in this case, despite the fact that respondents appear to distinguish among these aspects – for instance by stressing to an extent possible negative consequences on culture – there does not appear to be a fundamental division among these respondents with respect to these different aspects. While the encounters which citizens have with globalisation fall fairly neatly into three factors, this is not the case with the attitudes of the respondents about its effects; some distinctions emerge, but their strength is rather limited and they seem particularly weak as they form part of a single factor in the Western European region. This is despite the fact that, in that region, there appears to be a greater move to defend culture against possible encroachments by the rest of the world. Thus a number of important aspects of the problem remain uncharted. That globalisation is not unpopular in a general manner is clear: but the reasons why this is the case will have to be further investigated by means of longitudinal studies. What will then be needed is to assess how far the phenomenon of globalisation in its different forms is likely to continue to be broadly accepted by the majority of citizens.

## 5 Citizens' attitudes to international organisations and reactions to globalisation

*Jean Blondel*

The previous chapter was concerned with the attitudes of respondents with respect to key economic, social and political trends and policies characterising the globalisation process. Yet the globalisation process is not exclusively the result of these trends and policies. A further crucial component is constituted by international organisations, which, as was indicated at the beginning of this volume, have both multiplied and come to have an increasingly important role in the second half of the twentieth century. Such a development clearly indicates that the attitudes of citizens towards these organisations have to be examined alongside the attitudes of citizens towards the trends and policies belonging to the globalisation process.

As a matter of fact, attitudes towards international organisations have to be examined for another reason as well. To a significant extent, these bodies constitute the instruments with which at least many globalisation policies are implemented and are even in some cases regulated as well as perhaps occasionally restrained. Some of these organisations have indeed been set up for these purposes: the main function of the World Trade Organization (WTO), for instance, is to provide a framework for world trade processes. Thus the reactions of citizens towards international organisations may well be linked, to an extent at least, to the reactions which citizens have towards globalisation trends and policies. The extent to which there is such a link in the minds of citizens needs therefore to be examined, although, in a cross-sectional study such as this, it is impossible to determine what is the direction of any link which might be found to exist, let alone whether that link is increasing or decreasing: what can be observed is merely whether a link exists at all and, if so, how strong it appears to be.

Yet, if it is therefore decided that the reactions of citizens towards international organisations in the context of a study of globalisation have to be identified, it is not possible to undertake such a task without also undertaking a drastic selection: the number of international organisations, indeed private as well as public, has become so large that one cannot, within the framework of a mass survey, do more than examine the reactions of citizens to a very small number of organisations; the choice is likely to be, to an extent at least, arbitrary. Indeed, what constitutes an international organisation is not – or is no

longer – immediately clear. The only point which is clear is that these are bodies which operate beyond the level of a single state: but what is less clear is whether one should focus exclusively on public institutions or whether private undertakings should be selected as well; what is also less clear is whether one should look exclusively at worldwide organisations or whether one should also consider regional bodies.

Let us thus proceed gradually. First, among worldwide public organisations, the UN has to be selected, whatever its real power: it is well known and covers the political and perhaps the cultural sides as well as the economic side of globalisation. Other public international organisations which are part of the UN system, typically economic ones, also need to be included in the analysis: this is the case with the World Bank and the WTO, despite the fact that this last body is fairly recent, and was especially recent at the time this survey was administered; the case for inclusion of the International Monetary Fund alongside the World Bank is somewhat weaker.

Second, some private worldwide organisations may well have as much, perhaps even more resonance among a cross-section of respondents, indeed in both regions: this would seem to be the case with such bodies of an economic character as multi-national corporations and ‘international big business’ in general. Questions about these types of bodies can be expected to attract genuine reactions on the part of respondents: it seems therefore imperative to examine the attitudes which they elicit.

Third, however, the case for selecting regional organisations in the context of this survey is less clear-cut: that case would be strong only if there were regional bodies, in each of the two regions, which did not have just parallel goals but had an equivalent weight in the two sets of societies. Such bodies cannot be found in the two regions analysed here; this is especially so of what would ostensibly seem to be the two best candidates for selection, the EU for Europe and ASEAN (or ASEAN plus 3) for East and Southeast Asia. There is a vast difference in the extent to which the societies of the two regions are affected by these bodies. While the European Union has a large impact, whatever is thought about the supra-national character of that body, the structure of ASEAN (or ASEAN plus 3) is scarcely developed at all and the influence of that body, externally and internally, is very limited. Sentiments which respondents may have vis-à-vis ‘their’ regional organisation are therefore not likely to be based on an identical or even a similar framework of images and observations. Overall, therefore, it is more prudent to restrict the analysis to worldwide international organisations and in effect to the UN, the World Bank, the WTO, multi-national corporations, as well as to big business, and to refer occasionally only to the EU and to ASEAN.

This chapter thus first examines the reactions of respondents to the international organisations which were selected and does so at the level of the whole survey, at the regional level and at the country level. It considers, second, as the previous chapter did, the extent to which these reactions appear to vary depending on whether citizens have encountered globalisation. Third, the chapter

relates the reactions of respondents to these organisations to the knowledge which they have about political life and to their socio-demographic condition. Finally, it considers how far the respondents' reactions to international organisations appear related to the assessment which these respondents make about the globalisation trends and policies analysed in chapter 4.

### **Citizens' attitudes towards international organisations**

The reactions of respondents to international organisations were examined by means of two questions. One asked about the amount of confidence which respondents had in a number of bodies. Question 102, which also inquires about views on some regional organisations (NATO, ASEAN and the EU), thus states:

How much confidence do you have in:

- a International big business?
- b The United Nations?
- c The World Trade Organization (WTO)?
- e The World Bank?"

Respondents had the choice of six answers: (1) a great deal; (2) quite a lot; (3) not much; (4) none; (5) don't know; (6) not thought about it.

The second question asked about the effect on respondents' lives of a number of international bodies: it referred not only to the UN and multi-national corporations, on the one hand, but also, on the other, in order to assess better the relative weight of this effect, to the national government, the EU and ASEAN. Question 401 thus states:

How much effect do you think that the activities, decisions and so one [of the following] have on your day-to-day life:

- d The United Nations and its various agencies?
- e Multi-national corporations?"

Respondents had the choice of four answers: (1) great effect; (2) some effect; (3) no effect; (4) don't know.

### ***Confidence in international organisations***

There are differences in the extent to which respondents express confidence in the international bodies to which they were asked to react. It is to the UN that



these react most favourably: about half (49 per cent) of the sample have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in that organisation, while only two-fifths (39 per cent) do so with respect to international big business and a third (34 and 33 per cent, respectively) with respect to the World Bank and to WTO. Thus the amount of confidence in the UN is appreciably larger than the confidence in the economic bodies which are examined here.

That difference is due essentially, however, not to the extent to which respondents have no confidence at all in these economic organisations (which varies only between 7 and 9 per cent of the sample), but to the much larger proportion which state that they do not know or have not thought about the matter: these constitute together 22 per cent of the sample with respect to the UN, but 27 per cent with respect to international big business, 35 per cent with respect to the World Bank and 38 per cent with respect to the WTO.

There is some difference in respondents' attitudes in the two regions, but, while it is not very large, its character has some significance. On the whole, Western European respondents have a little more confidence in the UN than do East and Southeast Asian respondents (51 per cent state that they have great confidence or quite a lot of confidence as against 47 per cent); on the other hand, East and Southeast Asian respondents have greater confidence than Western European respondents in the three economic types of organisations which are examined here: respectively 35, 31 and 28 per cent of the Western Europeans have great confidence or quite a lot of confidence in international big business, the World Bank and WTO, respectively, but this is the case of 43, 39 and 39 per cent of the East and Southeast Asians.

There are much larger variations, as on other matters, at the country level, in terms of the extent to which respondents have confidence in international organisations. Among those who state that they have a great deal and quite a lot of confidence, the range, with respect to the UN, in East and Southeast Asia, is between a minimum of 34 per cent in Malaysia and a maximum of 61 per cent in the Philippines, and, in Western Europe, between a minimum of 24 per cent in Greece and a maximum of 65 per cent in Sweden and Italy. The range is similar with respect to international big business, the World Bank and WTO, as it varies from a minimum of 25, 22 and 28 per cent to a maximum of 64, 56 and 50 per cent, respectively, in East and Southeast Asia and from a minimum of 22, 15 and 17 per cent to a maximum of 53, 37 and 41 per cent, respectively, in Western Europe, with correspondingly large variations in the proportion of respondents who say that they don't know or that they hadn't thought much about it.

Despite these variations and these differences, there appear to be some basic connections: both at the inter-regional and at the regional levels, the answers given by respondents about the confidence they have in the organisations analysed here fall within one factor only. There is thus an apparent underlying relationship in the extent of confidence expressed about the UN as such, about the economic institutions which are part of the UN system and even about international big business.

***Perceived effect of international organisations on one's life***

The reactions of respondents to the effect which they perceive from international organisations also fall into one factor. This is so with respect to the two sets of international bodies examined here, the UN and multi-national corporations: that single factor extends to national governments as well to the EU or ASEAN, moreover, and the same finding is observed at the level of individual countries. Whether this denotes that there is a degree of automaticity in the responses to the various questions cannot of course be known; all that can perhaps be concluded is that these patterns of answers suggests that they might not be held very strongly.

Respondents display a degree of scepticism about the effect on their life, not just of the UN, perhaps not surprisingly, but, more surprisingly, of multi-national corporations as well. While 43 per cent state that the UN has a great effect or some effect on their lives, 41 per cent state that that organisation has none. With respect to multi-national corporations, there is a difference, with 49 per cent saying that they have an effect but 34 per cent that they have none. As 17 per cent of respondents reply don't know with respect to both organisations, the impression prevails that differences between the reactions to the two sets of organisations are relatively limited, especially when these reactions are compared with those which are elicited by the effect of national governments (77 per cent stating that it has an effect) or even the EU (68 per cent of the Europeans stating that it has an effect).

Again, perhaps not surprisingly, at the level of the two regions examined separately, the extent to which the UN has an effect on the life of respondents is almost the same: 41 per cent in East and Southeast Asia and 44 per cent in Western Europe think that it has a great effect or some effect; the only difference is that East and Southeast Asian respondents are appreciably more numerous in stating that they do not know – 23 v. 10 per cent – while Western European respondents are more numerous – 46 v. 36 per cent – in stating that the UN has no effect for them.

Meanwhile, some, but only some of the surprise with respect to that inter-regional result is reduced when one considers the reactions of respondents of the two regions with respect to the effect of multi-national corporations, as Western Europeans are (perhaps more realistically) proportionately more numerous than East and Southeast Asians in stating that multi-national corporations have a great or some effect on their life (56 v. 43 per cent), with the proportion of those who state that they have no effect being the same among East and Southeast Asians and among Western Europeans (34 and 35 per cent, respectively); in this case, too, the proportion of East and Southeast Asian respondents who state that they do not know is larger (again 23 v. 10 per cent). As we saw, to a degree, but admittedly only to a degree, East and Southeast Asian respondents display more confidence in business on the international plane than do Western Europeans: they now also appear to combine this greater support with the feeling that international businesses have less effect on their lives. There is indeed some

relationship between these two views at the level of the overall sample, that is to say, in both regions taken together. When the answers from the two regions are considered separately, one does not find that the relationship is stronger in East and Southeast Asia than it is in Western Europe, however: it seems therefore difficult to suggest that more East and Southeast Asian respondents have confidence in multi-national corporations *because* they feel that these bodies impact less on their lives than Western Europeans do.

There is also some difference between confidence and perceived effect in international organisations in that the range of country variations with respect to the effect of the UN and of multi-national corporations is appreciably smaller in Western Europe, though not in East and Southeast Asia, than is the range of country variations with respect to confidence in the organisations examined. If those who state that there is a great effect and those who state that there is some effect are taken together, there is a 43 per cent variation between the maximum and the minimum in East and Southeast Asia, but only a 16 per cent variation in Western Europe with respect to the UN, and a 40 per cent variation in East and Southeast Asia, but only a 15 per cent variation in Western Europe with respect to multi-national corporations.

Moreover, some countries tend to occupy relatively similar positions with respect to at least a number of these variables. Thus, in East and Southeast Asia, Japan tends to be among the countries whose respondents have a low confidence rating and who also feel least that these international organisations have an effect, while, at the other end of the scale, Filipino respondents tend to give high ratings to both sets of variables. In Western Europe, Greece tends to be among the countries whose respondents have low confidence ratings, although they do not feel that way in terms of the effect of these international organisations on their lives.

There is thus much country idiosyncrasy both in terms of the confidence of respondents with respect to international organisations and in terms of the effect which these organisations are regarded as having. Yet this is in a context in which, on the whole, positive attitudes towards the UN and towards economic bodies, public and private, constitute at least a substantial minority, although, in Western countries, a greater doubt emerges in relation to these economic bodies, perhaps because Western Europeans are rather more uncertain than are East and Southeast Asians about the value of the weight of the presence of multi-national corporations in their midst (Table 5.1).

### **Encountering globalisation and views about international organisations**

As with respect to attitudes to globalisation, those respondents who encounter globalisation are more likely to have confidence in the international bodies examined here. The view that these have an effect on their day-to-day life is also more pronounced among respondents who encounter globalisation than among those who do not.

Table 5.1 Confidence in and perceived effect of international organisations (percentages)

<i>(A) Confidence</i>						
	<i>A great deal</i>	<i>Quite a lot</i>	<i>Not much</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Dont know</i>	<i>Hadn't thought much about it</i>
United Nations	10	38	22	7	13	9
World Bank	6	28	21	9	21	14
World Trade Organization	5	28	22	7	23	15
International big business	6	33	25	9	21	14

<i>(B) Perceived effect</i>				
	<i>Great</i>	<i>Some</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Dont know</i>
United Nations	10	33	41	17
Multi-national corporations	15	34	34	17
National government	36	41	17	6
European Union (Europe only)	21	46	27	6
ASEAN + 3 (E. and S.E. Asia only)	10	35	33	21

In order to examine the possible relationship between reactions to international organisations and citizens' encounters with globalisation, the analysis is naturally conducted here on the basis of the patterns of encounters identified in Chapter 3 and subsequently used in Chapter 4 to examine the relationship between encounters with and attitudes to globalisation. These encounters were found to take mainly one of four forms, concerned respectively with assessing whether respondents had family or friends abroad, whether they often followed TV entertainment programmes from abroad, whether they used the Internet or whether they had a job placing them in contact with foreign countries.

### ***Levels of confidence in international organisations are somewhat affected***

At the inter-regional level, the confidence which respondents display with respect to international organisations varies in two ways. First, the proportions of interviewees who feel a great deal and quite a lot of confidence in each of the types of organisations concerned, UN, World Bank, WTO and international business, are larger among those who encountered globalisation than among those who did not, irrespective of the type of encounter, although there is a gradation, from having

friends or family abroad, through often following entertainment TV programmes to using the Internet and having a job placing the respondents in contact with foreign countries: between the reply for which the difference is smallest and the reply for which the difference is largest, the range is from 0 (in relation to WTO) and 11 per cent with respect to family and friends and from 10 and 19 per cent for the other three types of encounters.

The difference is in the other direction in relation to those who did not express a view when asked whether they had confidence in any one of the four types of organisations and stated they did not know or had not thought much about the matter: these were proportionately more numerous among those who had not encountered globalisation. There is, in this case, too, a gradation and it is indeed more marked than among those who expressed substantial confidence in the organisations concerned. Thus between those who said that they had friends or family abroad and those who said that they did not there was only a difference of between 0 (with respect to WTO) and 15 per cent in the proportion of those who could and those who could not state whether they had confidence in the organisation concerned because they did not know or because they had not thought about the matter; between those who said that they often watched foreign entertainment TV programmes and those who did not, the proportional difference was between 19 and 30 per cent; between those who said that they used Internet and those who did not, the proportional difference was between 31 and 46 per cent; between those who said that their job placed them in contact with other countries and those who did not often watch foreign entertainment TV programmes, the proportional difference was between 31 and 48 per cent.

There are appreciable differences between the two regions in terms of the extent to which having encountered globalisation is related to confidence with respect to international organisations. In all cases, the extent of confidence in the organisations was more boosted, so to speak, by having encountered globalisation among respondents from East and Southeast Asia than it was among respondents from Western Europe. Although variations were somewhat erratic, that confidence boosting was also somewhat larger with respect to the World Bank and the WTO than with respect to the UN and international businesses. Why this should be the case does not appear immediately obvious: it is not that confidence was greater in general among Western Europeans, as we saw: on the contrary, only with respect to the UN is the level of confidence somewhat higher, while it is lower with respect to the World Bank, the WTO and international businesses; it is true, however, that the difference between the two regions is greater at least with respect to the World Bank and WTO.

***Levels of effect of international organisations on respondents are also somewhat affected***

With respect to the effect which, in the opinion of the respondents, these organisations have on their lives, those who do encounter globalisation are also more

likely to state that this is the case than those who do not, once more irrespective of the type of encounter, whether it is because they have family or friends abroad, follow foreign entertainment on television, use the Internet or have jobs giving contacts abroad. If those who feel that there is a great deal of effect and those who feel that there is some effect are examined jointly, they are in all cases proportionately more likely to be found among those to whom these encounters apply than among those to whom these encounters do not apply. In this case, moreover, this is so both with respect to the UN and with respect to multi-national corporations, at least to the same extent among respondents who have family and friends abroad as among those who had other types of encounters with globalisation: there is no gradation in the proportional difference, except with respect to encounters involving jobs abroad. Conversely, those who state that they don't know are appreciably less likely to be found among those to whom these encounters apply, these trends being equally marked with respect to multi-national corporations and with respect to the UN. The trends are indeed further emphasised by the fact that the proportion of respondents who had encounters with globalisation are appreciably less numerous than those who did not, and roughly in the same proportions, with respect to the UN and to multi-national corporations.

There is also a difference between the regions in the extent to which having encountered globalisation affects the extent to which respondents believe that they are affected by the UN and/or multi-national corporations. The difference is in both cases larger among East and Southeast Asian respondents than it is among Western European respondents, although this is more marked with respect to the UN than it is with respect to multinationals. In this case, however, there is no systematic difference among the types of encounters, except in that, among Western Europeans at least, those who use the Internet or hold jobs which lead them to have contacts abroad are appreciably more likely to declare that multi-national corporations have an effect on their lives.

Encounters with globalisation have therefore a relationship with the extent to which respondents from both regions show confidence in international organisations or feel that these organisations have an effect on their lives. It is not the case that the relationship between these encounters and the sense of confidence in these organisations or the belief that these have an effect is in all cases the same. There are substantial variations, both from encounter to encounter, from organisation to organisation, as well as with respect to the level of confidence felt by respondents or with respect to the sentiment that these organisations have an effect. On the basis of the data analysed here, however, it would be imprudent to go beyond noting that the relationship exists and that it is far from being insignificant. Overall, therefore, there is no doubt that, with respect to international organisations as with respect to attitudes to globalisation, having encountered globalisation of one of the types which have been examined in Chapters 3 and 4 does appear to be related to the views which respondents hold about the international environment in which these find themselves (Table 5.2).

*Table 5.2* Confidence in, perceived effect of international organisations and selected types of encounters with globalisation (percentages)

	<i>(A) Confidence</i>							
	<i>Family and friends</i>		<i>Internet use</i>		<i>Entertainment on TV</i>		<i>Job contacts</i>	
	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>
United Nations								
Some confidence	52	47	58	45	51	45	54	47
Little or no	29	30	29	30	30	28	35	29
Don't know/not thought	19	23	12	26	18	26	11	23
World Bank								
Some confidence	36	34	39	33	37	31	38	34
Little or no	31	30	35	29	31	29	39	29
Don't know/not thought	32	38	27	39	31	40	23	38
WTO								
Some confidence	33	33	39	31	36	30	37	32
Little or no	30	29	33	28	30	29	36	28
Don't know/not thought	38	28	28	41	34	42	27	39
Internet businesses								
Some confidence	42	47	47	36	43	35	47	38
Little or no	34	35	35	34	34	35	37	33
Don't know/not thought	25	18	18	30	24	30	15	29

## Notes

Some = a great deal + quite a lot; Little or no = not much + no; Dont know/not thought = don't know + hadn't thought much about it.

	<i>(B) Perceived effect</i>							
	<i>Family and friends</i>		<i>Internet use</i>		<i>Entertainment on TV</i>		<i>Job contacts</i>	
	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>
United Nations								
Some effect	49	40	47	41	46	40	53	41
None	41	41	41	41	41	41	39	41
Don't know	12	20	12	18	14	20	8	18
Multi-nationals								
Some effect	57	45	61	44	54	45	68	46
None	33	35	29	36	33	36	25	36
Don't know	11	20	10	19	13	20	7	18

### Reactions to international organisations and the political knowledge and background of respondents

In the same way as the respondents' exposure to globalisation was analysed in Chapter 3 and the respondents' awareness of globalisation was analysed in

Chapter 4, respondents' reactions to the international organisations examined in this chapter need to be related to these respondents' political knowledge and to their socio-economic background. This is naturally undertaken on the basis of the same variables as those used in the previous two chapters. Political knowledge is assessed by means of the answers given by respondents to the question asking them the name of the foreign minister of their country; socio-economic background is assessed by means of six indicators, concerned with gender, age, education, living standards, employment in the public or private sector and religious practice.

### ***Political knowledge and reactions to international organisations***

Let us consider successively the extent to which political knowledge, as identified by the respondents' knowledge of the foreign minister of their country, appears to be related to the extent of confidence displayed for international organisations and the extent to which these organisations are perceived to affect the lives of individuals. Thus, to begin with, levels of confidence in international organisations are indeed related to levels of political knowledge. This is so especially with respect to the UN, since there is in this respect a difference of seven points (53 v. 46 per cent) between those who know the name of the foreign minister of their country and those who do not; the difference is of three points only, on the other hand, with respect to the World Bank, of two points with respect to WTO and of one point with respect to international business.

The link between political knowledge and confidence in international organisations needs to be explored further as it does not appear to be connected to the extent of confidence in the organisations analysed here, except in terms of the UN, but primarily as to whether respondents have any view at all about confidence: only the proportion of those who stated don't know or of those who stated that they hadn't thought much about [the matter] constitutes a larger group among those who are less knowledgeable. On the contrary and remarkably, there is a uniform difference of at least nine points with respect, in this case, to all four institutions between the more knowledgeable and the less knowledgeable in favour of the more knowledgeable among all those respondents who have a view, any view, including no confidence at all, about these institutions. As a result, the more knowledgeable are not found to differ from the less knowledgeable to a greater extent if they do not have much confidence or no confidence at all in any one of the four types of organisations examined here than if they do have confidence in these organisations.

Yet this general conclusion obtains at the inter-regional level only, as it is not confirmed at the regional level, where, on the contrary, a sharp difference emerges between East and Southeast Asia and Western Europe. Admittedly, the more knowledgeable do tend to be more numerous among those who have confidence in all four sets of organisations in both regions, but the extent of the variation also differs in all four cases between the two regions. Those whose confidence in the organisations concerned is more boosted among the more



knowledgeable are the respondents from East and Southeast Asia; in Western Europe, on the contrary, the greater boost among the more knowledgeable is found in the group of those who declare having not much or no confidence at all in these organisations, a difference which is intriguing, but cannot unfortunately be accounted for on the basis of these data.

Meanwhile, with respect to the perceived effect of the UN or the multinational corporations on the lives of respondents, the pattern of answers between the more knowledgeable and the less knowledgeable is somewhat different; it might even be regarded as more normal. In both cases, at the inter-regional level, a larger proportion of those who are more knowledgeable feel that the organisation has an effect on their lives, but, while the proportion of those who feel that the UN has no effect is the same among more knowledgeable and less knowledgeable respondents, the proportion of those who feel that multi-nationals have no effect is smaller among more knowledgeable than among less knowledgeable respondents. Yet that pattern of reaction is almost entirely due to Western European respondents: there is very little difference, in East and Southeast Asia, between the more and the less knowledgeable, in the distribution of respondents among those who feel that there is an effect, those who feel that there is no effect or those who state that they do not know; among Western Europeans, on the other hand, those who feel that there is an effect tend to be more knowledgeable and those who feel that there is no effect or who state that they do not know tend to be less knowledgeable.

Knowledge of political affairs does therefore appear related, as one might have expected, to levels of confidence in international organisations and to the expectation that these organisations have an effect on the lives of respondents. Yet the relationship is not straightforward. On the whole, Western Europeans appear more affected than East and Southeast Asians; moreover, where confidence is being discussed, one finds a greater proportion of Western Europeans who are more knowledgeable not just among those who have confidence in the four sets of organisations analysed here, including the UN, but also among those who do not have confidence in these organisations. Whether this suggests that better informed Western Europeans are more realistic or are more cynical than their East and Southeast Asian counterparts cannot of course be ascertained (Table 5.3).

### ***Socio-economic background and reactions to international organisations***

With respect to the six indicators adopted in this study to analyse the socio-economic background of respondents, namely gender, age, education, religiosity, living standards and private or public employment, there does appear to be some relationship with respondents' reactions to international organisations in five cases. In one case, however, that of being employed in the public or private sectors, no difference emerges at all. This is indeed so in other contexts: the distinction therefore does not appear to have, perhaps surprisingly, any relationship with the way in which respondents react to international

Table 5.3 Confidence in, perceived effect of international organisations and political knowledge (percentage of respondents knowing the name of their foreign minister)

<i>(A) Confidence</i>								
	<i>UN</i>		<i>World Bank</i>		<i>WTO</i>		<i>Internet business</i>	
<i>Know the name of their foreign minister:</i>								
	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>
Some confidence	53	46	36	33	34	32	40	30
Little or no	34	26	35	27	35	26	39	30
Don't Know/not thought	13	28	29	40	31	42	21	31

Notes  
Some = a great deal + quite a lot; Little or no = not much + no; Dont know/not thought = don't know + hadn't thought much about it.

<i>(B) Perceived effect</i>				
	<i>UN</i>		<i>Multi-nationals</i>	
<i>Know the name of their foreign minister:</i>				
	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>N</i>
Some effect	47	39	55	45
None	41	41	32	36
Don't know	12	20	13	19

organisations any more than it appears to have in any other way in which they are affected by globalisation.

There is some relationship between gender and the extent of religious practice, on the one hand, and reactions to international organisations, on the other, but that relationship is rather weak. Indeed, in both cases, the prevailing pattern is constituted by slight differences at the level of all the substantive types of answers compensated by a larger difference at the level of don't knows. This pattern is also similar in terms of the extent of confidence in and in terms of the perceived extent of the effect of these organisations. Thus, with respect to gender, those who say that they don't know or state that they hadn't thought much about [the matter] are appreciably more likely to be found among women than among men, while men are proportionately more numerous among those who either have confidence or do not have confidence and either feel that there is an effect or do not feel that there is an effect: only in one case, with respect to the effect perceived of the multi-national corporations, does one find, beyond the fact that there are more women among the don't knows, also more women than men among the respondents who state that there is no perceived effect at all.

Similarly, it is principally in relation to don't knows that one finds a difference between those who practice their religion and those who do not: there are fewer don't knows in the first group than in the second, but, with respect to the confidence felt in international organisations, this is not the case among those who hadn't thought about [the matter]. It seems to make little or no difference whether the religious practice is large, small or non-existent, in terms of the extent to which there is or is not confidence in international organisations or in terms of the perceived effect of these bodies. The difference is between the proportion of don't knows and the proportions of those who express an opinion.

The pattern is somewhat different in the context of education, while there are also larger variations from one level of attainment to another. First, the proportion of respondents who have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the four sets of international organisations increases by at least a quarter and in the case of international business by a third from among respondents who had less than ten years to those who had over ten years of formal education. Second, the proportion of respondents who had not much confidence or no confidence at all in the four sets of international organisations examined here does not vary appreciably with levels of educational attainment. Third, there is a correspondingly sharp decrease in the proportion of don't knows and of those who stated that they hadn't thought much about [the matter]. A rather similar pattern is found with respect to the levels of perceived effect of the UN and multi-national corporations on respondents, the only difference being that, as educational attainment increases, the proportion of respondents who believe that there is no effect slightly increases in the case of the UN while it slightly decreases in the case of multi-nationals.

The pattern is a little more complex, albeit along similar lines, with respect to the relationship between age and living standards, on the one hand, and confidence in and perceived effect of international organisations, on the other: variations do not in these cases concern almost exclusively the proportion of don't knows (though it does concern them as well, as that proportion increases markedly from the younger to the older age groups). There are also differences in the types of variations which are found in relation to the various levels of confidence. For instance, with respect to the UN, in the case of age, the extent of confidence decreases monotonically among those respondents who have either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence from respondents in their twenties to those in their sixties or beyond; but, among those who have not much confidence in the organisation, it first increases from the respondents who are in their twenties to those in their thirties, before decreasing in the subsequent age groups. Meanwhile, among those who have no confidence at all in the UN, there is a slight, but equally monotonic *increase* from respondents in their twenties to respondents belonging to older age groups. The same pattern is found, only more strongly, with respect to confidence in the three economic sets of organisations, except that, with respect to the World Bank, there is a decrease in the proportion of respondents who have no confidence in the organisations from those in their fifties to those in their sixties and beyond. One can observe a similar type of

variation in terms of the perceived effect of the UN and of multi-national corporations: there is a decline of the proportion of respondents who believe that there is an effect from younger to older age groups, but little change and even a slight increase from one age group to the next among those who believe that there is no effect, while there is also an increase of the don't knows.

The relationship between living standards, on the one hand, and, on the other, confidence in or perceived effect of international organisations is also rather large and somewhat complex. The proportion of respondents who have quite a lot of confidence in international organisations tends to decrease monotonically and indeed markedly as living standards decrease, but the decrease only occurs from slightly lower living standards onwards among those who have not much confidence and it does not occur at all among those who have no confidence in these organisations. Meanwhile, the decreases at the top of the scale are compensated by a marked monotonic increase of don't knows and some increase of those who hadn't thought about [the matter] among respondents with lower living standards. The pattern is broadly similar in the case of the relationship between living standards and the perceived effect of international organisations (Table 5.4).

The links between educational achievement, age and living standards, on the one hand, and confidence in and perceived effect of international organisations, on the other, are thus substantial, while they are moderate in connection with gender and religious practice. By and large, there are few differences between the two regions in respect to these links but, while variations among countries are limited with respect to gender and religious practice, they are appreciably larger with respect to age and education. The links between reactions to international organisations and socio-economic factors, as indeed between reactions to international organisations and political knowledge are not tight enough, however, to transform the general pattern of relationships which was described in the first section of this chapter.

## **Respondents' reactions to international organisations and attitudes to globalisation**

We thus found that there was some relationship between respondents' reactions to international organisations and the extent to which these respondents had encountered globalisation; we also found that there was some relationship between respondents' reactions to international organisations and the knowledge and social background of these respondents. Yet, as was pointed out at the outset in this chapter, perhaps the most important and intriguing question is whether a link does emerge between the manner in which respondents assess international organisations and the way they react to key trends and policies characterising globalisation. The short answer is that, while one can find elements of such a link, these do not seem to be more than traces.

In this respect, moreover, as in practically all elements of this study, it is of course not permissible to assign a direction to any links which happen to be

Table 5.4 Confidence in, perceived effect of international organisations and aspects of the socio-economic background (percentages)

	<i>(A) Confidence and education</i>					<i>All</i>
	<i>Years in education</i>					
	<i>Under 10</i>	<i>10 or more</i>				
United Nations						
Some confidence	40	53			49	
Little or no	27	31			30	
Don't know/not thought	32	17			22	
World Bank						
Some confidence	30	37			34	
Little or no	25	33			30	
Don't know/not thought	46	30			36	
WTO						
Some confidence	27	36			33	
Little or no	25	32			30	
Don't know/not thought	49	32			38	
Internet Businesses						
Some confidence	29	42			39	
Little or no	31	36			34	
Don't know/not thought	36	22			27	
		<i>(B) Confidence and age</i>				
		<i>Age</i>				
	<i>20s</i>	<i>30s</i>	<i>40s</i>	<i>50s</i>	<i>60s+</i>	<i>All</i>
United Nations						
Some confidence	53	49	48	47	43	49
Little or no	28	31	30	30	28	30
Don't know/not thought	19	20	21	22	30	22
World Bank						
Some confidence	40	35	35	31	27	34
Little or no	29	33	31	31	27	34
Don't know/not thought	31	33	34	38	47	36
WTO						
Some confidence	38	34	32	31	26	33
Little or no	28	32	31	29	27	29
Don't know/not thought	34	35	36	40	48	38
International businesses						
Some confidence	47	42	39	35	28	39
Little or no	31	35	36	36	34	34
Don't know/not thought	22	23	26	29	39	27

*continued*

Table 5.4 continued

<i>(C) Confidence and living standards</i>						
<i>Living standards</i>						
	<i>High</i>	<i>Relatively high</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Relatively low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Total</i>
United Nations						
Some confidence	56	55	49	44	36	49
Little or no	30	32	30	29	25	30
Don't know/not thought	14	13	21	27	40	22
World Bank						
Some confidence	42	37	35	30	27	34
Little or no	34	36	30	29	24	30
Don't know/not thought	24	27	35	41	49	36
WTO						
Some confidence	41	38	33	29	24	33
Little or no	29	33	29	29	25	29
Don't know/not thought	30	29	27	43	51	38
International businesses						
Some confidence	50	44	40	34	29	39
Little or no	32	37	34	34	30	34
Don't know/not thought	18	19	26	32	41	27
<i>(D) Perceived effect and education</i>						
<i>Years in education</i>						
	<i>Under 10</i>		<i>10 or more</i>		<i>All</i>	
United Nations						
Some confidence	37		45		43	
Little or no	40		41		41	
Don't know/not thought	23		14		17	
Multi-nationals						
Some confidence	40		54		49	
Little or no	36		33		34	
Don't know/not thought	23		13		17	
<i>(E) Perceived effect and age</i>						
<i>Age in years</i>						
	<i>20s</i>	<i>30s</i>	<i>40s</i>	<i>50s</i>	<i>60s+</i>	<i>All</i>
United Nations						
Some confidence	45	44	44	42	42	42
Little or no	41	42	41	40	40	41
Don't know/not thought	14	14	16	18	23	17

continued

Table 5.4 continued

Multi-nationals						
Some confidence	53	51	51	48	39	49
Little or no	34	35	34	34	26	34
Don't know/not thought	14	14	15	19	25	17
<i>(F) Perceived effect and living standards</i>						
<i>Living standards</i>						
	<i>High</i>	<i>Relatively high</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Relatively low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Total</i>
United Nations						
Some confidence	64	60	50	42	33	49
Little or no	28	29	35	36	39	34
Don't know/not thought	8	11	16	23	29	17
Multi-nationals						
Some confidence	55	48	44	36	29	42
Little or no	36	41	41	41	42	41
Don't know/not thought	9	11	16	23	29	17

## Notes

Some = a great deal + quite a lot; Little or no = not much + no; Don't know/not thought = don't know + hadn't thought much about it.

found: even if a reaction to an international organisation seems in principle likely to antecede a reaction to a particular globalisation trend or policy, it is never possible to state without a shadow of doubt that this is the case, except on the basis of empirical evidence; it is always possible, and in some cases perhaps also likely, that someone's reaction to a particular development in a given aspect of globalisation will influence attitudes to a particular international organisation. Throughout this section, therefore, reference will only be made to links or relationships, not to influence.

A severe selection had to be undertaken to reduce to a manageable number the vast array of cases in which respondents' reactions to international organisations could be compared with reactions to the judgements passed by these respondents about the existence and value of an impact of globalisation on the trends and policies analysed here. Such a selection took place in three ways. First, the analysis concentrated on four of the eight fields over which the views of respondents relating to the impact of globalisation were tested in Chapter 4, namely 'what one can buy in shops', 'the kind of things reported in news on TV', job security and the standard of living. Second, reactions to international organisations were recoded into three sets of answers both with respect to 'confidence' ('some confidence', 'not much or no confidence' and 'don't know') and with respect to the perceived 'effect' ('an effect', 'no effect' and 'don't know'). Finally, in the questionnaire itself, respondents had been given the opportunity to react in six ways to what they felt was the

impact of globalisation: they could assess that the impact was positive or that it was negative; they could state that that impact was neither positive nor negative or that there was no impact at all; they could say that they did not know or had not thought much about the matter. By means of recodes, these six sets of answers were reduced to three. The first of these recodes aimed at eliciting whether any relationship emerged with levels of confidence in or perceived effect of international organisations when either an evaluation, any evaluation, was made or none was made about the existence or nature of the impact of globalisation on trends and policies. The second recode aimed at eliciting whether such a relationship existed when respondents were either neutral or not neutral about the value of any impact of globalisation on trends and policies. The third recode aimed at eliciting whether such a relationship existed when respondents felt either positive or negative about the nature of any impact of globalisation on trends and policies.

### ***Confidence in international organisations and attitudes to the impact of globalisation***

Let us begin by examining how far there appears to be a relationship between respondents' confidence in international organisations and attitudes to globalisation in reply to the three sets of assessments which have just been described and which relate to what the impact of globalisation on trends and policies meant to respondents. First, there is indeed a relationship between confidence in international organisations and the extent to which an evaluation, any evaluation, was made by respondents about the impact of globalisation on trends and policies: what one finds is a slight decline from those who state that they have some confidence to those who state that they have little or no confidence in these organisations; but the bulk of the decline emerges at the level of those who state that they cannot say what is their level of confidence in international organisations. That pattern is almost identical with respect to the four fields over which the assessment of the impact of globalisation is examined here – buying in shops, reporting of news on TV, job security and standard of living – and it covers all four sets of organisations: those who do not know whether they have confidence in any of the four international organisations tend also to be drawn from among those who do not evaluate the impact of globalisation. This is only a relative tendency, moreover, as between two-thirds and three-quarters of those who do not know about whether they have confidence in these four international organisations do evaluate the impact of globalisation in the four fields examined here. The link between confidence in international organisations and the evaluation of the impact of trends and policies is thus limited at this level.

Second, when positive or negative answers about the effect of globalisation are contrasted to neutral evaluations (the impact is judged to be neither good nor bad), the link is also limited in its extent, but it is particularly low with respect to buying in shops and, perhaps surprisingly, to job security. With respect to the



nature of the respondents' reaction to the possible impact of globalisation on reporting of news TV and the standard of living, one does find a decline in the proportion of evaluative answers, but a small one, between those respondents who have some confidence and those who have not much or no confidence in the four organisations examined here, although it is particularly small in the case of the UN with respect to the standard of living. On the other hand, in this case, the proportion of evaluative answers tends to be about the same among those who state that they do not know what is their level of confidence in international organisations and those who state that they have little or no confidence in these organisations.

Third, admittedly, there is a greater difference in terms of the relationship between views about the confidence of respondents in international organisations and assessments about the impact of globalisation when positive answers are contrasted to negative answers. In this case, moreover, the main pattern is for the lowest proportion of positive views about the nature of the impact of globalisation to be found among those respondents who have little or no confidence in any one of the four sets of international organisations and not among those respondents who do not know what level of confidence they have in these organisations. The gap is smallest in relation to buying in shops (4 or 5 per cent); it is somewhat larger with respect to the impact of globalisation on the standard of living (6 to 9 per cent) and is at its largest with respect to the impact of globalisation on reporting of news on TV and on job security (11 to 13 per cent, except with respect to the UN on job security where it is 7 per cent only). As a matter of fact, there is even a greater proportion of negative answers with respect to the value of the impact of globalisation in these fields among those who have little or no confidence in international organisations than there is among those who do not know what level of confidence they have in these organisations: this is so in all cases except in relation to the UN with respect to the impact of globalisation on buying in shops where it is exactly the same. This is perhaps the clearest case of a genuine connection between views about international organisations and views about the impact of globalisation on specific trends and policies: the link is significant, although one should not exaggerate its overall strength.

Despite this last finding, the relationship between the extent of confidence of respondents in international organisations and the ways in which these respondents react to the impact of globalisation on trends and policies does remain, on the whole, limited. What one finds more frequently is that those who answer don't know to the confidence question are more often, though not always, likely not to evaluate either the effect of globalisation on trends and policies: this means that those who state they do not know with respect to one side of the equation (international organisations) tend to be drawn from among those who do not know with respect to the other side (the value of the impact of globalisation on specific trends and policies). There is therefore a link, but one which tends to be reduced to less truly substantive aspects of what the relationship might be (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Confidence in international organisations and positive impact of globalisation on four sets of trends and policies (percentages of respondents who view the impact as positive)

	<i>Buying in shops</i>	<i>News on TV</i>	<i>Job security</i>	<i>Standard of living</i>
United Nations				
Some confidence	82	76	60	79
Little or no	77	63	53	73
Don't know/not thought	77	76	60	75
World Bank				
Some confidence	81	78	63	81
Little or no	77	62	53	73
Don't know/not thought	79	75	57	75
WTO				
Some confidence	81	78	63	80
Little or no	76	64	51	72
Don't know/not thought	80	73	60	77
International businesses				
Some confidence	81	77	64	81
Little or no	77	64	50	72
Don't know/not thought	80	75	59	76

Notes

Some = a great deal + quite a lot; Little or no = not much + no; Don't know/not thought = don't know + hadn't thought much about it.

***Perceived belief in the effect on one's life of international organisations and attitudes to the impact of globalisation***

Relationships are also rather limited, as well as somewhat erratic, when the perceived effect of the UN and multi-national corporations on the life of the respondents is examined in connection with the effect of globalisation on the four types of trends and policies examined here. First, with respect to all four types, there is indeed a relationship between respondents providing or not providing an assessment of the impact of globalisation on trends and policies and stating that international organisations have or do not have an effect on one's life. If we first consider the distinction between stating or not stating whether there is an impact at all of globalisation on these trends and policies, there is even an appreciable difference (about 10 points) in the case of what one can buy in shops with respect to the perceived effect of both the UN and multi-national corporations on the views of respondents between those who say that these organisations have an effect and those who say that they have none; there is then a further 10 point difference between this last response and that of those who state that they do not know whether there is such an effect. In the case of the reporting of news on TV, a substantial relationship is also found to exist between the perceived effect of the UN and multi-national corporations on the life of respondents and the fact

that the respondents do or do not know whether globalisation has an impact on such a reporting; that relationship is also marked both when those who state that these organisations have an effect are contrasted to those who state that these organisations have no effect and when this last group is contrasted to those who state that they do not know whether these organisations have an effect. The same kind of relationship is found with respect to the extent to which globalisation has an impact on job security and on the standard of living of individuals. To this extent, therefore, there is a link between the perceived effect of international organisations and the feeling that there is an impact of globalisations on the trends and policies examined here.

Second, however, although there is also a relationship, it is weaker when neutral answers to the question of the impact of globalisation (there is an impact, but it is neither positive nor negative), on the one hand, and positive or negative answers, on the other, are compared with attitudes about the effect of international organisations on the lives of respondents. With respect to all four fields analysed here – buying in shops, reporting of news on TV, job security and standard of living the extent of the variation is about the same – from 2 to 5 per cent – between those who state that there is an effect and those who state that there is none; there is then a further difference of about 4 per cent between this last group and the group of those who state that they do not know what is the effect of international organisations on their lives.

Finally, and perhaps more crucially, when positive answers are contrasted to negative answers with respect to the assessment of the impact of globalisation on the four types of trends and policies examined here, the level of the relationship with the perceived existence of an effect of international organisations is the weakest among the groups of relationships examined here, as it is typically of about 3 to 4 per cent only. One does find some difference, however, in that, with respect to buying in shops, and – but less so – with respect to job security and the standard of living, those respondents who do not perceive an effect of international organisations are slightly more numerous in being negative about the nature of the impact of globalisation, while, with respect to reporting of news on TV, this is the contrary: but, in all cases, the variations are not more than 6 per cent and, in most cases, much smaller.

The perceived effect of international organisations on the life of respondents is thus strongest when the contrast is between giving and not giving an evaluative answer. This shows that there is some linkage between views on international organisations and views on the impact of globalisation on trends and policies, but that linkage appears limited as one moves to when a neutral evaluation (neither positive nor negative) is contrasted to a positive or negative evaluation; the linkage is weakest of all when positive and negative answers are contrasted. The relationship between the way in which respondents judge the effect of globalisation on trends and policies and the way they assess the effect of international organisations on their lives thus appears to be primarily between those who do and those who do not have a view. Meanwhile, those who have a positive or a negative view of the value of the impact of globalisation are found

Table 5.6 Perceived effect of international organisations and positive impact of globalisation on four sets of trends and policies (percentages of respondents who view the impact as positive)

	<i>Buying in shops</i>	<i>News on TV</i>	<i>Job security</i>	<i>Standard of living</i>
United Nations				
Some confidence	80	71	60	77
Little or no	78	72	56	77
Don't know/not thought	80	77	59	74
Multi-nationals				
Some confidence	82	71	60	78
Little or no	75	72	56	75
Don't know/not thought	78	76	58	73

Notes

Some = a great deal + quite a lot; Little or no = not much + no; Don't know/not thought = don't know + hadn't thought much about it.

in broadly the same proportions among those who perceive an effect of international organisations on their lives, those who do not perceive the existence of such an effect and those who do not know whether there is an effect at all. Such a finding does not suggest that the linkage is really strong (Table 5.6).

\* \* \*

Most respondents are aware of many aspects of the impact of globalisation on their life and many do at least pass a judgement about the value of this impact: in the same vein, respondents are also aware of the part played by international organisations alongside concrete trends and policies. Large numbers of these respondents are willing to state whether they have confidence in these organisations, specifically the UN and a number of economic organisations. International organisations are also viewed by a substantial proportion of respondents as having an effect on their lives, although East and Southeast Asian respondents, in general, tend to believe that they are less affected, by the multi-nationals at least, than Western Europeans. It is therefore right to consider these organisations as part of a 'panoply' of developments contributing to the sentiment that the contemporary world is (or perhaps is becoming) 'one world'.

Yet what is also manifest is that there are very clear limits to the links between attitudes of respondents with respect to the confidence they have in international organisations, on the one hand, and, on the other, the judgements of these respondents about the impact of globalisation on specific trends and policies. These limits are also clear when one relates views about that impact to the perceived effect of international organisations on the respondents' life. Thus, while these organisations are recognised, they are recognised, so to speak, independently, in most cases, from the views on the trends and the policies which are

probably more commonly felt to characterise globalisation. A key question was raised at the beginning of this chapter as to whether respondents did relate in their minds international organisations to other aspects of globalisation: the answer to that question appears to have to be negative, at any rate on the basis of the current evidence: the links between the two aspects are rather tenuous; they mainly distinguish those who know about the problems from those who do not.

The position of international organisations in the development of globalisation thus appears separated, in the minds of most respondents, from other aspects of the impact of globalisation. Admittedly, what is needed to be more definite on the matter are analyses designed to examine whether there is a trend for international organisations to come closer over time to other elements in the globalisation panoply: only with longitudinal studies, however, will it become possible to determine how far these international organisations are gradually better recognised as constituting instruments having an effect on the globalisation process. Only then can one hope to go further and begin to discover whether these organisations help to render the whole process more legitimate in the minds of citizens, for instance by being perceived as able to curb to an extent some of the moves which might otherwise lead to an unfettered form of globalisation.

**Part II**

**Encountering and  
responding to globalisation**



## 6 Identity, inequality and globalisation

*Richard Sinnott*

### **Introduction**

With relatively few exceptions, people identify with their 'nation', that is they think of themselves as French, or Korean, or Irish, or Thai, or whatever. The intensity of national identity may vary from individual to individual. Within any given state, the object of 'national' identification may be contested and this contestation may lead ultimately to the formation of a new nation-state or, at a minimum, to special institutional arrangements providing either sub-state autonomy or guaranteed participation in governance for the dissenting group. It is also true that national identity is not the only collective identification that people espouse; people may identify with their family, with their locality, with their ethnic group, with their social class, with their religion, or with one or more groups dedicated to various beliefs or causes. Despite these necessary qualifications, national identity not only persists but possesses an institutionalised salience that makes it a potentially important factor in national and international politics and, in particular, in the politics of globalisation.

In one interpretation of the relationship between national identity and globalisation, national identity provides a focal point for resistance and is, accordingly, strengthened and made more salient by globalisation. Other interpretations argue just the opposite: globalisation erodes or undermines or bypasses national identity, replacing it with a complex array of objects of identification that enable individuals to negotiate their way between the global and the local and between the personal and the political as the context requires. This chapter seeks to shed some empirical light on these conflicting interpretations by examining people's sense of national identity and how this is affected by exposure to globalisation.

The first task is to clarify the concept of national identity and to develop some theoretically based expectations as to the potential effects of national identity on mass responses to globalisation. Having briefly considered the measurement problems involved in pursuing these issues, the chapter then provides an overview of the similarities and differences in sense of identity between the two regions and the eighteen countries that are the focus of this project. In so far as the data permit, it considers how people's sense of national identity has changed over the course of the 1990s when, most observers agree, there was a noticeable



acceleration in the process of globalisation. The chapter concludes with an analysis of some of the factors that account for variations in identity across countries and between individuals.

### Identity and its variants

In order to define what we mean by the term national identity, we must first of all define the term nation. For this purpose, we draw on the set of definitions put forward by Max Weber.<sup>1</sup> Weber began by defining ‘ethnic group’ as ‘those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or customs or both, or because of memories of colonisation or migration’ (Weber, 1978, p. 389). The key point here is that ethnicity is *subjective*. A group is an ethnic group if it *believes* in its common descent. The basis of that belief can vary enormously and may be nothing more than similarity of customs or shared memories of having been colonised or of having migrated.

This emphasis on the subjective reappears prominently in Weber’s definition of the term nation:

In so far as there is at all a common object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term ‘nation’, it is apparently located in the field of politics. One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own.

(Weber, 1948, p. 176)

Elsewhere Weber elaborates on the variety of potential bases on which such a ‘community of sentiment’ might be constructed:

the concept [of nation] seems to refer – if it refers at all to a uniform phenomenon – to a specific kind of pathos which is linked to the idea of a powerful political community of people who share a common language or religion or common customs, or political memories; such a state may already exist or it may be desired.

(1978, p. 395)

These two definitions capture the essential elements of the ideas of nation and, by implication, of national identity. A nation is constituted by a community of sentiment or a subjective sense of belonging together (i.e. an identity) that can be based on a variety of shared experiences and that is distinguishable from other communities of sentiment or identities by the accompanying demand for the right to the autonomous exercise of political power by the group or community in question.<sup>2</sup> This reference to the exercise of political power is an essential part of the definition of nation and national identity; this is

what differentiates national identity from, for example, ethnic identity. Thus if, over the course of time, an ethnic identity becomes associated with the aspiration to political autonomy, it is no longer merely an ethnic identity and has become a national identity.

Because political autonomy can be a matter of degree, identities that have the in-built demand for political autonomy that has just been described can vary in terms of what is demanded. The 'normal' demand or aspiration is for the establishment of a full-blown nation-state or the preservation, protection and development of a nation-state where it already exists. However, the aspiration may only extend to partial political autonomy and, accordingly, the community that is the basis of the identity may be a sub-national rather than a national community. Another closely related variant of identity occurs when the object of identification lies above the nation-state. In this case the community of sentiment is a supra-national one.

As well as varying in terms of the *objects* (sub-national, national and supra-national) to which they are attached, the identities we are concerned with also vary in their *intensity*. Being French or Korean, Irish or Thai is more important or less important to different people in different societies. Likewise, at the supra-national level, the intensity of the feeling of being European or Islamic or Chinese is likely to vary considerably as between these different identities and between the different groups and individuals that espouse them. Finally, the intensity or degree of importance accompanying a given sense of identity is not necessarily static. Indeed, as noted above, some argue that a decline in attachment to the nation-state is an essential by-product of globalisation. Accordingly, if we are to examine the relationships between identity and globalisation, we need evidence of the *trajectory* of identity as well as of its objects and its intensity.

### **Theories linking identity and integration**

Specifying the links between identity and mass responses to globalisation is not an easy task. One might suppose, for instance, that intensity of identity and responses to globalisation would be negatively related – the stronger the sense of national identity, the greater the resistance to globalisation. However, as one of the classic treatments of European integration pointed out, support for international integration can be positively related to a well-formed and confident sense of national identity and may even require such underlying strong identities in the participating states (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 881–885). Analogously, it could be argued that a strong sense of national identity is compatible with or even conducive to support for international integration in the form of globalisation.

The consequences of supra-national identification might seem more straightforward – on the face of it one would expect a supra-national identity to render its holder more favourably disposed to globalisation. This is likely to vary, however, depending on the supra-national identity in question and on the role that the political community that is the object of identification is seen to play in the international

system. In short, the effects of identity on responses to globalisation appear, at first sight, to be very indeterminate.

In order to reduce this indeterminacy, we draw on the theory of nationalism elaborated by Ernest Gellner, in particular on his insistence that nations and national identities, far from being primordial or natural phenomena, are created by the processes of modernisation and industrialisation or, more precisely, by their uneven diffusion. In exploring the sources of the political mobilisation of identity, Gellner argued that the determining factor is the relationship between identity on the one hand and the experience of equality and inequality on the other: it is when a sense of identity is accompanied by perceptions of unequal or unfair treatment of the group and when the inequality can be countered by being seen as national discrimination that identity becomes a really potent source of political mobilisation. As he puts it:

What all this amounts to is this: during the early period of industrialization, entrants into the new order who are drawn from cultural and linguistic groups that are distant from those of the more advanced centre, suffer considerable disadvantages which are even greater than those of other economically weak new proletarians who have the advantage of sharing the culture of the political and economic rulers. But the cultural/linguistic distance and capacity to differentiate themselves from others which is such a handicap for individuals, can be and often is eventually a positive advantage for entire collectivities, or potential collectivities, of these victims of the newly emergent world. It enables them to conceive and express their resentments and discontents in intelligible terms.

(Gellner, 1983, p. 62)

Gellner developed these ideas in the context of exploring assimilationist versus secessionist responses to the advancing uneven wave of industrialisation and, more generally, in the context of an examination of core-periphery relations. *Mutatis mutandis*, globalisation is the contemporary version of Gellner's 'newly emergent world' and 'wave of industrialisation' and is characterised by all the unevenness that made its predecessor so disruptive (see, for example, Hurrell and Woods, 1999). As Held *et al.* note, rather than global convergence or the arrival of a single world society, for many observers:

globalisation is associated with new patterns of global stratification in which some states, societies and communities are becoming increasingly enmeshed in the global order while others are becoming increasingly marginalised. A new configuration of global power relations is held to be crystallising as the North-South division rapidly gives way to a new international division of labour such that 'the familiar pyramid of the core-periphery hierarchy is no longer a geographic but a social division of the world economy' (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. xii).

(Held *et al.*, 1999, p. 8)

In summary, adaptation of Gellner's core-periphery or conflict theory of nationalism and its application to the phenomenon of globalisation contributes substantially to specifying the conditions under which national identity is likely to have positive or negative effects on mass responses to globalisation. The key hypothesis is that national identities that are accompanied by perceptions of inequality will be associated with negative responses or resistance to globalisation while identities that are accompanied by feelings of equality will be associated with positive responses.<sup>3</sup>

### **Measuring identity**

Identity, whether national, supra-national or sub-national, has proved to be singularly difficult to measure in mass attitude research. This difficulty is reflected in the continuing proliferation of different measures in contemporary survey research and in the failure of long-standing efforts in this area to converge on a common approach. The early Eurobarometers, the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey attempted to measure national and other geo-political identities by means of a three-part preferential question about belonging to 'geographical groups'. The wording of the question was as follows: Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? And the next? And which do you belong to least of all? The geographical groups presented to respondents were: locality or town where you live; county (or region) where you live; your country as a whole; Europe (or other continent); the world as a whole.

There are two problems with this instrument. The first is the explicit reference to geographical groups. Such a reference carries the danger of privileging local identification over national and supra-national identifications, which are less geographical and more political. The second problem compounds the first. By asking a preferential question and by limiting the choice to three (first, second and least preferred), this approach fails to collect data on each potential level of identity. If a respondent, perhaps influenced by the reference to geographical groups, chooses locality or town first, county (region) second and world last, one has virtually no data on their attitude to national or supra-national identity other than that they come after local identifications. Despite these limitations, the original EVS/WVS wording is still being used in the current waves of the EVS and WVS surveys (EVS 1999–2000) and WVS (1995). The 1995 ISSP<sup>4</sup> National Identity survey made a substantial break with this dominant approach. It retained five somewhat altered categories or levels of identity, but dropped the explicit reference to geographical groups and, most importantly, used an ordinal scale for each identity in place of the partial preference ordering of the EVS/WVS question. The full wording of the ISSP question was as follows: How close to you feel to ... your neighbourhood (or village); your town or city; your county (or region); [name of country]; Europe. The response categories were: very close, close, not very close, not close at all, and can't choose. This is certainly an advance in so far as it obtains data on all the

levels of identity specified and avoids an excessively geographical emphasis. However, one might still have reservations about the possible confusion between a physical and a psychological proximity, either of which could be implied in the question 'How close do you feel to ...'. The Eurobarometer has also occasionally used a question of this sort, asking respondents 'How attached do you feel to ... your town or village; region; country; Europe (as a whole)?' The response categories were (very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all attached). The term 'attached to' is probably better than the term 'close to' though the Eurobarometer version is open to the criticism that it presupposes some degree of attachment, thus risking influencing the respondent in a positive direction.

The main development of Eurobarometer identity questions has taken a different route. It was noted above that the Eurobarometer started out with a preferential, geographical-belongingness question. However, it quite quickly departed from this approach, due in part, one suspects, to the low probability of the occurrence of European identity as either first or second choice in the truncated preference scale. The new instrument, which was introduced in 1982, started with a categorical question: 'As well as thinking of yourself as [nationality], do you ever think of yourself as European?' Those who answered affirmatively were then asked: 'Does this occur: often, sometimes or rarely?' This question has the advantage of focusing unambiguously on the object of interest – in this case, sense of European identity – and of defining it in terms of a clear psychological identification (... think of yourself as ...). It could be argued, however, that the response scale is unnecessarily limited to a frequency specification (often, sometimes, rarely) and that a straightforward intensity or salience scale would have served the purpose better.<sup>5</sup>

Of the measures just outlined, the ISSP closeness measure and a Eurobarometer-style combination of a categorical 'Do you think of yourself as ...' question followed by a scale question to measure the intensity of identification are the most plausible. On the face of it, it is difficult to choose between these two approaches. Fortunately, the issue can be resolved empirically by considering the findings of a study that used both the ISSP question and the Eurobarometer-style question in the same survey. Detailed analysis of these data<sup>6</sup> show that the correlations between each of the two measures and a range of relevant variables measuring nationalist/integrationist attitudes are substantially larger in the case of the scaled identification measures. For example, the correlation between sense of national identity and preferring to be a citizen of the country in question (Republic of Ireland) rather than being a citizen of any other country is 0.24 when identity is measured by means of the ISSP closeness measure but 0.42 *in the same dataset* when identity is measured by means of the scaled identification measure. Similarly the correlation between European identity and overall attitude to European integration is 0.12 for the ISSP closeness measure and 0.32 for the scaled identification measure (again, in the same dataset and using the same 'dependent' variable). These results suggest that a combination of a categorical identification question followed by a scaled intensity or importance question is

the best way to measure identity. Accordingly, in the Asia–Europe Survey (ASES) project, national identity in the eighteen states in the survey was measured by posing the following pair of questions (taking Japan as the example):<sup>7</sup>

Q.1. Many people think of themselves as being part of a particular nationality, for example as French or American or Japanese or whatever. Do you think of yourself as [Japanese] or as belonging to another nationality, or do you not think of yourself in this way?

Q.2. Overall, how important is it to you that you are [Japanese (or other nationality if indicated)]?

Between them, these questions capture both the overall incidence and the intensity of national identity. However, our discussion highlighted the need to also assess other aspects of national identity, namely its trajectory and the sense of equality or inequality associated with it. The discussion also pointed to the need to examine other identities, namely identification with supra-national and sub-national communities. Ideally, in seeking to measure the trajectory of national or any other identity one would be able to rely on repeated observations at appropriate intervals; in other words, one would have longitudinal data. The ASES study, as a first of its kind, did not have such data.<sup>8</sup> In its absence, we resort to respondents' subjective assessments of whether their identity has become more or less important over the last 10 years. In the case of national identity, the question was

Q.3. Overall, has being [read out answer to Q.1 or Q.1a] become more important or less important to you, or has its importance stayed much the same over the last 10 years?

The experience of equality/inequality in relation to national identity was measured in the ASES survey on two dimensions – respect and fair treatment. The questions were:

Q.4. In general, do you think that [Japan] and the [Japanese] people are respected by people in other countries, as much as they ought to be? (Circle one answer)

Q.6. And in general, do you think that [Japan] and the [Japanese] people are treated fairly in international economic and political affairs? (Circle one answer)

Finally, the incidence, intensity and trajectory of supra-national identities were measured by the following questions:

Q.9. Some people also think of themselves as being part of a larger group that includes people from other countries, for example, as European, Asian, Chinese, Islamic. How about you, do you think of yourself in this way?

Q.10. Overall, how important is it to you that you are [read out answer to Q.9]?

Q.11. Overall, has being [read out answer to Q.9] become more important or less important to you, or has its importance stayed much the same over the last ten years?

**National identity – incidence, intensity and trajectory**

The evidence relating to national identity in the eighteen countries in this study bears out the proposition with which this chapter opened: people do identify with the nation – to the tune of an average of 90 per cent in our Asian sample and 89 per cent in the European sample. In the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia the proportion who identify with the nation is as close to 100 per cent as makes no difference<sup>9</sup> and the proportion is also extremely high in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In both our regions, however, some countries have




Figure 6.1a Incidence and intensity of national identity – East and Southeast Asian countries.




Figure 6.1b Incidence and intensity of national identity – Western European countries.

significant minorities in this regard. These minorities are of two types: those who identify with another nationality and those who identify with none. People with the latter outlook – either pre- or post-nationalist – are very common in Japan (one-third of the sample) and quite common in China (one-fifth) and in Germany (also one-fifth). Smaller non-nationalist minorities are to be found in Taiwan and in all the European countries except Greece, Ireland and Portugal.

When it comes to identification with an alternative nationality, only one of the eighteen countries in the project can claim to be a multi-national state. The country in question is Great Britain where 20 per cent of the population opt for some alternative when asked whether they think of themselves as British. The alternatives to which people looked for identification reflect the component parts of Great Britain and the size of those component parts, namely English, Scottish and Welsh. Britain also has a substantial number of people identifying with one of a heterogeneous range of other nationalities. Apart from Britain, a handful of other countries have smaller but still significant national minorities. In the case of Europe, this occurs in Spain (mostly Basques and Catalans) and in Sweden (mostly Finns) and, in the case of Asia, in Taiwan (mostly Taiwanese) and in Singapore (mostly Malaysian).

In summary, globalisation occurs in a context of widespread and largely homogeneous national identification. Thus, it encounters states that are not just governmental apparatuses but are also collectivities or, in Weber’s terms, communities of sentiment. What we need to consider now, however, is not just the incidence of national identity but the intensity with which people identify with the nation.

There is a substantial contrast in the intensity of national identification between the nine East and Southeast Asian states and the nine Western European



states included in the ASES project. As the regional averages in Figure 6.1 show, the tendency to regard one's national identity as extremely important is much more common in the East and Southeast Asian states as a whole (just under 60 per cent) than in the group of Western European states as a whole (just over 40 per cent). The contrast is particularly sharp if we focus on sub-groups of states within each region. Thus very high levels of commitment to national identity are found in three East and Southeast Asian states – the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia – where between 70 and 90 per cent of people say that their national identity is extremely important to them. At the other end of the scale, this level of commitment to the nation is relatively rare (around 30 per cent) in four European states – Germany, France, Sweden and Spain. There are of course notable exceptions to the overall regional contrast – Greece's level of commitment to the nation-state is close to that found in the three most 'nationalist' East and Southeast Asian state, while Japan is indistinguishable in this regard from the four distinctly less committed European states.

These contrasting patterns are partly the result of divergent paths in the development of the importance of national identity during the preceding decade (the 1990s). As Figure 6.2 shows, the majority of people in all but two of the East and Southeast Asian countries felt that their sense of national identity had become more important over the period in question. In the Western European region by contrast, majorities in all the states felt that the importance of their sense of identity had either remained static or declined. Within East and Southeast Asia, Malaysia stands out on the side of growing intensification of the sense of national identity, while Japan and Taiwan mainly experienced stability in this regard. Within the group of Western European States, there is a substantial





Figure 6.2a Trajectory of national identity over the last ten years – East and Southeast Asian countries.



*Figure 6.2b* Trajectory of national identity over the last ten years – Western European countries.

contrast between Spain, Ireland and Portugal on the side of relatively greater growth in the importance of national identity and Germany, Sweden, France and the United Kingdom on the side of minimal increase.

From the point of view of our interest in globalisation, the foregoing evidence can be briefly summarised. Overwhelming majorities in most of the states under consideration acknowledge a national identity. This identity is accorded at least some importance by very large majorities in all the states in question bar one (Japan) and it is seen as extremely important by majorities in ten of the eighteen states. On the issue of change over time, majorities see their national identity as having grown in importance in all but two of the Asian states (Japan and Taiwan) and as having either grown in importance or been stable in this respect by overwhelming majorities in all of the Western European states. In short, if globalisation is undermining the foundations of national identity, its progress in this regard has been very slow. The most that can be said is that, by virtue of somewhat lower levels of attribution of extreme importance to national identity and by virtue of the existence of (mostly small) minorities who have no sense of national identity at all, some states show cultural attributes that are consistent with the thesis that globalisation has led to some degree of erosion of national identity. The states in question are Germany, Sweden, France and Britain in Europe and Japan and Taiwan in Asia. This conclusion remains very tentative because the lower levels of commitment to national identity may well be due to other (national) factors. For example, the quite low initial rate of endorsement of national identity and low sense of either the importance or the growth in importance of national identity may have roots in Japanese culture and history that have little or nothing to do with globalisation. In short, much more analysis will

be required before we can either confirm or refute the causal assumptions regarding the impact of globalisation on identity that pepper the literature. In working our way through the possible causal connections, the next step implied by the argument presented earlier in this chapter is to consider the issue of identity and inequality.

### Identity and inequality

As noted in the discussion of measurement issues, perceptions of equality and inequality were tackled in the ASES questionnaire by means of two questions, one relating to the degree of respect accorded to the country and nationality in question by people in other countries and one relating to their fair treatment in international economic and political affairs. In the case of respect, both regions include some countries in which the perception of lack of respect is quite widespread and some countries in which this perception is quite rare (Figure 6.3). The result is that the average level of perceived lack of respect in each of our two regions is almost identical. The Asian countries in which the perception that appropriate respect is not accorded to the nationality and people in question is quite prevalent in South Korea and Taiwan. Among the Western European countries, relatively high levels of perceived lack of respect are found in Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. The countries at the low end of the spectrum of perceived lack of respect are Malaysia and Singapore in East and Southeast Asia and Ireland and Sweden in Western Europe.





Figure 6.3a Perception of disrespect for and unfair treatment of national identity – East and Southeast Asian countries.



*Figure 6.3b* Perception of disrespect for and unfair treatment of national identity – Western European countries.

When it comes to perceptions of fair treatment in economic and political affairs, the two regional profiles diverge to a much greater extent. In the case of the countries in Western Europe, the incidence of perceptions of unfair treatment is, by and large, similar to the incidence of perceptions of lack of respect (see Figure 6.3). In East and Southeast Asia, however, the experience of inequality is much more prevalent when the indicator is the more concrete one of unfair treatment in economic and political affairs as compared with the more intangible notion of lack of respect. The tendency for perceptions of unfair treatment in the economic and political realm to outstrip perceptions of lack of respect is particularly evident in Thailand and Indonesia and to a lesser extent in China, Malaysia and Taiwan.

Given the ways in which a succession of international economic crises affected a number of countries in East and Southeast Asia in the years preceding the ASES survey, the question of the trajectory of perceptions of inequality is particularly relevant. The average assessment in the two regions as a whole on the question of the trajectory of respect is rather similar – just over one-half give a positive assessment in this regard in the East and Southeast Asia countries while just under one-half do so in the Western European countries. Moreover, it is striking that the belief that things have got a lot worse in regard to equality of respect is relatively rare (see Figure 6.4). However, if we include the category of a little worse, we find substantial proportions of people believing that respect for their nationality has declined in the last 10 years in eight of the eighteen countries. This perceived decline is particularly noticeable in Indonesia and Great




Figure 6.4a Trajectory of perception of respect for national identity in the last ten years – East and Southeast Asian countries.




Figure 6.4b Trajectory of perception of respect for national identity in the last ten years – Western European countries.

Britain and also occurs to a lesser extent in the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea and in France, Greece and Sweden.

At the other end of the scale, strongly positive assessments (‘a lot better’) are found among one-third to one-half of respondents in four countries – Malaysia, China, Singapore and Ireland. If we add in the ‘a little better’ response, the proportion of positive assessments becomes overwhelming in these four countries and, additionally, is well above the majority mark in Thailand and in Portugal and Spain.

The picture that has just been drawn is derived from the data on the trajectory of respect for the country and its people. However, as Figure 6.5 shows, almost identical patterns of response apply in the case of perceptions of the trajectory of unfair treatment in economic and political affairs. The only significant qualification to be made to this observation is that, when attention is focused on fair/unfair economic and political treatment rather than on respect, South Korea has a less negative view of the direction of change while Thailand has a more negative one. In considering this contrast, however, one should bear in mind that the basic South Korean assessment is highly, and more or less equally, negative on both the respect and fair treatment dimensions whereas the Thai assessment is quite positive on respect and much more negative on economic and political treatment.

Looking at the matter from a globalisation perspective, the evidence just considered underlines the importance of testing the theory that perceived discrimination against the nation, whether by the peoples of other countries or in the processes of international economic and political affairs, may result in opposition to globalisation. At a minimum, perceptions of inequality (of either the respect or fair treatment variety or both) are quite widespread in each of our two regions, such views being held by some 30 plus per cent of Asian and European respondents. At the same time, the incidence of these perceptions varies substantially by country – from South Korea and Taiwan at one end to Malaysia and Singapore at the other in Asia and from Greece and Italy at one end to Sweden and Ireland at the other in the case of Western Europe. The question is: What do these variations imply for the process and the prospects of globalisation? The fact that substantial minorities in many of the countries in our samples believe




Figure 6.5a Trajectory of perception of fair treatment of national identity – East and Southeast Asian countries.




Figure 6.5b Trajectory of perception of fair treatment of national identity – Western European countries.

that inequalities of this kind were on the increase during the 1990s adds to the case for examining the consequences of these perceptions.

### Supra-national identity

Some fifty years of painstaking ‘European construction’ has resulted in the creation in Europe of a supra-national political entity that has a complex and powerful set of institutions that include a supra-national executive, legislature and judiciary, each with significant powers in certain areas. All the countries in our Western European sample are members of this supra-national political community, now known as the European Union. In East and Southeast Asia, on the other hand, although efforts at supra-national integration have been underway since 1967, the resulting institutional structures that make up the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) do not suggest that the region is on a similar path to that pursued in Europe. Moreover, two of the countries in our Asian sample are not even members of ASEAN.

Given these historical and institutional differences, one might expect that supra-national identity would be less prevalent and less intensely held in the Asian countries considered. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the overall incidence of supra-national identification is rather similar in the two regions, being, if anything, slightly lower in the case of Western Europe (see Figure 6.6). Also and contrary to what one might have hypothesised, the incidence of supra-national identification varies far more within the regions than between them. Thus, in the case of East and Southeast Asia, the incidence of supra-national




Figure 6.6a Incidence of supra-national identity – East and Southeast Asian countries.




Figure 6.6b Incidence of supra-national identity – Western European countries.

identity ranges from 90 per cent in South Korea to 30 per cent in Japan and, in Western Europe, from 80 per cent in Spain to 30 per cent in Great Britain. The expectation that a supra-national identity would be much more prevalent in a region that already has well established supra-national institutions is clearly not borne out.



When we turn to the importance of supra-national identity, the evidence also runs counter to expectations (see Figure 6.7). Whether we think of the measure of importance as extremely important or as extremely important plus somewhat important, the East and Southeast Asian countries generally outstrip the Western European ones. The outstanding Asian exception is Japan, which has a profile of




Figure 6.7a Intensity of supra-national identity – East and Southeast Asian countries.





Figure 6.7b Intensity of supra-national identity – Western European countries.

strength of supra-national identity of about the same order as Great Britain – the European country with the lowest overall level and lowest intensity of commitment to such an identity.

Part of the greater commitment to supra-national identity that obtains in most of the countries of East and Southeast Asia seems to be of recent origin. Compared with their European counterparts, more people in these countries feel that their sense of supra-national identity has been growing more important (Figure 6.8). This sense of an upward trajectory of supra-national identity is most common in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and, at the other end of the scale, is almost negligible in Japan. In the European case, an upward trajectory is found in the four countries that showed the strongest sense of European identity (Italy, France, Spain and Portugal) and is found only among one-quarter of respondents or less in Great Britain, Sweden, Germany, Greece and Ireland.

This brings us to the final difference between the extent and nature of supra-national identification in our two regions. Supra-national identity in the European countries is almost completely undifferentiated (i.e. homogeneously European). In the majority of the East and Southeast Asian countries, in contrast, it is distributed over two or more competing supra-national identities – Chinese plus Asian in the case of China and Taiwan (the latter being more Chinese than the Chinese themselves); Islamic plus Asian in the case of Indonesia; and, in varying proportions, Islamic plus Chinese plus Asian in Malaysia and in Singapore. These contrasts, between East and Southeast Asia and Western Europe and between the various countries of East and Southeast Asia reflect not only the very different historical experiences referred to above but



*Figure 6.8a* Trajectory of supra-national identity over the last 10 years – East and Southeast Asian countries.




Figure 6.8b Trajectory of supra-national identity over the last ten years – Western European countries.

also the different ethnic and religious composition of the two regions and of the various countries in them.

These contrasting patterns also give some clues as to the forces underlying the different degrees of importance of supra-national identity in the two regions. On the one hand, the strong institutionalisation of supra-national identity in Europe may well have set up a conflict between supra-national and national identity that, at least in some countries, sets limits to the development of supra-national identity. In East and Southeast Asia, on the other hand, the minimal institutionalisation of supra-national identity may allow national and supra-national identities to coexist comfortably precisely because minimal institutionalisation makes fewer demands. The greater intensity of supra-national identity in East and Southeast Asia may also be attributable to the fact that two of the available identities (Chinese and Islamic), as well as being supra-national, are rooted in national or religious cultures.

This raises the more general question as to whether the differences in intensity of supra-national identity may be related to differences in the object of identity, some supra-national objects being associated with stronger degrees of commitment. Figure 6.9 provides a simple test of this hypothesis – combining the data from all eighteen countries, it presents the frequency of degrees of importance of supra-national identity broken down by the object of identification. The results of the test are quite striking – European identity elicits the lowest level of commitment, with only 20 per cent saying that such an identity is extremely important to them. Asian and Chinese supra-national identities come next (over one-third say extremely important). Finally, Islamic supra-national identity is in a class of its own, with fully two-thirds of those who endorse it




Figure 6.9 Intensity of Islamic, Asian, Chinese and European supra-national identities.

saying that it is extremely important to them.<sup>10</sup> Given that Islamic supra-national identity is substantial in only two countries (Malaysia and Indonesia), the obvious question is whether such identity is equally strongly endorsed in both. The answer is no – the rate of attachment of extreme importance to Islamic identity in Malaysia is 84 per cent, compared with 49 per cent in Indonesia.

In summary, supra-national identity varies substantially both across and within our two regions and does so in ways that run counter to any expectations one might have to the effect that institutional developments would foster more widespread and intense commitment to a supra-national identity.

### The impact of exposure to globalisation on identity

The remaining task for this chapter is to examine the effect(s) of exposure to globalisation on people’s sense of identity. As we have seen, globalisation is thought by some to be likely to undermine national identities. Others see it as reinforcing national identity by provoking resistance. Depending on the experience of the country and of the individual, globalisation could also lead to either an enhanced sense that one’s national identity is respected and fairly treated or to the reverse. It is of course also possible that exposure to globalisation has no effect on identity, one way or the other.

We examine these issues by focusing on four of the indicators of exposure to globalisation, namely exposure through work and web, through family and friends, through foreign TV news and entertainment and through the perception that globalisation is having an adverse effect on the individual’s job security. In analysing

the effects of these three variables, we must of course control for other factors that may influence identity and that, if not taken into account, would confound the analysis. The first set of control variables are the basic socio-demographic attributes of individuals that might be seen as affecting their sense of identity.

These variables include age, gender, education, ideological (left–right) orientation<sup>11</sup> and religious practice. The second set of control variables is designed to take account of country effects. These are included in order to avoid the pitfall of attributing causal influence to substantive variables that are no more than proxies for various cross-country differences.<sup>12</sup> Once we have allowed for the impact of socio-demographic factors and of differences between countries, we can estimate the impact of exposure to globalisation on national and supra-national identity and on the degree of respect for and equal treatment of the people and the country that are the focus of national identity.

### *National identity*

Strength of national identity is positively related to age (see Table 6.1). On the basis of the present data, which consist of a single cross-sectional comparative survey, it is impossible to determine whether this age effect represents a generational change or a life-cycle effect. If it is the latter, it is likely that it has to do with a process of learning and habituation over the life cycle through which individuals acquire a sense of identification with their country and its people. On

*Table 6.1* Determinants of perceptions of (a) strength of national identity and (b) strength of supra-national identity

	<i>(a) Strength of national identity</i>		<i>(b) Strength of supra-national identity</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>
Socio-demographics				
Older	0.048	0.004***	0.008	0.008
Female	–0.035	0.011***	–0.064	0.023***
High education	0.003	0.008	0.073	0.016***
Salient left-wing identification	–0.050	0.021**	0.148	0.041***
Frequent religious practice	0.033	0.004***	0.029	0.008***
Exposure to globalisation				
Through work and web	–0.029	0.007***	0.082	0.013***
Through family and friends	–0.018	0.007***	0.091	0.013***
Through TV news and entertainment	0.009	0.006	0.100	0.012***
Through perceived adverse effect on job security	–0.005	0.014	0.043	0.029
Constant	3.038	0.039***	1.151	0.077***
<i>R</i> Square	0.139		0.143	

#### Notes

*P* value: \* = 0.10; \*\* = 0.05; \*\*\* = 0.01.

the other hand, the age contrast is quite compatible with a generational interpretation that would argue that young people are more involved in and more amenable to global trends and global values and, accordingly, less committed to national identity *and* that these differences are due to formative experiences that mean that their effects will endure as the individuals in question grow older.

Strength of national identity is also related to frequency of religious practice; this relationship too is open to contrary interpretations. On the one hand, it may reflect the impact of an underlying tendency towards social involvement, with those who share the tendency being more likely to participate in religious services and more likely to identify with various groups, including the nation. On the other hand it may reflect a more direct, implicit or explicit, connection between religion and the nation that leads those who are more religious to feel more strongly about their national identity.

The third general influence on the strength of national identity is ideological orientation: having a salient left-wing identification tends to reduce the strength of national identity. This is consistent with the internationalism traditionally associated with left-wing politics and left-wing ideology and with the tendency to see nationalism as a right-wing phenomenon. Finally among the potential socio-demographic effects considered here, one should note that level of education has no effect on strength of national identity.

This brings us to the main point of the analysis – the identification of the effects on national identity of exposure to globalisation. Here there is indeed some evidence of an erosion effect, though this does not operate across the full range of our indicators of exposure to globalisation. Briefly stated, exposure to globalisation through work and web reduces the strength of national identity, as does exposure through family and friends. However, exposure to globalising influences through foreign television news and entertainment has no effect one way or the other. More surprisingly, perhaps, the perception that globalisation has adverse effects on the individuals' own job security does not appear to translate into a higher sense of national identification.

### ***Supra-national identity***

While older people are more likely to have a strong national identity, the right-hand panel of Table 6.1 shows that age makes no difference to the likelihood of having a supra-national identity. On the other hand, gender does have an effect on both national and supra-national identity and the effect is in the same direction – women are less likely to have a strong commitment to either form of identity. Religious practice also plays a similar role in relation to national and supra-national identities, in this case boosting both. The remaining two socio-demographic characteristics have different effects on supra-national and national identity. First, education, which had no influence on the strength of national identity, does have an effect on supra-national identity – more highly educated individuals are more likely to espouse a supra-national identity. Second, a salient left-wing orientation has opposite (but logically consistent) effects on

national and supra-national identity: while diminishing the strength of the former, it enhances the strength of the latter.

Against the background of these general socio-demographic effects, we can again turn to our central question: What are the effects of exposure to globalisation on, in this case, the strength of supra-national identity? The answer is that exposure to globalisation plays discernibly different roles in relation to national and supra-national identity. As we have seen, two of the variables measuring exposure to globalisation (work and web and family and friends) had significant negative effects on the strength of people's national identity. In contrast, three of our exposure measures (the same two plus exposure through foreign TV news and entertainment) have positive effects on the strength of supra-national identity. In short, exposure to globalisation does appear to be influencing people's sense of identity and is doing so by eroding commitment to national identity and boosting commitment to supra-national identity.

Our fourth measure of exposure to globalisation – the perception that globalisation has a negative impact on the respondent's job security – does not seem to affect the strength of either national or supra-national identity. This does not, however, mean that negative experiences of globalisation have no consequences for national identity in particular. As we have seen above, whether national identity is accompanied by a sense of equality or a sense of inequality is of crucial importance. We now turn to explore the effect of exposure to globalisation on just this sense of equality/inequality, as measured by questions dealing with whether the respondent's country and people (a) are respected by people in other countries as much as they ought to be and (b) are treated fairly in economic and political affairs.

As with the regressions already presented, the exploration begins with the impact of socio-demographic factors. Two such factors – gender and religious practice – restrain the development of a sense of inequality in relation to one's national identity. On the other hand, two socio-demographic factors seem to encourage such a perception. First, and perhaps not surprisingly, people with a salient left-wing orientation are more likely to see their nation as not being treated fairly in international economic and political affairs (see Table 6.2). And this seems to be more than a matter of a critical left-wing socio-economic analysis of the structure of the international system – left-wingers are also more likely to see their nation as being slighted by people in other countries. The second socio-demographic factor that seems to nurture a sense of inequality is education. We have seen that education has no effect on strength of national identity. Where it kicks in is in relation to how that identity is seen to be treated – the higher the level of education the greater the likelihood of the perception that slights (disrespect) and injuries (unfair treatment) have been meted out to one's country and its people and, hence, to one's national identity. This is consistent with the role attributed to educated elites in many theories of nationalism.

This brings us to the question of how perceptions of equality/inequality are affected by exposure to globalisation. With just one exception, the impact of exposure to globalisation on both measures of inequality is very similar. The exception is exposure through work and web. This form of exposure has no

Table 6.2 Determinants of perceptions of (a) no respect for country and people and (b) unfair treatment of country and people

	<i>(a) No respect for country and people</i>		<i>(b) Unfair treatment of country and people</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>
Socio-demographics				
Older	-0.003	0.002	-0.001	0.002
Female	-0.015	0.006**	-0.047	0.007***
High education	0.039	0.005***	0.044	0.005***
Salient left-wing identification	0.020	0.012*	0.031	0.012**
Frequent religious practice	-0.007	0.002***	-0.007	0.002***
Exposure to globalisation				
Through work and web	0.001	0.004	-0.008	0.004**
Through family and friends	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.004
Through TV news and entertainment	0.021	0.003***	0.016	0.004***
Through perceived adverse effect on job security	0.077	0.008***	0.086	0.009***
Constant	0.254	0.022***	0.339	0.023***
R Square	0.144		0.143	

## Notes

*P* value: \* = 0.10; \*\* = 0.05; \*\*\* = 0.01.

effect one way or the other on the more psychological dimension of respect but does have a significant effect on whether one's country and its people are seen to be fairly/unfairly treated in international economic and political affairs – those with more exposure to globalisation through their work and through use of e-mail/Internet are less likely to see any such unfairness.

After that the pattern of influence of the various measures of exposure to globalisation is very similar as between the two types of inequality: perceptions of inequality of both sorts are nurtured by increased exposure to foreign television news and entertainment and by the perception that one's job security is adversely affected by globalisation. The latter relationship is noteworthy (a) because it had no effect on the strength of either national or supra-national identification and (b) because it suggests that it is through this sense of grievance and inequality that people translate their individual negative experience of globalisation into a collective negative response.

## Conclusion

As the partisans of globalisation predict or hope, two aspects of the experience of globalisation – exposure through work and the Internet and exposure through family and friends – tend to reduce the intensity of national identity. In contrast, and contrary to the predictions of the opponents of globalisation, exposure to globalisation via foreign television shows no tendency to undermine the



strength of national identity (though it does encourage a sense of supra-national identification).

This chapter has drawn attention to several features of national identity over and above the issue of its strength. In particular, it has emphasised the importance of experiences or feelings of unequal or unfair treatment relating to national identity. The results of our analysis show that the belief that globalisation is bad for one's job security has no impact on the strength of national identity but does affect the perception of inequality, increasing the tendency to see both lack of respect for one's nationality and to see unfair treatment in economic and political affairs. This suggests that people do translate their personal insecurities into group responses, creating the potential for the mobilisation of national identity by generating a sense of group inequality over and above any sense of individual misfortune.

We have also seen that strength of national identity increases with age. The problem is that age can be a proxy for a number of processes. The gender effects we have identified may also be proxy effects. For example, being female reduces the strength of both national and supra-national identity and also reduces tendency to see unfair treatment in economic and political affairs. What gender may be a proxy for remains elusive. Notable also and a matter for further elucidation is the effect of education: a higher level of education has no effect on strength of identity but does increase the probability of feeling that one's nationality has been slighted and that it, and one's country, are unfairly treated. Obviously many more variables affect the relationships just considered. Furthermore, our analytical strategy involves analysing the effects of exposure to globalisation on fundamental political attitudes as well as the effect of these attitudes on responses to globalisation. Accordingly, any more ambitious or comprehensive conclusions must await the findings of the analyses and discussions in Chapters 9 and 10.

## Notes

- 1 While the discussion in the text deals only with Weber's definitions, very similar approaches can be found in subsequent treatments of the issue, for example in Kohn, 1944; Doob, 1964; Rose, 1971; Smith, 1971; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1992.
- 2 As Weber notes, the autonomy in question may already have been achieved or may be an aspiration.
- 3 This hypothesis does push Gellner's thinking to the limit. Thus, O'Leary notes Gellner's insistence that 'It is impossible to predict with confidence, prior to the crystallisation of this or that nationalism, just which nations will emerge' (Gellner, 1964, p. 174 quoted in O'Leary, 1998, p. 44). O'Leary goes on to argue that 'this predictive weakness may make his theory looked suspiciously untestable, but he left the impression that it can be tested in other ways ...' (O'Leary, *ibid.*).
- 4 International Social Survey Programme.
- 5 The question just described survived only until 1990 and was then replaced by a question that asked whether respondents felt, to take a particular example, 'Irish only, Irish and European, European and Irish or European only'. It seems doubtful that this is a significant advance on the previous version and doubtful in particular whether the two scale points 'Irish and European' and 'European and Irish' can really be distinguished by respondents as gradations of European identity.

- 6 The data are from the 1999 European Values Survey as conducted in the Republic of Ireland. For a full discussion of the measurement issues involved, see Sinnott, 2006.
- 7 For the full format of the question and the response categories see Appendix 1.
- 8 Hopefully, the ASES survey will become the base point for a process of repeated measurement.
- 9 The reader should recall that the Indonesian survey was limited to the island of Java.
- 10 The gradation in the belief that the supra-national identity has become much more important over the last ten years is even more pronounced: 12 per cent say that their European identity has become much more important, 23 and 22 per cent say the same of Asian and Chinese supra-national identity, while 52 per cent of Islamic identifiers take this view
- 11 The left–right variable takes account not only of self-placement on a ten-point left–right scale but also the salience of such placement for the individual respondent.
- 12 The country effects are incorporated in the model via a set of ( $n-1$ ) country dummies. However, in order to simplify the presentation, the country effects are not shown.

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## 7 Ideology and globalisation

*Ian Marsh*

Much political analysis proceeds on the assumption that citizens have an 'ideology' that frames the way in which they view political issues and the political process. Contemporary world events and trends suggest that there may even be a connection between such an ideology and citizens' orientations to globalisation. Talk of 'the global capitalist system' and the view that the problems of global inequality are rooted in the very structure of that system resonate with ideological concepts that have long been part of the stuff of national politics. The attacks made against the 'global order', in particular in the form of virulent protests on the occasion of meetings of global or international organisations, constitute ostensible evidence that globalisation is not only strongly rejected by a section of public opinion, but that this rejection is done in the name of an alternative ideology. How widely such an ideology is shared across the population of the world is not known. What seems clear, however, is that the presence or absence of an overarching ideological framework is an important feature of the national political culture into which globalisation intrudes. This chapter investigates the extent and nature of ideological orientations in the countries in the ASES project and how these orientations are affected by exposure to globalisation.

Such an investigation immediately encounters serious problems, the central one being constituted by the notion of ideology itself. As Gerring puts it:

Recurrent disputes over ideology stem not merely from disagreement over method and measurement but also from disagreement over what ideology is, which is to say, over matters of definition. Problems of definition have not been resolved by resort to new terminology, to 'history', or to the causes of ideology; nor can such problems be avoided simply by embracing the plenitude of definitional traits now inhabiting the term.

(Gerring, 1997, p. 965)

In short, the concept of ideology and its role in shaping the policy preferences of citizens raises very real difficulties of conceptualisation and of operationalisation. The conceptual difficulties stem from the fact that there is no agreement as to what ideology consists of: major definitional controversies have not been

resolved and probably never will be. Not surprisingly, the operationalisation of the concept is equally controversial. While there is a widely held view that self-placement on a left–right scale is the most obvious such operationalisation, there is an equally widely held view that that ‘dimension’ does not just simplify but oversimplifies the concept. A further problem arises from the fact that ideology may well encompass different realities in different countries and at different points in time.

Disputes about the concept of ideology go to the core of what constitutes social inquiry. According to Thompson, there are three mutually exclusive perspectives on the concept, characterised as, ‘Ideology as a rational project’ and ‘Ideology as social relations’ and ‘Ideology as a belief system’ (Thompson, 1984, p. 75 ff.). Thompson regards the third of these as social-scientific, describing it as ‘cast within the framework of orthodox political science’ (75). It is based on the notion that ideology is a ‘set’ or ‘system’ of beliefs that are coherent with each other. It is further based on the view that ideologies can be examined and systematically analysed by social science instruments. In this perspective, there cannot be an ‘end of ideology’: such an expression can only mean that the ideologies that prevail in a given country have come to be close to each other, not that they have disappeared.

Ideology is more than just an aggregation of disparate beliefs: it is a coherent set or system of beliefs. It does not follow from the fact that because everyone holds beliefs that these constitute a set that has the same importance for everyone. Accordingly, one must find out whether there is coherence in the beliefs that individuals hold and how salient those beliefs are. For one thing, the extent of political mobilisation stemming from the actions of the government, of political parties and of groups and movements is likely to affect the coherence and importance of ideology. Furthermore, as Gouldner (1976) suggests, exposure to the media and the content of the messages coming from the media are also likely to affect the construction of an ideology by citizens and the importance that citizens attribute to ideology.

Of course it can be argued that the real importance that citizens attribute to ideology is impossible to measure, at least on the basis of a conventional interview: citizens may simply not know what is the impact of ideology on society and their consciousness of ideology may well be very limited. One needs therefore to be careful when attempting to determine whether citizens have an ideology and when interpreting what they may say about the importance which they attribute to ideology. The extent to which beliefs are coherent can be assessed with some degree of validity by scrutinising the views that respondents have on a series of issues. The true importance that respondents give to these matters is more difficult to determine. Caution is particularly required in a study such as this which straddles different cultures, although one aspect of such a study is to see how ‘global’ or ‘globalised’ the very notion of ideology has come to be in the contemporary world.

In summary, ideology is here defined as a coherent set or system of beliefs, the nature of the ideology held by citizens and even the extent to which

citizens have an ideology being empirical questions. The most obvious indicator of ideology in this sense is provided by the notions of left and right, which are widely regarded as corresponding to the division between socialists or social democrats (or liberals in the North American sense of word) and conservatives. Whether that dimension is truly global is a matter to be investigated, since it is in the West, and in particular in Western Europe, that it has played a major part. Even in Japan, it began to play a part only in the late nineteenth century. In the rest of East and Southeast Asia, it figured in political life at the earliest between the two world wars and in several countries after 1945.

The left–right dimension has other limitations, especially when it is regarded as covering many – or even all – substantive domains. The problem is that a lot of conflicts, religious or ethnic, for instance, cannot easily be incorporated in the same dimension as conflicts over economic issues. Conflicts about aspects of politics taking place ‘above’ the state, for instance about European integration, are also difficult to locate on a left–right dimension. This has also been so with the issue of postmaterialism: Inglehart has indeed suggested that ‘a new dimension of political cleavage ha[d] emerged’ and that ‘... the rise of Postmaterialism has brought a new perspective into play, one that sometimes runs against political orthodoxy; it is reshaping the meaning of left and right’ (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 318–319, see also Knutsen, 1995).

Perhaps even more worryingly, three further questions arise in relation to the left–right self-placement scale. First, as has been suggested, it is not *prima facie* always clear which substantive matters are behind the decision made by a respondent to state that he or she belongs to the left, to the right or to some intermediate position between these two extremes. Second, matters extraneous to ideology, for instance attitudes to political parties or to individuals within these parties may induce respondents to place themselves on the left, centre or right irrespective of the positions they may hold on specific issues. There may even be a degree of sheer symbolism attached to words such as left, centre or right. Third, one needs to find out whether the left–right dimension is considered to have the same meaning across cultures. For all these reasons, the analysis of self-placement on the left–right scale must be combined with an examination of the policy views and preferences of respondents. We begin, however, with the question of self-identification or self-placement as left or right.

### **Left–right self-placement**

Respondents were asked to react to the left–right dimension by means of two questions, neither of which was asked in China, as they were regarded as too sensitive in that country. First, respondents in the seventeen countries were asked to place themselves on a 10-point scale ranging from extreme-left to extreme-right; they had also the opportunity not to place themselves at all on this scale by answering ‘don’t know’. The question was:

Q. 403 In politics, people sometimes talk about ‘left’ and ‘right’. How would you place your views on this scale?

In order to determine the weight that the left–right dimension had in the eyes of the respondents, the question was followed immediately by a question about the importance of this self-placement:

Q. 404 And can you tell me how important this idea of left and right is for you personally?

(Respondents were asked to give their answer on a 4-point scale, ‘extremely important’, ‘somewhat important’, ‘only a little important’, ‘not important at all’. They could also answer ‘don’t know’).

The combination of these two questions makes it possible to assess how far respondents, in both regions, feel willing and able to relate their political beliefs to the two terms – left and right – that are so frequently regarded as the opposite poles of a universal, one-dimensional and all-encompassing political space.

Figures 7.1a and b present the preliminary evidence regarding ideological self-placement in the two regions involved in this study and in each of the seventeen countries in which the two questions were asked. In regard to usage of the terms left and right in our European countries, the evidence is clear-cut: there is a widespread recognition of these terms and a willingness among most





Figure 7.1a Self placement on left-right scale and importance of left and right – Asian countries (in descending order of importance of left and right).




*Figure 7.1b* Self placement on left-right scale and importance of left and right – European countries (in descending order of importance of left and right).

respondents to place themselves at some point on the scale. Specifically, 75 per cent or more of the citizens of the nine European countries are able and willing to locate themselves on the left–right dimension. When it comes to the importance of this self-placement, however, the spread of opinion is somewhat larger. Seventy per cent or more of people in Germany, Italy, Spain and France regard the left–right dimension as being at least ‘a little important’ while this is true of only approximately 60 per cent in Sweden, Ireland and Greece and, surprisingly given the bi-modal nature of British politics, of only 48 per cent in Great Britain.

It is when we turn to our eight Asian countries, however, that the real extent of the variation in use of the left–right framework becomes evident. The populations of three of the eight countries concerned – the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand – show a very widespread willingness (from 88 to 95 per cent) to place themselves on the scale. Moreover, these three countries match the group of more ideological Western European countries in the extent of attachment of at least some degree of importance to the left–right dimension. In the other five Asian countries, however, the picture is very different. In two of them – Taiwan and Singapore – less than half the population are able/willing to use the scale and only about one-third attach any degree of importance to it. In the remaining three countries, the situation is more mixed. Use of the terms left and right is moderately widespread in Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia, but is regarded as being of any importance by a majority in only one of the three countries, namely Malaysia. There are real surprises in these East and Southeast Asia results: Koreans and Thais appear able to place themselves easily on the left–right dimension, despite the fact that party politics in these two countries has not been structured on a left–right basis; on the other hand, while, understandably, half

the Singaporeans are not able to place themselves on the dimension, one might not have assumed that the Taiwanese would have reacted in the same way or that over a third of the Japanese would have been equally perplexed. There is thus a broadly uniform response to this aspect of the issue among Western European respondents and a substantial diversity among respondents from East and Southeast Asia. The true meaning of the dimension in many countries of the latter region is therefore in doubt despite the relatively limited overall proportion of ‘don’t knows’ on the initial self-placement question in the region as a whole.

The foregoing underlines the importance of measuring not just the incidence but also the salience of left–right self-placement. When this is done, however, the survey evidence shows significant differences not just in the extent of usage of the concepts but also in the distribution of people on the left–right scale. Differences are evident between our two regions and within them (see Figures 7.2a and b). The first difference to note is the contrasting proportions of those who do not place themselves on the scale at all or, if they do, do not think of it as being of any importance. These two response categories are combined in Figures 7.2a and b and the combined proportion varies from almost two-thirds of the population in Taiwan, Indonesia and Singapore to less than one-third in Germany, Italy, Spain and France (see the top segment of each stacked bar in Figures 7.2a and b). The second striking point about the distribution of people on this scale across countries is the similarity in the proportion of those placing themselves in the middle of the scale. With just two exceptions, these proportions fall within the 20 to 30 per cent band; the exceptions are the Philippines on the high side (43 per cent) and Japan on the low side (17 per cent). The third and final point to note in this regard is that left-wing self-placement exceeds right-wing self-placement in most of the European countries, while the opposite is the case in most of the Asian



*Figure 7.2a* Importance of and position of left-right scale – Asian countries (in ascending order of not important at all).






Figure 7.2b Importance of and position of left-right scale – European countries (in ascending order of not important at all).

countries. The exceptions on the European side are Ireland and Greece, where the two proportions are just about equal, and, on the Asian side, South Korea, where the left outstrips the right but only by just 6 percentage points.

**The substantive content of left–right self-placement**

In addition to analysing variations in the incidence and salience of the left–right self-placement scale, it is essential to also examine its substantive content. A comprehensive analysis of this sort that would cover all possible substantive correlates of left–right self-placement is beyond the scope of this study. However, what we can do on the basis of the ASES data is to test the extent to which left–right self-placement is related to a number of substantive indicators of left–right ideology in the socio-economic sense of that term. Thus, while we cannot rule out the possibility that left–right self-placement has other substantive associations (e.g. with a moral liberal-conservative dimension or with a democratic-authoritarian dimension), we can examine its substantive content (or lack of substantive content) in relation to socio-economic issues. Five questions in the ASES study were designed to assess the views of respondents on socio-economic policy issues. The five were:

- Q. 36a Competition is good because it stimulates the development of new ideas.
- Q. 306b The government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare.

Q. 306f We need a lot of government intervention to deal with today's economic problems.

Q. 306g Society is better off when businesses are free to make as much profit as they can.


Q. 412a Incomes should be made more equal.

Before analysing the relationships between responses to these five items and the left–right placement measure we have just been considering, it is important to examine the distributions of these attitudes across the two regions.

### **Socio-economic policy preferences in Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia**

Formally at least, the answers to the five questions on policy issues are remarkable in one respect: the proportion of don't knows is small. The ability of respondents to pass a judgement on specific policy preferences is thus appreciably larger than their ability to place themselves on the left–right dimension. Yet this small proportion of don't knows has to be seen in the light of the fact that, for a large majority of these questions, a substantial proportion of respondents declare that they neither agree nor disagree and thus do not choose. This type of answer is a refusal to take sides and, to that extent, it is akin to a don't know response. There are naturally variations from country to country in the proportion of respondents who opt for the non-committal middle category. The countries with a high proportion of respondents who do not commit themselves are, above all, Japan, but also Germany, Spain and Britain; those with a low proportion of such respondents are primarily Thailand, but also, though less markedly, Sweden and France. In order to control for the effect of variations in the size of the combined don't know and neither-nor responses and the discrepancies in this respect across the countries in the study, we present the distributions of responses to our five ideological items in the two regions as the *difference* between the proportion that takes a right-wing stance and the proportion that takes a left-wing stance on each of the issues. The proportion of right-wing responses is subtracted from the proportion of left-wing responses and the results for each item in each region are displayed as bars in the bar chart in Figure 7.3. Bars above the line indicate a preponderance of left-wing responses to the item in question and vice versa for bars below the line.

The balance of responses on three of the items (government provision of jobs/adequate social welfare, need for government intervention and equalisation of incomes) is towards the left – overwhelmingly so in the case of government provision of jobs. The two items that elicit responses that lean towards the right are attitudes to profit and attitudes to competition, attitudes to this latter issue being overwhelmingly on the right.



*Figure 7.3* Net extent of agreement with 'left-wing' positions (per cent agree with left minus per cent agree with right).

However, Figure 7.3 also makes clear that the two regions vary considerably in their response to three of the five items. Thus while responses in both regions are uniformly to the left on government provision of jobs and uniformly to the right on the issue of competition, responses differ between the two regions when it comes to government intervention, profit and equality of incomes and the differences are all in the same direction, with European responses being more left-wing and Asian responses more right-wing. On the question of government intervention, the difference is slight but statistically significant. Both regions endorse government intervention but that endorsement is just a bit more widespread in Europe than in Asia (by 13 percentage points). The next biggest contrast between the two regions is on the issue of businesses being free to make as much profit as they can, European opinion on this matter being evenly divided, while East and Southeast Asian opinion leans towards freedom to make profits. The net difference in Europe between the pro-profit-maximisation and the anti-profit-maximisation positions is 2 percentage points towards the pro-profit side; in Asia it is thirty-two points. The largest inter-regional discrepancy occurs on the issue of equalisation of incomes – both regions come down in favour of more income equality but, while Asia does so by a margin of 20 percentage points, Europe does so by a margin of sixty-seven points.

Not surprisingly, if we move down to the level of the individual countries, we find further differences in the distribution of responses to these five items. However, given that cross-country variations on left–right self placement have already been extensively discussed, we propose to set these detailed contrasts to one side and to move directly to the issue of how the substantive policy preferences and self-placement on the left–right scale are related.

### **Left–right self-placement and attitudes**

The relationships between the six items we have been considering (the five attitudinal items plus the left–right self-placement scale) can be explored using the factor analysis technique outlined in Chapter 3. Table 7.1 presents the results of factor analyses carried out for each region and for each individual country. The findings point to major contrasts between the two regions. We begin with the European results. The factor analysis for the set of Western European countries as a whole produces a two-factor solution showing a coherent and readily interpretable pattern (see Table 7.1). Thus, the two attitudinal items referring to the role of government (regarding the provision of a universal safety net in the form of either jobs or adequate social welfare and regarding the desirability of government intervention in the economy) load with the item referring to the equalisation of incomes to form a classic interventionist-egalitarian dimension. The second factor points to a dimension that incorporates a belief in the merits of competition, a belief in the right of businesses to make as much profit as they can and self-placement on the right-hand side of the left–right scale. This overall European pattern is precisely replicated in Germany, Sweden and Italy (see Table 7.1). A somewhat different two-factor structure that still reflects a coherent left–right structuring of the responses is found in France and Britain, the main difference being that in both cases equalisation of incomes loads with attitudes to competition and profits and with left–right self-placement.

The other four countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) show some signs of ideological inconsistency. This is limited in the case of Greece and Spain where the only anomaly takes the form of favourable attitude to competition loading with an otherwise left-wing set of items (see Table 7.1). In the case of Portugal, both the pro-competition item and the pro-profits item load with favourable attitudes to an expanded role for government. The Irish case shows some inconsistency on both factors – on factor 1, favourable attitude to competition loads positively with government provision and equalisation of incomes; while, on factor 2, more government intervention loads with favourable attitude to making profits and left–right self-placement.

In summary, factor analysis of our six ideological items produces indications of a consistent ideological structure when all nine Western European countries are analysed together. Analysis of each individual country confirms the existence of ideologically consistent patterns in five of the nine (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden). However, some anomalies emerge in the other four countries. The anomalies relate to just one of the items in Greece and Spain, to two items in the case of Portugal and to both factors in the case of Ireland. It is worth noting that the greater degree of ideological consistency is found in the five countries that have historically been part of the European economic and political core, while more inconsistency is to be found in the countries on the periphery.

In contrast to the European region, the analysis of the data from eight Asian countries taken together fails to produce a coherent pattern even at the level of

Table 7.1 Factor analysis of socio-economic attitudinal items and left-right self-placement by region and by country

	<i>Asia</i>		<i>Japan</i>		<i>South Korea</i>		<i>Taiwan</i>	
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
Competition good <sup>a</sup>	<b>0.68<sup>c</sup></b>	0.02	-0.27	0.14	<b>0.76</b>	-0.02	<b>0.74</b>	0.12
Government provision	<b>0.66</b>	0.30	<b>0.70</b>	0.08	<b>0.78</b>	-0.06	<b>0.75</b>	0.13
Government intervention	<b>0.65</b>	-0.14	0.42	<b>0.58</b>	0.28	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.74</b>	-0.10
Make profit	0.36	<b>0.36</b>	-0.02	<b>0.76</b>	<b>0.64</b>	0.29	0.12	<b>0.69</b>
Incomes equal	0.19	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.79</b>	-0.02	0.39	0.06	0.21	<b>0.64</b>
'Right' placement <sup>b</sup>	0.28	<b>0.72</b>	-0.26	<b>0.58</b>	-0.16	<b>0.81</b>	0.20	<b>-0.61</b>
	<i>Europe</i>		<i>United Kingdom</i>		<i>Ireland</i>		<i>France</i>	
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
Competition good	0.30	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.45</b>	0.67	<b>0.63</b>	0.23	<b>0.59</b>	0.40
Government provision	<b>0.77</b>	0.03	0.77	-0.12	<b>0.75</b>	0.02	-0.21	<b>0.73</b>
Government intervention	<b>0.67</b>	0.18	<b>0.65</b>	-0.05	0.27	<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>0.60</b>
Make profit	0.03	<b>0.68</b>	-0.05	<b>0.47</b>	-0.18	<b>0.62</b>	<b>0.71</b>	0.07
Incomes equal	<b>0.73</b>	0.16	0.44	0.56	<b>0.67</b>	-0.18	-0.48	0.37
'Right' placement	-0.22	<b>0.69</b>	-0.18	<b>0.66</b>	0.03	<b>0.68</b>	<b>0.68</b>	-0.16

Notes

a Question wording for left-right attitudinal items:

Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements

(5-point agree/disagree scale):

Competition is good because it stimulates people to develop new ideas (Competition good)

The government should ensure that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare (Government provision)

We need a lot of government intervention in order to deal with today's economic problems (Government intervention)

Society is better off when businesses are free to make as much profit as they can (Make profit)

Incomes should be made more equal (Incomes equal)

b Question wording for left-right self-placement:

In politics, people sometimes talk about 'left' and 'right'. How would you place yourself on this scale? ('Right placement')

c Factor loadings of 0.45 or above in bold.

Boxed numbers indicate inconsistent factor loadings.

<i>Singapore</i>		<i>Malaysia</i>		<i>Indonesia</i>		<i>Thailand</i>		<i>Philippines</i>			
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>		
<b>0.56</b>	-0.29	<b>0.75</b>	<b>-0.15</b>	0.44	-0.01	<b>0.64</b>	0.28	<b>0.77</b>	-0.09		
<b>0.64</b>	0.23	<b>0.74</b>	-0.01	<b>0.70</b>	0.23	<b>0.81</b>	0.07	<b>0.78</b>	-0.04		
<b>0.75</b>	0.09	<b>0.68</b>	0.24	0.32	0.48	0.24	<b>0.68</b>	<b>0.65</b>	0.12		
<b>0.70</b>	0.01	0.37	<b>0.48</b>	0.17	<b>0.65</b>	-0.11	<b>0.82</b>	0.18	<b>0.75</b>		
-0.03	<b>0.76</b>	0.03	<b>0.58</b>	<b>0.50</b>	0.14	<b>0.46</b>	-0.08	0.04	0.73		
-0.10	<b>-0.64</b>	-0.13	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>-0.66</b>	0.02	0.33	0.09	-0.22		
<i>Germany</i>		<i>Sweden</i>		<i>Italy</i>		<i>Spain</i>		<i>Portugal</i>		<i>Greece</i>	
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
0.09	<b>0.76</b>	0.30	<b>0.69</b>	0.22	0.44	<b>0.59</b>	0.39	<b>0.61</b>	0.05	<b>0.75</b>	0.19
<b>0.82</b>	0.04	<b>0.71</b>	0.10	<b>0.74</b>	0.10	<b>0.81</b>	-0.12	<b>0.66</b>	-0.13	<b>0.69</b>	-0.29
<b>0.73</b>	-0.04	<b>0.65</b>	0.05	<b>0.64</b>	0.05	0.41	0.38	<b>0.69</b>	-0.14	<b>0.66</b>	0.26
-0.04	<b>0.69</b>	-0.02	<b>0.77</b>	0.09	<b>0.77</b>	-0.01	<b>0.74</b>	<b>0.57</b>	0.35	0.13	<b>0.65</b>
<b>0.70</b>	-0.20	<b>0.70</b>	-0.18	<b>0.67</b>	-0.04	<b>0.69</b>	-0.29	0.43	<b>-0.47</b>	0.41	<b>-0.53</b>
-0.37	<b>0.50</b>	-0.37	<b>0.70</b>	-0.23	<b>0.76</b>	-0.12	<b>0.67</b>	0.06	<b>0.84</b>	0.10	<b>0.58</b>

the region as a whole (see top-half of the left-hand column in Table 7.1). The major problem lies with the first factor. As a glance at Table 7.1 shows, favourable attitude to competition does not load, as one would have expected, with attitude to businesses making a profit but, again contrary to expectation, does load positively with the items on government provision and government intervention. From the point of view of searching for ideological consistency, the second factor performs better, having two high-loading items indicating an association between left-wing self-placement (as indicated by the negative loading) and favourable attitude to equalisation of incomes.

When we turn to the analysis of the eight individual Asian countries, however, even this remnant of ideological consistency practically disappears. The association between left-wing self-placement and equalisation of incomes is replicated only in the second Singapore factor; elsewhere left–right self-placement is either not associated with any of the other items (this is the case in Thailand and the Philippines) or is associated with one or more of the other items but in an ideologically inconsistent fashion. Japan provides the only other instance of ideological consistency, its first factor being based on high loadings for government provision and equalisation of incomes. However, as the boxed loadings in the Asian segment of Table 7.1 indicate, with the exception of the second factor found in Singapore and the first factor in Japan, all the other factors in the country-by-country Asian factor analyses have one or more ideologically inconsistent loadings.

It should be emphasised that the foregoing analyses include all respondents who were willing and able to place themselves on the left–right scale. We noted above, however, that many of those who place themselves on the scale go on to say that they think that the dimension is of no importance at all. The obvious question is: If we were to exclude those who dismiss the ideas of left and right in this way, would we find more coherence in the structure of attitudes? The answer is no (see Table 7.2). In the European case, the structure of attitudes is identical among those who attach some importance to the concepts and those who don't. The only difference that controlling for important/not-important in the European sample brings about is that the loadings are somewhat higher among those for whom the left–right dimension is more important. In the case of the East and Southeast Asian sample, controlling for importance does nothing to improve the coherence of the attitudinal dimensions involved. Thus, focusing first on those who attach at least some importance to the dimension, it is clear that the first factor is just as inconsistent as in the overall analysis. And when we turn to those who attach no importance at all to the left–right dimension, the second factor from the overall analysis, which showed a consistent association between support for equalisation of incomes and left-wing self-placement, disappears and is replaced by an ideologically incoherent association between right-wing self-placement, support for equalisation of incomes and support for the freedom of businesses to make as much profit as they can. In sum, this further analysis shows that the consistent ideological structure that was apparent in the overall European sample holds up even among those who attach no

Table 7.2 Factor analysis of socio-economic attitudinal items and left-right self-placement controlling for salience of left-right dimension

	Asia				Europe			
	Important		Not important		Important		Not important	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Competition good <sup>a</sup>	<b>0.68</b>	0.04	<b>0.69</b>	-0.08	0.30	<b>0.60</b>	0.30	<b>0.58</b>
Government provision	<b>0.66</b>	0.30	<b>0.73</b>	0.12	<b>0.78</b>	0.04	<b>0.74</b>	-0.05
Government intervention	<b>0.66</b>	-0.18	<b>0.58</b>	0.07	<b>0.67</b>	0.17	<b>0.63</b>	0.27
Make profit	0.38	0.36	0.25	<b>0.45</b>	0.03	<b>0.69</b>	0.04	<b>0.63</b>
Incomes equal	0.20	<b>0.58</b>	0.12	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.74</b>	-0.18	<b>0.70</b>	-0.08
'Right' placement <sup>b</sup>	0.27	<b>-0.73</b>	-0.22	<b>0.55</b>	-0.22	<b>0.69</b>	-0.21	<b>0.65</b>

Notes

a Question wording for left-right attitudinal items:

Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements (5-point agree/disagree scale):

Competition is good because it stimulates people to develop new ideas (Competition good)

The government should ensure that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare (Government provision)

We need a lot of government intervention in order to deal with today's economic problems (Government intervention)

Society is better off when businesses are free to make as much profit as they can (Make profit)

Incomes should be made more equal (Incomes equal)

b Question wording for left-right self-placement:

c In politics, people sometimes talk about 'left' and 'right'. How would you place yourself on this scale? ('Right placement')

Factor loadings of 0.45 or above in bold.

Boxed numbers indicate inconsistent factor loadings.



importance to the concepts of left and right, whereas in the East and Southeast Asian sample, the limited amount of consistency that obtains in the overall sample only holds among those for whom the dimension is salient and collapses entirely among those for whom the ideas of left and right are of no importance.

The foregoing line of argument suggests one further analytical step before we turn to look at the connections between ideology and globalisation. This further test is designed to look at the possibility that the ideological consistency we are seeking is related to levels of political knowledge. After all, getting the connections between the various socio-economic issues and left–right self-placement requires a certain degree of cognitive sophistication. While it is not the whole story, political knowledge is one of the elements that go to make up such cognitive sophistication. Fortunately, the ASES study has a battery of items that measure political knowledge. This enables us to examine the structure of our left–right attitudes at three levels of knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Controlling for levels of political knowledge turns out to be more fruitful than controlling for the perceived salience of the left–right dimension. In the European case, the results show that that the structure of attitudes is extremely clear among those with a very high level of knowledge, is less definitive but still quite clear among those with an intermediate level, but shows one anomalous loading among those with a low level of political knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Thus the analysis of the attitudes of the least knowledgeable group in the European data produces a coherent second factor (right-wing self-placement and support for profit maximisation) but exhibits an element of inconsistency in the first factor due to the inclusion of the pro-competition item with support for government intervention/provision and for equalisation of incomes (see Table 7.3).

In the Asian data the factors are ideologically inconsistent at both the lowest and the intermediate levels of knowledge. At the intermediate level, for example, the first factor combines a favourable attitude to government provision with support for profit maximisation and support for equalisation of incomes, while the second factor combines pro-competition with pro-government-intervention and right-wing self-placement (see Table 7.3). At the highest level of knowledge in the Asian sample, however, the first factor remains inconsistent but the second factor is both internally consistent and very clear, combining favourable attitudes to government provision with support for equalisation of incomes and left-wing self-placement.

Comparing the results of all these factor analyses points to a major contrast in ideological orientations between the two regions. While full ideological consistency is found only in the five core European countries, at least one consistent factor is found in eight of the nine European countries (the exception being Ireland). In our set of East and Southeast Asian countries, on the other hand, no country produces two ideologically consistent factors and only two of the eight (Japan and Singapore) show even one consistent factor. The implications seem clear: left–right ideology as measured by a combination of self-placement on a left–right scale and a set of substantive policy-related items is a Euro-centric construct that, despite the forces of modernisation and globalisation, has not

Table 7.3 Factor analysis of socio-economic attitudinal items and left-right self-placement controlling for political knowledge

	<i>Asia</i>						<i>Europe</i>					
	<i>Low knowledge</i>		<i>Medium knowledge</i>		<i>High knowledge</i>		<i>Low knowledge</i>		<i>Medium knowledge</i>		<i>High knowledge</i>	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Competition good <sup>a</sup>	<b>0.71<sup>c</sup></b>	0.01	<b>0.44</b>	<b>0.52</b>	<b>0.60</b>	0.10	<b>0.54</b>	0.32	0.38	<b>0.56</b>	0.24	<b>0.67</b>
Government provision	<b>0.69</b>	0.18	<b>0.61</b>	0.42	0.42	<b>0.65</b>	<b>0.73</b>	-0.13	<b>0.77</b>	0.04	<b>0.77</b>	0.02
Government intervention	<b>0.66</b>	-0.03	0.09	<b>0.68</b>	<b>0.66</b>	0.14	<b>0.57</b>	0.21	<b>0.58</b>	0.32	<b>0.74</b>	0.08
Make profit	0.36	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.61</b>	0.01	0.39	-0.13	0.19	<b>0.72</b>	0.03	<b>0.67</b>	-0.03	<b>0.68</b>
Incomes equal	0.13	<b>0.58</b>	<b>0.56</b>	-0.02	0.02	<b>0.71</b>	<b>0.66</b>	-0.23	<b>0.71</b>	-0.24	<b>0.76</b>	-0.15
'Right' placement <sup>b</sup>	0.27	<b>-0.69</b>	-0.43	<b>0.62</b>	0.43	<b>-0.56</b>	-0.18	<b>0.68</b>	-0.15	<b>0.68</b>	-0.22	<b>0.71</b>

Notes

a Question wording for left-right attitudinal items:

Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements (5-point agree/disagree scale):

Competition is good because it stimulates people to develop new ideas (Competition good)

The government should ensure that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare (Government provision)

We need a lot of government intervention in order to deal with today's economic problems (Government intervention)

Society is better off when businesses are free to make as much profit as they can (Make profit)

Incomes should be made more equal (Incomes equal)

b Question wording for left-right self-placement:

In politics, people sometimes talk about 'left' and 'right'. How would you place yourself on this scale? ('Right placement')

c Factor loadings of 0.45 or above in bold.

Boxed numbers indicate inconsistent factor loadings.

been successfully cloned in any of our fairly extensive sample of East and Southeast Asian countries.

The additional analysis carried out, which controlled first for perceived salience of the left–right dimension and then for levels of political knowledge, qualifies the above picture in two respects. The first qualification is that in the European case full consistency in left–right attitudes is only found among those with intermediate or higher levels of political knowledge. The second qualification is that the one element of consistency that was signalled in the Asian sample as a whole (the association between left-wing self-placement and support for the equalisation of incomes) actually only obtains among those who perceive the ideas of left and right to be at least of some importance and among those with high levels of political knowledge.

It is clear that this rather differentiated picture of ideological orientation (differentiated by region, by country, and by levels of salience and levels of political knowledge) will have to be taken into account when it comes to assessing the impact of ideology on responses to globalisation. As noted in previous chapters, we have postponed tackling that particular challenge until Chapter 9, when all of the relevant variables will have been introduced. In the meantime, the remaining task for this chapter is to consider how the ideological orientations we have been considering are affected by exposure to globalisation. In examining this issue, we will obviously need to control for basic socio-demographic effects – age, gender, education, social class and the like – that, if not controlled for, might generate spurious relationships between the two things we are mainly interested in, namely the extent of people’s exposure to globalisation and their ideological orientations. Given the evidence of the impact of political knowledge already considered in this chapter, we will obviously also need to control for the effect of that particular variable. The key question is whether exposure to globalisation reinforces or undermines the tendency for people to think about politics in left–right terms. Accordingly, the following analysis takes the measure of the importance people attach to the notions of left and right as the dependent variable.

### **Effects of exposure to globalisation on the salience of the left–right dimension**

The regression results shown in Table 7.4 indicate that only two socio-demographic variables – education and gender – influence the degree of importance that is attached to the left–right dimension in both regions. That education affects people’s response to left–right appeals or left–right imagery is not surprising. As noted above, familiarity with and use of the concepts of left and right require a certain degree of cognitive sophistication and this is, in part, a function of higher levels of educational attainment. In this regard, it is worth emphasising that the effect of education on the salience of the left–right dimension persists even when we control for levels of political knowledge. But note that the same holds true in the other direction: irrespective of educational level,

Table 7.4 Regression of importance of left-right dimension on socio-demographics, political knowledge exposure to globalization

	<i>All</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Europe</i>
(Constant)	-0.103**	-0.504***	-0.090
<i>Socio-demographic effects</i>			
Age	0.042***	-0.001	0.074***
Female	-0.102***	-0.106***	-0.102***
Manual occupation	0.011	0.025	-0.001
Level of education (four)	0.063***	0.083***	0.044***
Working in state sector	0.005	0.018	-0.002
Unemployed	-0.035	-0.042	-0.015
Ever unemployed	0.002	-0.029	0.032
Trade union member	0.041*	0.052	0.033
Religious practice	0.018***	0.028***	0.005
<i>Political knowledge</i>			
Knowledge score	0.069***	0.049***	0.083***
<i>Globalization effects</i>			
Exposure through work and web	0.039***	0.040***	0.039***
Exposure through family and friends	0.036***	0.034**	0.044***
Exposure through TV news and entertainment	0.053***	0.056***	0.046***
Bad effect job security	0.063***	0.002	0.110***
Country and people not respected	-0.008	-0.034	0.015
Country and people not treated fairly	0.090***	0.119***	0.055**
<i>Identity effects</i>			
Strength of national identity	0.089***	0.114***	0.070***
Islamic supra-national identity	0.417***	0.414***	
European supra-national identity	0.139***		0.128***
Asian supra-national identity	0.147***	0.142***	
Chinese supra-national identity	-0.038	-0.035	
$R^2$	0.167	0.238	0.104

higher levels of political knowledge contribute to the attachment of a greater degree of importance to notions of left and right.

The second socio-demographic effect that obtains across both regions suggests that women are less inclined to attach importance to notions of left and right than men are. This is so controlling for education and all the other variables in Table 7.4. The reason for this is not readily apparent but it is possible that it is due to a lower level of interest in politics in general and/or to lower levels of media use.

In addition to gender, education and knowledge, which have effects in both regions, two socio-demographic variables have effects that are confined to one or other region. Thus, older people are more likely to attach importance to the left-right dimension in Europe, but not in Asia. This may reflect the fact that the importance of left and right is something that must be learned and such learning

takes place over the life-span and as a result of political experience. But, for such learning to take place, the political environment must provide signals and cues as to the meaning and significance of the concepts. The European political environment is much more likely to do this, thereby producing a greater consciousness of left and right among older people. Because our East and Southeast Asian countries lack a strong left–right historical legacy and have only limited experience with left–right political structures in the contemporary period, it should not come as a surprise that there is no relationship between the importance of the left–right dimension and increasing age in our Asian sample.

The second region-specific socio-demographic effect is religious practice. As Table 7.4 shows, people in East and Southeast Asia who have a high level of religious practice are more likely to regard the ideas of left and right as important; in Europe there is no association. This presumably reflects the different historical and contemporary roles of religion in the countries in the two regions concerned.

Apart from the five variables just considered, there is a plethora of variables that have no effect in either region. These non-significant variables include ones that one might have anticipated would influence left–right salience, namely social class (as measured by manual occupation), working in the state sector and experience of unemployment. The evidence does not support any of these expectations. It is true that being a member of a trade union seems to make a difference when the analysis is conducted for both regions together, but this effect evaporates when we look specifically at each region.

This brings us to the central point of this analysis – the effect of exposure to globalisation on the importance that respondents attach to the ideas of left and right. Relying on the analysis undertaken in Chapter 3, we have four measures of exposure to globalisation. Three of these variables – exposure through work and web, exposure through family and friends and exposure through TV news and entertainment – are based on the self-reported globalisation-related behaviour and/or situation of the respondent and are evaluatively neutral. The fourth variable is not neutral but rather measures a negative form of exposure to globalisation, namely the perception by the respondent that globalisation has a negative effect on his or her job security. As Table 7.4 shows, the three neutral behavioural indicators of exposure to globalisation are all positively associated with the tendency to regard left and right as important. In other words, the left–right dimension increases in importance with increasing exposure to globalisation. The evidence indicates that this relationship holds in both Asia and Europe.

The fourth exposure indicator – the perception that globalisation has a negative effect on job security – is also positively related to the salience of the left–right dimension, but only in the European sample. The fact that the relationship is limited to Europe makes sense in the light of the finding presented earlier in this chapter that it is only in Europe that one finds a reasonably robust left–right ideological framework. Such a framework provides a means by which the negative effects of globalisation on job security can be interpreted. It is not

surprising therefore that the perception that globalisation has a bad effect on job security is associated with the salience of the left–right dimension in our European sample. What is not so clear is the direction of causation involved. The finding in Table 7.4 could indicate that feelings of job insecurity resulting from exposure to globalisation give rise to an increased resort to notions of left and right; on the other hand it could be that a heightened sense of the importance of left and right encourages the individual to attribute any precariousness that may attach to their job situation to globalisation.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter started with the assumption that the presence or absence of ideology, in the sense of a coherent system of political beliefs, was likely to be a significant aspect of the political and cultural context within which societies and individuals experience and respond to the phenomenon of globalisation. This assumption implies a two-way process. Ideology may condition the response to globalisation, in a positive or negative direction. But globalisation may also affect (reinforce or undermine) pre-existing ideology (ies). In any event, it seems clear that the relationship between ideology and globalisation demands systematic examination.

Evidence derived from a left–right self-placement item and an item measuring the importance of the concepts of left and right indicates that societies differ substantially, not just in terms of the incidence of ideology, but also in terms of the importance attached to it. Further analysis introducing substantive indicators of left–right socio-economic policy preferences points to considerable variation in the extent to which the notions of left and right are embedded in a coherent system of socio-economic beliefs and principles. Summarising very briefly, the evidence from our measures of left–right self-placement and of the importance of left and right and from our factor analysis of these measures plus five substantive policy attitude-items suggests that left–right ideology tends to be more prevalent, more important and more structured in Europe than it is in the eight East and Southeast Asian countries under study. This is especially so if we focus on the core European states in our sample. The evidence also suggests that ideological orientations in Western Europe tend to be more left-leaning, while in East and Southeast Asian they lean more to the right (obviously, this observation needs to take account that what left and right mean is a good deal clearer in Europe than in East and Southeast Asia). In short, it is apparent that the ideological context into which globalisation intrudes varies from one region to another and, to a lesser extent, between groups of countries within each region. The question then is: what, if any, significance does all this have for our understanding of the relationship between public opinion and globalisation?

This, as emphasised in a previous chapter, is a two-way question. Looked at from one end, the question is: what effect does the experience of globalisation have on left–right ideological orientations? Looked at from the other direction, the question becomes: what effect, if any, does ideology have on the public's

evaluation of globalisation? The analysis presented in this chapter is confined to the first of these questions and the answer is pretty clear. Exposure to globalisation – through work, through family and friends, and through the mass media – are all associated with the attachment of greater importance to the notions of left and right. This finding holds irrespective of the influence of a wide range of socio-demographic control variables, some of which also have an independent effect on the importance of ideology and some of which, including, surprisingly, social class, do not. Moreover, the nature of these ‘exposure-to-globalisation’ variables is such that we can reasonably assume that the causal link runs from exposure to sense of importance of ideology rather than vice versa. This assumption, and that is all it is, is based on the temporal priority of most of the exposure variables. For example, it seems unlikely that, apart from a few special cases, the nature of one’s job would be a function of the importance one attaches to ideology. The same can be said for having family and friends abroad. While this argument does not apply to all the components of our measures of exposure to globalisation, it does apply to a sufficient number of them to enable one to conclude that globalisation does have an effect on the importance of ideology and that the effect is to enhance rather than undermine the significance of the traditional concepts of left and right.

Despite all the differences between the two regions in the use and meaning of the terms left and right, the positive association between our three behavioural indicators of exposure to globalisation and heightened sense of the importance of left and right is found in both regions. However, a relationship between a fourth measure of exposure to globalisation (perceived bad effect on job security) and the importance of ideology is found only in Europe. This may well reflect the greater robustness of the concepts of left and right in the European countries and their consequent capacity to provide a framework within which negative experiences of globalisation can be understood. It also, however, underlines the point that, in the case of this indicator, it is impossible to ascertain the direction of causation. It is entirely possible that a negative experience of globalisation leads to increasing resort to concepts of left and right in search of political solutions to personal predicaments. It is equally possible that prior belief in the importance of left–right issues may lead an individual to interpret his or her work situation in a way that puts the blame on globalisation rather than on other factors. In short, when the globalisation variable is a matter of evaluation rather than a reported behaviour or situation, it is a good deal more difficult to tease out the causal connection. However, this problem of the nature of the link between ideology (and a wide range of other variables) and evaluations of globalisation is taken up again in Chapter 9.

## Notes

- 1 The ASES political knowledge items and the distribution of respondents on the resulting knowledge scale are discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
- 2 See Sinnott, 2000 for similar findings in relation to attitudes to European integration.

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## 8 Finding global solutions?

### How citizens view policy problems and their solutions

*Shaun Wilson and Takashi Inoguchi*

#### Introduction

Recent trends towards greater international economic integration continue to raise questions about how public policies will cope with or improve new inequalities and risks attached to globalisation and truly global problems such as immigration, environmental destruction and poverty. While establishing greater regional or global policy coordination is a matter of institution building, any change in the balance between national, regional and global decision-making will hinge in part on political will formation, and in turn, on favourable public opinion about creating global power. At the level of national polities, the idea that public policies are made without considering the opinions of elites, likely winners and losers from policy change and the public at large is hard to sustain. And, at the same time, evidence shows that public opinion is strongly shaped by the experience of public policy and public policy traditions (see Pierson, 2004, p. 150; Stimson, 1999). As other chapters in this book suggest, the relationship between national and global processes deserves attention. Awareness and involvement in globalisation processes now play an important role in the development of national identity, political culture and ideology. Is this true of public policy as well? Is globalisation – or the prospect of global policy-making – registering with citizens? With the help of the results of the Asia-Europe Survey, this chapter starts to address this question by finding out how evaluations of policy problems and expectations of the *role of government* differ between these two regions, and what insights these judgements offer about the future of state capacity and global policy-making.

One point of departure for our discussion is an ongoing debate about the reshaping of national government in the face of global challenges (see, for instance, Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Wilensky, 2002). How national governments respond – or are *able* to respond – to the benefits and challenges of globalisation is a source of ongoing contention. Protagonists of globalisation argue that the policy capacity of the nation-state is undermined by economic globalisation. This well-known argument contends that trade and foreign investment, corporate integration and the regulatory power of international bodies such as the World Trade Organization create a set of new limits on the activity of

national governments. Indeed, the same protagonists argue that one political consequence is a new level of fiscal and policy discipline among national governments, which Thomas Friedman has imaginatively called the 'Golden Strait-jacket' (1999). While bilateral and multilateral trade agreements are visible examples of these new constraints, the constraints posed by global integration on the future of the welfare state – and the challenge to employment systems posed by the export of 'good jobs' – raise the most public anxieties.

On the other side of the debate, we find a more sceptical view about the demise of national state capacity, and one that has perhaps more cautiously observed the facts. For example, Linda Weiss (1997) argues that recent world economic development is better understood as a form of *deeper internationalisation*, with nation-states playing a leading role as they adapt their capacities to cope with greater openness (see also, Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Kahler, 2004). Much of Weiss's case rests on empirical insights into the performance of the newly industrialising countries of East Asia. As is now well known, these countries have relied on powerful state bureaucracies to facilitate trade and investment, the integration of research, new technologies and new industries, and some level of control over financial flows. And other evidence, which largely refutes the belief that welfare states face unique threats from the new 'laws' of global economics (Castles, 2004; Swank, 2002; Hicks and Zorn, 2005), raises further questions about how to understand better the national policy realities – and challenges – posed by economic integration.

To improve our understanding, we also need better information about how the public views the place of global or international policy-making in resolving or managing economic, social and environmental risks. This chapter does four main things to assist with this task. The first three are concerned with *policy evaluation* (how worried citizens are about particular problems) and the last is concerned with *policy orientation* (preferences about the broad direction of government policy). First, we provide fresh evidence from the nine Asian and nine European countries surveyed in the Asia-Europe Survey about the most important policy problems facing respondents and then consider how the publics across both regions judge government performance on these problems. Second, we find out whether there are regional differences in the policy areas where governments are judged poorly. These measures tell us, in regional terms, where weaknesses in citizen assessment of state capacity lie or, in other words, where governments are seen to fail in providing solutions to problems. Third, we directly address the question of whether the public believes that problems in three critical policy domains – the state of the economy, unemployment and the environment – are caused by international or national factors – and then whether solutions lie in international or national action. These findings enable us to locate those traditionally *national* policy areas that citizens now regard as deserving an international policy response. The final section addresses broad policy preferences that are particularly relevant in how national governments adapt to greater economic and political integration: attitudes to social protection and economic protection.

## Citizen policy evaluations: what worries Asians and Europeans?

Barometers of national and regional opinion regularly take stock of policy areas that matter to citizens and voters. The Asia-Europe Study provides an opportunity to do this as well, across two large world regions. The first area for investigation includes items in Q. 205 – the policy areas that preoccupy citizens across the eighteen countries surveyed. The question is:

Q. 205 When thinking specifically about the situation in [Country], how worried are you about each of the following? [The economy; political corruption; problems of human rights; unemployment; the level of crime; the quality of the public services; the level of immigration; ethnic conflict; religious conflict; the condition of the environment.

(Response categories: very worried, somewhat worried, not worried at all, don't know).

The level of worry for ten policy areas is measured by aggregating the percentages of respondents who opt for the first two responses ('very worried' or 'somewhat worried') on the 4-point scale. Table 8.1 ranks the findings by (the Asian) region. Before considering the comparisons, we first comment on the type of

*Table 8.1* Major policy preoccupations in Europe and Asia, 2000 (per cent of respondents 'very worried' or 'somewhat worried')

	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>Gap (positive score means Asian respondents more worried)</i>
Level of crime	56	58	-2
Unemployment	53	44	+9
Economy	46	23	+23
Corruption	45	33	+12
Environment	34	40	-6
Problems of human rights <sup>a</sup>	25	28	-3
Religious conflict	19	22	-3
Ethnic conflict	18	29	-11
Quality of public services	17	28	-11
Immigration	17	32	-15

Source: Asia-Europe Survey 2002.

Note

a Not asked in the People's Republic of China.

policy concerns surveyed. The distinction between ‘material’ and ‘postmaterial’ concerns (see Inglehart, 1997; and Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) helps us group, and make sense, of the findings. Material policy priorities reflect the immediate physical and security needs of the population (and pertain to items on the state of the economy, unemployment, the level of crime, and corruption). Postmaterial worries reflect ‘quality of life interests’ (quality of public services, the environment, human rights).<sup>1</sup> However, the remaining policy areas surveyed – including immigration and worries about ethnic and religious conflict are different again. We understand these as problems of *social integration* that governments may be closely involved in (such as setting immigration quotas) or may attempt to manage (such as alleviating potential ethnic tensions by promoting multiculturalism or cultural integration).

Respondents across the Asian countries surveyed place material preoccupations at the top: crime, unemployment, the economy and corruption. We find that worries about the economy and unemployment are strongly correlated, as we might expect for developmental states in which most welfare institutions are embedded in the provision of private sector industrial jobs (Kwon 2005, p.1). South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines register the highest number of respondents who are worried (see Figure 8.1). Singapore is the clear outlier in the Asian region, with much lower economic insecurity than in the remaining eight Asian countries. The level of economic insecurity in the Asian region closely corresponds to those economies damaged by the financial crisis that began in 1997. Indeed, the weak economy and increased employment insecurity that followed prompted major social policy reforms in at least two of these states – Taiwan and South Korea (Kwon, 2005, p. 2).




Figure 8.1 Asian countries more worried about the economy.

*Table 8.2* Policy responsiveness by governments in Europe and Asia, 2000 (per cent of respondents choosing 'very well' and 'quite well')

	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>Gap (positive score means Asian respondents more satisfied)</i>
Level of crime	36	52	14
Unemployment	31	36	-5
Economy	44	47	-3
Corruption	27	23	4
Environment	48	32	16
Problems of human rights <sup>a</sup>	43	45	-2
Religious conflict	53	37	16
Ethnic conflict	50	31	19
Quality of public services	53	32	21
Immigration	44	29	15
Mean policy score	43	36	7

Source: Asia-Europe Survey 2002.

Note

a Not asked in the People's Republic of China.

Base concerns about crime and corruption rank highly in both regions, as we would expect. In Asia, Japanese respondents are most likely to be very worried about crime (72 per cent of Japanese sample), and again, Singapore least. Anxieties about crime and corruption are not always closely related to the scale of the problem. For example, Japan has a comparatively small crime problem and, in fact, only around 60,000 people in prison (Ministry of Justice, 2005). By contrast, policy pre-occupations among Europeans reflect a greater mix of concern about material, postmaterial and social integration problems. Worry about the economy is weaker in Europe than it is in Asia, but unemployment remains a major source of insecurity (see Figure 8.2). Importantly, we find that the four countries that rank highest on global economic integration (see Appendix at the end of the chapter and Table 8.2) – Singapore, Malaysia, Ireland and Sweden – are all ranked in the bottom five survey countries for unemployment insecurity. We also find that general economic insecurity and unemployment insecurity appear less strongly related in Europe than they are in Asia. We offer an explanation: European economies have experienced 'jobless growth' (unemployment and economic insecurity coincident with economic growth) while developmental Asian states have had general downturns coincident with unprecedented unemployment.

The policy areas that we tentatively call postmaterial – the environment and the quality of public services – are more salient among Europeans than among




Figure 8.2 Unemployment troubles in both regions.




Figure 8.3 Asian countries more worried about respondents.

Asian respondents (for public services, see Figure 8.3). The environment ranks third among European policy concerns and the quality of public services is more important to Europeans than to Asians by a margin of 11 per cent. This is to be expected. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) demonstrate, environmental concern rises along with economic development (i.e. as material pressures on the population subside, the public begins to focus on problems affecting quality of life). The same argument probably applies to European attention to the state of public services. Peter Lindert (2004, pp. 28–29) shows that the preference for social




Figure 8.4 European anxieties about immigration.

expenditure increases as the political voice of welfare interests grows with the overall level of overall economic development, so it is no surprise that affluent Europe has high expectations about public services. As we shall suggest later, however, there are good reasons to expect that the Asian societies surveyed are likely to follow this path and increase their demand for environmental protection and public services.<sup>2</sup>

Recent tensions about the levels of immigration and ethnic conflict across Europe and in some Asian countries (like Thailand) warrant our attention. Although these immigration/ethnic integration problems are more pronounced in Europe than in Asia, they are not uniform by region and not necessarily related to actual levels of immigration (see Figure 8.4). Italian and Greek respondents are most likely to express their antipathies about the level of immigration (56 and 52 per cent, respectively) and these two countries also express the most anxiety about ethnic conflict. Italy and Greece both share borders with the former Yugoslavia and Albania from which many poor migrants have attempted to migrate in recent years and both countries have only recently become destinations sought by immigrants (Freeman 1995, p. 881). Fears about immigration attenuate in most Asian countries with the exceptions of Thailand and the Philippines, which are similar to the middle-ranking European countries.

So far, we have profiled national and regional differences on policy problems confronting publics and government. The Asia-Europe Survey also asks respondents from each country to evaluate how well their national governments are dealing with each problem area. The same ten-item list can now be used to gauge citizen views about the level of policy responsiveness (or perhaps effectiveness) of their governments, and these results are reported in Table 8.2. The

scores are the sum of responses for the 'Very well' and 'Quite well' categories. The relevant question from the survey is:

Q. 206 How well do you think the [Country] government is dealing with the following issues in [Country]? [list as above for Q. 205] (Response categories: very well, quite well, not well, not well at all).

Generally, respondents in the Asian countries surveyed rate government performance higher than do Europeans. Not surprising is that the low scores for both regions were recorded against the two main policy problem areas of crime and unemployment (see Figure 8.2). Europeans give poor ratings to several areas of government management: crime, corruption, immigration, and ethnic conflicts.

Again, regional differences in perceptions of government performance can be calculated by measuring the difference between Asian and European evaluations. The largest performance gaps (Europeans rating government performance lower than Asian respondents) are recorded for: the quality of public services and the environment, and for ethnic and religious conflict and immigration (see Table 8.2). As we stated earlier, these unfavourable results for European countries probably reflect the higher expectations of the public sector and environmental protection that come with socio-economic development (rather than 'Asian indifference' to both). And perhaps in the same vein, poor performance of European governments on immigration and ethnic conflict are a product of a complex mix of economic, social and cultural insecurities present in emerging multicultural democracies.

Turning now to specific areas of evaluation, we find that East Asian governments rate poorly on unemployment, which may reflect the specific circumstances faced by these economies after 1997, and by Japan for most of that decade (see Figure 8.5). (Dissatisfaction with overall economic performance by Asian governments follows a similar pattern). The southern European states are among Europe's poor performers when it comes to unemployment (OECD, 2006).<sup>3</sup> Not surprisingly, we can see from Figure 8.2 that respondents from Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal are insecure about employment. This insecurity finds its way across to assessments of government performance on unemployment. Spaniards, Italians, Greeks and the Portuguese all think governments are performing poorly in this area (again, see Figure 8.5).

Corruption features strongly as a public anxiety throughout the Asian and European countries surveyed. We also find that governments in both regions rate poorly on handling corruption, although these rankings generally correspond with the 2004 corruption rankings available from the rankings of political corruption compiled by the University of Passau (Transparency International, 2004). Even though aspects of its internal politics and administration are regularly described as authoritarian and nepotistic, Singapore is the only country where most respondents






Figure 8.5 Most Asian and Southern European governments rate poorly on Unemployment.




Figure 8.6 Governments rate badly on political corruption except in Singapore, Sweden and Malaysia.

think the government is handling corruption well (see Figure 8.6) and this confidence is confirmed by its ranking as the fifth *least* corrupt country in the world according to the Transparency rankings. Singapore is rated as the least corrupt country of the eighteen included in the Asia-Europe study. Next is Sweden (in sixth place on the world rankings) and the United Kingdom in eleventh position. The next country in the rankings in Asia is Japan, ranked twenty-fourth, while the most corrupt country surveyed is Indonesia, ranked at 133rd place overall.

Table 8.3 Policy capacity ‘gaps’ in Europe and Asia, 2000<sup>a</sup> (per cent)

	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Europe</i>
Level of crime	-20	-26
Unemployment	-22	-8
Economy	-2	24
Corruption	-18	-10
Environment	10	-8
Problems of human rights <sup>b</sup>	18	17
Religious conflict	34	15
Ethnic conflict	32	2
Quality of public services	36	4
Immigration	27	-3

Source: Asia-Europe Survey 2002.

#### Notes


a Number of respondents rating governments effective in a policy area minus the number of respondents worried about policy area.

b Not asked in the People’s Republic of China.

## Where do citizens think national governments are weak on policy?

Policy weaknesses – attributed to the problems of globalisation, meeting public expectations or unresolved national problems – inevitably call into question ‘state capacity’. This capacity refers to the government’s institutional ability to deal with or resolve policy problems (Painter and Pierre, 2004; Marsh, 2004). The Asia-Europe project is not primarily engaged with the task of assessing where weaknesses in state capacity lie. But survey results are able to provide some information about areas of policy – in individual countries and in both regions – that are considered very important but where government performance is judged weak. From this, we can obtain simple measures of a *policy performance gap* subtracting the per centage of respondents who are concerned (‘very worried’ or ‘worried’) about each policy area from the per centage who rate the national government effective in that area of policy (see Table 8.3). We acknowledge that this measure reflects only the balance of public opinion about policy performance, and does not account for objective measures of policy capacity attached to national governments found in the state capacity literature. But it still establishes where Asian and European respondents most believe the performance of government is weak.

As Table 8.3 (and Figure 8.7) show, responses to the problem of crime, and to some extent corruption, are poorly rated in both regions. Overall, the scores for crime are -20 points in Asia and -26 points in Europe. In other words, both Europeans and Asians think the ability of governments to deal with crime is much more limited than the extent of the problem. The problem of crime stands out in Europe as a real weakness of state policy. This may tell us something about ongoing political opportunities for tougher criminal sentencing and greater



*Figure 8.7* Net policy performance: governments in both regions report poorly on crime, unemployment and corruption.

**Note**

A net performance score is calculated by subtracting the percentage of respondents in each region who were 'Very worried' about each category of problems from the percentage of 'respondents who thought the government was responding 'Very and fairly well' to each problem. A negative score suggests that concern about a problem exceeds confidence in how the government is handling it.

law-and-order campaigning to build a new populist-right electorate in many European countries such as France and the Netherlands. Certainly, French presidential aspirant and UMP Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, has built his political profile in France on being tough on crime.

By contrast, unemployment is Asia's policy Achilles' heel. Taken as a whole, the Asian public rates government performance some 22 percentage points lower than its level of insecurity about the unemployment problem. Here public opinion corresponds closely with an objectively established weakness in policy capacity of developmental economies: the poor result is a response to the combination of regional economic crisis and inadequate welfare institutions to deal with unemployment. As we mention above, some East Asian governments extended social protection schemes to deal with this problem, but this is one area where most Asian region governments still lack state capacity (especially after the 1997 crisis and the slower levels of growth that have followed). As for areas of national government policy that appear to hold the public's confidence, Asian citizens judge their governments competent in the areas of religious and ethnic conflict and on the quality of public services. Again, this may tell us more about

the ‘non-problems’ that these policy areas represent in Asia rather than government capacity to deal with them. But hardline policies towards ethnic minorities and separatists in countries as diverse as China, Thailand and Indonesia may have registered with their respective publics.

### **Policy problems and their solutions: do citizens want global action?**

Although we can identify weaknesses in policy responsiveness by national governments, some policy problems are generated by international causes that nation-states may have a limited ability to manage. Certainly, Friedman’s ‘golden straitjacket’ analogy would apply more forcefully if the public too view policy problems as genuinely international in both origin and solution. How the public come to attribute global causes and solutions to policy issues is an important question (see Marsh, 2004); here, we evaluate responses at an empirical level. The Asia–Europe Study asks respondents:

Do you feel that [problems in the economy, unemployment, condition of the environment] are mainly due to causes within [country] or are due to in the international situation, or both?

(Response categories: mainly causes within the country; mainly international causes; both equally; don’t know).

Of the three policy areas surveyed – problems in the economy, unemployment and the environment – international factors are most implicated in problems of the economy: at least 60 per cent of respondents across the eighteen countries choosing either ‘International causes’ or ‘Both equally’ (see Table 8.4). Europeans are 9 per cent more likely than Asian respondents to consider international factors as the main cause of economic problems (27 to 18 per cent; see also Figure 8.8 for country breakdowns). Again, the strongly state-centric East Asia is *least* likely to think economic problems have global causes while the ‘globalisation’ worldview appears to have most strongly influenced French public opinion.

There is little controversy in claiming that environmental problems are now among the most urgent facing the international community. Problems like pollution, air traffic, the depletion of fish stocks and global warming are not problems confined within national borders. Do the publics of the survey countries see the problem in the same way? Overall, around 50 per cent of respondents attribute (either wholly or partly) an international dimension to ecological problems. But Europeans and Asian respondents hold different views, with Europeans around 15 per cent more likely to attribute these problems to international causes (Figure 8.9). Although ecological consciousness can be in part explained by postmaterial values of affluent Europe, it is less clear whether these value


*Table 8.4* National or international causes of economic, unemployment and environmental problems, 2000 (per cent)<sup>a</sup>

	<i>Problems in the economy</i>	<i>Unemployment</i>	<i>Environment</i>
<b>Asia</b>			
National	35	57	51
International	18	11	12
Both equally	42	27	33
<b>Europe</b>			
National	28	53	35
International	27	15	21
Both equally	39	27	38

Source: Asia–Europe Survey 2002.

Note

a Don't know excluded.



*Figure 8.8* Europeans more inclined to see economic problems as International.

differences can explain differences in attribution between national and international factors. It may be the case that Europeans also believe that, with environmental standards improving within its borders, the worst problems remain either truly global, such as atmospheric changes, or confined to destructive activities in developing countries, like primary deforestation or unregulated industry emissions. The differences could also be explained by the geographical boundaries of national states: most of the European countries surveyed share a land mass, while most Asian countries surveyed are islands with distinct national-geographical borders.




Figure 8.9 Europeans see environment as an international problem and Asians a national problem.

By contrast, when we examine the causes of unemployment, a quite different pattern of responses becomes clear. A majority of respondents in both Europe and Asia see unemployment as a problem with *national* causes (Figure 8.10). While respondents are more inclined to see environmental problems and general problems of the economy as having international causes, the problem of unemployment is seen as national. The shift to national causes is particularly strong in European countries, which otherwise see policy problems as largely international in their origin (see Table 8.4).

How do respondents in the Asia-Europe Survey judge the solutions to these policy problems? It does not automatically follow that if policy problems are attributed to national causes that the public will view solutions in the same way, and the same can be said for the balance between international causes and solutions as well. The Survey asks respondents:

Would you please tell me whether each of these problems should be dealt with by each country deciding for itself what should be done or by all countries together deciding what should be done?  
 (Dealt with by each country; dealt with by all countries together, Don't know; haven't thought about it much)

We find that Europeans are much more likely than Asian respondents to seek international solutions to the list of nine problems outlined in Table 8.5. This is not surprising given that a substantial regional government (in the European Union) is now well established, while corresponding regional activity in Asia is not (yet) at the level of regional government. However, there is strong majority




Figure 8.10 Respondents in most countries see unemployment as a national problem.

Table 8.5 Support for ‘all countries together’ dealing with problems ranked by total, 2000 (per cent)<sup>a</sup>

	Asia	Europe	Total
The danger of military conflict in Europe	–	77	77
The danger of military conflict somewhere else in the world	69	79	74
The problem of developing countries	54	76	65
The danger of military conflict in Asia	64	–	64
The problem of refugees and asylum seekers	59	62	61
Environmental problems	49	70	60
Problem of human rights	43	70	58
The problem of women’s rights	36	57	46
The problem of unemployment	28	38	33

Source: Asia–Europe Survey 2002.

Note

a Don’t know excluded.

support international action where the danger of military conflict in Asia, Europe or elsewhere in the world becomes possible. It is difficult to give a close interpretation to what this result means. It could mean that respondents strongly support international action and solidarity to prevent military conflict or perhaps support for international rather than unilateral action in the event of conflict. On the two of the three policy problems for which we have evaluated responses about whether they have national or international causes – environmental prob-





Figure 8.11 More variation among Asian publics about working together on environment.

lems and unemployment – we have corresponding responses for preferences for national and international solutions. We find much higher support for international solutions to problems of the environment than we do unemployment. Only 28 per cent of Asian respondents and 38 per cent of Europeans seek all countries to work together to find solutions to joblessness, while 49 and 70 per cent, respectively, seek international response to environmental problems.

Country-level analysis shows that the publics of Asian countries vary more over global solutions to environmental problems than do Europeans (see Figure 8.11), where only in Ireland does the number of ‘pro-global’ responses fall below a majority. On unemployment, France and Italy lead the Europeans in seeking global (probably regional) solutions (see Figure 8.12). Both countries have had among the most protracted unemployment problems in Europe, which may mean voters are compelled to look beyond national governments.

These results offer a preliminary assessment of how the publics in two regions understand ‘the division of labour’ between national and international policy responses. Europeans – with their now lengthy experience in regional institution building – are more inclined to support international decision-making. And, as we saw earlier, they are also more likely to perceive problems as having at least international causes in the first place. On military conflict, economic development, the protection of human rights and the environment, we see public opinion in both regions generally supportive of international action. No doubt visible achievements (and headaches) in these areas at the supra-national level mean that the public is already aware of the ‘globalisation’ of these problems. The one area where the publics of both regions are more reticent about international solutions is on unemployment.





*Figure 8.12* National solutions to unemployment prevail in most European and Asian countries.

What does this finding mean? The main point to establish is that there is little visible effort to build institutions that can solve unemployment beyond national boundaries – even in a region like Europe where substantial policy-making infrastructure now exists. Although there are some regional initiatives to combat unemployment (EU funds for development), most of the responsibility for this lies with national governments – and the public seem to recognise or expect this. Clearly, the absence of effective international means for dealing with unemployment (beyond those policies designed to promote growth in developing countries) shapes public opinion. But it may also be true that the public expects that national governments – much like Linda Weiss suggests – will tune their state capacities to ensuring social welfare and employment in adapting to greater global economic integration.

### **Policy orientations: do regions differ on social and economic outlooks?**

So far, we have surveyed policy problems that trouble Asians and Europeans, and considered whether these publics want problems to be addressed nationally or internationally. There is a high degree of recognition of the value of international and regional policy coordination. But, as we have seen in responses to unemployment, which is at the heart of domestic welfare, the public does not think all problems should be solved by international means. This final section addresses broad policy preferences that are particularly relevant in how national

governments adapt to greater economic and political integration: attitudes to social protection and economic protection.

### ***Attitudes to social protection – Asia and Europe***

For citizens, the most important and visible area of government activity is the social security system. European states have the most mature and developed social welfare states of any region in the world, although they still vary considerably in generosity, financing and redistributive scope (see Castles, 2004). At the same time, European societies are well known for their preference for social protection, and scholarly work has confirmed this (Svallfors, 1997). Less is established about Asian states and the welfare orientations of their citizens, in part because these institutions are still emerging in most countries (see Ramesh, 2004; Kwon, 2005). However, Asian welfare development is likely to become central to policy development in the coming decades, as the entire economic region grows in affluence and as the region struggles with new policy institutions after the limits of the growth-centred approach were painfully exposed in the 1990s. As Ian Gough remarks '[t]he older confidence in economic growth as the social policy has evaporated' (2000, p. 19).

As Gough's review of social welfare activity in East Asia shows, relatively few resources are devoted to social protection in these countries (2000, p. 8). Indonesia, for example, spends about 3 per cent of GDP on education, health and social protection (Gough, 2000, p. 8). The Philippines spends around 6 per cent and Malaysia 8 per cent (2000, p. 8). No Asian country has come close to the European average for social expenditure, with the exception of Japan. But, as Huck-ju Kwon points out, 'East Asian countries [have] adopted social welfare programmes at lower levels of socioeconomic development than the European countries had done' (2005, p. 1). And, two Asian states in the OECD – South Korea and Japan – have both recorded social expenditure growth at a faster rate than the average for 28 OECD countries. Korea's public social expenditure expanded from 3 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 6 per cent in 2001 and Japan's social expenditure has risen sharply, increasing from 11 per cent in 1990 (the level it had been for the previous decade) to 17 per cent in 2001 (OECD, 2004). In critical areas like health care, there are signs of greater development in the public health systems of South Korea and Taiwan (Kwon, 2005) and in the Philippines (Gough, 2000).

As we noted above, long-held perceptions of Asian values as monolithic or authoritarian are hard to sustain. Indeed, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 156) have shown, Confucian societies – long held up as having inherently anti-democratic features – are not only more democratic than is assumed, but their level of democratic commitment is following the path of their socio-economic development, and is thus likely to rise further over time. There is a prevailing view that (especially East) Asian countries are also 'anti-welfare' and that authoritarian social structures and economic-growth-first development strategies are mirrored in strong public values of hard work and self-reliance. Do we find weaker support in

the Asian survey countries for social protection than we find for Europe? Although the Asia-Europe Survey does not include a sufficient range of questions to scale responses into a 'welfare orientation scale' with adequate statistical properties, we are still able to evaluate responses to the following statements:

- Incomes should be made equal (*income equality*).
- The government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare (*universal minimum provision*).
- A woman's primary role is in the home (*gender equality*).
- Individuals should strive most of all for their own good rather than for the good of society (*individualism versus collectivism*).

Asian respondents are less inclined to support the proposition that incomes should be made more equal than Europeans – 50 versus 74 per cent (see Table 8.6). The exceptions in Asia are Thailand and South Korea, which have preferences similar to most European countries. The result for South Korea is not surprising given strongly reformist preferences revealed elsewhere in this volume. Higher support in Europe for equality is a likely outcome of long-term public policies aimed at reducing inequality that have shifted European preferences (see Svallfors, 1997). This is confirmed when national preferences for making incomes more equal are compared with the Gini coefficients for each country available in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report (2004). We find that most countries with a strong preference for reducing inequality have already obtained a lower level of income inequality (see Figure 8.13). By contrast, a group of Asian countries – Malaysia, China, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan – have a high level of income inequality and weak preferences for redistribution.

On another measure of social protection – the government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare – Asian responses are as supportive as Europeans (86 v. 84 per cent). The uniform level of support for this proposition deserves a brief explanation. Perhaps respondents everywhere found it hard to *disagree*

*Table 8.6* Social policy orientations in the two regions, 2000 (per cent agree)

	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Europe</i>
Incomes should be made more equal	50	74
The government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare	86	84
A women's primary role is in the home	30	17
Individuals strive for their own good rather than for the good of society	31	26

Source: Asia-Europe Survey 2002.




Figure 8.13 European countries have more equal incomes but also prefer lower income inequality.

with this apparently reasonable statement, so the question may not perform the task of revealing real opinion differences about 'government assistance' versus 'self reliance'. But perhaps stronger Asian support for this proposition than the income equality proposition reflects different expectations on what governments will do. Developmental states gain their legitimacy by taking responsibility for growing incomes and employment through government-led economic development, but not through explicit efforts at reducing income inequality (through 'welfare means' such as high taxes and high welfare spending).

Attitudes towards gender equality tend to modernise (towards the norm of gender equality) with higher levels of socio-economic development. Still, ensuring equal access to employment and the public sphere is an important component of national social policies. We find that national responses to the proposition that 'A woman's primary role is in the home' vary greatly across the Asian sample (see Figure 8.14). We find a strong adherence to traditional gender expectations in South Korea (despite that country seeking economic redistribution) and a very strong rejection of that tradition in China whose state-socialist heritage has stressed formal equality at least. There is a wide rejection of this proposition among Europeans with Greeks (most supportive) and Swedish (least supportive) at the two extremes.




Figure 8.14 Asian countries differ greatly in their responses to women's equality.

#### *Attitudes to economic protection – Asia and Europe*

Although protectionism is not typically part of the liberal view of globalisation, national policies to protect local economies and selectively promote globally competitive industries are closer to the reality of greater economic integration. Europe is traditionally known for its preference for economic and cultural protectionism (especially countries like France, which make a strong public virtue out of both). But on three measures, the Asia-Europe Survey suggests that the Asian region remains more protectionist. The margin of difference on the proposition that '[country] should limit the import of foreign products' is relatively small at 4 per cent (49 per cent of Asian respondents agree). But on the proposition that foreigners should not be able to buy land in the respondent's country of residence, we find Asian respondents much more likely to agree (51 v. 28 per cent). And preference for national culture – television should give preference to (locally) made films and programmes – is over 20 per cent higher in Asia than in Europe (62 v. 41 per cent).

We single out preferences for import restrictions for country-level analysis in Figure 8.15. International studies have shown that support for protection *within* countries is higher among low skilled workers, workers whose jobs are exposed to global trade and individuals with relatively lower socio-economic status (Mayda and Rodrik, 2002). But are there also differences between countries – in and between regions? Variations in responses are considerably greater between Asian countries than between their European counterparts. Preferences for restricting imports is low in successful export economies such as Japan and Singapore in Asia (both with big current account surpluses) and in Germany and Sweden (which also are both among Europe's most export-oriented economies). Greece and Thailand are the most protectionist of the two regions.

Table 8.7 Protectionist orientations in the two regions, 2000 (per cent agree)

	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Europe</i>
[Country] should limit the import of foreign products	49	45
Foreigners should not be able to buy land in [country]	51	28
[Country's] television should give preference to [Country's] made films and programmes	62	41

Source: Asia-Europe Survey 2002.




Figure 8.15 Successful export economies in Asia and Europe do not prefer import restrictions.

## Conclusion

This chapter has mainly considered how policy problems are shaped by regional and global factors. We find that the policy concerns of Asian survey countries are generally more ‘materialist’ – consistent with their level of socio-economic development. In Europe, however, ‘postmaterial’ policy priorities emerge as also important, particularly for the environment and the state of public services. These generalisations do not account for intra-regional differences that depend on more cautious explanations attuned to history, culture and politics, and in most cases beyond the scope of our immediate research. Yet another set of policy problems confront European societies, which we have called here problems of social integration (immigration, ethnic and religious conflict), which indicate plenty of conflict over the future of multicultural societies.

Two policy problems stand out particularly across the regions: corruption and

unemployment. Governments are seen as failing to address both adequately. Europeans are generally more likely to see economic and environmental problems as international in their origin and support international efforts at managing them. The Asian survey countries – and particularly the East Asian countries of China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – are most likely to view policy problems as national in their origin and management. However, Europeans share with citizens of most Asian countries surveyed the view that unemployment remains a national policy problem and believe national governments are responsible for solving it. Clearly, the publics of most countries entrust national governments to play an active role in securing adequate employment *regardless* of the larger question about the role of global forces in shaping the economic opportunities afforded to national governments. Part of these expectations for national action may be closely linked to highly visible past or ongoing efforts to create full employment by national governments, and the absence of plausible global alternatives.

Scholars and commentators outside Asia are increasingly less prone to see the Asian region as united by ‘Asian values’, even when Asian leaders themselves have referred to such values for various, often convenient, reasons (see Sen, 1997; Blondel, 2006). Understood in this way, Asian values have often referred to the ethics of hard work, self-support (extrapolated to mean anti-welfare) and being undemocratic (tolerance for authoritarian politics). Inglehart and Welzel undermine these assumptions in demonstrating that the publics of Confucian societies are more committed to democracy than is assumed. We also find here that Asian expectations of social policy are not sharply different from the ones held by Europeans. Although some differences in expectations of women, the role of individual achievement and income inequality are apparent, the most important findings of this chapter are that European and Asian citizens hold similarly strong expectations of government in providing welfare and employment and Asian citizens are no more inclined to seek economic growth at the expense of the environment.

## **Appendix**

To measure the impact of international economic integration, we rely on the following index provided by *Foreign Policy* magazine (see Table 8.A1; see Table 8.A1 notes for measurement details). Three of the top four most economically integrated economies in the world are included in the ASES study – Singapore, Ireland, Malaysia and Sweden. Generally, Asian countries outperform their European counterparts on foreign trade, but the reverse holds true for foreign investment.

Table 8.A1 Ranking of eighteen countries by global economic exposure

	<i>Foreign trade</i>	<i>Foreign investment</i>	<i>Overall economic</i>
Singapore	1	1	1
Ireland	4	2	2
Malaysia	2	21	4
Sweden	21	6	12
Thailand	7	43	14
Taiwan	13	32	18
Spain	42	11	22
France	46	10	24
China	36	19	26
Philippines	41	51	28
United Kingdom	45	20	32
South Korea	25	47	38
Germany	30	54	43
Portugal	34	53	44
Italy	50	40	47
Indonesia	37	59	50
Greece	48	58	55
Japan	62	52	62

Source: *Foreign Policy?* (2005). Available online at: [www.foreignpolicy.com](http://www.foreignpolicy.com).

Note

Countries ranked in the respective categories of trade and FDI by percentage of GDP.

## Notes

- 1 We acknowledge that, perhaps increasingly, the provision of goods like public services and the state of the environment have clear material implications, as do Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
- 2 Speculating on the question of Asian values and the welfare state, Peter Lindert (2004 p. 29) points out  
Convergence toward the OECD standard of high social transfers will probably occur even in East Asia, contrary to the frequent rhetoric about antistatist “Asian values”. As their populations age, even those countries where official dogma espouses Confucian traditions of reliance and family support will experience a rise in public pensions and other social transfers as a share of GDP’.
- 3 We do note, however, that Spain’s (very high) unemployment is dropping relative to other southern welfare states (Italy, Greece and Portugal).

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# 9 Globalisation and political participation

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## Introduction

Political participation is central to democracy. To flourish, democratic governments need a continuous input of information and support from the societies they govern. Various forms of political participation inject this information into the political system. Political participation is also important in educating citizens to be supportive of the political system. Through political participation, citizens are socialised into the practice and ethos of good democratic citizenship; enhancing their interest in politics, learning their own political role and strengthening their sense of belonging to the political community. Political participation cultivates democratic capabilities. ‘The heirs of Tocqueville ... point to the democratic orientations and skills that develop when people work together voluntarily: social trust, norms of reciprocity and cooperation, and the capacity to transcend narrow points of view and conceptualize the common good’ (Verba *et al.* 1995).

Despite the importance of participation to democratic life, certain aspects of participation are not well understood. Theorists continue to debate the motivations behind participation: why do some citizens participate in politics? Some commentators emphasise the importance of *modernisation*: increasing levels of education, rising standards of living and changes in employment structures have produced a new style of citizen politics. This new style is characterised by increased public demands, new social movements and weakening loyalties to traditional hierarchies (Dalton, 1996). Others emphasise the importance of *institutional rules*. For the institutionalists, laws, party systems and constitutions govern the structure of opportunities available, and hence account for differences in political participation among nations (Powell, 1986). Still others argue that *mobilisation* plays a fundamental role in determining participation (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). More recently Verba *et al.* (1995) developed a *civic voluntarism model*. They argue that citizens’ skill and resource levels influence their participation. Time, money, and civic skills – derived from familial, occupational and associational memberships – make it easier for some citizens to participate.<sup>1</sup>

These factors are all clearly crucial. But two things are absent from much of this literature. First, the research tends to focus on Western Europe or the United

States, and we still know relatively little about participation in Asia. And second, the influence of globalization on political participation is not clearly understood. In this chapter, we examine the extent, nature and causes of orientations to political participation in seventeen countries in our study.

Although there is no generally agreed-upon definition of the term 'globalisation', commentators use the term loosely to refer to the accelerated cross-national transfer of capital, goods, people and ideas that has occurred in recent decades (Norris, 2004). Nor is there a consensus on the consequences of globalisation: for some, globalisation is responsible for all evil, whereas for others it is transforming the world in positive ways. Huge claims have been made about the effects of globalisation: some theorists, such as Giddens (1990), understand this process as unprecedented in the reshaping of societies, economies, governments and the world order. Others contend that globalisation is undermining national boundaries, and weakening national identities (Norris, 2004, p. 2). Clearly, given the claims about the effects of globalisation, it would be reasonable to assume that globalisation has an impact not only on citizens' values, identities and political preferences – as have been examined in previous chapters – but also on their participation.

Globalisation weakens the sovereignty of nation-states: does this weakening of sovereignty in turn weaken national identities, and commitments to national politics, thus lowering participation rates? Or is it the case that globalisation is a resource that enhances intra-national political life? Through using electronic resources, the Internet, foreign news and contact with other nationals do citizens develop a global outlook that includes the importance of domestic civic engagement? We contend that they do. We examine whether citizens who are more heavily exposed to the processes of globalisation are more or less likely to discuss and participate in politics. We find that globalisation has a significant, but modest, impact on political discussion and participation: exposure to globalisation is a resource that encourages participation in civic life.

Since we assess the impact of globalisation on political participation, we begin by describing and comparing the levels and modes of political participation. We then analyse the causes of political participation in the countries and regions in the project. China is not included in this analysis because we are not allowed to ask questions related to political participation.

Our definition of political participation follows a quite standard format (Huntington and Nelson, 1976; Verba and Nie, 1972). Political participation is an activity undertaken by general citizens with the aim of influencing governmental decisions.<sup>2</sup> More strictly, it is an actual political action and psychological attitudes such as political knowledge and political interest are not included in our definition of political participation. Political participation is a political activity undertaken by general citizens, and the various occupational activities of bureaucrats, politicians and lobbyists are not included. In our study, we do not distinguish between mobilised participation and autonomous participation because they are empirically difficult to separate and we assume that both have some influence on governmental decisions.

Participation has become a contentious issue, even in the most studied nations of Europe and in the United States. Putnam (2000), for example, concludes that participation in the United States has substantially declined, with potentially deleterious consequences for democratic practice. This finding has been challenged in other work (Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). The application of these findings to other advanced democratic states and their significance for the 'quality' of democratic life have also been explored (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Contributors to this latter project disagree in their assessments. Some see a decline in the incidence of participation, whereas others contend that the forms and patterns of participation have changed. Some judge this to be of concern for the health of the developed democracies and others conclude that democratic vitality remains robust.

In a survey of new social movements, Tarrow (2000) also explores the move towards more confrontational and challenging modes of participation. He concludes:

These trends suggest a range of interactions of activists with contentious and institutionalized politics that corresponds poorly to the classical division between parties and interest groups on one hand and social movements on the other. They have created a movement society in which the boundaries of tolerated contention have expanded, established actors share a border region of contentious actions with new and aggressive challenges, and some disruptive tactics have been so fully accepted that they have lost much of their political clout.

(2000, p. 283)

Norris (2002) has also explored the development of a more critical outlook amongst citizens in the developed democracies: citizens are critical of democratic practice, but retain a commitment to democratic ideals and still participate. The countries covered in this present survey include not only the established democracies of Europe, but also a number of newer democracies in Asia. Of the nine Asian states China retains a socialist regime and thus questions of political action were omitted in that state. Japan is the oldest of the Asian democracies and although earlier work identified distinctive patterns of engagement and authority (e.g. Wolferen, 1989), the most recent studies finds citizen views closely aligned to those found in other mature democratic states (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Of the other Asian states, democracy was introduced in Taiwan in the early 1990s and restored in South Korea at the same time. It was also re-established in the Philippines in the late 1980s and in Indonesia, following the financial crisis of 1997, in the late 1990s. Meantime, Thai democracy was restored following a military coup in 1992 and democracy was strengthened under constitutional change in 1997, but in 2006 the military overthrew the elected government and the country returned to military rule. Finally, Malaysia and Singapore have both created democratic institutions although democratic practice is highly constrained.

In this chapter, we first compare the levels and types of political participation in which citizens engage in the nations and regions included in the Asia-Europe Survey (ASES). We then assess the impact of globalisation on political participation: to what extent can exposure to the freedoms and practices in other nations through work, friends and relatives living abroad, travel and the media increase the levels of democratic participation?

### **How active are citizens?**

Before entering into the heart of the discussion, let us first assess the actual levels of political participation. We present an overview of political participation in seventeen (eight Asian and nine European) countries in Table 9.1.

Obviously care must be taken when comparing individual activities across nations because similar activities are not always equivalent in meaning. For example, the various rules imposed by parties within nations influence citizens' decisions to join political parties. Parties in some countries actively pursue a broad but relatively non-committed member base through easy membership processes, while parties in other countries maintain rigorous membership processes with the aim of promoting party loyalty or ideological consistency. Even the act of voting, while in itself a well-defined concept, is influenced by systemic variables that differ dramatically cross-nationally, such as registration, regulations and party resources. Thus, the relatively low voting rates seen in some countries may not be an absolute indication of voter apathy vis-à-vis other nations, but rather a reflection of the idiosyncratic voting systems adopted by individual nations.

### **Regional and national political participation**

Two broad observations can be made. First, citizens in the European countries participate in politics more than do citizens in the Asian countries in every activity except for voting in national elections and helping a politician or party at election time. Second, not only do participation rates differ between the two regions, but within each region, countries differ widely. In general, citizens participate at similarly high rates for the easy acts, with talking and voting being the most common, and more difficult acts evidence greater variation, but participation in the Asian countries generally takes place around a lower threshold.

We divided the information on political participation presented in Table 9.1 into participation in the two regions: Asia and Europe (see Figure 9.1). We exclude voting from our analysis since some, but not all countries in the sample, have compulsory voting regulations. Even a glance at Figure 9.1 shows that not only do European citizens participate more actively in political activities, but the difference in participation between easy and difficult tasks is stark. For example, although Europeans are only 1.2 times more likely to talk with family and friends about political matters than are Asians, they are more than 4 times more likely to attend a protest, march or demonstration, and more than twice as likely to either sign a petition or to contact an elected politician about a

Table 9.1a Political participation in seventeen countries: per cent who say they have done at least once (by country)

<i>Asia</i>								
	<i>Japan</i>	<i>South Korea</i>	<i>Taiwan</i>	<i>Singapore</i>	<i>Malaysia</i>	<i>Indonesia</i>	<i>Thailand</i>	<i>Philippines</i>
Sign a petition	23.2	12.6	3.1	1.1	3.8	0.5	1.8	5.2
Contact an elected politician about a personal or local problem	9.9	5.0	8.5	3.3	7.3	1.0	11.9	12.4
Attend a protest, march or demonstration	10.2	7.7	2.8	0.3	2.3	1.7	3.4	5.6
Contribute money to the campaign of a party or candidate in an election	15.9	3.6	11.7	2.1	18.4	6.7	4.8	11.0
Contact an elected politician about a national issue or problem	6.2	3.8	10.4	4.2	15.8	3.9	11.5	15.7
Actively help a political party or candidate at election time	21.3	7.8	13.2	1.4	14.9	4.9	11.1	22.7
Get together informally with others to deal with some community issue or problem	5.0	4.7	9.0	2.4	6.6	6.2	18.4	13.9
Join a political party	7.8	9.6	11.4	1.6	26.8	7.7	6.4	14.5
Voting for all national elections	69.1	69.5	83.9	70.8	67.7	57.9	83.5	72.8
Voting for all local elections	70.7	62.5	82.8		68.3	22.9	80.3	71.7
Talk about the problems facing country with family and friends	8.2	10.3	10.9	10.6	10.0	12.9	11.2	10.3
Talk about the international or world problems with family and friends	7.9	8.9	11.1	11.0	9.6	9.7	9.8	10.6
Talk about country's party politics or party leaders with family and friends	10.4	8.4	10.7	7.7	9.1	11.8	12.7	7.9
	20.4	16.5	20.7	9.7	20.0	11.4	20.5	21.1

*continued*

Table 9.1a continued

<i>Europe</i>										
	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Ireland</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Portugal</i>	<i>Greece</i>	
Sign a petition	26.7	18.3	27.1	8.2	23.2	13.1	13.6	10.0	8.4	
Contact an elected politician about a personal or local problem	14.8	31.3	25.0	12.4	9.4	11.0	9.5	6.1	21.1	
Attend a protest, march or demonstration	9.3	13.9	30.9	16.3	13.3	20.7	22.4	13.3	26.0	
Contribute money to the campaign of a party or candidate in an election	9.7	30.6	12.8	9.5	8.5	14.5	12.4	5.8	22.1	
Contact an elected politician about a national issue or problem	11.1	38.1	13.7	15.4	9.5	9.2	12.5	4.9	14.1	
Actively help a political party or candidate at election time	7.1	15.3	10.4	8.8	6.1	14.4	9.2	7.5	23.8	
Get together informally with others to deal with some community issue or problem	12.2	24.4	20.8	13.5	4.6	15.6	17.8	7.4	17.6	
Join a political party	10.4	10.6	11.1	9.6	15.9	19.2	11.7	8.5	17.3	
Voting for all national elections	63.1	57.9	72.3	74.8	78.7	87.8	60.1	69.2	88.2	
Voting for all local elections	48.5	54.5	66.8	71.1	69.6	87.9	59.4	68.6	86.9	
Talk about the problems facing country with family and friends	12.7	13.0	13.9	12.3	11.4	13.3	10.5	13.9	14.5	
Talk about the international or world problems with family and friends	13.2	13.4	15.2	13.4	12.1	13.9	10.7	14.5	15.0	
Talk about country's party politics or party leaders with family and friends	12.2	13.4	14.0	13.5	12.0	13.9	10.5	15.0	16.7	
	19.3	25.7	25.7	21.4	21.1	25.7	20.0	18.8	28.6	



*Table 9.1b* Political participation in seventeen countries: per cent who say they have done at least once (means for Asia and Europe)

	<i>Mean</i>	
	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Europe</i>
Sign a petition	6.4	16.5
Contact an elected politician about a personal or local problem	7.4	15.6
Attend a protest, march or demonstration	4.3	18.4
Contribute money to the campaign of a party or candidate in an election	9.3	14.0
Contact an elected politician about a national issue or problem	8.9	14.3
Actively help a political party or candidate at election time	12.2	11.4
Get together informally with others to deal with some community issue or problem	8.3	14.9
Join a political party	10.7	12.7
Voting for all national elections	71.9	72.5
Voting for all local elections	65.6	68.1
Talk about the problems facing country with family and friends	10.6	12.8
Talk about the international or world problems with family and friends	9.8	13.5
Talk about country's party politics or party leaders with family and friends	9.8	13.5

personal or local problem. The only exception to this pattern is that an Asian citizen is more likely to help a political party or candidate actively at election time, although this difference of 0.8 per cent is so small as to render this result insignificant.

It is unsurprising that Asian participation rates are lower overall since some of the countries in the sample such as Singapore and Indonesia, are 'semi-democracies', and citizens there participate less in many of the activities than do citizens of more open democracies such as Japan. In Asia, the greatest variation between the countries occurs in signing petitions, where an individual would be required to leave a written public record of participation.

A further point of interest here is that not only do Asians and Europeans participate at different rates in many activities, but the variation amongst individual countries within each regional block is also significant. This is shown clearly in Figure 9.2. Again, more difficult acts evidence greater variation in




Figure 9.1 Political participation in Asia and Europe.

participatory rates between the regions and variation amongst European countries is more prevalent than is variation amongst Asian countries. Similarly, the variation in participation rates amongst Asian countries is notable. The most outstanding example is that of signing a petition, with Japanese 46 times more likely to sign a petition than Indonesians. Similarly, Malaysians are 17 times more likely than Singaporeans to join a political party, and a citizen in the Philippines is 16 times more likely to help a political party or candidate actively at election time than is a Singaporean citizen.

Returning to a comparison of Asian and European countries, interestingly, patterns emerge between the two regions, even in regard to intra-group variation. For example, whereas the greatest variation in Europe occurred in difficult political activities, once again, we can see that in Asia, participation levels in such activities tend to centre around a fairly low common threshold. Within Europe, nations whose citizens participate most do so consistently across the different types of political activities while those who participate least do so across all activities. Within Asia, the greatest variation occurred in activities where an individual would be required to leave a written record of participation, such as signing a petition and joining a political party. Here, citizens of such authoritarian countries as Singapore and Indonesia have a much lower participation rate than do citizens of more open democracies such as Japan.




Figure 9.2 The difference in political participation in Asia and Europe (per cent who say have done once or more).

### The modes of political participation

The different modes of political participation received little attention until Verba and Nie’s (1972) pioneering work in the early 1970s. There are two reasons for this: first, voting was held to be the central concept of political participation, and second, analysts assumed that political participation had a single-dimensional structure.

Milbrath (1965) claimed that the structure of political participation is accumulative, that is, the process begins with participation in easy political acts such as political discussion, voting and election campaigning, and grows to incorporate more difficult acts such as contacting public officials and politicians, contributing to political funds and attending political rallies. People who participate in difficult political acts are likely to participate in easier political acts, but the opposite pattern does not hold.

Verba *et al.* (1978) tested the hypothesis that modes of political participation exist using factor analysis. They identified four modes of political participation: voting, campaign activities, communal activities and personal contacting. According to Verba *et al.* differences among the four modes of participation are theoretically important in terms of type of influence, scope of outcome, conflict, initiative required and cooperation with others (see Table 9.2).

The ASES excluded questions that dealt with particularised contacting because we expected, in line with the findings of Verba *et al.*, that particularised contacting would not have the systematic relationship to institutions and to social conflicts. Moreover, particularised contacting is not related to public outcomes, which are the essence of politics.

Table 9.2 The dimensions of political activity and modes of activity

<i>Mode of activity</i>	<i>Type of influence</i>	<i>Scope of outcome</i>	<i>Conflict</i>	<i>Initiative required</i>	<i>Cooperate with others</i>
Voting	High pressure/low information	Collective	Conflictual	Little	Little
Campaign activity	High pressure/low to high information	Collective	Conflictual	Some	Some or much
Communal activity	Low to high pressure/high information	Collective	Maybe yes/maybe no	Some or much	Some or much
Contacting officials on personal matters	Low pressure/high information	Particular	Non-conflictual	Much	Little

Source: Verba *et al.* (1978), p. 54.

Exploring the modes of political participation has theoretical and methodological importance. Theoretically, it is interesting to verify the modes of participation in very heterogeneous sets of nations. Methodologically, it is useful to reduce the number of dependent variables from the ten political acts discussed in the previous section to a set of modes of participation derived from factor analysis. We realise that there are methodological problems with using factor analysis: the dimensions found are dependent on the number and centrality of questions chosen, and it may ‘overstate the number of real dimensions’ (Stimson, 1975, p. 406). However, they are less problematic for our analysis because we use the same wording and number of questions in all seventeen countries.

With this expectation in mind, we performed factor analysis (principle component analysis with varimax rotation) on the data for all countries. We present the results of this analysis in Table 9.A1 of the Appendix. When voting is excluded from the analysis, three clear factors of participation emerge. We named these factors political discussion, campaign activity and contentious activity. The first factor – political discussion – is composed of (1) talking about domestic problems, (2) talking about international problems and (3) talking about party politics. The second factor – campaign activity – is composed of (1) contributing money to the campaign of a party or candidates in an election, (2) actively helping a political party or candidate at election time, (3) joining a political party and (4) contacting a politician about a national issue. The third factor – contentious activity – is composed of (1) signing a petition, (2) contacting an elected politician about a personal or local problem, (3) attending a protest, march or demonstration, (4) contacting an elected politician about a national issue or problem, and (5) getting together informally with others to deal with some community issue or problem.

## **Explaining political participation**

### *The influence of political attitudes and beliefs on participation*

Using the three modes of participation derived from our analysis, we calculated the correlations between participation and political attitudes and beliefs (Table 9.A2 in the Appendix).

#### *Political knowledge*

The first three columns of Table 9.A2 show the correlations among the three modes of participation and political knowledge. Our expectation was that the more a person knows about politics, the more they would participate in politics. This is clearly the case for communal activities. In all countries, citizens with higher levels of political knowledge participate more in communal activity. However, turning to campaign activity, in South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Spain the relationship between knowledge and campaign activity is insignificant. The relationship between voting and knowledge varies

cross-nationally. The relationship between political knowledge and voting is positive and significantly correlated in only six countries: one in Asia and five in Europe. Note the negative correlation between political knowledge and voting in South Korea and Indonesia, implying that more knowledgeable people are less likely to vote. The correlation is insignificant in seven countries.

### *Political interest*

Milbrath and Goel generalized that ‘persons who are more interested in and concerned about political matters are more likely to be activists’ (1982, p. 46). Our data show that this is the case for communal activity: citizens with more interest in politics are more likely to participate in communal activity in all countries. However, the correlation between campaign activity and political interest is positive and statistically significant in thirteen out of seventeen countries. The exceptions are South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Spain, all countries where social movements have challenged the representative character of the party systems. A different picture emerges in relation to voting activity. Citizens who are more interested in politics are more likely to vote than are the less interested in only six countries. The remaining eleven includes all the newer democracies in Europe (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and all the countries of Asia save for Japan. Moreover, in Korea and Indonesia, citizens with higher levels of political interest are less likely than less interested citizens to vote. The above two findings are consistent with Milbrath and Goel’s generalization that ‘psychological involvement relates more strongly to campaign, communal and protest activities and less strongly to voting and contacting’ (1982, p. 46).

### *Confidence in politics*

The next item we consider is citizens’ confidence in politics. As we have seen in previous chapters, the ASES asks respondents how much confidence they have in various political institutions. As with all survey questions on confidence, interpretations of the responses are beset by at least two difficulties. First, the survey questions designed to measure confidence tap too many underlying concepts, from the performance of current political leaders to the nature of the political system itself. Much of what is measured is really just a performance evaluation of political incumbents (see also Norris, 1999). The second difficulty is also a measurement problem – contemporary political culture sanctions expressions of cynicism, so that people may respond cynically to an interview question and yet behave no more cynically than they did before. Increases in confidence during the 1980s seemed to vindicate the argument that performance evaluations of incumbents (such as the President, in the case of the United States) are closely tied to individual-level feelings of trust in government (Citrin and Green, 1986).

Here we paid more attention to the question of political trust first, because it involves the issue of democratic stability. This arises because a balance between

activism and moderation is essential to preserve political order. In *The Civic Culture* (1963), Almond and Verba posited what they termed a ‘civic orientation’ as a democratic ideal. Citizens who embodied this pattern of orientations and values exhibited that balance of activism and moderation necessary to sustain a democratic political order. In their conception, democratic consolidation involved a movement towards this universal ideal. If subsequent investigation has demolished the notion of a universal ideal as the foundation for exemplary democratic practice, the problem of the preservation of political order through processes of democratic consolidation remains. And the second reason for our attention to political trust is, as we saw in Chapter 8, the more citizens are exposed to globalisation, the lower their levels of confidence in domestic democratic institutions. Since these institutions include parliament, parties, government and the law and courts, it is reasonable to assume that lack of confidence may also depress their rates of participation.

Does a person who has confidence in democratic institutions participate in politics more than a person who does not? The answer is mixed. In Europe, in general, the answer is yes. In Asia, except for Japan, where the trusting participate more in politics than do those who evince distrust, there tends to be negative relationship between political trust and participation or relationships that are not statistically significant. In other words, for most Asian citizens it seems that confidence in democratic institutions leads to participation, or it makes no difference.

### *Political ideology*

The last item we consider is the relationship between political ideology and participation. Political ideology was measured by self-placement on a left–right scale. We divide the sample by region into European and Asian nations, with the expectation that ideology may have a different impact in Asia than in Europe. We present the results in Figures 9.3 and 9.4.




Figure 9.3 The influence of ideology on the modes of participation in Asia.




Figure 9.4 The influence of ideology on the modes of participation in Europe.

As we saw in Chapter 7, ideology is more meaningful in some countries than in others. Yet our findings indicate that ideology influences participation in remarkably similar ways in Asian and European nations. Unsurprisingly, citizens who place themselves on an ideological scale participate more in party/campaign activity than do those who are not ideologically aligned. The left in both regions participates more than the right in contentious activities, whereas ideology hardly influences levels of discussion in either Asia or Europe.

### *The participation of particular socio-demographic groups*

What individual characteristics were associated with political participation?

#### *Gender*

Men are significantly more likely than women to participate in campaign activity in all countries except for Thailand and Spain (see Table 9.A3 in the Appendix). Analysts have offered various explanations for this gender difference in previous research. Among these, the work and social context of women's lives may depress their participation rates, with family and work obligations limiting the time they have available. In addition, the dominance of men in political parties and organisations may also restrict women's opportunities: in the United States, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) claim that people participate in politics when others ask them to. It is likely that more men than women will participate in party/campaign activity unless the participants deliberately encourage more women to participate. Men are more likely than women to discuss politics in most Asian nations (except for the Philippines), whereas in most European nations, women and men are equally as likely to do so (except for Italy, Greece and the UK). Men are more likely than women to participate in contentious



political activity in four of the Asian and four of the European countries. In the other countries, no differences emerged.

### *Age*

Older people are more likely than the young to engage in campaign activity in Thailand, South Korea and Japan, and in half of the European nations. In Singapore and Indonesia, the reverse is true; there younger people are more likely to campaign. Contentious activity forms a striking contrast. Of the nations where age is related to contentious activity, in most there is a negative relationship: younger people are more likely than older people to participate in contentious activity. There are two exceptions: Japan and Thailand. In Japan, this finding lends weight to the notion of the 1960s generation as radical activists. As they age, they still participate in contentious politics.

### *Education*

The correlations between education and participation are striking. In almost all nations in Europe and in Asia, the more highly educated are more likely to discuss politics, and to participate in contentious activities (Japan, Indonesia, Thailand and the UK are exceptions to the latter pattern). In half of the nations in Europe and half of the Asian nations, the more highly educated are more likely to participate in campaign/party activities.

The more educated are more likely to participate in contentious activities only in Japan, Thailand and Sweden. The opposite relationship – the less educated participate more in contentious activities – in Ireland, Italy, Spain and Greece.

### *Religiosity*

We also report the correlations between three modes of participation and religiosity measured by the frequency of attendance at religious institutions. The more religious are statistically more likely than the less religious to engage in campaign activity in Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Spain and Greece. In contrast, slightly different relationships emerge in discussion and contentious activity. For discussion, statistically positive relationships with religiosity are found in South Korea, Malaysia, the UK, Ireland and Germany, whereas negative relationships are found in some of the newer democracies: Indonesia, Thailand, Spain and Portugal.

## **Globalisation and political participation**

Since we aim to analyse the impact of globalisation on political participation, we performed a factor analysis on the measures of globalisation included in our survey as discussed in earlier chapters. The items load on three components: (1) work/web (using the Internet, using e-mail, having a global-

related job, (2) family/friends (family/relatives living abroad, having friends from other countries, travel abroad and (3) television (watching foreign news on the television, watching foreign entertainment on television, access to international satellite or cable television) (see Table 9.4 in the Appendix).

### **Multiple regression analysis: globalisation and participation**

Having discussed the simple correlations among the three modes of participation – political discussion, party/campaign activity and contentious activity – and psychological and sociological variables, we now assess the importance of exposure to globalisation on participation. We estimate one regression analysis for each mode of participation and present the results of the analyses in Table 9.3.

As independent variables, we include the three measure of exposure to globalisation. We also include in our analyses psychological measures: political discussion, different levels of political knowledge, the extent of political interest, the sense of political duty, the level of political trust, system confidence, political satisfaction, life satisfaction and ideological self-placement. In addition, we include a set of socio-demographic factors and country effects.

Our findings suggest that certain aspects of globalisation have a modest but significant impact on all three modes of political activity. In general, citizens with more exposure to globalisation are more likely than others to participate in, and to discuss, politics. All three measures of globalisation (Internet use, friends/relatives abroad and television) are associated with higher levels of political discussion. Citizens with friends/relatives abroad and citizens who use the Internet are more likely than others to participate in contentious activities. Of the three measure of globalisation, only the mode of having friends/relatives abroad influences campaign/party activity.

Psychological and socio-demographic factors also influence participation. However, the impact of these factors is quite uneven. Taking into account other causes of participation, across all three measures of participation and discussion, the most consistently influential measures are political interest and discussion, higher levels of interest and discussion are associated with higher levels of participation.<sup>3</sup> As Milbrath and Goel generalized, ‘persons participating in informal discussions are more likely than non-discussants’ to participate in all modes of participation (1982, p. 36).

We also find effects of ‘critical citizens’: those with less confidence in the system and also those who were less satisfied with politics are more likely than others to discuss politics. Higher levels of political satisfaction are associated with participating in party/campaign activities. Political trust increases probability of campaign activity, but its effect on contentious activity and discussion is not significant. Life satisfaction has an effect on discussion but its effect on the other modes of activity is not statistically significant. Political ideology measured by self-placement on a left–right scale has positive effect only on contentious activity; implying that conservative citizens participate more in contentious activities. Religious practice (measured here by the proxy variable of extent of

Table 9.3 The influence of globalisation on political participation

	<i>Discussion</i>		<i>Party/campaign</i>		<i>Contentious</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Std error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std error</i>
Globalisation (Internet)	0.068***	(0.075)	-0.001	-(0.001)	0.067***	(0.069)
Globalisation (friends, relatives)	0.087***	(0.092)	0.053***	(0.049)	0.085***	(0.083)
Globalisation (TV)	0.076***	(0.080)	-0.013	-(0.013)	0.007	(0.007)
Political discussion	-		0.061***	(0.055)	0.021*	(0.020)
Political knowledge	0.037***	(0.084)	-0.003	-(0.006)	0.035***	(0.073)
Political interest	0.150***	(0.147)	0.286***	(0.249)	0.094***	(0.086)
Political duty	0.126***	(0.130)	0.016	(0.014)	0.000	(0.000)
Political trust	0.008	(0.009)	0.026**	(0.024)	-0.009	-(0.009)
System confidence	-0.034***	-(0.035)	0.055***	(0.050)	-0.013	-(0.012)
Political satisfaction	-0.066***	-(0.076)	0.063***	(0.065)	-0.016*	-(0.017)
Life satisfaction	0.036***	(0.039)	-0.008	-(0.007)	-0.017*	-(0.017)
Political ideology						
strong left	-0.023	-(0.006)	0.335***	(0.085)	0.294***	(0.078)
left	0.058**	(0.023)	0.055*	(0.020)	0.130***	(0.049)
right	0.027	(0.011)	0.071**	(0.025)	-0.032	-(0.012)
strong right	0.041	(0.013)	0.286***	(0.079)	-0.094***	-(0.027)
Religious practice	-0.004	-(0.010)	0.022***	(0.042)	0.005	(0.010)
Gender (male)	-0.024	-(0.013)	0.135***	(0.063)	0.050***	(0.024)
Age	0.019***	(0.032)	0.039***	(0.056)	-0.007	-(0.011)
Education	0.069***	(0.060)	0.024	(0.018)	0.080***	(0.065)
Employed	0.067	(0.014)	0.142***	(0.027)	0.056	(0.011)

(Reference = UK)									
Japan	-0.334***	-(0.066)	0.197***	(0.035)	-0.262***	-(0.048)			
South Korea	-0.637***	-(0.170)	0.165**	(0.039)	-0.548***	-(0.136)			
Taiwan	0.065	(0.014)	0.668***	(0.125)	-1.111***	-(0.218)			
Malaysia	0.020	(0.004)	0.917***	(0.169)	-1.385***	-(0.267)			
Indonesia	0.205***	(0.048)	0.558***	(0.116)	-1.364***	-(0.297)			
Thailand	0.095*	(0.028)	-0.063	-(0.016)	-1.282***	-(0.345)			
Philippines	-0.298***	-(0.092)	0.486***	(0.134)	-0.742***	-(0.214)			
Ireland	-0.074	-(0.018)	0.380***	(0.084)	0.033	(0.008)			
France	0.325***	(0.089)	-0.151**	-(0.037)	0.308***	(0.079)			
Germany	0.313***	(0.076)	0.072	(0.016)	-0.500***	-(0.113)			
Sweden	-0.246***	-(0.056)	0.085	(0.017)	-0.242***	-(0.051)			
Italy	0.445***	(0.119)	0.317***	(0.076)	-0.463***	-(0.116)			
Spain	-0.127**	-(0.028)	0.227***	(0.044)	-0.032	-(0.007)			
Portugal	0.213***	(0.054)	0.198***	(0.044)	-0.356***	-(0.083)			
Greece	0.858***	(0.227)	0.185***	(0.044)	-0.562***	-(0.139)			
Singapore	-0.057	-(0.012)	-0.075	-(0.014)	-1.290***	-(0.255)			
Constant	-0.711***		-1.040***		0.280***				
Adjusted $R^2$	0.235	0.182	0.389						

Notes

\*:  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ .

The correlation between 'political discussion' and 'discussion' as political participation is 0.966, so the independent variable was excluded from the analysis of political discussion.

religious practice) contributes to party and campaign activity, but has no effect on the other activities.

Our findings also indicate that, even after taking into account all causes of participation, certain basic socio-demographic factors have an effect on participation. Men are more likely than women to participate in campaign and party activity and in contentious activities. But women are equally as likely as men to discuss politics. Older cohorts are more likely to discuss politics and to participate in campaign and party activity, but they are no more likely to participate in contentious activities. As always with age effects, it is more likely a life-cycle effect: it is likely that this has to do with a process of learning and habituation over the life cycle rather than with any physiological ageing effect. A higher level of education increases the probability of communal activity, but its effect on voting and campaigning is not statistically significant.

## **Summary**

To sum up, citizens' responses to globalisation are mediated by a complex set of individual and national level of influences. Overall, globalisation is associated with some forms of political participation, but the national contexts provide citizens with very different frameworks of incentives within which they decide to participate, and care must be taken to understand exactly what incentives the frameworks provide.

Citizens who have friends/relative abroad and have travelled abroad are more likely than others to participate in a range of political activities. It seems likely that these citizens have developed more of a global outlook, an outlook that includes the importance of participating in democratic practices. Certainly, increased exposure to globalisation has not created cosmopolitan citizens with fewer attachments to national-level politics. But other effects are inconsistent and the influence of globalisation is not consistent across all types of political activity. Citizens with increased exposure to the world through work, the Internet, through family and friends, and through television news are slightly more likely than others to participate in politics. Most notably having friends/relatives abroad and travel abroad increases all types of political participation. The most prominent effects of globalisation were in increased levels of political discussion, where citizens with greater exposure to the various aspects of globalisation were more likely to discuss politics. Only those who travel and have friends/relatives abroad were more likely to participate in party/campaign activity, whereas having friends/relatives abroad and using the Internet were associated with higher levels of contentious participation. Overall our findings indicate that exposure to globalisation does not consistently increase citizens' participation in all types of domestic political participation, but some aspects of global exposure are important in increasing levels of political participation.

## Appendix

Table 9.A1 Aspects of participation (excluding voting)

<i>Items</i>	<i>1: Discussion</i>	<i>2: Party/ Campaign</i>	<i>3: Contentious</i>
Talk about domestic problems	0.910	0.080	0.167
Talk about international problems	0.887	0.078	0.220
Talk about party politics	0.817	0.164	0.216
Help a party or candidate	0.102	0.824	0.183
Join a political party	0.102	0.802	0.081
Contribution	0.039	0.726	0.166
Contact a politician about a national issue	0.175	0.513	0.506
Sign a petition	0.155	0.023	0.811
Attend a demonstration	0.196	0.160	0.747
Contact a politician about a personal problem	0.185	0.422	0.598
Informal community meeting	0.294	0.386	0.509

Note

Analysed by the method of principal component analysis, varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation, three components extracted.

Table 9.A2 The correlations between the three modes of participation and political knowledge, political interest and political trust

	Knowledge			Political Interest			Trust		
	Discussion	Party/ campaign	Contentious	Discussion	Party/ campaign	Contentious	Discussion	Party/ campaign	Contentious
	Japan	0.31***	0.08*	0.12***	0.32***	0.29***	0.26***	0.09*	0.14***
South Korea	0.11***	-0.03	0.25***	0.19***	0.19***	0.15***	0.01	-0.01	0.08**
China	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Taiwan	0.24***	0.17***	0.10***	0.26***	0.29***	0.14***	-0.04	-0.01	-0.09**
Singapore	0.27***	0.04	0.03	0.31***	0.18***	0.14***	0.15***	0.02	-0.01
Malaysia	0.18***	0.11***	0.11***	0.26***	0.40***	0.06	-0.09**	-0.12***	-0.09**
Indonesia	0.18***	0.25***	0.09**	0.22***	0.41***	0.16***	-0.17***	0.00	0.03
Thailand	0.28***	0.02	0.07**	0.18***	0.09**	0.08***	-0.07**	0.06*	0.06*
Philippines	0.12***	0.05	0.19***	-0.01	0.28***	0.11***	-0.11***	0.06*	-0.06*
United Kingdom	0.31***	0.18***	0.11***	0.44***	0.38***	0.14***	0.18***	0.20***	-0.01
Ireland	0.29***	0.16***	0.25***	0.35***	0.36***	0.18***	0.13***	0.10***	-0.01
France	0.21***	0.17***	0.20***	0.28***	0.41***	0.24***	0.18***	0.28***	0.20***
Germany	0.15***	0.16***	0.24***	0.32***	0.32***	0.21***	0.12***	0.24***	0.16***
Sweden	0.19***	0.18***	0.04	0.36***	0.40***	0.11***	0.16***	0.18***	-0.03
Italy	0.29***	0.21***	0.20***	0.27***	0.43***	0.27***	0.00	0.27***	0.15***
Spain	0.02	0.02	0.28***	0.04	0.35***	0.29***	0.09**	0.09**	0.17***
Portugal	0.39***	0.13***	0.34***	0.42***	0.34***	0.34***	0.28***	0.11***	0.22***
Greece	0.15***	0.08**	0.24***	0.21***	0.28***	0.15***	0.03	-0.05	0.04

Notes

The figures in the cells are Pearson correlation coefficients.

\*:  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ .





Table 9.A4 Aspects of exposure to globalization

Items	1: Work/ web	2: Family/ friends	3: TV
Q305c: Use the Internet	0.773	0.068	0.140
Q305g: Use e-mail to people abroad	0.749	0.207	0.101
Q305h: Global-related job	0.610	0.214	0.030
Q305a: Family/relatives abroad	-0.052	0.811	0.146
Q305d: Have friends from other countries	0.336	0.718	0.110
Q305b: Travelled abroad	0.457	0.568	0.023
Q305f: Watch foreign news on TV	0.049	0.142	0.837
Q305e: Watch foreign entertainment on TV	0.144	0.141	0.827
Q305i: International satellite or cable TV	0.432	-0.085	0.380

## Note

Analysed by the method of principal component analysis, varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation, making components with initial eigenvalues more than 1 extracted.

## Notes

- 1 Norris (2002) succinctly outlines this literature.
- 2 We exclude voting; as the most common and one of the 'easy' participatory acts, we expect globalisation to have little impact on voting. In addition, excluding voting allowed us to include Singapore in the analyses.
- 3 We excluded the discussion mode from the analysis of political discussion.

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## **Part III**

# **Conclusion**



# 10 Determinants of mass attitudes to globalisation

*Richard Sinnott*

This book began by identifying and describing the main features of globalisation. It then examined the evidence of people's exposure to and awareness of globalisation and provided an elementary comparative analysis of aspects of the national political cultures that are part of the context into which the forces of globalisation obtrude. It is now time to bring these strands together in order to examine what it is that determines mass attitudes to globalisation. This chapter focuses on three particular aspects of such attitudes: *policy preferences*, *policy attribution* and *confidence in institutions*. Before analysing the correlates of these attitudes, however, we must first describe their distribution across our two regions and eighteen countries.

## **Policy preferences – protection or liberalisation?**

The issue of protectionism versus free trade goes to the heart of what globalisation is all about and successive rounds of global trade talks have ensured that it has a prominent place on the policy agenda of global elites, government leaders, regional integration institutions, and national and international pressure groups. Moreover, the issue of protectionism extends beyond that of free trade in goods and includes a wide range of policies dealing with the movement of capital, with migration and with the protection/promotion of national culture, especially in the area of mass entertainment. Here we focus on policy preferences in two of these areas – the issue of free trade versus import restriction and the issue of giving preference to nationally produced films and programmes on national television.

Policy preferences regarding free trade versus restriction of imports were measured in the ASES questionnaire by means of the following item:

Q. 208 Now, I have some statements here that people make from time to time. You might agree or disagree with them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (Circle one answer for each statement)

INTERVIEWER: SHOW and READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–f

*Strongly agree*    *Agree*    *Neither agree nor disagree*    *Disagree*    *Strongly disagree*    *Don't know*

[COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6

On the evidence of responses to this question, East and Southeast Asians and Western Europeans taken as a whole have largely similar outlooks on the issue of free trade, there being a difference of only 4 per centage points in aggregate opinion between the two regions – 49 per cent of Asian respondents choose one or other of the pro-import-restriction options (strongly agree/agree with the statement) compared with 45 per cent of Europeans. However, as with many of the variables in the Asia-Europe Survey, there is much greater diversity in attitude within each region than between them. Both regions have almost equally wide ranges of opinion, the extremes being, in Asia, Singapore (18 per cent in favour of limiting imports) versus Thailand (76 per cent) and, in Europe, Germany (23 per cent) versus Greece (68 per cent). However, close examination of the distributions of attitudes in the countries in between these pairs of extremes highlights subtle but important differences between the two regions. This is because, if we were to drop the two extreme cases in the European region, there would be very little variation in support for trade protectionism, whereas if we were to drop the two extreme cases in the Asian region, we would still have a lot of variation. This is evident from Figure 10.1, which shows support for trade protection ranging from 33 per cent in Taiwan to 68 per cent in Malaysia compared with 35 per cent in Sweden to 50 per cent in Portugal.




Figure 10.1a Agreement that country should limit the import of foreign products – Asian countries (in ascending order of agree plus strongly agree).




Figure 10.1b Agreement that country should limit the import of foreign products – European countries (in ascending order of agree plus strongly agree).

The basic message, however, is that near majorities in both regions favour the protectionist or anti-globalisation option and that, given relatively high levels of neutral/don't know responses, these near majorities substantially outnumber the proportions who are prepared to embrace free trade and, by implication, globalisation. It is particularly striking that, taking all nine European countries as a whole, there is such a large protectionist plurality in the Western European region. After all, the nine countries in question are members of a regional free trade bloc (the EU) and one that is committed to the maximisation of free trade in current global trade talks.

While there are of course countries in both regions that have publics committed to free trade – principally Singapore and Japan in Asia, and Germany and Sweden in Europe – the weight of opinion is on the other side. Thus, in most countries pro-free-traders have much to do to persuade mass publics of the merits of the free-trade case. And the inter-country comparisons indicate that such persuasion faces more of an uphill task in some countries than in others. The full extent of the persuasion required and, indeed, whether it is feasible at all will only emerge when we have examined what it is that leads to these protectionist and anti-globalisation instincts, a task that we undertake later in this chapter.

Our second protectionist versus liberalisation variable seeks to measure cultural protectionism as it applies to films and television programmes. Inserted in the same list of agree-disagree items as the question on limiting foreign imports, the relevant statement reads as follows (taking Japan as the example): 'Japan's television should give preference to Japanese made films and programmes'. Support for cultural protectionism as measured in this way is marked by greater inter-regional variation than support for trade protection (see Figure 10.2). As we have seen, support for the restriction of imports is 49 per cent in East and South-east Asia and 45 per cent in our Western European countries. When it comes to giving preference not to nationally produced goods in general but to nationally made films and programmes on television, protectionist instincts increase






Figure 10.2a Agreement that country’s television should give preference over nationally made films and programs – Asian countries (in ascending order of agree plus strongly agree).

significantly in East and Southeast Asia (to 62 per cent), while diminishing slightly in Western Europe (to 41 per cent). Of course labelling the preference for nationally made programmes as ‘cultural protectionism’ is an oversimplification. A preference for or against giving priority to nationally made programmes may reflect a judgement of the relative merits of domestic and international programmes and may also depend on the accessibility of foreign material on other channels and the cost of such access. In some countries with easy access to a wide range of foreign broadcasting, support for giving preference to national programmes may simply reflect a view that in an age of television without borders the only continuing justification for national TV stations is to provide national material. We shall return to the issue later in the chapter when we examine the




Figure 10.2b Agreement that country’s television should give preference over nationally made films and programs – European countries (in ascending order of agree plus strongly agree).

extent to which support for cultural protectionism is related to fundamental political orientations such as feelings of national and supra-national identity. In the meantime, it is also important to note that as well as showing up considerable contrasts between our two regions, cultural protectionism in this sense also varies strongly within the regions. Thus, in the case of East and Southeast Asia, three countries – Japan, Singapore and South Korea – show noticeably lower levels of support for cultural protection;<sup>1</sup> while, in the other five states in the region, cultural protectionism (assuming that is what it is) runs between 72 and 81 per cent (see Figure 10.2). There is also considerable variation on this issue in Western Europe. On the side favouring the showing of foreign programmes and films one finds Germany, Sweden, Italy and Great Britain; in these countries support for cultural protectionism ranges from 20 per cent (Germany) to 33 per cent (Britain). In the more protectionist parts of the European bloc, support for giving preference to nationally made programmes and films ranges from 45 per cent in France to 59 per cent in Portugal with Greece, Ireland and Spain in between.

### **Policy attribution – the internationalisation of issues?**

As well as having preferences about the substance or the *'what'* of policy – whether imports should be limited, whether nationally produced television material should be privileged, etc. – mass publics may respond to issues and problems facing society by forming preferences as to how policies are decided. In the case of issues relating to or arising from globalisation, the *'how'* question becomes that of whether a given issue should be dealt with/decided at an international level or at a national level. In short, the question is whether or not the issue should be internationalised.

The issue of the internationalisation of policy-making is a particularly salient one in the European Union where the respective competences of the European and national levels of governance are at the core of the debate about integration. Previous analysis in a European context has suggested that there are three ways in which an issue can be internationalised (Sinnott, 1995). The three ways are endogenous internationalisation, exogenous internationalisation and attributed internationalisation. Endogenous internationalisation describes a situation in which the nature of the issue requires action at an international level. Global warming is a prime example. Exogenous internationalisation arises when an agency of internationalised governance lays claim to a particular policy area. The process by which the European Union has been developing a policy competence in the field of security and defence is a case in point. Finally, there is attributed internationalisation, i.e. when public opinion attributes competence relating to a policy or set of policies to an agency or process of internationalised governance. The long-standing attribution by European publics of policy towards developing countries to the European level is a good illustration of this form of internationalisation.

The three modes of internationalisation of issues imply three overlapping sets of issues – those that are internationalised endogenously, those that are internationalised exogenously and those that are internationalised by attribution. The




Figure 10.3 Venn diagram showing the three overlapping sets of issues.

degree of overlap of these three sets is of considerable significance and can be illustrated by constructing a simple Venn diagram (see Figure 10.3). Given three types of internationalisation to start with, the Venn diagram defines seven possible subsets of internationalised issues. The most important one is where all three circles overlap, as in the shaded area in Figure 10.3, i.e. where (a) the nature of the issue requires that it be internationalised, (b) an agency of internationalised governance assumes responsibility for the issue and (c) public opinion, or at least a substantial majority within public opinion, supports the idea that the matter be dealt with by concerted action among countries. In an ideal world, all issues that are not purely national or local would fit into the three-way overlap portrayed by the shaded area in Figure 10.3. This is the area in which internationalised governance might be described as triple A – appropriate, actual and accepted by the mass public. As Figure 10.3 suggests, however, there may be many global policy issues that fall outside this ideal realm. Assuming the presence of endogenous internationalisation, the failure to internationalise an issue fully is due to a failure of exogenous internationalisation or a failure of attributed internationalisation or a failure of both. The evidence considered in this chapter deals of course with attributed internationalisation.

Given the weakness of ASEAN, the mass publics in East and Southeast Asia have only relatively remote institutions of internationalised governance as their reference point. Accordingly, it would not be surprising if the extent of attribution of issues to the international level were lower in East and Southeast Asia than in Western Europe. These differences in the context obtaining in Western Europe and in East and Southeast Asia also have implications for how we measure the attributed internationalisation of issues in our two regions. If we were conducting a survey only in Europe, our question could be: ‘Do you think that the following

issues should be decided by all the member states of the European Union acting together or by each individual member state acting on its own'. With minor variations, this question has been asked in the Eurobarometer surveys over the last twenty-five years. However, in East and Southeast Asia, in the absence of institutions analogous to the European institutions, we are obliged to make the reference to the form of internationalised governance much more general. Accordingly, our question on the attributed internationalisation of issues (used in both regions) runs as follows:<sup>2</sup>

Q. 304 Here is ... [a] list of issues. Would you please tell me whether each of these problems should be dealt with by each country deciding for itself what should be done or by all countries together deciding what should be done. There may be one or two items on the list that you haven't thought much about. If so, just tell me and we'll go to the next item. (Circle one answer for each statement)

INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a-i

<i>Should be dealt with by each country deciding for itself what should be done</i>	<i>Should be dealt with by all countries together deciding what should be done</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Haven't thought much about it</i>
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(a) Environmental problems

1

2

3

4

The full question on the internationalisation of decision-making dealt with nine issues (see the questionnaire in Appendix III). From this list we have selected two issues (environment and development) as the focus of our cross-national and inter-regional comparisons (and for use as dependent variables in the analysis later in this chapter). As a foil to the discussion of these two issues we also present the distribution of opinion on the internationalisation of the problem of unemployment.

Before proceeding to discuss the evidence, it must be recognised that European respondents may well have the European context rather than any wider international context in mind in answering this question. This does not, however, invalidate the responses. Nor does it render the responses non-comparable across the two regions. It is rather an empirical matter whether the more advanced supra-national/international decision-making apparatus of the European Union leads to a greater readiness to allocate responsibility for policy to a level of governance above that of the nation-state.

Given the relative weakness of agencies of internationalised governance in the




Figure 10.4a Environmental problems should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together – Asian countries (in ascending order of should be dealt by each country).

East and Southeast Asian region, it may seem remarkable that as many as half of our Asian respondents think that environmental problems should be ‘dealt with by all countries together deciding what should be done’. However, this seemingly high level of support for the internationalisation of this issue is substantially exceeded in Western Europe where 70 per cent of respondents feel that environmental issues should be dealt with by all countries acting together. Another way of stating the contrast is that in eight of the nine Western European countries support for the internationalisation of environmental policy-making runs at over 60 per cent,<sup>3</sup> whereas such a level of support is reached in only three of the nine East and Southeast Asian countries, the three being Japan (76 per cent), South Korea (69 per cent) and the Philippines (67 per cent). Variation in attitudes on this issue is also much more limited in Europe (see Figure 10.4). This is evident




Figure 10.4b Environmental problems should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together – European countries (in ascending order of should be dealt by each country).

in the fairly modest range that separates the two extremes (35 percentage points) and even more so by the extremely limited range (18 percentage points) spanned by the seven European countries that are not at either end of the spectrum. The equivalent ranges in the Asian case are 56 percentage points between the two extremes – Japan and Taiwan – and 44 percentage points between the countries next in rank to either extreme – South Korea and Indonesia, respectively. In summary, on the matter of the internationalisation of decision-making on environmental problems, there is a widespread consensus among Western European publics that such decision-making should be internationalised, whereas, in East and Southeast Asia there is much less support for such an approach and also widespread disagreement on the matter among the countries concerned.<sup>4</sup>

The evidence regarding the attributed internationalisation of policy on developing countries shows quite remarkable homogeneity of opinion across the nine European countries. Support for the internationalisation of the issue spans only 11 percentage points from a low of 70 per cent in Spain to a high of 81 per cent in Portugal. Opposition to internationalisation shows a spread of only six points (11 per cent in Portugal to 17 per cent in Britain). In short, among the European countries in the sample, there is a very strong consensus in favour of the internationalisation of decision-making regarding the problems of developing countries and that consensus obtains not only at the overall European level but across the individual countries as well.

The picture in our Asian sample is quite different. Overall, there is a majority in favour of internationalisation of the issue, but it is a modest majority (54 per cent) and it trails a long way behind the European average of 76 per cent. This Asian average also hides substantial disagreement between the countries concerned (see Figure 10.5). Opinion across the countries is best seen in terms of three groups. The first group consists of five countries with substantial majorities in favour of internationalisation, from 66 per cent in Singapore to 72 per cent in




Figure 10.5a The problems of developing countries should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together – Asian countries (in ascending order of should be dealt with by each country).




Figure 10.5b The problems of developing countries should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together – European countries (in ascending order of should be dealt with by each country).

Indonesia and the Philippines (the other counties in the group are Japan and South Korea). Then there is a group of two countries with just about a majority showing support for internationalisation of the issue. Finally, there are two countries with clear majorities opposed to internationalisation, namely Thailand (64 per cent opposed) and Taiwan (78 per cent opposed).

The pendulum swings clearly away from support for the internationalisation of issues when one turns to the third issue to be considered – the problem of unemployment (see Figure 10.6). In this case, 65 per cent of Asian respondents and 57 per cent of European respondents express a preference for each country deciding for itself what should be done. Admittedly, there are four states (the Philippines, Italy, Portugal and France) where a majority (a large one in the case of the Philippines) expresses a preference for the internationalisation of the issue of unemployment. Apart from these few cases, however, majority opinion is on the




Figure 10.6a The problem of unemployment should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together – Asian countries (in ascending order of should be dealt with by each country).




Figure 10.6b The problem of unemployment should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together – European countries (in ascending order of should be dealt with by each country).

side of national action and that majority amounts to 70 per cent or more in Britain and Ireland and in five East and Southeast Asian states – Thailand, Malaysia, China, Indonesia and, most strongly of all, Taiwan (81 per cent national).

The typology of the sources of internationalisation of issues outlined at the beginning of this section may help to clarify the significance of these findings regarding attitudes to decision-making on the problem of unemployment. One possibility is that unemployment is an issue that requires concerted international action and is, accordingly, an endogenously internationalised issue. If this is the case, then public opinion is out of sync and, in the terms of the typology, attributed internationalisation has failed to keep up with endogenous internationalisation. The main alternative interpretation is that solutions to the problem of unemployment must emerge and be implemented primarily at the national level and that public opinion is responding appropriately by insisting on national action first and foremost. Other variations on this theme could pursue the argument that, if the issue ought to be internationalised and is not, the fault lies with international institutions, which have not come forth with credible initiatives to deal with the problem. On this interpretation the main failure is a failure of exogenous internationalisation which in turn explains why the public does not attribute responsibility to the international level – they do not do so because they have not received the relevant cue from an appropriate international institution. Of course, in order for any lead from any international institution on this or on any other issue to be effective, it is necessary that the public have confidence in the institution in question. This brings us to our third set of attitudes to globalisation, namely confidence in institutions of globalised governance.

### Confidence in institutions of globalised governance

Confidence in political institutions is the bedrock of political legitimacy. Institutions are agreed-upon procedures and mechanisms for the resolution of conflicting



demands. While approval of the actions and output of political institutions may fluctuate in response to particular events or to the nature of the times, such institutions can only function to the extent that there is an underlying belief among the public that they operate in a fair and effective manner. Confidence in institutions must be distinguished from confidence in the incumbents of those institutions, whether those incumbents be an individual or sets of individuals or political parties who happen to be in office at any one time. Confidence in incumbents may decline sharply due to events or major policy failures or scandals or whatever. In one version of democratic theory, indeed, people ought not to regard the incumbents with too much confidence since the role of the individual is not to be a passive and trusting subject but to be an active and critical citizen. In short, the confidence we wish to measure is confidence in the system of governance or in aspects of that system. As representative aspects of the emerging system of internationalised governance, we have selected the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The ASES question in this area reads as follows:<sup>5</sup>

Q. 102 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following? There may be one or two items on the list that you haven't thought much about. If so, just tell me and we'll go to the next item. (Circle one answer for each statement)

INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a-g

*DO NOT give explanations of these international organisations to the respondent. If they have never heard of them or don't know much about them, code 'Don't know (item 5)'.*

*A great deal      Quite a lot      Not much      None at all      Don't know      Haven't thought much about it*

(a) The United Nations (UN)

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6

(b) The World Trade Organization (WTO)

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6

At first sight, the level of confidence in the United Nations appears to be almost identical as between our two regions. Forty-seven per cent of people in our Asian countries have either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the United Nations and 51 per cent of Western Europeans give a similar response.




Figure 10.7a Confidence in the United Nations – Asian countries (in descending order of a great deal plus quite a lot).

However, the rate of non-response (don't know or haven't thought much about it) is significantly higher among Asian respondents (28 per cent don't know as compared with 16 per cent among Western Europeans). The corollary of this is that lack of confidence (not much or none at all) is higher among Europeans (33 per cent compared with 25 per cent). If we take one-third or more of respondents having not much or no confidence in the UN as an indicator of substantial lack of confidence in the institution, we see another Asia-Europe contrast, namely that there are five such countries in Western Europe (France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Greece – the last being an extreme case with 60 per cent of respondents having not much or no confidence in the UN) – and only three in East and Southeast Asia (see Figure 10.7)

Lack of attitude formation (i.e. extensive don't know/haven't thought about it responses) is a bigger problem in the case of confidence in the WTO. In Asia 36 per cent of respondents fall into this category and five of our countries in that region have 40 per cent or more who give a 'don't know' or 'haven't thought




Figure 10.7b Confidence in the United Nations – European countries (in descending order of a great deal plus quite a lot).




Figure 10.8a Confidence in the World Trade Organisation – Asian countries (in descending order of a great deal plus quite a lot).

about it’ response. In this case the problem is equally extensive in Western Europe. The overall non-response rate in the region is 39 per cent and non-response rates in excess of 40 per cent are found in five West European countries (see Figure 10.8). Focusing on those who do take a view on the WTO, it is apparent that Europeans are less positive. Thus only 28 per cent of Western European respondents have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the WTO, compared with 39 per cent of Asian respondents. And, whereas no European country comes anywhere close to a majority expressing confidence in the WTO, three of our East and Southeast Asian countries do so, namely China, Taiwan and the Philippines.

It is clear from the foregoing that mass attitudes to globalisation are complex and manifold. Focusing on different aspects produces different distributions of opinion for and against. On average, there are more protectionists than free traders in both regions and protectionist instincts become more pronounced in




Figure 10.8b Confidence in the World Trade Organisation – European countries (in descending order of a great deal plus quite a lot).

our East and Southeast Asian countries when the issue is the protection of national culture on television. However, when the focus is on the internationalisation of policy-making in relation to the environment and to development, majority opinion swings in favour of the global over the national, both in our Asian sample as a whole and, much more strongly, in our European sample. In the latter, indeed, support for internationalised decision-making on development issues is overwhelming and almost uniform across the nine countries. In order to illustrate the point that not all problems are, in the minds of the mass public, ripe for internationalisation, we have also presented the data on decision-making on unemployment issues, where clear majorities say that the problem should be dealt with by each country deciding for itself what should be done.

It is one thing to attribute policy-making in a given area to the international level; it is quite another to have confidence in the processes and institutions involved. Accordingly, we looked at confidence in two institutions and noted majority or near majority confidence in the UN in both regions, but substantially weaker levels of confidence in the WTO, especially in Europe.

Given these intra-regional variations in the distributions of attitudes to globalisation, it is evident that national political, economic and socio-cultural context will play a major role in determining individual attitudes. Accordingly, the multivariate analysis that is the remaining task of this chapter includes countries as variables (the so-called fixed effects model) as well as the wide range of attitudinal variables already described in the various chapters up to this point.

### **Multivariate analysis of the determinants of attitudes to globalisation**

It must be emphasised that this analysis is exploratory rather than definitive and selective rather than comprehensive and is subject to all of the reservations attendant on conducting a large-scale regression of this sort. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the dependent variables in the regressions that follow fall into three groups – protectionism (in relation to trade and culture); the internationalisation of issues (in relation to the environment and developing countries) and confidence in globalised governance (the WTO and the UN). In each case the analysis begins with a set of five socio-demographic variables that enable us to examine and control for the effect of generation, gender and social status (the five variables are age, female, level of education, subjectively assessed living standard and unemployment). These are followed by successive sets of variables reflecting aspects of the political culture and of the attitudes and experiences of individuals that potentially affect responses to the policies and institutions associated with globalisation. The range of independent attitudinal variables includes ideological orientation, confidence in national political institutions, national and supra-national identity and exposure to globalisation. The exposure to globalisation variables are those defined in Chapter 3, namely exposure through work and web, exposure through family and friends and exposure through TV news and entertainment. Finally it should be noted that frequency of

religious practice and level of political knowledge are included as control variables and that, as indicated above, all of the models include country effects.

### *Free trade versus protection*

Four of our five socio-demographic factors have an impact on attitudes to the issue of free trade versus protection (see Table 10.1). Conflict over the issue is partly generational, older generations being more protectionist and the young more in favour of free trade. Gender also plays a role, in this case women being more protectionist than men. The socio-demographic analysis also indicates that support for trade protection is inversely related to level of education (see the negative sign on

Table 10.1 Determinants of favourable attitudes to free trade

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>			
Age	-0.014	-0.007	-0.050
Female	-0.083	-0.020	-0.000
Level of education (four)	0.054	-0.015	-0.000
Living standards	0.026	-0.015	-0.076
Unemployed	0.031	-0.049	-0.520
<i>Ideological/political outlook</i>			
Left-right importance	-0.088	-0.025	-0.001
Right-wing	-0.018	-0.048	-0.704
Left-wing	-0.025	-0.052	-0.639
Interaction of left-right importance and right-wing	-0.049	-0.060	-0.411
Interaction of left-right importance and left-wing	0.113	-0.064	-0.078
Confidence in national institutions	0.054	-0.011	-0.000
<i>Identity</i>			
Strength of national identity	-0.112	-0.014	-0.000
Identity – not respected, not fair treatment	-0.223	-0.026	-0.000
Supra-national Islam	-0.181	-0.050	-0.000
Supra-national Europe	0.136	-0.028	-0.000
Supra-national Asia	-0.096	-0.039	-0.015
Supra-national China	0.120	-0.053	-0.022
Religious practice	0.008	-0.007	-0.240
<i>Exposure to globalization</i>			
Exposure through work and web	0.077	-0.011	-0.000
Exposure through family and friends	0.047	-0.011	-0.000
Exposure through TV news and entertainment	0.053	-0.010	-0.000
Political knowledge	0.042	-0.005	-0.000
Constant	3.260	0.091	0.000
Adjusted $R^2$	0.173		

the coefficient for education in Table 10.1). This finding is open to more than one interpretation. On one view, it simply reflects the greater cognitive and political sophistication of those with higher levels of education. Alternatively, it may reflect the positions and interests of individuals in the labour market and how those interests are affected by free trade (see O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2002 for a detailed analysis of this latter aspect). The effect of the respondent's standard of living on protectionist sentiment is also statistically significant (at  $p = 0.08$ ). However, our final socio-demographic variable – unemployed status – does not appear to have any effect on protectionist sentiment. This may seem somewhat surprising, given the tendency in the media and in political circles to link unemployment to globalisation and job displacement. On the other hand, failure to find an unemployment effect has to be seen in the context of the inclusion in the model of a range of attitudinal variables that may be the means by which the experience of being unemployed is translated into a protectionist policy preference. Left–right ideology may well be an element in that translation process.

As we have seen in Chapter 7, when measured across the wide range of countries in the ASES study, left–right ideology is a complex phenomenon and, in some countries, a rather tenuous one. In order to take account of this complexity, the present analysis includes two variables measuring self-placement on the left–right scale (left-wing or not and right-wing or not) and an additional variable measuring the importance of the concepts of left and right to the respondent. As well as entering these variables separately, the analysis also allows interactions between them, the interaction terms being included in order to capture the effect of left-wing and right-wing self-placement in combination with an assessment that the left–right spectrum is important. This analysis shows that, in the case of trade liberalisation versus trade protection, the key ideological variable is the perceived salience of the notions of left and right: the more salient the spectrum, the lower the support for trade liberalisation. Being left-wing also has a statistically significant effect ( $p = 0.08$ ) on support for trade liberalisation, but only when combined with the belief that the notions of left and right are important. In short, support for trade liberalisation is somewhat strengthened by left-wing identification, but is more substantially and clearly related to the belief that the notions of left and right are important. The direction of the latter effect is that the more the respondent feels comfortable with the notions of left and right, the greater his or her support for trade liberalisation. What lies behind this correlation is not entirely clear, but it may be that the view that left and right are important ideas is a measure of political sophistication and that those who are more politically sophisticated are more likely to take a liberal view on trade policy. In addition to ideological position, the analysis in Table 10.1 includes respondents' degree of confidence in a range of national political institutions (parliament, political parties, government, the law and the courts, and the civil service). This variable will be particularly important when this chapter tackles the issue of confidence in global political institutions. However, it is also included in the other analyses undertaken here in order to examine how domestic political experiences feed into attitudes towards international issues and processes. The evidence from the

ASES study confirms that there is an association between attitudes at the two levels. Our composite measure of confidence in national political institutions is clearly associated with support for free trade and vice versa. The wider implication here is that the greater the legitimacy of the state and its institutions in the eyes of its citizens, the greater the latitude the state has in pursuing a free trade policy. Contrariwise, if the state tends to lack legitimacy it is likely to come under pressure to be more protectionist.

The hypothesis that various aspects of people's sense of political identity would have an impact on attitudes to globalisation is certainly confirmed by the findings reported in Table 10.1. First of all, it is clear that support for free trade decreases as the degree of importance attached to national identity increases. This suggests that there are two opposite processes at work here. On the one hand, protectionism increases as the importance of national identity increases. On the other hand, protectionist sentiment also intensifies as people feel more negatively about their national political institutions. In short, it is not simply a matter that opposition to globalisation is rooted in close attachment to the nation-state and its institutions. Rather is it the case that one aspect of the individual's relationship to the state (identification) promotes opposition to globalisation, while another aspect (confidence in the institutions of the state) pulls the other way, i.e. in support of globalisation.

But there is a further layer to the way in which identity affects mass attitudes to globalisation. As outlined in Chapter 6, one of the main theories of nationalism suggests that the perception that the national group identified with is being discriminated against or is not being accorded due respect by other peoples or nations is a potent factor in generating a nationalist response. Following this line of reasoning, the model in Table 10.1 includes a composite measure that combines the extent to which perceptions of lack of respect and of unequal treatment in economic and political affairs attach to the respondent's national identity. As the table shows, this sense of grievance is a significant predictor of anti-globalisation sentiment, at least as the latter is reflected in preference for trade protection. Yes, strong national identity nurtures protectionist attitudes to trade issues. But, over and above this, there is a further boost to protectionism when individuals feel that the national group they identify with is getting a raw deal, whether that be in terms of esteem, or in terms of political or economic treatment. In short, opposition to globalisation is conditioned both by identity and by experiences of inequality attaching to that identity.

The third and final aspect of identity examined by the ASES study has to do with identification with an entity defined in the questionnaire as 'a larger group that includes people from other countries', with European, Asian, Chinese and Islamic being given as examples. Obviously, there is great variation among these potential objects of identification, especially in terms of the strength of corresponding regional institutions. However, provided that this qualification is borne in mind in interpreting the data, we believe that it is legitimate and useful to describe these overarching identities as supra-national.

While one would expect identities of this sort to have an impact on attitudes

to trade, the direction of that expected impact is unclear. One possibility is that attachment to a supra-national entity or group encourages openness and nurtures support for free trade rather than protection. The opposite is also a possibility. In this scenario, the supra-national group that the respondent identifies with acts as the focus of a demand for economic protection and as a means by which globalising forces can be resisted.

As it happens, all four forms of supra-national identity (European, Islamic, Asian and Chinese) have effects on protectionism, but the effects are far from uniform. On the one hand, European supra-national identity and Chinese supra-national identity are both positively related to support for free trade. In the former case this raises doubts about notions of 'Fortress Europe', at least at the level of mass political culture. In the case of Chinese identity, it presumably reflects the trading role traditionally played by émigré Chinese throughout the region. However, Asian identity and Islamic identity harbour protectionist impulses, the anti-liberalisation effect being particularly pronounced in the case of Islamic identity. Because of the obvious religious dimension of Islamic identity and the possibility that religious commitment may be the real underlying factor, the analysis includes frequency of religious practice as a control variable. It is clear, however, that inclusion of frequency of religious practice does not affect the strength of the coefficient for Islamic identity. Accordingly, the negative effect of Islamic identity on support for free trade can not be written off as a function of religiosity.

This brings us to our final set of variables that may be presumed to have an impact on mass attitudes to globalisation, namely various forms of exposure to globalisation. Three indicators of exposure to globalisation in the ASES study measure exposure through work and web, exposure through family and friends and exposure through television news and entertainment (for details see Chapter 3. As can be seen from Table 10.1, each of the three aspects of exposure to globalisation has an effect on the preference for free trade, the effect in each case being positive: the greater the degree of respondents' exposure to globalisation, the more liberal their response to the issue of imports. Because it might be argued that the association between exposure to globalisation and a pro-free trade sentiment is spurious and merely reflects the greater political sophistication of those with high levels of exposure, the analysis also includes a measure of respondents' level of political knowledge. While it is clear that political knowledge itself has an impact on protection (greater knowledge being associated with less protectionist attitudes), this effect does not dilute the association between exposure and attitude to the protection of trade. In sum, and contrary to the assumption that increased exposure to globalisation will generate resistance to it, the ASES evidence indicates that the more people experience globalisation, the more positive their response to the policies that sustain globalisation.

### ***Protectionism – culture***

Cultural protectionism was measured by agreement with the statement that, taking Japan as the example, 'Japan's television should give preference to Japanese made



films and programmes'. While the determinants of cultural protectionism of this sort have some features in common with the determinants of economic protectionism, there are important differences. Such differences begin with the demographic effects (see Table 10.2). Thus, the pro-protectionist effect of age is noticeably stronger in the case of culture than it is in the case of trade. And gender, which is positively associated with a preference for trade protection, turns out to have no effect when the issue is giving preference to national films and programmes on television. Something similar happens to the living-standards variable: whereas this had a statistically significant ( $p = 0.078$ ) effect on the relationship in the case of trade (higher standards of living being associated with support for free trade), it has no effect at all on cultural protectionism. Finally on the demographic front, we

Table 10.2 Determinants of opposition to cultural protectionism

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>			
Age	-0.073	-0.006	-0.000
Female	-0.006	-0.018	-0.726
Level of education (four)	0.042	-0.013	-0.002
Living standards	-0.000	-0.013	-0.978
Unemployed	-0.080	-0.045	-0.072
<i>Ideological/political outlook</i>			
Left-right importance	-0.046	-0.023	-0.049
Right-wing	0.060	-0.044	-0.170
Left-wing	0.059	-0.048	-0.223
Interaction of left-right importance and right-wing	-0.123	-0.055	-0.026
Interaction of left-right importance and left-wing	-0.009	-0.059	-0.873
Confidence in national institutions	-0.041	-0.010	-0.000
<i>Identity</i>			
Strength of national identity	-0.148	-0.012	-0.000
Identity – not respected, not fair treatment	-0.060	-0.024	-0.013
Supra-national Islam	-0.290	-0.046	-0.000
Supra-national Europe	0.067	-0.026	-0.010
Supra-national Asia	-0.024	-0.036	-0.509
Supra-national China	0.009	-0.048	-0.851
Religious practice	-0.030	-0.006	-0.000
<i>Exposure to globalization</i>			
Exposure through work and web	0.106	-0.010	-0.000
Exposure through family and friends	0.032	-0.010	-0.002
Exposure through TV news and entertainment	0.091	-0.009	-0.000
Political knowledge	0.024	-0.005	-0.000
Constant	2.228	0.083	0.000
Adjusted $R^2$	0.207		

noted with surprise the finding that being unemployed has no effect on attitudes to trade; equally surprising is the fact that it has a significant effect ( $p = 0.072$ ) on cultural protectionism, unemployment being associated with support for a protectionist approach.

Turning to the political variables, left–right self-placement plays a role in relation to both trade and cultural policy, but there are subtle differences between the determinants of attitudes in the two areas. A perception of the importance of the left–right dimension is associated with support for protection in both domains. However, the interaction between this variable and self-placement shows up different effects in each policy domain. In the case of trade, being right-wing and regarding left–right distinctions as important has no effect, but being left-wing and regarding the matter as important does have an effect (in a free trade direction). In the case of preference for films and programmes of national origin, however, the opposite pattern obtains: being left-wing has no effect either with or without an accompanying sense of importance; but, being right-wing and thinking this to be important has a substantial effect (in the direction of increasing support for cultural protection). The final category of ideological/political effects also shows a remarkable contrast. While confidence in national political institutions is associated with opposition to trade protectionism, it is associated with support for protection in the case of culture.

Given these contrasting effects, it is not surprising that the effects of sense of national and supra-national identity also differ in subtle ways. First, the effect of the degree of importance attached to national identity is noticeably stronger (in a protectionist direction) in the case of culture than in the case of trade. In contrast, perceptions of inequality have a stronger effect on support for trade protectionism than on support for cultural protectionism, though the effect remains significant in the cultural case. In the case of supra-national identity, the effect of Asian and Chinese identities drop out of the picture when the focus turns from trade to culture. However, given the same switch in focus, the protectionist effect of Islamic identity intensifies and the liberalising effect of European identity weakens (but remains significant).<sup>6</sup> The effects of the three types of exposure to globalisation on cultural protectionism are quite straightforward – each of the three forms of exposure increases support for globalising tendencies in both the trade and cultural (specifically television) realms.

### ***Attributed internationalisation of issues – environmental problems and problems of developing countries***

As outlined above, policy preferences have two quite distinct aspects – preference regarding the substance of policy (as in, for example, preferences regarding trade policy) and preferences regarding the level of governance at which policy should be decided. Levels of governance include local, national and international, our interest here being in the international level, or what was called above the attributed internationalisation of issues. Recent years have seen

an intensification of decision-making at the international level either through the expansion of the role of formal agencies of internationalised governance, through relatively robust international regimes or through ad hoc and often recurring international conferences and processes of negotiation. These international efforts have focused in particular on two issues – the manifold problems of developing countries and the increasingly pressing issue of the environment. Support for the internationalisation of decision-making on these two issues was measured by asking respondents whether the problem should be dealt with by each country deciding for itself what should be done or by all countries together deciding what should be done (see Tables 10.3 and 10.4).

Table 10.3 Determinants of attribution of decision-making on environmental problems to international level

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>			
Age	-0.010	0.003	0.000
Female	-0.021	0.008	0.006
Level of education (four)	0.025	0.006	0.000
Living standards	0.010	0.006	0.063
Unemployed	-0.012	0.019	0.518
<i>Ideological/political outlook</i>			
Left-right importance	0.030	0.010	0.002
Right-wing	0.002	0.019	0.906
Left-wing	0.003	0.021	0.898
Interaction of left-right importance and right-wing	-0.030	0.023	0.205
Interaction of left-right importance and left-wing	0.005	0.025	0.836
Confidence in national institutions	0.013	0.004	0.002
<i>Identity</i>			
Strength of national identity	-0.006	0.005	0.267
Identity – not respected, not fair treatment	0.019	0.010	0.065
Supra-national Islam	0.018	0.019	0.366
Supra-national Europe	0.038	0.011	0.001
Supra-national Asia	0.012	0.015	0.438
Supra-national China	0.068	0.021	0.001
Religious practice	0.004	0.003	0.095
<i>Exposure to globalization</i>			
Exposure through work and web	0.018	0.004	0.000
Exposure through family and friends	0.017	0.004	0.000
Exposure through TV news and entertainment	0.010	0.004	0.013
Political knowledge	0.015	0.002	0.000
Constant	0.522	0.035	0.000
Adjusted $R^2$	0.170		

Table 10.4 Determinants of attribution of decision-making on problem of developing countries to international level

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>			
Age	-0.009	0.003	0.001
Female	-0.012	0.007	0.105
Level of education (four)	0.032	0.005	0.000
Living standards	0.021	0.005	0.000
Unemployed	-0.027	0.018	0.143
<i>Ideological/political outlook</i>			
Left-right importance	0.032	0.010	0.001
Right-wing	-0.019	0.018	0.277
Left-wing	0.008	0.020	0.673
Interaction of left-right importance and right-wing	0.000	0.022	0.989
Interaction of left-right importance and left-wing	0.021	0.024	0.375
Confidence in national institutions	0.016	0.004	0.000
<i>Identity</i>			
Strength of national identity	-0.009	0.005	0.092
Identity – not respected, not fair treatment	0.002	0.010	0.877
Supra-national Islam	0.071	0.019	0.000
Supra-national Europe	0.060	0.011	0.000
Supra-national Asia	0.059	0.015	0.000
Supra-national China	0.090	0.020	0.000
Religious practice	0.005	0.003	0.059
<i>Exposure to globalization</i>			
Exposure through work and web	0.008	0.004	0.062
Exposure through family and friends	0.020	0.004	0.000
Exposure through TV news and entertainment	0.012	0.004	0.001
Political knowledge	0.015	0.002	0.000
Constant	0.522	0.034	0.000
Adjusted $R^2$	0.180		

Support for the internationalisation of the problems of developing countries shows a broadly similar socio-demographic pattern to that which characterises support for free trade. Older age groups and women tend to be opposed to the internationalisation of the issue, the female effect being at the margin of statistical significance ( $p = 0.105$ ). On the other hand, those with a higher level of education and/or a higher standard of living support dealing with the problem at an international level. Roughly the same socio-demographic pattern obtains in the case of the internationalisation of environmental problems.

While they have some role in influencing attitudes to protection, left-right variables play only a miniscule role in affecting support for the internationalisation of

either the issue of developing countries or the issue of the environment. In fact the only left–right variable to have an effect is how important one considers the whole left–right notion to be. At no point does left–right self-placement have any effect on the internationalisation of either issue, suggesting that the question of internationalised governance is just not seen by citizens as aligned with left–right positions.

However, the other major aspect of national political culture included in the analysis (confidence in national political institutions) does play a role and the role has important implications for our understanding of public support for the internationalisation of the problems of the environment and development. Confidence in international institutions is associated with support for the internationalisation of both environmental and development issues. Thus, rather than supporting the internationalisation of these issues because they have lost confidence in the capacity of national political institutions, people support international decision-making, from, as it were, a platform of confidence in the domestic political process. The more the public has confidence in national political institutions, the more it is open to internationalised decision-making, at least in these two issue areas.

The role of identity as a determinant of attitudes towards the internationalisation of issues also varies by comparison with the role it played in relation to protection of trade or culture. It also varies depending on whether the internationalisation of decision-making relates to the environment or to development. Let's take the environment first. Three identity variables have an impact on support for the internationalisation of environmental issues and one of those effects is quite unexpected. The unexpected effect is that a sense that the nationality one identifies with is unequally treated makes it more likely that an individual will support the internationalisation of environmental issues. The other two significant identity variables are European identity and Chinese identity, both of which are associated with support for the internationalisation of environmental issues. On the other hand, Islamic identity, Asian identity and, surprisingly, strength of national identity have no impact one way or the other on support for the internationalisation of environmental issues.

In the case of the problems of developing countries, however, all but one of the identity variables have significant effects. The anti-globalisation impact of strength of national identity that was evident in the case of protectionist issues, but was not significant in the case of the internationalisation of the environment, reappears in the case of problems of developing countries ( $p = 0.092$ ). Asian and Islamic supra-national identity also reappear as significant influences, it being particularly noticeable that, in this case, Islamic identity favours globalisation, whereas up to this point it had consistently negative effects on attitudes to globalisation (see the change in sign between Tables 10.1 and 10.2).

The internationalisation of issues does not occur in a vacuum. It is supported by international regimes of various sorts and by more formally constituted international institutions. Accordingly, our final step in examining the determinants of attitudes to globalisation will be to focus on two institutions – the United

Nations and the World Trade Organization. Acknowledging that there are major differences between the two organisations, we treat both here as institutions of globalised governance.

***Confidence in institutions of globalised governance – the UN and the WTO***

The main determinant of confidence in both the UN and the WTO is confidence in national political institutions. It seems that confidence or lack of it at the national level spills over to the international level, either nurturing or undermining the prospects for the development of effective institutions of global governance. As Table 10.5 show and 10.6, the effect of lack of confidence in national institutions is very substantial and it obtains with more or less the same force whether the international object of confidence is the United Nations or the World Trade Organization. All of this implies zero support here for the speculation that individuals who are dissatisfied with national institutions circumvent the nation-state and place their trust in the new global order.

In addition to the major impact of confidence/lack of confidence in national institutions, it is also apparent that confidence in the UN and the WTO is affected in different ways by two basic demographic variables – age and gender. Increasing age diminishes confidence in both institutions, while being female is associated with increased confidence in both. In contrast to the pattern of influence on the other indicators of support for globalisation, education has no effect on confidence in either of the international institutions considered here. Nor, in a now familiar pattern, does unemployment have any effect. Living standards, do, however, play a significant role, with higher living standards being associated with more confidence in the WTO and in the UN.

Our left–right variables have different effects depending on which institution is being considered. The results in the case of the WTO are particularly clear-cut – it all depends on the interaction. Neither the importance attached to the idea of left versus right, nor left-wing self-placement or right-wing self-placement on their own have any effect on confidence in the WTO. What matters, rather, is the interaction between self-placement and the perceived importance of the dimension. Seeing themselves as left-wing *and* believing that the concepts of left and right matter have significant negative effects on confidence in the WTO as an institution. In contrast, confidence in the UN is largely unaffected by left–right position, but is increased by the sense that all of this left–right ideology is important.

In all but one of the analyses presented so far, the strength of feeling surrounding national identity has had negative effects on support for globalisation – nurturing economic and cultural protectionism and diminishing support for the internationalisation of the problem of development. It is striking therefore that, in the case of both our institutions of internationalised governance, the effect of strength of national identity is positive – strong identity nurtures confidence in both the WTO and the UN. However, the other aspect of identity we

Table 10.5 Determinants of confidence in international institutions – the United Nations

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>			
Age	-0.027	0.005	0.000
Female	0.043	0.014	0.002
Level of education (four)	0.013	0.010	0.191
Living standards	0.048	0.010	0.000
Unemployed	0.002	0.034	0.960
<i>Ideological/political outlook</i>			
Left-right importance	0.034	0.018	0.059
Right-wing	0.033	0.034	0.339
Left-wing	-0.006	0.036	0.862
Interaction of left-right importance and right-wing	-0.060	0.042	0.156
Interaction of left-right importance and left-wing	-0.040	0.044	0.364
Confidence in national institutions	0.243	0.007	0.000
<i>Identity</i>			
Strength of national identity	0.028	0.009	0.003
Identity – not respected, not fair treatment	-0.075	0.019	0.000
Supra-national Islam	-0.111	0.037	0.003
Supra-national Europe	0.089	0.020	0.000
Supra-national Asia	0.077	0.030	0.009
Supra-national China	0.065	0.039	0.097
Religious practice	0.013	0.005	0.008
<i>Exposure to globalization</i>			
Exposure through work and web	0.013	0.008	0.104
Exposure through family and friends	0.029	0.008	0.000
Exposure through TV news and entertainment	0.033	0.007	0.000
Political knowledge	-0.003	0.004	0.406
Constant	1.758	0.064	0.000
Adjusted $R^2$	0.192		

have measured pulls in the opposite direction: if a person's identity is seen by them not to be respected and/or not to be treated equally, confidence in international institutions suffers. On the supra-national front, three of our identities contribute positively to confidence in international institutions. The exception is Islamic identity, the effect of which is clearly negative in the case of the UN. In the case of the WTO, the effect is in the same direction but weaker and significant only at  $p = 0.096$ . Finally, in a now familiar pattern, all three forms of exposure to globalisation (work and web, family and friends, and TV news and entertainment) are associated with higher levels of confidence in the UN, but confidence in the WTO is boosted only by exposure through TV news and entertainment.

Table 10.6 Determinants of confidence in international institutions – the World Trade Organization

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. error</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>			
Age	-0.019	0.006	0.001
Female	0.043	0.016	0.006
Level of education (four)	0.000	0.012	0.972
Living standards	0.063	0.012	0.000
Unemployed	-0.046	0.039	0.246
<i>Ideological/political outlook</i>			
Left-right importance	0.026	0.020	0.189
Right-wing	0.028	0.038	0.462
Left-wing	-0.038	0.041	0.353
Interaction of left-right importance and right-wing	-0.030	0.047	0.522
Interaction of left-right importance and left-wing	-0.102	0.050	0.040
Confidence in national institutions	0.243	0.008	0.000
<i>Identity</i>			
Strength of national identity	0.051	0.011	0.000
Identity – not respected, not fair treatment	-0.108	0.021	0.000
Supra-national Islam	-0.069	0.041	0.096
Supra-national Europe	0.044	0.023	0.059
Supra-national Asia	0.070	0.032	0.028
Supra-national China	0.129	0.042	0.002
Religious practice	0.016	0.005	0.004
<i>Exposure to globalization</i>			
Exposure through work and web	0.017	0.009	0.049
Exposure through family and friends	0.023	0.009	0.008
Exposure through TV news and entertainment	0.043	0.008	0.000
Political knowledge	-0.019	0.004	0.000
Constant	1.439	0.073	0.000
Adjusted $R^2$	0.172		

## Summary and conclusions

The findings set out above can be summarised by placing them in three categories: effects that are complete and consistent across all the dependent attitude-to-globalisation variables, effects that are consistent but incomplete in the sense that they affect some but not all of the dependent variables, and effects that are inconsistent across the range of dependent variables in that the independent variable in question has positive effects on some aspects of attitudes to globalisation and negative effects on other aspects. The overall pattern of these effects is displayed in Table 10.7, which identifies the significant



Table 10.7 Summary of determinants of attitudes to globalisation

	Trade	Culture	Environment	Developing countries	United Nations	World Trade Organization
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>						
Age	**	**	**	**	**	**
Female	***	***	***	***	***	***
Level of education (four)	***	***	***	***	***	***
Living standards	*		*	***	***	***
Unemployed		*				
<i>Ideological/political outlook</i>						
Left-right importance	***	**	***	***	*	
Right-wing						
Left-wing						
Interaction of left-right importance and right-wing		**				
Interaction of left-right importance and left-wing	*					**
Confidence in national institutions	***	***	***	***	***	***

*Identity*

Strength of national identity	***	***	*	***	***
Identity – not respected, not fair treatment	***	**	*	***	***
Supra-national Islam	***	***	***	***	***
Supra-national Europe	***	***	***	***	*
Supra-national Asia	**		***	***	**
Supra-national China	**	***	***	*	***
Religious practice		***	*	***	***
<i>Exposure to globalization</i>					
Exposure through work and web	***	***	*	***	**
Exposure through family and friends	***	***	***	***	***
Exposure through TV news and entertainment	***	***	**	***	***
Political knowledge	***	***	***	***	***

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\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

effects and indicates the direction of the effect by placing a box around the negative ones.

The independent variables showing complete and consistent effects are age, European identity and two of our measures of exposure to globalisation. The older the respondent, the lower the support for globalisation. European identity is equally consistent, but works in the opposite direction, i.e. is associated with higher support for all the aspects of globalisation considered here. Finally in this category of consistent and complete effects, two of our exposure variables (exposure through family/friends and through television) boost support for globalisation right across the range.

The remainder of the effects identified in this analysis are either incomplete or inconsistent or both. Thus higher living standards lead to support for globalisation, but not on all issues – the exception is giving preference to foreign television programmes and films. Education increases support for globalisation in the areas of trade, culture, environment and developing countries, but this pro-globalisation effect disappears when confidence in international institutions is the dependent variable and this absence of an educational effect applies in the case of both the UN and the WTO. Exposure through work and web is also conducive to positive responses to globalisation with again an exception in regard to confidence in institutions – in this case the exception is confined to confidence in the UN. Finally, the effect of Chinese identity falls into this incomplete-effects category in that it is supportive of globalisation across most of the aspects involved, while not affecting cultural protectionism in either direction.

The inconsistent effects are perhaps the most interesting in that they highlight the complexity of the determinants of mass attitudes to globalisation. For example, being female has both positive and negative effects on support for globalisation – positive in the case of confidence in international institutions, but negative in the case of trade and international decision-making on the environment. Likewise, attributing importance to the notions of left and right leads to support for international decision-making, but to opposition to liberalisation of either trade or television. In terms of specific positions on the left–right spectrum, being right-wing (and regarding this as important) is associated with cultural protectionism while being left-wing (and regarding this as important) is associated with lack of confidence in the WTO.

Other core variables also have conflicting effects. This is particularly true of our identity variables. Thus, strength of national identity reduces support for the liberalisation of trade and culture, but boosts confidence in international institutions. And perceptions of inequality attached to identity have negative effects with the single exception of a positive effect on the importation of foreign-made television programmes. Asian identity is also ambivalent in its effects, having positive effects on most aspects but a negative effect on trade liberalisation. Finally, Islamic identity has negative effects on all aspects of support for globalisation but one, the exception being the positive effect Islamic identity has on support for problems of developing areas being decided at an international rather than a national level.

All of this bears out the point made at the outset of this chapter, namely that attitudes to globalisation issues are determined by a complex combination of individual-level and country-level influences. Having examined the individual-level influences in this chapter, our next task is to place these in context and to tease out their implications by returning to the major themes and issues set out at the commencement of this book.

## Notes

- 1 The level of support for cultural protectionism in Japan is particularly low due to the high level of don't know and neither/nor responses (53 per cent). Setting those responses aside, supporters of cultural protectionism in Japan are outnumbered by opponents by almost 2 to 1.
- 2 Note the use of the extra response category 'haven't thought much about it'. This response option is explicitly included in the question as read out to the respondent. Its purpose is to make not having an opinion on the matter a legitimate response and to avoid the manufacture of 'non-attitudes' of the kind that Converse (1964) warned against.
- 3 The exception is Ireland, where only 48 per cent endorse common decision-making on the environment and a virtually identical proportion oppose such common action.
- 4 This disagreement among East and Southeast Asian states on the issue is of some relevance to the methodological discussion regarding the wording of this question. This is because if the lack of decision-making competence at the regional level were driving the responses, one would not expect such a large divergence in opinion within the region. The occurrence of such disagreement tends to reinforce the validity of the question.
- 5 On the use of the response category 'haven't thought much about it', see footnote 2 above.
- 6 While it is only included in the model as a control variable, it should be noted that the role of religion is quite different between the two types of protectionism. In the case of trade, the effect of frequent religious practice is statistically insignificant. However, in the case of cultural protection, its effect is quite strong (in the direction of supporting cultural protection). The reason behind this association between religious practice and cultural protectionism is presumably that the culture being protected by promoting national films and TV programmes is, at least in part, national religious culture.

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# 11 Globalisation and citizen attitudes to politics and the state

*Ian Marsh*

The year 1989 did not mark the end of history, but it did initiate a new phase in relations between states and peoples. The term globalisation has become the label for this work-in-progress. But it is an exceedingly slippery term. Globalisation is used descriptively as an umbrella word to link a variety of otherwise unconnected developments, and also evaluatively to indicate an attitude or orientation towards these developments. The term globalisation is ubiquitous in political rhetoric. Politicians invoke it as the cause of insoluble problems or the reason for unavoidable changes. For scholars and activists, it functions variously as a problematic analytical construct or as a value-laden ideology. For some, it is the new guise of Orientalism, for others a code for the pursuit of American or Western self-interest, and for still others, the royal road to economic prosperity, democracy and freedom.

These ambiguities are reflected in a burgeoning literature: references on the Social Sciences Citation Index have mushroomed from twenty-three in 1990 to 2,664 in 2003 (Fine, 2004 p. 222). Yet missing from this armada of studies is any comprehensive empirical assessment of how ordinary citizens respond to globalisation. This exploratory study sought to begin to fill this gap. It had three primary aims: first, to assess comparatively exposure to, and evaluation of, globalisation amongst citizens of eighteen of the countries most engaged in the economic dimensions of this process; second, to assess some at least of the relationship between these experiences and attitudes to politics and the state; third, and conversely, the relationship between orientations to politics and the state and attitudes towards globalisation.<sup>1</sup>

The literature on globalisation covers a variety of topics that are directly or indirectly relevant to this assessment. It includes such issues as its nature and scope (e.g. Held and McGrew, 2002), its economic dimensions (e.g. Dicken, 2003), its historical manifestations (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2001), the development of trans-national regulatory regimes (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000), international elites and globalisation (e.g. Berger and Huntington, 2002) and the development and impact of international social movements (e.g. Tarrow, 2005). Its impacts on patterns of governance and state policy choices have also been extensively examined (e.g. Hay, 2004; Hobson and Ramesh, 2002; Weiss, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2002). The inclusion of European states introduced a further

issue, namely the complementary, mixed or defensive relationship between a regional order like the EU and globalisation (e.g. Wallace, 2000).

The literature on globalisation also addresses impacts on individuals. It has figured in a broader debate about what it means to be cosmopolitan (e.g. Appiah, 2006; Vertovic and Cohen, 2002; Waldron, 2000; Jung and Tarrow, 2004). Some argue that globalisation has fostered a hybrid identity based on multiple connections (e.g. Hall, 2002). Others contend that it fosters temporary identifications (e.g. Sennett, 2002) and fragments rather than unifies experience (e.g. Zabaïda, 2002, p. 39).

There were thus many conceptual, comparative and interpretive difficulties associated with a wide-ranging study across a large number of otherwise varied countries. These difficulties touched all aspects of the project, starting from definitions of the two key terms, globalisation and the state. First, there is no agreement in the literature about the forms and scope of globalisation. Hay (2004) has discussed the causal power of ideas about globalisation, particularly those held and disseminated by elites. These have helped spread awareness and reinforced, if not framed, the impacts of globalisation on citizen attitudes. Others emphasise institutional and structural changes. The roles of international political organisations like the WTO or the UN have expanded. MNCs and international financial markets have become particularly significant (e.g. Crouch, 2004). Cultural as well as commercial goods and services are now extensively traded. Global integration may also be the consequence of a variety of otherwise unrelated structural developments. In the words of William Wallace, integration is driven by 'those intense patterns of interaction which develop amongst countries without the impetus of deliberate political decisions, following the dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks and social change' (quoted Rosamond, 1999, p. 655).

The activities of citizens can also enhance their exposure to globalisation. Some activities mark its presence not because of their novelty but rather because of their contemporary accessibility and popularity, for example tourism and studying abroad. Other individual activities are novel, in particular those that reflect new, easy and cheap ways of connecting with people in other countries, for example via the Internet and e-mail. Migration too has risen significantly in political salience. Many states are endeavouring to restrict these movements and, at least in a number of European countries, populist right-wing parties have mobilised new anti-migration constituencies.

To overcome confusion about the scope and range of globalisation as it touches day-to-day life, this study adopted a particular approach. Citizens may come to understand 'globalisation' less through cognitive processes, and more through practical experience. Respondents were thus invited to indicate whether they engaged in activities that are commonly associated with international engagement, and also whether they recognised an impact on aspects of everyday life. In both cases the focus of this study was on particular activities or experiences. Respondents were asked to indicate if they had engaged in particular activities, like tourism. They were also asked if they recognised the influence of

international factors in changes in everyday experiences like foods in restaurants, goods in shops and people in neighbourhoods.

The second definitional problem concerned the idea of the state. What is a state? An imagined community? A community of fate? A (more or less porous) infrastructure of political and civil institutions? A particular patterning of policy and power? All four are relevant. Katzenstein (2000), Swank (2003) and Svallfors (1997) have all explored the links between state strategies that buffer citizens against global forces and support for international economic engagement. State economic strategies also vary with presumably differential effects on citizen attitudes (e.g. Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Crouch, 2005; Marsh, 2006). Meantime, a burgeoning literature discusses the role of institutions, of which the state is the most prominent example. Institutional theories trace many present practices and attitudes to historical experience, including events in the very remote past (Pierson, 2004; also March and Olsen, 1995; North, 1990). Such factors constitute the state in the memory of its citizens. Contemporary policy strategies can reinforce these loyalties. Together, these varied factors create the idea of the state in the minds of its citizens. They also create degrees of freedom for states in influencing citizen attitudes. In turn, both could mediate impacts of globalisation. But the current and historical, institutional, structural and cultural elements that are joined in the idea of a state are too complex and too variegated to be collected into a single proxy variable.

To overcome this problem, this study focused on the most generally accepted measures of citizen attitudes to politics and the state, or what might broadly be called political culture – including identity, ideology, policy preferences, confidence and participation. The range of variables indicates the complex nature of citizen opinion and the varied psychological planes and processes that constitute it. For example, policy issues and preferences involve primarily attitudes and judgements, ideological orientations reflect values and beliefs, and identity is associated with more deeply rooted affective or emotional loyalties. This study sought to draw variously on formative, life cycle and current experiences, as they are expressed in more immediate hopes, beliefs, ideals and aspirations.

A further difficulty arose from the absence of firm evidence about the direction of influence underlying any relationships identified. The presence of a relationship between experiences of, and attitudes to, globalisation and the identities, beliefs and preferences of citizens can be measured. But a reciprocal relationship is no less plausible than a unidirectional one. Finally, for the most part, regional could not be differentiated from global developments. The impact of a supra-state infrastructure on citizen identities has been studied in the context of the EU, but this is a much more developed institutional order than that associated with globalisation (e.g. Marcusson *et al.*, 1999; Hermann *et al.*, 2004). These institutional and structural differences must be borne in mind in interpreting the findings of the present study.

The results are briefly summarised in the following four sections. The first outlines experiences of globalisation; the second discusses its relationship to

orientations to politics; the third section reviews attitudes to the state; and the fourth section considers the relationship between orientations to politics and attitudes to globalisation.

### **Citizen experiences of globalisation**

The survey included three broad measures of citizen experience of globalisation: exposure, experience and evaluation. In relation to exposure, respondents were asked to indicate which of nine possibilities applied to them. The response categories covered family members/relatives living abroad, international travel for work or holiday, use of the Internet for home, school or work, having friends from other countries, watching foreign news and/or entertainment on TV, using e-mail to contact people in other countries, international contact through work, and access to an international satellite or cable TV service. These exposures ranged from relatively more active links (the job category) to the quite passive exposure represented by television viewing. A factor analysis showed that these experiences were structured around three distinct domains: one related to connections through work, e-mail and the Internet; a second to connections based on family, friends or travel abroad; and a third to media exposure. Whereas 13 per cent of the overall sample indicated they were actively exposed to globalisation via work and Internet links, for 51 per cent this occurred more passively via the medium of television. The factor structure varied regionally and also by country thus implying substantial variations in the patterning of exposure.

Amongst Western European respondents, 22 per cent registered a work and web link and 49 per cent a family, friends and travel link. By contrast, only 16 per cent of East and Southeast Asian respondents registered a work and web link and 23 per cent a family, friends and travel link. The EU is presumably one powerful influence on the Western European results. The factor structure also varied between the regions. The responses of Western Europeans split between only two groupings with work, family, friends and travel joined in a single factor.

The experience and evaluation measures covered eight aspects – goods in shops, food in restaurants, job security, standard of living, impacts on neighbourhoods and communities, use of English, and foreign news and entertainment on television. Respondents were asked to indicate if they recognised each particular effect (experience) and if they judged it to be positive or negative (evaluation). On average 48 per cent of the overall sample responded with a definite positive or negative answer and a further 29 per cent indicated that they recognised an effect but could not say whether it was good or bad. This means that overall approximately 75 per cent of respondents indicated awareness or experience of an effect of globalisation. The numbers who offered a definite view were about the same in both regions. In sum, overall levels of recognition of particular impacts of globalisation amongst respondents were very high.

The proportion of positive judgements was also quite high. Of the just on 50 per cent of the sample who had a definite view about these varied aspects of globalisation, an average of 71 per cent said the effects were positive – that is



about 35 per cent of the overall sample. The proportion of positive respondents was again fairly close between the regions (75 per cent, East and Southeast Asian and 66 per cent, Western Europe). On only one item – the use of English – and in only one region – Western Europe – did negative answers exceed positive answers and then only barely (27 v. 25 per cent). The questions on foods in restaurants and standard of living elicited the highest ratios of positive to negative responses (77 and 70 per cent). The question on job security the lowest (59 per cent).

But there were wide variations in country results. A majority of Thais judged the effects of globalisation on food negatively; a majority of South Koreans and Japanese did likewise in relation to impacts on job security; and a majority of South Koreans in relation to foreign films and entertainment. In Western Europe, majorities in four countries (Britain, Italy, Portugal and Spain) judged the impacts on job security to be negative and the positive margin in two others was only one or two points (France and Germany). A majority of Germans, Swedes, Portuguese and Greeks also judged the wider use of English as a negative; as did majorities of French, Spaniards and Greeks in relation to foreign media and films.

A factor analysis showed that these attitudes bunched into three distinct groups, media, life style and work and living standards, but when repeated on a country and regional basis the patterns diverged widely, particularly amongst states in Asia. This suggests that national or other factors significantly affect the structure of experience. There was also some correlation between exposure to globalisation in one or another form and positive views about its effects. Those who were exposed to globalisation in both regions were more likely to have a positive attitude.

English is the dominant language of globalisation. Excluding English-speaking states, on average 77 per cent of respondents from the states in Asia and 54 per cent from those in Europe had no knowledge of English or only up to an elementary capacity. A further 12 per cent of respondents in Asia and 13 per cent from Europe had ‘middling’ levels of English competence. Finally, only a minority claimed fluency or near fluency: the Asian average was 11 per cent, with 14 per cent in Western Europe. These average results masked wide variation at the country level.

In sum, the evidence from the ASES indicates that exposure to people from other countries was widespread and the experience of international effects on daily life was particularly high. In aggregate, around 35 per cent of the respondents across the eighteen countries offered a positive evaluation of these experiences. There were, however, some important reservations relating to job security and, in Europe, language and culture. The intensity of exposure also varied widely. For example, in both regions, the most passive medium, television, was the most common one. The incidence and patterning of exposure, experience and evaluations also varied widely between countries. Finally, factor analyses of both exposure and experience variables suggested that globalisation is mostly recognised not as a unitary development, but rather in a variety of forms or dimensions that are characterised by widely different frequencies.

## **Globalisation and citizen orientations to politics**

The exposures and experiences just described can be presumed to be mediated by the national political cultures of the countries concerned. Accordingly, the next step in this study was to examine three core political culture variables, namely identity, ideology and orientations to participation.

### ***Identity***

Identity involves potentially the most visceral connection to national politics. In this study, the strength of national identity varied widely by region. Sixty per cent of respondents from East and Southeast Asia declared national identity to be extremely important compared with 40 per cent of Western Europeans. Levels of supra-national identification were rather similar in the two regions. But whereas the political category, European, dominated in Europe, amongst Asian respondents religion, ethnicity and culture all figured as aspects of trans-national identity. Further, the forms and the importance attached to these identities varied widely not only between regions but between countries and sometimes in surprising ways. For example, whereas 84 per cent of Malaysians rated their Islamic identity as extremely important, only 50 per cent of Indonesians (Javanese) responded in this way. Amongst Europeans, some 60 per cent nominated European as their supra-national identity, but only 20 per cent indicated that they judged this as important or extremely important.

National identity was said to have become more important by respondents from seven of nine Asian countries (the exceptions were Thailand and Japan). By contrast, respondents from all nine Western European countries said the strength of national identity had either not changed or diminished over the past decade. Whether this was due to globalisation or the EU or the rise of regional loyalties is unclear. Britain was the only state where more than 20 per cent of respondents nominated a sub-national (English, Welsh, Scottish) rather than national identity.

Because of its links to nationalism, the perception of unfair or unequal treatment is an important indicator (e.g. Gellner, 1964; Samuels, 2003, p. 23). Some 30 per cent of Asian and European respondents saw their country and people as being on the receiving end of a process of unfair treatment. But the incidence varied widely between countries. This perception was held by majorities of Greek and Italian respondents in Europe and South Korean and Thai respondents in Asia. By contrast, majorities of Malaysian, Singaporean, Swedish and Irish respondents were positive about their countries' international treatment. These perceptions were affected by our exposure and experience variables. For example, those who were exposed through television (nearly 50 per cent of the sample) and those who believed globalisation had a negative impact on job security (41 per cent of the sample) were more likely to believe their countries were treated unfairly in international contexts.

Active exposure to globalisation was also associated with a less intense attachment to national identity. Those who experienced global impacts through

work and the Internet or through having family and friends in other countries were less likely to declare their national identity to be very important and more likely to declare supra-national identity to be important. The most common (and most passive) mode of exposure, watching foreign entertainment and news on television, had no effect on the strength of national identity.

In general, these findings suggest that national identity remains a core element of the self-recognitions of individual citizens but that its potency varies, with East and Southeast Asians valuing this attachment much more than their Western European cousins. Further, the effects of exposure to globalisation were differentiated. Active engagement through work, family and other direct contacts diminished the strength of national identity, but passive engagement through television and the perception of a negative effect on job security enhanced shared grievances and grievance in turn may be the path through which individual experiences become translated into a collective response.

### *Ideology*

The role played by ideology in all this was examined by assessing first, whether respondent's recognised, and attached importance to, the ideological self-placement left–right scale and second, through their attitudes towards substantive issues concerning equality, economic freedom and the role of the state. Using comparable indicators across the two regions, the ASES sought to establish if these ideological aspirations and orientations are equally strong and widespread across our sample of Western European countries and whether they have spread to the countries and the citizens in East and Southeast Asia.

There was clearly no general ideological dimension common to respondents from the two regions, a fact that could be expected to have a significant impact on more immediate responses to globalisation. Starting with evidence of attachment to the left–right scale, 75 per cent of the citizens of the nine European countries located themselves on a left–right dimension, although there was variance between countries both in respect of self-placement and in the importance attached to this scale. For example, 70 per cent of respondents in Germany, Italy, Spain and France attached at least a little importance to the scale, whereas only 48 per cent of respondents in the UK did so. The variation in Asia was more extensive. Between 88 and 95 per cent of the citizens of the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand were willing to place themselves on the scale. In the other five states either relatively few were able to place themselves on the scale or they attached little importance to it. Allowing for these various differences between the regions, it is clear that left-wing self-placement exceeded right-wing self-placement in Western Europe, but the reverse was the case amongst the Asian respondents.

At a substantive level, there was convergence on three issues. Approximately 85 per cent of respondents in both regions agreed competition was good. But in response to the question 'firms should be free to make as much profit as they can' 22 per cent of Asian respondents answered affirmatively compared with

2 per cent of Western Europeans. On the need to equalise incomes, 20 per cent of Asian respondents answered affirmatively compared with 67 per cent of Europeans.

The relationship between left right self-placement and policy preferences suggested a classic interventionist-egalitarian dimension for Western Europe, which was evident in all countries save for Ireland. However, the factor analysis of the responses from individual Asian countries and Asia as a whole failed to produce an analogous pattern. Instead, and more consistent with a developmental ideology, government intervention and government provision of jobs or welfare were linked to favourable attitudes to competition. No country in East and Southeast Asia produced *two* ideologically consistent factors on the Western European pattern. Singapore and Japan showed one result comparable with Europe.

Finally, the left–right dimension was used to test the association between exposure to globalisation and ideology. The three exposure variables – family and friends abroad, work and web, and watching foreign entertainment or news on the media – were all positively associated with the judgement that the left–right dimension was important. This was also true at the regional level. However, in Europe only, the judgement that globalisation had a negative impact on job security was positively associated with the left–right dimension. This result is consistent with the more robust relationship between left and right in that region.

In sum, the presence, incidence and importance of ideology varied markedly between the two regions. It is more prevalent, more important and more structured in Western Europe. Furthermore, exposure to globalisation enhanced the significance of the left–right dimension. But the difference between the European and Asian results concerning the importance of ideology and its substantive content indicates that there is no convergence: rather orientations to national politics are being framed by quite different underlying sources in the two regions.

### ***Participation***

The survey probed levels of citizen engagement in twelve activities. Following a factor analysis, these were further categorised into three groups: political discussion (talk about party politics, talk about national problems, talk about international problems), campaign activity (contribute money, actively help a party of candidate, vote, join a party) and contentious activity (sign a petition, contact an elected representative about a personal problem, contact an elected representative about a national problem, attend a protest march or demonstration, join others in informal activity to deal with community issue or problem). There was a wide disparity between the two regions in the incidence of participation both overall and between the categories. Europeans were four times more likely to attend a protest march and two times more likely to sign a petition and contact an elected politician. Further, European nations whose citizens participated most did so consistently across the different types of political activity.

Within the two regions too, there were wide disparities. For example, 33 per cent more Irish than Portuguese had contacted an elected politician about a national issue and 25 per cent more about a local or personal problem. French respondents were three times more likely to attend a protest march or demonstration than their British counterparts. In Asia, Japanese respondents were forty-six times more likely to sign a petition than Indonesian respondents. Malaysians were seventeen times more likely than Singaporeans to join a political party and Filipinos were sixteen times more likely than Singaporeans to help a candidate at election time.

Citizens with high exposure to globalisation were more likely than others to participate in and discuss politics. Citizens with friends abroad or who used the Internet were more likely to engage in contentious activity. In general, exposure to globalisation had a modest but positive impact on all three modes of political activity.

### ***Summary***

These measures of citizens orientations indicate how deeply rooted in national politics most citizens remain. There is a relationship between exposure to globalisation and political orientations; and, in the case of family and friends abroad or international contacts through work, the direction of impact is arguably from contacts to citizen orientations. But the effects of exposure are cross-cutting. It is generally associated with weakened national identity, although it is unclear if this signifies transcendence or amplification of national loyalties. A more internationalist orientation is not inconsistent with persisting and strong local attachments: these are the ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who figure in Tarrow’s study (2005) of international activists. Further, in Europe, but not in Asia, exposure to globalisation enhances the salience of left–right ideology. It also enhances the likelihood of active participation in politics. Indeed in one important case – that of a negative attitude to the impact of globalisation on job security – there is a link to a collective response in the form of a sense of unfair national treatment. Differentiated citizen responses to globalisation, both between the two regions and between countries in the two regions, could also be expected because of markedly different orientations to identity and ideology and because of markedly different patterns of participation. Thus the impacts of globalisation are varied and clearly not in one direction. Rather, this ‘outside-in’ development introduces additional pluralising tendencies. In the case of European states, this is to politics in which citizen loyalties are already differentiated by bottom-up materialist and post-materialist cleavages. In the case of Asian states, this is to politics in which cleavages are mostly emergent rather than already structured.

What individual characteristics were particularly associated with impacts of globalisation and with attitudes to national politics? There was a kaleidoscope of effects but no consistent patterns. There was no close, systematic or general relationship between exposure and the socio-economic background of respondents. Not surprisingly, exposure to the range of global connections was more

likely amongst those with higher levels of education, younger people or those with higher living standards.

Positive views about globalisation were also strongly associated with younger age groups, better education and higher living standards. The strength of feelings of national identity was also strongly related to age – but it was unclear if this was a cohort or life-cycle effect, or if age was a proxy for an array of other factors. Other evidence suggests there is no case for seeing young people as more likely to jettison national loyalties (Jung and Tarrow, 2004). The relation between political knowledge and evaluations was also complex. There was substantial variation across the two regions and more knowledge did not always associate with more positive attitudes to globalisation. So again globalisation seems associated with divergent effects. It introduces additional cleavages to domestic politics. How these might translate into political mobilisation is more problematic. From the perspective of opinion formation however, the domestic arena arguably remains primary, with television the (passive) medium by which international impressions reach most citizens.

### **Attitudes to the state**

Since the Treaty of Westphalia, states have occupied a central place in international political relationships. As argued in Chapter 1, most of the states included in this survey are relatively ‘strong’. The outside-in pressures associated with globalisation are also marked in all. In assessing its impacts, the final piece of evidence concerns citizens’ assessments of their states. To what extent do citizens still see their state as the primary problem-solving agency? Do they judge their state to be the primary institutional influence on day-to-day life? What are their expectations? Are they proud of their institutions? Whilst none of these is definitive, this collection of assessments provides an indicator of the standing of the state as an institution in the eyes of its citizens.

### ***The causes of issues***

Respondents were invited to indicate their assessment of the causes of three issues: problems in the economy, the causes of unemployment and the condition of the environment. They were offered four choices: mainly causes within the country, mainly international causes, both equally, and don’t know. The mean responses indicate that there is widespread acknowledgement of international causes, of problems in the economy and the environment.

Unemployment, however, continues to be predominantly perceived as a domestic problem with 57 per cent of respondents in Asia and 53 per cent in Europe nominating wholly domestic causes. With the addition of ‘both equally’ responses, 84 per cent of Asian respondents and 80 per cent of European respondents nominated mainly national or both equally causes. In only two cases, Singapore and France, did a majority of respondents identify international causes of unemployment. Singapore is a city-state with the highest exposure to

the global economy of any state in the survey. The French result may reflect orientations to the EU that were then current.

Mean results for the three issues were calculated. Five states in Asia were more than one standard deviation away from the mean. Respondents in Indonesia, China and South Korea were more likely to see the causes of these three issues originating within their own country and respondents from the Philippines and Singapore were more likely to attribute the causes to international developments. In Europe, only one country, France, recorded results more than one standard deviation away from the mean and in the direction of international causes. The other European results were bunched around the mean and point to a continuing emphasis on domestic causes.

### *Attributions of responsibility*

Respondents' attributions of responsibility for responding to five issues were assessed. These issues were selected because of their particular significance for domestic political agendas. Three issues – human rights, environmental problems, and women's rights – are post-materialist in character. Unemployment is a classic social democratic issue and problems of refugees and asylum seekers are associated with a new politics of social integration. These are all issues that have received extensive publicity and, in some cases, there is also already extensive international or regional institutional machinery. Respondents were asked to select from four responses: should be dealt with by each country deciding for itself what should be done, should be dealt with by all countries together, don't know, haven't thought much about it.

The internationalisation of a number of these issues is clear. In aggregate around 60 per cent of respondents nominated 'all countries together' for responding to three issues: refugees and asylum seekers, environmental problems and human rights. However, there were sharp differences between European and Asian responses in relation to the latter two with fewer than 50 per cent of respondents favouring collaborative responses compared with between 60 and 70 per cent of Europeans. Similarly, 57 per cent of European respondents suggested a collaborative response in relation to women's rights, whereas only 36 per cent of Asians nominated this response. Unemployment, however, stands out as still clearly perceived to be a national responsibility with 65 per cent of Asian respondents and 58 per cent of European respondents choosing this response. On average Ireland was the least internationalist amongst the nine European countries followed by Britain and Greece. Taiwan was the least internationalist in Asia followed by Indonesia and Thailand. A disposition to support collaborative action was much stronger in Europe than in Asia, perhaps pointing to the role of the EU.

### *Perceptions of state performance*

Respondents were asked to indicate how well they judged their national governments to be handling eight issues: the economy, political corruption, human



rights, unemployment, the level of crime, the quality of public services, the level of immigration and the condition of the environment. Mean scores were calculated. Respondents in the Asian countries generally rated government performance higher than did Europeans. Low scores in both regions were recorded on two issues: crime and unemployment. Europeans also gave poor ratings to several other areas: corruption, immigration and ethnic conflicts.

Europeans rated government performance lower than Asian respondents for: the quality of public services and the environment, and for ethnic and religious conflict and immigration. These unfavourable results may reflect higher expectations of the public sector and environmental protection that come with socio-economic development. Overall, Greek respondents were most critical of their government's performance followed by Italian respondents, whilst Irish and British respondents scored highest on evaluations of government performance. Respondents from Spain (83 per cent), Italy (78 per cent), Greece (76 per cent) and Portugal (71 per cent) also assessed government performance poorly on unemployment. Amongst Asian states, Japanese and South Korean respondents rated overall government performance least well (means 1.98 and 1.99 out of a possible 4 points). Asian governments were also rated poorly on unemployment, not surprisingly in the specific circumstances faced by these economies after 1997, and by Japan for most of that decade. Singapore was the only country in which a majority of people scored governmental performance well on every issue (mean 3.27 out of a possible 4 points). Corruption also featured strongly as a public anxiety throughout the Asian and European countries surveyed. Singapore was again the only country where most respondents thought the government was handling corruption well!

### ***Perceptions of state impact***

Respondents were invited to indicate how much impact on their day-to-day lives they attributed to the state and to the UN, the EU (Europe only) and MNCs. Mean scores were calculated with zero equalling no effect and 2 equalling great effect. Asian respondents generally ranked the effect of their national governments ahead of their European counterparts (mean of 1.27 v. 1.12). In Asia the state also ranked well ahead of the other organisations (UN, 0.66; MNCs, 0.69). In Europe, the EU (0.94) was not so far behind national governments. European respondents also rated the impact of MNCs quite highly (0.83). At the level of individual countries, state impact was ranked highest in Europe by German (1.36) and Greek (1.35) respondents and least by French (0.87) and Italian (0.92) respondents. In Asia, Chinese (1.41) and Singaporean (1.35) respondents rated state impact highest and Thai (1.07) and Japanese (1.19) least.

### ***Statist sentiment***

Two questions invited respondents to indicate their views of the general role of the state in relation to employment, welfare and the economy. One question



asked respondents if they thought government should be responsible for providing jobs or social welfare and another if they agreed that substantial government intervention was required to deal with today's economic problems. Respondents were offered six responses: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree, don't know.

A scale was created from 5 to 1 (strongly agree = 5 etc.). The mean result for European states was 3.98 with a standard deviation of 0.33 and for Asian states 4.08 with a standard deviation 0.18. Amongst Asian states, only Japan recorded a result outside one standard deviation from the mean; this was in the direction of weak state sentiment. Amongst European states, Italy and Greece recorded pro-state sentiments more than one standard deviation from the mean (4.35 and 4.34, respectively) and Germany beyond one standard deviation at the other pole (3.47).

### *Pride and confidence in state institutions*

Finally, pride and confidence in state institutions was assessed. Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of pride in the following features of their country: the way democracy works, political influence in the world, its social welfare system, its economic achievements, its armed forces. Respondents were asked to select from five responses: very proud, somewhat proud, not so proud, not proud at all, don't know.

Amongst European respondents the armed forces scored highest (57 per cent) and amongst Asian respondents economic achievements (55 per cent). An index was again created with a score of 4 indicating great pride and a score of 1 its opposite. Irish respondents displayed the highest mean levels of pride in state institutions (2.87) and Italian respondents the least (2.19). In Asia, Malaysian respondents indicated the greatest pride (3.18), followed by Singaporean respondents (3.13). South Koreans recorded the least pride (2.13).

A similar assessment was undertaken in relation to confidence in state institutions. This covered: the national parliament, political parties, the law and courts, the main political leaders, the police, the civil service, the military, the mass media. Respondents were asked to select from six responses: a great deal, quite a lot, not much, none at all, don't know, haven't thought about it much.

Of those expressing a clear opinion, in Asia the police (61 per cent) and the military (60 per cent) were regarded with greatest confidence. Least confidence was accorded to political parties (75 per cent), main political leaders (70 per cent) and government (62 per cent). The parallel results for Europe were military (57 per cent) and civil service (51 per cent), with political parties (30 per cent), parliament (35 per cent) and main political leaders (37 per cent) at the other pole. By contrast 46 per cent of respondents in Asia and 51 per cent in Europe expressed confidence in the UN and, again in Europe, 45 per cent indicated confidence in the EU (with 40 per cent indicating no confidence). Overall, Singaporean respondents exhibited the highest confidence amongst Asian respondents and Irish amongst European respondents. South Korean and Italian respondents again occupied the opposite pole.

### **Summary**

In sum, there is clear evidence that the state, if somewhat beleaguered, continues to constitute the main context for citizen experience. Citizen judgements about it are often qualified. Citizen perceptions of the causes of environmental and economic problems have become internationalised. Majorities also favour collaborative action on a range of issues including the environment, refugees and asylum seekers, human rights and (in Europe) women's rights. Meantime, state impacts on everyday life are everywhere judged to be primary, but the importance of the EU and of MNCs is widely recognised, at least amongst Europeans. With a few notable exceptions, state performance is judged to be patchy. However, support of a strong social role for the state remains high. Further, on the important issue of dealing with unemployment, the state remains pre-eminent in the eyes of citizens. Only in Singapore and France did a majority of respondents see this as an international responsibility. Globalisation has also brought new populist, anti-globalisation, social and cultural constituencies to the fore, at least amongst European states: significant minorities are concerned to defend their national cultures and worried about social integration (immigration, ethnic and religious conflict). Finally, with notable exceptions, pride and confidence in political institutions specifically are both low. In Asia, South Koreans recorded the lowest pride and confidence in state institutions and Italians produced a similar result in Europe. In general, there is widespread recognition of the international pressures to which states are subject and, in a number of areas, a disposition towards international, or at least collaborative, action. Finally, even allowing for healthy democratic distrust, citizens in new and old democracies seem concerned about the condition of their political institutions specifically to a disturbing degree.

### **Orientations to politics and attitudes to globalisation**

The overall determinants of attitudes to globalisation were also examined. Three broad measures of responses to globalisation were selected, namely support for free trade versus support for protection (covering both economic and cultural activity); confidence in international institutions (specifically the UN and WTO); and attitudes to the internationalisation of governance (specifically concerning environmental and developmental aid issues).

#### ***Protectionism***

Whilst majorities in both regions favoured protection, there were also a wide variety of differences within and between the regions. There were sharp differences between respondents from the different states in Asia, but much more consistency in Europe. Only four countries recorded publics in favour of free trade: Singapore, Japan, Germany and Sweden. Singapore lives by trade. Germany, Sweden and Japan have all historically sought, albeit in different ways, to buffer

the impacts on their citizens of international economic engagement. At a socio-demographic level, older people, poorer people and less educated people were all more likely to support protection. So too were those who attributed salience to the left–right dimension. Similarly, strength of national identity was associated with support for protection as were respondents' grievances about the international treatment of their country. Asian and Islamic supra-national identity was also linked to protectionism. On the pro-free trade side, respondents who expressed confidence in their state institutions were more likely to be supporters. European and Chinese supra-national identity was also linked to support for free trade as was each of the three categories of exposure to globalisation – work and web, family and friends, and media.

In the case of cultural protectionism, older people were much more likely to be protectionist. Gender and income had no effect, but now unemployed people were more likely to be protectionist. Respondents who judged the left right dimension to be salient were more likely to support cultural protection, as were those who identified as right-wing. This time confidence in national political institutions was associated with support for cultural protection. Those who attributed importance to their national identities were more likely to support protection. But those who expressed grievance at their countries' international treatment were less likely to support cultural than economic protection. Identifying with Europe weakened support for cultural protection, but identifying with Islam intensified this attitude. Again, exposure to globalisation on all three measures was associated with the liberal response.

### ***International governance***

The second aspect of response to globalisation to be examined comprised attitudes towards management of environmental issues and aid to developing countries. Fifty per cent of Asian and 70 per cent of West European respondents supported international governance of environmental issues. Majorities in eight of nine European countries adopted this position. By contrast, this result was recorded in only three of nine countries in Asia. On developmental aid, substantial majorities in all European countries favoured international governance (from a low of 70 per cent in Spain to 81 per cent in Portugal). The Asian results were quite different with only 54 per cent overall favouring this approach, with absolute majorities in Thailand and Taiwan opposed. Socio-demographic results for the governance of both environmental and development aid issues were very similar to those recorded in the case of free trade. Older people and women were less likely to record internationalist responses and those with more income and more education the reverse. Those who attributed salience to the left–right spectrum were less likely to be internationalists, whereas those who expressed confidence in both national and international political institutions were more likely to support internationalised decision-making. Identity effects varied between the two issues. Those who felt their countries were treated badly in international contexts were more likely to support the internationalised governance, at least in

these two cases, as were those who acknowledged supra-national Chinese or European identities. Islamic and Asian identity had no impact on attitudes to the governance of environmental issues, but Islamic identifiers favoured the internationalisation of decision-making on development.

### ***Confidence in international organisations***

In aggregate, 47 per cent of Asian respondents and 51 per cent of Western Europeans expressed a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the UN and the WTO. On the other pole, five countries in Europe (France, UK, Spain, Germany and Greece) and three in Asia had publics that were sceptical about these agencies. Further, 36 per cent of Asian respondents had no view about the WTO and in five countries over 40 per cent responded either that they did not know or hadn't thought about the latter organisation. In Europe, 38 per cent had no views about the WTO and in four countries 40 per cent or more responded either that they did not know or hadn't thought about it. Again, the strongest association was between confidence in national political institutions and confidence in the nominated international bodies. This clearly suggests the supplemental role of international governance. Older people exhibited less confidence and women were more likely to declare confidence. Left and right had different effects depending on the agency. Strong national feeling was generally associated with strengthened confidence in the WTO and UN save for those who felt their country received less than its deserved respect or less than equal treatment internationally. So far as supra-national identity was concerned, being Islamic reduced confidence in the international organisations, but all European, Asian and Chinese identifiers were more likely to exhibit confidence.

### **Conclusion**

Returning to the broader themes of globalisation and citizen attitudes, two findings stand out: one concerns experience of globalisation and the other the continuing relevance of attitudes formed at local or national levels. Despite the relatively smaller proportion of the sample which was affected, direct exposure to globalisation was mostly associated with more liberal attitudes towards this development (i.e. family and friends abroad and engagement through work or the World Wide Web). Further, of the approximately half of the sample who held distinct positive or negative views about aspects of globalisation, the overwhelming majority were positive. Of course, this is a mathematical average. Evaluations may vary in intensity between the areas probed. A second finding concerns the continuing importance of attitudes seeded at the national level. Some scholars have suggested that these would be profoundly undermined by globalisation. As the findings here indicate, a variety of new influences that are acknowledged to be associated with globalisation are widely recognised. The formation of citizen opinion now does occur across a more complex grid, made up of new combinations of internally sourced experiences and internationally

derived influences. But in the formation of citizen attitudes and opinions, national political cultures retain a primary, sometimes a decisive, role and national institutions remain a primary setting.

Further, whilst it is clear that citizens are well aware of many aspects of 'globalisation', it is equally clear that this has not seeded the development of a new 'cosmopolitanism', at least if that is defined as 'free from national limitations' (OED); on the contrary, there is strong evidence that new experiences and perceptions are supplementing, not diminishing, older attachments and loyalties. Indeed to the extent public opinion has 'internationalised', this seems to have enhanced rather than diminished the significance of state institutions. For example, the findings show a positive association between a citizen's perception that state institutions are effective and his/her support for globalisation. The importance of state institutions as a setting for the refinement and development of public opinion about globalisation is thus emphasised. Other findings hint that those governments that have historically played active mediating, buffering and/or catalytic roles (e.g. in Europe, Sweden, Germany and Ireland, and in Asia, the developmental states) have been more effective in building constituencies for international engagement than those which have adopted a 'laissez faire' approach. This suggests important new brokerage and enabling roles for the state, not any lessening of state roles.

Globalisation in its varied forms is an important, and seemingly a growing, influence on the orientations of citizens. It is also a growing and unavoidable political imperative. Extreme global inequalities (e.g. Scott and Storper, 2003), and environmental and other challenges to orthodox conceptions of economic growth (e.g. Flannery, 2006; Gore, 2006), are just two reasons why this is so. But these troubling trans-national challenges are only one dimension of the contemporary political scene. At least for the states covered in this survey, new issues are also apparent from within. For those in the West, an expressive individualism has undermined older hierarchies and attachments (Taylor, 2003; Crouch, 1999) and presented a new challenge of citizen mobilisation and integration (e.g. Dalton, 2004). For those in the East, and save for Singapore and China, democratisation has imparted a new salience to the views of individual citizens.

In their different ways, these currents are making the orientations of citizens a more important, albeit not determinative, factor in the decisions of political elites. This augments the political challenge of responding to globalisation. Mass opinion now synthesises a much more complex array of influences from national, regional and international levels. Further, in the formation of individual opinion these influences are sometimes unidirectional, but more often inconsistent and sometimes cross-cutting. Finally, the findings indicate how differentiated these dynamics are between individuals, groups, nations and supra-national regions and also between issue areas. Held (2004) has described the best outcome of this collage: 'Political agents who can reason from the point of view of others are better equipped to resolve, and to fairly resolve, the challenging trans-boundary issues that create overlapping communities of fate' (p. 58).

Alternatively, globalisation could fuel a populist politics that plays on ignorance and fear in the name of a selfish and self-absorbed nationalism.

This choice will be determined in an immediate sense by the actions and influence of competing domestic elites. But the broad conversation about global issues, mediated by national, regional and international political and media institutions, constitutes a critical background frame. Current findings about the condition of that mediating infrastructure at most levels, and in both East and West, are not sanguine (e.g. for the West: Dalton, 2004; Katz and Blyth, 2005; for democratising Asia: Marsh, 2006). How the complex and often cross-cutting consequences of globalisation are absorbed into these conversations will be critical. This study clearly establishes that this process will occur variably, under the influence of widely differing exposures to globalisation and widely differing prior orientations to politics and to state institutions. Hence our conclusion echoes in another key a familiar contemporary theme (e.g. Dalton, 2004; Marquand, 2004). Political systems that facilitate national conversations that eschew populism, that expose the realities of interdependence, and that build publics who understand sympathetically the resultant complexities, will do a better job of shaping a tolerable future world, even, in the best case and with luck, one that is prosperous and mostly peaceful. But neither history nor current developments encourage optimism.

## Note

- 1 The survey was undertaken in the summer of 2000, thus attitudes to issues reflect views current at that time.

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# Appendix I: Characteristics of the Asia–Europe Survey

The Asia–Europe Survey (ASES) is an eighteen country cross-national survey conducted in summer 2000 for the democracy project funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science (#11102001, with principal investigator, Takashi Inoguchi, for the period between April 1999 and March 2002). Its aim is to examine, through randomly sampled national surveys of countries of Asia and Europe, how democracy (or quasi-democracy) functions in response to various domestic and international stimuli, especially focusing on the rise of civil society and the deepening of globalisation. The sample size is about 800 in each country, the sampling method is national random sampling and face-to-face interviewing was conducted, except for Japan. The country surveys were coordinated by the Nippon Research Center, Tokyo, and conducted by Gallup International coalitions.

The eighteen countries surveyed are: Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines from East and Southeast Asia and the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece from Western Europe. The questionnaire was designed in English first. It went through two devices to improve its quality: (1) back translation and (2) focus group experiments. Back translation was indispensable as the Asia–Europe Survey used many languages, sometimes even for just one country. Focus group experiments were no less indispensable. Budget limitation allowed us to do it only in Ireland and in Japan prior to the finalisation of the questionnaire in English. To give a dramatic example, the local language questionnaires used in China, Taiwan and Singapore included those in Chinese, but the three Chinese language questionnaires in these three countries are noticeably different from one another for various reasons. Cross-national surveys like this one demands overall unobtrusiveness, cultural sensitivity as reflected in questions properly composed linguistically and properly contextualized questions.

The questionnaire consists broadly of five areas: (1) identity, (2) trust, (3) satisfaction, (4) beliefs and actions, and (5) socio-economic attributes. By identity is meant what is primarily important in relating oneself to a larger social entity. By trust is meant what is reliable in terms of affection, utility and system. By satisfaction is meant the overall gratification in life in terms of various values

such as affection, health, wealth, power, knowledge and respect. Across the five areas, the two major thrusts of the Asia–Europe Survey, i.e. the rise of civil society and the deepening of globalisation, are reflected in the questionnaire.

The Asia–Europe Survey is one of the largest cross-national surveys carried out since the classic Almond–Verba civic culture survey carried out circa 1960. Needless to note, the Eurobarometer survey has been on the scene since the 1970s, but it is conducted by the transnational administrative-political institution. The World Values Survey has been conducted periodically for more than two decades, with the current wave being conducted in more than 70 countries. The World Values Survey is primarily academic. There is now no shortage of more regionally confined cross-national surveys. The Latino-barometer, the Afro-barometer, the New Democracy barometer, and the East Asia barometer are such examples. Those surveys run by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, is another example. The AsiaBarometer survey covering the entire sub-regions of Asia – East, Southeast, South and Central Asia – has been on the scene since 2003.

The beauty of the Asia–Europe Survey is the fact that it surveys two of the most dynamic regions of the world embedded with very different cultural contexts and historical countours. It allows us to compare and contrast the two regions, as well as the eighteen countries and different sub-groups, in terms of respondents’ attributes and responses. It allows us to bring in new regions to the survey-rich regions of the world, i.e. North America and Western Europe. The region of Asia is arguably the least surveyed area in the world in that it has surveys primarily focused on a single country, with regional surveys not being conducted regularly until the AsiaBarometer survey and the East Asia barometer arrived on the scene in the 2000s.

A few examples of questions included in the Asia–Europe Survey are given below:

(1) Many people think of themselves as being part of a particular nationality, for example as French or American or Japanese or whatever. Do you think of yourself as [JAPANESE] or as belonging to another nationality, or do you think of yourself in this way? (Circle one answer)

- 1 I think of myself as [JAPANESE]
- 2 I think of myself as another nationality
- 3 No, I do not think of myself in this way.

(2) Now, could you tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following? There may be one or two items on the list that you haven’t thought much about. If so, just tell me and we’ll go to the next item. (Circle one answer for each statement)

- 1 The [NATIONAL PARLIAMENT – INSERT ACCORDING TO COUNTRY]
- 2 The political parties
- 3 The [JAPANESE] government
- 4 The law and the courts
- 5 The main political leaders in [JAPAN]
- 6 The police
- 7 The civil service
- 8 The military
- 9 [JAPANESE] big business
- 10 The mass media.

(3) All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (Circle on answer)

Very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied

(4) For each of the following, could you please tell me whether or not it applies to you. (Circle one answer for each statement)

- 1 I have a family member or relatives living in other countries (Applies or Does not apply).
- 2 I travelled at least once in the past three years, for business or holiday purposes (Applies or Does not apply).
- 3 I use the Internet at home or school/work (Applies or Does not apply).
- 4 I have friends from other countries (Applies or Does not apply).
- 5 I often watch foreign entertainment programmes on TV (Apply or Does not apply).
- 6 I often watch foreign news programmes on TV (Applies or Does not apply).
- 7 I use e-mail to communicate with people in other countries (Applies or Does not apply).
- 8 My job involves contacts with organizations or people in other countries (Applies or Does not apply).
- 9 I receive an international satellite or cable TV service (Applies or Does not apply).

The sample size is roughly 800 for each society with basically a randomly selected nationwide sample. See the website of the Asia–Europe Survey (<http://www.asiaeuropesurvey.org>) for the fieldwork report of the Asia–Europe Survey.

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Asia–Europe Survey Web Page (<http://www.asiaeuropesurvey.org>). Please contact Prof. Takashi Inoguchi ([tinoguc@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp](mailto:tinoguc@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp)) for any inquiry.

## Appendix II: Profiles of the eighteen countries of the Asia–Europe Survey

Selected Indicators	Jpn	Sing	Kor	Malay	Thai	Phill	
HDI rank	11	25	28	61	73	84	
Human development index (HDI) value 2003	0.943	0.907	0.901	0.796	0.778	0.758	
Freedom House Index (1=democratic / 7=non)	1.5	4.5	1.5	4.0	2.5	2.5	
GDP per capita (PPP US\$) 2003	27,967	24,481	17,971	9,512	7,595	4,321	
GDP growth (annual %)	2.66	2.46	3.10	5.31	6.87	4.70	
Life expectancy at birth (years) 2003	82.0	78.7	77.0	73.2	70.0	70.4	
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) 2003	N/A	92.5	97.9	88.7	92.6	92.6	
Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary	84	87	93	71	73	82	
Total population (millions) 2003	127.7	4.2	47.5	24.4	63.1	80.2	
Physicians (per 100,000 people) 1990–2004	201	140	181	70	30	116	
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 2003	3	3	5	7	23	27	
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 2003	4	3	5	7	26	36	
Cellular subscribers (per 1,000 people) 2003	679	852	701	442	394	270	
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%) 1990–2003	1.0	3.5	4.6	3.4	2.8	1.2	
Employment by economic activity (%)	Women 1995–2002	5	(.)	12	14	48	25
	Agriculture	5	(.)	9	21	50	45
	Industry	21	18	19	29	17	12
	Services	37	31	34	34	20	18
		73	81	70	57	35	63
Urban population (% of total) 2003	65.5	100.0	80.3	63.8	32.0	61.0	
Electricity consumption per capita (kilowatt-hours) 2002	8,612	7,961	7,058	3,234	1,860	610	
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, <a href="http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/">http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/</a> ; United Nations, Human Development Report, 2005 HDI							

Ch	Vnam	Indn	Sw	Ireland	UK	Fr	It	Germ	Sp	Gr	Port
85	108	110	6	8	15	16	18	20	21	24	27
0.755	0.704	0.697	0.949	0.946	0.939	0.938	0.934	0.930	0.928	0.912	0.904
6.5	6.5	3.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0
5,003	2,490	3,361	26,750	37,738	27,147	27,677	27,119	27,756	22,391	19,954	18,126
9.30	7.24	4.88	1.58	3.70	2.22	0.47	0.26	-0.10	2.43	4.28	-1.20
71.6	70.5	66.8	80.2	77.7	78.4	79.5	80.1	78.7	79.5	78.3	77.2
90.9	90.3	87.9	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	98.5	N/A	N/A	91.0	92.5
69	64	66	114	93	123	92	87	89	94	92	94
1,300.0	82.0	217.4	9.0	4.0	59.3	60.0	58.0	82.6	42.1	11.1	10.4
164	53	16	305	237	166	329	606	362	320	440	140
30	19	31	3	6	5	4	4	4	4	4	4
37	23	41	3	6	6	5	4	5	4	5	5
215	34	87	980	880	912	696	1018	785	916	902	898
8.5	5.9	2.0	2.0	6.7	2.5	1.6	1.5	1.3	24	2.1	2.1
N/A	N/A	43	1	2	1	1	5	2	5	18	14
N/A	N/A	43	3	11	2	2	6	3	8	15	12
N/A	N/A	16	11	14	11	13	20	18	15	12	23
N/A	N/A	19	36	39	36	34	39	44	42	30	44
N/A	N/A	41	88	83	88	86	75	80	81	70	63
N/A	N/A	38	61	50	62	64	55	52	51	56	44
38.6	25.8	45.5	83.4	59.9	89.1	76.3	67.4	88.1	76.5	60.9	54.6
1,484	392	463	16,996	6,560	6,614	8,123	5,840	6,989	6,154	5,247	4,647

# Appendix III: Asia–Europe Survey (English Version)

## *Asia–Europe Survey (ASES)*

*A Multinational Comparative Study in 18 countries*

Finalized English Questionnaire March 21st, 2001 version

Respondent ID Number				

Sampling Point

<Respondent ID number>

- **Each country should enter the respondent ID number according to the following instructions.** NRC is planning to combine the data of all the eighteen countries. In order to avoid duplication of Respondent ID numbers, we ask you to enter the below numbers.

1	Japan	10,001–
2	South Korea	20,001
3	China	30,001–
4	Taiwan	40,001–
5	Singapore	50,001–
6	Malaysia	60,001–
7	Indonesia	70,001–
8	Thailand	80,001–
9	Philippines	90,001–

10	United Kingdom	100,001–
11	Ireland	200,001–
12	France	300,001–
13	Germany	400,001–
14	Sweden	500,001–
15	Italy	600,001–
16	Spain	700,001–
17	Portugal	800,001–
18	Greece	900,001–

<Notes>

- In order to be clear as possible, all questions are referring to the particular country or nationality, are specified using JAPAN as the example. Each country should substitute own name of country and name of nationality as appropriate.
- **DO NOT EXCLUDE people working in any industry or people belonging to the lower Social Economic Class.** The study is a social research and it is aimed at the entire population of male and females aged 18–79 years old of the specified survey area.
- **DO NOT INCLUDE expatriates, but INCLUDE all permanent residents** whether they have a citizenship or not.

**Date of interview**

day  month  year

**Time of starting the interview (enter the 24 hours clock)**

o'clock  minutes

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 3]**

- Q1.** Many people think of themselves as being part of a particular nationality, for example as French or American or Japanese or whatever. Do you think of yourself as [JAPANESE] or as belonging to another nationality, or do you not think of yourself in this way? (Circle one answer)

1	I think of myself as [JAPANESE]	→ GO TO Q2
2	I think of myself as another nationality	
3	No, I do not think of myself in this way	→ GO TO Q4

**[ASK, IF '2' IN Q1] [DO NOT SHOW CODE FRAME]**

- Q1a.** Which nationality is that? (Write in one answer given)

*\*Write in one answer given and then code according to the below code frame.*

(Circle one answer when coding the open end)

**\*INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY**

**[ASK, IF '1 or 2' IN Q1] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4]**

- Q2.** Overall, how important is it to you that you are [**READ OUT NATIONALITY ANSWERED IN Q1 or Q1a**]? (Circle one answer)

Extremely important	Somewhat important	Only a little important	Not important at all	Don't know
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	<b>Excluded</b>

**[ASK, IF '1 or 2' IN Q1] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

- Q3.** Overall, has being [**READ OUT NATIONALITY ANSWERED IN Q1 or Q1a**] become more important or less important to you, or has its importance stayed much the same over the last ten years? (Circle one answer)



Much more important	Somewhat more important	Stayed the same	Somewhat less important	Much less important	Don't know
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>(5 points)</b>	<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	<b>Excluded</b>

**[ASK ALL]**

**Q4.** In general, do you think that [JAPAN] and the [JAPANESE] people are respected by people in other countries, as much as they ought to be? (Circle one answer)

<p><b>1</b> Yes</p> <p><b>2</b> No</p> <p><b>3</b> Don't know</p>	<p>_____ → GO TO Q6</p>
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↓

**[ASK, IF '1 or 2' IN Q4] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q5.** In this regard, have things got better or worse over the last ten years? (Circle one answer)

A lot better	A little better	Remained the same	A little worse	A lot worse	Don't know
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>(5 points)</b>	<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	<b>Excluded</b>

**[ASK ALL]**

**Q6.** And in general, do you think that [JAPAN] and the [JAPANESE] people are treated fairly in international economic and political affairs? (Circle one answer)

<p><b>1</b> Yes</p> <p><b>2</b> No</p> <p><b>3</b> Don't know</p>	<p>_____ → GO TO Q8</p>
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↓

**[ASK, IF '1 or 2' IN Q6] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q7.** In this regard, have things got better or worse over the last ten years? (Circle one answer)

A lot better	A little better	Remained the same	A little worse	A lot worse	Don't know
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>(5 points)</b>	<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	<b>Excluded</b>

**[ASK ALL] [DO NOT SHOW CODE FRAME]**

**Q8.** As well as or sometimes, instead of having a sense of nationality, people may think of themselves as being part of some other community or group. How about you, is there any other community or group that you feel part of in this way? (Write in all answers given)

*\*Write in all answers given and then code according to the below code frame.*

(Circle all that apply when coding open ends)

- 1** Neighbourhood (refers to the particular area of your residence, e.g. village or town)
- 2** Region (refers to a larger area than your neighbourhood, e.g. city, prefecture, county, state, island, etc. Exclude supra-national regions such as Asia, Europe)  
*\*To Singapore; Leave the item as blank, but keep the code number in order to be consistent with other countries.*
- 3** Ethnic group
- 4** Religion
- 5** Other (SPECIFY)
- 6** No, I do not think of myself as part of any other community or group

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 6]**

**Q9.** Some people also think of themselves as being part of a larger group that includes people from other countries, for example, as European, Asian, Chinese, Islamic, etc. How about you, do you think of yourself in this way? (Circle one answer)

- 1** European
  - 2** Asian
  - 3** Chinese
  - 4** Islamic
  - 5** Other supra-national identity (SPECIFY)
  - 6** No, I do not think of myself in this way
- GO TO Q12

**[ASK, IF '1 to 5' IN Q9] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4]**

**Q10.** Overall, how important is it to you that you are **[READ OUT ANSWER TO Q9]**? (Circle one answer)

Extremely important	Somewhat important	Only a little important	Not important at all	Don't know
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	<b>Excluded</b>

**[ASK, IF '1 to 5' IN Q9] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q11.** Overall, has being **[READ OUT ANSWER TO Q9]** become more important or less important to you, or has its importance stayed much the same over the last ten years? (Circle one answer)

Much more important	Somewhat more important	Stayed the same	Somewhat less important	Much less important	Don't know
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>(5 points)</b>	<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	<b>Excluded</b>

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q12.** Thinking about [JAPAN], some people say that the following things are important for being truly [JAPANESE]. Others say that they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–e*

	Extremely important (4 points)	Somewhat important (3 points)	Only a little important (2 points)	Not important at all (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
a) To have [JAPANESE] citizenship	1	2	3	4	5
b) To be able to speak [JAPANESE, OR IF MORE THAN ONE LANGUAGE, INSERT MAIN OR DOMINANT OR OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF COUNTRY]	1	2	3	4	5
c) To feel [JAPANESE]	1	2	3	4	5
d) To be a [MAIN OR DOMINANT RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION IN COUNTRY] <i>*This question was not asked in Japan, South Korea and Singapore</i>	1	2	3	4	5
e) To have been born [JAPANESE]	1	2	3	4	5

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4]**

**Q13.** Overall, how proud are you to be [JAPANESE]? (Circle one answer)

Very proud	Somewhat proud	Not so proud	Not proud at all	Don't know
1	2	3	4	5
(4 points)	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	Excluded

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q14.** On this card are listed some things that people have said make them proud of [JAPAN]. How proud or not proud are you of [JAPAN] in each of the following areas? (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–e*

	Very proud (4 points)	Somewhat proud (3 points)	Not so proud (2 points)	Not proud at all (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
a) The way [JAPAN'S] democracy works <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4	5
b) [JAPAN'S] political influence in the world	1	2	3	4	5
c) [JAPAN'S] social welfare system	1	2	3	4	5
d) [JAPAN'S] economic achievements	1	2	3	4	5
e) [JAPAN'S] armed forces <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4	5

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 6 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q101.** Now, could you tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following? There may be one or two items on the list that you haven't thought much about. If so, just tell me and we'll go to the next item. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–j*

	A great deal (4 points)	Quite a lot (3 points)	Not much (2 points)	None at all (1 point)	Don't know Excluded	Haven't thought much about it Excluded
a) The [NATIONAL PARLIAMENT – INSERT ACCORDING TO COUNTRY]	1	2	3	4	5	6
b) The political parties	1	2	3	4	5	6

	A great deal	Quite a lot	Not much	None at all	Don't know	Haven't thought much about it
	(4 points)	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	Excluded	Excluded
c) The [JAPANESE] government	1	2	3	4	5	6
d) The law and the courts	1	2	3	4	5	6
e) The main political leaders in [JAPAN]	1	2	3	4	5	6
f) The police	1	2	3	4	5	6
g) The civil service	1	2	3	4	5	6
h) The military	1	2	3	4	5	6
i) [JAPANESE] big business	1	2	3	4	5	6
j) The mass media	1	2	3	4	5	6

*\*Do not ask this question in China.*

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 6 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q102.** Could you tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following? There may be one or two items on the list that you haven't thought much about. If so, just tell me and we'll go to the next item. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–g*

*DO NOT give explanations of these international organizations to the respondent. If they have never heard of them or don't know much about them, code 'Don't know (item 5)'.*

	A great deal	Quite a lot	Not much	None at all	Don't know	Haven't thought much about it
	(4 points)	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	Excluded	Excluded
c) International big business	1	2	3	4	5	6
d) The United Nations (UN)	1	2	3	4	5	6

	A great deal (4 points)	Quite a lot (3 points)	Not much (2 points)	None at all (1 point)	Don't know Excluded	Haven't thought much about it Excluded
e) The World Trade Organization (WTO)	1	2	3	4	5	6
f) NATO	1	2	3	4	5	6
g) The World Bank	1	2	3	4	5	6
h) ASEAN & Japan, Korea, China <i>*Ask in Asian countries only</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
i) The European Union (EU) <i>*Ask in European countries only</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6

**[READ OUT]**

Now I have a few factual questions about politics. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, so, if there are some you don't know, just tell me and we'll go on.

**[ASK ALL] [DO NOT SHOW CODE FRAME]**

**Q103.** Can you tell me the name of the current Foreign Minister of [JAPAN]?

*INTERVIEWER: If the respondent gives the 'FULL NAME', 'SURNAME' or the 'FIRST NAME', CODE 1.*

*If the respondent gives the wrong name, CODE 2.*

***\*Write in one answer given and then code according to the below code frame.***

(Circle one answer when coding the open end)

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1 | [INSERT FULL NAME OF THE CURRENT FOREIGN MINISTER] |
| 2 | Other names (SPECIFY)                              |
| 3 | Don't know   |

**[ASK ALL] [DO NOT SHOW CODE FRAME]**

**Q104.** Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Can you tell me the names of any of these five countries? (Circle one answer for every five countries given)

1st country given	<b>1</b> U.S.A <b>2</b> United Kingdom <b>3</b> France <b>4</b> Russia <b>5</b> China <b>6</b> Other countries <b>7</b> Don't know
2nd country given	<b>1</b> U.S.A <b>2</b> United Kingdom <b>3</b> France <b>4</b> Russia <b>5</b> China <b>6</b> Other countries <b>7</b> Don't know
3rd country given	<b>1</b> U.S.A <b>2</b> United Kingdom <b>3</b> France <b>4</b> Russia <b>5</b> China <b>6</b> Other countries <b>7</b> Don't know

4th country given	<b>1</b> U.S.A <b>2</b> United Kingdom <b>3</b> France <b>4</b> Russia <b>5</b> China <b>6</b> Other countries <b>7</b> Don't know
5th country given	<b>1</b> U.S.A <b>2</b> United Kingdom <b>3</b> France <b>4</b> Russia <b>5</b> China <b>6</b> Other countries <b>7</b> Don't know

**Correct answers**      **U.S.A**  
**United Kingdom**  
**France**  
**Russia**  
**China**

*\*Post code the answers of Q104 to the below code frame*

<b>1</b> All 5 countries are correct	<b>(5 points)</b>
<b>2</b> 4 countries are correct	<b>(4 points)</b>
<b>3</b> 3 countries are correct	<b>(3 points)</b>
<b>4</b> 2 countries are correct	<b>(2 points)</b>
<b>5</b> 1 country is correct	<b>(1 point)</b>
<b>6</b> The respondent gave answers but none of the countries were correct	<b>(0 points)</b>
<b>7</b> The respondent did not know any of the countries	<b>(0 points)</b>



**[ASK ALL] [SHOW EACH STATEMENT together with ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q201.** Now, I have some statements here that people make from time to time. You might agree or disagree with them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: SHOW and READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–h*

	Strongly agree  <b>(5 points)</b>	Agree  <b>(4 points)</b>	Neither agree nor disagree  <b>(3 points)</b>	Disagree  <b>(2 points)</b>	Strongly disagree  <b>(1 point)</b>	Don't know  <b>Excluded</b>
a) Citizens have a duty to vote in elections	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
b) There is widespread corruption among those who manage our national politics	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
c) Generally speaking, people like me don't have some say in what the government does	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
d) Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I cannot understand what's happening	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
e) Since so many other people vote in elections, it really doesn't matter whether I vote or not	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
	(5 points)	(4 points)	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	Excluded
f) Generally speaking, the people who are elected to the [NATIONAL PARLIAMENT] stop thinking about the public's interest immediately	1	2	3	4	5	6
g) I don't think governmental officials care much what people like me think	1	2	3	4	5	6
h) The way people vote is the main thing that decides how this country is run	1	2	3	4	5	6

*\*Do not ask this question in China.*

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 3 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q202.** Some people feel that their life is going well. Others are worried about the way it is going. In your own case, how worried are you about each of the following. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a-f*

	Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not worried at all	Don't know
	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	Excluded
a) Your work situation	1	2	3	4
b) Your health	1	2	3	4
c) Your family life	1	2	3	4
d) Your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4
e) Your country	1	2	3	4
f) The international situation generally	1	2	3	4

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q203.** Thinking about [JAPAN], and taking everything into consideration, how do you feel things in general have developed in the last ten years? (Circle one answer)

Improved a lot	Improved somewhat	Remained the same	Got somewhat worse	Got a lot worse	Don't know
1	2	3	4	5	6
(5 points)	(4 points)	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	Excluded

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q204.** Thinking about the international situation, and taking everything into consideration, how do you feel things in general have developed in the last 10 years. (Circle one answer)

Improved a lot	Improved somewhat	Remained the same	Got somewhat worse	Got a lot worse	Don't know
1	2	3	4	5	6
(5 points)	(4 points)	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	Excluded

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 3 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q205.** Now, when thinking specifically about the situation in [JAPAN], how worried are you about each of the following? (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–j*

	Very worried (3 points)	Somewhat worried (2 points)	Not worried at all (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
a) The economy	1	2	3	4
b) Political corruption <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4
c) Problems of human rights <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4
d) Unemployment	1	2	3	4
e) The level of crime	1	2	3	4

	Very worried (3 points)	Somewhat worried (2 points)	Not worried at all (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
f) The quality of the public services	1	2	3	4
g) The level of immigration	1	2	3	4
h) Ethnic conflict	1	2	3	4
i) Religious conflict	1	2	3	4
j) The condition of the environment	1	2	3	4

[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4 for EACH STATEMENT]

**Q206.** How well do you think the [JAPANESE] government is dealing with the following issues in [JAPAN]? (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a-j*

	Very well (4 points)	Fairly well (3 points)	Not so well (2 points)	Not well at all (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
a) The economy	1	2	3	4	5
b) Political corruption <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4	5
c) Problems of human rights <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4	5
d) Unemployment	1	2	3	4	5
e) The level of crime	1	2	3	4	5
f) The quality of the public services	1	2	3	4	5
g) The level of immigration	1	2	3	4	5
h) Ethnic conflict	1	2	3	4	5
i) Religious conflict	1	2	3	4	5
j) The condition of the environment	1	2	3	4	5

[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 3 for EACH STATEMENT]

**Q207.** Do you feel that the following problems in [JAPAN] are due mainly to causes within [JAPAN] or are due to causes in the international situation, or both? (Circle one answer for each statement)

## INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–c

	Mainly causes within the country	Mainly international causes	Both equally	Don't know
a) Problems in the economy	1	2	3	4
b) Unemployment	1	2	3	4
c) The condition of the environment	1	2	3	4

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW EACH STATEMENT together with ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q208.** Now, I have some statements here that people make from time to time. You might agree or disagree with them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (Circle one answer for each statement)

## INTERVIEWER: SHOW and READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a to f

	Strongly agree (5 points)	Agree (4 points)	Neither agree nor disagree (3 points)	Disagree (2 points)	Strongly disagree (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
b) [JAPAN] should limit the import of foreign products	1	2	3	4	5	6
c) Everyone should have the right to express his opinion even if he or she differs from the majority	1	2	3	4	5	6
d) People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
e) Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [JAPAN]	1	2	3	4	5	6
f) For certain problems like environmental pollution, international bodies such as the UN should have the right to enforce solutions	1	2	3	4	5	6
g) [JAPAN'S] television should give preference to [JAPANESE] made films and programmes	1	2	3	4	5	6

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW EACH STATEMENT together with ITEM 1 to 4]**

**Q301.** It is said we now live in an age when all sorts of things (for example, products, money, people and information) move around the world much more than they used to. Please tell me whether this kind of movement has any effect on your own life in each of the following areas and whether the overall effect has been a good thing or a bad thing. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: SHOW and READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a to h*

	Has good effect	Has bad effect	Has effect but is neither good nor bad	Has no effect	Don't know
a) What you can buy in the shops	1	2	3	4	5
b) The kind of food that is available in restaurants	1	2	3	4	5
c) The kind of people who live in your neighbourhood/ community	1	2	3	4	5
d) Job security	1	2	3	4	5
e) More use of the English language and English expressions among people in [JAPAN] <i>*Do not ask in Britain and Ireland</i>	1	2	3	4	5
f) Your standard of living	1	2	3	4	5
g) The films and entertainment programmes available on television in [JAPAN]	1	2	3	4	5
h) The kind of things that is reported in the news on television	1	2	3	4	5

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 and 2]**

**Q302.** Some people say that all this international influence is really a form of Americanization. Do you think this is a fair description? (Circle one answer)

- |   |                              |
|---|------------------------------|
| 1 | It is a fair description     |
| 2 | It is not a fair description |
| 3 | Don't know                   |

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 3 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q303.** Here is a list of issues. Do you think they have grown important within [JAPAN] or internationally in the past five years? (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a-i*

	Grown more important (3 points)	Grown less important (1 point)	No change (2 points)	Don't know Excluded
a) Problems of human rights <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4
b) Environmental problems	1	2	3	4
c) The problem of women's rights	1	2	3	4
d) The problem of unemployment	1	2	3	4
e) The problems of developing countries	1	2	3	4
f) The problem of refugees and asylum seekers	1	2	3	4
g) The danger of military conflict <i>in Asia</i> <i>*Ask in Asian countries only</i>	1	2	3	4
h) The danger of military conflict <i>in Europe</i> <i>*Ask in European countries only</i>	1	2	3	4
i) The danger of military conflict elsewhere in the world	1	2	3	4

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q304.** Here is the same list of issues. Would you please tell me whether each of these problems should be dealt with by each country deciding for itself what should be done or by all countries together deciding what should be done. There may be one or two items on the list that you haven't thought much about. If so, just tell me and we'll go to the next item. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a-i*

	Should be dealt with by each country deciding for itself what should be done	Should be dealt with by all countries together deciding what should be done	Don't know	Haven't thought much about it
a) Problems of human rights <i>*Do not ask in China</i>	1	2	3	4
b) Environmental problems	1	2	3	4
c) The problem of women's rights	1	2	3	4
d) The problem of unemployment	1	2	3	4
e) The problems of developing countries	1	2	3	4
f) The problem of refugees and asylum seekers	1	2	3	4
g) The danger of military conflict <i>in Asia</i> <i>*Ask in Asian countries only</i>	1	2	3	4
h) The danger of military conflict <i>in Europe</i> <i>*Ask in European countries only</i>	1	2	3	4
i) The danger of military conflict elsewhere in the world	1	2	3	4

**[ASK ALL]**

**Q305.** For each of the following, could you please tell me whether or not it applies to you. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a-i*

	Applies	Does not apply
a) I have a family member or relatives living in other countries	1	2
b) I travelled abroad at least once in the past three years, for business or holiday purposes	1	2



	Applies	Does not apply
c) I use the Internet at home or school/work	1	2
d) I have friends <i>from</i> other countries	1	2
e) I often watch foreign entertainment programmes on TV	1	2
f) I often watch foreign news programmes on TV	1	2
g) I use email to communicate with people in other countries	1	2
h) My job involves contacts with organizations or people in other countries	1	2
i) I receive an international satellite or cable TV service	1	2

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW EACH STATEMENT together with ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q306.** Now, I have some statements here that people make from time to time.

Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: SHOW and READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–g*

	Strongly agree (5 points)	Agree (4 points)	Neither agree nor disagree (3 points)	Disagree (2 points)	Strongly disagree (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
a) Competition is good because it stimulates people to develop new ideas	1	2	3	4	5	6
b) The government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare	1	2	3	4	5	6
c) With regard to most of the big problems we face, what the [JAPANESE] government decides doesn't make much difference	1	2	3	4	5	6
d) We should always do what the government wants instead of just acting in our own interest	1	2	3	4	5	6
e) Government usually knows best how to run a country	1	2	3	4	5	6

	Strongly agree (5 points)	Agree (4 points)	Neither agree nor disagree (3 points)	Disagree (2 points)	Strongly disagree (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
f) We need a lot of government intervention in order to deal with today's economic problems	1	2	3	4	5	6
g) Society is better off when businesses are free to make as much profit as they can	1	2	3	4	5	6

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 3 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q401.** Please consider each of the following and tell me how much effect you think their activities, decisions and so on have on your day-to-day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect or no effect? (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–e*

*DO NOT give explanations of these international organizations to the respondent. If they have never heard of them or don't know much about them, code 'Don't know (item 4)'.*

	Great effect (3 points)	Some effect (2 points)	No effect (1 point)	Don't know Excluded
a) The [JAPANESE] government	1	2	3	4
b) The European Union (EU) <i>*Ask in European countries only</i>	1	2	3	4
c) ASEAN & Japan, Korea, China <i>*Ask in Asian countries only</i>	1	2	3	4
d) The United Nations (UN) and its various agencies	1	2	3	4
e) Multinational companies	1	2	3	4

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4]**

**Q402.** How interested would you say you personally are in politics? (Circle one answer)

1 Very interested	(4 points)
2 Fairly interested	(3 points)
3 Not so interested	(2 points)
4 Not at all interested	(1 point)

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 10]**

**Q403.** In politics, people sometimes talk about ‘left’ and ‘right’. How would you place your views on this scale? (Circle one answer)

Left											Right	Don't know
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	
	(1 point)	(2 points)	(3 points)	(4 points)	(5 points)	(6 points)	(7 point)	(8 points)	(9 points)	(10 points)	Excluded	

*\*Do not ask this question in China.*

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 4]**

**Q404.** And can you tell me how important this idea of left and right is for you personally? (Circle one answer)

Extremely important	Somewhat important	Only a little important	Not important at all	Don't know
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	<b>Excluded</b>

*\*Do not ask this question in China.*

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW EACH STATEMENT together with ITEM 1 to 4]**

**Q405.** Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political activity that people can become involved in, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: SHOW and READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a-k*

	Have often done	Have done once or twice	Might do	Would never do	Don't know
a) Sign a petition	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
b) Contribute money to the campaign of a party or candidate in an election	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
c) Talk about the problems facing [JAPAN] with family and friends	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>

	Have often done	Have done once or twice	Might do	Would never do	Don't know
d) Talk about international or world problems with family and friends	1	2	3	4	5
e) Contact an elected politician about a personal or local problem	1	2	3	4	5
f) Attend a protest, march or demonstration	1	2	3	4	5
g) Talk about [JAPANESE] party politics or party leaders with family and friends	1	2	3	4	5
h) Contact an elected politician about a national issue or problem	1	2	3	4	5
i) Actively help a political party or candidate at election time	1	2	3	4	5
j) Get together informally with others in your community or local area to deal with some community issue or problem	1	2	3	4	5
k) Join a political party	1	2	3	4	5

*\*Do not ask this question in China.*

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q406.** In talking to people about elections we find that they are sometimes not able to vote for one reason or another. Think about the [INSERT PRESIDENTIAL/NATIONAL/GENERAL AS APPROPRIATE] elections since you were old enough to vote. Have you voted in all of them, in some of them, rarely voted in them or have you never voted in a [INSERT PRESIDENTIAL/NATIONAL/GENERAL AS APPROPRIATE] election? (Circle one answer)

- |   |   |            |
|---|---|------------|
| 1 | Voted in almost all of them   | (4 points) |
| 2 | Voted in some of them   | (3 points) |
| 3 | Rarely voted in them  | (2 points) |
| 4 | Never voted in a [INSERT PRESIDENTIAL/NATIONAL/GENERAL AS APPROPRIATE] election | (1 points) |
| 5 | I am not qualified to vote  | (0 points) |

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q407.** Now, thinking about the local elections that have been held since you were old enough to vote. Have you voted in all of them, in some of them, rarely voted in them or have you never voted in a local election. (Circle one answer)

<b>1</b>	Voted in almost all of them	<b>(4 points)</b>
<b>2</b>	Voted in some of them	<b>(3 points)</b>
<b>3</b>	Rarely voted in them	<b>(2 points)</b>
<b>4</b>	Never voted in a local election	<b>(1 point)</b>
<b>5</b>	I am not qualified to vote	<b>(0 points)</b>

*\*Cannot be asked in Singapore, since they do not have local elections.*

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5] \*Ask in European countries only**

**Q408.** And, thinking about the European Parliament elections that have been held since you were old enough to vote. Have you voted in all of them, in some of them, rarely voted in them or have you never voted in a European Parliament election. (Circle one answer)

<b>1</b>	Voted in almost all of them	<b>(4 points)</b>
<b>2</b>	Voted in some of them	<b>(3 points)</b>
<b>3</b>	Rarely voted in them	<b>(2 points)</b>
<b>4</b>	Never voted in a European Parliament election	<b>(1 point)</b>
<b>5</b>	I am not qualified to vote	<b>(0 points)</b>

**[ASK, ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to [insert the last code number including 'Don't know']]**

**Q409.** Which political party do you feel closest to? (Circle one answer)

<b>*INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY</b>	
<b>*You must add 'None of them', 'Don't know' and 'Refused'</b>	
None of them	
Don't know	
Refused	

*\*Do not ask this question in China.*

**[ASK, ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to [insert the last code number including 'I am not qualified to vote']]**

**Q410.** Thinking back to the last [INSERT PRESIDENTIAL/NATIONAL/GENERAL AS APPROPRIATE] in [JAPAN], on [INSERT DATE OF MOST RECENT NATIONAL ELECTION], which party did you vote for in that election or did you not vote? (Circle one answer)

**\* INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY**  
**\*You must add 'Did not vote', 'Don't remember', 'I am not qualified to vote' and 'Refused'.**

Did not vote in the last [INSERT PRESIDENTIAL/NATIONAL/GENERAL AS APPROPRIATE] election  
 Don't remember  
 I am not qualified to vote  
 Refused

*\*Do not ask this question in China and Singapore.*

**[ASK, ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q411.** All things considered, how satisfied are you with politics in your society today? (Circle one answer)

Very satisfied				Very dissatisfied	
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	
<b>(5 points)</b>	<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW EACH STATEMENT together with ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q412.** Now, I have some statements here that people make from time to time. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: SHOW and READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–g*

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
	<b>(5 points)</b>	<b>(4 points)</b>	<b>(3 points)</b>	<b>(2 points)</b>	<b>(1 point)</b>	<b>Excluded</b>
a) Incomes should be made more equal	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
b) A good environment is more important than economic growth	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
c) A woman's primary role is in the home	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
d) It is more important to achieve consensus in society than to encourage a lot of individual initiative	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
	(5 points)	(4 points)	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	Excluded
e) In making decisions, the experience of older people should be given extra weight or influence	1	2	3	4	5	6
f) The public interest should always come before family obligations	1	2	3	4	5	6
g) Individuals should strive most of all for their own good rather than for the good of society	1	2	3	4	5	6

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 3 for EACH STATEMENT]**

**Q501.** How often do you follow accounts of political or governmental affairs in the following media? (Circle one answer for each statement)

*INTERVIEWER: READ OUT EACH STATEMENT a–c*

	Regularly	From time to time	Never
	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)
a) Local newspaper, magazine, radio, or television	1	2	3
b) National newspaper, magazine, radio, or television	1	2	3
c) Foreign or international newspaper, magazine, radio, or television	1	2	3

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 5]**

**Q502.** All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (Circle one answer)

Very satisfied					Very dissatisfied
1	2	3	4	5	
(5 points)	(4 points)	(3 points)	(2 points)	(1 point)	

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 6]**

**Q503.** How well can you speak English? (Circle one answer)

- |  |
|--|
| 1 None/not at all  |
| 2 Enough to understand signboards, products labels etc, but cannot speak |
| 3 Enough to speak basic expressions required in daily life               |
| 4 Enough to understand the general meaning of what is written            |
| 5 Enough to read books with ease   |
| 6 Native fluency   |

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 7]**

**Q504.** Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? (Circle one answer)

- |                             |                     |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| 1 More than once a week     | 5 Once a year       |
| 2 Once a week               | 6 Less often        |
| 3 Once a month              | 7 Practically never |
| 4 Only on special holy days |                     |

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 9]**

**Q505.** What is your religious denomination? (Circle one answer)

- |                   |                   |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| 1 Roman Catholic  | 6 Hindu           |
| 2 Protestant      | 7 Buddhist        |
| 3 Other Christian | 8 Other (SPECIFY) |
| 4 Jew             | 9 None            |
| 5 Muslim          |                   |

**[ASK ALL] [INTERVIEWER'S OBSERVATION]**

**Q506.** Sex of respondent. (Circle one answer)

- |          |
|----------|
| 1 Male   |
| 2 Female |

**[ASK ALL]**

**Q507.** How old are you?

--

Years old

*INTERVIEWER: THE RESPONDENT MUST BE FROM 18-79 YEARS OLD*

**[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 11]**

**Q508.** Who are you currently living with? Exclude family members who live away from home. (Circle all that apply)



- 1 I live alone
- 2 Spouse or partner
- 3 Child(ren)
- 4 Your father and/or mother
- 5 Your brothers and/or sisters
- 6 Your grandfather and/or grandmother
- 7 Your grandchild(ren)
- 8 Spouse's or partner's father and/or mother
- 9 Spouse's or partner's brothers and/or sisters
- 10 Spouse's or partner's grandfather and/or grandmother
- 11 Others (SPECIFY)

[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to [insert the last code number]]

**Q509.** What is the highest educational level you have attained? (Circle one answer)

- 1 Did not receive formal education
- \* INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY**  
**\*You must add 'Did not receive formal education' as code 1.**

[ASK ALL]

**Q510.** Altogether, how many years did you go to school? Please exclude apprenticeships.

Years

[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 9]

**Q511.** Which of the following best describes your present situation with regard to employment? (Circle one answer)

- 1 Presently working full time (35+ hours a week)
- 2 Presently working part time (15–34 hours a week)
- 3 Presently working part time (less than 15 hours a week)
- 4 Used to work but now unemployed and looking for work
- 5 Used to work but now retired
- 6 Student
- 7 Never worked because permanently sick or disabled  → GO TO Q516
- 8 Looking after the home full time
- 9 Not working for other reasons

[ASK, IF '1 to 5' IN Q511] [SHOW ITEM 1 to [insert the last code number]]

**Q512.** What is (was) your main occupation? (Circle one answer)

*INTERVIEWER: \*ASK PRESENT OCCUPATION to respondents who are WORKING AT PRESENT. (Refer to respondent who answered '1 to 3' in Q511).*

*\*ASK PREVIOUS OCCUPATION to respondents who are NOT WORKING AT PRESENT, but USED TO WORK IN THE PAST. (Refer to respondent who answered '4 or 5' in Q511).*

**\*INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY**

**[ASK, IF '1 TO 5' IN Q511] [SHOW ITEM 1 to 6]**

**Q513.** Are you (were you) employed in the state sector or in the private sector? (Circle one answer)

*INTERVIEWER: \*ASK ABOUT THE PRESENT OCCUPATION to respondents who are WORKING AT PRESENT. (Refer to respondent who answered '1 to 3' in 511).*

*\*ASK ABOUT THE PREVIOUS OCCUPATION to respondents who are NOT WORKING AT PRESENT, but USED TO WORK IN THE PAST. (Refer to respondents who answered '4 or 5' in Q511).*

- 1 Work in a state, central or local civil service/administration/public services
- 2 Work in a state agency or a state-owned company
- 3 Work in a partially state-owned agency or company
- 4 Work in a [JAPANESE] private-sector company or organization
- 5 Work in a foreign private-sector company or organization
- 6 Others (SPECIFY)

**[ASK, IF '1 TO 5' IN Q511]**

**Q514.** Are (were) you a member of a trade union? (Circle one answer)

*INTERVIEWER: \*ASK ABOUT THE PRESENT OCCUPATION to respondents who are WORKING AT PRESENT. (Refer to respondent who answered '1 to 3' in 511).*

*\*ASK ABOUT THE PREVIOUS OCCUPATION to respondents who are NOT WORKING AT PRESENT, but USED TO WORK IN THE PAST. (Refer to respondents who answered '4 or 5' in Q511).*

1 Yes

2 No

*\*Do not ask this question in China and Malaysia.*

**[ASK, IF '1 TO 5' IN Q511]**

**Q515.** Have you ever been unemployed during the past 10 years? (Circle one answer)

1 Yes	2 No
-------	------

[ASK ALL] [SHOW CARD ITEM 1 to 5]

**Q516.** How would you describe your household's living standards? (Circle one answer)

1 High	(5 points)
2 Relatively high	(4 points)
3 Average	(3 points)
4 Relatively low	(2 points)
5 Low	(1 point)

[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to [insert the last code number EXCLUDING 'Refused']]

**Q517.** Could you tell me your monthly household income before being taxed? Please include income earned from side jobs. (Circle one answer)

<b>*INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY</b>
---

[ASK ALL] [SHOW ITEM 1 to [insert the last code number including 'Others']]

**Q518.** What is your ethnic group? (Circle one answer)

<b>*INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY</b>
<i>*You must add 'Others'.</i>
Other (SPECIFY)

*\*Do not ask this question in France.*

**Time of completion (enter the 24 hours clock)**

<table border="1"><tr><td><i>*Enter 2 digits</i></td></tr></table>	<i>*Enter 2 digits</i>	o'clock	<table border="1"><tr><td><i>*Enter 2 digits</i></td></tr></table>	<i>*Enter 2 digits</i>	minutes
<i>*Enter 2 digits</i>					
<i>*Enter 2 digits</i>					

**Total interviewing length**

<table border="1"><tr><td><i>*Enter 3 digits</i></td></tr></table>	<i>*Enter 3 digits</i>	minutes
<i>*Enter 3 digits</i>		

*INTERVIEWER: Check the STARTING TIME and calculate TOTAL INTERVIEWING LENGTH in MINUTES.*

**[INTERVIEWER'S OBSERVATION]**

**Q519.** The impression you had of the respondent. (Circle one answer)

- |                         |            |
|-------------------------|------------|
| 1 Seems rich            | (5 points) |
| 2 Seems relatively rich | (4 points) |
| 3 Seems to be average   | (3 points) |
| 4 Seems relatively poor | (2 points) |
| 5 Seems poor            | (1 point)  |

*INTERVIEWER: Please evaluate the respondent's impression from his/her appearance or from the type of housing he/she lives in. We allow your objective view.*

**[INTERVIEWER CODE]**

**Q520.** Language in which the interview was conducted. (Circle all that apply)

- |  |
|--|
| XXX  |
| XXX  |
| XXX *INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY |
| XXX  |
| XXX  |

**[INTERNAL REFERENCE]** \*Code according to your general practice.

**Q521.** Region where the interview was conducted.

- |  |
|--|
| XXX  |
| XXX  |
| XXX *INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY |
| XXX  |
| XXX  |

*\*Do not ask this question in Singapore.*

**[INTERNAL REFERENCE]** \*Code according to your general practice.

**Q522.** Population of city/town/village:

- |  |
|--|
| XXX  |
| XXX  |
| XXX *INSERT CODE FRAME ACCORDING TO EACH COUNTRY |
| XXX  |
| XXX  |

*\*Do not ask this question in Singapore.*

**[INTERNAL REFERENCE] \*Code according to your general practice**  
**Q523.** Country code

1 Japan	10 United Kingdom
2 South Korea	11 Ireland
3 China	12 France
4 Taiwan	13 Germany
5 Singapore	14 Sweden
6 Malaysia	15 Italy
7 Indonesia	16 Spain
8 Thailand	17 Portugal
9 Philippines	18 Greece

**[BREAKDOWN 1] \*A breakdown by Gender and Age**

- 1 Male
- 2 Female
- 3 18–29 years old
- 4 30–39 years old
- 5 40–49 years old
- 6 50–59 years old
- 7 60–69 years old
- 8 70–79 years old

**[BREAKDOWN 2] \*A breakdown by Supra-national Region (Asia & Europe)**

- 1 Asia
- 2 Europe

**[BREAKDOWN 3] \*A breakdown by 9 Asian countries**

- 1 Japan
- 2 South Korea
- 3 China
- 4 Taiwan
- 5 Singapore
- 6 Malaysia
- 7 Indonesia
- 8 Thailand
- 9 Philippines

**[BREAKDOWN 4] \*A breakdown by 9 European countries**

- 1 United Kingdom
- 2 Ireland
- 3 France
- 4 Germany
- 5 Sweden
- 6 Italy
- 7 Spain
- 8 Portugal
- 9 Greece

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