Joep de Hart
Paul Dekker
Loek Halman   *Editors*

Religion and Civil Society in Europe

Religion and Civil Society in Europe

Joep de Hart • Paul Dekker • Loek Halman
Editors

Religion and Civil Society in Europe

Springer

Editors
Joep de Hart
The Netherlands Institute for Social
    Research | SCP
The Hague, The Netherlands

Paul Dekker
Tilburg University/The Netherlands
    Institute for Social Research | SCP
Tilburg/The Hague, The Netherlands

Loek Halman
Department of Sociology
Tilburg University
Tilburg, The Netherlands

Note on the European Values Study as Main Data Source

Many of the contributions in this book make use of the survey data collected by the European Values Study. This longitudinal and international comparative survey research project started collecting data in 1981 for the first time in all, then, European Community member states and organised repeat surveys with a time interval of 9 years in an expanding number of countries. The latest wave of surveys took place in 2008 in all European countries, not only members of the European Union but also in candidate states and beyond, up to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The latter country is, however, excluded from the analyses because of poor data quality. The questionnaires used contain items about a range of life issues, such as religion and morality, society including volunteering and citizenship, politics, family life and relations, work and leisure time. The English Master questionnaire was translated in all national languages according to strict rules and using a webtool specially developed for this purpose. In all countries random samples were drawn and at least 1,500 cases were interviewed face to face. Sweden is an exception, because there postal surveys were applied. All steps taken are fully documented and publicly available at Gesis data archive in Cologne. The data can be downloaded free of charge via ZACAT (zacat.gesis.org/webview). That website also offers extensive possibilities to analyse the data online, even for nonstatistical experts. Basic analyses can also be made via an educational website that has been developed in close collaboration between Tilburg University and Fontys University of Applied Sciences in Tilburg. From this website, maps of Europe can be made of all substantive items in the questionnaire: www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu. Maps are also presented in the Atlas of European Values (Brill Academic Publishers). Further detailed information about the project and data is available in the sourcebook which have been produced on the previous waves (Loek Halman, Ronald Inglehart, Jaime Díez-Medrano, Ruud Luijkx, Alejandro Moreno & Miguel Basáñez (2008), Changing Values and beliefs in 85 Countries. Leiden & Boston: Brill) and which will be produced on the latest dataset (in 2013). The latter also includes data from previous waves (provisional

title: European values in European Values in Numbers. Trends and Traditions at the turn of the Century) and will appear in the Brill series on European values (http:// www.brill.com/publications/european-values-studies). More information on the European Values Study project is available at www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu.

The Hague, The Netherlands   Joep de Hart
Tilburg/The Hague, The Netherlands   Paul Dekker
Tilburg, The Netherlands   Loek Halman

Acknowledgements

This book brings together contributions about the role of religion in contemporary European civil societies. Our goal was to bring together a diverse group of scholars for a broad coverage of aspects of civil society and regions of Europe. We started more than 5 years ago to discuss the key issues by inviting not only theologians and students of comparative religion but also sociologists of religion, historians and civil society scholars. The history of developing chapters was marked by two conferences, financially supported by the CINEFOGO European network of excellence. One was hosted by the Dutch WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policy) in The Hague (on October 24–25, 2008) and the other by the Ersta Sköndal University College in Stockholm (on September 17–19, 2009). We are greatly indebted to these organisations for their support.

Besides The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP and Tilburg University as our prime employers for awarding us time and facilities to complete this project, Joep de Hart and Paul Dekker want to thank, respectively, the Protestant Theological University (PThU) and the Synthesis Foundation for their additional support.

Further, we wish to express our appreciation for the willingness of all authors to repeatedly and decisively respond to our comments and those of the reviewers.

Finally, we are grateful to the publisher and especially Hendrikje Tuerlings for being so patient.

The Hague and Tilburg   Joep de Hart
                                                                      Paul Dekker
                                                                     Loek Halman

Contents

Contributors

Olga Balakireva Department of Monitoring-Based Research Towards Social and Economic Transformations, NAS Institute for Economic and Forecasting, Kiev, Ukraine

Joep de Hart The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP, The Hague, The Netherlands

Paul Dekker Tilburg University/The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP, Tilburg/The Hague, The Netherlands

Yilmaz Esmer Political Science, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey

Franco Garelli Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Turin, Italy

Matteo Gianni Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

Marco Giugni Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

Loek Halman Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

David Herbert Institute of Religion, Philosophy and History, Faculty of Humanities and Education, University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway

Peter Lüchau Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

John T.S. Madeley Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

Noémi Michel Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

Pippa Norris Department of Comparative Politics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Kingsley Purdam Centre for Census and Survey Research, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

Sigrid Roßteutscher Social Science Department, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Iuliia Sereda Department of Monitoring-Based Research Towards Social and Economic Transformations, NAS Institute for Economic and Forecasting, Kiev, Ukraine

Ingrid Storm Institute for Social Change, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

Lars Trägårdh Department of Social Sciences, Institute for Civil Society Studies, Ersta Sköndal University College, Stockholm, Sweden

Claudiu Tufiș Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania

Erik van Ingen Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

Mălina Voicu Data Archive for the Social Sciences, GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Mannheim, Germany

The Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy of Sciences, Bucharest, Romania

Susanne Wallman Lundåsen Department of Social Sciences, Institute for Civil Society Studies, Ersta Sköndal University College, Stockholm, Sweden

Department of Social Sciences, Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall, Sweden

Chapter 1
Introduction: European Diversity and Divergences

Joep de Hart, Paul Dekker, and Loek Halman

1.1 The Comeback of Religion

Religion seems to be back again after never having been gone. In the previous century political ideologies (fascism, communism, conservatism, and liberalism) strongly affected the view on religion. Nowadays religion regains ground in many parts of the world. There is talk of a striking revival of religion in former socialist countries in East Europe, not in the last place among the younger generation. In the Catholic south of the continent religion appears to erode much less than in the Protestant regions. While in Northwestern Europe the mainline churches may have become more gray and empty, at the same time evangelical movements are said to be flourishing (also in comparatively highly secularized countries like France and the Netherlands), and smaller, conservative religious communities show a stable picture. As to the rest of the world, the USA maintained its position as a very religious country, and in many regions in South America, Africa, and Asia, evangelical churches appear to have been booming in the past decades. In the Middle East, Pakistan, and some East European countries, there was a revival of often militant Islamic movements.

It has not always looked that way. In some sense, conclusions about the loss of religious customs are timeless: They are a *basso continuo* in cultural criticism from

J. de Hart (✉)
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP, The Hague, The Netherlands
e-mail: j.de.hart@scp.nl

P. Dekker
Tilburg University/The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP,
Tilburg/The Hague, The Netherlands
e-mail: p.dekker@scp.nl

L. Halman
Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: loek.halman@uvt.nl

Theognis of Megara (ca. 500 BC) and Socrates (470–399 BC) to Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–1982), and from Jeremiah (ca. 650–580 BC) via Tacitus (ca. 55–120), Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498), and the great Protestant Reformers from the first half of the next century to pope Benedictus XVI (1927–). "Crush the infamous!" was Voltaire's famous rejection of dogmatic church bound religion; Nietzsche's madman declared that God was dead. According to Marx religion was an alienating force ("opium of the people") and Feuerbach saw it as no more than a Father Christmas wish list, a projection of humanity's best intentions. After the philosophers came the psychologists and sociologists. According to August Comte, the metaphysical stage of human history was ending, giving way to the final or "positive" stage (*l'état positif* or *scientifique*), in which explanations are based on scientific laws. That was certainly the hope of Sigmund Freud too, who thought it was time for humanity to grow up: "Religion is comparable to a childhood neurosis," he wrote. At around the same time, Max Weber anticipated a vanishing of magical worldviews in the West and observed a process of (to a phrase of Friedrich Schiller's) "disenchantment" in the modern world. "In a word, the old gods are growing old or are dying, and others are not yet born," Émile Durkheim concluded. A continuing relevance of religion was not anticipated by nearly all classical social theorists and is also at odds with contemporary theoretical insights, which are summarized under the name of modernization paradigm. In this the modernization and rationalization of societies are considered to be incompatible with a prominent role for religion. It will fade away and at the most endure for a while in the private lives of people. "Once religion was a vast forest, in which whole armies could hide," said Schopenhauer. "But nowadays it has been reduced to a grove, in which only a few highwaymen can hide."

Some 150 years later, however, these obituaries may seem somewhat premature. Today the former reports of the death of religion seem exaggerated, to borrow a phrase from Mark Twain (not the first to survive his own death). Surveys document the persistence of religion as an important dimension of people's lives, all over the world and even in Europe – until recently the lost continent of religion in the view of many commentators. Religion still appears to be an important element of various social processes, an undeniable source of inspiration for many organizations, and a vital motivation in the acts of numerous individuals.

1.2   Religion and Civic Engagement

Religious worldviews and arguments feature in moral debates and ideological conflicts on issues like abortion, euthanasia, stem cell research, poverty, discrimination, welfare reform. Religion is related with social attitudes and behavior, like individual voting behavior, membership of organizations, and social movement activism. All over Europe there are many religiously affiliated schools and universities, hospitals, labor unions, publishing companies and broadcasting stations, social service agencies, mutual support organizations, and other voluntary associations. Through the centuries religion has often played a significant role in anchoring

collective (national, local, ethnic) identities. Among many of today's immigrant groups in the Western world, religion is strongly interwoven with social capital and social participation, ethnic adaptation, and assimilation patterns.

Sociologically churches can be seen as organized historical forms of religious inspiration. With respect to the relation between religion and civic participation, they take a special place. Churches function not only as spiritual and support institutions for their members but also generate broader social commitment. Verba et al. (1995) have demonstrated for the USA that people, whose educational level and profession would otherwise condemn them to political passivity, can develop civic skills during their voluntary church activities. They learn to talk in public, to communicate with authorities, etc., which enable them to participate successfully in other social domains, too. In addition, churches sometimes play a manifest prominent political role. Even in countries where church and state are formally separated, religious institutions have time and again entered the political arena and affected political movements. Among other issues, clergymen imply political stances in their sermons; a solidarity meeting or political debate is organized in a church; churches provide facilities for political mobilization and protest; representatives of the church publicly choose sides in social and moral issues.

The organizational structure of at least the major churches is built upon a combination of facilities and networks at the social microlevel, while at the same time it is based on a hierarchy of administrative units which make possible the coordination of activities at local, national, and international level. In combination with the moral message that they propagate, this appears to make them especially suitable for the massive and effective mobilization of people for ideational or charitable purposes. In addition, churches bring people together on a regular basis and thus create a stable and secure setting for the development of various types of social commitment. Church participation can be an important form of social capital for many people. The local parish is one of the most important locations where citizens frequently meet each other; and, in a time in which so much social debate takes place electronically, personal contacts and face-to-face networks appear still crucial for the recruitment of people for participation (Wuthnow 1996, 2004).

Research has led to the conclusion that church participation is related to participation in civil society and that churchgoers are unusually active social capitalists. Opinions differ, however, as to how this relationship should be interpreted. Several authors have stressed universal social networks and community involvement effects: People get to know other people and are asked to join activities, to volunteer, etc. Others believe that it is not membership or participation per se but that the culture and beliefs in the networks of church members which are decisive: Without the content of religious beliefs and altruistic messages that are delivered from the pulpit, there would be no positive involvement effects. Church members participate much more in voluntary activities, but the reason is not that they have stronger internalized altruistic norms: They participate more often because they are part of social networks of volunteers and because the church is a meeting place for volunteers. Theology seems to be more of a resource that believers can use to justify both activism and retreatism.

1.3   The Changing Character of Religion

It has already been said that from the days of the founding fathers of their discipline, secularization has been considered by social scientists as an important aspect of the process of modernization of societies. Several dimensions can be discerned with regard to secularization, such as a shrinkage of the range of religion, a decrease in individual religiosity, and changes with respect to the content of religion in the sense of a stronger emphasizing of "das Diesseitige." For the subject of this book, it is especially the decrease in the range of religion that is relevant. In the authoritative version of authors such as Wilson and Bruce, it is not so much the disappearance of religion but the declining social significance of religion in European societies and its declining social, political, and economic influence that is the core element of the secularization paradigm.

The theme of the relevance of religion for politics and society only became current after the church and the state had lost their monopoly position during the process of modernization in their respective domains of religion and society. As a result of differentiation and specialization, specialized roles and institutions developed "to handle specific features or functions previously embodied in, or carried out by, one role or institution" (Wallis and Bruce 1992: 12). In traditional societies, religion in particular restricted the individual's freedom and governed and shaped the values in the various domains of social life. The processes of differentiation, specialization, and professionalization made each social sphere in life increasingly autonomous and a specialized unit in society with its own set of values and rules (Münch 1990: 443). The churches have lost several of their traditional functions such as schools, hospices, social welfare, registry of births, marriages and deaths, culture, and organization of leisure (Dogan 1995: 416). Institutional domains have become segmented in the sense that within each institutional sphere norms and values have become functional, rational, autonomous, and withdrawn from the religious sphere. The economy and the polity developed "secular" norms, which increasingly restricted the validity of the church norms to the specifically "religious sphere," while its "global" claims were generally neutralized to the status of mere rhetoric. Religion was gradually pushed back to a sphere of its own: A religious subsystem arose and the "sacred canopy is more and more restricted" (Dobbelaere 2002: 23). In this connection it has been stated that an "enchurchment" of Christianity has taken place. As a consequence, religion became marginalized and lost much of its influence on people's lives. In other words, religion has lost its societal and public functions, and religion has become privatized and marginalized within its own differentiated sphere (Casanova 1994: 19; cf. 2008a, b). At the same time, within and outside the church walls, in today's Europe, numerous alternative forms of spirituality and of "invisible religion" manifest themselves (Luckmann 1967; Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Heelas 2008).

In a general sense secularization can be defined as the decline of the social significance of religion (Wilson 1988). As far as the Christian, church-oriented religiosity is concerned, at the level of *society*, secularization means that the reach of the

church is reduced. Increasingly large sections of society became independent of church influence, and the churches were pushed back to people's personal life sphere (privatization thesis). This begs the question as to what role the churches play in public discourses (i.e., contribute to debates, behave as an advocacy group). At the *individual* level, secularization implies among other things a decline in church participation and a decrease in the impact of church directives on people's personal lives (Dobbelaere 1981, 2002).

All this raises the question whether church affiliation still contributes to the social and political involvement of citizens. More specifically, does church affiliation contribute to the political and social attitudes and expectations that support a democratic culture? What role does the church play in public discourses (i.e., do people trust the church and expect to play a role)? And does church affiliation contribute to social engagement and political involvement of citizens? Whether and how churches fulfill these functions in contemporary European societies is the central question in this book. Related questions are: Is support for the public role of churches basically restricted to their active members and does secularization consequently lead to a weakening of their role as public voice and mobilizing and facilitating force with regard to the general social and political activities of their members? Or is there evidence of a shift from face-to-face membership organizations to mailing-list advocacy organizations and do churches follow in this respect a more general trend in idealistic voluntary organizations?

One could hypothesize that in most European countries religious and nonreligious people no longer differ in their views and behavior in the secular public domains of life, such as politics. Moreover, in line with the thesis of the privatization of religion, one could assume that the impact of religious background nowadays remains restricted to the private sphere, that is, of the family, child raising, personal ethics, and sexuality, and that it has little impact on the decisions people make in the public spheres of politics or economics. On the other hand, a strong tendency towards "deprivatization" (Casanova 1994) can be observed in religious traditions all around the world (including Spain, Poland, Brazil, the United States) since the 1980s. In many places religious institutions and religious groups are making renewed efforts to challenge dominant political and social forces, raising questions about public morality, and joining initiatives that are developed in local civil societies.

Cosmopolitan elites may always have looked across the borders; in the past five decades, the cultural radius of action of the average European citizens has strongly broadened too. The diffusion of television and – more recently – of the Internet has been important factors, as have been the development of modern tourism and of multiethnic societies in the cities. These developments have also had consequences for religion and the participation in civil societies. Religious beliefs and spiritual practices have become much less taken for granted. They are no longer basic elements of a shared environment with social networks and voluntary associations with the same nest smell. Religion has become less normative and predictable and more diversified, dynamic, and eclectic. Participation has become more pragmatic and individually motivated. The connections of individuals with associations have become more loose and temporary, associational practices more flexible and informal (Wuthnow 2002).

1.4   The Varieties of European Experiences

It is a well-known story, but it is a story about mainly North and Western Europe. It applies much less to South European countries, whereas the developments in Central and Eastern Europe seem opposite although only quite recently reliable data have become available for that region. Religion has more than one whereabouts and sometimes changes its address. In some countries (Sweden, Norway, Great Britain) there is much belonging without believing; in other countries (the Netherlands, Estonia, Czech Republic) it's just the opposite, while there are also regions (former communist countries) where many people have to confine themselves to longing without belonging. Since a half millennium European Christians are divided in many different churches. This diversity continues itself in the constitutional basis of religion. Countries like Greece (Eastern Orthodox), Denmark and Norway (Lutheran), of England (Anglican) have official state religions; other countries, like Scotland (Presbyterian) or Sweden (Lutheran), do no longer have them; still other countries (like France, Ireland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and Turkey) are officially secular.

Europe has a long history of religious diversity (in a country such as the Netherlands, the main religious groups are still spread across the country according to the pattern of the Twelve Years' Truce (1609–1621) in the Eighty Years' liberation war against Spain). It is important not to lose sight on the large differences within and between European countries (cf. Davie 2000). There are countries where large majorities of the inhabitants consider themselves as "religious" (Poland, Romania, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland), and there are countries where this applies only to a minority (the Czech Republic, East Germany). There are countries where a large part of the population goes regularly to the church (Malta, Ireland, and Poland), and there are countries where almost nobody does (Russia, the Nordic countries, France). There are countries where the belief in astrology or the impact of Zen meditations and yoga are broadly spread (Russia, Bulgaria) and countries where few attach belief to these interests (Poland) (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Halman et al. 2005; Pickel 2009; Pollack and Pickel 2009; Huber and Krech 2009).

The developments in post-communist countries are of particular interest. In that part of Europe, many religious communities worked underground or at least unofficially. States sometimes performed explicit and severe antireligious campaigns. Until the 1980s and 1990s, very few reliable and generalizable data on religious beliefs and religious participation are available for these European regions, though there have been some estimates (e.g., Fletcher and Strover 1967; cf. Jerolimov et al. 2004). What we do know is that religious institutions often were seen as an alternative system of values for the official communist ideology (of atheism). After the fall of communist regimes, the churches entered a transition phase. In many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, religious communities increased. There is often great trust in the churches as problem-solving and uncompromised bodies and sources of spiritual guidance. However, all this might suggest a too uniform picture. There are clear differences between countries, between regions, and between religious groups. Moreover, many other factors come into play besides political factors like

state-church relationships and undeveloped party systems: urbanization, the transition to a postindustrial society, bureaucracy, globalization, fragile civil society institutions (like weak trade unions), the emergence of new religious movements (such as neo-Protestant sects and cults), etc.

1.5   The Approach in This Book

This book focuses on religious changes in Europe since the 1980s and their relationships with developments in civil society and civic engagement. We are interested in religion as a source of civic morality and social and political engagement of individuals. As a foundation of organized altruism and social services (faith-based organizations), but also as a cause of social and political tensions and cleavages. Obviously, when Europe is involved, much attention will be paid empirically to organized Christian religiosity, but we are also interested in the role of other organized beliefs (in particular Islam) in civil society as well as the civic consequences of unorganized individual forms of religiosity and spirituality. What is the evidence for civic morality and involvement effects of religious beliefs and religious practices, of religious communities, and of religious or faith-based institutions and organization networks? What are the mechanisms at work? Are they similar in various countries, for various beliefs, or are there typical patterns? As regards regional differences, we are particularly interested in differences between Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe (and differences between the North and South in this part), and also, primarily to mirror and to put the European findings in perspective, the USA (a modern but much more religious society) and eventually a few more countries. The connections between religion and civil society are dynamic and multiform, and they differ depending on the level of analysis. Therefore, it is questionable whether a single theory or approach can fully account for the many forms and conditions in which religion is associated with aspects of civil society.

An important data source for this book are the population surveys in a growing number of countries of the European Values Study (EVS) conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999, and 2008/2009 (www.europanvaluesstudy.eu). Additionally data are used from the World Values Surveys (WVS) (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), the European Social Survey (ESS) (www.europeansocialsurvey.org), and from several national surveys as well as international institutional and judicial data. Further information about the sources is found in the separate chapters.

1.6   What Follows

Many of the questions raised above will be discussed in the following chapters. David Herbert demonstrates the renewed importance of religion in Chap. 2. He offers a theoretical position in the debate about religion and civil society and notes a return

of religion in the public arena in Europe, emphasizing the role of modern media. Counter cultural religious movements which show a combination of religious fundamentalism and the use of modern mobilization means (global networking, communication technologies, including Internet) play a key role. Against this background, he puts the one-sided approach of many secularization theorists to debate.

In Chap. 3 John Madeley addresses the seeming paradox that as established religious bodies have progressively lost their privileged status in state and society, religious or religion-related issues have become more, rather than less, sources of general controversy. He argues that the ambivalent role of religion in public affairs in different parts of Europe continues to be conditioned by a long legacy of entanglement with state authorities that continue to regulate the religious sphere in a manner which discriminates between the more, the less, and the non-privileged institutions and organizations in the religious sphere. The picture which emerges can be described as one of a complex set of triangular entanglements (the European TAO) by means of which, contrary to assumptions about the normality of religion-state separation in liberal democracies, the public authorities retain a central role in defining the placement of religious organizations within civil society.

Routinely, both secularization theories and social capital research focus on individuals' attitudes and behavior. In Chap. 4 Sigrid Roßteutscher claims that ignoring the organizational aspect of religious and civil society participation means missing part of the story. Applying an ecological perspective, she argues that the health of religion and religious civil societies is determined by three core aspects: organizational density, features of associative aging and fertility, and institutional completeness. By using data from an organizational study conducted in eight European cities, Roßteutscher shows that the health of religious organizational sectors can be unrelated to the spread of individual church participation, i.e., individual level secularization can be low while civil society secularization has progressed far – and vice versa. Moreover, only dense civil societies seem to possess the capacity for regeneration (i.e., fertility) and the ability to cater for diverse thematic concerns (i.e., institutional completeness). Roßteutscher further shows significant differences between European cities that cannot be explained by culture, history, or secularization theories. Therefore, in explaining religious participation, organizational supply should not be ignored.

Loek Halman and Erik van Ingen explore the connection between religion and morality in Europe (Chap. 5). They focus on the differences between the religious and nonreligious (measured by religious practices as well as beliefs) in two moral dimensions across Europe and investigate whether or not these differences are determined by a country's degree of modernization, the religious pluralism, and communist heritage. Contrary to what might have been expected, Halman and Van Ingen find empirical evidence supporting the idea that differences between churchgoers and nonchurchgoers are larger in economically more developed countries. It increasingly makes a difference whether you go to church, but the (larger) effect of churchgoing affects a shrinking group of people. Religious practices appear more important for people's moral choices than people's beliefs. In religious pluralistic countries the religious resemble the nonreligious more in their moral outlooks than

in religiously more homogenous societies, whereas in ex-communist societies both religious indicators appear weaker predictors of moral dimensions than in Western countries. Finally, it seems that an ethos of anything goes has not developed and people have become only more permissive with regard to issues of personal concern.

The question of whether religion and religiosity is positively or negatively related to social trust has been widely debated. Susanne Wallman Lundåsen and Lars Trägårdh use data from a local level survey on trust in Sweden to test whether religiosity as *belief* and religion as *social organization* correlate in any way with social trust in the specific case of a highly secular society (Chap. 6). They apply a multi-level approach in which they introduce both individual and contextual level data (church attendance and church membership) and where the focus is on the local or community level. Lundåsen and Trägårdh conclude that while general surveys on trust suggest, if anything, a negative relationship between religiosity and social trust, one can, even in a highly secular country like Sweden, identify a modest positive correlation between trust and religion, which, however, is limited to religion as social organization.

In Chap. 7 Franco Garelli shows that in all the countries of Southern Europe, Catholicism plays a prominent role in the public sphere, which is revealed by renewed involvement of lay believers in various sectors of civil society. Everywhere Catholic groups and movements are in the forefront of social-assistance voluntarism, on the educational level, concerning the social and ethical issues. In this scenario, Italy stands out as a peculiar case with both the strong presence of the Church on the public scene and the deep involvement of faith-based associations in the numerous areas of the society. In some countries, such as Italy and Spain, the church's presence seems more aggressive and tenacious, while in Portugal it appears to favor a more open presence and dialogue with society. These are different strategies for the prevailing religion to husband its heritage of symbolic resources and sense, in countries, which are experiencing processes of secularization and laicization, typical of advanced modernity.

Religion is seen as a key aspect of civil society, but there has only been limited cross-European research on the direct contribution religion makes to civil life through individual values and behavior and how this may compare with more secular populations in different civil and welfare contexts. In Chap. 8 Kingsley Purdam and Ingrid Storm compare the helping profiles of religious and secular people in a number of European countries. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), they investigate the importance people attach to helping others, the extent to which they help with or attend activities in their local area, and how often they help people other than in their family, at work, and in voluntary organizations. Purdam and Storm compare people who are not religious, people who state they belong to a religion but do not attend religious services regularly, and those who attend religious services regularly.

Research in various European countries (and the USA) has shown that church participation is related to participation in civil society and that churchgoers are unusually active social capitalists. Opinions differ, however, as to how this relationship should

be interpreted. In Chap. 9, Joep de Hart and Paul Dekker go further into the relationship between religion and civic involvement. They start with comparing European countries and find strong connections between church affiliation and volunteering for Northwest Europe but less so for South and Eastern Europe. They then zoom in on differences between religious groups and investigate what elements of religion count most: religious networks or denominations? For the Netherlands De Hart and Dekker also look at religious alternatives for church communities and traditional religions: Are they also a source for civic engagement, or are the ideas and practices they promote too individualistic and detached for that?

In Chap. 10 Peter Lüchau looks at the changing character of religion. From being a social or collective phenomenon, religion in modern or postmodern countries is becoming an individualistic phenomenon, with God no longer as the judge of what is right or wrong – a task that is left to the individual. Alongside this religious change there is a growing interest in social capital and the role religion holds in producing such capital. Traditional Christianity is said to produce social capital, which poses the question of what will happen when collectively anchored Christianity gives way to individualistic spirituality. Will the role of religion in the production of social capital seize or will it simply change? Using expanded data from the Danish part of the European Values Study, Lüchau analyzes the possible impact of religious change upon the production of social capital in Denmark.

Time for a look to the East. Several chapters of this book and many other studies show that religion has a positive effect on civic engagement, both in terms of beliefs and of behaviors, increasing the level of social participation. Mălina Voicu and Claudiu Tufiș, in Chap. 11, however note that the relationship between religion, state, and society is rather different in post-communist countries. The communist regimes imposed a forced secularization, isolating religion into the private life and reducing its impact on public affairs. Using data from European Values Study 2008 wave, collected in 21 post-communist countries, Voicu and Tufiș investigate how the post-communist legacy shapes social participation in countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The data show that church attendance has a significant positive effect on civil activism in the countries under investigation, while belonging to a Protestant denomination boosts civil engagement. When one takes into account a country's main religious denomination, people living in countries with a strong Catholic tradition are more inclined to participate in civil associations, while those living in Orthodox countries are less predispose to be civically active.

Olga Balakireva and Iuliia Sereda make an attempt to develop a conceptual framework of the relationship between religion and civil society in the former USSR countries (Chap. 12). They explore how religious organizations and individual religiosity relate to civil society's structure, environment, and values in Russia and Ukraine. Countries are compared in terms of post-Soviet religious revival, mixed nature of religious identity, faith and practice, and challenges of cooperation between religion and civil society. On the basis of EVS data from selected countries, Balakireva and Sereda examine to what extent religiosity is connected with membership in nongovernmental organizations, practice of volunteering, political action, support of democracy, confidence, social cohesion, attitudes to transparency,

tolerance, concern, and environmental ethics. They emphasize that, despite the sharing of a common heritage and similar denominational structure, Russia and Ukraine currently have different levels of religiosity/secularism and slightly different relations between religiosity and civil society, though the link between them remains weak in both countries.

It was our stated intention to give the readers not only an impression of developments in (ex)Christian Europe. In Chap. 13, Marco Giugni, Matteo Gianni, and Noémi Michel look at the impact of religion on the political participation of Muslims in Switzerland. They distinguish between two dimensions of the potential impact of religion on participation: an individual dimension concerning individual religiosity and a collective dimension pertaining to collective religious embeddedness. Their analysis shows that the collective dimension matters, while the individual dimension has no effect. They then speculate on the connections between the collective dimension of religion and political participation by drawing from three theoretical perspectives that have stressed the role of voluntary associations for political engagement: civic voluntarism, social capital, and group consciousness.

Particularly after the so-called Arab Spring, the relevance of the "Turkish model" for other Islamic societies has been the subject of intense debate. Put more directly, the question is whether or not democracy can flourish and be sustained in societies where Islam is the dominant faith. In Chap. 14, Yilmaz Esmer examines the issue, making use of the most recent European Values Study data. Macrolevel multivariate analyses demonstrate that, even after controlling for social and economic development, Muslim majority societies score poorly on various comparative measures of democracy. Esmer proposes that one possible explanation for this is the absence of a vibrant civil society, a widely accepted prerequisite for democracy, in Islamic societies. He shows that, by and large, the negative "Islam effect" on civil society cannot be refuted.

In the final chapter, Pippa Norris once more raises the question whether belonging to churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, and sects directly strengthens activism in faith-based charities and philanthropic work (Chap. 15). Does it reinforce a broader dimension of social engagement in the local community, such as membership in nonreligious associations, exemplified by the Rotary club, YMCA, school boards, and social networks? And does it mobilize civic activism, expressed through voting turnout, party affiliations, campaign donations, and protest politics? There is a wealth of research on these issues in America but whether similar patterns hold in Europe is less well established. Norris first outlines alternative theories why religious organizations are believed to link citizens with their communities, focusing upon Robert Putnam's argument about the role of religion in generating social capital. She then compares cross-national empirical evidence to see how far religious participation shapes voluntary activism for religious organizations, membership of a broader range of secular community associations, and patterns of political activism. Comparisons are examined across a wide range of 34 European societies, as well as between Europe and the United States. Norris demonstrates considerable similarities in the positive effects of religious participation in strengthening civic engagement in Europe and the United States – although with contrasts in the effects on social trust – and considers their implications.

References

Casanova, J. (1994). *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.

Casanova, J. (2008a). Public religions revisited. In H. de Vries (Ed.), *Religion beyond a concept* (pp. 101–119). New York: Fordham University Press.

Casanova, J. (2008b). Beyond European and American exceptionalisms: Towards a global perspective. In G. Davie, P. Heelas, & L. Woodhead (Eds.), *Predicting religion: Christian, secular and alternative futures* (pp. 17–29). New York: Fordham University Press.

Davie, G. (2000). *Religion in modern Europe: A memory mutates*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dobbelaere, K. (1981). Secularization: A multi-dimensional concept. *Current Sociology, 29*(2), 1–216.

Dobbelaere, K. (2002). *Secularization: An analysis on three levels*. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.

Dogan, M. (1995). The decline of religious beliefs in western Europe. *International Social Science Journal, 47*, 405–418.

Fletcher, W. C., & Strover, A. J. (Eds.). (1967). *Religion and the search for new ideals in the USSR*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Halman, L., Luijkx, R., & Van Zundert, M. (2005). *Atlas of European values*. Leiden: Brill.

Heelas, P. (2008). *Spiritualities of life: New age romanticism and consumptive capitalism*. Malden/Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2005). *The spiritual revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Huber, S., & Krech, V. (2009). The religious field between globalization and regionalization: Comparative perspectives. In B. Stiftung (Ed.), *What the world believes: Analyses and commentary on the religion monitor 2008* (pp. 53–93). Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Jerolimov, D. M., Zrinščak, S., & Borowik, I. (Eds.). (2004). *Religion and patterns of social transformation* (pp. 23–47). Zagreb: Institute for Social Research.

Luckmann, T. (1967). *The invisible religion*. New York: Macmillan.

Münch, R. (1990). Differentiation, rationalization, interpenetration: The emerge of modern society. In J. C. Alexander & P. Colomy (Eds.), *Differentiation theory and social change* (pp. 441–464). New York: Columbia University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular. Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pickel, G. (2009). Secularization as a European fate? – Results from the church and religion in an enlarged Europe project 2006. In G. Pickel & O. Müller (Eds.), *Church and religion in contemporary Europe. Results from empirical and comparative research* (pp. 89–122). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Pollack, D., & Pickel, G. (2009). Church-state relations and the vitality of religion in European comparison. In G. Pickel & O. Müller (Eds.), *Church and religion in contemporary Europe. Results from empirical and comparative research* (pp. 145–166). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wallis, R., & Bruce, S. (1992). Secularization: The orthodox model. In S. Bruce (Ed.), *Religion and modernization. Sociologists and historians debate the secularization thesis* (pp. 8–30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, B. (1988). Secularization: The inherited model. In P. E. Hammond (Ed.), *The sacred in a secular age* (pp. 9–20). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wuthnow, R. (1996). *Sharing the journey*. New York: The Free Press.

Wuthnow, R. (2002). *Loose connections. Joining together in America's fragmented communities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wuthnow, R. (2004). *Saving America? Faith-based services and the future of civil society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 2
Religion and Civil Society: Theoretical Reflections

David Herbert

2.1 Introduction

> [T]he marked articulation of religion in the public realm destabilizes the narrative of modernity defined by the decline of the public role of religion. (Meyer and Moors 2006: 6)

> Today, public consciousness in Europe can be described in terms of a 'post-secular society' to the extent that at present it still has to adjust itself to the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment. (Habermas 2008: 19)

Religion's re-emergence as a significant factor in the public life of societies across the world demands sustained comparative attention – not only in order to draw together the experiences from different national contexts, now more than ever linked by transnational flows of people, ideas and practices, to see what may be learned but also because social theory is in many ways so ill equipped to deal with this re-emergence, having '[u]ntil recently' assumed 'that religiosity in Western democracies would attenuate with each generation, reflecting the march of secularisation and the forces of modern consumer societies' (Brahm Levey 2009: 1).

This academic task also has practical relevance. Religion in civil society has become a security concern since 9/11 and the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings; law and order concerns have emerged since the riots in Northern English post-industrial towns of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the summer of 2001 and the Paris *banlieue* riots of 2005; and a culture wars dimension has emerged in events like the Muhammad cartoons controversy (2005; Lindekilde 2010), surrounding the murder of Theo van Gogh (2004; Eyerman 2008), and in the Swiss minaret referendum (2009). In addition, there are anxieties over immigration and the growth of far right parties (Stolcke 1999). These concerns have not only surfaced across Europe, North America and other Western societies, but also have significant resonance with

D. Herbert (✉)
Institute of Religion, Philosophy and History, Faculty of Humanities and Education,
University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway
e-mail: david.herbert@uia.no

debates beyond the West – for example, with the rise of Hindu nationalism and the challenges facing secularism in India (Bhargava 2009: 109).

However, this chapter will focus on how social scientific theories can contribute to understanding relationship between religion and civil society, particularly in what Habermas (2008: 19 and above) has termed 'post-secular' societies. I focus on these because by this term Habermas is referring primarily to European societies, which are the primary focus of this volume (together with Turkey, which combines European and Middle Eastern traditions and has its own version of 'post-secular' culture clashes, Starrett 2008; Çaylak 2008).

In Habermas' understanding, post-secular societies are defined by two features. First, the majority indigenous or ethnic European population has to a large extent secularised, meaning that religious practice has substantially declined at least since the 1960s, as has the importance of religion in people's lives personally, socially and politically. Data from the World Values Survey (2007) show that since 1981 (when the survey began), both the proportion of people regularly practising core religious rituals and the subjective rating of the importance of religion in the individual's life have declined markedly in most European societies. This contrasts with much of the rest of the world, where initially higher rates have generally remained high and in some cases increased. While WVS data may be criticised because of problems with cross-cultural comparison, and possible discrepancies between attitudes and behaviour, this data tells us something at least about the perceived importance of religion.

Arguably even more important for the role of religion in civil society, WVS data shows that there are large differences between much of Europe and much of the rest of the world concerning views on the proper influence of religion in public life. For example, in 2005–2006 about a third of Americans and almost half of Brazilians agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that 'politicians who do not believe in God are not fit for public office'. This proportion increases to just over 50 % in South Africa, India and Turkey (formally 'secular' republics) and rises to over 70 % in Indonesia (the largest democracy in the Muslim-majority world). In contrast, when this question was last asked in Europe (in 1999), it received only a small percentage of affirmative responses (less than 4 % in the Netherlands and Sweden, around 10 % in Britain and France) and was largely dropped from the 2005–2006 questionnaire. It would seem that European populations share a more secularised attitude than is common, or at least prevalent, elsewhere.

This leads to the second distinguishing feature of post-secular societies – a widespread assumption, both amongst the political and academic elites and the general population – that religion would continue to take an ever less important role in public life. In Turkey this assumption has also been widespread amongst a significant section of the population, hence the shock of finding religion once again becoming prominent and hence Habermas' definition of the post-secular society as one which 'still has to adjust itself to the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment' (2008: 19). The focus of this chapter, then, will be on what light social scientific theories can shed on religion and civil society in such contexts. The aim is not primarily to explain why Europe is different in terms of religiosity and secularity, though this will be touched on (for an extended

discussion of this, see Berger et al. 2008), but rather to ask, given this situation, what theories best help us to understand the dynamics of what is going on? What theories in the social sciences can help us to think constructively through the challenges of religion and civil society in media-rich, religiously diverse, consumer-oriented post-secular societies?

The chapter will begin with theories in the sociology of religion, use some anthropological approaches in critiquing these and then move on to political science and finally cultural and media studies approaches.

2.2 Approaches in the Sociology of Religion

Looking back at sociological tradition, concerns about how modern industrial and post-industrial societies hold together have long been a central concern, running back at least to Emile Durkheim's first published volume, *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893). Indeed, Durkheim provided what is still one of the most concise and useful definitions of social cohesion as '[T]he interdependence between the members of a society, shared loyalties and solidarity' (Durkheim 1997 [1893], quoted in Mayhew 2009). Furthermore, this concern with social cohesion has been a persistent feature of sociological discourse, including mid-twentieth-century figures such as Talcott Parsons and later figures such as Niklas Luhmann. Religion was also central for sociology's founding fathers and played a central role in social cohesion too. However, each in their different ways saw religion's influence waning in the increasingly industrial societies that they inhabited. By the time of Parsons and certainly Luhmann, religion was widely seen to have become marginal to the major social systems of modern industrial societies and indeed to their social integration or cohesion. More precisely, by the mid-1970s a sociological consensus, widely shared in academic and other elite cultural circles in Western societies, had emerged, which held that modernisation produced secularisation, defined as the declining social significance of religion, and that the rest of the world would eventually follow Northern and Western Europe in declining patterns of influence of religious institutions and falling religious observance.

2.2.1 *Contemporary Sociological Responses to the Resurgence of Public Religion: A Critique of Secularisation and Rational Choice Theories*

As the WVS data presented indicates, while secularisation as a function of modernisation roughly fits the data amongst White Christian heritage populations in North and Western Europe and some amongst their global diasporas (though not significant American subcultures, e.g.; see Smith 1998), it is more difficult to find a fit elsewhere and amongst other groups. Indeed, in other contexts penetration of the

same rationalised modern systems, increased plurality and the spread of consumer culture that are seen as producing secularisation in the Western Europe appear to be associated with a growth in religious influence in societies with historical and religious heritages as diverse as Brazil (Martin 1996), Egypt (Starrett 1998) and India (Rajagopal 2001). These global differences are important in European post-secular societies because increasing proportions of the population, especially in urban areas, come from global regions where religion remains socially significant and appears to be adapting successfully to the challenges of modernity, without privatising. For example, in the Netherlands, it is predicted that Muslims of various ethnicities (from Surinam, Morocco and Turkey) will outnumber indigenous Dutch in the three largest cities of the Netherlands by 2020 (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 13), and these Dutch cities are not untypical of others across Europe; London now has a minority White British population (45 %), with 37 % of residents born outside the UK (2011 census; BBC 2012), while 30.4 % of Oslo's population in 2012 were either immigrants or Norwegian-born to immigrant parents (Statistics Norway 2013). These proportions of ethnic minorities likely to increase further due to a younger demography, even if (as is usually the case) birth rates converge to close to that of the largest ethnic group over a generation (Finney and Simpson 2009: 152).

Sociologists have responded to these global challenges to the once orthodoxy of secularisation theory (challenges also now evident in most European cities) in a variety of ways. On the one hand, criticism of secularisation theory has become so commonplace within sociology of religion that one of its leading advocates recently published a book subtitled 'In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory' (Bruce 2010). Yet, arguably, no clear alternative has replaced it. In fact, engagement between advocates of secularisation theory and what has been widely seen as its main rival – rational choice theory (RCT) – seems to have declined in recent years after a flurry of activity in the late 1990s (Stark and Iannocone 1996; Stark 1999; Bruce 1999), without any real resolution of the issues at stake. Some development has gone on within the rival theories; secularisation theorists such as Bruce have nuanced their theory to take into account additional factors mediating the impact of modernisation on religion, including political freedom (Bruce 2002), and religious nurture/education (Bruce and Glendinning 2010) and have engaged with social historians' arguments on the timing of secularisation (Bruce and Glendinning 2010) and with Davie's concept of vicarious religion as articulating a pattern of continuing religious loyalty without religious practice (Bruce and Voas 2010). Meanwhile, rational choice theorists have continued to apply their religious market model to new historical and contemporary cases (Stark 2006; Lu et al. 2008).

A key problem with both secularisation and RCT is their static and limited concepts of religion and culture. This renders them of little value in thinking through the cultural dimensions of globalisation and the impact of these on the reproduction and interaction of religious traditions. Yet this is arguably the most important nettle to grasp in post-secular societies: for it is in the media-rich consumer cultures of global cities that religions in civil society most commonly interact and here that social dramas and cultural traumas (borrowing Eyermans's 2008 phrase) between religious and secular identities are performed.

In RCT the focus is on how religious markets (and restrictions on them) influence demand for religion, but what religion is is supposed to be pretty much constant, not just across cultures but over time (Stark 2001). Such a static concept cannot deal with the idea that religions themselves may change as they engage with new contexts, for example, in circulation via new media:

> Christianity is significantly transformed as it spreads throughout the surface of social life, disseminating signs yet having to accommodate to given formats. (Meyer and Moors 2006: 19)

… or by being taught in new discursive contexts:

> The functionalization of Egypt's religious tradition meant that the ideas, symbols, and behaviors constituting 'true' Islam came to be judged not by their adherence to contemporary popular or high traditions, but by their utility in performing social work, either in furthering programs of social reform or in fulfilling the police functions that Europeans attributed to education as such. (Starrett 1998: 62)

Given that secularisation is concerned with social change and its implications for religion, one might expect a more dynamic approach, and indeed, Bruce's definition of religion as 'mediating the transcendent' promises this. However, in practice Bruce's corralling of culture into the two processes of cultural defence and cultural transmission fails to do justice either to the autonomy of cultural processes relative to structural change or to the complexity of these processes in the context of globalisation.

Bruce sees cultural transition and cultural defence as 'surface' phenomena which may temporarily halt or even reverse the secularising effects of the 'deep structures' of modernisation (i.e. differentiation, societalisation and rationalisation). He describes them as follows:

> Where culture, identity, and sense of worth are challenged by a source promoting either an alien religion or rampant secularism and that source is negatively valued, secularization will be inhibited. (Bruce 1999: 25)

Where identity is threatened in the course of major cultural transitions, religion may provide resources for negotiating such transitions or asserting a new sense of worth. (Bruce 1999: 24)

This is fine in so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough for it fails to envisage the possibility that in being mobilised – in defence of national identity (cultural defence) or to negotiate transition to a new environment (cultural transition) – religion might itself be changed and change the social systems in which it becomes embedded in the process so that no straightforward return to pre-mobilisation conditions is possible. For example, in post-Communist Poland the Roman Catholic church in various institutional forms (not all Vatican sanctioned) has become embedded in relationships with the state, political and civil society that may initially be explained partly by the role of the church in defending Polish identity against aggressive Soviet secularism but which have subsequently taken on a life of their own, with implications for Polish civil society (Czerwinski 2004).

Similarly, a major problem with the cultural transition model is its implicit assimilationism; religion is seen as useful to help a community through the traumas of settlement but is assumed to demobilise once communities are settled. But what if communities never 'settle' in this sense? What if memories of (and live connections with) a homeland persist over generations if religion continues to give a sense of belonging to a transnational community of meaning? Whereas birth rates may consistently converge towards Western European norms, there is much less evidence that this is the case with religion, at least in any consistent way (Guveli and Platt 2011; Maliepaard et al. 2012). Rather, cultural transition seems much more likely to become an ongoing process of transcultural renegotiation in which both religions and the structures of integration in societies are likely to be transformed.

In contrast, secularisation theory appears to rely on a kind of 'barometric' model of religion as a cultural defence mechanism. Religiosity is 'inflated' as a defence against and way to cope with challenging circumstances, but once the latter improve, it is assumed that religiosity will drop down again to its 'natural' level. But, as Starrett argues:

> [T]he barometric approach ignores the institutional frameworks and social processes through which culture is created and transmitted. Like other institutions, religious … ones fill not only a social need, but a social space. They take on a very real life of their own with interests, dynamics and potentials that are only incompletely determined by the intersection of forces that brought them about. (1998: 227–228)

Furthermore, cultures do not, especially in contemporary urban settings, function as sealed units (the 'parallel lives' thesis notwithstanding, of which more below), and religions change as they adapt to new conditions. As they do so they sometimes change the popular and public cultures in which they interact, as Starrett (1998) shows in the Egyptian case and the Meyer and Moors collection (2006) in a variety of settings, including Brazil, Israel-Palestine, Turkey, Ghana, South Africa and India. As more self-aware and assertive forms of secularism develop to confront more assertive forms of religion in Europe, it is unlikely that neither, nor European public culture, will emerge unchanged. To understand such processes, a dialectical approach is needed, in which religion is understood to change as it interacts with modern systems and cultures but may also have a transformative influence on those systems and cultures, such that the aftermath of heightened religious salience in public culture is not a necessarily a return to a trajectory of privatisation of religion. As Starrett writes, 'religious [institutions] … take on a very real life of their own with interests, dynamics and potentials that are only incompletely determined by the …forces that brought them about' (1998: 228).

Now, it may be objected that this may be so in various global contexts but not in the societies that are the focus of secularisation theory, that is, as Bruce defines it:

> In trying to summarize …the impact of modernization on the place and nature of religion, I am referring only to the history of western Europe and to the societies created by migrant Europeans. There is no suggestion that what is offered is a universal template to which all societies must eventually conform. (1998: 2)

However, in making modernisation the key to religious decline, secularisation theorists cannot logically deny its wider application, because modernisation has clearly not

been confined to 'Europe and those countries populated by peoples of European descent'. Furthermore, Bruce's confinement of the theory to 'western Europe and societies created by migrant Europeans' oversimplifies the nature of global interaction. Societies were not created by migrant Europeans in isolation but in 'exchange' – often brutal and always coercive in some sense – with the peoples already inhabiting those territories, who, where they survived the encounter, continue to form part of those societies. Also, one of the other consequences of colonialism and subsequent globalisation is migration of people from areas of colonial influence to Western Europe, so that even this region, so long an exporter of peoples to the 'New World':

> … has become a novel experiment in multiple, tiered, and mediated multiculturalisms, a supranational community of cultures, subcultures and transcultures inserted differentially into radically different political and cultural traditions. (Modood 1997: vi)

As we have already seen, peoples of non-European origin already form a large and growing proportion of the population of European cities, a development which needs to be integral to thinking about the relationship between religion and social change in those cities. Hence it is problematic to say the least to produce a supposedly general theory which only explains changes in the social significance of the religion of White Europeans and their postcolonial progeny, when these religions are (and long have been) formed in interaction with those of so many others. It seems particularly bizarre for a theory which claims to have modernisation as its driving force, since clearly modernisation in these settings impacts on non-White populations as much as on the White ones. The recent history of Europe is perhaps most importantly one of immigration and (between EU states) integration; while cultural defence and cultural transition can shed some light on these processes, they are intrinsically limited because they lack a dialectical element in their account of the articulation of religion and culture.

2.2.2   Other Sociological Responses: Towards a Dialectical Approach

So what are the alternatives? Some have attempted to move beyond secularisation theory while retaining a focus on religion's articulation with modernisation processes. Thus, neo-secularisation theorists like Chaves (1994) and Yamane (1997) have restricted the scope of secularisation to declining religious authority, particularly as a result of institutional differentiation. The problem with these accounts is that they identify religious authority with religious institutions or elites and hence read the decline of the latter as the decline of the former. But, as we shall see further below, religious authority may be relocated in religious discourse, and its cultural authority increases, even as that of religious elites and their institutions declines (Starrett 1998). Again, a fuller account of how religious as discourse articulates with popular culture and social systems is needed than these accounts provide.

Informed by the WVS, Inglehart (1997) interposes human security as a variable between modernisation and secularisation, arguing that modernisation impacts on

religion through its effects on human perceptions of security, such that it is in more equal and secure societies (such as found in Scandinavia) rather than in affluent but unequal societies (such as the United States) that secularisation bites deepest. He also argues that more equal and secure societies (post-materialist conditions) also nurture post-consumer interest in spirituality so that religion returns in a post-modern, questing role. This is an important contribution, but it is limited both by the national level of analysis of the WVS data (such that differences in class, ethnicity and transnational connections are rendered invisible) and again (at least in terms of shedding light on religion in civil society) because it does not consider dialectical processes or the way in which, by becoming visible, religions take on new social roles and transform public space as they are themselves transformed by articulation with states and media cultures.

Casanova's *Public Religion in the Modern World* (1994) examined the re-emergence of public religion using civil society as a central analytic concept to challenge secularisation assumptions; indeed, Casanova's was the first major study since Alexis de Toqueville's (1840) *Democracy in America* to use civil society in this way. Coming from an entirely different intellectual tradition to rational choice theory's challenge to secularisation, Casanova presented a developed concept of civil society, well articulated with both political and social theory, which enabled the elaboration of a nuanced account of religion's social activity and political significance across a range of contemporary societies. Furthermore, these societies were not restricted to the 'usual suspects' of Western sociology of religion, that is, Western European or North American societies; rather, by using Latin America (Brazil) and Central-Eastern Europe (Poland) amongst his case studies, Casanova raised the possibility of a global comparative framework, so important for thinking about religion and civil society in contemporary Europe given the extent of global exchange and its impact on European cities.

However, Casanova did not (at this stage) consider any Muslim-majority societies (nor, indeed, any non-Christian-majority societies) nor minority religions in Western contexts. Also (inevitably, given the date of publication), he did not consider Poland beyond the initial phase of democratic transition and hence what might happen to a post-Solidarity, demobilised Polish Catholicism. Nor did he take on board the by then developing criticism of civil society as an analytical concept in the political theory/political science literature, especially an awareness, as Alexander articulates in the quotation above, that the 'civility' of civil society is a fragile achievement that cannot be attributed to any institutional arrangement as such and therefore calls for some kind of distinction between civil society as a normative concept and the institutions which may (or may not) support it (empirical civil society).

Religion and Civil Society (Herbert 2003) attempted to develop the analysis of religion and civil society in the directions implied by this critique of Casanova. In terms of its engagement with secularisation theory, it argued that modernisation changes the structural environment – especially communications conditions through transformations of media – with which religious discourses, symbols and practices articulate (further developed in Herbert and Fras 2009; Herbert 2011). These effects occur wherever these technologies and social systems spread, but their impact on

the transmission and influence of religion can be hugely various. Thus, religions sometimes lose their functions to other institutions and professional groups, as when health, schooling and welfare provision increasingly became the province of various secular professionals and the British state through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But on the other hand, they sometimes gain influence across other social systems in new ways, as when health, education and welfare provision was increasingly taken back from the Egyptian state by Islamic and Christian private voluntary organisations in Egypt during the late twentieth century (Starrett 1998) or indeed across many societies in the Muslim-majority and postcolonial world.

2.2.3 Functionalisation

A key process highlighted by *Religion and Civil Society* is 'functionalisation' (Starrett 1998: 62). This describes an important aspect of how religion changes when it becomes enmeshed in modern functional systems and how and why it manages to survive and even thrive in those systems, including media, political, legal, economic, health, education and welfare systems. For example, in Egypt the public education system has over a long period disseminated a view of religion as practically useful and oriented to improving the human good so that religion, science and technology are widely seen as complementary:

> Functionalization occurs without the desacralization of the material, so that the process described by Durkheim earlier in this century as one of the goals of the modern education system is subverted. Naturalistic and materialistic explanations coexist with supernatural ones, for Muslims perceive them as non-contradictory. The 'real' reasons for religious practices do no strip off their theological cloaks. Since God is concerned with the welfare of the Muslim community, the prescriptions of Islam are not only beneficial, but manifestly rational. (Starrett 1998: 153)

One consequence of this is that instead of becoming socially situated in antagonism with scientific and other secular knowledge systems as often in European and American history, science and religion are widely seen as complementary. The association of religion with useful social work has also meant that, in the presence of the corruption and inefficiency of the state and political parties, private voluntary organisations, Muslim and Christian, have been able to mobilise an effective parallel health education and welfare system and, in the former case, challenge the political legitimacy of the state based on its claim to look after the welfare of its citizens. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's first post-Arab Spring elections, and the election of a Muslim Brother as president (June 2012), needs to be understood in this context.

Furthermore, as already indicated, Egypt is not exceptional beyond the European context; religion is functionally integrated into the modern systems and processes of everyday life across large parts of the world. This is so not just across the Muslim-majority world (e.g. Hefner on Indonesia 2000; Deeb on Shi'ites in Lebanon, 2006) but can be seen in the commercial and political use of Hindu iconography (Rajagopal 2001) and in the role of Pentecostalist discourses on work,

family and God's blessings to make sense of the life of migrants to megacities (Martin 1996; Gledhill 2006). Religion may also be less functionally oriented to survival but rather articulated as a resistance ideology to market capitalism, for example, in pagan eco-theology/ideologies, and various forms of anti-capitalist Islamist ideology (Tripp 2006).

Sometimes too, religious discourses lose their public purchase for a while but remain as latent cultural resources to be mobilised when conditions permit, so long as they remain in circulation in some form or preserved as a cultural memory by some institution. The mobilisation of such memories is sometimes far from progressive, judged by social democratic standards, as when the Serbian Academy of Sciences drew on Serbian Orthodox tradition to mobilise a nationalist movement that contributed significantly to the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia in the early 1990s (Ramet 1999).

On such an understanding the institutional location and mode of influence of religions changes, but religions can still be influential, sometimes in dynamic, adaptive and self-renewing ways. Such processes have implications for how religions may impact on social cohesion. Powerful religious institutions may no longer dominate society in many contexts, but religious discourses and networks remain significant resources for cultural and sometimes political mobilisation.

2.2.4 Contested Secularity and Growing Visibility: Challenges Since Religion and Civil Society (2003)

Further challenges have emerged since the publication of *Religion and Civil Society (2003).* One (at least to have emerged with greater clarity) is the influence of different forms of secularism or secularity on religion in civil society, understood as not just as an ideology but a 'formation [that] focuses on transformations wrought in the domains of ethics, aesthetics and epistemology' (Mahmood 2010: 293) and which shapes the possibilities for self-organisation, social engagement, public contribution and, more generally, public presence of religion in civil society.

This latter point suggests several further areas important to understanding the role of religion in civil society where thinking has recently developed – each concerns the public presence or visibility of religion (Amiraux and Jonker 2006; Tarlo 2010). First, it has become clear that public presence and religious resurgence are separate things – indeed, religions may become more publicly assertive as their popularity declines (Achterberg 2009). Second, public presence has a number of causes and meanings – a high public profile may be because a religious group becomes more publicly assertive, or it may be because the media focuses more attention on a group for a variety of reasons – especially security related in the case of Muslims (post-9/11, van Gogh, 7/7, etc.).

Third, the role of the media in shaping public perceptions and political discourses on religion has been highlighted – for example, the extent to which public relations concerns and processes may shape local community politics, with strong implications for the welfare of religious groups (Uitermark and Gielen 2010).

Fourth, media formats, especially news and entertainment, also have implications for the circulation of religious discourses and the location of religious authority – as well as challenging secularist assumptions embedded in 'the narrative of modernity', as Meyer and Moors put it (2006: 19) . While their focus is on the mediatisation of religion beyond Europe, and it is apparent that religion as entertainment is less prominent in Europe than elsewhere (including the United States), there is evidence that mediatised forms of religion are influential amongst new Europeans (D'Haenens et al. 2007; Leurs et al. 2012) and also in Turkey, which this collection also addresses.

Fifth, religion has also become visible in at least some government responses to community relations in contemporary European societies. In the UK in particular, theories of civil society and social capital fed explicitly and implicitly into the post-2001 reorientation of community relations work under New Labour (1997–2010), and religious actors in civil society were explicitly addressed and cast as agents of potential reconciliation (as well as a source of problems) in this policy discourse (Beckford 2010: 130). Such government intervention can greatly influence the role of religion in civil society, and so the case of 'community cohesion' policy in the UK will be considered as an example of this.

This remainder of the chapter, then, will take the following form. It will begin with an updated summary of the critical theory of civil society (and especially its articulation with religion) as presented in *Religion and Civil Society* (2003), which was developed, as indicated above, in response to Casanova (1994). It will then consider how this account might be developed further in response to the issues of 'visibility' introduced above and their impact on religion in civil society, specifically: varieties of secularism or secularity, the relationship between religious vitality and religion's public presence, the mediatisation of religion and (especially local) politics, the impact of transnational connections on religion in civil society and the impact of government interventions which thematise religion as a factor in community relations, considering in particular the UK case.

2.3 Approaches in Political Studies: Towards a Critical Theory of Civil Society

> Civil society should be conceived … as a solidary sphere in which a certain kind of universalising community gradually comes to be defined and to a certain degree enforced. To the degree that this solidary community exists, it is exhibited by 'public opinion', possesses its own cultural codes and narratives in democratic idiom, is patterned by a set of peculiar institutions, most notably legal and journalistic ones, and is visible in historically distinctive sets of interactional practices like civility, equality, criticism, and respect… This kind of community can never exist as such; it can only exist 'to one degree or another'. (Alexander 1998: 7)

> Probably the only proposition about civil society that few would contest is that over the last ten to fifteen years interest in the subject has been enormous and the literature about it has grown exponentially. (Burnell and Calvert 2004: 1)

Thus begins a recent collection on the role of civil society in democratisation, a much discussed but highly contested topic. In the 1990s discussion mushroomed as commentators sought to grasp the reasons for the wave of democratisation that swept the globe in the last quarter of the twentieth century, which placed a focus on the role of civil society in democratic transition. Since 2000, the slide of some of those new democracies back into autocracy (Shlapentokh 2008) has placed new emphasis on the role of civil society in democratic consolidation and deepening, that is, on what might serve to anchor and stabilise not just democratic political institutions (consolidation) but also to embed democratic practices in society ('deepening', Heller 2009). These debates have proved contentious for several reasons. Partly, normative ideas about what civil society ought to do and be have sometimes obscured and dominated empirical enquiry into what actually existing (empirical) civil society is and does (Omelicheva 2009; Kopecký and Mudde 2003). This problem is present both in more theoretical- and in more policy-oriented work. Thus, as Tester comments on Keane (theory oriented):

> … all too often it is simply asserted that civil society involves democratic pressures; the connection is never really deconstructed or interrogated. (1992: 128)

> … so Mercer (2004) comments in a critical review of the policy literature:

> Of particular concern is the widespread embracing of NGOs as democratic actors that is discernible in much of this literature. This appears to owe more to ideological persuasion and assumption than to an engagement with wider debates about the politics of development. (2004: 5)

Second, there are definitional arguments about what civil society is – whether commercial organisations or the 'economic sphere' should be considered part of civil society, for example, or concerning the relationship with the state, with some commentators insisting on the independence of civil society from both (Cohen and Arato 1992) and others that the shaping role of the state is vital to grasp its dynamics (Chandhoke 2001). Third, some influential political actors (Western governments and international civil society organisations, INGOs) may be seen to have a stake in emphasising the role of civil society in democratisation, the former to justify limiting state intervention (either to save money or for ideological reasons) and the latter to promote their own agendas. To these reasons may be added some methodological problems common to social scientific research, including those of causation (whether good civil society is caused by good democratic institutions or vice versa; Schmitter 2010: 17), and how far the actions of civil society organisations (CSOs) rather than other social actors are responsible for particular outcomes in a complex social field (Omelicheva 2009).

Each of these concerns about the relationship between civil society and democratisation resonates when considering religion and civil society. Thus, substantively, for example, in post-Communist societies, the same religions, which sometimes played a role in supporting and sheltering civil society opposition to authoritarianism, have subsequently participated in the turn to new forms of nationalist autocracy (e.g. the Russian Orthodox Church) or focused on securing as much political influence as possible for the church, rather than on wider democratic concerns

(e.g. the Polish Roman Catholic Church). Second, studies of religious actors in civil society are vulnerable to the same kind of criticisms over their handling of issues of definition and causation as those found in the civil society and democratisation literature (e.g. Coleman 1998; Wuthnow and Hackett 2003).

Perhaps the best way to navigate through these conceptual confusions is to outline how the concept of civil society has developed and then to develop a critical understanding that responds to this history and these criticisms.

2.4   Civil Society, a Brief History: CSI and CSII

In still the most comprehensive account of the development of the concept of civil society, Cohen and Arato (1992) trace the origins of the concept from Aristotle's *politike koinonia* (political community), through the Roman translation *societas civilis*, to the medieval city state (ibid.: 84–86). But the modern history of the concept begins with Hobbes (1588–1679), Locke (1632–1704) and Montesquieu (1689–1755). Their early modern concept was introduced in opposition to their respective *ancien régimes* in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Each was convinced of the bankruptcy of the old patriarchal order of authority but unsure how society could avoid degenerating into chaos without it (Tester 1992). Their solution was to reinvest the monarch's authority in the state and to legitimise the state from the bottom-up instead of the top-down (Hobbes, Rousseau), so that 'horizontal networks of interdependencies' (Habermas) or 'relations of symmetric reciprocity' (Tester 1992) intermediate between the state and kinship networks, took centre stage in their thinking, a concept they called 'civil society', drawing on ancient precedents, and constructed in opposition to the old aristocratic chains of dependence and obligation.

This broad and idealistic use of civil society is described by Alexander as the first phase of the modern theory of civil society (CSI). It was patriarchal and elitist and bounded by the emerging nation state and tended to be frame religion in opposition to civil society. However, writing a little later from a vantage point where it was possible to see what public religion could become decoupled from the ruling class of an *ancien régime*; Alexis de Toqueville (1805–1859) did not see religion as a dangerous divisive force to be contained but rather, based on his observations of America in the 1830s, as a key constituent of civil society. For him, the churches were important social institutions for the learning of civic virtues necessary for democracy to flourish. Yet de Toqueville was one of the last users of the idea in this early modern sense, largely due to the intervention of Karl Marx. For Marx:

> Not only is civil society now simply a field of play of egotistical, purely private interests, but it is now treated as a superstructure, a legal and political arena produced as camouflage for the domination of commodities and the capitalist class. (Alexander 1998: 4–5)

This marks the beginning of the second historical phase (CSII) identified by Alexander (1998: 4–6). Marx's deconstruction of civil society as a reification of

particular interests (in Marx's case, class) can also be seen as setting the pattern for subsequent critiques of CSI, including those of its recent (1980s–2000s) revival (Foucault 1988: 167–168).

Still within the Marxist tradition, Gramsci (1891–1937) nonetheless began the rehabilitation of the concept of civil society. Gramsci saw civil society as ambivalent: on the one hand it was the means by which the state secured authority through consent rather than coercion, but on the other hand it was also potentially the site of most effective resistance to the state. This is because where the state is entrenched in institutions and the minds of the population through a developed civil society, it cannot be moved by frontal assault – hence the failure of revolutions other than the Russian, where civil society was not well developed, during Gramsci's lifetime. However, the 'trenches' of civil society are also potentially sites of resistance to the vested interests which control the state – places where the proletariat can reflexively deconstruct the 'second nature' of existing arrangements (Tester 1992: 140–143). Gramsci's Marxist understanding of the proletariat as the revolutionary class may no longer be relevant (Keane 1998: 16–18); but his understanding of the ambivalence of civil society – that it could become the site of resistance to a repressive state as well as the means of entrenchment of the state – remains a useful analytical insight.

The revival of CSI by activists in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, followed by its rapid worldwide dissemination to the Middle East (Therborn 1997), Africa (Hearn 2000), China (McCormick and Shaozi 1992) and South America (Hudick 1999), gave new impetus to the concept, which became a powerful source of mobilisation against repressive states. The idea of the spontaneous self-organisation of society also appealed in a Western context in which the limits of state intervention, especially of the welfare state, seemed to be increasingly exposed. But a combination of the difficulties of post-Communist reconstruction (Skapska 1997), the limitations of Western strategies to promote civil society in developing societies (Hearn 2000) and the problems of applying the concept cross-culturally (Hann 1996), together with CSII type criticisms – that use of the concept conceals the variety of interests in antistate coalitions, the dimension of class conflict, etc. – have left many disillusioned with the concept but has also given rise to its recent rethinking (CSIII), in response to these concerns.

2.5   'CSIII': Towards a Critical Reformulation of the Civil Society Concept

Responding to concerns about its normative freight – especially the idea that a layer of semi-autonomous organisations between the state and individual necessarily involves democratic pressures – White (1994) provides a definition of the concept

stripped of this presumption to enable the connections between civil society and democratisation to be critically examined. Thus, he defines civil society as:

> an intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect to extend their interests or values. (2004: 10)

However, critics such as Chandhoke (2001, 2007) argue that this definition exaggerates the autonomy of civil society from the state and neglects the critical role that the state plays in shaping civil society. For example, in India in the 1990s government enforcement of the recommendations of Mandal Commission, designed to increased equality for marginalised social groups (hence 'Mandalisation'), led to a massive and ongoing Hindu nationalist backlash (hence 'Mandirisation', from the Hindi *mandir*, 'temple'), which, while deeply rooted in civil society, also contains profoundly uncivil and exclusionary elements. Thus, the Indian state is profoundly implicated in shaping of civil society, a civil society that itself is ambivalent from the standpoint of democracy, because it is both democratic in the sense of channelling popular voices and representing popular interests in the public sphere and (at least in large parts) undemocratic in excluding and subordinating other groups in Indian society.

In response to this kind of criticism, it seems helpful to distinguish between empirical (actually existing) and normative civil society, the latter referring to the norms such as an open participatory public sphere (or spheres), democracy, mutual criticism and mutual respect, which any actual 'intermediate associational realm between state and family' conforms to only more or less. The Indian example is also useful because whereas Western mobilisations of civil society have tended to articulate around the problem of defending the rights of individuals against a strong, intrusive central authority (whether an early modern absolute monarch or autocratic communist state), in other contexts the state may be weak compared with various societal, communal or populist forces, in which case liberal elements in the state become very important in defending the rights of minority groups. Recent history – Swiss referenda on the construction of minarets and deportation of non-citizens for relatively minor offences springs to mind – suggests that such considerations may become increasingly important in a European context too, with the rise of populist Islamophobic and anti-immigrant parties and movements. Thus, the shaping and restraining role of the state is important in both an analytic and a normative account of civil society.

So far, then, it seems that a critical definition of civil society will distinguish between empirical and normative elements, perhaps along the following lines:

> Empirical civil society refers to an intermediate associational realm between state and kinship networks, which, while it is likely to be influenced by state policies and may be effected by the operation of kinship networks, has significant autonomy from both. Normative civil society refers to the role that this associational realm may play in enabling popular concerns to be brought to public attention (i.e. into the public sphere), and in promoting liberal democratic norms, virtues and practices such as public service, participation, mutual criticism, mutual respect and respect for human (civil, political and social) rights.

Another way in which some theorists have sought to differentiate civil society from other parts of social and political life is in terms of its 'governing logic'. Thus, both Cohen and Arato (1992) and Habermas (1996) distinguish civil society from the state and the economy in this way. As Heller summarises, they each:

> … distinguish political and civil society by their distinct modes of social action. Political society is governed by instrumental-strategic action and specifically refers to the set of actors that compete for, and the institutions that regulate (in a democratic system) the right to exercise legitimate political authority. Civil society refers to non-state and non-market forms of voluntary association that are governed by communicative practices. (2009: 124)

As a definition of an operative logic that is particularly characteristic of empirical civil society, this is useful, though partial; CSOs ('civil society organisations') clearly exist also to achieve various instrumental ends (give youth something to do, run sports tournaments, host communal prayer, help elderly people, etc.). Similarly, CSOs have no monopoly on communicative practices; the state (though organising political consultations), kinship networks (though practices of mutual obligation) and market mechanisms (through practices of exchange) also foster these. Communicative practices are therefore an important normative aspect of civil society but are neither exclusive to nor wholly definitive of it.

So, if we have a basic working definition of civil society that takes into account some recent arguments about civil society as an analytic concept in general, we can begin to consider other recent developments, particularly to do with the public presence of religion in contemporary societies.

How can we best understand the articulation of religion with the popular and public cultures of contemporary post-secular societies, an articulation which takes place largely through commercially competitive and consumer-oriented media systems and is accommodated to their formats? My answer here will focus on the process of mediatisation both of politics and of religion, before considering somewhat broader social processes in a case study of community cohesion policies in the UK. But first, a little further 'ground clearing' is needed on the question of Islam and civil society, given that Islam has become such a controversial and contested issue in Europe and elsewhere.

2.6   Islam, Secular and Muslim Attitudes and Civil Society

As the introduction indicated, 'cultural traumas' (Eyerman 2008) in which aspects of Islam or Muslim identities have been highlighted as central theme have occurred in several European societies in recent years. However, the extent to which Islam as a religion and Muslims as a group are seen as problematic – rather than just some interpretations of Islam or extremist groups – has varied, both across different parts of the media and political discourse within societies and between different countries. Thus, for example, Vellenga (2008) argues that in the Netherlands Islam as a religion and Muslims as a whole group have come to be seen as a problem, even in

the discussion of political elites and across the media, whereas in Britain political elites and some parts of the media (the influential 'red-top tabloids' excepted) have persisted in differentiating between extremist groups on the one hand and Islam as a religion and the views of most Muslims on other and to some extent seem to have succeeded in shaping public opinion in this direction. Thus, a Pew survey in 2006 found that 51 % of the Dutch had an unfavourable view of Muslims, compared with 14 % of the British (ibid.: 466).

Where an undifferentiated or essentialist discourse about Muslims and/or Islam becomes culturally dominant, the very idea that Islam (and hence Muslims who remain faithful Muslims) can coexist with the kind of liberties associated with the normative concept of civil society is brought into question. Therefore, especially in such contexts, it is important for a discussion of religion in civil society to consider some basic evidence concerning the relationship between Muslim attitudes, Islam as a religion and normative civil society.

Empirically, it is clear that societies with practising Muslim majorities do support diverse civil societies and democratic politics: Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey are examples (Hefner 2000). While democracy and civil liberties may be far from perfect in any of these, it is difficult to argue that they are not functioning democracies with active and diverse civil societies and which compare favourably with other (in Indonesia and Malaysia's case) postcolonial societies with Christian majorities (e.g. in sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America). Furthermore, if one looks at studies of support for the kind of democratic values characteristic of normative civil society, the evidence indicates that support for democracy is strong in most Muslim-majority societies, including authoritarian ones; as Norris and Inglehart conclude their analysis of WVS data: 'support for democracy is surprisingly widespread among Islamic publics, even among those who live in authoritarian societies' (2011: 155).

However, popular (and sometimes elite) European discourses often ignore most Muslims and most Muslim societies and focus instead on gruesome events such as the corporal and capital punishment administered in Saudi Arabia, Sudan or (Taliban-controlled) Afghanistan, as somehow more revealing of the 'real Islam' (Poole 2002). We shall consider the processes involved in this selection bias further below, but to finish this 'ground-clearing' exercise on Islam, Muslims and civil society provide some context for these controversial practices.

The Wahhabi school, which is the established tradition in Saudi Arabia under which such killings take place, springs from an eighteenth-century revivalist movement, which rejects the four main historical legal traditions of Sunni Islam. The movement produced an insurrection against Ottoman rule, which also resulted in violent attacks on Sufi shrines. The Ottomans eventually suppressed the insurrection and executed its leaders, but it persisted underground and resurfaced more than a century later when the Ottoman Empire dissolved, with the Wahhabi *ulema* forming an alliance with the al-Saud family. Backed by the United States, this alliance formed the core and dynamo of the emergent Saudi Arabian state. While Saudi oil money has been widely influential in disseminating Wahhabi propaganda amongst Sunni Muslims, support for Wahhabism remains very much a minority position.

The Wahhabi form of Islam, then, is not typical of Islam as it has generally been historically (or legally) articulated, and Saudi society differs most Muslim-majority setting in the dominance of tribal social organisation. The latter is a persistent but not dominant feature across the Arab world and largely absent in the rest of the (far more populous) Muslim-majority world. As historian Ira Lapidus writes:

> The Middle Eastern Islamic heritage provides not one but two basic constellations of historical society, two golden ages, two paradigms, each of which has generated its own repertoire of political institutions and political theory. The first is the society integrated in all dimensions, political, social, and moral, under the aegis of Islam. The prototype is the unification of Arabia under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century … The second historical paradigm is the imperial Islamic society built not on Arabian or tribal templates but on the differentiated structures of previous Islamic societies … By the Eleventh century Middle Eastern states and religious communities were highly differentiated … Thus, despite the common statement that Islam is a total way of life defining political as well as social and family matters, most Muslim societies … were in fact built around separate institutions of state and religion. (Lapidus 1992: 14–15)

Thus, both in the present and in history, Islam as a religion has for the most part existed in societies in which institutions of state and religion were clearly differentiated, a basic precondition for the emergence of civil society. Both the tribal hierarchy of Saudi Arabia and some political Islamist visions of an Islamic state are recent deviations from this predominant historical pattern.

One objection to this argument might be that it is not the compatibility of Islam with the institutional forms of civil society that is problematic but rather the pre- and proscriptions of the Qur'an, and Muslim insistence on their continued validity, that are incompatible with secular norms. However, such arguments almost invariably interpret the Qur'an in a context-free way, without regard for the *sunnah* which provide the occasion of revelation, and which always frame any traditional Muslim reading of the text, or for the traditions of *fiqh*, which always frame any legal inference drawn from it. And this is just to summarise the traditional hermeneutical tools, without considering new forms of *ijtihad* (new interpretation) that contemporary Muslim thinkers have developed (Ramadan 2004). In short, such arguments (or better, assertions) are very largely simply misinformed, but their frequency, and in some cases cultural influence, requires that they are addressed. The kind of processes through which they become influential – and hence shape the dynamics of religion in civil society – is the subject of the next section.

2.7 Media and Cultural Studies Approaches: The Mediatisation of Religion and Politics

Danish sociologist Stig Hjarvard defines mediatisation as a process through which 'the core elements of a social or cultural activity assume media form' (2004: 48). In the case of religion, mediatisation is a process in which 'religion is increasingly subsumed under the logic of the media', meaning that 'the media mold religious imagination in accordance with the genres of popular culture' (2008: 9). This 'molding'

is significant because 'the media have taken over many of the social functions of the institutionalised religions, providing both moral and spiritual guidance and a sense of community' (ibid.), meaning that for many in European societies, all or most of their knowledge of and views about religion come from media sources rather than religious institutions. In support, he sites evidence from a representative poll in Denmark which found that watching television, reading non-fiction books and accessing the Internet were more frequently identified ways of engaging with spiritual issues than attending church ceremonies or reading the Bible (ibid.: 20); similarly non-religious media sources, and especially film, TV and fiction novels, by far outstripped religious books and texts as sources (of stories about the fight between good and evil), and hence of moral guidance (ibid.: 21).

It is also important for post-secular contexts to note that most Europeans' perceptions of minority religions also come via the mass media, as Poole comments in the British context:

> British Muslims are 'known' to non-Muslims in the UK mostly through the media. It is the media that define the meaning of the Muslim presence in Britain, as found in previous research on the ethnic 'Other' … and provide us with out 'ways of seeing' … There is evidence of an ideological reproduction of dominant discourses in relation to Islam in terms of gender, primitivism, separatism, restriction and cultural difference. These discourses have been naturalised and allow the perpetrators [sic] to take on a superior stance. (Poole 2002: 40)

Complementary evidence on media influence extending beyond transmission (mediation) to shaping (mediatisation) comes from Meyer and Moors' (2006) edited collection, which shows how the media shape the communication of religion not just for unchurched Europeans but also for the religious across the world. To compete in the cultural marketplace, religious organisations increasingly adopt electronic communications media and the formats and genres of popular culture, especially entertainment culture, with examples ranging from Islamic audiocassette sermons (Hirshkind 2006) to Israeli ultraorthodox Jewish radio (Lehmann and Siebzeher 2006) to Ghanaian Pentecostal worship spectaculars (Meyer and Moors 2006) and Indian televised Hindu epics (Rajagopal 2001).

Starrett's study (1998) shows that the mediatisation of religion (both in the sense of a new medium to a given context becoming the main source of knowledge about religion for a population and in these sense that institutional carriers other than religious specialists become central to its transmission) is not new, since the shift from traditional modes of religious education in late nineteenth century Egypt involved both change in the form of communication (from aural rote learning through recitation to written learning with an instrumental purpose, with implications both for the content of religious knowledge and how it is evaluated) and challenge to established religious authorities, since responsibility for religious transmission passed from the *ulema* to the officials responsible for the public education system. However, while a change in dominant medium and shift in the locus of religious authority is not new, the influence of the specific properties of new electronic media and the dominance of particular news and entertainment formats is. This is best seen through examples, so we now turn to consider some, from which conclusions about theory will be drawn.

2.7.1   The Consequences of Mediatisation I: The Making of the Suffering Ummah

First, there is evidence from Muslim communities over the last 15 years that suggests that the media's circulation of images and discourses can produce some quite radical reconfigurations of religious identity. For example, images of (and discourse on; Hirshkind 2006: 29) Muslim suffering in different parts of the world (especially Bosnia, Palestine, Iraq, Kashmir and Chechnya) made available through the electronic media since the 1990s have arguably transformed the historically diverse meanings of the Arabic term *ummah* (Ayubi 1991: 18), politicising and inflecting it to invoke a suffering community, much more akin to the Shi'ite theology of martyrdom than the Sunni theology of 'Manifest Success' in which the concept first developed (Geaves 2005: 96–117). While the initial disseminators of these images (transnational, Western-based broadcasters such as CNN) produced this effect unwittingly, the advent of Arab satellite broadcasting (e.g. Al-Jazeera) significantly altered the semantic framing of their dissemination, and *jihadi* websites self-consciously promote it (Awan 2007).

There is evidence that this sense of being part of a suffering *ummah* is now very widespread, both from studies of Muslims in the West (Mandaville 2001; Cesari 2004; Al-Ghabban 2007) and in the Middle East (Hirshkind 2006). In this case, then, structural change (e.g. the advent of media technologies enabling instant transnational broadcasting and lower access costs enabling wider transnational dissemination) is implicated in the increased political salience (and semantic transformation) of religious discourse, in turn producing change in an aspect of religious identity. In secularisation theory this process would be categorised as 'cultural defence', but this is inadequate, because this is not simply a defence of tradition but rather a radical reinterpretation of it, one with dramatic consequences for post-secular empirical civil societies because this reframing of news and identity is a key stage in a process which can lead to radicalisation and ultimately justification of violence against 'the West', framed as the enemy of Islam.

2.7.2   The Consequences of Mediatisation II: 'Global Viewing in East London'

Ammar al-Ghabban's paper 'Global Viewing in East London' (2007) reflects on an ethnographic study of how White and Bangladeshi teenagers in Tower Hamlets (a Muslim-majority area in East London) interpreted media stories related to the post-9/11 security situation. Al-Ghabban's careful analysis of the teenagers' conversations illustrates how the interaction between news discourses (sometimes from multilingual satellite channels), entertainment genres of popular culture and religious ideas interact to shape the teenagers' worldviews. It shows how religious

discourse as it is actually articulated in daily life, that is used to interpret events, is shaped by its articulation with news and entertainment discourses. His conclusions in terms of these interactions and causal analysis are worth quoting at length:

> One can see how such a view of the world and life – a belief that there are 'signs' and 'the end of the world' is approaching, and a concomitant preparedness to die – sits very comfortably with media discourses about 'the next terrorist threat'. In fact, to account for such a view, we should take into account three factors. First, the lived social realities for a majority of the Bengali community in the East End of London include severe poverty, unemployment, low wages, dangerous working conditions, overcrowded and unsanitary housing, gang fights, drug addiction, racial harassment, police harassment, familial pressures and general lack of opportunities. Second, the media environment of saturation news (24 hour channels, various language channels) and Hollywood apocalyptism [sic] (as seen in films such as *The Day After Tomorrow* (2004) and *The Core* (2003)), results in a constantly repeated flow of audiovisual deaths and destruction. Third, religious-political language is used by figures such [as] Bush, Blair and bin Ladin. These factors lock into, or are forcibly articulated with, one another. It would be wrong to explain young people's utterances in terms of any one single reason … Only by looking at the entire range of conditions and experiences can we go some way towards explaining how and why deeply sceptical consumers of television news … can at the same time accept key aspects of media discourse. (ibid.: 321)

These kinds of hybridised, mediatised worldviews are constructed by and between the inhabitants of contemporary post-secular societies in half-sceptical, half-unconscious acceptance of media-circulated discourses. The particular world presented here may seem remote from usual representations of religion and civil society; but if we are to understand the micro-dynamics of religion in actually existing, empirical civil society, more of this kind of thick description and cultural analysis is needed.

2.7.3   The Consequences of Mediatisation III: Local Politics and Religion in an Amsterdam Suburb

In analysing events in the Amsterdam locality of De Baarsjes following the murder of Dutch film-maker and media personality Theo van Gogh, Uitermark and Gielen (2010) show 'how mediatisation has transformed the relationship between government and civil society in this neigbourhood' (ibid.: 1326). De Baarsjes had previously been the site of a widely reported 'disturbance of the multicultural peace' at a ceremony to commemorate the dead of World War II on 4 May 2003, when some Moroccan adolescents had interrupted the traditional 2-min silence with shouts of 'Jews must be killed' ('*joden moeten we doden*'). Local civil society actors co-operated in attempts to repair community relations: young Moroccans were to be involved in the next year's ceremony commemorating Moroccan as well as Dutch war dead, and, critically, considerable effort was put into public relations – 'weeks before 4 May, Moroccan youths and administrators gave press interviews and made television appearances to demonstrate their joint commitment to the commemorations' (ibid.: 1330).

The strategy of proactive media engagement became a central priority of the local authority:

> The administrators considered it self-evident that local interventions should be designed in such a way they can be communicated to national media audiences. The administration had cultivated a sort of self-reflexivity that evaluated possible political moves against the yardstick of the quality of their anticipated representation in the media. (ibid.: 1332)

This became evident in the response to the murder of van Gogh on 2 November 2004 by a Dutch youth of Moroccan heritage. The municipal administrators came up with the strategy of a 'Contract with Society' that local mosques would be invited to sign to show their support for integration:

> This is then the drive of mediatised politics: to show in real-time the thrills of integration politics. This strategy paid off for the administrators. Several high-profile television shows, magazines and newspapers devoted attention to the Contract. Administrators were given ample space to explain that the Contract, for them, illustrated a new approach towards governance that was characterised by direct interactions with civil society associations, a focus on obligations and an awareness that co-operation is necessary to counter polarisation and radicalisation. These interventions have value for governance actors; they feel emboldened and energised when they can show to the nation how they engage with integration issues. The interventions also boosted the position of the Baarsjes administrators within the administrative field. They received many invitations from politicians and civil servants to explain 'the success' or 'uniqueness' of their approach which occupied a specific strategic niche; somewhere in between the 'softness' associated with the political left and the 'toughness' associated with the political right. (ibid.: 1332–1333)

However, the policy was less successful in gaining the support of the mosques invited to participate: only one of three ended up signing the contract. The problem was that while the offer of media appearances appealed to some of the mosque leadership, only one leadership team was able to convince its committee to sign up (although another leader participated in a public signing ceremony, even though he did not actually sign up). The policy also had the effect of altering power relations both within and between the mosques, not surprisingly, influence and resources bestowed by the local authority flowed to those who had backed the Contract. However, in the longer run:

> The government seems to have given the liberals within Milli Gorus a kiss of death: the intense co-operation provided conservatives within Milli Gorus with ammunition to make the case that the leadership had stopped representing the interests of the members and the association. (ibid.: 1339)

The researchers suggest that the case reveals a 'structural problem haunts any attempt to create stronger partnerships between government and minority associations in the context of mediatised politics':

> Although both the government and the associations express their desire to co-operate, there is a conflict between the demands by the (mostly native Dutch) media audiences and the constituents of minority associations. On the one hand, Van Gils and his team wanted to show to media audiences that the government was restoring order and preventing future attacks. The administrators argued for co-operation but—anticipating accusations that they are 'too soft'—felt that mosques had to prove their good intentions and make firm commitments. On the other hand, the mosque representatives had to deal with the concerns and

anxieties of their constituents who were deeply frustrated about the stigmatisation of Muslims in the media. They do not welcome plans based on the premise that it is now Muslims' turn to show loyalty or, in the words of Van Gils [local authority leader], that Muslims have to 'put in 10 kilos extra to restore the balance'. That may have been true according to Van Gils and media audiences, but it was certainly not true according to mosque constituents. (ibid.: 1338)

Similar tensions between the need to please voters who are also media audiences and engage with the issues and perspectives of minority communities also surface on a larger stage in the British government's response to the riots of 2001.

2.7.4   The Mediatisation of Religion and Politics IV: Community Cohesion Policy in Britain 2001–2010

In the summer of 2001, disturbances involving serious public disorder and clashes between police, White (including some from far right groups) and South Asian men occurred in Oldham (26–27 May), Burnley (23–25 June) and Bradford (7–9 July) in 2001. Fortunately, no one was killed, but there were a number of serious injuries and considerable damage to property. Beyond such a basic characterisation, almost every aspect of these disturbances is disputed.

The incidents were widely framed as 'race riots' in the domestic and international press, yet principal confrontations were not between groups of different ethnic backgrounds but rather between police and protesters. It is true that there were some 'trigger incidents' involving White on Asian confrontation and violence, and vice versa, and that the majority of arrests in Oldham and Bradford were from South Asian backgrounds, but this does not make them race riots; further in Burnley around two-thirds of those arrested were White (Bagguley and Hussain 2008: 50), in contrast to the predominant press coverage. Notably, the same misrepresentation occurred with the French riots of November 2006, yet as Oberti writes in a detailed analysis of the dynamics of these disturbances, 'in no instance were the actions organised on an ethnic basis, just as the violence was at no moment aimed at a specific ethnoracial group' (2008: 64). This suggests the important role of the media in framing public discussion both of the riots and crucially of the policy debates that followed.

Awareness of the media's power also shaped the UK government's response: the same imprint of public relations on public policy as was present in De Baarjes is evident in the British 'New' Labour response to these riots. While there is no single media event to point to, PR techniques are evident in signs such as the coining of a new phrase, 'community cohesion' (actually derivative, but not widely known) to express the new policy, the use of highly visible public engagement techniques (four supposedly independent commissions, established to produce a series of reports) and the micromanagement of the subsequent policy formulation process, in which rival interpretations of events were dismissed as outmoded or completely ignored.

It is striking that in spite of the variety and disputed nature of these events, the reports arrive at rather similar conclusions about the underlying problems and how they should be addressed. I shall therefore examine these conclusions, highlighting some problems with them, and then consider what other evidence or perspectives might help to provide a fuller picture of the dynamics of community relations, and especially a proportionate, and so far as possible balanced, assessment of the role of religion within them.

First, it is worth noting the general process of evidence gathering that lay behind the reports. Each was produced by a consultative commission, which convened for several months, taking evidence from leaders, local organisations, authorities and individuals either in person, writing or online. Thus, evidence from a wide variety of sources can be considered quickly, and the strengths of different panel members used to question witnesses. The local presence of the commission also serves a political purpose in showing that local problems are taken seriously. But it is likely to produce different results to social research methods such as a survey (where contributors' anonymity is preserved, and a sample can be demographically balanced) or ethnographic work (which will typically take place over a longer period and involve developing trust with participants). So an initial concern is that by paying little attention to academic studies, the reports missed opportunities to triangulate their findings with evidence gained by other methods.

While rooted in consultations in each locality where the disturbances occurred, the Cantle report had a national remit and comparative purpose, consulting also in three multi-ethnic locations with good community relations reputations – Southall (West London), Birmingham and Leicester – although Birmingham has subsequently experienced its own disturbances (King 2013). The other three reports were purely locally based and comprised:

> *Community Pride Not Prejudice* (on Bradford; Ouseley 2001)
> *One Oldham, One Future* (Ritchie 2001)
> *Burnley Speaks, Who Listens?* (Burnley Task Force 2001)

The Cantle report is explicitly acknowledged as a key source by the report of the *Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion* (Denham 2001) which followed in the Spring of 2002 and which articulated the government's policy response, including the proposal that 'community cohesion should be made an explicit aim of Government at national and local levels' (ibid.: 22). Thus, the concept became central to subsequent government policy, although this is under review by the new coalition government (May 2010–), and it is very likely that there will be significant changes and certainly reduced funding.

The Cantle report places significant responsibility for the disturbances on the shoulders of local communities, specifically calling for their remoralisation through the creation of 'shared values'. Furthermore, with an unanimity of discourse that seems unlikely to be coincidental, the basic contention of all four reports is that the problems in each of the troubled areas were primarily the result of voluntary or

'self-segregation' (Ritchie 2001: 9) and lack of a shared language and values between ethnic and religious groups, as can be seen in the following remarks:

> [W]e have concluded that the main cause for residential segregation has been preferences both within the indigenous and Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities of people 'to live with their own kind'. (Ritchie 2001: 9)

> Too many people now tend to do what they feel is best for themselves and their families within their perceived comfort zones, comprising people like themselves, and do not see the need for integration or wider interaction. (Burnley Task Force 2001: 50)

> Asian and White communities lead separate and parallel lives, and have very few ways of learning from and understanding one another's cultures and beliefs. (Burnley Task Force 2001: 7)

> Cantle summarises the position in the main summary of his commission's findings:

> Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges. … There is little wonder that the ignorance about each others' communities can easily grow into fear; especially where this is exploited by extremist groups determined to undermine community harmony and foster divisions. (ibid.: 9)

However, there are several significant problems with these conclusions. The claims about segregation are not well substantiated (Bagguley and Hussain 2008: 164–165) or placed in comparative context – there is no reference to any other studies of residential, occupational, educational or other forms of segregation nor to standard indices used to measure segregation (Gorard and Taylor 2002; Simpson 2005). No causal link between segregation and the violence that ensued is established. As an example of the former, *Oldham Independent Review* describes Oldham as 'the most segregated town in England', but the only quantitative data that the report presents is on ethnicity by electoral ward, which shows much lower concentrations of minority population than many areas in other British cities, and the same applies to Bradford and Burnley (Bagguley and Hussain 2008: 164–165).

Furthermore, without any measurement of segregation to enable comparison across areas, it is impossible to know whether these areas are or were in fact unusually segregated and hence to assess whether segregation was a major factor in the riots. On the contrary, evidence that is available in the case of Bradford and Oldham using 1991 and 2001 census material (Simpson 2004; Simpson and Galvalas 2005) rather suggests increased dispersal of the South Asian population during the decade preceding the riots:

> Bradford has become more mixed. There are many fewer mono-racial areas at the beginning of the 21st century than a decade before … there has not been a separation of the South Asian and Other populations. (ibid.: 669)

In place of evidence, a 'common sense' connection between segregation and unrest is simply asserted: lack of contact is presumed to breed 'fear and suspicion' (Cantle 2001: 9). While there may be something to this common sense view, it is surely not sufficient simply to assert it as self-evidently *the* root cause of these

disturbances, let alone proceed directly to wholesale policy reformulation when there are so many other possible factors to investigate.

Indeed, other evidence suggests that factors other than segregation may be more fundamental to urban unrest and indeed that there are some benefits, both for long-term integration and for the lives of people from ethnic minorities to concentrations of ethnic minority population. Thus, studies of American suburbia suggest that lack of social cohesion in itself is not a direct cause of social unrest. Commenting on Baumgartner's (1988) work, Kearns and Forrest (2000) – in a paper which, ironically, is one of the main academic sources used by the Cantle Report team and whose use of 'community cohesion' predates the Cantle report – comment:

> [S]uburbs may work because people do not have much to do with one another. …[Indeed] [t]he less robust and deep-rooted are neighbourhood networks, the more stable and conflict free may be the social order in which they sit. (ibid.: 1012)

In other words, work on the functioning of suburbs suggests that *lack of* social cohesion may be a reason for peaceable coexistence in these areas. At the very least, this suggests that social cohesion is not necessarily the key to peaceable coexistence. It further suggests that in troubled areas factors other than social cohesion – deprivation, poverty and inequality – may be more fundamental than lack of cohesion as causes of urban unrest.

A further counterargument with the 'segregation is the root of unrest' hypothesis is evidence that high ethnic concentration may actually facilitate integration by enabling participation in broader social structures – education, training, access to services and social support networks are all easier to deliver to a concentrated than a dispersed population (Dunn 1998; Peleman 2002; Simpson 2004). Ethnic density enables state and voluntary services to be tailored to meet the particular needs of ethnic minority communities, increasing contact with local services, and local people who work for them, as well as improving language and work skills to improve labour market participation. Furthermore, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that the mental and possibly physical health of ethnic minorities is better in areas of higher ethnic concentration, in spite of lower income levels (Wilkinson 2000). Thus, there is substantial evidence that ethnic concentration provides both advantages of scale for service provision and psychosocial benefits, both of which are likely to be for the benefit of long-term integration of minorities.

The aspect of the reports' attribution of the causes of alleged segregation that critics have found most objectionable is the claim that segregation is self-chosen. Thus, while it has been suggested that there are good reasons for choosing to live in areas of high minority concentration, there is also substantial evidence that housing concentrations reflect constraint at least as much as choice. Thus, Cole and Ferrari conclude from their study of residential mobility in Birmingham, England, that 'segregated housing outcomes are likely to be more powerfully explained by constraint and competition between different ethnic groups than by active 'self-segregation'' (2008: 70). Complementary attitudinal data comes from Philips et al. (2008) study of residential choice amongst Asian and White people in Oldham and Rochdale, which found that most (especially young) Asians expressed a desire to live in more mixed areas and had very similar values to Whites in terms of housing

priorities – safety and proximity to family. Rather, cost and fear of racial harassment were the main barriers to mobility (ibid.: 90–5).

While material published later than 2001 has been used in compiling this account, counterevidence along similar lines was available at the time of the enquiries, either in the form of academic papers or official sources of statistics. Yet Cantle was dismissive of academic approaches, preferring a more direct moral, even religious appeal:

> It is unfashionable to speak of loving one's neighbour, but unless our society can move at least to a position where we can respect our neighbours as fellow human beings, we shall fail in our attempts to create a harmonious society in which conditions have changed so radically in the last 40 years … It is easy to focus on systems, processes and institutions and to forget that community cohesion fundamentally depends on people and their values. (Cantle 2001: 20–8)

Community cohesion was thus a policy grown out of public relations techniques and accordingly dismissive of difficult to communicate evidence and contrary voices for fear of appearing confused or indecisive. It shows clear signs of policy shaped by mediatisation – accommodated to easy to communicate media formats, averse to open debate which might reveal dissent. While it took religion – in the form of the constructed object of 'faith', as in 'faith communities' – seriously as a factor in community relations, it did not seriously consider how religion articulates with other factors in contemporary civil societies. Rather, like the case of mediatised politics in de Baarsjes, the entire policy was built on 'a sort of mirage' (Uitermark and Gielen 2010). In de Baarsjes:

> The government acted against radicalism not because it observed radicalism in the neighbourhood, but because it sensed there was a demand for images amongst media audiences for images and narratives of the struggle against radicalism. (ibid.: 1340)

In the story of community cohesion, the government wanted a 'fresh' policy it could 'sell' to an electorate conditioned by media narratives concerning ghettoisation and religious difference. Hence, on the basis of narratives of perceived segregation culled from 'community consultations', it formulated the problem of self-segregation, and the solution of incentivised (or, if necessary) enforced mixing. The facts that 'rather than retreating into their own areas, Britain's minority ethnic residents tend to move put from existing settlement areas to neighbouring areas or to suburbs' and that 'in almost every city with a sizeable inner area that has been the focus of immigration in the past 60 years, children of immigrants have on balance moved away from those areas' (Finney and Simpson 2009: 136) did not disturb them, but the effects of mediatisation should concern us if we want to grasp the dynamics of religion in post-secular civil societies.

2.8   Conclusions

This chapter has argued that recent developments in sociological, anthropological, political and cultural studies approaches can all shed light on the dynamics of religion and civil society in post-secular contexts and indeed in other locations where similar processes are at work. While the (still) most used theories in

sociology of religion (secularisation and rational choice theories) are of limited value in capturing the dialectical interplay between religion, culture and structure revealed by some anthropological and cultural studies approaches, they do help to make sense of some phenomena. For example, Bruce's concept of 'cultural transition' captures something of what goes on when groups migrate, and the 'supply side' of the provision of religious 'goods' does doubtlessly influence the choice of religious consumers in post-secular cultural marketplaces. Inglehart's work (1997; and with Norris 2011) testifies to the power of secularisation theory to make some sense of the global picture when the human perceptions of security are interposed as a variable between modernisation processes and religious behaviour. However, Inglehart's construct of human security is problematic, because the important element of the cultural construction of risk and hence security is not theorised; yet, as the post-9/11 literature on risk shows all too clearly, human risk and security cannot be simply reduced to material factors but depends heavily on their cultural mediation (Herbert 2007).

Recent theory on democratisation and civil society, mostly written in the political science tradition (including international relations and development studies), can also help guide analysis of religion and civil society. Concepts such as 'democratic deepening' (Heller 2009) are useful in thinking about the contested role of religion in post-secular societies; Gramsci's insight into the ambivalence of civil society in advanced industrial societies as both a site for entrenching the power of the state and for articulating resistance to it remains valuable – consider the examples of Dutch and British local and national governments' attempts to do this considered in the two mediatisation case studies. A distinction between normative and empirical civil society also seems useful to enable the normative concept to perform a critical role, while the empirical concept can enable an open-minded study of the actual effects of CSOs without confusing 'ought' with 'is'.

Recent developments in theory in cultural and media studies are also useful in conceptualising what is happening in the interplay between religion and civil society. 'Mediatisation' (while contested, Strömbäck 2008) seems particularly useful, as it enables analysis to reveal the dialectical interplay between media form, religious symbols and discourse and political actors in civil society, as the four case studies illustrated. Finally, while at least the third and fourth case studies suggest a rather grim prognosis for religion in civil society under conditions of mediatised politics, it should be noted that some aspects of media development also open up new possibilities for citizen participation and a reconnection between politics and civil society (De Luca and Peeples 2002; Dahlberg 2001). Furthermore, the common ground between Muslim-majority society populations and European populations revealed by the WVS on questions of democracy (above), and also support for religious organisations having a voice in public life on some issues, suggests both the presence of some overlapping consensus (in spite of the polarising experiences of the last decade) and an institutional means (constitutional democracy) through which negotiations over the role of religion in post-secular civil societies can take place.

References

Achterberg, P. (2009). A Christian cancellation of the secularist truce? Waning Christian religiosity and waxing religious deprivatization in the West. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 48*(4), 687–701.

Alexander, J. (Ed.). (1998). *Real civil societies: Dilemmas of institutionalization*. London: Routledge.

Al-Ghabban, A. (2007). Global viewing in East London: Multi-ethnic youth responses to television news in a new century. *Journal of European Cultural Studies, 10*, 311–326.

Amiraux, V., & Jonker, G. (2006). *The politics of visibility: Young Muslims in European public spaces*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Awan, A. (2007). Virtual jihadist media: Function, legitimacy and radicalizing efficacy. *Journal of European Cultural Studies, 10*, 389–408.

Ayubi, N. (1991). *Political Islam*. London: Routledge.

Bagguley, P., & Hussain, Y. (2008). *Riotous citizens: Ethnic conflict in multicultural Britain*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Baumgartner, M. (1988). *The moral order of a suburb*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BBC. (2012). *2011 census: 45% of Londoners white British*. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-20680565. Posted 11 Dec 2012. Accessed 9 May 2013.

Beckford, J. (2010). The return of public religion: A critical assessment of a popular claim. *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, 23*(2), 121–136.

Berger, P., Davie, G., & Fokas, E. (Eds.). (2008). *Religious America, secular Europe?: A theme and variations*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bhargava, R. (2009). Political secularism: Why it is needed and what can be learned from its Indian version. In G. Brahm-Levey & T. Modood (Eds.), *Secularism, religion and multicultural citizenship* (pp. 82–109). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brahm Levey, G. (2009). Secularism and religion in a multicultural age. In G. Brahm-Levey & T. Modood (Eds.), *Secularism, religion and multicultural citizenship* (pp. 1–24). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bruce, S. (1998). *Conservative protestant politics*. Oxford: OUP.

Bruce, S. (1999). *Choice and religion: A critique of rational choice theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruce, S. (2002). *God is dead: Secularization in the West*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bruce, S. (2010). *Secularization: In defence of an unfashionable theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruce, S., & Glendinning, T. (2010). When was secularization? Dating the decline of the British churches and locating its cause. *British Journal of Sociology, 61*(1), 107–126.

Bruce, S., & Voas, D. (2010). Vicarious religion: An examination and critique. *Journal of Contemporary Religion, 25*(2), 243–259.

Burnell, P., & Calvert, P. (2004). *Civil society in democratization*. London: Frank Cass.

Burnley Task Force. (2001). *Burnley speaks, who listens? A summary of the Burnley Task Force report on the disturbances of 23–25 June 2001* [known as 'The Clarke Report']. Downloaded from http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/Default.aspx?recordId=95. 9 Dec 2012.

Cantle, E. (2001). *Community cohesion: A report of the independent review team*. London: HMSO.

Casanova, J. (1994). *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Çaylak, A. (2008). Autocratic or democratic? A critical approach to civil society movements in Turkey. *Journal of Economic and Social Research, 10*(1), 115–151.

Cesari, J. (2004). *When Islam and democracy meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chandhoke, N. (2001). The "civil" and the "political" in civil society. *Democratization, 8*(2), 1–24.

Chandhoke, N. (2007). Civil society. *Development in Practice, 17*(4–5), 607–614.

Chaves, M. (1994). Secularization as declining religious authority. *Social Forces, 72*, 749–774.

Cohen, J., & Arato, A. (1992). *Civil society and political theory*. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.

Cole, I., & Ferrari, E. (2008). Connectivity of place and housing market change. In J. Flint & D. Robinson (Eds.), *Community cohesion in crisis? New dimensions of diversity and difference* (pp. 57–80). Bristol: The Policy Press.

Coleman, J. (1998). Religion and public life: Some American cases. *Religion, 28*, 155–169.

Czerwinski, A. (2004). Sex, politics, and religion: The clash between Poland and the European Union over abortion. *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 32*(4), 653–674.

Dahlberg, L. (2001). The internet and democratic discourse: Exploring the prospects of online deliberative forums extending the public sphere. *Information, Communication and Society, 4*(4), 615–633.

Deeb, L. (2006). *An enchanted modern: Gender and public piety in Shi'i Lebanon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DeLuca, K. M., & Peeples, J. (2002). From public sphere to public screen: Democracy, activism, and the 'Violence' of Seattle'. *Critical Studies in Media Communication, 19*(2), 25–151.

Denham, J. (2001). *Building cohesive communities: A report of the ministerial group on public order and community cohesion*. London: Home Office.

D'Haenens, L., et al. (2007). Digital citizenship among ethnic minority youths in the Netherlands and Flanders. *New Media and Society, 9*(2), 278–299.

Dunn, K. M. (1998). Rethinking ethnic concentration: The case of Cabramatta, Sydney. *Urban Studies Routledge, 35*(3), 503–528.

Durkheim, E. (1997[1893]). *The division of labor in society* (trans: Coser, L.). New York: Free Press.

Eyerman, R. (2008). *The assassination of Theo van Gogh: From social drama to cultural trauma*. London: Duke University Press.

Finney, N., & Simpson, L. (2009). *Sleepwalking to segregation: Challenging myths about race and migration*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Foucault, M. (1988). *Politics, philosophy, culture: Interviews and other writings 1977–1984* (trans: Sheridan, A., et al.). London: Routledge.

Geaves, R. (2005). *Aspects of Islam*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd.

Gledhill, J. (2006). Resisting the global slum: Politics religion and consumption in the remaking of life worlds in the twenty-first century. *Bulletin of Latin American Research, 25*(3), 322–339.

Gorard, S., & Taylor, C. (2002). What is segregation? A comparison of measures in terms of 'Strong' and 'Weak' compositional invariance. *Sociology, 36*(4), 875–895.

Guveli, A., & Platt, L. (2011). Understanding the religious behaviour of Muslims in the Netherlands and the UK'. *Sociology, 45*(6), 1008–1027.

Habermas, J. (1996). *Between facts and norms*. Cambridge: Polity.

Habermas, J. (2008). Notes on post-secular society. *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly, 25*(4), 17–29.

Hann, C. (Ed.). (1996). *Civil society: Challenging western models*. London: Routledge.

Hearn, J. (2000). Aiding democracy? Donors and civil society in Africa? *Third World Quarterly, 21*(5), 815–830.

Hefner, R. (2000). *Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Heller, P. (2009). Democratic deepening in India and South Africa. *Journal of Asian and African Studies, 44*, 123–149.

Herbert, D. (2003). *Religion and civil society: Rethinking public religion in the contemporary world*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Herbert, D. (2007). Shifting securities in Northern Ireland: Terror and the troubles in global media and local memory. *European Journal of Cultural Studies, 10*(3), 343–359.

Herbert, D. (2011). Theorizing religion and media in contemporary society: An account of religious 'Publicization'. *European Journal of Cultural Studies, 14*(6), 626–648.

Herbert, D., & Fras, M. (2009). European enlargement, secularisation and religious re-publicisation in Central and Eastern Europe. *Religion, State & Society, 37*(1/2), 81–97.

Hirshkind, C. (2006). Cassette ethics: Public piety and popular media in Egypt. In B. Meyer & A. Moors (Eds.), *Religion, the media and the public sphere* (pp. 29–51). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hjarvard, S. (2004). From bricks to bytes: The mediatization of a global toy industry. In I. Bondebjerg & P. Golding (Eds.), *European culture and the media* (pp. 43–63). Bristol: Intellect.

Hudick, A. (1999). *NGOs and civil society: Democracy by proxy?* Cambridge: Polity.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keane, J. (1998). *Civil society*. Cambridge: Polity.

Kearns, A., & Forrest, R. (2000). Social cohesion and multilevel urban governance. *Urban Studies, 37*(5–6), 995–1017.

King, M. (2013). Birmingham revisited – Causal differences between the riots of 2011 and 2005? *Policing & Society, 23*(1), 26–45.

Kopecký, P., & Mudde, C. (2003). Rethinking civil society. *Democratization, 10*(3), 1–14.

Lapidus, I. (1992). The golden age: The political concepts of Islam. *Annals of the American Academy, 524*, 13–25.

Lehmann, D., & Siebzeher, B. (2006). Holy pirates: Media, ethnicity and religious renewal in Israel. In B. Meyer & A. Moors (Eds.), *Religion, the media and the public Sphere* (pp. 91–113). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Leurs, K., et al. (2012). Digital multiculturalism in the Netherlands: Religious ethnic and gender positioning by Moroccan-Dutch youth. *Religion and Gender, 2*(1), 150–175.

Lindekilde, L. (2010). Soft repression and mobilisation: The case of transnational activism of Danish Muslims during the Muhammad cartoon s controversy. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 42*(3), 451–469.

Lu, Y., Johnson, B., & Stark, R. (2008). Deregulation and the religious market in Taiwan: A research note. *The Sociological Quarterly, 49*(1), 139–153.

Mahmood, S. (2010). Can secularism be otherwise? In M. Warner, J. VanAntwerpen, & C. J. Calhoun (Eds.), *Varieties of secularism in a secular age* (pp. 282–299). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maliepaard, M., et al. (2012). Generational differences in ethnic and religious attachment and their interrelation. A study among Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33*(3), 451–472.

Mandaville, P. (2001). *Transnational Muslim politics: Reimagining the Umma*. London: Routledge.

Mayhew, S. (2009). *Social cohesion in a dictionary of geography* (Oxford Reference online). http://www.oxfordreference.com.libezproxy.open.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/9780199231805.001.0001/acref-9780199231805-e-3636?rskey=z5Hnlr&result=3&q=social%20cohesion. Accessed 18 June 2013.

Martin, D. (1996). *Forbidden revolutions: Pentecostalism in Latin America, Catholicism in Eastern Europe*. London: SPCK.

McCormick, B., & Shaozi, S. (1992). The 1989 democracy movement: A review of the prospects for civil society in China. *Pacific Affairs, 65*(2), 182–202.

Meyer, B., & Moors, A. (2006). *Religion, the media and the public sphere*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Modood, T. (1997). *Ethnic minorities in Britain: Diversity and disadvantage*. London: Policy Studies Institute.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2011). *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oberti, M. (2008). The French republican model of integration: The theory of cohesion and the practice of exclusion. *New Directions for Youth Development, 119*, 55–73.

Omelicheva, M. (2009). Global civil society and democratization of world politics: A bona fide relationship or illusory liaison? *International Studies Review, 11*, 109–132.

Ouseley, H. (2001). *Community pride not prejudice: Making diversity work in Bradford*. Bradford: Bradford Vision.

Peleman, K. (2002). The impact of residential segregation on participation in associations: The case of Moroccan women in Belgium. *Urban Studies, 39*(4), 727–747.

Philips, D., Simpson, L., & Ahmed, S. (2008). Shifting geographies of minority ethnic settlement: Remaking communities in Oldham and Rochdale. In J. Flint & D. Robinson (Eds.), *Community cohesion in crisis? New dimensions of diversity and difference* (pp. 81–98). Bristol: The Policy Press.

Poole, E. (2002). *Reporting Islam: Media representations of British Muslims*. London: I B Tauris.

Rajagopal, A. (2001). *Politics after television: Hindu nationalism and the reshaping of the public in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ramadan, T. (2004). *Western Muslims and the future of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ramet, S. (1999). *Balkan Babel: The disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the war for Kosovo*. Boulder: Westview.

Schmitter, P. (2010). Twenty-five years, fifteen findings. *Journal of Democracy, 21*(1), 17–28.

Shlapentokh, V. (2008). Russian civil society: Elite versus mass attitudes to the democratization of Russia. In J. Ciprut (Ed.), *Democratizations: Comparisons, confrontations and contrasts* (pp. 165–196). Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.

Simpson, L. (2004). Statistics of racial segregation: Measures, evidence and policy. *Urban Studies, 41*(3), 661–681.

Simpson, L. (2005). On the measurement and meaning of residential segregation: A reply to Johnston Poulsen and Forrest. *Urban Studies, 42*(7), 1229–1230.

Simpson, L., & Galvalas, V. (2005). *Population dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham: Population, household and social change* (CCSR working paper). Manchester: University of Manchester.

Skapska, G. (1997). Learning to be a citizen: Cognitive and ethical aspects of post-communist society transformation. In R. Fine (Ed.), *Civil society: Democratic perspective* (pp. 145–160). London: Cass.

Smith, C. (1998). *Evangelicalism: Embattled and thriving*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Sniderman, P., & Hagendoorn, L. (2007). *When ways of life collide : Multiculturalism and its discontents in the Netherlands*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stark, R. (1999). Secularization R.I.P. *Sociology of Religion, 60*(3), 249–273.

Stark, R. (2001). Efforts to Christianize Europe, 400–2000. *Journal of Contemporary Religion, 16*(1), 105–123.

Stark, R. (2006). Religious competition and Roman piety. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion, 2*, 1–30.

Stark, R., & Iannocone, L. (1996). Response to Lechner: Recent religious debates in Quebec, Poland and the Netherlands: A theory vindicated. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 35*(3), 256–271.

Starrett, G. (1998). *Putting Islam to work: Education, politics and religious transformation in Egypt*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.

Starrett, G. (2008). Authentication and affect: Why the Turks don't like enchanted counterpublics. A review essay. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 50*(4), 1036–1046.

Statistics Norway. (2013). *Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, 1 January 2013*. http://www.ssb.no/en/innvbef. Posted 25 Apr 2013. Accessed 9 May 2013.

Stolcke, V. (1999). New rhetorics of exclusion in Europe. *International Social Science Journal, 51*(159), 25–36.

Strömbäck, J. (2008). Four phases of mediatization: An analysis of the mediatization of politics. *Press/Politics, 13*(3), 228–246.

Tarlo, E. (2010). *Visibly Muslim: Fashion, faith, politics*. Oxford: Berg.

Tester, K. (1992). *Civil society*. London: Routledge.

Therborn, G. (1997). Beyond civil society: Democratic experiences and their relevance to the "Middle East". In E. Özdalga & S. Persson (Eds.), *Civil society and democracy in the Muslim world* (pp. 45–54). Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute.

Tripp, C. (2006). *Islam and the moral economy: The challenge of capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Uitermark, J., & Gielen, A. (2010). Islam in the spotlight: The mediatisation of politics in an Amsterdam neighbourhood. *Urban Studies, 47*(6), 1325–1342.

Vellenga, S. (2008). The Dutch and British public debate on Islam: Responses to the killing of Theo van Gogh and the London bombings compared. *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 19*(4), 449–471.

White, G. (1994). Civil society, democratization and development (I): Clearing the analytical ground. *Democratization, 1*(3), 375–390.

Wilkinson, M. (2000). The globalisation of Pentecostalism: The role of Asian immigrant Pentecostals in Canada. *Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies, 3*(2), 219–227.

Wuthnow, R., & Hackett, C. (2003). The social integration of practitioners of non-Western religions in the United States. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42*(4), 651–667.

Yamane, D. (1997). Secularization on trial: In defence of a neo-secularization paradigm. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 36*, 109–122.

Internet Resources

Neighbourhood Statistics Ealing. http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadTableView.do?a=3&b=276751&c=Ealing&d=13&e=16&g=332021&i=1001x1003x1004&m=0&r=1&s=1250872110830&enc=1&dsFamilyId=87. Accessed 23 Nov 2010.

Neighbourhood Statistics Newham. http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadTableView.do?a=3&b=276767&c=Newham&d=13&e=16&g=343478&i=1001x1003x1004&m=0&r=1&s=1250871514458&enc=1&dsFamilyId=87. Accessed 23 Nov 2010.

Oldham Independent Review. (2001). One Oldham, one future – Ritchie report. http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/DownloadDocumentsFile.aspx?recordId=97&file=PDFversiondownloaded. 18 June 2013.

Oldham PCT. http://www.raceforhealth.org/members/pcts/oldham. Accessed 23 Nov 2010.

World Values Survey. (2007). www.jdsurvey.net/bdasepjds/QuestionMarginals.jsp. Accessed 27 Nov 2007.

Chapter 3
Religion, State and Civil Society in Europe: Triangular Entanglements

John T.S. Madeley

3.1 Introduction

Much of the recent interest in the role of religion in civil society has derived from the participation of religious figures, churches and related organisations – mainly, but not at all exclusively, Catholic – in the dramatic transitions to democracy that have occurred in Southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe and other parts of the world since the 1970s. While this interest is understandable given the particular prominence of actors such as Pope John Paul II and of religious or religion-inspired activists in Poland and Latin America, it is curious that it should have occurred at a time when the Catholic church had seemed to eschew its traditional involvement in politics in favour of, instead, developing its role in society. In 1994 Jose Casanova argued persuasively that since Vatican II, there had occurred 'a fundamental change in the location and orientation of the Catholic church from one centred and anchored in the state to one centred in civil society … the public locus of the church is no longer the state or political society but, rather, civil society' (Casanova 1994: 62–63). This chapter addresses the seeming paradox thrown up by these observations by surveying the location and orientation of churches and other religious organisations in Europe relative to the state, political society and civil society. It is argued that the ambivalent role of religion in public affairs in different parts of Europe continues to be conditioned by a long legacy of entanglement with states, political parties and movement organisations which continues to shape and condition its role in civil society. The picture which emerges can be described as one of triangular entanglements which entails *inter alia* a continuing and increasing concern on the part of state authorities with the regulation of the religious sphere, as well as a corresponding resurgence of the religious factor in politics.

J.T.S. Madeley (✉)
Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science,
London, UK
e-mail: j.madeley@lse.ac.uk

The analysis is complicated by the fact that in contemporary Europe, the category religion now embraces a very wide range of disparate phenomena; in addition to the traditional Christian churches and mainline denominations with their associated institutions and organisations, recent decades have seen the emergence of significant minorities with backgrounds in the other world religions on the one hand and, on the other, the growth of a bewildering variety of so-called New Religious Movements – Scientologists, Moonies, Wicca, etc. – the existence of which have only served to highlight problems associated with issues of religious toleration, freedom and recognition. In Europe the development of this new religious pluralism has occurred in a context which is still informed by a long history of problematic church-state-society relations (Madeley and Enyedi 2003). With the almost universal acceptance by the 1990s in Europe, West and East, of the principle of religious toleration, most of the resulting arrangements – with few, if significant, exceptions – had ceased to be unduly controversial, but the subsequent influx of new, unfamiliar and occasionally exotic religious impulses has led to a recrudescence of the old debates, as well as the emergence of some new issues. In Thomas Banchoff's terms, it is in particular arrangements reflecting the 'hierarchical dimension of the new pluralism' which have given rise to controversy: 'There are majority religious traditions and majority political cultures … within which diversity is articulated. Pluralism is about the responses of minorities to majorities and vice versa. Only by viewing the interaction among religious groups on an uneven playing field can one specify distinctive contours of the new pluralism' (Banchoff 2007: 6).

3.2   The Surviving Legacy of State Confessionalism

In an important sense religion in Europe has been pluralistic throughout history – whether under or outside the pagan Roman Empire, or during the same empire's last century and a half when Christianity achieved the status of an established religion but suffered serious internal doctrinal and other disputes, or following the great eleventh century schism between the Greek East and the Latin West at a time when parts of northern Europe still remained pagan and a major Islamic civilisation held sway in the Iberian peninsula. Even when, finally, the successful Christianisation of most of the continent by the late fifteenth century had been achieved (excepting only those south-eastern parts where the Islamic Ottoman Empire continued to encroach), Christian Europe was decisively torn apart by forces driving the reformation(s), the Counter-Reformation and the ensuing wars of religion. An important feature of this 'old' pluralism of religious traditions is that until about a century ago it remained inscribed across the continent's geography by the fixity of the boundaries between relatively cohesive confessional blocs (Madeley 2003a, b). The end of Europe's age of religious wars, conventionally marked by historians at the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, did not issue in the establishment of <u>general</u> religious toleration (except at the level of relations between states), although it did require the observance of a range of *particular* local exceptions to the *cuius regio eius religio* ('whose region, his religion')

rule. Instead the final institutionalisation of that rule decisively conferred on the authorities within each jurisdiction the right to enforce conformity to the locally established confession thereby repressing pluralistic tendencies within individual territories. Even the great 1789 French Revolution's declaration that 'no one may be harassed because of his opinions' – to which was added, as it needed particular emphasis, 'even religious ones' – failed to introduce a decisive change to Europe's confessional map. Although it signalled the important symbolic break of uncoupling citizenship rights from denominational membership within that country was for a long time, 'the only country to have put this major and radical dissociation into operation' (Rémond 1999: 39). Throughout most of Europe for a century thereafter, growing tendencies towards religious dissent and pluralism continued to be held at bay, courtesy of the civil authorities, by means of discrimination in favour of the locally established confessions, using the instrumentality of, variously, religious tests for public office, the provision or denial of public funding, the encouragement of religious-nationalist themes and in some countries the maintenance of oppressive systems of penal law. It is perhaps unsurprising then that Europe continues at the start of the third millennium of the Common Era to exhibit some of the marks of the age of the early-modern confessional state (Madeley 2009).

One of the most striking – if rarely remarked – features of contemporary religious Europe is the survival of high levels of confessional identity inherited from an earlier age, despite the recent growth of the new religious pluralism. Table 3.1 illustrates the fact that the confessional map of Europe continues to be dominated by the historically mono-confessional blocs of Roman Catholic, Protestant and Eastern Orthodox countries in the Southern, Northern and Eastern parts of Europe, separated though they are from each other by relatively narrow belts of historically multi-confessional territories, where the principal traditions have abutted on each other since 1648 (Knippenberg 2006).

The fixing of this overall pattern has been analysed by German historians as the result of processes of the 'confessionalisation' (*Konfessionalisierung*) of subject populations which continued for long to reinforce confessional conformity within individual territories. Nor have the secularising trends of declining levels of religious belief and observance over the last century led to the erasure of the resulting patterns of confessional identity; in Grace Davie's terms, habits of belonging – or at least of identification – have survived even where traditions of believing and practice have decayed (Davie 2000). As the table shows, 38 (83 %) out of Europe's 46 national territories continued in 2000 to exhibit single-confession majorities and 33 (72 %) of these had supermajorities (i.e. populations in which more than two-thirds share a single confessional identity) – 13 of them (28 %) are even recorded as having over 90 % of their population sharing a single identity. However crude and at the margin disputable, these figures can be taken to demonstrate that, despite the twentieth century's massive economic, social, political and other dislocations, the early-modern confessional state continues to throw a long shadow. Of course the finding of continuing confessional majoritarianism does not imply that the majorities referred to represent cohesive blocs of religious opinion and observance. Under current conditions even the most solid confessional identity majorities – such as the

Table 3.1 The long shadow of the confessional state in Europe: confessional majoritarianism by tradition and country

%	Catholic	Protestant	Orthodox	Muslim	Other	Fractionalisation index
91–100	Spain: 99	Iceland: 99		Turkey: 99		0.0561 Turkey
				Cyprus, Turkish[a]: 99		0.1472 Spain
	Luxembourg: 97					0.2027 Iceland
	Portugal: 97	Norway: 95				0.1778 Lux
				Azerbaijan: 94		0.2346 Portugal
			Greece: 93			0.1889 Norway
	Poland: 92					0.2860 Azerb
	Ireland: 92					0.1639 Greece
	Malta: 91		Armenia: 91			0.1485 Poland
						0.2753 Iceland
						0.1045 Malta
						0.3761 Armenia
81–90	Andorra: 89	Finland: 89				0.2012 Andorra
	Croatia: 88	Denmark: 86				0.2609 Finland
	Lithuania: 85					0.2120 Croatia
	Italy: 84.	Sweden: 84				0.2279 Denmark
			Bulgaria: 82			0.3048 Lithuania
						0.3048 Italy
						0.4594 Sweden
						0.4656 Bulgaria
71–80	Belgium: 80					0.3380 Belgium
	Liechtenstein: 80		Cyprus, Gk: 78[a]			0.4296 Liecht
	Austria: 78		Romania: 77			0.4184 Austria
	Slovenia: 76		Georgia: 75			0.5060 Romania
						0.2958 Slovenia
						0.6392 Georgia

61–70	France: 69, Hungary 67, Slovakia 67	Belarus: 70, Moldova: 70		Albania: 65	
51–60		Utd Kingdom: 53	Yugoslavia[a]: 60, FYROM[a]: 59, Russia: 51		
41–50	Switzerland[b]: 46			Bosnia-Herz[c]: 44	
31–40	Cz Republic[d]: 40, The Netherlands[g]: 34	Germany[f]: 35			Estonia[e]: 36, Latvia[h]: 34
50+ %	17	6	11	4	0
50– %	3	1	0	1	2
Total	20	7	11	5	2

Herfindahl scores:

0.6816 Belarus	0.7499 Utd Kgdm
0.7287 Moldova	0.6617 Russia
0.4921 France	0.6460 Switz
0.5677 Hungary	0.5777 Bosnia-H
0.5104 Slovakia	0.7057 Cz Rep
0.7597 Albania	0.8022 Estonia
	0.7230 Germany
	0.7662 The Neths
	0.7969 Latvia

Source: Barrett et al. (2001). Herfindahl scores calculated from same source leaving out groups which count for less that 1 % of the population

[a] No fractionalisation index available

[b] Switzerland and other confessional groups: Protestant 40 % and Others 8.9 %

[c] Bosnia-Herzegovina and other confessional groups: Orthodox 31 %, Catholic 15 %, and Protestant 4 %

[d] Czech Republic and other confessional groups: Others 38.6 %, Protestant 4 %, and Orthodox 2 %

[e] Estonia and other confessional groups: Protestant 17.2 %, Orthodox 16.5 %, and Catholic 0.6 %

[f] Germany and other confessional groups: Catholic 33.7 % and Others 26.4 %

[g] The Netherlands: Protestant 26.9 % and Others 12.9 %

[h] Latvia: Orthodox 22.8 %, Protestant 22.2 %, and Catholic 19.7 %

Roman Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox majorities in, respectively, Spain, Iceland and Greece – can be seen to be internally divided along many dimensions of membership, belief, practice and ethical viewpoint. And in almost all countries there is now a growing penumbra of alternative traditions, some with deep roots in particular territories, others relatively novel and often exotic in their provenance; the fractionalisation scores in the last column of the table indicates by the use of Herfindahl quotients the presence of these other groups. There are also in most parts of the continent more or less significant groups of secularists – some of them enjoying state recognition as separate 'communities of conviction' – although it is notable that their often high profile in cultural and intellectual circles is rarely reflected in terms of their representation among the general population.

3.3   The Continuing Role of State Authorities in the Religious Sphere

One of the reasons why confessional majoritarianism continues to mark Europe's religious map is that state authorities, having largely abandoned attempts to repress religious dissidence, have continued to provide support for the historically dominant confessions while extending it usually on less generous terms to other mainstream religions on the grounds that they also could be argued to contribute to the public good. It is often assumed that in Western liberal democracies traditions of religious establishment have been superseded and replaced by one form or another of separation of the religious from the political. Thus for example Charles Taylor presents as unproblematic the claim that in western societies the public sphere has been almost completely secularised: 'whereas the political organization of all pre-modern societies was in some way connected to, based on, guaranteed by some faith in, or adherence to God, or some notion of ultimate reality, the modern Western state is free from this connection. Churches are now separate from political structures (with a couple of exceptions, in Britain and the Scandinavian countries, which are so low key and undemanding as not really to constitute exceptions)' (Taylor 2007: 1). Although there is room to question the nature and significance of the surviving connections between religious institutions and political structures, a brief review of the headline evidence indicates that this judgement requires some qualification.

Table 3.2 shows that in 1900 all but one of Europe's 46 territories were occupied by states which could still be judged *de jure* 'religious' that is officially committed in one way or another to the support of either a particular religion or religions (31 cases) or to religion in general (14 cases). The one exception identified is the Netherlands which is labelled *de jure* 'secular', presumably on the grounds that the Dutch Reformed Church had by then finally been disestablished in 1848, although it – along with other Calvinist denominations which had divided from it – continued to enjoy considerable status, political power and influence (Kennedy 2010). Elsewhere in Europe the legal and/or official foundations of the inherited systems of church establishment still survived across almost the whole continent, even if by 1900 they

Table 3.2 State religiosity and regime types in Europe (*de jure*), 1900–2000

Empire groups as of 1900		1900	1970	2000	State-religious regime type 2000
	Andorra	RC	RC	RC	Official religion
	Belgium	R	R	R	Cooperationist
United Kingdom	Great Britain	RA	RA	RA	Official religion(s)
	Ireland	RC	RC	R	Endorsed religion
	Malta	RC	RC	RC	Official religion
	Denmark	RL	RL	RL	Official religion
	Iceland	RL	RL	RL	Official religion
	France	R	S	S	Separationist
	Germany	R	R	S	Cooperationist
	Greece	RO	RO	RO	Official religion
	Italy	RC	RC	RC	Cooperationist
	Liechtenstein	RC	RC	RC	Official religion
	Luxembourg	RC	RC	RC	Cooperationist
	The Netherlands	S	S	S	Accommodationist
	(Poland)	R	A	RC[a]	Endorsed religion
	Portugal	RC	RC	RC	Endorsed religion
	Romania	RO	A	RO[a]	Endorsed religion
	Spain	RC	RC	RC	Official religion
	Sweden	RL	RL	R[b]	Cooperationist
	Norway	RL	RL	RL	Official religion
	Switzerland	R	R	R	Cooperationist
	(Yugoslavia)	R	A	RO[a]	Cooperationist

Table 3.2 (continued)

Empire groups as of 1900		1900	1970	2000	State-religious regime type 2000
Russian Empire	Russia	RO	A	S	Endorsed religion
	Armenia	OO	A	OO	Official religion
	Azerbaijan	RI	A	RI	Separationist
	Belarus	RO	A	RO	Endorsed religion
	Ukraine	RO	A	RO	Cooperationist
	Estonia	R	A	S	Accommodationist
	Finland	RX	RX	RX	Official religion(s)
	Georgia	RO	A	RO	Endorsed religion
	Latvia	RO	A	S	Cooperationist
	Lithuania	RO	A	S	Cooperationist
	Moldova	RO	A	RO	Endorsed religion
Austria-Hungary	Austria	R	S	S	Cooperationist
	Czech Rep	R	A	RC	Cooperationist
	Bosnia-Herz	R	A	RI	Cooperationist
	Croatia	RC	A	RC	Endorsed religion
	Hungary	R	A	S[a]	Cooperationist
	Slovakia	R	A	S	Cooperationist
	Slovenia	RC[b]	A	RC[b]	Cooperationist

Ottoman Empire				
Turkey	RI	S	S	Official religion
Albania	RI	A	S	Accommodationist
Bulgaria	R	A	RO[a]	Endorsed religion
Cyprus	R	R	R	Cooperationist
Macedonia	RO	A	RO	Endorsed religion

Sources:

Attributions: Barrett et al. (1982, 2001) supplemented by information from *Annual Reports on International Religious Freedom: Europe and the New Independent States* (US Dept of State)

SRAS scores: Fox (2008)

The state-religious regime type labels are a combination of those used by Fox (2008) and by Durham (1996: 20–22). The latter's Endorsed Religion is preferred to Fox's Civil Religion, while Fox's Official Religion is preferred to Cole Durham's Established Church(es)

Codes: *A* Atheistic, *R* Religious (unspecified), *RA* Anglican, *RC* Roman Catholic, *RI* Islamic, *RL* Lutheran, *RO* Orthodox, *RX* (Finland only) Lutheran and Orthodox, *OO* (Armenia only) Oriental Orthodox, *S* Secular

[a] These Barrett attributions changed (from A) on the basis of information from the more recent sources

[b] Changed attribution: formal disestablishment of the Lutheran church occurred in January 2000

[c] Changed attribution (in Barrett (2001) listed as RO)

appeared to be increasingly under threat. In most countries religious freedoms had expanded – albeit at different paces and occasionally with reversals – and few establishments could any longer rely for their maintenance on the negative penal disciplines by which state authorities had once shored them up. In France tensions between clericals and anticlericals were to come to a head soon after 1900, issuing in a decisive change which made that country Europe's first *laïciste* (or *secularist*, as opposed to merely *secular*) state. The Law of Separation of 1905 proclaimed that henceforth the Republic would neither recognise nor subsidise any religious confession or cult (Rémond 1999: 149). This was an exceptional move however, and no other countries followed the French example until after the First World War when in Turkey after 1923 Kemal Atatürk introduced his own *laiklik* version of *laïcité*. In Russia, following a more brutally secularist path, Lenin's Bolsheviks had by then disestablished the Orthodox Church 3 months after seizing power in late 1917, reducing it to the status of a mere religious association with no corporate personality, thereby preventing it from even holding property in its own right. In Germany and Austria in the aftermath of the First World War, formal establishment was also ended, although the resulting arrangements continued to allow for cooperation in such matters as religious education in the public schools, the raising of the *Kirchensteuer* (a church tax collected by the state tax authorities) and other valued aspects of the earlier system of formal establishment.

Some contemporary commentators concluded that all these developments indicated that by the early 1920s church establishment had finally been consigned to the dustbin of history (Wyduckel 2001: 169). The table indicates that this judgement was however at the very least premature. Formal church-state establishment survived in different confessional guises in the Nordic countries, England and Scotland within the UK, the Iberian peninsula and the Orthodox states of the continent's south-east. In Catholic thinking state, churches – despite their virtual existence in the small, overwhelmingly Catholic states of Liechtenstein, Malta and Monaco – had never been regarded by Rome as fully legitimate institutional forms, often having come into existence on the back of entanglements with the local temporal authorities. The arrangement which the Vatican preferred to formal establishment was friendly cooperation between church and state within a particular territory on the basis of Concordats, that is, treaties which were negotiated to protect the autonomy of the church in the spiritual sphere while providing favourable conditions for its mission within civil society. It was on such a basis that relations between the Vatican and the Italian state were at last settled with the Lateran Pacts of 1929 – a series of concordat agreements which also finally regularised the existence of Europe's only surviving church-state: the State of Vatican City. Four years later major concordat agreements were also signed in 1933 with Germany and Austria, although these subsequently were found to provide inadequate protection from the depredations of Nazism. In Spain, where the French or Latin pattern of clerical-anticlerical confrontation was starkly exemplified in a series of violent political oscillations involving the standing of the Catholic Church, 1931 saw the establishment of a Second Republic, the separation of church and state, the nationalisation of church property, the abolition of state support, the secularisation of the education system and the

expulsion of the Jesuits. By the end of the decade, however, after 3 years of bitter civil war, Franco's authoritarian regime had reversed the situation once again and firmly entrenched a system of National Catholicism.

The period following the end of the Second World War saw the restoration of the historic churches in the West and the suppression of their freedom in the East, now under Soviet overlordship. As complete disenchantment with the authoritarian and totalitarian alternatives of fascism, Nazism and communism set in, Christian Democratic parties emerged across most of the West – even for a time in France where such parties had fared poorly earlier. In the terms used by Alfred Stepan, this made for a considerable role in political society as well as for direct influence in the state. Aside from the critical economic reconstruction over which they presided, Western Europe's Christian Democrats were also responsible for ensuring conditions favourable to the principal religious institutions in their several countries. Unlike in 1918 there was little appetite for measures of disestablishment; instead, in Western Europe the churches either retained or were restored to their former places of honour and privilege; in Germany and Italy the interwar concordats remained in force, while in Franco's Spain, a new concordat in 1953 further reinforced an anti-pluralist system of National Catholicism. In Eastern Europe the outcome of the world war produced radically different outcomes however, as Soviet-installed regimes imposed strict controls on the churches and other religious bodies. This occurred more often than not in the context of constitutional provisions which ostensibly guaranteed religious freedom in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and other international legal instruments (Boyle and Sheen 1997). In defiance of these commitments however, by 1970, as Table 3.2 indicates, all 22 countries of Central and Eastern Europe which lay behind the Iron Curtain could be designated Atheistic *de jure*, committed in Barrett's terms to 'formally promoting irreligion'. This meant typically that while the state was ostensibly separated from all religions and churches, it was also 'linked for ideological reasons with irreligion and opposed on principle to all religion', claiming the right 'to oppose religion by discrimination, obstruction or even suppression' (Barrett 1982: 96). The so-called church-state separation in these states was in other words entirely one-sided; it meant exclusion (separation) of the religious from public life and the cutting off of most of the resources required for religion to flourish. It emphatically did not mean however that the state was debarred from interfering in the field of religious provision – rather that, as in Turkey, the state and its organs were equipped to exert maximum control. In the extreme case of Albania, finally, the attempt was openly made between 1967 and 1991 to abolish all manifestations of religion altogether. In very different ways the decades after 1945 can then be seen as a time when the connections between, and mutual entanglement of, religion and the state were actually reinforced in both Western and Eastern Europe albeit under opposite signs, positive and negative.

The changes which have occurred since the 1970s have transformed church-state relations in the Iberian peninsula and Eastern Europe. The so-called third wave of democratisation began in April 1974 with the military overthrow of Portugal's authoritarian regime and the transition to democracy which followed shortly

afterwards upon the death of Franco in neighbouring Spain. Having spread out to Latin America and parts of Asia before washing back across Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, this wave put an end to the atheist or secularist regimes of the Soviet bloc. Churches and religious groups in some of these countries, most notably in Poland, were important actors in the campaigns for liberalisation and democratisation which – along with the withdrawal of Soviet guarantees – precipitated the shift to more open, democratic regimes. As part of this transition, as Table 3.2 indicates, by 2000 all the states which were coded as Atheistic in 1970 had either returned to the category of *de jure* Religious states providing support to the locally dominant religious tradition (15 cases) or had made changes which justified classifying them as *de jure* Secular (seven cases: Russia, the three Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia and Macedonia), that is, officially promoting neither religion nor irreligion. None of them formally adopted a state church model even though it is notable that in almost all cases ministries and departments devoted to regulating the religious field continued – and continue – to exist. Nor did more than one of them (Azerbaijan) opt for the separationist model, despite the recommendations of the United States and international organisations such as the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the claim in some quarters that so-called church-state separation constituted a virtual *sine qua non* of liberal democracy (Ferrari 2003: 411–427). As the last column in Table 3.2 indicates, most have instead chosen to adopt models which involve endorsement of – or patterns of accommodation or cooperation with – the principal churches and many, including those that did not have significant Catholic populations, have negotiated some kind of concordat settlement with the Vatican.[1]

3.4   Patterns of State-Religion-Society Entanglement in Europe, East and West

Table 3.3 illustrates the 2002 distribution of different types of state-religion regime type identified by Cole Durham and Jonathan Fox as between Western and Eastern/Central Europe (Durham 1996; Fox 2008). The table is arranged by deciles based on the scores for Fox's measure for Separation of Religion and State (SRAS) where a zero score would indicate complete or strict separation. Each point above zero can, then, be counted as reflecting the existence of a deviation from separation as this was interpreted and applied by the United States Supreme Court between the 1940s and the 1980s during the heyday of strict separationism. The deviations are identified from batches of variables which code for (a) state support for one or more religions

---

[1] All of the eight former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe that joined the EU in May 2004 (in alphabetic order: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) concluded concordat agreements with the Vatican. This is all the more remarkable since of the 15 previous EU members only five (Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain) had existing concordats (Schanda 2005).

Table 3.3 State-religion-society entanglement in Europe, East and West: measures and state-religion regime types

SRAS decile	Western Europe	SRAS score	Total of GRI, GFI and SRI	GRI	GFI	SRI	State-religion regime type
0.00>9.99	The Netherlands	1.25	12.8	0.0	5.5	7.3	Accommodationist
10.00>19.99	Luxembourg	10.50	8.2	0.6	7.6	0.0	Cooperationist
	Sweden	12.17	5.9	0.8	3.8	1.3	Cooperationist
	Italy	13.00	11.6	1.4	6.9	3.3	Cooperationist
	Ireland	15.75	2.7	0.0	2.0	0.7	Endorsed religion
	Germany	19.88	13.3	2.2	6.4	4.7	Cooperationist
20.00>29.99	Switzerland	20.50	13.2	0.6	6.6	6.0	Cooperationist
	Portugal	21.94	7.8	0.0	7.8	0.0	Endorsed religion separationist
	France	22.92	12.0	3.1	2.9	6.0	Official religion
	Andorra	23.13	7.5	0.0	7.5	0.0	Cooperationist
	Austria	24.25	11.6	1.4	6.2	4.0	Cooperationist official religion
	Belgium	25.50	15.6	3.1	6.5	6.0	Official religion
	Malta	25.63	7.9	0.0	7.9	0.0	Official religion
	Norway	25.83	12.1	1.4	7.4	3.3	Official religion
	Denmark	26.04	12.1	1.4	7.4	3.3	Official religion(s)
	Liechtenstein	27.50	9.0	1.4	7.6	0.0	Official religion
	UK	27.67	13.3	2.2	7.1	4.0	Official religion
	Spain	28.46	10.7	0.0	7.4	3.3	Official religion
	Iceland	29.79	10.7	2.2	7.8	0.7	
30.00>39.99	Finland	32.88	8.0	1.7	5.6	0.7	Official religion(s)
W. average scores		21.73	10.3	1.2	6.4	2.7	

(continued)

Table 3.3 (continued)

SRAS decile	East/Central Europe	SRAS score	Total of GRI, GFI and SRI	GRI	GFI	SRI	State-religion regime type
0.00>9.99	Estonia	3.52	3.4	0.0	2.7	0.7	Accommodationist
	Albania	7.69	4.0	0.6	2.1	1.3	Accommodationist
10.00>19.99	Slovenia	11.96	10.7	1.4	6.0	3.3	Cooperationist
	Cyprus	16.13	16.5	2.2	7.6	6.7	Cooperationist
	Bosnia-H	16.33	17.4	6.1	6.0	5.3	Cooperationist
	Yugoslavia	16.75	15.7	1.4	7.6	6.7	Cooperationist
	Latvia	17.56	15.8	4.7	6.4	4.7	Cooperationist
	Lithuania	17.58	12.8	3.1	6.4	3.3	Cooperationist
	Czech Rep	18.19	10.8	0.6	6.9	3.3	Cooperationist
	Slovakia	19.88	14.3	2.2	6.7	5.3	Cooperationist
	Ukraine	19.99	17.1	4.7	6.4	6.0	Cooperationist
20.00>29.99	Poland	22.21	9.8	0.0	5.8	4.0	Endorsed religion
	Croatia	22.42	15.0	1.4	7.6	6.0	Endorsed religion
	Hungary	22.79	9.4	1.4	6.7	1.3	Cooperationist
	Romania	24.50	16.6	7.8	7.8	1.0	Endorsed religion
	Macedonia	27.17	15.1	4.7	7.1	3.3	Endorsed religion

Azerbaijan	31.65	21.4	7.8	5.6	8.0	Separationist
Moldova	32.34	20.0	5.6	7.1	7.3	Endorsed religion
Georgia	32.83	22.9	6.4	8.5	8.0	Endorsed religion
Greece	33.31	25.2	7.8	8.7	8.7	Official religion
Belarus	35.66	22.5	9.2	4.6	8.7	Endorsed religion
Bulgaria	36.72	16.8	8.6	4.9	3.3	Endorsed religion
40.00>49.99 Armenia	40.36	24.6	7.2	8.1	9.3	Official religion
Turkey	47.10	22.4	6.9	5.5	10.0	Endorsed religion
C/E average scores+(T)	24.2	16.1	4.3	6.4	5.3	
Whole table average scores	23.1	13.5	2.9	6.4	4.1	

either officially or in practice, (b) state hostility towards religion, (c) comparative government treatment of different religions, including both benefits and restrictions, (d) government restrictions on the practice of religion by religious minorities, (e) government regulation of the majority religion, and (f) legislation of religious laws (Fox 2008).

It is notable that the lowest SRAS scores in Europe are to be found in the three countries with an Accommodationist, not a Separationist, type of state-religion regime – the two cases of Separationist regimes in fact score either moderately above the regional average SRAS in the case of France or well above the average in the case of Azerbaijan. By contrast with Separationism, Accommodationist regimes are described by Cole Durham as marked by a 'benevolent neutrality toward religion' which does not however extend to direct financial subsidies or the requirement that religious education be provided in schools (Durham 1996: 21). In Western Europe the eight countries with the highest SRAS scores are, unsurprisingly, those with Official Religious regimes – or, in Cole Durham's terms, those with Established Churches. In Eastern/Central Europe only two cases of Official Religion are identified – Greece with its long-standing recognition of, and support for, the Greek Orthodox Church as 'the prevailing religion' of the country and Armenia, the only post-Soviet state to opt for this type of state-religion regime. The other two types of regime occupy the central range of both columns with the Cooperationist type being on average lower in the 7 Western and the 10 East/Central European cases and the Endorsed Religion higher in the 2 Western and the 10 East/Central European cases on the SRAS loading; as these figures indicate, both types exhibit significant levels of deviation from full religion-state separation.

The traditional distinction between the principal patterns of church-state relations in Europe identified only three categories: state or national church, more or less strict separation and cooperation (sometimes called concordatarian) patterns (Robbers 2005: 578–579). This typology had a number of disadvantages. On the one hand it failed to distinguish other types such as the Accommodationist and Endorsed Religion patterns identified by Cole Durham. On the other hand, as Ferrari argued, it granted 'excessive importance to the formal element of the relationship between church and state, in other words to the type of association that exists between two institutions, and overlooks its legal substance' (Ferrari 2003: 415). Concentrating on the official or constitutional *de jure* aspect obscured the different dynamics which occurred at lower levels of actual regulatory interchanges between different state authorities and the whole range of religious institutions and organisations (Bader 2007). More importantly the traditional typology was inadequate to the task of describing the changes which have been occurring in the field of state-religion-society relations since the 1980s. In 1999 Ferrari claimed to be able to identify the 'legal substance' of an emergent European model which distinguished it from models to be found in other parts of the world. The key feature of this model was the distinctive framing of relations between the public authorities and religious actors in civil society:

> A religious sub-sector is singled out within the public sector. This may be understood as a 'playing field' or 'protected area'. Inside it the various collective religious subjects (churches, denominations, and religious communities) are free to act in conditions of

substantial advantage compared to those collective subjects that are not religious. The state's only role is to see that the players respect the rules of the game and the boundaries of the playing field. (ibid: 3)

The considerations involved in this important claim can be objected to on normative and descriptive grounds – in other words whether it describes an acceptable state of affairs or whether it accurately describes that state of affairs. The privileging of religion involved in granting 'conditions of substantial advantage' clearly departs from the requirements of some normative liberal theorists such as Robert Audi (1989), for example. In Audi's terms the European model as identified by Ferrari can be seen as seriously deficient on neutrality and equality grounds since it grants religious 'subjects' significant advantages not available to nonreligious 'subjects'. But it might be argued that it fails also to recognise another inegalitarian feature of almost all patterns of state-religion interconnections in Europe, namely, the effective 'hierarchies of recognition' which distinguish between, respectively, highly favoured religions, recognised but less favoured religions, recognised but barely tolerated religions and, a gradation down, those religious bodies that are denied any recognition as religious at all, sometimes even being denied legal existence on one ground or another (Richardson 2004; Madeley 2006). With the increased levels of religious pluralism, this feature has become increasingly noticeable. The modelling of the role of the state on that of a football referee 'seeing that the players respect the rules of the game and the boundaries of the playing field' appears also to underplay the fact that, to adopt Banchoff's phrase, the playing field is in fact in almost all cases very uneven and actually tilted – that there is a 'hierarchical dimension' in the relations between religious actors which has been of long standing but has become even more strikingly visible with the development of 'the new pluralism'. These intrusive elements of inequality have been recognised by Ferrari in the most recent presentation of his European model: 'the centre of gravity of European church-state relations seem to be shifting towards a range of national systems that are distinct but which share certain common features: acceptance of the public standing of religious communities; recognition of their special features; a certain degree of state control over them; and the selective and graded cooperation of public institutions with religious communities' (Ferrari 2008: 110). It is notable that each of these emergent features involves a degree of direct or indirect regulatory action on the part of state actors.

3.5 The European TAO of State-Society-Religion Relations

In attempting to describe emergent features and to understand the dynamics of change which have produced them, it is also possible to use the individual constituents of Fox's SRAS measures to identify the basis of the different patterns of religion-state-society relations which continue to underlie the developing pan-European pattern. Doing this also makes it possible to test hypotheses about the explanatory potential of, for example, the relative levels of inherited confessional

majoritarianism, the character of the different confessions involved or the existence of contrasting state traditions (Dyson 1980). One approach to undertaking this task involves distinguishing between those elements of religion-state relations which relate to fiscal, financial and property connections (Treasure), those which relate to the exercise of states' powers of command (Authority) and those which relate to the direct or indirect effects of the involvement of governmental institutions on the actual organisation of the religious sphere itself (Organisation) (Madeley 2009). The different combinations of these three instrumentalities of the state (what Christopher Hood calls the Tools of Government) can then be used to specify more precisely the complex nature of the European model and its internal structure (Hood and Margetts 2007). On the basis of this analysis the European model can be identified as a European TAO – a European 'way' or methodology for the management and regulation of religion-state-society relations structured according to the use by public authorities of the government tools of Treasure (T), Authority (A) and Organisation (O). In schematic form the three elements can be displayed by the intersecting circles of a Venn diagram which illustrates the use or non-use (at various dichotomous cut-off points) of each of the three instrumentalities in different countries. In a 2009 exercise using the Fox data 44 of the 45 countries for which there was relevant data on all three elements appeared within the intersecting fields of the Venn diagram, meaning that only one country failed to appear as having no positive score on any of the three (Madeley 2009: 285). Sixteen states (36 %) scored on all three and were therefore located in the central field of maximal crossover, 15 (33 %) scored on two, while the remaining 13 (29 %) scored on only one. A notable finding of the analysis was that France and Turkey, despite their claims to be *laïque* or *laiklik*, were found among the 16 countries located in the centre field, indicating their use of the full range of TAO government tools. The analysis appeared to confirm Ferrari's overall thesis that, despite surface differences, almost all European governments provide graded levels of support for religious institutions and organisations.

The data recorded in the middle columns of Table 3.3 provide another means of detecting and describing some of the differences between Europe's 50-odd countries as they relate to the mutual entanglement of state authorities and religious bodies (or, as in some cases, 'communities of faith or conviction', including secular bodies) and, in addition, provide a proxy measure for autonomous, civil society regulation effects in the field of religion. The data is coded from the information provided by the US State Department Reports on International Religious Freedom for 2005. The GRI (Government Regulation of Religion Index) is based on six variables indicating the incidence of 'restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by the official laws, policies, or administrative actions of the state' (Grim and Finke 2006: 7). In terms of the TAO typology these negative sanctions affecting religious freedom can be accounted as exercises of different states' Authority tool. The GFI (Government Favouritism of Religion Index) on the other hand is based on five variables which indicate the incidence of 'subsidies, privileges, support, or favourable sanctions provided by the state to a select religion or a small group of religions' (ibid: 8) (Fig. 3.1).

Fig. 3.1 The European TAO as reflected in Grim and Finke's GFI/GRI/SRI typology. Attributions are based on all-Europe averages as cut-offs, i.e. all those below the median on a particular measure are excluded from a field. Countries scoring below average on all three measures (and therefore not represented in the diagram) are Albania, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Poland and Sweden (Source of data: pewresearch.org/pubs/1443/global-restrictions-on-religion accessed on 21 May 2011)

In terms of the TAO four of the five data points relate to differential government funding of favoured religious bodies and can therefore be taken to measure the use of the Treasure tool to provide positive supports. The table discriminates between the 20 Western European and the 25 Eastern-and-Central European states in order to provide an indication of whether the existence or otherwise of stable consolidated democracy has a bearing on the differences between the principal measures. It is striking that the GFI averages for the two sets of countries are identical when rounded to the nearest whole decimal point (6.4). This finding lends support to the idea that there is indeed an emergent Pan-European model characterised in part by the privileging of the principal mainline religious institutions in both in the Western and Central/Eastern parts of the continent. In the field of governmental regulation using negative sanctions against disfavoured religious groups and practices (GRI), there is on the other hand a significant difference between the low average of 1.2 in Western countries and the higher average of 4.3 in Central and Eastern Europe.

In attempting to account for this it would be natural to speculate about the effects of decades of state atheism managed by directories of religious affairs and, more distally perhaps, the connections which might be presumed to exist with the character of the different confessional traditions, Catholicism and Orthodoxy being collectively predominant in Eastern Europe.

In addition to the measures of governmental regulatory activity however – and most notably in the current context – Grim and Finke's SRI (Social Regulation of Religion) also provides a valuable extra measure focusing on 'general social attitudes toward religion and the actions of social movements and religious institutions toward other religious groups, especially new, foreign, or minority religions', in other words the 'restrictions which groups face from the larger culture and other institutions' (Grim and Finke 2006: 19). The measure is principally based on data relating to popular and official attitudes towards nontraditional religions, including attitudes to their proselytising, and the way their converts are regarded, and insofar as these receive official endorsement they can be expected to impact on the organisational capacities of the groups affected – i.e. in terms of the TAO they reflect the use of the O tools of government as well of society more generally. Although there is a high correlation between the GRI and SRI indexes, exploratory factor analysis indicated to Grim and Finke, who developed the measure, that they tapped distinct latent factors (Grim and Finke 2006: 21). Insofar as SRI measures negative attitudes in civil society between groups defined by religion, it might be taken to reflect the presence of what some analysts of civil society have dubbed negative social capital. And in the analysis of 'the new religious pluralism', it can be taken to indicate civil society endorsement of the vertical dimension which characterises the discriminatory effects of governmental regulation and favouritism.

3.6   Conclusion

The involvement of state authorities in regulating religion in Europe appears to generate increasing controversy. In the western half of the continent relatively stable patterns of cooperative church-state relations have been put in question as new religious groups present the claim that they should not be excluded from access to the same or equivalent benefits received by more established religious bodies. In the context of post-9/11 concerns about Islamic *jihadi* militancy on the one hand and the suspicions directed against so-called cults and NRMs (New Religious Movements) on the other, such claims for favourable treatment have, unsurprisingly, raised questions about how far, if at all, religious bodies should receive such benefits. In addition to the aggrieved groups who have pressed claims on their own behalf, others have involved themselves and raised the temperature around these and related issues, in particular increasingly voluble groups of humanists and atheists, who have always objected to the fact that religion is made the object of a positive discrimination, which inevitably entails the relative favouring of non- and antireligious groups. For them the fact that 'communities of conviction' – and this

means overwhelmingly the churches and religious organisations which fought for the measure – are, according to the now ratified 2006 Lisbon Treaty, to be accorded special consultation rights ('open, transparent and regular dialogue') with the top officials of the European Union is a characteristic cause of offence as it promises a degree of special treatment not available to other civil society organisations and movements (Madeley 2013). With new departures of this sort, secularists observe that the positive discrimination entailed in Europe's TAO is set to continue (and in Eastern Europe maybe to increase), rather than to decline or be removed as many theorists of liberal democracy have demanded and most secularisation theorists had always expected. A number of the less-established religious groups have also argued that religion-state entanglements actually tend to compromise and corrupt, rather than to protect or promote, religion itself and should thus be progressively removed. There appears however to be little prospect of this occurring in the near future despite the controversies now surrounding the 'triangular entanglements' of state, civil society and religion which continue to characterise Europe.

References

Audi, R. (1989). The separation of church and state and the obligations of citizenship. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18*(3), 259–296.

Bader, V. (2007). *Secularism or democracy? Associational governance of religious diversity*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Banchoff, T. (Ed.). (2007). *Democracy and the new religious pluralism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barrett, D. (Ed.). (1982). *World Christian encyclopaedia: A comparative study of churches and religions in the modern world AD 1900–2000*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Barrett, D., Kurian, G. T., & Johnson, T. D. (Eds.). (2001). *World Christian encyclopaedia: A comparative study of churches and religions in the modern world*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Boyle, K., & Sheen, J. (Eds.). (1997). *Freedom of religion and belief: A world report*. London: Routledge.

Casanova, J. (1994). *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Davie, G. (2000). *Religion in modern Europe: A Memory mutates*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Durham, C. W. (1996). Perspectives in religious liberty: A comparative framework. In J. D. van der Vyver & J. Witte (Eds.), *Religious human rights in global perspective* (pp. 1–44). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Dyson, K. (1980). *The state tradition in Western Europe: A study of an idea and institution*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.

Ferrari, S. (1999). The new wine and the old cask: Tolerance, religion, and the law in contemporary Europe. In A. Sajo & S. Avineri (Eds.), *The law of religious identity: Models for post-communism* (pp. 1–15). The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

Ferrari, S. (2003). Church and state in post-communist Europe. In S. Ferrari, C. W. Durham, & E. A. Sewell (Eds.), *Law and religion in post-communist Europe* (pp. 411–27). Leuven: Peeters.

Ferrari, S. (2008). State regulation of religion in the European democracies: The decline of the old pattern. In G. Motzkin & Y. Fischer (Eds.), *Religion and democracy in contemporary Europe* (pp. 103–112). London: Alliance Publishing Trust.

Fox, J. (2008). *A world survey of religion and the state*. Cambridge: CUP.

Grim, B. J., & Finke, R. (2006). International religion indexes: Government regulation, government favoritism, and social regulation of religion. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion, 2*, 1–40.

Hood, C., & Margetts, H. (2007). *The tools of government in the digital age*. London: Palgrave.

Kennedy, J. C. (2010). Dutch political developments and religious reform. In K. Robbins (Ed.), *The dynamics of religious reform in Northern Europe 1780–1921: Vol. 1. Political and legal perspectives* (pp. 117–146). Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Knippenberg, H. (2006). The political geography of religion: Historical state-church relations in Europe and recent changes. *GeoJournal: An International Journal on Human Geography, 67*, 253–265.

Madeley, J. T. S. (2003a). European liberal democracy and the principle of state religious neutrality. In J. T. S. Madeley & Z. Enyedi (Eds.), *Church and state in contemporary Europe: The chimera of neutrality*. London: Frank Cass.

Madeley, J. T. S. (2003b). A framework for the comparative analysis of church-state relations in Europe. In J. T. S. Madeley & Z. Enyedi (Eds.), *Church and state in contemporary Europe: The chimera of neutrality*. London: Frank Cass.

Madeley, J. T. S. (2006). Still the century of antidisestablishmentarianism? *European Political Science, 1*, 395–406.

Madeley, J. T. S. (2009). America's secular state and the unsecular state of Europe. In R. Fatton & R. Ramazami (Eds.), *Thomas Jefferson's church-state separation principle in the contemporary world* (pp. 109–136). New York/London: Palgrave.

Madeley, J. T. S. (2013). *Deus ex machina*: Representing God on the stage of the European Union. In L. N. Leustean (Ed.), *Representing God in the European Union. Does God matter?* London: Routledge.

Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. (2009). pewresearch.org/pubs/1443/global-restrictions-on-religion

Rēmond, R. (1999). *Religion and society in modern Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Richardson, J. T. (2004). *Regulating religion: Case studies from around the globe*. London: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.

Robbers, R. (Ed.). (2005). *State and church in the European Union*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

Schanda, B. (2005). Church and state in the new member countries of the European Union. *Ecclesiastical Law Journal, 8*(37), 186–198.

Taylor, C. (2007). *A secular age*. Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Wyduckel, D. (2001). Die Zukunft des Staatskirchetums in der Europäischen Union. In P. C. Müller-Graff & H. Schneider (Eds.), *Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften in der Europäischen Union*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Chapter 4
The Dynamics of Civil Society: Density, Age, Fertility and Completeness in the Religious Voluntary Sector

Sigrid Roßteutscher

4.1   Introduction

Secularisation is a multifaceted concept. It covers such diverse processes as the takeover of former church domains such as welfare and education by the state, the integration of religious laws and rules of conduct into secular laws and – most of the time and for most people – the secularisation of individual beliefs, attitudes and practices (see, e.g. Kaufmann 2000). This volume looks at the (diminishing) role of religion in politics and society from a particular angle: religious organisations' capacities in fostering civic engagement. Indeed, there is ample evidence that church organisations and religious associations are especially efficient in instilling norms of reciprocity, in encouraging altruism and the willingness to help others and in mobilising individuals for different forms of political participation (see, e.g. Putnam 2000; Ayala 2000; De Hart and Dekker 2005; Wuthnow 2004; Gill 2003). Again, the largest part of the research in this field focuses on the role of religious organisation in forming individuals' 'habits of the heart' (Bellah et al. 1985). Consequently, the majority of empirical chapters compiled in this volume follow such a road (see for instance the chapters by Trägårdh and Pettersson, by Purdam, by Dekker and de Hart and others).

By contrast, this chapter argues that looking at individuals *only* misses an (essential) part of the story. Civil society is the realm of state (and market)-independent networks, associations and organisations where individuals meet freely and act as equals (Maloney and Roßteutscher 2007b). Therefore, an organisational perspective is important. Simply, without organisational platforms, there is no civil society formation and individuals would not find a training ground to 'enlarge their heart' (the Bellah thesis) or to 'train for democracy' (the famous de Tocqueville argument).

S. Roßteutscher (✉)
Social Science Department, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University,
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
e-mail: rossteutscher@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

Accordingly, this chapter will argue and present evidence that shows that looking only at individual attitudes and actions can be misleading. As an example, electoral research documents an unbroken and stabile link between church membership and participation in church organisations, on the one hand, and party preferences for Christian Democrat parties, on the other (Pappi 1985; Wolf 1996; Roßteutscher 2007, 2012; Elff and Roßteutscher 2011). However, this evidence of stability masks dramatic decline: Less and less individuals are active church members, i.e. church membership is more and more insignificant for explaining vote choice – although the linkage is still intact as ever. Something very similar applies to religious organisations' capacity to encourage civic engagement and collective good production. The 'educational' nexus might be as strong as ever, therefore producing strong correlations between organisational membership and democratic habits. However, if the civil society sector is in decline, this function or nexus applies to less and less individuals.

How can we, thus, assess the relevance of religious civil societies in present and future European societies? One obvious research strategy is to ask individuals via survey methods whether they are members of religious organisations (see several chapters in this volume for such an approach). While such a research strategy provides very interesting insights, it tells much about individual demand but nothing about organisational supply. If we find declining figures of religious involvement, we cannot know whether this is the case because of changes in the demand structures (i.e. progressing value change and individualisation) or because of changes in the organisational environment – the supply side. Individuals might reduce their religious engagement because there are no attractive options for engagement on offer – an argument repetitively put forward by the adherents of the rational choice school (see, e.g. Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Finke and Stark 1988). Although the rational choice paradigm is highly contested and had been proven more often wrong than correct – at least for Europe (see, e.g. Bruce 1999, 2000; De Hart and Dekker 2005; Roßteutscher 2009) – there is one crucial truth in its attack on standard secularisation theories: Too often it focuses exclusively on micro phenomena of value change and individual patterns of church involvement – thereby ignoring the (potential) impact of organisational supply. This one-sidedness is also true for the dominant strands in social capital research. However, civil society consists of both individuals prepared to join and associations that provide the occasion for joining. By looking at the supply side of this mutual relationship from a perspective of ecological theory, this chapter attempts to fill this void. How? If standard survey data is inappropriate to assess the attractiveness and availability of civil society organisations, how can we find a more successful approach? Ideally, organisational panel data could demonstrate how the networks and associations connected to church and religious endeavours developed across time and space. Unfortunately, such data is not available. This chapter will, therefore, pursue a third and more promising strategy: using ecological information on local civil societies in a comparative approach.

4.2 Data and Method

If individual survey data is of little help in assessing the quality of and the changes originating from organisational supply and if long-term observations of civil society developments are not available, cross-sectional data on entire local civil societies in different countries, from different historical backgrounds in terms of denominational composition, and church-state relations shall help in evaluating the quality and vitality of organisational supply. The study used here, therefore, focuses on religious associations, networks and clubs which originate from within churches or are, as an independent organisation, associated to a particular denomination. In seven European societies (Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Scotland, East and West Germany), the entire voluntary sector of selected medium-sized cities[1] was, first, mapped and, secondly, surveyed by mail questionnaires. The countries and communities were chosen in order to represent Europe's religious landscape as fully as possible, i.e. ranging from traditional Catholic nations to predominantly Protestant countries (both Calvinist and Lutheran) to denominationally mixed countries. Moreover, the participating communities were selected due to structural similarities, i.e. all should be large enough to have a rich and diverse associational life, all are regional centres with populations in excess of 100,000 inhabitants, they have a mixture of industry and services (locally and internationally focused) and they have a fully fledged educational system (with at least one university), major hospitals, etc. (Font et al. 2007: 20ff). The comprehensive and internationally comparative strategy of mapping entire local civil society sectors[2] allows one to (1) control for the potential impact of different state-church relations and denominational compositions, (2) make a thorough comparison of the relation between organisational supply within single dominations and across dominations and (3) compare the religious and secular sectors, permitting conclusions about the particularities of the religious realm of civil society compared to its secular twin. Whether associations were classified as religious or secular depended on their self-description. Associations received a list with a total of 32 possible issues or thematic concerns. If they ticked 'religious matters' as one of their concerns, they were subsequently treated as religious

---

[1]The respective local communities are Mannheim (West Germany), Chemnitz (East Germany), Enschede (the Netherlands), Lausanne and Bern (Switzerland), Sabadell (Spain), Aalborg (Denmark) and Aberdeen (Scotland).

[2]The comparative survey of local civil societies was part of the CID (Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy) project. Through extensive searches of local newspapers, neighbourhood leaflets, Internet, expert interviews, etc., the entire spectrum of local associational life, formal and informal, could be sampled. Data collection took place between 2000 and 2001. The figures concerning inhabitants and church membership are from official local statistics and reflect the status quo of the year 2000. For a detailed description of method and mapping strategy, see Font et al. (2007). For more information on this project, see also www.uni-mannheim.de/mzes/projekte/cid and Maloney and Roßteutscher (2007a).

Table 4.1 The CID study on organisations

	Total N of inhabitants	% with church affiliation	Total N of associations	N of associations in data set	% religious associations
Aalborg	161,661	90	2,031	1,023	5
Aberdeen	212,650	58	1,907	497	22
Bern	122,537	87	1,198	665	8
Chemnitz	259,246	16	1,388	687	28
Enschede	150,499	66	1,658	822	11
Lausanne	125,238	83	925	473	6
Mannheim	319,944	77	5,002	1,618	27
Sabadell	185,270	83	1,129	360	19

Table 4.2 The denominational composition of local civil societies

	Proportion Catholic[a]	Proportion Lutheran	Proportion Calvinist	Proportion Protestant sects[b]	Proportion others[c]
Aalborg	2	71	0	9	4
Aberdeen	2	2	62	17	5
Bern	22	0	24	13	16
Chemnitz	9	75	0	0	2
Enschede	17	4	19	35	24
Lausanne	31	0	17	3	10
Mannheim	52	34	0	1	11
Sabadell	79	0	0	10	0

Notes: [a]Cases do not always add up to 100 %, because denomination could not be established firmly

[b]Such as Baptists, Methodists and Mennonites (in the Netherlands also neo-Calvinists)

[c]Such as Muslim, Orthodox, Jewish and Hindu

organisations.[3] Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the baseline figures of this comparative study.

Looking at individuals first, we see that – with one prominent exception – most inhabitants of European cities are still connected to church. Affiliation in terms of membership and belonging is very high in the Danish city of Aalborg and not much lower in the two Swiss communities Bern and Lausanne and the Spanish city of Sabadell. The fact that the Dutch and Scottish societies witnessed rather dramatic processes of secularisation and 'de-churching' is visible in the relatively small percentage of inhabitants which still hold a formal relationship to church (for the

[3]Of all religious organisations, 39 % claimed that religion is also their most important concern, i.e. roughly two thirds of all religious organisations see their main concern in other thematic areas, welfare and sports amongst the most frequently mentioned. The data also reveals striking differences between denominations. The proportion of religious core activity is smallest amongst Catholic organisations and by far the largest amongst Calvinist associations (Roßteutscher 2009: 334–335).

developments in the Netherlands see, e.g. Sengers 2004; de Hart and Dekker 2005; for Scotland, see, e.g. Brown 2001; Bruce 1999; for European societies in general, see Roßteutscher 2009).[4] While these figures, 34 % non-affiliated in the case of Enschede and 42 % in the city of Aberdeen, express a drastic decline compared to the 1960s when the churches still encompassed almost the entire population, these developments are modest compared to the East German city of Chemnitz. More than 40 years of state socialism and an ongoing process of 'enforced secularisation' (Meulemann 2004) left deep traces in the religious landscape of the former GDR. At present, East Germany constitutes the most secularised society of Europe (Pickel 1998). These developments are clearly visible in the very low percentage of inhabitants of Chemnitz which still belong to church.

Interestingly, however, potential demand does not correspond to the provision of supply. In the highly churched city of Aalborg, only 5 % of its civil society sector provides religious offers. By contrast, the highly secularised population of Chemnitz finds an amazingly high proportion of religious associations within its civil society.[5] Taken together, approximately 20 % of local European civil society organisations are hosted by congregations or are attached to a specific denomination. In any case, the associative world is far more secular than in the USA where some estimate that about half of all associative activity is of a religious nature (e.g. Putnam 2000: 66f.). That said, secularisation processes have progressed highly differently across Europe. In Germany, the religious arm of civil society is still very strong, with roughly 30 % of all organisations belonging to some church or religious context. At the other extreme, in Denmark or Switzerland religious matters have a clear minority position. In these countries, civil society is a predominantly secular project.

Moreover, the present-day denominational composition of religious organisation still largely reflects the religious landscape as it developed in the aftermath of the Reformation and the subsequent religious wars that haunted Europe (see Table 4.2). The Danish religious sector is dominated by Lutheran associations, Catholic organisations hold almost a monopoly position in Spain, the largest part of the associations in Scotland is Calvinist by nature and the Dutch and German organisational sector is more or less split between Catholics and variants of Protestantism.[6] Note

---

[4]It would have been interesting to also plot the number of locally present associations against the number of individuals with active church involvement/attendance. However, such figures are not available at the local level. Moreover, from a conceptual point of view, active church involvement is not directly comparable to the sheer number of existing organisations (for which we also do not consider whether and how many individuals are active).

[5]After regime breakdown in 1989/1990, the civil society sector of East Germany collapsed more or less completely. In the context of the transfer of the West German institutional setup and the establishment of the West German welfare model, the churches were amongst the first who rebuilt a close net of civil society organisations (Roßteutscher 2009: 202ff).

[6]Not too long ago, the Dutch figures would have been dramatically different. From the 1970s on, the Netherlands witnessed a radical process of de-pillarisation. The Catholic church even voluntarily dissolved many of its civil society organisations, and the Catholic pillar collapsed quickly. Of the Calvinist churches, the neo-Calvinists were most successful in withstanding this general trend (see Sengers 2004; Dekker and Ester 1996; for a summary Roßteutscher 2009: 197–200).

that there are also striking differences with regard to the local presence of non-Christian religious associations (predominantly Muslim). These differences reflect both the respective cities'/countries' migration history as well as the religious tolerance of state and local authorities in permitting non-Christians to organise. While such denominational differences are not in the focus of this chapter, one should keep in mind that the variance between localities might be affected by such distributional idiosyncrasies.[7] In order to highlight the particularities of religious civil society, the remainder of this chapter will ignore interdenominational differences and focuses instead on the difference between the secular and the religious organisational world – from an ecological perspective.

4.3 The Vitality of Religious Civil Society: An Ecological Approach

The health or vitality of an organisational environment is determined by several basic features. The most prominent feature is the locally available number of associations in relation to the number of potential joiners, i.e. associative density. Looking at religion, the density of religious organisations (in relation to the population of religiously affiliated) is an indicator of organisational legitimacy. Put simply, the higher the degree of organisation of a given subpopulation, the higher is its legitimacy (Hannan and Freeman 1989: 129–131; Minkoff 1995: 123). Moreover, density is a unique and the most simple indicator or shortcut for organisational attractiveness. If density is low, individual choice is limited and presumably suboptimal. In other words, 'the higher the density, the more likely it is that individuals will find the association they want to participate in, and an association that is easy to reach, i.e. close to potential members' homes' (Maloney and Roßteutscher 2007c: 42). Put in a nutshell, the more, the better (see also Offe and Fuchs 2001: 464). Moreover, higher density might imply more competition and therefore more responsiveness to members' needs. If there are high numbers of singing clubs in one local environment, members have a strategic and potentially harmful exit option. If, by contrast, there is only one singing association available to cater the singing interest of one entire locality, choice is close to nil. Members can only choose between staying with such a (potentially suboptimal) association or abstaining from singing in groups. Consequently, associations in high-density environments will be particularly sensitive to members' demands and wishes (Maloney and Roßteutscher 2007c: 42–3). From a joiner's perspective, thus, high-density civil societies are attractive: little demand on time and energy to find and reach responsive and participatory associations. Finally, macro indicators of organisational density are an indication of civil society health per se. In the empirical

---

[7]However, an analysis of such interdenominational differences concerning a wide range of social capital indicator shows that non-Christian organisations are in no way exceptional but tend to fall in between Catholic and Protestant organisations (Roßteutscher 2009).

social capital literature, there is a consistent mismatch between findings resulting from micro and macro or aggregate level analyses. While microanalyses regularly reveal rather tiny, even insignificant or partly negative relations between associative membership or activity, on the one hand, and indictors of trust and democratic attitudes, on the other, aggregate analyses report much stronger and significantly positive relations (see, e.g. Gabriel et al. 2002; Newton and Norris 2000; Roßteutscher 2010). This empirical paradox resulted in the formulation of the so-called 'rainmaker' function of civil society (Putnam et al. 2000: 26): Associations' beneficial effects stretch beyond the smaller circle of civil society activists. As producers of trust and civic orientations, associations contribute to a better representation of interests, a higher quality of governance and elite responsiveness (Boix and Posner 1996; van der Meer 2003). Hence, their impact is not restricted to membership: 'The existence of a multitude of visible voluntary associations is in itself evidence of the value and rationality of collaborative efforts, even for individuals who are not active in these efforts themselves' (Wollebæk and Selle 2004: 251). While these arguments are put forward with regard to civil society in general, they can easily be applied to the religious sector. If we believe, as many do, that religious organisations are particularly effective in instilling norms of reciprocity, altruisms, compassion and collective orientations (see, e.g. Cnaan et al. 2003; Yeung 2004; Wuthnow 1996), there should be more of this healthy 'rain' in societies where many religious associations produce these traits. To summarise, density is *the* core ingredient of vital religious sectors (1) because it produces organisational legitimacy, (2) because it increases the attractiveness for potential joiners, (3) because it contributes to more competition and responsiveness within the sector and, finally, (4) because dense civil society produces more rain and thus contributes to a more civic, altruistic and caring environment.

However, density is only one core ingredient. Ecologists also emphasise the relationship between 'young' and 'old' associations. An organisational environment is only dynamic and healthy as long as founding associations are simple and frequent, i.e. as long as civil society is characterised by a process of regeneration and high rates of organisational fertility. Moreover, there is – in theory – a direct relationship between density and fertility. With density there is an increase in organisational legitimacy and, consequently, an increase in the rate of new foundations (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Minkoff 1995). As in any other population, the organisational environment is unhealthy and its long-term survival is threatened if there is an unbalanced relation between births and deaths (Vermeulen 2005: 48; Minkoff 1995: 123). Patterns of aging and fertility will thus provide further evidence for the health of the religious civil society sector. In ecological theory, moreover, organisational age is an expression of fitness, i.e. only those organisations survive who manage to adapt to the demands of a changing environment (e.g. Singh 1990). In a given organisation ecology, therefore, there is constant organisational exchange. In other words, the associative universe of a given year is the outcome of birth rates, on the one hand, and a long-term process of organisational selection which only the 'fittest', i.e. most adaptable, survives, on the other (see also Roßteutscher et al. 2007). While fertility signals the potential for dynamic developments and growth, indicators of age and aging express a civil society's capacity for stability and continuity.

'Old', adaptive, i.e. successful, organisations experience a decreasing risk of mortality (Selle and Oymyr 1992: 159) and, therefore, secure an organisational population's long-term survival.

Finally, organisational populations are 'institutionally incomplete' (Breton 1964) and deficient if certain themes and interests are systematically excluded. From such a perspective, civil societies must represent the interests and convictions of a 'wide range of people' (Caulkins 2004: 179). Historically, the civil society arm of religion developed in most parts of Europe during the nineteenth century when the churches lost the battle against a secularising nation-state that wretched core responsibilities in areas such diverse as welfare, education and morals from the churches. Although this struggle between church and state was more serious in Catholic or religiously mixed nations such as Germany, the Netherlands or Switzerland, civil society building became a dominant feature of religious survival and revival in Protestant nations as well (see Roßteutscher 2009: 177ff, for a more extensive discussion). The denominational subcultures or milieus emerged as a response to an increasingly secular society which was perceived as threatening basic religious identities. Therefore, members should be kept apart from this hostile environment. To be successful, religious civil societies had to be 'complete', i.e. provide substitutes for all thinkable life circumstances and individual interests. Although this basic opposition to the secular world faded away during the last decades of the twentieth century, the width of thematic concerns catered by religious organisations is still an indicator of civil society vitality (and its impact on individual members). The more frequent and the more diverse the contact of individuals with church and religious organisations is, the stronger is its potential impact on habits and mores. If members visit church only once a month for common prayer, they will be much less exposed to the messages and identities communicated via church and religion than individuals who also sing in church choirs, play football with their co-affiliates or take care of children in religious crèche groups and PTA organisations. To generate such a multidimensional integration attractive to individuals with highly different interests, however, organisational supply is mandatory. Therefore, organisational completeness or thematic width will be a third indicator to assess present-day civil society's vitality. In the subsequent section, we will thus address the issue of civil society vitality from these three different ecological perspectives: density, age and fertility and institutional completeness.

4.4 Assessing Religious Vitality: An Empirical Analysis of Local Civil Societies

Table 4.1 above revealed that in most European cities the majority of inhabitants are still (at least passively) churched. However, there is a huge gap between the percentage of individuals who belong to church and the percentage of religious organisations within the civil society sector of these local communities. Why is the relationship

Table 4.3 Density in Europe – comparing religious and secular civil societies

	Associative density, in total	Secular associative density	Religious associative density
Aalborg	12.6	119.3	0.7
Aberdeen	9.0	16.6	3.4
Bern	9.8	69.2	0.9
Chemnitz	5.4	4.6	9.4
Enschede	11.0	28.8	1.8
Lausanne	7.4	40.9	0.5
Mannheim	15.6	49.6	5.5
Sabadell	6.1	29.0	1.4

Note: Calculated by dividing the numbers of associations through the numbers of inhabitants per city (i.e. total density = N associations/N inhabitants; secular density = N secular associations/N of non-church-affiliated inhabitants; religious density = N religious associations/N of inhabitants with church membership). The figures in the table therefore express how many associations there are per 1,000 inhabitants

between potential demand and supply so uneven? Is it because churches and religious organisations have problems in organising, i.e. some weakness related to the supply side? Or, rather, is it because in these cities and countries there is a low demand for joining religious associations? Table 4.3 gives a first tentative answer to this question. The number of religious organisations is plotted against the numbers of individuals in these cities who still belong to church. The assumption is that – potentially at least – church-belonging individuals could become members of such organisations as they still are connected to church activities by regular leaflets, etc. and are – in principle at least – not hostile against religious matters.

Looking at Table 4.3, there are huge differences between European cities both in terms of general associative density and the density of the religious sector. The civil society sector is very dense in the German city of Mannheim and in the Danish city Aalborg and still relatively strong in Enschede, in the Netherlands. In these communities, there are 16 (or 13 and 11) associations from which 1,000 inhabitants can choose. The Scottish and Swiss communities take intermediate positions with clearly less than 10 associations per 1,000 inhabitants. At the bottom of this general density ranking, we find the Spanish city of Sabadell and, in particular, the East German post-Communist location of Chemnitz. From an ecological perspective, therefore, German, Danish and Dutch local civil societies are vital, i.e. attractive, responsive, organisationally legitimate and effective producers of civicness for members and non-members alike (the rainmaker function). At the other extreme, the Spanish and East German communities suffer from deficient civil society sectors, resulting in little attractiveness and responsiveness and poor legitimacy of the organisational model and with little impact on the spread of democratic orientations in the populations.

Looking at the density of the religious realm (compared to the secular twin), a completely different picture emerges. Admittedly, the second and third columns in Table 4.3 are based on the past reality that secular individuals only join secular

organisations and individuals with bonds to church will search for associations connected either to church or religious matters. Although the assumption of such a clear divide is heroic in present-day modern societies, it helps to highlight the relative weakness of the religious organisational sector. This is particularly dramatic in the Danish case. Aalborg, a city with a high-density civil society sector, provides almost exclusively secular supply. For the religiously affiliated segment of the population (90 %, see Table 4.1), there are very few options on offer. The (predominantly Lutheran) church provides less than one association per 1,000 individuals with church belonging. Similarly bad supply characterises the two Swiss cities, Bern and Lausanne. The two German cities, by contrast, give evidence for different patterns. The East German community of Chemnitz, a city with a very deficient and poor civil society sector in terms of general associative density, possesses ample opportunities for religious engagement. After decades of state socialism, the secularisation rate is high, with more than 80 % of the population having no church membership. However, the remaining small religious segment finds many religious associations to choose from (more than 9 per 1,000 inhabitants). Mannheim is another interesting case. The West German city has a very high-density sector at its disposal; however, and in contrast to Aalborg, there are also relatively high numbers of religious organisations for individuals with church attachment (almost 6 associations per 1,000 inhabitants). Generally, however, religious associative density is low in *all* European communities. In all instances, the religious supply is a tiny fraction of the available supply in secular matters. That said, the variation amongst European cities is impressive.

Why? The organisational data – based on evidence from eight European cities – indicates that three potential explanations are presumably wrong. First, there seems to be nothing such as a general 'cultural' thrift, which links density in the religious sector to density in the voluntary sector in general by reference to the 'art of association' which is culturally ingrained in some places but not in others. Organisational density can be very high, while religious associative density is extremely low (Aalborg) or relatively high (Mannheim). Vice versa, deficient civil society sectors can host comparatively dense religious networks (Chemnitz). Second, historical explanations referring back to the processes of reformation or nation-state building can also not claim too much plausibility. Indeed, milieu and subculture building was historically more pronounced in the Catholic world where the church-state struggle about hegemony was fought with far more eagerness and hostility than in the Protestant world. Moreover, closed subcultures emerged most strongly in religiously mixed countries where the state-church conflict was cross-cut by a denominational divide (see Roßteutscher 2009: 177ff). While these historical patterns are still visible in the present-day denominational composition of religious civil societies (see Table 4.2), they can hardly account for differences in density. In predominantly Lutheran contexts, religious associative density can be extremely low (Aalborg) or relatively high (Chemnitz). In religiously mixed countries, religious density ranges from low (the Swiss cities) to medium (the Dutch city of Enschede) and relatively high (Mannheim). Third, general processes of modernisation, i.e. secularisation, are also not able to offer satisfying explanations. On the individual level, secularisation

Table 4.4 Patterns of aging

	Average age		Age of the youngest 20 %		Age of the oldest 20 %		N of cases
	Sec	Rel	Sec	Rel	Sec	Rel	
Aalborg	34	39	0–8	1–7	57 +	75 +	861
Aberdeen	32	80	0–8	1–11	51 +	127 +	425
Bern	55	70	0–13	1–20	92 +	121 +	603
Chemnitz	22	30	0–7	0–3	49 +	53 +	607
Enschede	32	46	0–8	1–10	54 +	71 +	755
Lausanne	37	36	0–7	2–7	69 +	54 +	426
Mannheim	36	36	0–6	0–6	64 +	81 +	1,427
Sabadell	23	35	0–4	0–8	40 +	55 +	339

can have progressed far without causing much damage to the voluntary sector (Chemnitz or to a lesser degree Aberdeen), while in other places church affiliation is still the norm, but the civil sector collapsed more or less completely (Aalborg, Bern or Lausanne). Clearly, trends in demand and trends in supply can develop along different paths. Looking at eight different European cities, therefore, the most obvious candidates for accounting for the density of religious civil society fell short. Therefore, we cannot point to culture, history or modernisation. Thus, who is the culprit? In other words, how can we account for the generally low level of religious civil society density *and* the huge variations between different cities?

From an organisational (or supply-side) perspective, such findings indicate a clear culprit: Religions and churches have given up or neglected their organisational supply. In most European cities, there are few and presumably also few attractive organisational options on offer. The organisational model is delegitimised: Why should individuals become engaged? And in particular, why should they become involved if the secular arm of civil society is so much richer? As an example, why should one sing in a church choir which is miles away from one's home if there are plenty of attractive secular singing associations around one's backyard? Moreover, supply-side adherents would explain differences between European cities with diverging efforts and strategies of (local) church and core religious actors. They would point to the strikingly high potential demand (visible in the percentages of church-affiliated individuals) and conclude that local churches and the religious elite have succeeded or failed very differently in providing this (constant) demand with supply. Can such a supply-side explanation be supported by looking at other core factors of organisational vitality: age, fertility and organisational completeness? Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present basic figures concerning age and fertility in the religious sector compared to the secular realm of civil society.

Age is a crucial indicator of the health of civil society because it signals (1) the capacity of organisations to adapt to changing environments ('survival of the fittest') and (2) the existence of successful role models for new foundations. Looking at the eight European cities, it is clear that religious organisations tend to be much older than their secular counterpart. The difference is particularly pronounced in Aberdeen (average age of 80 compared to 32 in the secular sector) and still quite

Table 4.5 Rates of fertility

| | Five years old or younger | | | |
| | Secular sector | | Religious sector | |
	In percent	Fertility rate	In percent	Fertility rate
Aalborg	12.4	62.5	8.2	2.5
Aberdeen	14.2	22.2	7.4	3.3
Bern	6.2	27.7	3.9	1.6
Chemnitz	15.2	26.2	26.7	16.6
Enschede	11.1	49.8	13.4	7.3
Lausanne	17.1	55.1	17.4	3.2
Mannheim	16.5	56.6	20.1	20.9
Sabadell	28.5	42.6	12.9	4.3

Note: Fertility rates were calculated by dividing the number of new foundations by the number of inhabitants per city. The result is multiplied by 1,000. As an example, in the secular sector of Mannheim, there is a fertility of 56.6, i.e. there are 181 very young organisation (16.5 % of all organisation), that is, almost 56 new foundations per 100,000 inhabitants during the last 5 years $(181:319.944) \times 1,000$

large in the cases of Bern (70:55), Enschede (46:32) or Sabadell (35:23) and rather small, even non-existent, in Aalborg, Chemnitz, Lausanne and Mannheim. With few exceptions, therefore, religious associations are better capable in surviving longer periods of time than secular associations. However, there are again stark contrasts between the cities. Bern's civil society is by far the oldest (both with regard to secular and religious organisations). Cities whose countries experienced system breakdown and drastic political changes such as Chemnitz or Sabadell host very young sectors. These differences also translate in differences concerning the age distribution. In Aberdeen and Bern, the youngest 20 % of the religious sector stretches across the age of 20 (and 11 in the case of Aberdeen). Accordingly, the oldest 20 % of the distribution are associations with an age of 120 years and more. In the concert of European cities, this is clearly exceptional. At the other extreme, in the young civil society sector of Chemnitz in East Germany, the youngest 20 % comprise religious associations of an age between 0 ('newborn') and 3 years, while the oldest 20 % encompass associations from an age of 53 years and older. Are some civil society sectors 'older' because of the particular 'fitness' of their associations or, rather, because fertility rates and institutional turnover is low?

Ecological theory thinks of fertility as a core ingredient of vital and healthy organisational environments because it signals the capacity for innovation and regeneration that keeps civil societies dynamic and future orientated. Again, in all instances, the secular sector is much more dynamic and fertile. The differences are consistent and large. Again, Bern and Aberdeen are striking outliers. Both with regard to the secular and the religious sector, there are exceptionally low fertility rates. With regard to the religious sector, Aalborg, which possesses a very vital and fertile secular sector, joins the club. Indeed, with two prominent exceptions, the religious arm of civil society has very few start-ups. Its capacity to regenerate is thus very limited. The two

exceptions are Mannheim and Chemnitz. In both German cities, there are at least 17 start-ups or newborns per 100,000 inhabitants during the last 5 years. Although this rate is modest compared to the rejuvenation capacity of the secular sectors, it is outstanding in the concert of European religious civil societies. Why?

The Christian churches are old and very strong institutions. They function as umbrella organisations to most civil society activities. This institutional strength and longevity, therefore, seems to guarantee organisational survival. In the secular world, associations are far more often free-standing and lack thus the protection and support of strong umbrella organisations (in fact, less than half of the secular associations are hosted by an umbrella, while this is the case for 87 % of Catholic, 94 % of Lutheran and 86 % of Calvinist organisations; see Roßteutscher 2009: 296). However, organisational stability coincides with weak and insufficient rates of rejuvenation. Compared to the secular sectors, none of the religious civil societies is very dynamic. In other words, the relative old average age of religious associations is – partly at least – less a result of particular survival capacities but of low fertility rates. This relation between (old) age and fertility is highlighted by comparing the age pattern of Bern with the age distribution of a city such as Mannheim. The high average organisational age of religious associations in the Swiss city is a combined result of the particular longevity of many organisations and extremely low fertility rates. In Mannheim, by contrast, organisations can also be quite old, but the average age is much lower because of the regeneration capacities of its religious sector (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5). Why is one sector so much younger, more dynamic and more capable of regeneration than the other? Is this difference driven by diverging demand structures or different supply strategies by local churches and religious entrepreneurs? Looking at the demand side, differences appear to be rather small. Bern possesses even a slightly higher proportion of churched inhabitants than the city of Mannheim. Moreover, Switzerland and West Germany are also very similar with regard to active church involvement, i.e. regular service participation (Roßteutscher 2009: 196ff.). If demand structures cannot explain diverging civil society vitality, causes must be sought in the supply side.

How is, finally, the relationship between patterns of age and fertility, on the one hand, and the number of interests and concerns catered for by religious organisations, on the other? From an ecological perspective, thematic width or institutional completeness is one major ingredient of healthy civil societies. Completeness is defined in terms of an organisational sector's capacity to cater for *all* possible needs of its constituency. If sectors are incomplete, they risk that members of the group turn to alternatives which in turn weakens the organisational and social coherence of the sector and might result in decline. With regard to religion, this means if churches are no longer able to provide associational offers for members who, e.g. want to sing in choirs and play chess or football with friends, they risk losing them to presumably secular alternatives. This idea of institutional completeness in fact guided the establishment of closed milieu or pillar structures during nineteenth-century Europe. In order to assess the thematic width of contemporary civil societies, the organisational questionnaire contained a list of 32 different organisational concerns (see note under Table 4.6 for an enumeration), attempting to cover all thinkable options of associative

Table 4.6 Thematic width

	Secular		Religious	
	In %	N of cases	In %	N of cases
Aalborg	97	867	28	52
Aberdeen	84	349	41	101
Bern	97	415	34	47
Chemnitz	84	456	44	160
Enschede	91	730	41	92
Lausanne	88	261	28	18
Mannheim	97	1,113	72	417
Sabadell	75	251	38	47

Note: Organisations could choose between a total of 32 different concerns: charity/welfare, health, handicapped, pensioners/the elderly, religious activities, education, poverty, concerns of non-natives, sports, children/youth, parents, hobbies, culture/music, research, economic development, environment, animal protection, peace, humanitarian aid, women, human rights, child care, communal development, politics, employer/firm representation, worker/employee representation, representation of occupational groups, consumer interests, family, employment and qualification and housing. Organisation could tick as many options as they wished

activity. A sector would be fully complete, i.e. reach the maximum value of 100 %, if all these 32 concerns would be covered by at least one locally active association. Table 4.6 presents basic figures concerning institutional completeness.

There are again striking differences between the secular and the religious civil society sector. With one exception, the relatively young civil society of the Spanish city of Sabadell, secular civil society is complete, i.e. there are organisations for almost all thinkable concerns and interests. Civil society sectors in European cities cover between 84 % (Chemnitz and Aberdeen) and 97 % (Aalborg, Mannheim) of potentially relevant associative themes and concerns. This is clearly not the case with religious civil society. The difference is most striking in the case of Aalborg where an institutionally complete secular sector coexists alongside a religious sector where only 28 % of organisational themes are covered. Similarly drastic differences apply to all cities except one: Mannheim. The city's religious sector covers 72 % of potential associative themes and is thus outstandingly diverse in terms of interests and concerns which are represented. In the concert of European communities, therefore, the West German city has a particular vital religious civil society, high density, good survival rates and high fertility, and is (almost) institutionally complete. Is Mannheim so much more vital because it succeeded in maintaining the historical diversity of religious subcultures? If so, why are the religious sectors of Bern or Enschede which developed along similar historical trajectories so much less successful in transforming past organisational ecologies into the modern era? Looking for a possible cause, there is one trait peculiar to the German case which might account for the leading position in terms of organisational density and institutional completeness: fertility rates. In Germany – and only in Germany – there is an ongoing influx of new foundations which complement an aging organisational universe and contribute to a wide range of issues and niche concerns covered. In other words, supply matters.

4.5   Conclusion

It is important to note that none of the religious sectors examined is very dense, fertile or complete compared to the secular realm. In Europe, therefore, civil society dynamics are of a predominantly secular nature. In this sense, evidence based on organisational data complements and supports evidence gathered by survey data on individuals: The story of religion in Europe is a story of decline. Europe is a secularising continent both from the perspective of individual attitudes and practices and a perspective that focuses on (the vitality of) organisational supply. However, it is also important to note that there are huge variations between different religious civil societies. It is clear that the degree of (formal) individual church attachment is unrelated to all aspects of organisational ecology. None of the highly churched local communities has a dense and vital religious sector at its disposal. On the other hand, highly secularised communities, Chemnitz is the prime example, can possess quite strong religious organisational environments.[8] In short, in search for an explanation, demand seems irrelevant. On the other hand, there is clear interrelation between different aspects of organisational vitality. Density is high where fertility rates are high. Vice versa, low fertility coincides with low density and institutional incompleteness. On the basis of our eight communities, the causal mechanism cannot be established firmly. According to ecological theory, density results in organisational legitimacy and, therefore, inspires imitation. Whenever there is a new interest, a new concern not yet catered for, network foundation occurs along the lines of the successful and legitimate role model. On the other hand, it is equally plausible to assume that high fertility rates increase the number of active associations and, as a result, contribute to a high-density sector.

The relationship between age and religious vitality is more complex. Old age per se is rather related to a lack of dynamics. Only if (average) age and organisational survival capacities are correlated with higher rates of fertility, dense and vital sectors emerge. Finally, the findings concerning institutional completeness or thematic width are inconclusive. While in one sector (Mannheim), high fertility and sector density coincide with a richness of diverse thematic interests, this is not the case in Chemnitz where institutional completeness is only average. Whether this is a transitory phenomenon explicable by a still growing civil society sector in a post-socialist city must remain open to future investigations. According to supply-side theories, high fertility in dense networks results in the organisational occupation of formerly non-occupied market niches, i.e. thematic width should increase over time (e.g. Finke 1997; Finke and Stark 1988; Stark and Iannaccone 1994).

This chapter analysed the features of entire voluntary sectors in selected European communities. The data gathered is, therefore, highly reliable concerning civil society

---

[8]Note that the religious sector of Chemnitz was reconstructed after the Fall of Communism with much financial and organisational aid by the West German churches. This is a preliminary proof for the fact that supply can be established independent or in ignorance of actual demand. Whether the sector will survive is, of course, a matter of future investigations.

features in a given locality. However, conclusions concerning the nation-states and national civil societies should be drawn with utmost caution. There is nothing such as the representative city of a country. Hence, it cannot be excluded that other cities from the seven societies examined here might bring diverging results. That said the cities participated in the countries historical trajectory. Indeed, the denominational composition of present-day civil societies corresponds still perfectly to the historical patterns emerging from the Reformation era and the nature of state-church conflicts during large parts of the nineteenth century (see Table 4.2). Therefore, we can quite firmly establish that present-day organisational vitality is unrelated to these historical paths. Differences between cities that experienced similar past constellations (such as Bern, Enschede or Mannheim) are too large to offer plausible explanations. Further, there is nothing such as a general 'art of association'. It is simply not the case that religious sectors are rich when there are plenty of secular organisations or vice versa. Amongst the cities in our data set, there are cases with rich secular civil societies and poor religious organisational networks and others with rather poor secular organisational environments and rich and vital religious sectors. Therefore, we can also discard cultural explanations that rely on a country's or city's general associative capabilities. Finally, demand-side explanations or secularisation theories can also not help much in solving the puzzle. Demand-side secularisation can be low, while civil society secularisation has progressed far – and the other way around. If we want to explain why civil society sectors are dynamic and vital in some places and static and poor in others, standard explanations are of little help. So what? This chapter sought an alternative route: looking at organisational universes and at patterns of supply. If nothing else, it could show that an analysis of organisational supply is worthwhile because it sheds a new and different light on civil society activities and patterns of engagement. So far, we tend to explain different patterns of religious organisational involvement with diverging historical, cultural or modernisation experiences and features. This chapter could demonstrate that the vitality of religious civil societies can be highly different even if history, culture or degree of secularisation is very similar. Thus, supply matters and needs to be taken into the equation. However, we are still far from an understanding of *why* – under otherwise very similar conditions – supply can be so different. Definitely a promising road for future investigations!

References

Ayala, L. (2000). Trained for democracy: The differing effects of voluntary and involuntary organizations on political Participation. *Political Research Quarterly, 53*(1), 99–115.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. New York: Harper & Row.

Boix, C., & Posner, D. N. (1996). *Making social capital work: A review of Robert Putnam's making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy* (Working Paper Series 96(4)). Cambridge: Harvard University.

Breton, R. (1964). Institutional completeness of ethnic communities and the personal relations of immigrants. *The American Journal of Sociology, 70*(2), 193–205.

Brown, C. G. (2001). *The death of Christian Britain: Understanding secularization 1800–2000*. London: Routledge.

Bruce, S. (1999). *Choice and religion: A critique of rational choice theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruce, S. (2000). The supply-side model of religion: The Nordic and the Baltic States. *Journal of Contemporary Religion, 17*(1), 317–328.

Caulkins, D. D. (2004). Organizational memberships and crosscutting ties: Bonding or bridging social capital? In S. Prakash & P. Selle (Eds.), *Investigating social capital: Comparative perspectives on civil society, participation and governance* (pp. 162–183). New Delhi et al.: Sage.

Cnaan, R. A., Boddie, S. C., & Yancey, G. I. (2003). Bowling alone but serving together: The congregational norm of community involvement. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common good* (pp. 20–31). Waco: Baylor University Press.

De Hart, J., & Dekker, P. (2005). Churches as voluntary associations: Their contribution to democracy as a public voice and source of social and political involvement. In S. Roßteutscher (Ed.), *Democracy and the role of associations: Political, organizational and social contexts* (pp. 168–196). London: Routledge.

Dekker, P., & Ester, P. (1996). Depillarization, deconfessionalization and deinstitutionalisation: Empirical trends in Dutch society 1958 to 1992. *Review of Religious Research, 37*(4), 325–341.

Elff, M., & Roßteutscher, S. (2011). Stability or decline? Class, religion and the vote in Germany. *German Politics, 20*(1), 107–127.

Finke, R. (1997). The consequences of religious competition: Supply-side explanations for religious change. In L. A. Young (Ed.), *Rational choice theory and religion: Theory and assessment* (pp. 46–65). London/New York: Routledge.

Finke, R., & Stark, R. (1988). Religious economies and sacred canopies: Religious mobilization in American cities. *American Sociological Review, 53*(1), 41–49.

Font, J., Geurts, P., Maloney, W. A., & Berton, M. (2007). Organizations in context: Politics and culture shaping associational life. In W. A. Maloney & S. Roßteutscher (Eds.), *Social capital and associations in European democracies* (pp. 19–38). London: Routledge.

Gabriel, O. W., Kunz, V., Roßteutscher, S., & van Deth, J. W. (2002). *Sozialkapital und Demokratie: Zivilgesellschaftliche Ressourcen im Vergleich*. Wien: WUV-Universitäts-Verlag.

Gill, A. (2003). Lost in the supermarket: Comments on Beaman, religious pluralism, and what it means to be free. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42*(3), 327–332.

Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1989). *Organizational ecology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kaufmann, F.-X. (2000). *Wie überlebt das Christentum?* Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder.

Maloney, W. A., & Roßteutscher, S. (2007a). *Social capital and associations in European democracies*. London: Routledge.

Maloney, W. A., & Roßteutscher, S. (2007b). Assessing the significance of associational concerns: Leisure, politics and markets. In W. A. Maloney & S. Roßteutscher (Eds.), *Social capital and associations in European democracies* (pp. 52–78). London: Routledge.

Maloney, W. A., & Roßteutscher, S. (2007c). The associational universe in Europe: Size and participation. In W. A. Maloney & S. Roßteutscher (Eds.), *Social capital and associations in European democracies: A comparative analysis* (pp. 39–51). London: Routledge.

Meulemann, H. (2004). Enforced secularization – Spontaneous revival? Religious belief, unbelief, uncertainty and indifference in East and West European countries 1991–1998. *European Sociological Review, 20*(1), 47–61.

Minkoff, D. (1995). *Organizing for equality: The evolution of women's and racial-ethnic organizations in America, 1955–1985*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture, or performance? In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), *Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries?* (pp. 52–73). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Offe, C., & Fuchs, S. (2001). Schwund des Sozialkapitals? Der Fall Deutschland. In R. D. Putnam (Ed.), *Gesellschaft und Gemeinsinn: Sozialkapital im internationalen Vergleich* (pp. 417–514). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Pappi, F. U. (1985). Die konfessionell-religiöse Konfliktlinie in der deutschen Wählerschaft: Entstehung, Stabilität und Wandel? In D. Oberndörfer, H. Rattinger, & K. Schmitt (Eds.),

Wirtschaftlicher Wandel, Religiöser Wandel und Wertwandel (pp. 263–290). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Pickel, G. (1998). Religiosität und Kirchlichkeit in Ost- und Westeuropa: Vergleichende Betrachtungen religiöser Orientierungen nach dem Umbruch in Osteuropa. In D. Pollack, I. Borowik, & W. Jagodzinski (Eds.), *Religiöser Wandel in den postkommunistischen Ländern Ost- und Mitteleuropas* (pp. 55–85). Würzburg: Ergon Verlag.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York et al.: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, R. D., Pharr, S. J., & Dalton, R. J. (2000). Introduction: What's troubling the trilateral democracies? In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), *Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries?* (pp. 3–27). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Roßteutscher, S. (2007). CDU-Wahl 2005: Katholiken, Kirchgänger und eine protestantische Spitzenkandidatin aus dem Osten. In F. Brettschneider, O. Niedermayer, & B. Weßels (Eds.), *Die Bundestagswahl 2005: Analysen des Wahlkampfes und der Wahlergebnisse* (pp. 321–347). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Roßteutscher, S. (2009). *Religion, Zivilgesellschaft, Demokratie*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Roßteutscher, S. (2010). Social capital worldwide: Potential for democratisation or stabiliser of authoritarian rule? *American Behavioral Scientist, 53*(3), 737–757.

Roßteutscher, S. (2012). Die konfessionell-religiöse Konfliktlinie zwischen Säkularisierung und Mobilisierung [Special issue]. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 45*, 111–133.

Roßteutscher, S., Medina, L., & Selle, P. (2007). Age and generation: Patterns of associational fertility and survival. In W. A. Maloney & S. Roßteutscher (Eds.), *Social capital and associations in European democracies. A comparative analysis* (pp. 195–223). London: Routledge.

Selle, P., & Oymyr, B. (1992). Explaining changes in the population of voluntary organisations: The roles of aggregate and individual level data. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 21*(2), 147–179.

Sengers, E. (2004). 'Although we are Catholic, we are Dutch' – The transition of the Dutch Catholic church from sect to church as an explanation for its growth and decline. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 43*(1), 129–139.

Singh, J. V. (1990). *Organizational evolution: New directions*. Newbury Park: Sage.

Stark, R., & Iannaccone, L. R. (1994). A supply-side reinterpretation of the 'Secularization' of Europe. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 33*(3), 230–252.

Van der Meer, J. (2003). Rain or fog? An empirical examination of social capital's rainmaker effects? In M. Hooghe & D. Stolle (Eds.), *Generating social capital: Civil society and institutions in comparative perspective* (pp. 133–151). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vermeulen, F. F. (2005). *The immigrant organising process: The emergence and persistence of Turkish immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam*. Dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam.

Wolf, C. (1996). Konfessionelle versus religiöse Konfliktlinie in der deutschen Wählerschaft. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 37*(4), 713–734.

Wollebæk, D., & Selle, P. (2004). Passive membership in voluntary organizations: Implications for civil society, integration and democracy. In S. Prakash & P. Selle (Eds.), *Investigating social capital* (pp. 235–255). New Delhi et al.: Sage.

Wuthnow, R. (1996). *Learning to care*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wuthnow, R. (2004). Presidential address 2003: The challenge of diversity. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 43*(2), 159–170.

Yeung, A. B. (2004). An intricate triangle – Religiosity, volunteering, and social capital: The European perspective, the case of Finland. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33*(3), 401–422.

Chapter 5
Secularization and the Sources of Morality: Religion and Morality in Contemporary Europe

Loek Halman and Erik van Ingen

5.1 Introduction

For a long time in history, a religious "Weltanschauung" dominated people's lives. God was the central point of reference to understand and interpret the natural and social order, human consciousness, and people's moral concerns. Public or civic behavior was to a large extent determined and restricted by religion and often took place within the churches or in activities organized by the churches. Churches were important resources for groups to mobilize; they created a sense of belonging and contributed to social integration, civic engagement, and associational life (see also Herbert 2003). In public affairs, moral decisions, and value judgments, churches and church leaders provided guidelines or directions grounded in a theology in which God was the ultimate authority, and fear of the Gods was for a long time an important motive to enforce the laws of society (Smith quoted by Yinger 1970: 52–53). Religion was a major source of inspiration of morality and the churches were the moral guardians of society.

A process of secularization is assumed to have made an end to this religious dominance in the modern world. Religion ceased to be "the all-encompassing reality in which the secular realm found its proper place" (Casanova 1994: 15), or as Peter Berger (1967) noted, the idea of religion as a sacred canopy has become questionable to a growing number of people. Due to social differentiation and specialization, religion gradually lost its overarching claims and its dominant position in society. The various institutional spheres, such as health care, judicature, economy, welfare, education, and family are no longer "under the presidency of religion" (Wilson 1996: 17). They developed independent from religion their own "secular" norms, which increasingly restricted the validity of the church norms to the specifically "religious sphere." Religion was gradually pushed back to a sphere of its own

L. Halman (✉) • E. van Ingen
Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: loek.halman@uvt.nl; e.j.vaningen@uvt.nl

and has become privatized and marginalized within its own differentiated sphere (Casanova 1994: 19).

As Bruce (2002) argued, secularization means that religion has become less important in contemporary society and that the number of people who live by the rules and norms provided by the churches has declined. According to some, this development has serious consequences for the moral order and civil society. For example, Francis Fukuyama (2000) argued that these social trends weakened the social bonds and shared values considerably, disrupted the social norms, and fuelled the view that "society's moral order has been on the decline" (Fukuyama 2000: 7). Because social bonds and moral commitments are vital for a vibrant civil society, civil society is in jeopardy (Wuthnow 1996).

In this chapter, we are interested in the connection between religion on the one hand and people's moral views on the other. As said, for a long time in history, religion has been an important source of inspiration for people's moral views and propagator of decent or civic behaviors. Religious authority is increasingly put into question, and humans are increasingly "abandoned to their own wits and will" (Bauman 1995: 18). In modern society, the role of the churches has become more limited and the churches do not seem to be the moral compasses of society anymore. To what extent the beliefs of the religious and nonreligious about a number of moral issues are different in contemporary Europe is explored in this chapter. In particular, we ask ourselves what the differences are between churchgoers and non-churchgoers when countries have advanced economically and have become more modern. In other words, we examine the differences between the religious and nonreligious across countries and investigate whether or not these differences are determined by a country's degree of modernization.

People in contemporary society are not only assumed to be no longer forced to be religious; also religiosity has become a personal matter. This appears, e.g., from the many people in the Netherlands who do not feel attracted anymore by the churches and do not consider themselves belonging to one of the churches. It also appears from the declining numbers of people who attend religious services regularly. All over Western Europe, church attendance is on the decline (Halman et al. 2011: 65). Of course there remain people who prefer to be religious and who still go to church as there are people who define themselves religious but do not go to church. Although churchgoers generally are more religious than people who do not or hardly go to church, religious people not necessarily have to attend religious services, and many of the religious people will not attend religious services for a variety of reasons. It raises the question whether these religious people are more civic than nonreligious people. Are they more strict in their moral judgments than nonreligious or less devout people? Are churchgoers more civic than non-churchgoers? To what extent do churchgoers still adhere to the prescriptions and lessons from their religious leaders, and hence, do they differ in moral views and convictions from people who do not go to church? Such questions are dealt with in this chapter.

Previous studies made clear that a distinction has to be made between religious beliefs and religious practices. Stark (2001) concluded that Durkheim was wrong in

claiming that religious integration is essential. Stark demonstrated that religious beliefs were more important predictors of moral values than church participation and thus falsifying Durkheim's claim. Others found opposite results (e.g., Parboteeah et al. 2008). Their analyses provided evidence that religious beliefs were not so important for people's moral views. Religious practices, such as church attendance and prayer, were negatively associated "to justification of ethically suspect behaviours" (Parboteeah et al. 2008: 394). Such contradictory results seem to make it necessary to distinguish religious beliefs from religious practices and investigate which explains people's moral values better: beliefs or practices.

Secularization may be a modern phenomenon; it seems mainly to be confined to Western Europe. The recent developments in Central and Eastern European countries seem to reveal a different story. In many of the countries in that part of Europe, religion and religious organizations grew since the fall of Communism (Tomka 2005). And also outside Europe, religion appears to remain of major importance in the lives of many people. For Peter Berger, once one of the fierce proponents of secularization ideas, reason to admit that he was wrong in predicting that by the year 2000, there would be no churches and religious communities anymore and that a worldwide secular culture would have developed (Joas 2006: 57). In his 2000 Paul Hanly Furfey lecture, he abandoned the old secularization theory because the empirical evidence refutes the theory; the world "is as religious as it has ever been, and in some places is more religious than ever" (Berger 2001: 445).

In many Central and Eastern European countries, it seems that religion and religious practices are increasingly attractive to ordinary people since the collapse of the Communist period. The secularization trends are thus not similar across Europe, and therefore, it is unlikely that civil society and people's moral views have developed similarly across Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, the churches seem to have gained prominence. During communism, the state was accepted as the power "to regulate society over a wide area of life" (Crawford 1996: 26), though the majority remained very hostile towards the state (idem). After the fall of Communist regimes, the churches entered a transition phase, and in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, religious communities increased. In contrast to the state during Communism, churches are considered as reliable problem-solving and uncompromised bodies and resources of spiritual guidance. A last research question addresses this issue: to what extent are the links between religion and morality stronger in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe?

5.2 Religion and Morality

Religious beliefs are considered important sources of people's moral principles. For religious people, it seems usually quite clear what is ethically right and wrong and they do not need laws to guide their conduct across a host of behaviors. According to the divine command theory, there exists a strong connection between religion and morality, simply because moral rules are considered the rules given by God (see

Gert 2005: 118). The basic idea is that "what is good or right is good or right only because God wills it or commands it" (Wainwright 2005: 73). The waning of the dominant position of religion in modernizing society fostered the establishment of a "new morality" or "permissive morality" (Wilson 1982: 86). Since the moral guidance of the churches and religion is less self-evident and under heavy pressure, it can be assumed that people's religious orientations are no longer, or less strongly, linked to their moral views. Individualized people are free, autonomous, and independent from the traditional institutions in general and churches and their leaders in particular. As Taylor (1989: 312–313) argued, "masses of people can sense moral sources of a quite different kind, ones that don't necessarily suppose a God."

This is also how Casanova sees secularization, or at least one of the propositions of secularization: it is the differentiation of secular spheres from religious institutions and norms (Casanova 1994: 211). He goes on to argue that this remains a general modern structural trend. One of the consequences is that religious authority over moral convictions has diminished or has lost its determining power over morality. In contemporary modern society, people are assumed to have become their own decision takers, no longer bound to be influenced by religion and independent from their religious beliefs. If that is true, we would expect to find declining differences in moral views between religious people and nonreligious people and between churchgoers and non-churchgoers because moral convictions in both groups will be less and less determined by their religious views and behaviors. Both believers and nonbelievers have become free and autonomous people and decide for themselves what to believe and who/what to follow. Neither of them needs a church as a moral source. Not only churchgoing is a matter of personal choice: also moral convictions are personal considerations. Hence, *(H1a) the more modern a country is, the smaller the differences in moral views between churchgoers and non-churchgoers and between believers and nonbelievers.*

However, it can also be argued that the differences between churchgoers and non-churchgoers remain, because churchgoers and strong believers still rely on their church or their beliefs in moral decisions and hence remain more morally strict than unchurched people. Differences could even become larger: a countermovement may occur among the group of churchgoers, in which a reorientation on religious beliefs takes place in response to the secularizing forces in society. In that case, it can be expected that the differences in moral outlooks of both believers and unbelievers become more salient and more marked. This would not be inconsistent with an overall decline in the extent to which people subscribe to clerical norms: if the group of non-churchgoers grows at the expense of the group of churchgoers, this may also affect the average beliefs in the population. Hence, *(H1b) the more modern a society is, the more the believers and nonbelievers will differ in their moral views.*

According to the secularization theory, religion has become privatized and people are increasingly defining their religiosity in a personal, nontraditional, and institutionally loose way. Grace Davie (2000, 2002) coined the situation as "believing without belonging." People turn away from the churches but do not necessarily become less religious. Also others like Wilson (1982: 149) and Chaves (1994: 750) pointed out earlier that secularization should not be understood as the decline of

religion as such, but as "the declining scope of religious authority." Thus, secularization refers to the declining authority of religion or "the displacement of religion from the centre of human life" (Bruce 2011: 1), which not necessarily should be equated with declining levels of individual beliefs and religious ideas. Only those who remain to adhere to the teachings and lessons from the churches will be stricter. In their moral choices, the voice of the churches and church leaders are echoed. For those who are not churchgoing, the moral voice of the church will be irrelevant. But what to expect when it comes to religious beliefs? Why would people who are more devout, but not churched, be more strict than churched or less devout people? It would assume that atheists are immoral people or have lower standards of morality, which seems unlikely to be true. Hence, we predict that *(H2) the differences in moral views are smaller when it comes to religious and non- (less) religious people than between churchgoers and non-churchgoers.*

As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, earlier studies (e.g., Stark 2001; Parboteeah et al. 2008) provided evidence that religious beliefs and religious practices were differently related to people's moral views. Their studies also revealed that other factors may explain the effects of religion on morality. One suggestion of Parobeeah et al. was to look at religious pluralism. Following studies of Voas, Olsen, and Crockett (2002), they suggested that "the degree to which single religions are not dominant and there are any alternatives available could also be potentially linked to ethics" (Parboteeah et al. 2008: 396). In the article they referred to, Voas et al. did not focus on the relationship between religion and morality but on religious involvement. They did not find evidence that religious pluralism affected levels of participation. Also Halman and Draulans (2006) were not able to substantiate the claim of rational choice theorists that religious pluralism in Europe had any impact on religious practices and religious beliefs. Voas et al., however, concluded that "the question of whether religious diversity promotes or undermines commitment – and by implication how modernization affects traditional belief and practice – remains one of the most interesting problems in the field" (Voas et al. 2002: 227). As far as we know, the issue of religious pluralism has never been studied in relation with moral views and the impact religious diversity might have on people's moral convictions and values.

In mono religious settings, there is no competition between religions and hence no competition between moral views. Following the arguments of the proponents of the rational choice theory, in such circumstances, the churches do not have to do their best to be attractive to the believers. In case churches have to compete with each other, they have to do their best to attract believers, who on their turn will not only be stronger believers but also more strict followers of the religious and moral messages and teachings of the church leaders. Hence, we may expect to find stronger associations between religion and morality in such competitive environments than in mono religious societies. The following hypotheses can be formulated: *(H3a) The more religiously diverse societies are, the stronger religiosity impacts moral values.*

The adherents of the secularization ideas argue the opposite. According to them, religious pluralism undermines the plausibility structure of religion (Berger 1967), and therefore, people will be less inclined to follow the religious and moral messages

of the church and their leaders. From this opposite point of view, we can formulate the following competing hypothesis: *(H3b) The more religiously diverse a society is, the weaker the impact of religiosity on moral values.*

5.3 Central and Eastern Europe

As noted before, the recent developments in Central and Eastern European countries seem to reveal a different story which does not fit the secularization ideas. In many countries in that part of Europe, religion and religious organizations grew since the fall of Communism. Religion and religious practices are becoming increasingly attractive to ordinary people now that state communism has vanished and with it the dominant provider of morality. In many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, religious communities and churches are considered reliable problem-solving and uncompromised bodies and sources of spiritual guidance.

The secular ideology and the Communist efforts to destroy religion make it likely to expect lower levels of religiosity in Central and Eastern European societies (Pollack 2003). However, it has been pointed out that the atheist ideology did not destroy religiosity. For example, Hormel (2010: 50–52) argues that not expressing your religious identity was merely a means to avoid scrutiny or to gain status. It does not reveal that state-imposed atheism was fully internalized or accepted. This is also what Tomka (2005: 16) noted: "Communism undeniably weakened the churches and the institutional and official forms of religiosity, but it also contributed to the growth of informal religious life as well." As such, the atheist doctrine appeared not very successful. It means that it would be all too simple to expect levels of religiosity to be lower in Central and Eastern Europe because of its secular ideology or to expect that levels of religiosity have increased after the collapse of Communism and the end of state atheism allowing previously hidden religious feelings to be openly expressed (again). Furthermore, Central and Eastern Europe are far from homogeneous in this regard. Tomka points to differences in imposed structural transformations of the economies. The forced industrialization and urbanization in countries like Eastern Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia disintegrated the old rural families and dissolved the rural social system and hence traditional culture too. These most industrialized societies appear to be most secularized indeed (Pollack 2003: 324). In countries like Poland, Slovakia, and Romania, the old social system persisted, and where that is the case, traditional culture is maintained (Tomka 2005: 22).

In other countries, the churches accommodated with the Communist regimes, e.g., Moldova and Bulgaria, and other churches challenged the regimes, e.g., "the catholic Church in Lithuania and Ukraine, the Lutheran church in Estonia and the Orthodox church in Georgia" (Hormel 2010: 50). In case the churches successfully co-opted by the regime, the churches lost their "credibility among religious believers, who then disaffiliated in substantial numbers" (Gautier 1997: 290; see also Caplow 1985: 106). In case the churches did not accommodate with the regime, they remained in a strong position and "despite Soviet efforts to sanction their activities,

were able to maintain public interest" (Hormel 2010: 50). The weak international and organizational structure of the Orthodox churches and traditions of close ties between state and Orthodox Churches are a major factor to understand why these churches more or less voluntary subordinate to the totalitarian regime. The Catholic churches had a tradition of opposition to the state and above all have strong international and organizational structures that defended local churches from an international position to accommodate with the regime (Borowik 2006: 269).

What can be expected with regard to the impact of religion on morality in Central and Eastern Europe? Even if the Soviet doctrine had survived and all people had turned into atheists, it is of course not very likely that morality has disappeared or destroyed as well. In Central and Eastern Europe, it can be suggested that because the state had taken over the legitimating functions of religion, Communism weakened the link between religion and morality (see also Stark 2001: 619). Therefore, it seems most plausible to assume that the impact of religion on morality will be weaker in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Hence, the hypothesis (H4a) reads: *Church attendance and religious beliefs are weaker predictors of opinions on moral issues in Eastern Europe than it is in Western Europe.*

However, since the collapse of Communism, religious organizations and church attendance seem on the rise in many Central and Eastern European countries. Especially in the first years of the post-Communist period, a religious revival was reported (Tomka 2005: 11) which slowed down in the later years. Tomka added to this that in general, also in Central and Eastern Europe, the younger generations appear less religious. Hence, also in this part of Europe, cohort replacement will eventuate in a gradual decline of religiosity possibly accelerated by modernization processes. The religious revival may imply that people are increasingly eager to follow the religious leaders and their moral views. As Tomka noted, "regular church attendance and frequent prayer distinguish one group. Another one is distinguished by the lack of any sign of religious practice" (Tomka 2005: 83). Thus, also in Central and Eastern Europe, a polar situation will exist. However, it must be noted that it seems unlikely that this ideological polarization resembles the polarization in the west. In Central and Eastern Europe, there does not seem to be much evidence "that the decline of traditional religiosity would be compensated for by unorthodox forms of religion" (Tomka 2005: 83–84). Hence, it can be expected that religious and nonreligious people will differ significantly in their moral views and that these differences between religious and nonreligious groups will be stronger in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe where nontraditional forms of religiosity have developed. In other words, in Central and Eastern Europe, believing without belonging has not developed and thus believing and churchgoing are strongly connected. Religiosity outside the churches is not widespread or even nonexistent, whereas in Western Europe, an increasing number of people turn away from the churches but remain religious one way or the other.

Following such arguments, it can be expected that in Central and Eastern Europe, the differences in moral views between religious and nonreligious people will be more marked than in Western Europe. Our last hypothesis is *(H4b): Church attendance and religious beliefs are stronger predictors of opinions on moral issues in Eastern Europe than it is in Western Europe.*

5.4   Data, Measurements, and Analyses

To test our hypotheses, we use the data from the most recent European Values Study. Data was collected in all European countries, from Iceland to Azerbaijan and from Malta to Finland (see www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu). The following countries were included in our analyses (alphabetically, with country abbreviations and the number of cases in brackets): Albania (AL; 1534), Austria (AT; 1510), Armenia (AM; 1477), Belgium (BE; 1507), Bosnia Herzegovina (BA; 1512), Bulgaria (BG; 1500), Belarus (BY; 1500), Croatia (HR; 1498), Cyprus (CY; 999), Northern Cyprus (CY-TCC; 495), Czech Republic (CZ; 1793), Denmark (DK; 1507), Estonia (EE; 1518), Finland (FI; 1134), France (FR; 1501), Georgia (GE; 1498), Germany (DE; 2038), Greece (GR; 1498), Hungary (HU; 1513), Iceland (IS; 808), Ireland (IE; 982), Italy (IT; 1519), Latvia (LV; 1506), Lithuania (LT; 1499), Luxembourg (LU; 1609), Malta (MT; 1497), Moldova (MD; 1551), Montenegro (ME; 1516), Netherlands (NL; 1552), Norway (NO; 1090), Poland (PL; 1479), Portugal (PT; 1553), Romania (RO; 1489), Russian Federation (RU; 1490), Serbia (RS; 1512), Slovak Republic (SK; 1509), Slovenia (SI; 1366), Spain (ES; 1497), Sweden (SE; 1174), Switzerland (CH; 1271), Turkey (TR; 2326), Ukraine (UA; 1507), Macedonia (MK; 1493), Great Britain (GB-GBN; 1549), Northern Ireland (GB-NIR; 495), and Kosovo (RS-KM; 1601).[1]

The questionnaire includes questions on attitudes and opinions in a wide variety of life domains, including religion. For more information, we refer to the EVS website: www.europeanvalues.nl. Data on a society's level of modernization come from the International Monetary Fund and refer to 2008 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx). Data on religious pluralism are from Barro (2011; http://rbarro.com/data-sets).

5.4.1   Measurements

The Dependent Variables

Moral orientations in the European Values Study are tapped by a long list of items covering a wide range of moral issues and particular behaviors. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not these issues and behaviors could always be justified, never be justified, or something in between (1 = never to 10 = always). The statements presented range from cheating on taxes and avoiding paying a fare to political assassinations, homosexuality, and euthanasia.

---

[1] EVS surveys were conducted in Northern Ireland and Northern Cyprus separately. In the final analyses, we merged Northern Ireland and Great Britain and Northern Cyprus with Turkey. For Northern Ireland and Northern Cyprus, country characteristics are of course from Great Britain and Turkey, respectively.

Fig. 5.1 Justification of various behaviors and issues in Europe. (Country means on 10-point scales: 1=never justified, 10=always justified) (Source: EVS 2008)

Behaviors which are considered to be most of all justifiable are in vitro fertilization and divorce, whereas joyriding, bribery, and using drugs are considered least justifiable. It should be noted, however, that "rarely does a score exceed the halfway point of the scale (i.e., 5.5 out of 10), and most of the scores are considerably lower than" (Harding et al. 1986: 7). In other words, high proportions of the Europeans consider most of the behaviors as "never or hardly justified," suggesting that, generally speaking, people in the countries investigated by the European Values Study are very reluctant to accept such issues and behaviors. In Fig. 5.1, the mean scores are displayed for Europe.

There appear to be two major areas of permissiveness: one with regard to behaviors defined by the law as an offense or a crime. It includes the acceptance of claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to, taking free rides on public transport, tax fraud, lying in your own interest, accepting a bribe, and joyriding. The other concerns issues and behaviors which were, and often still are, regarded as sinful according to traditional Christian doctrine, such as homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, and divorce. We calculated mean scores for each of these two dimensions which we labeled "acceptance of law violations" and "moral permissiveness," respectively.[2]

The Independent Variables

Our main explanatory variables are people's religious convictions and their religious practices: personal religiosity and religious involvement.

---

[2]Factor analyses yielded two dimensions which appear reliable scales with Cronbach's alpha of .82 and .79 for "moral permissiveness" and "acceptance of law violation," respectively.

Table 5.1 The combination of churchgoing and non-churchgoing and being religious or not

Religiosity combined	Frequencies	%
Nonreligious and non-churchgoer	17,220	27
Religious and non-churchgoer	27,281	43
Nonreligious and churchgoer	973	1
Religious and churchgoer	18,231	29
Total	63,705	100

Source: EVS (2008)

As indicators of individual religious involvement, we included one measure of traditional institutional religiosity which is tapped by church attendance. This is measured by the question: "Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?" The answer possibilities ranged between 1 (= more than once a week) and 8 (= never, practically never). For our analyses, this item was dichotomized: 1 = at least once a month, 0 = less often.

Religiosity is tapped by the answer to the question "independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are: a religious person; not a religious person; a convinced atheist." Also this item was dichotomized: 1 = religious, 0 is not religious.

In order to further test the effects of churchgoing and religiosity (Which affects moral orientations stronger?), we classified our respondents according to the combination of church attendance and religiosity. We defined 3 dummies: (1) those who are religious and go to church at least once a month, (2) those who are religious and do not go to church once a month, and (3) nonreligious people who do go to church at least once a month. The last category is of course very small. In Table 5.1, we displayed the frequencies. The combination of nonreligious and non-churchgoers will be the reference category in the analyses.

At the individual level, we also included control variables age, gender, and level of education. For gender, we included a dummy variable for men. Age was measured using year of birth and recoded as age in years. Level of education is tapped in six categories: 0 = up to preprimary education, 1 = primary education or first stage of basic education, 2 = lower secondary or second stage of basic education, 3 = (upper) secondary education, 4 = post-secondary non-tertiary education, 5 = first stage of tertiary education, and 6 = second stage of tertiary education.

Macro characteristics include the degree a society's modernization, measured by GDP per capita (in thousands of dollars at purchase power parity) in 2008 (International Monetary Fund; http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx).

Further, we included a measure for religious diversity and a dummy for Eastern European countries.

Religious diversity is measured by the so-called Herfindahl index as calculated by Barro and McCleary (2003). The index is the sum of the squares of the population fractions belonging to each religion. In case everyone in a country belongs to the same religion, the Herfindahl index equals one, and hence, the pluralism indicator equals zero. The more divers, the lower the Herfindahl index and higher the pluralism index (Barro and McCleary 2003: 764). Table 5.2 provides an overview of all independent variables.

Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of continuous and dummy variables

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Christian morality	67,061	4.339	2.557	1	10
Acceptance of law violations	67,391	2.154	1.373	1	10
Women	67,774	0.555	0.497	0	1
Age	67,495	46.526	17.787	15	108
Church attendance	66,960	0.293	0.455	0	1
Religious person	64,282	0.714	0.452	0	1
GDP (centered)	75,680	0.000	24.598	−24.007	177.123
Religious diversity (centered)	70,739	0.000	0.219	−0.421	0.410
Eastern Europe	67,786	0.538	0.499	0	1

5.4.2   Analytical Strategy

We applied multi-level models with individuals nested in countries. All models included a random (country) intercept. The independent variable of interest (a dummy variable that indicated being religious or going to church) was allowed to vary across countries (i.e., its slope was random) and the covariance between the random slope and intercept was also estimated. To see whether the effect of the dummy variable was affected by a country characteristic, we included cross-level interactions. We used the xtmixed module of Stata 11 with maximum likelihood estimation in all models.

5.5   Results

In Fig. 5.2, the countries' mean scores on the two moral dimensions are displayed in a two-dimensional graph. The law violations appear to be accepted most in Belarus, followed by Russia and Slovakia. At the bottom, we find Turkey and Turkish Cyprus, Kosovo, and Malta. Also in Denmark, these civic issues and behaviors are rejected. Again, it should be stressed that also in the most lenient societies, the acceptance is rather modest. In no country, the mean acceptance exceeds the halfway point of the scale (i.e., 5.5 out of 10), and all scores are considerably lower than this!

   The general acceptance of the issues and behaviors that we considered indicative of moral permissiveness is higher than with regard to law violations, although again in the majority of the countries, the acceptance does not exceed the halfway point of the scale. Most lenient appear now countries in the North-Western part of Europe: Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, and the Netherlands. Least permissive appear again Kosovo and Turkey. Also in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Cyprus, Malta, and Bosnia Herzegovina, people appear mostly reluctant in accepting these issues and behaviors.

Fig. 5.2 Countries' mean scores on the two moral dimensions (Source: EVS 2008)

It is not easy to find a clear pattern in these permissiveness dimensions. Countries do not differ much with regard to the acceptance of law violations; in most countries, these are rejected, but there exists some more variation with regard to the acceptance of behaviors that are condemned by the (Christian) churches and which have to do with life issues such as abortion, euthanasia, in vitro fertilization but also with issues such as homosexuality and divorce. Roughly speaking, the division is East–west; the West being more lenient than the East.

Table 5.3 shows the results of our analyses concerning moral permissiveness. As a first step, we explored the variance of this variable and find out how large the share of the total variance is that is due to country variation. This turned out to be .32, which is considerable and it indicates that country characteristics play a role in explaining differences in this kind of morality.

Models I and II of Table 5.3 tested our hypotheses 1a and 1b. The churchgoer effect ($b = -1.07$; model I) indicates the difference between churchgoers and non-churchgoers in countries with an average GDP per capita (the GDP variable in the model is centered). The 1 point difference on the 10-point scale is relatively large: it equals .42 standard deviations (SDs) of moral permissiveness (see Table 5.1). The negative interaction effect indicates that the difference between churchgoers and non-churchgoers was larger (more negative) in more modern countries. The size of this interaction effect was also considerable. For example, in a country with a GDP that is two standard deviations above average (Switzerland is the nearest country to that position in the distribution), the estimated difference between churchgoers and non-churchgoers equaled -1.85. Alternatively, the estimated difference in a country with a GDP of two SDs below average equaled -0.28.

Table 5.3 Multi-level regression of moral permissiveness on explanatory variables (unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors)

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
Churchgoer	−1.068** (0.082)				
Religious person		−1.004** (0.087)			
GDP (centered)	0.031** (0.006)	−0.031** (0.010)	0.018** (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)	−0.007 (0.008)
Churchgoer × GDP	−0.016** (0.003)				
Religious person × GDP		0.001 (0.003)			
Religiosity:					
None (ref.)			0	0	0
Religious and non-churchgoer (d1)			−0.725** (0.063)	−0.697** (0.052)	−0.905** (0.080)
Nonreligious churchgoer (d2)			−0.850** (0.115)	−0.827** (0.098)	−1.067** (0.131)
Religious churchgoer (d3)			−1.637** (0.121)	−1.657** (0.119)	−2.171** (0.139)
Religious diversity (RD)				−1.625 (0.956)	
Religiosity × RD:					
None × RD (ref.)				0	
Religious and non-churchgoer × RD				1.052** (0.244)	
Nonreligious churchgoer × RD				1.217** (0.436)	
Religious churchgoer × RD				1.346* (0.563)	
Eastern Europe (EE)					−2.433** (0.453)
Religiosity × EE:					
None × EE (ref.)					0
Religious and non-churchgoer × EE					0.365** (0.111)
Nonreligious churchgoer × EE					0.524* (0.208)
Religious churchgoer × EE					1.032** (0.191)
Random-effects parameters					
Var. churchgoer	0.280				
Var. religious person		0.306			
Var. religiosity d1			0.154	0.087	0.112

(continued)

Table 5.3 (continued)

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
Var. religiosity d2			0.203	0.087	0.118
Var. religiosity d3			0.621	0.563	0.374
Var. intercept	1.158	4.744	1.396	1.589	1.289
Cov. churchgoer/intercept	−0.370				
Cov. religious person/intercept		−0.722			
Var. residual	3.914	3.947	3.791	3.840	3.780
Intercept	4.268** (0.172)	4.906** (0.332)	4.729** (0.188)	4.786** (0.207)	6.092** (0.316)
N (countries)	65,527 (45)	62,937 (45)	62,409 (45)	58,213 (42)	62,409 (45)

Note. All models are controlled for gender, age, and education

**$p<.01$; *$p<.05$

The results of model II, concerning the impact of religiosity, are different. The estimated difference between religious and nonreligious persons in a country with an average GDP was roughly similar to the difference between churchgoers and non-churchgoers ($b=-1.00$). However, there was no significant interaction effect. The size of the difference between the religious and nonreligious did not vary with GDP.

Based on models I and II, we conclude that our findings with regard to church attendance are in line with hypothesis 1b (hypothesis 1a is rejected) and that with regard to being a religious person, our findings are not in line with hypothesis 1b (hypothesis 1b is rejected). However, there is also not much evidence that the differences between religious and nonreligious persons in their moral views are smaller in more affluent, that is, more modern societies.

In model III, the indicators of church attendance and religiosity are combined. In our data, 27 % considered themselves to be nonreligious, 43 % was religious but did not go to church frequently, and 29 % was religious and went to church frequently. A small share (1.5 %; $N=973$) indicated to go to church without being religious. We are unsure how to interpret this response, but we provide their scores in our models for the sake of being complete. As model III shows, both religious and churchgoing groups reported significantly lower levels of acceptance than the nonreligious, not churchgoers. Moreover, going to church added to the difference among the religious: the effect of religious churchgoer is more than twice the effect of the religious and non-churchgoer, and this difference was significantly different from zero ($Chi2(1)=46.98$; $Prob>Chi2=0.000$). This finding is in line with hypothesis 2 and suggests that church attendance adds to the negative effect of being religious.

In model IV, an interaction effect between religiosity and religious diversity (to test hypothesis 3a and b) was added. The effect of religious diversity was centered, which means that the "main effects" of religiosity should be interpreted as the differences in a country with average religious diversity (such as Romania or Austria). As the significant interaction effects show, the differences in countries with a high level of religious diversity are smaller (less negative). For example, the estimated difference between religious churchgoers and the nonreligious in a country with a religious diversity that is one SD (see Table 5.1) above average (such as the Czech Republic) equaled -1.36, whereas the same difference in a country that is one SD religious diversity below average (such as Croatia) was estimated -1.95. This is in line with hypothesis 3b (hence, hypothesis 3a is rejected).

Model V shows a similar pattern. An interaction with a dummy variable that indicates the difference between Eastern and Western Europe is added to the model. This means that the main effects of religiosity should be interpreted as the estimated differences in Western Europe. The interaction effects show that Eastern Europe is different. The differences between the religious and the nonreligious were smaller in Eastern Europe (less negative). For example, the difference between religious churchgoers and the nonreligious people is approximately half the size of the same difference in Western Europe ($-2.17+1.03=-1.14$). This means that hypothesis 4b is rejected.

Table 5.4 has exactly the same setup as Table 5.3 but now the dependent variable is the other moral dimension: the acceptance of law violations. The variance of that variable is mostly due to individual level differences: only 9 % of the total variation

Table 5.4 Multi-level regression of the acceptance of law violations on explanatory variables (unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors)

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
Churchgoer	−0.144** (0.030)				
Religious person		−0.249** (0.030)			
GDP (centered)	0.005 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.011** (0.003)
Churchgoer × GDP	−0.003** (0.001)				
Religious person × GDP		−0.001 (0.001)			
Religiosity:					
None (ref.)			0	0	0
Religious and non-churchgoer (d1)			−0.210** (0.025)	−0.207** (0.025)	−0.181** (0.035)
Nonreligious churchgoer (d2)			0.063 (0.086)	0.072 (0.085)	0.023 (0.110)
Religious churchgoer (d3)			−0.319** (0.034)	−0.318** (0.034)	−0.349** (0.049)
Religious diversity (RD)				0.547 (0.327)	
Religiosity × RD:					
None × RD (ref.)				0	
Religious and non-churchgoer × RD				0.194 (0.244)	
Nonreligious churchgoer × RD				0.538 (0.384)	
Religious churchgoer × RD				0.264 (0.159)	
Eastern Europe (EE)					0.622** (0.180)
Religiosity × EE:					
None × EE (ref.)					0
Religious and non-churchgoer × EE					−0.056 (0.049)
Nonreligious churchgoer × EE					0.100 (0.173)
Religious churchgoer × EE					0.053 (0.067)
Random-effects parameters					
Var. churchgoer	0.032				
Var. religious person		0.030			

Var. religiosity d1			0.018	0.017	0.017
Var. religiosity d2			0.144	0.129	0.140
Var. religiosity d3			0.038	0.036	0.038
Var. intercept	0.190	0.218	0.196	0.180	0.178
Cov. churchgoer/intercept	−0.019				
Cov. religious person/intercept	−0.041				
	3.914				
Var. residual	1.591	1.574	1.574	1.590	1.574
Intercept	3.169** (0.075)	3.307** (0.080)	3.283** (0.077)	3.313** (0.078)	2.927** (0.128)
N (countries)	65,826 (45)	63,198 (45)	62,661 (45)	58,453 (42)	62,661 (45)

Note. All models are controlled for gender, age, and education

**$p<.01$; *$p<.05$

was due to country differences. We already concluded that the country differences are modest and that most people in all countries simply reject these behaviors and issues. It will not come as a big surprise that the main conclusion from the table is that all differences are considerably smaller than those found for moral permissiveness. This is true in terms of absolute differences – compare the effects of churchgoers in models I, for example, ($b=-0.14$ vs. $b=-1.07$) – but also in terms of relative differences. The difference between churchgoers and non-churchgoers (model I) in the extent to which they approve law violations equaled .10 SDs (against the .42 in the case of moral permissiveness). The interaction effect in model I indicates that this difference was somewhat greater in countries with a high GDP.

The findings in models II and III show that religious people reported lower levels of acceptance than the nonreligious people and that church attendance had an effect on top of being a religious person.

Another main difference with the Table 5.3 is that interactions with religious diversity and Eastern Europe are now lacking. The size of the differences between the religious and the nonreligious was not found to vary according to these country characteristics.

5.6 Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter, we addressed the relationship between religion and morality. In modern societies, religion is not any longer a self-evident and valid rational justification of objective moral standards, and according to MacIntyre, this implies that "there are no such standards in contemporary society" (MacIntyre 1981: 254). Also proponents of secularization ideas suggested that the diminishing role of religion will eventuate in a permissive society (Wilson 1982: 86). This can be seriously questioned for it suggests that secular people or atheists, because they are no longer bound to the religious leaders and religious principles, will have no morality or lower moral standards than religious people. It also suggests that only the churches and their leaders are able and allowed to provide moral guidelines and that these guidelines need to be religious. If such arguments are taken seriously, and thus if it is indeed religion that provides moral norms, we must ask ourselves, how can society survive without religion? (Beit-Hallahmi 2010: 114).

In this chapter, we explored the relationships between religion and morality. With regard to religion, we distinguished religious beliefs from religious practices. The latter refers to institutional religiosity, the first refers to one's own perception that one considers himself religious or not. As for morality, we make a distinction in moral permissiveness and the acceptance of law violations. The latter kind of permissiveness implies that actions and behaviors which are against the law are accepted. The other moral dimension includes the acceptance of various behaviors that were and are strongly rejected by the churches.

We investigated the relationships in Europe and we argued that the impact of religion on morality will depend upon the degree to which societies are modern. We

formulated two competing hypotheses with regard to the impact of modernization on the differences between churchgoers versus non-churchgoers and the religious versus the nonreligious. We found empirical evidence supporting the idea that differences between churchgoers and non-churchgoers are larger in economically more developed countries. This may seem contradictory at first sight, but it is not. A decreasing share of the populations of the more economically developed countries in Europe is going to church. At the same time, the "effect" of church attendance goes up, defined as the difference between churchgoers and non-churchgoers. In other words, it increasingly makes a difference whether you go to church, but the (larger) effect of churchgoing affects a shrinking group of people. As a result, the churches are less and less able to control the opinions of the overall population (indicated by a growing acceptance of abortion, euthanasia, etc.). The findings regarding religiosity are different. The cleavage between the religious and the nonreligious appears to be not larger in more modern societies compared to less modern countries.

We also found that both religiosity and church attendance have an (independent) effect on people's opinions. It seems that not Durkheim but Stark was wrong when the latter concluded that religiosity is more important for people's moral views than church attendance. In line with Durkheim's reasoning, we find that the institutional ties are significant predictors for rejecting homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, and divorce in more modern settings. Religiosity also affects people's moral views but church attendance has an effect on top of that, and their effects are of roughly similar size.

We also tested whether religious pluralism affects the relationship between religion and morality. Our analyses corroborated the hypothesis that the more religiously diverse a society is, the weaker the impact of religion on moral convictions will be. In religiously pluralistic societies, the differences in moral outlooks between religious and nonreligious people are smaller than in religiously less diverse societies. This contradicts the claims of some American sociologists of religion that religious pluralism enhances religiosity. A greater diversity of religions available in a country implies more competition and consequently a religion that fits better the individual preferences (see also Barro and McCleary 2003: 761). Although more religious diversity may stimulate greater religious participation and beliefs, it does not imply that religion has a stronger impact on people's moral choices. In more religiously diverse societies, churchgoers and non-churchgoers as well as religious and nonreligious people resemble each other more than in non-pluralistic societies. The differences between religious and nonreligious people are more pronounced in less pluralistic societies.

With regard to the hypotheses concerning the differences between Western and post-Communist societies, the results of our analyses suggest that both religiosity and church attendance are weaker predictors of moral orientations in post-Communist societies than in Western Europe, but not for the acceptance of law violations. Hence, our hypothesis 4a is confirmed and 4b, which suggested the opposite, is rejected.

Overall, the differences between the religious and the nonreligious and churchgoers and non-churchgoers are far less pronounced in the case of the acceptance of

law violations than they are with regard to moral permissiveness. This may have to do with the fact that moral permissiveness includes behaviors and issues which are strongly condemned by the churches. It is more or less obvious that churchgoers differ more with regard to these issues than when it comes to law violations. In that respect, Durkheim's claim that the degree of integration in the church is important still counts. Religious integration was important and remains important for people's moral views in contemporary Europe.

Although citizens in contemporary society may increasingly question the traditional sources of religious authority and no longer feel bound by common religious moral principles and have become their own moral guide, most people are very reluctant in accepting all kinds of uncivic behavior. A vast majority of the Europeans reject uncivic behavior, but when it comes to such issues as homosexuality, abortion, divorce, and euthanasia, many Western Europeans are more permissive, and Europe appears more varied in the acceptance of these behaviors and issues. Perhaps because the latter issues are increasingly considered matters of private concern and we do not want to interfere or let others interfere in such private affairs as long as no body is harmed or threatened. Uncivic behavior on the other hand may harm us and the broader community, and as such, the acceptance of these issues does not show much respect for others' properties and collective goods. Violations of these are regarded hardly justifiable. This indicates some sort of alternative morality: people are free to do what they want but that freedom is restricted by the demand not to harm others.

Churchgoers appear more reluctant to accept these violations than non-churchgoers or not religious people who appear to be more lenient in these matters. However, the differences between religious and nonreligious people are negligible. The idea that secularization ultimately will lead to a permissive morality, as predicted by Bryan Wilson (1982), or that an ethos of anything goes will develop has to be rejected. Most people are opposed to uncivic behaviors and that is perhaps also the reason why so many people in contemporary Europe are so concerned about other people's misbehaviors. As far as this is concerned, we did not find any signs of a *disruption* of society.

References

Barro, R. (2011). *Religion adherence data*. 2003. Downloaded from: http://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data

Barro, R. J., & McCleary, R. M. (2003). Religion and economic growth across countries. *American Sociological Review, 68*(5), 760–781.

Bauman, Z. (1995). *Life in fragments. Essays on postmodern morality*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Beit-Hallahmi, B. (2010). Morality and immorality among the irreligious. In P. Zuckerman (Ed.), *Atheism and secularity* (pp. 113–148). Santa Barbara: Praeger.

Berger, P. (1967). *The sacred canopy*. New York: Double day & Company.

Berger, P. (2001). Reflections on the sociology of religion today. *Sociology of Religion, 62*(4), 443–454.

Borowik, I. (2006). Orthodoxy confronting the collapse of communism in Post-Soviet countries. *Social Compass, 53*(2), 267–278.

Bruce, S. (2002). *God is dead*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Bruce, S. (2011). *Secularization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Caplow, T. (1985). Contrasting trends in European and American religion. *Sociological Analysis, 46*, 101–108.

Casanova, J. (1994). *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chaves, M. (1994). Secularization as declining religious authority. *Social Forces, 72*(3), 749–774.

Crawford, K. (1996). *East Central European politics today*. Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press.

Davie, G. (2000). *Religion in modern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davie, G. (2002). *Europe: The exceptional case*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd.

EVS. (2008). European values study 2008: Integrated dataset (EVS 2008). *GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4800 data file version 3.0.0.* http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.11004. doi:10.4232/1.11004

Fukuyama, F. (2000). *The great disruption*. New York: Touchstone.

Gautier, M. L. (1997). Church attendance, religious belief in postcommunist societies. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 36*, 289–296.

Gert, B. (2005). *Morality. Its nature and justification*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Halman, L., & Draulans, V. (2006). How secular in Europe? *The British Journal of Sociology, 57*(2), 263–287.

Halman, L., Sieben, I., & Van Zundert, M. (2011). *Atlas of European values*. Leiden: Brill.

Harding, S., Phillips, D., & Fogarty, M. (1986). *Contrasting values in Western Europe*. London: Macmillan.

Herbert, D. (2003). *Religion and civil society*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Hormel, L. M. (2010). Atheism and secularity in the former Soviet Union. In P. Zuckerman (Ed.), *Atheism and secularity* (pp. 45–72). Santa Barbara: Praeger.

Joas, H. (2006). *The genesis of values*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

MacIntyre, A. (1981). *After virtue*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Parboteeah, P. K., Hoegl, M., & Cullen, J. B. (2008). Ethics and religion: An empirical test of a multidimensional model. *Journal of Business Ethics, 80*, 387–398.

Pollack, D. (2003). Religiousness inside and outside the church in selected post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Social Compass, 50*(3), 321–334.

Stark, R. (2001). Gods, rituals, and the moral order. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40*(4), 619–636.

Taylor, C. (1989). *Sources of the self*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tomka, M. (2005). *Church, state and society in Eastern Europe*. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

Voas, D., Olsen, D. V. A., & Crockett, A. (2002). Religious pluralism and participation: Why previous research is wrong. *American Sociological Review, 67*, 212–230.

Wainwright, W. J. (2005). *Religion and morality*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Wilson, B. (1982). *Religion in sociological perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, B. (1996). Religious toleration, pluralism and privatization. In P. Repstad (Ed.), *Religion and modernity* (pp. 11–34). Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

Wuthnow, R. (1996). *Christianity and civil society: The contemporary debate*. Valley Forge: Trinity Press International.

Yinger, M. (1970). *The scientific study of religion*. New York: Macmillan.

Chapter 6
Social Trust and Religion in Sweden: Theological Belief Versus Social Organization

Susanne Wallman Lundåsen and Lars Trägårdh

6.1 Why Study Religion and Trust?

The argument for studying the possible relation between religion and trust is linked to the debate regarding the conditions under which social trust is created, continues to thrive, comes under pressure, and is undermined. Two fundamental premises inform this debate, and before we delve into the more specific question of the role of religion, let us briefly provide this broader context.

The first premise is the idea that, in the words of Sissela Bok (1978: 26), "when trust is destroyed, societies falter and collapse." While some scholars (see, e.g., Hardin 1999; Patterson 1999) also note the role of distrust as a necessary antidote to blind trust and naïve gullibility, most economists, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, and management theorists appear to agree that social trust is the glue that holds families, societies, organizations, and companies together (e.g., Fukuyama 1995; Seligman 1997; Bordum 2001). With it society will flourish, without it society will either fall apart or require sheer, repressive force to survive.

The second premise is that social trust is waning. Large-scale population surveys conducted throughout the world indicate that in some countries, most prominently the United States, both the general social trust the citizens have in each other and the confidence they have in the political system have declined. A recurrent theme in the

S. Wallman Lundåsen (✉)
Department of Social Sciences, Institute for Civil Society Studies,
Ersta Sköndal University College, Stockholm, Sweden

Department of Social Sciences, Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall, Sweden
e-mail: susanne.lundasen@esh.se

L. Trägårdh
Department of Social Sciences, Institute for Civil Society Studies,
Ersta Sköndal University College, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: lars.tragardh@esh.se

analysis of why this decline is occurring is that trust is linked to traditional social practices, values, and institution – such as religion – that place commitment to community and civic virtue at the center of moral codes and values. These, it is argued, have increasingly been giving way to egotistic individualism, the central value of the modern market society, leading to suspicion of fellow citizens and common institutions (Putnam 2000).

This linkage of modernity to a decline in social cohesion and trust is not new (cf. Simmel 1950). Indeed, social theorists have long associated the rise of modern society with a shift from warm *Gemeinschaft* to cold *Gesellschaft*, leading with necessity to anomie, alienation, and a breakdown of social trust. According to thinkers as varied as Marx, Durkheim, Simmel, Weber, and Tönnies, modernity was characterized by selfish individualism, the freedom and anonymity of the big city, the loss of natural community, and deadening life in the "iron cage" dominated by the bureaucratic state and the ruthless market (Sztompka 1999). The underlying assumption of these theories is that that trust arises in small, closely knit communities where there is a large degree of interdependence. This nostalgic tradition has continued into our own time, through David Riesman's famous analysis of solitude and alienation in post-World War II American mass society in *The Lonely Crowd*, through Christopher Lasch's book on "narcissistic individualism" in the 1970s, to Ulrich Beck's recent theories about the "risk society" (Riesman 1950; Lasch 1979; Beck 1992), and the laments of Putnam (2000) concerning the decline of social capital and the collapse of community.

In light of this long-standing tradition Delhey and Newton (2005: 311) have argued that it is a puzzle why social trust exists at all in large-scale and industrialized urban societies. Large-scale societies would arguably be less than ideal for the creation of social trust since social networks are thinner and weaker and people by and large do not know each other personally, but are linked only through what Benedict Anderson famously called the "imagined community" of the nation (Anderson 1983).

However, recent survey data[1] suggest an opposite argument: the more traditional societies tend to have less trusting citizens. Indeed, it is precisely the most modern, individualistic, and secular countries, most notably the Nordic countries, that are characterized by broad social trust beyond the intimate sphere of family, clan, and friends. Indeed, as Delhey and Newton (2005) suggest, removing the Nordic countries from the analysis minimizes many of the correlations between trust and other variables, suggesting that the high-trust Nordic societies need to be investigated more closely to tease out what factor or factors that are more important as well as to what extent these are so inextricably linked so as to make it hard to disentangle them. However, these findings broadly suggest the possibility of a

---

[1] Although social trust is a complex theoretical concept, it has very often been measured through a single survey item, and it has been discussed whether this single item accurately picks up the complexity (Van Deth 2003). In this chapter we will rely upon several different items that measure trust as a moral imperative.

reversed causal chain, centered on the hypothesis that modern market societies are heavily dependent upon social trust in order to function. Social trust would then be understood as either a necessary precondition, a result from, or be mutually reinforced by modernity.

The possible linkages between trust and modernity or traditionalism bring to the fore the question of religion and religiosity's relation to social trust. Insofar as (a) at least some very modern societies – Sweden being a prime case – stand out as secularized, and (b) religion in most accounts constitutes an important aspect of "traditionalism," the question of whether religion plays a role in shaping, maintaining, or breaking social trust appears to be both crucial and potentially controversial in secularized societies, especially as they face increased immigration of more religious individuals, families, and communities.

The literature on the connection between religion and social trust is not settled, but we can broadly identify two main themes: one concerned with whether faith, belief, and dogma matter for trust and a second one asking if religion as organization or social network is linked to trust. The present study will, accordingly, attempt to investigate separately the effects on trust of religion as faith, on the one hand, and religion as social organization, on the other. Here we follow previous studies that have also argued for an operationalization that separates religiosity (in terms of belief and importance of religion in life) from religious practice (church attendance) both at the individual level and the community level (Halman and Draulans 2006; Putnam and Campbell 2010).

6.2   Religion as Theology and Belief

Classical sociological theorists have underlined the importance of religion for shaping citizens' values and behavior. Max Weber argued, for example, that the protestant ethic underlined the importance of trust and trustworthy behavior, suggesting a direct accountability to God, which meant that less than diligent behavior would be noticed from "above" and be punished (Delhey and Newton 2005; Misztal 1996).

Another line of argument linking religiosity to trust is that religious people would appear more trustworthy than nonreligious people as most religions incorporate (moral) codes of conduct and tend to encourage diligent behavior and the following of rules and therefore spread more trust (Berggren and Bjørnskov 2011). A widespread trustworthiness among the citizens, through for instance the religiously imposed codes of conduct, would in turn facilitate the creation of social trust (Rothstein 2005). If others assume that most people are religious and that religious people are more diligent and trustworthy, there ought to be a positive correlation between the proportion of religious citizens and levels of social trust. Shared moral beliefs may in this way facilitate the creation of "moral communities" (Traunmüller 2011). Interpersonal trust in itself may also contain a moral dimension where it is considered as a moral imperative to trust others even though one has no real evidence of the trustworthiness of others (Uslaner 2002). In a related argument,

Luhmann (2000) has argued that religion and religious codes of behavior reduce uncertainty in human relations. With less uncertainty in human relations theoretically, this would encourage social trust.

Perhaps not surprisingly most of the literature that delves into the role of religion in Western countries has been focused in the USA. Churches and other faith-based organizations have been central in the formation of both American civil society and the writing of the constitution of the Republic. Diverging radically from the European norm, where the principle one state, one nation, and one religion came to dominate, the American revolution and its subsequent constitution was based on the ideas of religious pluralism and a strict separation between state and church. Furthermore, a general suspicion of state power went hand in hand with civil society institutions – and especially faith-based organizations – playing a central role in building and running schools, universities, hospitals, charities, and other institutions that provided services that in Europe and especially the Nordic countries were provided by the state.

For these and other reasons, American sociologists of religion, public intellectuals, and politicians have for a long time argued that faith-based organizations and individual religiosity play an important role as the social glue that has bound together American society, balancing the forces of egoism that characterized American capitalism. Against the spectre of narcissistic individualism, political polarization, and the decline of social trust in the USA that has been measured since the 1950s, religion is often held up as the "habits of the heart" (Bellah et al. 1985) that has held such tendencies at bay. Robert Bellah, Peter Berger, Alan Wolfe, Robert Wuthnow, and Robert Putnam, all leading academic and public intellectuals in the USA, have in a number of important and influential books pointed to the central role of religion in fostering a sense of community by promoting social trust, charitable giving, volunteering, and civic responsibility.

In a recent ambitious study, based on large national surveys ("the Faith Matters" surveys), Putnam and Campbell (2010) again appear to show that religiosity is correlated with social virtues like trust, trustworthiness, giving, volunteering, and civic mindedness. At the same time they are also careful to note that religion divides as well as unites Americans. The division is both one between those who are religious and belong to congregations and those who are secular or at least stand apart from organized religion and between different religions. Furthermore, while they, generally speaking, see religion as a positive force for social cohesion, they also note that hard-core fundamentalists tend to stand out as more intolerant and less inclusive.

Here Putnam and Campbell echo others who have emphasized both differences between different religious traditions and variation within these traditions. Thus, earlier works by scholars such as Schoenfeld (1978) have suggested that a certain type of fundamentalist religiosity is negative for social trust. Fundamentalist religiosity often tends to emphasize the sinful character of human beings and how the surrounding world, outside the own religious group, is hostile. Schoenfeld (1978) therefore argues that those who belong to fundamentalist-type religious group tend to trust those who are members of the own religious congregation, while they, in general, tend to distrust those outside their own religious group. Uslaner (2001) has also found that fundamentalists are less likely to trust others outside their own religious

group and that their volunteering in civil society is more often restricted to groups of people that are similar to themselves. A fundamentalist type of religiosity is more connected to particularized trust or trust in people that is similar than trust towards people in general (Uslaner 2001).

Recent studies using cross-country comparative data paint a picture that at least superficially differs from the one that has emerged from American data. Instead of showing positive correlations these studies instead point to negative correlations between religiosity and social trust (Berggren and Bjørnskov 2011; Wollebaek and Selle 2007). But on closer view these findings appear to call out for further scrutiny. In a study on individual level religiosity and civic engagement in Norway by Stromsnes (2008), she finds that those who often attend church tend to be more politically active as well and that churchgoers at the individual level tend to be slightly more trusting. Even if the relationship between religious involvement and trust, after taking into account socioeconomic and demographic variables, emerges as quite modest, it, on the other hand, gives scant support for the notion that the relationship is a negative one.

However, the emphasis on church attendance and political engagement involves, in fact, a shift away from a concern with sheer belief towards the rather different emphasis on religion as a social practice and on faith-based communities as forms of social organization, a matter to which we will now turn.

6.2.1 Religion as Social Organization

The question of whether it is religion as social organization and participation in church-related activities that matters most for trust is, perhaps, of a more recent pedigree and linked to the massive literature on "civil society" and "social capital" that has developed since the 1990s. Following Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993), it has been argued that participation in organizations helps to create or maintain social capital. How this actually happens is not always clear, but one argument is that it occurs through mutually reinforcing processes of cooperation and social control, which sanction free-rider behavior and reward social virtue (see, e.g., Wollebaek and Stromsnes 2008).

This suggested connection between participation in organizations, and trust in others has, however, also been questioned (Hooghe 2003; Wollebaek and Selle 2002; Rothstein 2005; Uslaner 2002). It is argued that those who join organizations engage in a process of self-selection, whereby individuals who already are more trusting than others join other high trusters (Newton 1999). However, many empirical studies of the relation between civil society participation and trust have rested on survey data from national level samples where individuals are treated as atoms and are disconnected from their social context. A central claim of the first writings of Putnam (1993) was that social capital, which also contains the concept of interpersonal trust, is a group or even community level asset. If organizational involvement is measured only at the individual level, one may miss the community level aspect (cf. Wollebaek and Stromsnes 2008).

Following that logic, religion and religiosity can also be regarded as a group phenomenon in which religion not only join devout people in religious ceremonies but also bring less practicing followers together under a common set of norms and values. If there is a high level of church attendance at the community level, this could therefore have an impact on social trust in several different ways. High levels of church attendance (just as attendance in other civil society organizations) create dense social networks. It has been argued that if these social networks become sufficiently extensive, they become a public good, and therefore, even those who do not attend church would benefit from these social networks (Granovetter 1973; Putnam 1993). The social networks can function as sources of transferred trust ("if A trusts B and B trusts C then A can also trust C") (Coleman 1990; Hardin 1993). They can also function as institutionalized forms of cooperation and reciprocity where a non-cooperative (or not trustworthy) behavior is sanctioned. A behavior that breaches the trust granted is less likely to pass unnoticed in a society with dense social ties, effectively creating social trust as well as promoting integration and social control. The social networks would in this way function as institutions of social control, and church attendance would then be important mostly at the community level, as the social networks constitute a collective good more than an individual asset.

The study by Putnam and Campbell (2010) also underlined the importance of social networks. In their study what seemed to matter for having less negative attitudes towards those with a different religion is having a diversified social network and to actually have friends from different religions (cf. Marschall and Stolle 2004). There is of course a question of endogeneity associated with trust in strangers and diverse social networks, do people have diverse social networks because they already are more trusting of strangers or do they become more trusting because of the diversity of their social networks? Putnam and Campbell (2010) argue that the increased contacts between different religious groups in the USA seemed to increase trust between these groups.

With respect to Sweden, qualitative studies in areas with relatively high levels of church attendance show that the social networks and connections created through church-related activities were used more broadly, for example, as contacts used for business purposes, and that they also exercised strong social control (Frykman and Hansen 2009; Wigren 2003). Thus the church, even in these relatively secularized communities, still appears to play an important role in creating and maintaining social networks. This is a matter we will pursue and test further below.

6.2.2 Lutheranism Secularized: The Case of Sweden

To analyze the role of religion in the Nordic countries is not an easy matter. While these countries are among the most secularized in the world, this does not mean that the Lutheran legacy is without impact today, albeit in a secularized form, nor that the church as a social institution is of no importance. The Lutheran legacy can also be understood at different levels. For one, the secular moral values associated with

the modern welfare state, such as a stress on individual autonomy, equality, and social solidarity, are quite consistent with Lutheran dogma and morality. At another level it is also clear that the (Lutheran) emphasis on a legitimate, positive, and dominant role of the state, on the one hand, and universal literacy (in order that all individuals would be able to read the bible), on the other, have had long-term effects of social structure and political culture, fostering both social trust, confidence in institutions, and an emphasis on individual autonomy and responsibility. In other words, it is difficult to separate out the influence of Lutheranism from its secular successor ideologies, including Social Democracy or, for that matter, a modern market society based on radical individualization and the rule of law.

At a more concrete level it has already been noted above that qualitative studies indicate the importance of the church in shaping the local social networks (Frykman and Hansen 2009; Wigren 2003; Aronsson 2002). One way to proceed is to consider both religiosity and secularism in terms of both dogma and belief and as a social practice. That means separating out, as a matter of both analysis and operationalization, religion as dogma and belief and religion as a social organization and practice. And it should be noted that the same can be done with secularism, on the one hand looking at secular forms of association in civil society that enhance trust and foster social and civic virtues, on the other considering a more dogmatic form of secularism that is aggressively atheist and also incorporates a view of human nature closer to classical economic theory with its atomistic individualism according to which, as Margret Thatcher famously claimed, "there is no such thing as society."

These are grand questions: here our ambition is more modest, namely, to tease out analytically and capture in operational terms what we see as two different dimensions of religion. We now turn to that task.

6.2.3   Hypotheses

We have chosen to formulate different hypotheses regarding the effects of the intensity of religiosity as theology and faith, on the one hand, and religious involvement as a social network, on the other hand. As noted above, it has been argued that religious activities mainly tend to foster in-group trust rather than trust towards strangers (Schoenfeld 1978). Distrust in strangers is more connected to being active within more fundamentalist-type religions because the sinful and untrustworthy nature of mankind is often underlined within these groups (Schoenfeld 1978). On the other hand a view of religion that stresses the love of mankind may work the opposite way underlining the importance of doing good things and is therefore encouraging trust in others.

The first set of hypotheses concerns *religion as faith and dogma* and if it matters for trust:

(1a) Religious salience in life correlates negatively with generalized trust.
(1b) Individual religious participation correlates negatively with generalized trust.
(1c) A view on religion as doing good things correlates positively with generalized trust.
(1d) A dogmatic view on religion correlates negatively with generalized trust.

The second set of questions revolves around whether *religion as social organization and social networks* correlates with trust. This could be interpreted as the civil society aspect of religion:

(2a) Church attendance at the community level correlates positively with generalized trust.

(2b) Volunteering for a parish or a religious congregation correlates positively with generalized trust.

6.3   Methodological Considerations

One of the main criticisms against cross-country comparative studies is that institutional and other contextual differences are confounded with the effects of the studied variables (Traunmüller 2011). In other words it is often difficult to disentangle whether other variables that express country level differences that are omitted may better explain the differences between countries. A possible way round the problem of spurious relationships due to variables that are not included in the models up is to try and keep as many as possible of the background variables constant. Arend Lijphart (1971) and others (Przeworski and Teune 1970) have proposed the use of most similar systems design in comparative studies. In our case this is achieved through the study of different local communities within a single country. By doing so we keep the institutional context constant. Traunmüller (2011) has carried out a similar within-country comparative study on Germany.

As a measurement of social trust we chose to use several different survey items related to trust rather than rely on the single generalized trust question.[2] The survey items that are used are: generally speaking most people can be trusted; you ought to trust people even if you have no proof of their trustworthiness; it is right to trust people even if you don't know them too well. We use the factor scores of the three survey items multiplied by 100 in order to get more readable regression coefficients. For the wording of the survey items used, please see Table 6.1.

How to methodologically define religiosity is often a debated issue (Putnam and Campbell 2010). In other studies a distinction between religious belief and religious practice has been made (Halman and Draulans 2006; Putnam and Campbell 2010). We opt to use both individual level measurements and community level measurements to express religiosity as belief and religious practice. At the individual level we use measurement of the saliency of religion in one's life, measurements of religious participation, and measurements reflecting the scope of religion.

Different from most other surveys we have the possibility to include variables expressing religiosity at the community level that are not derived from the survey answers. Sweden also has an excellent source of aggregate level statistics related to

---

[2]See note 1 on the problems associated with the classical single trust question first used by Rosenberg.

Table 6.1 Description of variables

Variable	Scale	Question wording
Volunteer: sports club	Yes=1, No=0	Have you done any voluntary efforts for any of the listed organizations during the past 12 months?
Volunteer: parish	Yes=1, No=0	Have you done any voluntary efforts for any of the listed organizations during the past 12 months?
Importance religion	1–4 (very unimportant, unimportant, important, very important)	How important is religion in your life?
Church attendance	1=never or almost never, 2=a few times a year, 3=every month, 4=every week, 5=several times a week	How often do you attend religious services? Disregarding marriages, funerals, and christenings
Member of religious congregation	Yes=1, No=0	Are you a member of a religious congregation?
Religion: follow rules	1=disagrees completely, 2=disagrees somewhat, 3=agrees somewhat, 4=agrees completely	Religion is mainly about following rules and religious ceremonies
Religion: do good things	1=disagrees completely, 2=disagrees somewhat, 3=agrees somewhat, 4=agrees completely	Religion is mainly about doing good things for others
Church attendance (municipal)	Attendance in main mass/member	Statistics provided by the Church of Sweden
Church membership (municipal)	Members/inhabitants	Statistics provided by the Church of Sweden
Education (municipal)	Share of inhabitants with only mandatory education (9 years)	From official records Statistics Sweden
Foreign population (municipal)	Share of inhabitants born outside the Nordic countries	From official records Statistics Sweden

Lutheran religiosity as the Lutheran Church of Sweden keeps statistics on, e.g., church attendance and membership rates. Church attendance varies across the investigated municipalities. At the local community (aggregate) level we use a measurement reflecting church attendance. In addition we also use a measurement expressing community level church membership, it could however be disputable to which extent it is a measurement of religiosity as membership in the church was so pervasive during the period that it was still a state church. Church attendance is correlated, although not very strongly, at the aggregate level with the proportion of church-affiliated citizens in the municipality (Pearson's $r=0.29$, $p<0.00$). Just using the degree of religious affiliation may therefore not be a good measurement of religiosity in the case of Sweden.[3]

---

[3]This is mainly due to the already mentioned history of Sweden having had a state church with the citizens being members of the church until they explicitly left it.

We use data from a survey carried out in 2009 in Sweden with a representative sample of citizens in 33 different municipalities. In order to achieve variance at the contextual (community) level variables, we created a quasi-experimental design. The municipalities were first grouped in 16 different subgroups according to variation in contextual level variables (among which official rates of church attendance) and then randomly drawn (two from each group) into the survey.[4] In a second stage the representative sample of citizens in each municipality was drawn. The survey was carried out by Statistics Sweden. The overall response rate was 51.2 %, and due to internal missing values, the valid observations decrease, and the total number of respondents used in the analyses below is 3,658. Given the nested structure of the sample multilevel modeling is the most appropriate method of analysis (Hox 2002).

6.4 Results

In order to analyze the Swedish data we use multilevel modeling statistics. One of the advantages of multilevel modeling techniques is that we can model the effects both from individual level data and context (community) level data. We can therefore model whether there are any effects from the community level church attendance on individual level trust.

In the empty model the amount of variance explained at the community (contextual) level is statistically significant, implying that a small amount of the variance in individual levels of trust is coming from the variance in community level factors. Approximately 1.2 % of the variance of individual levels of trust is explained by community (contextual) level variables. This also implies that 98.8 % of the variance is explained by variance in individual level variables. We construct a model including variables that express the different aspects of religiosity and a set of control variables. We add the proportion of the foreign population as a control variable since it is less likely that residents (even from neighboring Nordic countries) born abroad are members of the Church of Sweden (cf. Stolle et al. 2008). We also add community population size as a control variable to check whether or not community size influences individual levels of trust. If religious practice is more connected to small and less urbanized communities, then this variable ought to become statistically significant. We also add intensity of religious practice (church attendance) both at the individual and the community level without considering the importance of religion in life. Furthermore we add items expressing the scope of religion (following rules and religious ceremonies and religion as doing good things to others) (Table 6.2).

In the full model where both the individual and the contextual level variables are added, the overall fit of the model increases (this could be observed from how both the deviance and the BIC values decrease). However, the variable expressing the importance of religion in life is *not statistically significant*, and neither is the

---

[4]With the addition of the municipality of Malmö.

Table 6.2 Multilevel analysis (REML) fixed effects, 33 Swedish municipalities, trust as dependent variable

	Reference model	Model 1 coefficients	Model 2 coefficients	Full model[a]
Intercept	8.62*	−20.72	−2.89	−8.03
Volunteer: parish/religious congregation			20.13**	21.33**
Importance religion		5.71**	4.47	−3.21
Church attendance				4.26
Member of religious congregation		13.55**	12.81**	8.97*
Religion: follow rules				−3.78*
Religion: do good things				10.21***
Municipality variables				
Church attendance			7.86	8.77*
Church membership		−28.29	−49.50	−58.86
Education		−1.77**	−1.96**	−1.87**
Individual variance	9922.01***	9506.94***	9457.96***	9367.41***
Municipal variance	116.24*	50.59	32.87	35.69
Intraclass correlation	0.012	0.005	0.003	0.004
N individual (municipalities)	3,648 (33)	3,648 (33)	3,648 (33)	3,648 (33)
Deviance	43945.72	43756.89	43721.87	43674.87
BIC	43962.12	43773.29	43738.26	43691.27

***$p<0.001$; **$p<0.01$; *$p<0.05$, Controlling for age, gender, individual level of education, volunteering for sports club and community size, proportion of foreign population in municipality in the full model

[a]The same equation as model 3 is tested with only those who consider religion as rather important or very important. The results remain to a large extent in the same direction

variable measuring individual level church attendance. The saliency and the practice hypotheses (1a and 1b) at the individual level thus find no support in the data. The individual level variables connected to religiosity that are statistically significant and *positively correlated with trust* in others are being a member of a religious congregation and having a view of religion as doing good things for others (1c). (It is, however, not entirely uncomplicated under which aspect of we can place the membership variable in the case of Sweden given the character of the historical monolithic state church where all citizens were members.) The item expressing the view on religion as following dogma and devoutly participating in religious ceremonies is *negatively correlated with trust* in others, which is also in line with expectations (1d).

At the municipal level church attendance is *positively correlated* with individual levels of trust and statistically significant at the 5 % level. This is in line with the expectations of religious participation as creating social networks (2a). Volunteering for a parish/religious congregation is also *positively related* to trust in others (2b). The figure below shows the marginal effects from volunteering on predicted levels of trust (all other variables kept at their mean value). The predicted value on the trust

Volunteering for parish and individual predicted levels of trust

Fig. 6.1 Volunteering for parish or religious congregation and individual level predicted trust

Community level church attendance and individual levels of trust


Fig. 6.2 Community level church attendance and individual level predicted trust

scale is about 23 units higher for someone who volunteers for a parish or another religious congregation than for those who don't (Fig. 6.1).

The community population size is not statistically significant in any of the models, which indicates that religiosity is not solely an expression of being a small and hence more rural community. The levels of education at the community level are however statistically significant, and the results indicate that the higher the proportion of inhabitants with low levels of education are, the lower the individual levels of trust become. It is well known from previous studies that education plays an important role in explaining levels of trust (Fig. 6.2).

The graph below shows the marginal effects (keeping all other variables constant at their mean value) from community level church attendance and predicted individual levels of trust.

The illustrations show that the increase on individual levels of trust from community level church attendance. An individual living in a community within the 10th

percentile of lowest levels of church attendance has a predicted trust score equaling 2, while an individual living in a community with the highest level of church attendance has a predicted trust score equaling 11, all other things equal. This is quite a modest increase, albeit statistically significant, given that the trust score varies from approximately −250 to 200. The figure also shows that the increase is sharper at the top end (above the 50th percentile) of the distribution of the church attendance than at the bottom end. This suggests that the attendance needs to be sufficiently high in order to have more tangible effects on the individual levels of trust.

6.5   Discussion and Conclusion

We started this chapter by presenting two seemingly different aspects of the supposed causal mechanisms behind how religion as social organization and religiosity as belief may influence trust. We argued that it is important to distinguish between these two different aspects and to combine community and individual level data in order to be able to test context effects. The first finding is that religiosity in general has some impact on individual level trust even in a relatively secularized country like Sweden. The religiosity and religious practice variables that were significantly correlated with trust in others were more related to the social organization aspects of religion rather than religion as saliency in life or individual level practice. Neither individual level importance of religion in life nor individual level church attendance correlated significantly with trust in others.

Trust is, on the other hand, positively related with having a moral or philanthropic view on religion (Uslaner 2002; Traunmüller 2011). That is to say, the internalization of moral codes founded in religious belief may be a factor in explaining why people trust even if they have no real evidence of the trustworthiness of the other person. Believing that it is good to trust others is positively associated with having a religious belief in the sense of thinking that religion is about doing good things for others and being active as a volunteer in a parish. The positive correlation between volunteering and trust confirms results from previous studies on the relationship between volunteering and trust (Putnam 1993; Putnam and Campbell 2010). It is difficult to disentangle through survey research whether having a view on trust as something normatively good actually corresponds with a more trusting behavior.

The social organization hypothesis, is at least partially, confirmed through the positive relationship between community level church attendance and trust. Church attendance seems to have an effect only as a collective phenomenon, while it has not any significant effect on trust at the individual level. Someone could attend the church each and every day, but it does not seem to have the same effect on trust as the community level church attendance. It strengthens view of social participation (social networks) as a collective or group asset. The interpretation of the community level church attendance could be twofold either that the social networks restrain opportunistic (untrustworthy) behavior or that it encourages trustworthy behavior

(cf. Putnam 1993). More qualitative studies in Swedish communities with high levels of church attendance have shown that the social networks in these areas are dense and extensively used (also for social control) (Frykman and Hansen 2009; Aronsson et al. 2002). The conclusion therefore is that religion as social organization seems to matter for individual levels of trust, while the role of theology or religious beliefs is not confirmed in the data.

The broader implication of these findings is that, in so far as our focus is on trust and social cohesion, we may be better off to see the role of religion from a social network or civil society organization perspective rather than in terms of dogma and belief. On this reading, congregations are one part of the associational life that taken together connect and socialize individuals in a climate of trust. To be sure, this does not mean that values – as opposed to practices – are not important. As noted above, religious belief in the sense of thinking that religion is about doing good things for others and being active as a volunteer in a parish does appear to correlate with trust. The point is rather that such values are general and open enough not to exclude others but instead function as a bridge between secular and religious society.

This takes us back to the larger question of how the specific religious inflection that is dominant in Sweden – Lutheranism – has shaped and continues to shape social, political, and economic life in modern Sweden. Pace Weber, it is hard not to see the linkages between Lutheran values and practices, with an emphasis on the individual, the state and the law, and those that seem to be the paradoxical hallmark of modern Sweden: a radical individualism joined to high levels of social trust and the rule of law (Berggren and Trägårdh 2010).

References

Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Aronsson, P. (2002). *Tillit eller misstro i småorternas land – en studie av social ekonomi i fem län*. Växjö: Växjö University.

Aronsson, P., Betranz, L., Hansen, J., Johansson, L., Lärstedt, C., & Olofsson, G. (2002). *Tillit och misstro i småorternas land, en studie av social ekonomi i fem län*. Växjö: Växjö universitet.

Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society: Towards a new modernity*. New Delhi: Sage.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Berggren, N., & Bjørnskov, C. (2011). Is the importance of religion in daily life related to social trust? Cross-country and cross-state comparisons. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 80*(3), 459–480. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.05.002.

Berggren, H., & Trägårdh, L. (2010). *Social trust and radical individualism: The paradox at the heart of Nordic capitalism in The Nordic Way*. Stockholm: Global Utmaning.

Bok, S. (1978). *Lying: Moral choices in public and private life*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Bordum, A. (2001). Tillit er godt! Om tillidsbegrebets vaerdiladning. In A. Bordum & W. Barlebo (Eds.), *Det handler om Tillid*. Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur.

Coleman, J. (1990). *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2005). Predicting cross-national levels of social trust: A global pattern or Nordic exceptionalism? *European Sociological Review, 21*(4), 311–327.

Frykman, J., & Hansen, K. (2009). *I ohälsans tid: sjukskrivningar och kulturmönster i det samtida Sverige*. Stockholm: Carlssons förlag.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: Free Press.

Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. *The American Journal of Sociology, 78*(6), 1360–1380.

Halman, L., & Draulans, V. (2006). How secular is Europe? *The British Journal of Sociology, 57*(2), 263–288.

Hardin, R. (1993). The street-level epistemology of trust. *Politics and Society, 21*(4), 505–529.

Hardin, R. (1999). Do we want trust in government? In M. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hooghe, M. (2003). Participation in voluntary associations and value indicators: The effect of current and previous participation experiences. *Non Profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32*(1), 47–69.

Hox, J. (2002). *Multilevel analysis*. Mahwah/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Lasch, C. (1979). *The culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations*. New York: Norton.

Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method. *American Political Science Review, 65*(3), 682–693.

Luhmann, N. (2000). Familarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), *Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations* (pp. 94–107). Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford.

Marschall, M., & Stolle, D. (2004). Race and the city. *Political Behavior, 26*(2), 125–153.

Misztal, B. (1996). *Trust in modern societies: The search for the bases of social order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Newton, K. (1999). Social capital and democracy in Europe. In J. van Deth, M. Maraffi, K. Netwon, & P. Whiteley (Eds.), *Social capital and European democracy* (pp. 3–24). London/New York: Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science.

Patterson, O. (1999). Liberty against the democratic state: On the historical and contemporary sources of American distrust. In M. E. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). *The logic of comparative social inquiry*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Putnam, R. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, R., & Campbell, D. (2010). *American grace*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Riesman, D. (1950). *The lonely crowd*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rothstein, B. (2005). *Social traps and the problems of trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schoenfeld, E. (1978). Image of man: The effect of religion on trust. *Review of Religious Research, 20*(1), 61–67.

Seligman, A. (1997). *The problem of trust*. New York: Free Press.

Simmel, G. (1950). *The sociology of Georg Simmel*. New York: Free Press.

Stolle, D., Soroka, S., & Johnston, R. (2008). When does diversity erode trust? *Political Studies, 56*(1), 57–75.

Stromsnes, K. (2008). The importance of church attendance and membership of religious voluntary organizations for the formation of social capital. *Social Compass, 55*(4), 478–496.

Sztompka, P. (1999). *Trust. A sociological theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Traunmüller, R. (2011). Moral communities? Religion as a source of social trust in a multilevel analysis of 97 German regions. *European Sociological Review, 27*(3), 346–363.

Uslaner, E. (2001). Volunteering and social capital: How trust and religion shape civic participation in the United States. In P. Dekker & E. Uslaner (Eds.), *Social capital and participation in everyday life* (pp. 104–117). London/New York: Routledge.

Uslaner, E. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Deth, J. (2003). Measuring social capital: Orthodoxies and continuing controversies. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 6*(1), 79–92.

Wigren, C. (2003). *The spirit of Gnosjö: The grand narrative and beyond* (Dissertation series: 17). Jönköping: Internationella Handelshögskolan.

Wollebaek, D., & Selle, P. (2002). Does participation in voluntary associations contribute to social capital? The impact of intensity, scope, and type. *Non Profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31*(1), 32–61.

Wollebaek, D., & Selle, P. (2007). Origins of social capital: Socialization and institutionalization approaches compared. *Journal of Civil Society, 3*(1), 1–25.

Wollebaek, D., & Stromsnes, K. (2008). Voluntary associations, trust, and civic engagement: A multilevel approach. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37*(2), 249–263.

Chapter 7
Religion and Civil Society in Italy and in Other Latin Countries

Franco Garelli

For some time, Italy has been a 'modern' country under observation, which has caused the observers to wonder about the secret of a system which manages to maintain its dynamism despite the many imbalances which permeate it. It is an atypical Western country, which – in spite of its mix of rich and poor areas, advanced and backward, post-industrial and archaic – is still today among the six or seven greatest economic powers in the world. Hence, arises the idea of a particular case of study, defined in international comparative studies as 'The Italian Case'. The specificity of the Italian case stands out also in comparison with other Southern European countries, with which Italy shares some common features of the interlink between religion and civil society.

7.1 Basic Dynamism and Weak System

This distinctiveness can be observed on various levels. From the economic point of view, Italy's weaknesses are well known – its energy dependence, the gradual decrease in the number of major companies, its public debt and tax evasion which has reached unacceptable levels. Nevertheless, these restrictions concern a country which still enjoys good productivity rates, whose driving forces are small Northern companies, tourism and avant-garde sectors such as fashion and design. But parallel with these economic areas, which are capable of competing with the most advanced zones in Europe, there is another – slower – Italy which pays a high price for its social and territorial imbalances.

Political instability is another characteristic of the Italian situation, as is evidenced by the fact that in the last 65 years – since the end of the World War II and the

F. Garelli (✉)
Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
e-mail: franco.garelli@unito.it

foundation of the Italian Republic – the country has had no fewer than 60 governments. It is true that in the most recent decade, they have lasted longer, but that has not been enough to strengthen institutions, activate essential reforms and create a 'normal' political system. Now, the political crisis affects all wings, from the right, which is more populist than laissez-faire, and to the left, which is handicapped by its internal fragmentation. Thus, there is a high degree of estrangement of citizens from the *res publica*, and pride in local culture and traditions takes precedence over a sense of national belonging.

Further ambivalence and contradictions can be identified in a population which is more inclined to get involved in voluntary activities expressing social compassion than in defining more clearly public and institutional roles; in the Italian spirit tending more, in certain circumstances, towards flexibility and improvisation – the art of getting by – than to value correctly organisation and planning; and in a country characterised by many ideological divisions and cultural streams, so that conflict and adopting rigid positions often win out over a search for the common good.

At this point, it seems natural to wonder about the stabilising element in Italy with so many different facets, the factor which prevents the country from disintegrating in periods of great upheaval and tensions. Various authorities have found the answer in a civil society which is so rich and dynamic that is capable of giving stability to such an institutionally precarious country (Garelli and Simone 2001: 494).

7.2 Not Only Voluntarism and the Third Sector: The Role of Religion

When we talk about civil society, we mean the totality of groups and associations, characterised by their own ability to formulate and to plan and by a position of relative autonomy from the political system as traditionally understood (the state, its agencies, political parties) and from the economic system (the market). Besides being organised in political and economic terms, every society is composed of a basic cultural and associative dynamism, scene of ferments and tensions, reactions and forecasts, and of confrontation and solidarity, able to contribute significantly to set up and nurture both social relations and collective ethos of a society.

In this sphere of free association, there is no lack of conflicts and contradictions in relation to different interests and ideas of the world of the various groups. But this is also the level on which the various groups are bound to find common ground, expressing their own vitality within a framework of personal and collective responsibility, adopting 'civilised' modes of behaviour, granting to others the same dignity and rights as they demand for themselves, identifying and experimenting with common rules of coexistence. So, it a diffuse idea of civil society, which goes beyond voluntary associations and the non-profit world, including, for example, values and civicness that are improved and nurtured in this framework of associations and social relations.

This definition seems well suited to the Italian situation where liveliness of civil society is clearly thriving. That said, it is clear that one has to move cautiously when dealing with such topics as not all grassroot activities are 'civil' and also because there is a tendency to idealise anything not under the government's umbrella and/or belonging to the institutional sphere. As Peter Berger observed (Berger 2005: 11–22),[1] there are in-between realities (i.e. groups and associations) which can be described neither as state (government) nor market and which have nothing to do with civil life, the Mafia being a case in point. Furthermore, a number of groups adopt the label 'civil' without having any of the features this definition implies. This said, in Italy, there clearly is an arena in which there are various actors which operate in a socially constructive manner making up for the many imbalances in the country.

Speaking about the actors of civil society in Italy, many observers stress primarily the role of family, as an institution able to set up basic social relations and to play an important role as a social buffer or a safety valve coping with youth unemployment and the lack of public care services for children and the elderly (Diamanti 2010). This positive evaluation of the family confirms the idea – widespread in the country – that both basic groups and institutions are the good part of the society in spite of other social areas (public institutions, market, etc.), that are evaluated in a more ambivalent and controversy way. However, it is important to point out that the family's pivotal role in civil society has drawbacks too, e.g. *familism* and lack of social mobility[2]; these features question the idea that family contributes to develop civil values, but notwithstanding, families remain the 'real wealth of the country', as it has been defined (Alesina and Ichino 2009).

Beyond the family, the arena of civil society in Italy enjoys a wealth of basic spontaneous and voluntary associationism, which can be seen in the most varied areas and forms, from promoting cultures and local traditions to professional or trade groupings, from sports groups and those based on hobbies or specific cultural or artistic interests, from associations formed by what one might call 'peer groups', conscripts, people from the same village, alumni to the more socially or politically committed ones. The close-knit fabric of social voluntary associations[3] operates achieving a purpose rather than generating profit and developing the values of peace, of solidarity, of social justice, of environment respect, of international cooperation and of development of poor countries fall within this framework. In Italy, it is a much widespread phenomenon, which stands out in various organisational forms: among these, someone is a point of reference in its area of activity both at local and national level.

---

[1] On these issues, see also the debate and the recent studies on the role of civil societies in countries where the democracy process is at the beginning, e.g. the Arab spring: Bozzo and Luizard (2011), Kepel and Luizard (2011) and Kilani (2011).

[2] On this issue, a recent research was carried out by Sciolla (2004).

[3] On the characteristics and relevance of the third sector in Italy and on its role in the civil society; see: Zamagni (2011), Silvano (2011), Donati and Colozzi (2002) and Cesareo (2003).

Recently, various ethnic associations have sprung up in the country. As well as being places of welcome and mutual assistance for foreign immigrants, they perform a bridging role between their original culture and insertion in the host country. The activities of educational institutions have developed alongside a number of civil society organisations involved with youth centres and not just with the lower-income segment of the young. As for publishing, communication channels and information tools are widespread although they are unable to compete with the more powerful national broadcasting corporations. However, they voice regional and local issues, mirroring what is known as the 'Italy of the Thousand Communes', which is historically one of the country's hallmarks. The last example concerns civil society's potential contribution to the world of work: most microenterprises, which have been essential for what little growth Italy's GDP has registered over the past few years, develop from civil societies and then shift to a market setting and rationale.

Religion plays a major role against this backdrop: especially Catholicism, to which – despite the growth of other faiths and religious traditions in Italy – 80 % of the population still says it belongs.[4] Even if Italy is the nation which hosts the Vatican, it too has also become more secularised and churches are not as packed as they were. Both the decline in new vocations and the ageing of the clergy have become all too apparent; hierarchy guidelines on sexual and family *morality* mostly going unheeded. In spite of this, most people still identify with the Catholicism for cultural reasons or because of their education rather than for religious or spiritual reasons. The Catholic Church still plays a pre-eminent role in the country, which express itself on various levels: about 1 in 4 Italians attend Catholic rites once a week (and numbers are higher if one considers a month or a year); over 12 % (with a large percentage of young people) are members of Catholic associations. Religious involvement in social activities continues unabated, ecclesiastical institutions never fail to voice their opinion on controversial points in the public debate. The Catholic vote is the most courted by all sides, left, right and centre, as it is thought to be decisive in winning any electoral race. This is also the result of a church, which has maintained a widespread presence throughout the country, with 224 dioceses (twice as many as the provincial governments), 25,000 parishes and more than 140,000 religious as well as a large number of lay people who aid the clergy with catechism, educational activities and organisational tasks. Such a widespread presence is a hallmark of Catholic in Italy unlike other European countries where Catholic culture is prevalent: for instance, Poland's 45 dioceses, Spain's 98, Germany's 29 hardly compare to Italy's 224. On average, in Italy, there is for one diocese every 250,000 baptised Catholics, where France and Spain have one for every 500,000 and Poland and Germany one for every 900,000 (Garelli 2007: 75).

These hints show how strongly intertwined the Catholic Church is in the development of the country's social relations. They also highlight how part of the

---

[4]This and other data refer to a survey on the religiosity carried out in 2007 on a sample of the Italian population (3,160 cases) aged 16–74 (Garelli 2011). The last survey of the 'European Value Survey' carried out in Italy in 2008 (forthcoming) reaches the same conclusions.

above-mentioned dynamism of Italian civil society is the product of the Catholic world (associations, parishes, parish centres; cultural, training and leisure centres, as well as magazines, papers, etc.).[5] But apart from this presence, the Church in Italy has another link with the country's civil society, as it is considered the main receiver of its message and appeal: the Church often addresses its thoughts to the fundamental forces of civil society, reminding them of the duty of solidarity, public and private spiritual and moral values and a sense of responsibility. All this is especially relevant in a country with such a widespread Catholic following. The focus on civil society is also stressed within the Catholic magisterium by the subsidiarity principle, according to which the state apparatus should not necessarily intervene at every level of social organisation but the social bodies and organisations closest to the problem (should deal with it).

7.3 Historical Roots

According to the above description, civil society in Italy has always been a major player, because of historical and cultural factors: it has made up for the lack of sense of the state and of institutions mostly seen as not having to do with communal living, but it has also come to express Italian vitality par excellence, and in particular the bottom up organisational ability citizens have, thus highlighting micro-identities (belonging) and primary social relations.

Catholicism has repeatedly supported and gone along with this dynamism, being interested in strengthening a form of civil society independent of government and major economic powers.

Historically this happened at times when the Church strongly contrasted the liberal state and in the decades that followed the unification of Italy which took place 150 years ago, when the Popes' temporal power came to an end, church properties were confiscated, and Catholics were marginalised from the political arena. Those were the years of the *Non expedit* ('It is not expedient'), a decree forbidding Italian Catholics to take part in the political life of the country, either as voters or as candidates, to avoid what might be seen as official recognition of an enemy state. But they were also the years of the *Opera dei Congressi,* the Catholic Committees, of Rerum Novarum (Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical, on Labour and Capital), all initiatives to prevent the Catholic worlds losing influence in the country, in fact pushing it to rise to the challenges of the time: on the one hand the lay and separatist (between church and state) politics of the newly unified country, on the other the laissez-faire and socialistic tendencies (both considered irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine) which were gaining ground and colliding in the emerging industrial development (Traniello and Campanili 1981; Guerriero 1996). This is what triggered activism that in turn

---

[5]Further information about the role of socialisation and promoting public participation played by religious environments are available in Wuthnow (1996).

led to the establishment of Catholic agricultural and industrial unions, the creation of Catholic banks and rural and workers' saving banks and credit unions. These were the first steps of a cooperative movement which was to grow in time the setting up of publishing houses with Catholic leanings whose aim was to produce good Christians, the constitution of professional categories and arts and crafts associations capable of representing Catholic values and interests in various fields and finally various forms of charity and rehabilitation of 'poor, abandoned youth'.

The Church addressed the challenges of those years which had overturned the balance of the past not just by contrasting institutionally a state which had stripped her of ancient privileges, not just denouncing the spread of ideologies contrary to doctrine: the Church also actively promoted a Catholic social movement able to address emerging needs and build a civil society with a Christian orientation where Catholics could fully express their role in the public sphere.

What happened in those hard times is a constant in the history of the Church in Italy which has always been careful to nurture a social fabric close to itself, thanks to an organisational network permeating every area of civil life although formally aimed at spiritual action. The organisational strength of the Catholic movement and the ability of the religious institution to communicate with the masses was one of the factors leading Fascism to resolve the conflict between church and state with the 1929 Concordat, a fact which marked the life of the nation for several decades.

7.4 Three Recent Phases of the Relationship Between Religion and Civil Society in Italy

In the past decades – since World War II – the Catholic religion and civil society have undergone three phases which mirror the country's main changes of landscape.

7.4.1 Catholic Social Block Immediately After WW2

Phase one concerns reconstruction and post-war development, when Catholic had a majority in fact a near national hegemony, thanks to the large number of vocations and faithful and also to the catholic party (the Christian Democrats) which had a large following and had managed to stabilise the system and favour industrial development. A third ingredient needs to be added, the dynamism of intermediate Christian-inspired bodies acting in the most diversified sectors of society.

At that time, the role of the Church was to motivate and support the Catholic civil society which found many ways of partaking in public life. Hence, some of the old organisations resurfaced and new, more modern ones were established, such as *Coltivatori diretti* (the Catholic Farmers' union)*, Cisl* (the Catholic Trade Union Confederation) and *Acli* (Young Catholic Workers). Specific and professional organisations were also promoted – at university, in the schools, in the health

system, in the craft sector and so on – or aimed at encouraging sports and youth. There was also a large growth of religious associations, where *Azione Cattolica* was the major player although it was diversifying internally – Catholic university students, Catholic graduates and the Italian Women's Centre (*Centro Italiano Femminile – CIF*). All the above drew inspiration from the Church's social doctrine: they embodied the subjectivity of various components of Italian Catholicism, developing projects, rules of cohabitation, forms of representation not just to address their members' needs but also to generate a constructive social environment. Many associations favoured the role of the catholic party, while maintaining their own judgement and activity.

Basically, the Church nurtured (and controlled), then as now, the moral and religious fabric of the nation, encouraging active believers to operate in society. Catholic associations had to bear witness to their faith in the various historical contexts: the Christian Democrats governed the country, interpreting the feelings of large sections of the population, benefiting from the resources – ideas and human resources – which the active and committed Catholic base provided them with. It was a relatively well-integrated social dynamic, a sort of 'social block' consisting of connected forces each involved with its own task and which were to leave their mark in the Italian society of the time.

The strength of the Catholic world in that period was such that it was able to stem the strongest Communist Party and movement in the West, which was rooted in Italy. Operating in the country, Catholic culture came in conflict with the Communist culture when it became active in the country in the same years, especially as the Communists were involved in very much identical and similar operations in civil society, circulating the values and principles of Communism. However, in spite of the strong juxtaposition, the two cultures appear to have shared a common set of values – a strong sense of the family, valuing industriousness, respect for authority, moral rigour, recognition of local traditions, the primacy of popular social institutions compared to the government's, solidarity and so on – all of which helped keep the system together. Many of the aforementioned values are enshrined in the Italian Constitution signed immediately after World War II and still in force today: it was the result of the contribution of, and compromise among, very diverse political and cultural forces that shared the intention of acting for the common good of the nation.

7.4.2   Secularisation and Social Voluntary Organisations

Phase two in the relationship between Catholicism and civil society in Italy began with the cultural changes that questioned the system of traditional values: it was by then the late 1960s and early 1970s of the past century when the explosion of workers' struggles and the student revolt overturned the existing social and political order based on Catholic culture, which had already been threatened by a higher standard of living and consumer society values fuelled by economic growth. The new social climate (determined by the revolt against institutions,

the denial of all principles of authority, the drive to experiment with different ways of living) disoriented the associationism of Catholic origin and weakened the civil society close to the Church, introducing trends and aspirations extraneous to its nature. It is well known that in that period, political alternatives were never implemented, although there was a profound lifestyle change which enhanced the country's process of secularisation. The outcomes of the referenda to repeal the laws on divorce and abortion were the most evident sign of change, and those in favour of the abrogation (the 'yes' voters) turned out to be a minority of the population.

This was the situation when the Church realised that the Catholic culture and its various organisations in the society were in crisis, hence the new strategy, with the intention of having a more distinctive and qualified presence among Italy's believers. The church asked a bewildered Catholic associationism – split and reduced (even in its membership) by the social and political tensions of the time – to return to its original vocation represented by the civil and religious education of its members and involvement in youth training. At the same time, the Catholic groups and communities were encouraged to address the evils of society, to deal with old and new forms of poverty, identifying a specific – through solidarity and charity – role for Catholic organisations in the public sphere. In a nutshell, 'evangelization and promoting the development of human beings' was the slogan which the Church used as it tried to renew the civil society of that time.

It was then, in 1971, that Italian Caritas was established: it is an ecclesiastical organism whose aim is to 'bear witness to charity', 'in forms that are appropriate considering the time and needs, for a complete development of man, social justice and peace, with particular attention to the poor and with a mainly pedagogical function'.[6] The pedagogical function it refers to does not merely mean offering the services to help people fully integrate in society but also cultivates the idea that 'good samaritan policies' (taking care of problems of material and human poverty) were a credit card opening people up to a religious and spiritual perspective. Thus in every diocese, in the main parishes, arose listening and welcoming centres, services dealing with all kinds of social marginality, sites for training volunteers and collecting resources. The institutional activity followed the pioneering activity of various Catholic 'rank and file' groups, the real vanguard in dealing with the types of poverty found in a developed modern society – such as drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, usury, sexual exploitation, households in difficulty and so on. The growth of social and welfare-based voluntary work became the icon of the Catholic presence in civil society in those years: clearly, there were non-Catholic groups too in this field, but the former were prevalent. The Catholic commitment continued to grow and to be appreciated as a support for that public or state welfare system which is being downsized due to financial constraints.

---

[6] Art.1, Statute Caritas Italiana.

7.4.3   *The Cultural and Identity Shift of Italian Catholicism*

The third and last phase of the relationship between the Church and civil society in Italy dates back to the early 1990s, in the framework of growing cultural and religious pluralism (following among others the immigration flows) and characterised by the involution of the political system in which the Catholic party ceased to exist. The new situation led the Church to question itself: it saw itself bereft of the political point of reference which had defended Catholic values and interests for decades and also perceived the risk of the country's bonds and culture weakening. In fact, in an increasingly open and pluralistic society, the depth of one's roots and memory is reduced; there a loss of civic sense and localism thrives; the most important subcultures of the country, including the Catholic, appear spent. According to the Church, voluntary work, education and religious training are not enough to counter the trend.

Hence, the identity and culture change which the Church hierarchy developed in this phase and which led to it playing a more important role on the public stage: conducting several battles and campaigns to stress the Catholic identity of the nation, defending the presence of crucifixes in public buildings (schools, hospitals and courts); getting the state to recognise the constructive role of Catholic agencies in the country, including financial aid and tax breaks; and preventing the pressing of Italian laws which would penalise the Christian vision of reality – in the name of pluralism – on matters such as couples and the family, sexuality, reproduction, bioethics and the beginning and end of life.

This political activism was based on two pillars or 'certainties':

- The idea of interpreting widespread feeling among Italians which, according to the Church, is not mirrored in the positions of opinion leaders or by a minority nonreligious or lay world
- The idea that advanced modernity lacks basic values and that Christian thought and anthropology offer sense capable of informing an elevated concept of human cohabitation (Garelli 2010: 88)

Clearly, this new – and continuing – cultural commitment of the Church in Italy has triggered a strong reaction among non-believers, people who represent other denominations and faiths, and among those Catholics who are inspired by laic values, desiring a state which is neutral on religious issues and churches respecting freedom of choice and position. There is a new season in the Italian Church which has mobilised many groups and Catholic movements, defending inalienable values, while other sections of the Church – and especially the groups most involved in social activities – have maintained a less prominent position or even dissent, as they are concerned that the new position of the Church might lead it to act in areas outside its remit or that the cultural battle could prevail over charitable engagement and solidarity.

The third phase of the relationship between the Catholic Church and Italian civil society differs from the previous two in three respects:

(a) The focus shifts from social Catholicism – aimed at promoting human and Christian solidarity in civil society – to cultural Catholicism, concentrating on

a Christian identity to be rediscovered and reaffirmed for the good of individuals
and the nation.

(b) The ecclesiastical institution passes from a logic of delegating action to the
Catholic party to a strategy of lobbying the most important players in the political,
economic and societal arenas.

(c) Part of the Catholic world abandons the idea of promoting Christian values
through intermediate social bodies and shifts to a policy of defending them in
the public sphere.

7.5 The Mark of Religious Organisations on Civil Society

As a result of the above, two basic issues should be addressed: the first concerns
the nature of Catholic civil society in Italy (its size, weight, in which fields it is
most active, and who makes it up); the second refers to the ability of the Church
to influence people on the most important topics being debated in public. By
addressing these two issues, some of the key questions raised in the studies on the
relationship between religion and present-day societies (see Chap. 1), i.e.: Does
religious affiliation favour the social, civil (and political) commitment of citizens?
Do people trust the Churches and believe they will intervene on this level? Is the
support Churches offer basically limited to its active members or does it expand
beyond, outside the fold where faithful and the like are to be found? And again, do
people's religious backgrounds show themselves only in private or is this also true
of the public sphere? At this level, can the faithful be told apart from those who
have no religious faith?

It may prove useful to look at what is happening in organised associations to
evaluate the weight and influence of Catholic inspiration on the civil society A
recent comprehensive study (Garelli 2011: 101–104) has made it possible to rank
the main types of associations which Italians state they are members of. Results
suggest that about 10 % of the adult population is involved in religious or parish
groups; a comparable number is involved in social and welfare voluntary organisa-
tion (5 % in nonreligious groups and 5 % in the ones with a religious orientation),
about 7 % are members of organised sports and leisure associations, and a compa-
rable number are members of groups which are for culture and art and of those
which promote local culture and traditions. These are at the present the kind of
associationism most widespread in the population, while other types of aggregation
(with trade union, political, humanitarian and ecological aims, or to look after a
category's interests or on behalf of students and education) may have smaller but yet
considerable membership.

These preliminary data suggest that in terms of numbers, religious-based asso-
ciations (formed by groups with a religious aim or the Catholic voluntary sector)
seem to be one of the strengths of Italian civil society, even when multiple
memberships are discounted. However, there are also associations with a lay or
nonreligious face or whose aims are not religious that can become magnets for

religiously oriented people, hence the interest in surveying the Catholic presence to know how widespread it is in the main sectors of Italian associations. The figure can be obtained by analysing the frequency of worship stated on average by the members of the various association groupings. Considering worship as weekly, which, as mentioned above, in Italy applies to 25 % of the population, members of religious or parish groups have an 88 % attendance rate, members of Catholic-based voluntarism associations 78 % and in groups involved in youth groups and education 70 %. In different way, members of sports groups, fan clubs, trade unions, parties and movements or political collectives on average display a much lower rate than the national average. Lastly, the percentage of practising members belonging to nonreligious voluntary associations or to cultural and artistic organisations or humanitarian ones is around 40 %.

Furthermore, data show that people attached to any organised group or association has a higher than average religious practice rate compared to those who do not belong to any association.

The above indicates that:

(a) The commitment of Catholics in civil society is not only concentrated among those attending religious and parish groups or Church-led social voluntary organisations, but it can also be found in education where this cultural leaning has always heavily invested.

(b) There is a certain presence of Catholics in the nonreligious voluntary sector, humanitarian, culturally and artistically oriented associations: these are areas where Catholics cooperate and mix with subjects displaying other orientations, thus coming to terms with the kind of pluralism a highly developed society has. Faced with a Catholic world which operates in associations promoted by the clergy and Church, there is another which prefers to stay in open and pluralistic social spaces, especially because it identifies with activities and interests considered to have more of a secular than religious value.

(c) However, there appear to be other involved and committed associations in the public arena – such as trade unions, political and environmental groupings – which appear to attract fewer Catholics, just as sport or leisure associations. In brief, in the vast world of Italian associations, Catholics are widely albeit selectively present, which seems to indicate a degree of cultural sensitivity so that some sectors are privileged over others, and the ones where members feel they can have a greater impact are preferred.

As well as people who are currently active, there are some who were members of religious organisations but stopped over the years. About 20 % of the population was a member of some religiously active or educational association movement, about 6 % come from scouts and guides (where the Catholic orientation prevails) and 9 % were involved in social or welfare religiously oriented voluntary groups.

Once again, data cannot be accumulated as there are cases of multiple membership, but they give an idea of how vast religious activism is in Italy: the heading includes both those who describe themselves as active members in religiously oriented groups and at least some of those who were active in these organisations and

still share their values and aims. In other words, findings suggest this is the 'catchment area' for the so-called Catholic subculture whose members experienced periods of intense training and to this day have strong associational bonds or continue to identify with the basic values they once acquired.

Organised Italian Catholicism no longer has a hegemonic associative model as Azione Cattolica was until the Second Vatican Council but a host of associations active in civil society and widely recognised both inside and outside the Church confines. It is like a Catholic 'archipelago' where diverse 'souls' and 'charismas' live side by side, some of which give rise to many manifestations (meetings, conferences, seminars, marches and the like), which attract large audiences.

Currently some of the most vital movements are the ones decisively asserting Catholic identity and distinctiveness in a pluralistic society – such as Comunione e Liberazione, Opus Dei and some of the spirituality movements – or pressure groups and the forums recently established in support of the public battles undertaken by the Catholic hierarchy on the family, human life and bioethics. However, activism is also found in groups and associations which interpret their religious matrix in a lower key – groups such as Caritas, the Comunità di S. Egidio, Acli and the Gruppo Abele – mostly involved in those social and humanitarian activities which look to the lowest, foreign migrants, youngsters without a regular job, fighting the Mafia, getting involved in international cooperation and so forth.

One last remark concerns the overall profile of the Catholics who belong to the various facets of Italian associationism, a profile which suggests that more women than men get involved compared to trends in the population as a whole. There are more graduates and those with primary school education than those with junior high school education, while there do not seem to be any particular differences when the country's macro-areas – north, centre and south – are compared. Age wise, there is a large number of young people in all types of associationism, except for political groups and trade unions (where there are fewer Catholics in any case), and more adults.

7.6   The Church's Public Positions and Civil Society

In dealing with the relationship between religion and civil society in Italy, it is essential to understand what kind of consensus the people offer the Church which plays a major role on the national stage by defending and promoting those values they cherish. The Italian (and Catholic) case seems to confirm the theses José Casanova developed 15 years ago: he believed the process of secularisation did not necessarily lead to the privatisation of religion and that reconquering the public sphere was possible for 'historical' religions too (Casanova 1994).

The negative reactions from the lay or nonreligious world faced with a Catholic Church which acts as a pressure group in society have already been mentioned. However, there are also non-believers, the so-called *atei-devoti* ('devout atheists'), who backed the bishops in contrasting ethical relativism and the loss of

fundamental points of reference. To what extent do people identify with or distance themselves from this new public role of the Church? The answer to this question can be elicited from the many findings in the aforementioned national survey investigating the relationship between state and church, and to the presence of the latter in Italian society.

Most Italians appear not to question the link between the prevailing religion and national identity (Garelli 2011); consistently, they support the presence of the crucifix in public places, are in favour of teaching the Catholic religion in state schools, agree that the 8/1,000 governmental tax[7] should be designed for church's activities and agree that religions should voice their opinions on the most relevant topics of the time. Clearly, consensus is not general. People might appreciate many of the activities of the church but disagree with its tax exemptions; ecclesial social and educational activities might be appreciated, but religious organisations may be accused of having too much power. Above all, a lot of people are irritated by a church which exceeds its specific tasks, gets involved in political events and makes choices not-so innocent.

A number of fine distinctions emerge with reference to the Church's statements: social and public ethics interventions appear the most appreciated, just as when the Church recalls duties of solidarity, reminds politicians of the common good, tries to keep the nation united and strengthens the collective ethos. The voice of the hierarchy is not listened to in the same manner on sexual and family ethics, areas where Italians have expressed their own autonomous judgement for a long time. Feelings are still divided on the Church's thoughts on the beginning and end of life, bioethics, genetic engineering and the boundaries to be set to science that knows no limits, although most would appreciate 'Catholic' caution on these new frontiers.

Beyond the average trends, what social groups identify more closely or are more distant from the public statements of the Church? In this respect, a number of interesting differences can be observed, classifying Italians according to how they define themselves from a religious viewpoint, comparing subjects 'with no religion' (that is to say those who do not profess any religion), to all those who belong to non-Catholic religions or denominations, and then to the main facets of Italian Catholic religiousness. With reference to the latter, there appear to be four prevailing types: 'active and convinced', 'convinced but not always active', Catholics 'by tradition and education' and Catholics 'in their own way' or selectively.

To offer an example, one can limit the analysis to some of the cultural battles or ethical choices of the Church – including appeals to the unity of the nation, the defence of families based on marriage, the condemnation of abortion, the ban on heterologous in vitro fertilisation and the stand against euthanasia (Table 7.1).

---

[7]A system whereby eight thousandths of the income tax a citizen must pay can be directed, according to individual choice, to a selection of religious bodies in order to help sustain them financially.

Table 7.1 Attitude of the Italian population to a series of public pronouncements or choices of the Catholic Church in the social and ethical field (%)

		Religious belonging					Other religion	No religion
	Total	Catholic				Catholic total		
		Active and convinced	Convinced but not always active	By tradition/education	'In my own way'			
Agreement with the following public pronouncements of the Church								
Importance of the family based on matrimony	77	97	88	72	73	83	71	26
Necessity to keep Italy united, resisting local tendencies	69	89	77	64	66	74	45	32
Constant condemnation of abortion because a human being must be respected from the moment of conception	57	85	64	47	48	61	67	16
Necessity to set limits to biomedical scientific research	53	73	60	48	41	57	49	16
Position on the following choices								
Heterologous fecundation (a couple using external donor sperm in order to have children)[a]								
Forbid	37	59	36	32	32	39	44	13
Limit	32	27	37	33	30	33	26	26
Allow	23	9	18	27	31	21	17	54
Euthanasia (helping an incurably ill person to die)								
In favour	37	18	30	48	42	35	22	68
Against	33	58	36	22	26	35	50	7
Not sure	30	24	34	30	32	30	28	25
N	3,160	607	873	954	287	2.721	151	288

Source: Religione all'italiana, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2011

[a]7.4 % of respondents answered 'Don't know'

The following results can be observed:

(a) The group which defines itself as having 'no religion' is the only one whose opinions are markedly different from those expressed by the Catholic hierarchy, as most do not share such positions. However, even in the culturally more secular or nonreligious group, there is still a minority of people (numbers vary) which appreciates the Church's support for national unity (32 %), for the family–marriage dyad (26 %), against abortion (16 %) and to set boundaries in the biomedical field (16 %). There are also people who are against (7 %) or uncertain (25 %) about euthanasia.

(b) The people who belong to 'religious faiths' other than Catholic mostly share similar orientations to the ones expressed by the Catholics: over two-thirds of this mixed group share the 'Catholic view' on the central role of the family based on marriage and are against abortion. Just over one-fifth say they are in favour of euthanasia, compared to 35 % of all Catholics and 37 % of all Italians.

(c) As for the public statements of the church leadership, a marked difference among the various types of Catholic religiousness was observed.

The group of the 'active and convinced' Catholics is the one which is most aligned with the positions and the choices of the church in the areas investigated, while the other kinds of Catholic religiousness – those 'by tradition and education', or the 'in their own way' – display a large percentage that do not follow the hierarchy's appeals or guidelines on a number of issues. In fact, selective adherence to the statements and to the social and ethical battles of the Church can also be observed in a section of the religiously more involved Catholics, although it is more common among groups on the outskirts of the religious institution.

For instance, the constant condemnation of abortion by the Church is shared by 85 % of the 'active and convinced' or practising Catholics and by 64 % of the 'convinced but not always active', but by less than half of those who adhere through tradition or education or interpret it 'in their own way'. Likewise, over 40 % of the members of the two latter groups are in favour of euthanasia – compared to 18 % in the 'active and convinced' or practising one, in spite of the firm and repeated ban of the Church against offering it to terminal or incurable patients. However, Catholics as a whole focus on some cultural and ethical battles of the Church rather than others: for instance, they identify more with the pronouncements on the importance of the family and marriage (or the unity of the Italian nation) than with setting boundaries to scientific research in the biomedical field, thus displaying a range of positions on the demanding questions on the beginning and end of life, an issue which the Catholic hierarchy holds well-defined positions.

To sum up, the public positions of the Church seem to command a wide consensus among the Catholics closest to it and also among part of those less religiously committed or involved Catholics or those more independent of the religious institution. The most curious fact is that some of the statements by the Catholic hierarchy interpret the feelings of large groups of people who belong to religious minorities in Italy and who are especially sensitive to topics concerning the family and human life. Furthermore, they are appreciated also by a minor but not insignificant share of the non-believers or

those do not belong to any religious denomination. In all cases, Catholic doctrine forms a corpus of guidelines and positions or orientations with which not just normal people but also opinion leaders, the lay world and political forces are called to address.

7.7 Latin Countries Are Not All the Same: Comparing/Contrasting Italy, Spain and Portugal

Observers of religious phenomena often tend to lump together Latin countries with Catholic roots – Italy, Spain and Portugal – excepting France, usually considered a separate case, a model of the secular state and of the society which characterises it. Perhaps this is because there was in their past an epoch in which Catholicism exercised a hegemonic role in society, based on a quite normative ecclesiastical magisterium, over a widespread national network of parishes and a population totally exposed to clerical influence, after the pattern of militant commitment capable of getting a grip on the most dynamic and vital social sectors. Indeed, the most exhaustive studies[8] emphasise that these countries – in which Catholic culture is still prevalent – follow different paths through advanced modernity, and these can be seen in the forms assumed by the relationship between religion and civil society.[9] In Italy, as we have seen, that relationship has in recent decades undergone three key moments which have paradoxically restored the Catholic Church and its world to the centre of the public stage. This development was by no means inevitable, as is evidenced by the examples of Spain and Portugal who – although sharing analogous dynamics – have reached outcomes different from those of Italy.

7.7.1 The Common Itinerary in Processes of Laicisation and Secularisation

Like all countries, heirs to a Christian condition, Spain (Pérez-Agote 2010) and Portugal too passed through a phase – during the 1970s and 1980s of the last century – of rapid erosion of the social model which rotated around Catholicism.

---

[8] Interesting descriptions on various Catholic European countries have been drawn in recent research promoted by the Groupe Européen de Recherche Interdisciplinaire sur le Changement Religieux, directed and coordinated by Alfonso Pérez-Agote (University of Madrid), with the participation of Liliane Voyé and Karel Dobbelaere (Belgium); Alfonso Pérez-Agote, Jose Santiago, Antonio Ariño, Ana Aliende and Ana Núñez (Spain); Céline Béraud, Denis Pelletier and Philippe Portier (France); Franco Garelli, Enzo Pace and Annalisa Frisina (Italy); and Helena Vilaça and Maria João Oliveira (Portugal). See Pérez-Agote (2012) for the three case studies presented in this chapter.

[9] As well as in other national contexts, also in Southern European countries, national cultures and geographical areas differ deeply in both the role and the social relevance of religion. See Halman et al. (2005) and Norris and Inglehart (2004).

Nevertheless, at the end of this process in Latin countries, we do not find that the traditional religion has been marginalised but that Catholicism actively seeks out new motives and forms of public presence in advanced modernity. In the dynamics of recent decades, certain factors have been common to, and recurrent in, all countries in South Europe.

(a) Like all Western European countries, also those of the South characterised by strong Catholic roots have seen their religious landscape modified in recent decades, both as to the growth of religious minorities (as a result of foreign migratory flows) and even more by the declining influence of the prevailing religion and a growing process of laicisation of the society. Still today in the Iberian Peninsula, around 80 % of the native population is bound to Catholicism – although not more than 20 % regularly practice religious rites – while others attend irregularly or limit their participation to rites of passage or the practice of popular devotions. Large swathes of people interpret subjectively their belonging to the Catholic Church, in particular not fully agreeing with the church's teachings on the family and sexual morality. This happens in places where the church, despite the sharp reduction in the national scene, is already a relevant presence, even exercising more influence in traditional than emerging areas, in mixed-economy zones rather in the metropolis (as, e.g. in 'greater Lisbon'). Yet in this composite scenario, Catholic feeling – as is true also in Italy – is still widespread in Spain and Portugal, which contain – in Santiago de Compostela and Fatima, respectively – two sanctuaries which are symbols of religious identity intertwined with national vicissitudes (Esteves 1986).

(b) What unites the three countries under consideration here on the political level is the progressive pluralism of Catholics' choices.

In Spain and Italy, this pluralism increased in inverse proportion to the decline of parties with Christian Democratic orientations, and where the parties formally remained on the scene, it was at the cost of a strong internal laicisation process which led them to lose their links with the tradition of social Catholicism from which they had sprung. In Spain, in truth, the Popular Party is by now to all intents and purposes a lay party which no longer reflects its origins as a mass Christian Democrat party.[10] In Portugal, on the other hand, which has not had a political tradition of this kind, the dissemination of Catholics as a whole (including those most religiously committed) throughout all political groupings is a process which accompanied the arrival and development of democracy in the country. However, Catholics are present in large numbers in the Socialist Party. In addition, it is true that there is a right-wing party (the Social Democratic Centre) which claims to be Christian, but it has never received official recognition from the Portuguese Church as such. The

---

[10] Pérez-Agote et al. (2012: 92) write on this issue: 'on doit d'abord noter le manque d'enracinement d'un parti démocrate-chrétien en Espagne, qui aurait pu assurer la présence des catholiques dans la vie politique.'

same occurs in the case of another party born recently which, although it does not explicitly define itself as Christian, is de facto inspired by the church's social doctrine (supporting, for instance, among other things, the principle of subsidiarity in the governance of society). The Portuguese Church is careful – at last formally – to adopt a neutral position with regard to various forces and to keep a certain distance from political power.

Thus, from different points of view, in all Southern European countries, there has been a process of adaptation of Catholics to new political scenarios, including Catholic unions which, in order to survive the crisis, have diluted or lost sight of their original purpose.

(c) The crisis, or lack of political leadership, pushed the Catholics of these countries to step up their efforts in the area of social-assistance voluntary work.

In Portugal, after the advent of democracy (which coincides with an acceleration in the secularisation process), it was the church itself which took the initiative in encouraging new forms of social engagement for the faithful, thereby compensating at least in part for the weakening of its pastoral activity in the country. Although the church did not have a monopoly of the *agire solidale* (social intervention) in Portugal, it played a decisive part in this field, as is evidenced by the fact that 37 % of the bodies and institutions looking after the most marginalised social groups, welcoming immigrants and dealing with new and old forms of poverty depend on the church (Vilaça and Oliveira 2012). Similar stimulus to act in this field came from the Spanish Church, which together with other Latin countries redirected the engagement of that part of civil society which is still guided by the church. This does not mean, however, that the Catholic world in Spain and Portugal has abandoned other social sectors. In both contexts, ecclesiastical authorities exhort the faithful closest to them to remain active in the field of youth education, in ethical committees at various levels, in defending the values of human life and the family, in participating in the world of culture and in the public debate on the relevant themes of the day.

(d) Another common element is the differentiation process of Catholic associationism which was triggered off by the spreading throughout society of cultural and religious pluralism. In Spain and Portugal, as well as in Italy, the end of Catholic hegemony in society produced an increasing differentiation in Christian-inspired movements and associations which are more concerned with expressing their charisma or their particular social and religious sensitivity than with being in tune with other realities which make up the world of organised Catholic associationism. Here, we can detect a constant of the militant Catholic presence in the age of pluralism: there is no longer a hegemonic associative model, and many groups and movements cohabit in the Catholic space without being necessarily connected among themselves; while sometimes, there may be links of affinity and common interests, the overall desire for autonomy and distinction remains predominant. Of course, they all share in a common culture to which they bear witness in civil society (a religious and spiritual sense of existence; the values of family, human life and education; involved and essential lifestyles;

the idea of a community, etc.) but which admits several different interpretations of the church–world relationship, faith and social commitment. Sometimes – especially in Italy and Spain – these topics give rise to serious tensions and opposition in ecclesiastical circles. This diversity can also be seen in relations with the church: while some associations live on the periphery of the church (either critical of or detached from it), most groups and movements seem to have a special relationship with institutional religion and consider that they represent it legitimately in the light of their own charisma and their own background. Some have their own bishop to answer to, some even their own clergy. Within this 'archipelago', some movements stand out because of their dynamism and their ability to operate in contemporary society's visibility mechanisms – one example is Opus Dei in Spain.

7.7.2   Civil Society and Delayed Democratic Development

The fact of having shared for some time the exit path from Christianity with other Southern European countries like Italy and France has not brought Spain and Portugal the same results, at least on the level of civil society.

If on one hand widespread commitment to voluntarism and social work in general is a common trait, on the other, it is a matter of fact that in the two countries under consideration there are fewer religious militants than in Italy. At least quantitatively, the Catholic presence in civil society is less prominent in Spain and Portugal, with all which that implies in terms of their influence on public dynamics and inferior ability to compensate for state welfare which is suffering from a structural crisis of resources.[11] Naturally, there remain in these contexts considerable traces of social Catholicism, from hospitals and means of communication with Catholic roots, from family and life-support centres to Catholic schools, etc. Nevertheless, the abiding impression is that this action is carried out much more by church bodies and structures than by Catholic associationism and that Catholic ferment in civil society is less pervasive than in Italy. Having said that, we should recognise that in the Iberian Peninsula, the public reputation of Catholic schools – especially those run by Jesuits – is much higher than in Italy at present, and this renown (even among non-believers) of providing a first-class education has created a situation where supply cannot satisfy demand. Furthermore, Portugal reports a special Catholic presence in the world of culture, whose style is partly different from that in Italy, giving more weight to dialogue with society than to emphasising in all situations its Christian distinction. Side by side with centres defending

---

[11]Focussing on a recent survey, Pérez-Agote et al. (2012: 95) state 'que la participation citoyenne des catholiques dans des associations religieuses est plutôt faible: en 2002, 6.9 % seulement des Espagnols font partie d'une association à caractère religieux (…) Ajoutons que, selon le même sondage, il existe un faible degré de confiance de la part de la société espagnole envers ce genre d'associations à caractère religieux.'

Catholic values (questions of human life, family, bioethics, education) can be found interesting initiatives aimed at creating 'cultural bridges' in civil society, instituting dialogue between theology and the arts, believers and the lay world, mystics with those responsible for earthly realities, those inside and outside the church and so on.

This more open presence of the church and Catholics in Portuguese civil society reflects a national context marked – with the arrival of democracy after the 1974 Carnation Revolution – by secularisation of the state and freedom of religious expression. These choices were mostly accepted by the hierarchy, partly because they did not call into question the public role of the church and the identification with the Catholicism of the majority of the population. The situation is different, however, in Spain, which in recent decades has experienced a more intense secularisation process whose political echoes can be discerned in the libertarian choices of socialist governments in the last few years. Thus, the ecclesiastical hierarchy has vehemently opposed the new political direction, calling on Catholics to defend Christian values, the public role of the church and the presence of religious symbols in public buildings. Although this phenomenon promotes initiatives capable of mobilising the masses, it seems rather the result of a delayed modernisation process than a real identity reawakening or a project to federate or coordinate the various spirits of the Catholic world within civil society – which is what is happening in Italy. In addition, particularly in Spain, only a part of the militant Catholic laity agrees with the church's antisocialist political activism.

This relatively weak Catholic presence in civil society in the Iberian Peninsula is connected with the particular passage of the two countries from the clerical fascist regimes of Franco and Salazar to democratic life. In that configuration, ecclesiastical institutions enjoyed a kind of legal hegemony, thanks to a concordat with the state, which guaranteed them ample resources and favourable treatment compared to non-Catholic religious denominations, against the background of authoritarian affirmation of the nation's Catholic identity. All of this lasted until the end of the 1970s of the last century. The passage to democracy came about as a result of pressure born within civil society which was primarily secular and antithetical to ecclesiastical hierarchies and Catholicism as a whole: it was perceived by large sections of the population to be clearly aligned with right-wing political forces. Moreover, the processes of modernisation and democratisation were not directed by Christian Democrat-inspired political and social forces, as they were in Italy. These dynamics weakened the role played by groups and associations in the development of Spanish and Portuguese civil society, because they had to find elsewhere the set of shared common values which would be capable of leading both countries towards modernity.

To sum up, in all the countries of the Southern Europe, the Catholic Church plays a more prominent role – more than in North-Central European nations where Catholic culture is still important – in the public sphere, which is revealed by renewed involvement of lay believers in various sectors of civil society. Everywhere, Catholic groups and movements are in the forefront of social–assistential voluntarism, on the educational level, concerning the social and ethical themes which are today most in the public consciousness, with regard to rules of cohabitation in a pluralistic society (family, human life, bioethics, the intervention of science at the

cutting edge, multiculturalism, religious pluralism and so on). In some countries, such as Italy and Spain, the church's presence seems more aggressive and tenacious, while in Portugal, it appears to favour a more open presence and dialogue with society. These are different strategies for the prevailing religion to husband its heritage of symbolic resources and sense, in countries which are experiencing the processes of secularisation and laicisation typical of advanced modernity.

References

Alesina, A., & Ichino, A. (2009). *L'Italia fatta in casa. Indagine sulla vera ricchezza degli italiani*. Milano: Mondadori.

Berger, P. (2005). Religion and global civil society. In M. Juergensmeyer (Ed.), *Religion in global civil society* (pp. 11–22). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bozzo, A., & Luizard, J. (Eds.). (2011). *Les Sociétés civiles dans le monde musulman*. Paris: La Découverte.

Casanova, J. (1994). *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago.

Cesareo, V. (Ed.). (2003). *I protagonisti della società civile*. Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino.

Diamanti, I. (2010, Novembre 1). L'Italia che si aggrappa alla famiglia. E' l'unico ammortizzatore sociale. *La Repubblica*.

Donati, P., & Colozzi, I. (2002). *La cultura civile in Italia: fra stato, mercato e privato sociale*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Esteves, A. J. (1986). A religião popular em Portugal. *Cadernos de Ciências Sociais, 4*, 63–76.

Garelli, F. (2007). *La chiesa in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Garelli, F. (2010). *Catholicism in Italy in the age of pluralism*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Garelli, F. (2011). *Religione all'italiana*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Garelli, F., & Simone, M. (Eds.). (2001). *Quale società civile per l'Italia di domani?* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Guerriero, E. (Ed.). (1996). *La chiesa in Italia. Dall'unità ai giorni nostri*. Milano: San Paolo.

Halman, L., Luijkx, R., & Zundert, M. (2005). *Atlas of European values*. Leiden: Brill.

Kepel, P., & Luizard, J. (2011, Mars 3–9). Où vont les révolutions arabes? *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 40–43.

Kilani, M. (2011). La religion dans la sphère civile. *Esprit février, 372*, 91–111.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular. Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pérez-Agote, A. (2010). Religious change in Spain. *Social Compass, 57*(2), 224–234.

Pérez-Agote, A. (Ed.). (2012). *Portraits du catholicisme: Belgique, Espagne, France, Italie, Portugal*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Pérez-Agote, A., Santiago, J., Ariño, A., Aliende, A., & Núñez, A. (2012). Portraits de catholicisme en Espagne. In A. Pérez-Agote (Ed.), *Portraits du catholicisme: Belgique, Espagne, France, Italie, Portugal* (pp. 57–103). Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Sciolla, L. (2004). *La sfida dei valori*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Silvano, G. (2011). *Società e Terzo settore. La via italiana*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Traniello, F., & Campanili, G. (1981). *Dizionario storico del movimento cattolico in Italia. I/2 I fatti e le idee*. Torino: Marietti.

Vilaça, H., & Oliveira, M. J. (2012). Portrait du catholicisme au Portugal. In A. Pérez-Agote (Ed.), *Portraits du catholicisme: Belgique, Espagne, France, Italie, Portugal*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Wuthnow, R. (1996). *Sharing the journey*. New York: The Free Press.

Zamagni, S. (2011). *Libro bianco sul Terzo settore*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Chapter 8
Secular Values, Religious Beliefs and Civil Life: A Comparative Analysis of Helping Values and Behaviour

Kingsley Purdam and Ingrid Storm

8.1 Introduction

Religion is seen by many as a key aspect of civil society (Tocqueville 1835; Putnam 2000) in terms of shaping individual morality, personal support networks and providing welfare services.[1] Religion is often given a legally privileged status alongside other aspects of people's identity such as age and gender. It has been argued that prosocial behaviour, defined in general terms as voluntary actions to help others (e.g. organising a local community event or providing support to a neighbour), is integral to religious identity (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008 and Batson et al. 1993). However, to whom and to what effect such helping attitudes and behaviour are directed and how they compare with the behaviour of secular populations is subject to some debate. Such issues need to be examined in the context of debates about the development and maintenance of civil society.

Research by Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993) and Putnam and Campbell (2010) has highlighted the association between religious identity and social capital benefits, such as in the form of contacts and networks of support and cooperation as

---

[1] In the UK the terms 'civic society' and 'civic participation' are more routinely used than 'civil participation' and 'civil society'. However, in terms of participation 'civic' usually describes a similar wide range of activities in relation to community and public life such as: joining a voluntary group, helping a neighbour, voting and involvement in consultation and policy making. See, for example, Purdam and Crisp (2009). 'Civil' is used in this broad sense here but specific types of activities are identified. The term 'civil' in the UK can have more political and legal rights connotations.

K. Purdam (✉)
Centre for Census and Survey Research, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
e-mail: kingsley.purdam@manchester.ac.uk

I. Storm
Institute for Social Change, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
e-mail: ingrid.storm@manchester.ac.uk

well as providing opportunities for civil participation to develop. Putnam (2000: 66) describes faith communities as 'the most important repository of social capital in America'. He argues that people whose religion is very important to them are the most likely to belong to voluntary groups and that the active involvement in religious organisations is amongst the strongest predictors of philanthropy. Smid's (1999) research in Canada has similarly found that church attendance was strongly associated with civil engagement. In his research on citizenship in the USA, Dalton (2008) suggests that the most engaged citizens (those involved in civil society groups) were those who were either highly religious or not religious at all.

Helping other people, for example organising a local community event or providing support to a neighbour, is at the core of debates about civil society. For example, in the UK citizens are increasingly being encouraged to take on new roles and responsibilities in governance such as looking after their local area, running local schools and delivering local services alongside private sector service providers. However, research has also shown that people are more likely to see helping others as important than actually help in practice (Purdam and Tranmer 2012). These issues can be seen in the context of debates around deliberative democracy and governmentality and link with what Ilcan (2009) has described as the mobilisation of responsible citizenship.

In this chapter we compare the helping profiles of religious and secular populations in order to examine the links to civil society. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), we compare the importance people attach to helping others, the extent to which they help with or attend activities in their local area and how often they help people other than in their family, at work and in voluntary organisations. We compare people who state they are not religious, people who state they belong to a religion but do not attend religious services regularly and those who attend religious services regularly. There has only been limited cross European research on the direct contribution religion makes to civil life through individual values and behaviour. This chapter adds to the literature by comparing secular populations, those who belong to a religion and those who are regular attenders of religious services in different civil and welfare contexts.

8.2 The Recognition of Religion and the Function of Public Benefit

In many countries religious identity has a legally privileged status and is protected in law as part of equalities legislation as a human right. Across Europe, under the European Convention on Human Rights, religion has been given legal protection. This is specified in terms of the following articles: Article 9 – freedom of thought, conscience and religion and freedom to manifest ones religion or belief; Article 1 of the First Protocol – peaceful enjoyment of possessions; and Article 14 – freedom from discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. The convention has been variously interpreted at a national level. However, the definition of what types of belief are recognised as religious is subject to some legal debate, and in certain

contexts legal recognition is linked to an assessment of public benefit. For further discussion see Weller et al. (2013).

The legal definition of religion in law remains very general and subject to debate. For example, there is no particular list of religions or beliefs that are included in UK legislation, though most major world religions and minority belief systems are recognised implicitly. Recently in the UK the Druid Network has been recognised as having charitable status under the *2006 Charities Act*. Religious organisations gaining this status have to carry out their work for the advancement of religion for public benefit. It is this notion of public benefit that we in part are examining in this research. The notions of secular and non religious are also debated. See Berger et al. (2008) and Woodhead with Catto (2009).

Our primary interest in this chapter is whether religion contributes to people's orientation to, and participation in, civil society and how religious individuals compare with secular individuals. By focusing on helping, we are exploring one aspect of the contribution both religious and secular populations make to their local area and society more generally. For a recent discussion of the role of religion in welfare in the UK see Jawad (2012).

We are aware that an individual's religious identity can take different forms. Some people's religious identity is based on personal faith and does not involve public activity, whereas others place a premium on observance of ritual and social participation (Davie 1994, 2000; Halman and Draulans 2004; Storm 2009). Further, large numbers of European populations claim to belong to a religion without either believing or participating in it. Religious identity may thus simply be a way of expressing one's religious or ethnic heritage or agreement with the moral values of the religion (Davie 1994; Day 2009). Consideration of the meaning of religious belonging and participation informs both our methods and the interpretation of the results.

8.3 Understanding Helping

Previous research has identified a number of factors associated with the likelihood of someone helping a neighbour or another citizen in particular circumstances. Batson (1998) points to the differences between situational and dispositional factors (i.e. the immediate context and the individual person's orientation). For example, the likelihood of helping a stranger in an emergency has been found to depend on: self-concern of harm, the appearance and similarity of the person in need with the potential helper, location, number of bystanders, perceived risk of helping, self confidence, emotional need, mood and the person's generalised view of reciprocity (i.e. has the person been helped in the past and feels they are indebted in a general way to society).

A person's likelihood of helping is the result of a complex set of factors. Amato's (1990) research suggests that people are most likely to help friends and family members and that the individual characteristics of people are more closely associated with planned helping. It is notable that in research by Batson (1998) intelligence was not found to be a strong predictor of whether a person would help a stranger. See Darley

and Latané (1968) for an overview of different experimental research in the area of helping. The learning aspect of helping is clearly important. Experimental research with young men in the 1960s (Berkowitz 1968) found that the extent to which young, working class men gave help was associated with the help they had received in the past. Those who were classified as middle class had a stronger internalised set of ideals prescribing that they help people in need without the expectation of help in return, which could be because middle class people are more likely to report they have been helped in the past.

Batson (1998) highlights how helping can also be motivated by self-interest not only in terms of anticipating some future need for help but also directly in terms of people feeling better about themselves and perhaps rewarding themselves for helping another person in need. This may lead to an increase in their own sense of well-being. Conversely, not helping someone may also be associated with feelings of guilt, inadequacy or isolation. Putnam (2000) has highlighted the key role played by reciprocity in community structures and civil society. Sober and Wilson (1999) suggest that the ultimate explanation for altruism is that it facilitates cooperation and refer to models showing that groups of altruistic individuals fare better than groups of selfish individuals. Wilson (2002) further relates this to religion, arguing that religious belief can be seen as an evolutionary adaptation partly because it facilitates altruistic behaviour. However, Batson (1998) found that religion was not a strong predictor of whether a person would help a stranger. See also Dovidio et al. (2006), Berkovitz (1968), Gouldner (1960), Trivers (1971) and Wuthnow (1993).

Our focus is on a number of general measures of helping: firstly, whether people see it as important to help other people and care for their well-being (helping as a value) and, secondly, whether they have helped with or have attended a local event in the last year (help in practice). The latter measure is used deliberately because of its general and low resource cost to the person doing the helping, and we therefore limit the effects that may be associated with specific circumstances or opportunities to help. We also consider two other aspects of helping: the extent to which people have provided help to people outside of their family, work or in voluntary groups (help others) and the extent to which people perceive others living locally are willing to help one another (the local context of help).

8.4 Data and Definitions

The European Social Survey (ESS) collects data on the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of people living in Europe. The 2006 wave includes data from 23 European countries. The data was collected from random probability samples of the eligible residential populations aged 15 years and older. The minimum required sample size for each country was 1,500, or 800 in countries with populations less than two million. The response rate varies between countries but the target is 70 % (ESS 2006).

We have considered two outcome indicators of help and a further two independent helping variables as well as a combined measure of religious belonging and attendance as summarised in Table 8.1. We use logistic regression models, with each of the

Table 8.1 Definitions and measures

Variable	ESS questions and recoding
1. Help as a value – value helper	*How much like you is this person? 'It is very important to help the people around you and care for others' well-being' Very much like me/Like me/Somewhat like me/A little like me/Not like me/ Not like me at all.* **Recoded:** (1) *Not like me/Not like me at all,* (2) *Very much like me/Like me*
2. Help in practice – local helper (help with or attend local activities)	*In the past 12 months, how often did you help with or attend activities organised in your local area? At least once a week/At least once a month/At least once every 3 months/At least once every 6 months/Less often/Never/Don't Know.* **Recoded:** (1) *Less often than once every 6 months,* (2) *At least once every 6 months*
3. Help – local context	*Please tell me the extent you feel people in your local area/ neighbourhood help one another? (0–6) Not at all – A great deal*
4. Helping others – (excluding family, work or voluntary orgs)	*Not counting anything you do for your family, in your work, or within voluntary organisations, how often, in the past 12 months, did you actively provide help for other people?* **Recoded:** (1) *Less often than once every 6 months,* (2) *At least once every 6 months*
5. Religious belonging	*Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?*
6. Religious attendance	*Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?* **Recoded:** *Less than once a month or more than once a month*
	Variables 5 and 6 combined into religious identity variable with categories: (1) *Not religious,* (2) *Belonging and attending less than once a month,* (3) *Belonging and attending more than once a month*

outcomes as recoded dichotomous variables. This relatively straightforward approach allows the significance of religious belonging, attendance and religious identity to be examined after controlling for age, gender, education and the perception of local help. We compare the different countries across the ESS with the UK. The UK is chosen as a basis for comparison due to the policy initiatives of the previous and present governments aimed at developing what has been termed 'active citizenship' (Marinetto 2003) and the Big Society (Cabinet Office 2010).

All analyses were weighted to take account of the population size of the different countries and the country specific sampling strategies (ESS 2006). Due to the small sample size, Cyprus could not be included in the multivariate analysis. For further discussion of values and benevolence see Schwartz and Bilsky (1990).

8.4.1 Measurement Limitations

It is important to note that whilst 'helping with or attending activities in the local area' is only one aspect of helping in relation to civil engagement, we argue that it has low resource costs in terms of time and commitment and so is a good general

indicator. Since it includes just attending activities, it is likely to be an overestimate of actual helping. On the other hand, it may not capture those who are too busy to help with or attend activities in their local area because they are committed to other helping activities. We also do not know whom the people are providing help to or how much time they invest in the helping activity.

The social desirability of giving a certain response may also be a factor as respondents state that they do see helping others as important because they feel that it is the acceptable answer. This makes some of our findings even more striking as it means the profiles of help and helping we have identified are probably overestimates. It is notable that experimental evidence has shown that people who state they have a religion are more likely to give socially desirable responses (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008; Leak and Fish 1989).

Finally, it is clearly a challenge to capture the different role religion can have in people's lives considering how this varies across different countries, traditions and generations. Here we use as indicators whether someone belongs to a religion and how often they attend religious services. We use the latter as a proxy for how actively involved people are in their religion. We created three mutually exclusive categories by combining these two variables. Those people not belonging to a religion are categorised as 'not religious', those belonging to a religion but attending religious services less often than monthly are categorised as 'belongers', and those belonging to a religion and attending religious services at least once a month are categorised as 'attenders'. The proportion of belongers relative to attenders of religious services varies greatly by country (Halman and Draulans 2004; Storm 2009). For example, in some countries, most notably the Scandinavian countries, it is customary to belong to the national church, even if the levels of regular church attendance are extremely low. In some majority Catholic countries such as Poland and Ireland, however, it is unusual to describe oneself as belonging to a religion without at least some attendance at religious services.

We consider these measurement challenges and limitations in the interpretation of our findings.

8.5 Findings: Comparing Helping Values and Behaviour Amongst Religious and Secular Populations Across Europe

8.5.1 Religious Belonging and Attendance of Religious Services

Across the countries in the ESS overall 60 % of people state that they belong to a religion. This varies considerably across the countries in the ESS, from 28 % of people in Estonia to 93 % of people in Poland.

The concept of religious identification requires further analysis. It is possible to examine religiosity as how often a person attends religious services – *'How often do*

you attend religious services apart from special occasions?' Whilst this does not capture all aspects of religiosity and certain traditions do not place such emphasis on organised participation, it provides a basis for the further comparison of the helping profiles of religious and secular populations. Overall, 38 % of people belong to a religion without regularly attending religious services, whilst 22 % of the total population are regular attenders of religious services. The rate of regularly attending religious services varies from 6 % in Estonia to 74 % in Poland.

8.5.2   Value Helpers and Helping in Practice

The category of value helpers is based on the question – '*How much like you is this person? 'It is very important to help the people around you and care for others' well-being''*. Across the countries in the ESS we find that overall 61 % of people are 'value helpers'.

In relation to helping in practice – '*Helping with or attending activities in your local area*' – the overall rates are much lower. The difference is quite striking. Only just over a quarter of people (27 %) state that they help in practice even by the low resource cost measure used here. There are sizeable gaps between value helping and helping in practice across all the populations – those who just belong, those who belong and attend religious services regularly and those who state that they do not have a religion.

Women across all age groups are more likely than men to be value helpers. Conversely in relation to helping in practice (helping with or attending local activities), women are overall less likely than men to help. In general older men and women aged over 25 are more likely to state that helping others is important. These differences may be a consequence of the barriers that women and older people could face in implementing their values. For example, they may not have the opportunities and the resources or be in good enough health to help in practice in terms of helping organise or attend local activities. For further discussion of the differences in helping by age and gender, see Purdam and Tranmer (2012).

In relation to religious identity and value helping, comparing those who state they belong to a particular religion (including regular attenders of religious services) and those who do not, we find a small difference – 64 % of those who belong to a religion state that it is 'very important to help the people around them and care for others' well-being' compared to 57 % of those who do not belong to a religion.[2] In relation to helping in practice, there is a small difference – 28 % of those people who belong to a religion (including regular attenders of religious services) stated that they help in practice compared to 24 % of those people who do not belong to a religion.[3]

---

[2]Chi square, 272.036 ($P<0.000$); Cramer's V, 0.076. $N=47,621$.
[3]Chi square, 75. 540 ($P<0.000$); Cramer's V, 0.040. $N=47,544$.

Table 8.2 Religion and secular populations value helping and helping in practice (*N*=46,612) (ESS 2006)

	Value helper (%)	Helper in practice (help with or attending local activities) (%)
Not belonging to a religion	57	24
Belonging to a religion	62	25
Belonging to a religion and attending regularly	68	33
Total	61	27

However, it seems just 'belonging' to a religion is associated with a larger gap between values and practice. As shown in Table 8.2, people who belong to a religion but are not regular attenders of religious services are more likely to be value helpers than secular populations (62 % compared to 57 %), but the difference is negligible when we consider helping in practice (25 % compared to 24 %).

It is important to note that there is no clear direction of causality here, and although it is possible that religious service attendance could be linked to someone being more likely to help in practice, it could also be that people who help in practice are also more likely to be regular attenders of religious services. Since attending a religious service could be regarded as a form of local participation, we would expect regular attenders of religious services to also be more active in other local activities. In fact respondents might even be referring to religious services or activities when they answer the question, and so the measure of helping might be capturing this. Even so, the patterns identified are an important insight into the contribution regular attenders of religious services are making to civil life and how people who just belong to a religion and those who state that they do not have a religion compare.

It is useful to consider a second measure of helping in practice – helping other people than those in one's family, at work or as part of a voluntary organisation – *'Not counting anything you do for your family, in your work, or within voluntary organisations, how often, in the past 12 months, did you actively provide help for other people?'* This question is likely to be capturing helping in relation to more spontaneous, unstructured and informal helping such as to a neighbour or a stranger in need of assistance. Whilst more specific, this question is also more likely to be capturing barriers to helping that individual people might face. Even so, 49 % of those people from secular populations are helpers in practice according to this measure compared to 46 % of those people who belong to a religion and 52 % of those people who belong to a religion and are regular attenders of religious services.[4] Figure 8.1 provides a summary of the helping profiles of the different populations.

Those people who state they belong to a religion but are not regular attenders of religious services are the least likely to help other people (other than their family,

---

[4]Chi square: 96.068 (*P*<0.000). *N*=46,071.

Fig. 8.1 Comparing measures of helping by religious belonging, attendance of religious services and not religious (*N*=46,612) (ESS 2006)

at work or as part of a voluntary organisation). Perhaps by virtue of their having the regular activity of religious attendance, we would also expect attenders of religious services to have more associates and acquaintances outside of work, family and voluntary organisations. Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that they report higher levels of this kind of helping than the other populations.

It is also important to consider the local environment in which people live. The 'local context of help' is a measure of the extent to which an individual perceives people help each other in their local neighbourhood. It is derived from the question – '*Please tell me the extent you feel people in your local area/neighbourhood help one another?*' Using this measure, Purdam and Tranmer (2012) found a generally positive relationship between the value of help and the extent of perceived help locally. This suggests that as people perceive more help around them, they are also more likely to state that helping others is important and vice versa.

In relation to comparing religious and secular populations, we found that across the countries in the ESS people who stated they did not belong to a religion were the least likely to state that people in their local area help one another – 45 % compared to 49 % of those people who belong to a religion and 53 % of those who attend religious services regularly.[5] As Fig. 8.2 shows, the relationship is consistent across the scale.

[5]Chi square: 182.797 (*P*<0.000). *N*=46,320.

Fig. 8.2 The local context of help by religious belonging, attendance of religious services and not religious (*N*=46,612) (ESS 2006)

8.5.3 Multivariate Results

In order to explore these patterns in more detail, we conducted a series of statistical models. We had three outcome variables, 'Value help', 'Local help' and 'Helping others', and controlled for age, gender, education and country as well as the 'local context of help' and religiosity. We used logistic regression models with each of the outcomes as recoded dichotomous variables. The results can be found in the Appendix. We compared those people who stated that they were not religious with those who stated that they were religious but were not regular attenders of religious services and those who stated that they were religious and were regular attenders of religious services.

   After controlling for key demographics, the results highlight that women are much more likely than men to state that it is 'very important to help the people around you and care for others' well-being' (value helper). Those people with higher levels of education qualifications are a little more likely to be value helpers. The likelihood of a person stating that they are a value helper is positively associated with local helping in practice (help with or attend local activities), helping others (excluding family, work or in voluntary organisations), living in an area where the person perceives other people to be helpful (local context of help), belonging to a religion and being a regular attender of religious services (compared to those who state they are not religious). It is notable that one of the strongest associations is in relation to the local context of help, arguably highlighting the importance of peoples' immediate neighbourhood surroundings.

In relation to helping in practice, we find conversely that women are less likely than men to state that they help with or attend local activities. Those with higher levels of education qualifications are more likely to help in practice. This may suggest that there are barriers affecting those people with lower educational qualification levels translating their values into action. Helping in practice is positively associated with the value of help, living in an area where the person perceives other people to be helpful, belonging to a religion and being a regular attender of religious services (compared to those who state that they are not religious). In relation to belonging to a religion and regularly attending, there seems to be a stronger association with helping in practice compared to the value of help. The strongest associations are with helping others and the local context of help again highlighting the importance of people's immediate surroundings.

As for helping others (excluding family, at work or in voluntary organisations) we find that older people and women are less likely to state they help. Those with higher levels of education qualifications are more likely to help others. Helping others is positively associated with the value of help, living in an area where other people are perceived to be helpful and being a regular attender of religious services. However, it should be noted that people who state that they are not religious are more likely to help others than those who say they belong to a religion but do not attend regularly.

In relation to belonging to a religion and attending regularly, there seems to be a weaker association with helping others (excluding family, at work or in voluntary organisations) when compared to local helping in practice (help with or attend local activities). This may suggest that the higher levels of helping amongst those people who belong to a religion may take a specific form or what might be termed 'bounded helping'. Whilst there is a positive association with the local context of help, this is weaker than the association between local context and local helping in practice. Helping others, it seems, is less related to the immediate context in which people live. There is also a stronger association with the value of help. This highlights the importance of values in relation to people helping those outside their immediate families, networks and formal organisations. The full results are given in the Appendix.

We now look in more detail at the profiles of help and helping across different European countries in the ESS comparing secular and religious populations.

8.6 Cross-Country Comparisons of Help by Religion

As outlined above, nearly two-thirds of people state that they feel helping others is important (the value of help). There are however considerable differences between countries. The countries having the highest rates of the value of help are quite mixed including Spain (83 %), Switzerland (74 %) and Slovenia (74 %). Slovenia is considered to be one of the most democratic of the former Communist states

Fig. 8.3 Percentage of people who are value helpers *(It is very important to help the people around you and care for others' well-being)* by religious belonging, attendance of religious services and not religious (*N*=46,612) (ESS 2006). Chi-square: *P ≤ 0.05; **P ≤ 0.01

(Freedom House Index 2009). The countries with the lowest rates are mainly post-Communist countries and include the Russian Federation (49 %) and Ukraine (52 %).

In relation to helping in practice (helping with or attending a local activity), the overall rates are much lower with just over a quarter of people stating that they help others in practice. At both ends of the scale, there appears to be clustering by democratic tradition and welfare regime type with certain Scandinavian countries such as Norway (46 %) and Denmark (46 %) contrasted with certain post-Communist Eastern European countries (Bulgaria 9 %, Hungary 13 %).

Religious belonging and attendance vary across countries and in relation to particular denomination and national traditions (Halman and Draulans 2004; Storm 2009), and this may have implications for the variations in terms of the culture of helping. Figure 8.3 shows the proportion of value helpers by religion.

As the figure shows in most countries in the ESS (apart from Belgium, Germany and Portugal), those who are regular attenders of religious services are the most likely to state that helping others is important (the value of help). There are exceptions, however. In Germany it is those who state that they do not have a religious identity who are the most likely to be value helpers. The differences were significant at the 99 % level in eight of the countries.

Fig. 8.4 Percentage of people helping in practice *(Helping with or attending activities in local area)* by religious belonging, attendance of religious services and not religious (*N* = 46,612) (ESS 2006). Chi-square: **P* ≤ 0.05; ***P* ≤ 0.01

Across a number of other countries, including Ireland, Ukraine, Finland, Switzerland, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, those who state that they do not have a religion are about as likely or more likely, to be value helpers, than those who state that they belong to a religion. The countries with the biggest gap in value helping between those who belong to a religion and those who attend religious services are Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine.

In terms of helping in practice, the overall levels of reported helping in practice are much lower than the levels of value helping. This is the case across all countries and for whether the person is not religious, belongs to a religion or is a regular attender of religious services. The differences were significant at the 99 % level in eight of the 23 countries (Fig. 8.4).

It is notable that across all countries, those who are regular attenders of religious services are the most likely to state that they help in practice. In many countries those people who state that they do not belong to a religion are about as likely, or more likely, to be value helpers than those who state that they belong to a religion but are not regular attenders of religious services including Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, UK, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Sweden and Slovakia. The UK and Ireland are the countries with the biggest gap in helping in practice between those who belong to a religion and those who attend religious services.

8.6.1 Multivariate Analysis

In order to explore these patterns in more detail, we compared the different countries in the ESS with the UK in the logistic regression models examining the association with the value of help, helping locally and helping others (See Appendix).

Supporting the descriptive findings we again see considerable country differences in the likelihood of people being a value helper. After controlling for key demographics and religion, we see that in very few countries (with the notable exception of Spain) is the likelihood of being a value helper higher than in the UK. The significant lowest likelihoods of being a value helper compared to the UK are the Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Estonia.

In relation to helping in practice (help with or attending local activities), the significant lowest likelihoods of being a helper in practice compared to the UK are in Bulgaria and Poland.

In relation to helping others (excluding family, at work or in voluntary organisations), the patterns vary. In numerous countries the likelihood of helping others is significantly higher than in the UK particularly Slovenia and Denmark. The significant lowest likelihoods of helping others compared to the UK are Bulgaria, Portugal, Ukraine and Hungary. The picture is mixed but there are some patterns that require further research in order to examine the interplay between welfare infrastructure, civil tradition and the role played by the state as we discuss below.

8.7 Discussion and Conclusions

Religion and religious belonging are seen by many as a key aspect of civil society in terms of shaping individual morality, personal support networks and providing welfare services. It has been argued that prosocial behaviour, defined in general terms as voluntary actions to help others (e.g. organising a local community event or providing support to a neighbour), is integral to religious identity.

Religion is often given a legally privileged status alongside other aspects of people's identity such as age and gender. In the UK a religious organisation can be given charitable status if it is deemed to be acting in the interests of the public good. At the same time there are different ways of defining both what religion is and what religious belonging means. Across many countries in the ESS, there are substantial differences between the proportion of people stating that they belong to a religion and the proportion attending religious services.

In this chapter we have compared people's views towards helping and the extent of self-reported helping in practice of those people who belong to a religion, those who are regular attenders at religious services and those that state they do not belong to a religion. Although general, self-reported measures of helping have limitations, they also provide a rich source of evidence for comparing helping across different populations in different contexts.

Our analysis highlights that across all populations there are sizeable differences between the proportion of people stating that helping others is important and the

proportion of people who state that they actually help in practice. People who attend religious services regularly are the most likely to state that they think helping other people is important and also to state that they actually help people in practice. Nonetheless, only just over two-thirds of regular attenders of religious services state that they think helping other people is important and only a third help in practice (help with or attend local activities). Given that other research (e.g. Norenzayan and Shariff 2008) has identified a greater likelihood of social desirability bias in the survey responses of religious people, the levels of reported helping are even more striking. Also see research by Sedikides and Gebauer (2013).

The relatively higher levels of helping in practice (local help) amongst regular attenders of religious services could be highlighting the organisational aspect of this type of helping. It may be that the social networks associated with regularly attending religious services lead people to help in this way, but it is also possible that the activities and events that they are helping to organise are religious activities. Thus, this could also be seen as evidence of what can be termed 'bounded helping' where helping takes place within the infrastructure and under the name of their religion. For further discussion see Saroglou et al. (2005). However, it should be added that the activities of religious organisations are sometimes about reaching out to those in need and not necessarily only helping people of the same religion. Conversely of course, it could be that among people who state that they belong to a religion, those who are more helpful are more likely to be regular attenders at religious services.

Recent research in the USA has highlighted the strong link between civil behaviour and those who regularly attend religious services rather than those who just state they have a religious affiliation, i.e. because these people are what is termed 'joiners' rather than just having a religious identity (Putnam and Campbell 2010). At the same time, it is the regular attenders of religious services who have lower levels of support for civil liberties and higher levels of intolerance on a number of measures compared to secular populations. For further discussion see Weller et al. (2013).

In terms of helping people other than one's family, at work and in voluntary organisations, the lowest levels of helping are amongst those who state that they belong to a religion but do not regularly attend religious services. Moreover, the differences between people who state they do not belong to a religion and those that attend religious services regularly are smaller compared to the differences in relation to local helping in practice. Controlling for key demographics, belonging to a religion but not regularly attending religious services is negatively associated with helping people (other than ones family, at work and in voluntary organisations) compared to those people who state they are not religious. It seems that simply belonging to a religion, or stating one's affiliation to a religion, is not acting as a vehicle for civil participation per se.

Comparing across countries and across secular and religious populations within these countries, it is clear there are striking differences in the overall levels of value help and helping in practice. The differences in helping in practice are apparent even amongst regular attenders of religious services. It is likely that contextual differences across countries such as welfare infrastructure, civil tradition and the roles played by the state and religious organisations would explain some of the variations in the patterns of helping, with established welfare democracies having higher rates

of helping. This may also be linked to higher living standards in these countries, and more research is needed to establish the mechanisms that lead to higher rates of helping in some countries compared to others. Kuti (2004) suggests that the history of military rule and authoritarianism (including the enforcement of volunteering) did not engender the development of an infrastructure of civil society in certain Eastern European countries. However, such country-level generalisations can lead to oversimplifications. For further discussion, see Esping-Andersen (1990), Kautto (1999), Kolberg (1992), Meier and Stutzer (2008), Parboteeah et al. (2004), Powell and Barrientos (2004) and Bartowski and Jasinska-Kania (2004).

The local context of help where people live is clearly important. For all populations the extent to which people think other people in their local neighbourhood are helpful is positively associated with the extent to which they think helping others is important and also the extent to which they help in practice. Across the countries in the ESS, those people who stated they did not belong to a religion were the least likely to state that people in their local area help one another. It appears those people who do not belong to a religion tend to live in areas where they have comparatively lower perceptions of people helping each other, though the differences are not very substantial.

Although general, self-reported measures of helping have limitations, they do provide a rich source of evidence and our findings have potentially far-reaching implications for our understanding of debates about civil society and responsible citizenship amongst both secular and religious populations. The gap amongst all populations between seeing helping as important and helping in practice is clearly an important focus for renewed policy development. Those people who have a religious belonging and attend religious services regularly play an important role in civil life. However, the levels of helping others among secular populations are higher than for those who belong to a religion but do not regularly attend religious services. These results indicate that helping is not necessarily predicted by religious belonging per se, but rather with the practice and possibly the social networks associated with religious service attendance.

Help and helping is vital to the functioning of society and civil life and underpins the notion of responsible citizenship. The roles that religious and secular populations can play in the culture of helping are an important research and policy focus.

Appendix: Results Logistic Regression

1. Value Helper - "It is very important to help the people around you and care for others' well being"

	Exp(B)	Sig.
Age (in years)	1.01	0.00
Female	1.37	0.00
Education (secondary compared to higher)	1.09	0.00
Help in practice (help with or attend local activities)	1.02	0.43

(continued)

(continued)

	Exp(B)	Sig.
Help others (excluding family, work or voluntary orgs)	1.63	0.00
Local context of help (low help compared to high)	1.40	0.00
Non religious (Reference)		0.00
Religion - belonging	1.17	0.00
Religion - regular attending	1.32	0.00
Country (Reference UK)		
Austria	0.56	0.00
Belgium	0.93	0.42
Bulgaria	0.69	0.00
Switzerland	0.89	0.26
Germany	0.61	0.00
Denmark	0.78	0.04
Estonia	0.42	0.00
Spain	2.01	0.00
Finland	0.47	0.00
France	0.44	0.00
Hungary	0.63	0.00
Ireland	0.76	0.06
Netherlands	0.61	0.00
Norway	0.55	0.00
Poland	0.56	0.00
Portugal	0.56	0.00
Russian Federation	0.39	0.00
Sweden	0.43	0.00
Slovenia	0.94	0.76
Slovakia	0.45	0.00
Ukraine	0.41	0.00
Constant	0.97	0.60

2. Help Locally - "In the past 12 months, how often did you help with or attend activities organised in your local area?"

	Exp(B)	Sig.
Age (in years)	1.00	0.28
Female	0.89	0.00
Education (secondary compared to higher)	1.51	0.00
Value Helper (important to help the people around you and care for others' well being)	1.03	0.23
Help others (excluding family, work or voluntary orgs)	5.61	0.00
Local context of help (low help compared to high)	1.74	0.00
Non religious (Reference)		0.00
Religion - belonging	1.21	0.00
Religion - regular attending	1.96	0.00

(continued)

	Exp(B)	Sig.
Country (Reference UK)		
Austria	0.99	0.93
Belgium	0.72	0.00
Bulgaria	0.19	0.00
Switzerland	0.86	0.13
Germany	0.44	0.00
Denmark	0.87	0.20
Estonia	0.49	0.01
Spain	0.77	0.00
Finland	0.25	0.00
France	0.93	0.11
Hungary	0.26	0.00
Ireland	0.89	0.43
Netherlands	0.42	0.00
Norway	0.95	0.67
Poland	0.21	0.00
Portugal	0.32	0.00
Russian Federation	0.35	0.00
Sweden	0.45	0.00
Slovenia	0.57	0.00
Slovakia	0.32	0.00
Ukraine	0.34	0.00
Constant	0.10	0.10

3. Help Others - "Not counting anything you do for your family, in your work, or within voluntary organisations, how often, in the past 12 months, did you actively provide help for other people?"

	Exp(B)	Sig.
Age (in years)	0.99	0.00
Female	0.93	0.00
Education (secondary compared to higher)	1.39	0.00
Value Helper (important to help the people around you and care for others' well being)	1.64	0.00
Help in practice (help with or attend local activities)	5.63	0.00
Local context of help (low help compared to high)	1.14	0.00
Non religious (Reference)		0.00
Religion - belonging	0.90	0.00
Religion - regular attending	1.21	0.00
Country (Reference UK)		
Austria	1.72	0.00
Belgium	1.33	0.00
Bulgaria	0.47	0.00
Switzerland	1.55	0.00

(continued)

	Exp(B)	Sig.
Germany	2.33	0.00
Denmark	2.84	0.00
Estonia	0.60	0.03
Spain	0.62	0.00
Finland	2.45	0.00
France	1.35	0.00
Hungary	0.58	0.00
Ireland	0.85	0.26
Netherlands	1.29	0.00
Norway	1.56	0.00
Poland	0.70	0.00
Portugal	0.43	0.00
Russian Federation	0.63	0.00
Sweden	2.21	0.00
Slovenia	3.42	0.00
Slovakia	0.82	0.09
Ukraine	0.58	0.00
Constant	0.54	0.00

References

Amato, P. R. (1990). Personality and social network involvement as predictors of helping behavior in everyday life. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 53*(1), 31–43.

Bartowski, J., & Jasinska-Kania, A. (2004). Voluntary organisations and the development of civil society. In W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.), *European values at the turn of the millennium* (pp. 109–138). Leiden: Brill.

Batson, D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behaviour. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Batson, C. D., Schoenrade, P., & Ventis, W. L. (1993). *Religion and the individual*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berger, P., Davie, G., & Fokas, E. (2008). *Religious America, secular Europe? A theme and variations*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Berkowitz, L. (1968). Responsibility, reciprocity, and social distance in help-giving: An experimental investigation of English social class differences. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4*(1), 46–63.

Cabinet Office. (2010). *Building the big society*. London: Cabinet Office.

Coleman, J. C. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *The American Journal of Sociology, 94*, 95–120.

Dalton, R. L. (2008). *The good citizen*. Washington: CQ Press.

Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8*, 377–383.

Davie, G. (1994). *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without belonging*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Davie, G. (2000). *Religion in modern Europe: A memory mutates*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Day, A. (2009). Believing in belonging: An ethnography of young people's constructions of belief. *Culture and Religion, 10*, 263–278.

de Tocqueville, A. (1835). *Democracy in America*. London: Saunders and Otley.

Dovidio, J., Piliavin, J. A., Schroeder, D. A., & Penner, L. (2006). *The social psychology of prosocial behaviour*. London: LEA.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

ESS. (2006). Survey documentation. European Social Survey 3–2006. www.europeansocialsurvey.org/

Freedom House. (2009). *Freedom in the world*. Washington: Freedom House.

Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. *American Sociological Review, 25*(2), 161–178.

Halman, L., & Draulans, V. (2004). Religious beliefs and practices in contemporary Europe. In W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.), *European values at the turn of the millennium* (pp. 317–339). Leiden: Brill.

Ilcan, S. (2009). Privatizing responsibility: Public sector reform under neoliberal government. *Canadian Review of Sociology, 46*(3), 207–234.

Jawad, R. (2012). *Religion and faith-based welfare: From wellbeing to ways of being*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Kautto, M. (1999). *Nordic social policy*. London: Routledge.

Kolberg, J. E. (Ed.). (1992). *The study of welfare state regimes*. New York: Sharpe.

Kuti, E. (2004). Civic service in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: From mandatory public work toward civic service. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33*(4), 79–97.

Leak, G. K., & Fish, S. (1989). Religious orientation, impression management, and self-deception: Toward a clarification of the link between religiosity and social desirability. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 28*, 355–359.

Marinetto, M. (2003). Who wants to be an active citizen? The politics and practice of community involvement. *Sociology, 37*(1), 103–120.

Meier, S., & Stutzer, A. (2008). Is volunteering rewarding in itself? *Economica, 75*, 39–59.

Norenzayan, A., & Shariff, A. F. (2008). The origin and evolution of religious prosociality. *Science, 4*, 58–62.

Parboteeah, K. P., Cullen, J. B., & Lim, L. (2004). Formal volunteering: A cross-national test. *Journal of World Business, 39*, 431–441.

Powell, M., & Barrientos, A. (2004). Welfare regimes and the welfare mix. *European Journal of Political Research, 43*, 83–105.

Purdam, K., & Crisp, R. (2009). Measuring the impact of community engagement on policy making in the UK. *Journal of Civil Society, 5*(2), 169–186.

Purdam, K., & Tranmer, T. (2012). The values of helping that underpin civic engagement – A multilevel analysis of the European Social Survey. *European Societies, 14*(3), 393–415.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Putnam, R., & Campbell, D. (2010). *American grace*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Saroglou, V., Pichon, I., Trompette, L., Verschueren, M., & Dernelle, R. (2005). Prosocial behavior and religion: New evidence based on projective measures and peer ratings. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 44*, 323–348.

Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1990). Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: Extensions and cross cultural replications. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*, 878–891.

Sedikides, C., & Gebauer, J. E. (2013). Religiosity as self-enhancement: A meta-analysis of the relation between socially desirable responding and religiosity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14*(1), 17–36.

Smid, C. (1999). Religion and civic engagement: A comparative analysis. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 565*, 176–192.

Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1999). *Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Storm, I. (2009). Halfway to heaven: Four types of fuzzy fidelity in Europe. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 48*, 702–718.

Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. *The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46*, 35–57.

Weller, P., Purdam, K., Contractor, S., & Ghanea, N. (2013). *Religion or belief, discrimination and equality*. London: Bloomsbury.

Wilson, D. S. (2002). *Darwin's cathedral: Evolution, religion, and the nature of society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Woodhead, L., & Catto, R. (2009). *'Religion or Belief': Identifying issues and priorities* (Res. Rep. 48). Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission.

Wuthnow, R. (1993). *Caring for others and helping ourselves*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 9
Religion, Spirituality and Civic Participation

Joep de Hart and Paul Dekker

9.1 Faith and Deeds[1]: Background and Research Questions

Solidarity with one's fellowmen and the call to help and support them is a core element of all world religions, from the charity and welfare work of Christianity to the zakat – one of the pillars of Islam – from metta and karuna in Buddhism to chesed in Judaism and daya and ahimsa in Hinduism. Religion has long embraced all kinds of practical care for fellow human beings; selfless dedication that is aimed at the wider community and takes place in a more or less organised way is of more recent date. Volunteering, as we know that in the Netherlands today, arose in the nineteenth century (De Hart 1999). It is linked to the social doctrine of the church more strongly than individual charity. From biblical times to present-day social scientists, religion has been associated with social engagement and norms of doing social good. There is an extensive body of literature which, based on a diversity of studies, concludes that churchgoers make a disproportionately large contribution to the social capital of society (e.g. Gerard 1985; Hodgkinson et al. 1990; Wuthnow 1991; Cnaan et al. 1999; Verba et al. 1995; Jackson et al. 1995; Wilson and Janoski 1995; Uslaner 1997; Greeley 1997; Dekker and De Hart 2006; Bekkers 2004;

---

[1] James 2:14: 'What good is it, my brothers and sisters, if someone claims to have faith but has no deeds? Can such faith save them?'

J. de Hart (✉)
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP, The Hague, The Netherlands
e-mail: j.de.hart@scp.nl

P. Dekker
Tilburg University/The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP,
Tilburg/The Hague, The Netherlands
e-mail: p.dekker@scp.nl

Putnam 2000; Becker and Dhingra 2001; Lam 2002; Yeung 2004; Schwadel 2005; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Ruiter 2008; Ruiter and De Graaf 2010).[2]

At the same time, studies suggest that there are differences in the scope of the social engagement generated by religious communities. Smaller, conservative Dutch church communities, for example, have strong feelings of connection with their own community and their own faith. Religion exerts a strong influence on all areas of these people's lives (not just the way they spend their time and money but also in relation to things such as bringing up children and education, the political choices they make, the media they use, their use of language, their social interaction, clothing and sexual morality). These communities are characterised by a strong religious discipline and intensive internal social cohesion. Research has shown that religious particularism is negatively associated with volunteering for secular organisations (e.g. De Hart and Dekker 2005; Reitsma 2007; cf. Hoge et al. 1998; Dekker and Peters 1989; Stoffels 1990; Vellenga 1991). Some pietistic Reformed circles in the Netherlands, in particular, are dominated by a sort of catacomb mentality, and religious orthodoxy not infrequently results in a pronounced contemptus mundi and a tendency towards social isolationism. This contrasts markedly with the Dutch Kuyperian Calvinist tradition, for example, which calls on Christians, in the spirit of the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount, to be the 'salt of the earth' and 'light of the world'. In the Catholic social doctrine, the commitment to 'the good of the community' (the 'bonum commune') plays a central role (with the emphasis on world rather than individual citizenship).

This is the way things have been both traditionally and from a doctrinaire perspective. The glory days of church life, especially in Northwestern Europe, are long gone, and religiously inspired social networks and organisational structures are in a precarious position, including in the secularised Netherlands. Survey after survey, like the available institutional censuses, shows that major changes have taken place in the last half century in the religious lives of the Dutch and other European peoples, with the decline in church participation one of the most striking changes. As stated, churchgoers are unusually active social capitalists, and this begs the question of whether the fragmentation of church life means that one of the most important sources of social engagement is drying up. Also, what are we to make in this light of the rise of all kinds of 'self-spirituality', which has already been characterised by some authors as nothing less than a 'spiritual revolution' (Heelas 2008; Heelas and Woodhead 2005)? Lack of research on this subject to date means the impact of this 'revolution' is an open question for the moment. In the chapter of his frequently cited study Bowling Alone that is devoted to religious participation as a source of social capital, Putnam, like virtually all other authors, completely ignores the new spirituality (Putnam 2000).

---

[2] We do not explore the role of mosques, religious communities and houses of prayer among migrants here. For information on this for the Netherlands, see e.g. Jongeneel et al. (1996), Castillo Guerra et al. (2006), Euser et al. (2006), Van der Sar et al. (2008) and Jansen and Stoffels (2008).

New spirituality has been criticised by many commentators not only as a world ruled by commerce but also as a world populated by people who are fixated upon themselves, who expend much effort in trying to improve themselves but do little to help improve society (e.g. Heelas 1996; Bruce 2002; Carrette and King 2004; Höllinger 2004; by contrast: Chandler 2008). As the British sociologist Steve Bruce, for example, wrote, 'New Agers are highly critical of many aspects of the modern world, but make little or no effort to change it', and similar views can also be heard in the Netherlands (Bruce 2002: 97; cf. Schnabel 1982: 296). Yet there are also authors who argue that the new spirituality not only has historical roots in schools of social criticism but that it is still characterised by active social engagement. Earlier analyses have shown that a strong interest in alternative spirituality is clearly linked to an endorsement of values and goals in relation to social criticism (and has less affinity with values focusing on marriage and family or financial security).[3] Whatever the case may be, new spirituality has grown into a factor that should not be underestimated; it has long ceased to be the province of the informal interests of intellectuals, artists and esoteric communities. In the Netherlands as in other Western countries, many elements of new spirituality have in recent decades penetrated modern institutions such as the business community, health care, the media and education (e.g. Carson 1989; Burack 1999; Sheldrake 1999; Ashmos and Duchon 2000; Renesch 2000; Carr 2001; Krahnke and Hoffman 2002; Williams 2003; Giacalone and Jurkiewicz 2003). The way in which these ideas find their way into the lives of individual citizens is another matter. We will turn our attention to this later, based on two surveys which looked in detail at both spiritual interests and diverse forms of social engagement.

This chapter thus offers a broader perspective, closer analysis and updating of the findings that we and others have presented in earlier publications on this subject. The argument is built up from three elements, each with its own type of comparison. We start by exploring to what extent this is an international phenomenon: how universal is the positive correlation between church affiliation and social engagement? We examine this by means of a comparison between European countries. Are certain patterns typically Dutch or do we also find them elsewhere? And what role do the dominant religion and the ideological climate play in the different countries? For Northwestern Europe, we expect to find strong relationships between association with the church and diverse indicators of civic engagement (donations to good causes, upholding solidarity, membership of idealistic organisations, volunteering, informal help). Does this also apply for Southern and Eastern Europe?

We then provide an update of the data we have presented earlier on the Netherlands, concentrating initially on the significance of church affiliation. Can

---

[3] Social values such as breaking through existing power structures, increasing democratic decision-making, greater social equality and reducing income differentials, as well as a strong affinity with nature and environmental movements (De Hart 2011).

changes be discerned in the relationship observed earlier between church affiliation and volunteering (social engagement) in the Netherlands? Are there differences between churches? Which social mechanisms play a role in that relationship? Which aspects of religion play the biggest role in its social impact: going to church or religious faith, religious networks or religious norms? To investigate this, we also include nonreligious characteristics in our analyses (such as ethnic background, age, education, political leanings).

Finally, we explore the significance of spiritual alternatives to church communities and traditional religion. Are they also a source of civic engagement or are the ideas and practices they propound too individualistic and uncommitted? In this third section we broaden the analysis by investigating whether the relationship between spiritual and social participation is also present in certain nonchurch settings. First, we try to reflect the religious diversity in the Netherlands by comparing six different religious categories, ranging from those with no interest at all to Orthodox and churchgoing Christians. We then home in on the phenomenon of 'new spirituality'. We define followers of the new spirituality as people who are interested in spirituality but are not necessarily involved in a church, people who until recently might have been called 'New Agers'. Are these 'new spirituals' engaged in navel gazing with little commitment to the broader society, as is often claimed? As far as the church is concerned, we have established that the social network of church members plays a particularly crucial role in their volunteering efforts. Does something similar apply for 'new spirituals'? Are the factors that mobilise people in the church tradition to volunteer also found in alternative spiritual movements? And if so, where are their volunteering efforts directed?

9.2 Religious Participation and Social Engagement in Europe

Is the social ethos of the various church traditions found at national level in different countries? Do we find the perhaps flexible global pragmatism that is often regarded as typical of Catholicism and its image of the Church as a mediator to the saints? Do we find the Protestant rejection of granting such authority to any earthly institution and its emphasis on individual conscience? Do we find anything of Luther's inner experience of faith as a justification in itself and his doctrine of two kingdoms, which have often become associated with introspection, quietism and docility towards the secular authorities? What of Calvin's suspicion about this latter aspect and his demand that nothing must distract mankind from the service of the heavenly Majesty, who has placed His Creation in the hands of men to administer it in accordance with the laws of the Bible? In Calvinism, in particular, religion is not a private hobby, but a public matter, a matter of public interest; the Calvinist church is a confessional church, with no inclination to

withdraw from the world. At European level, it has been said that the Reformation is associated with differences in mentality between North and South. Bowle, for example, writes, 'With the Reformation the Puritan element in the North asserted itself against the traditional authority, the emotionalism, and the image worship of the Mediterranean world. (…) Calvinism is the Augustinian position as interpreted by the judicious, hard-minded, practical North (…)' (Bowle 1968: 272, 281). According to Sabine and Thorson, European history is characterised by the fact that 'similarity of political conviction depended more on circumstances than on theology, and political differences resulted rather from the varying situations in which the churches found themselves than from theological differences' (1973: 332).

The days of the *respublica Christiana* are gone. For the first time in 1,500 years, Christianity in many European countries appears to have been reduced to a minority religion. The social position of Christians has changed fundamentally, and this has not left their attitude towards participation in civil society unaffected. In what follows we draw on the findings of national surveys to document some elements of that attitude. Following the international comparison in this section, we then concentrate on the situation in the Netherlands, a country where the heritage of Augustine, Luther and Calvin can still be felt but where an alternative spirituality is also manifesting itself, which until recently was known as New Age.

Clearly, a discussion of the entire relationship between religion and social engagement across the whole of Europe goes beyond the scope of this chapter. We will have to limit ourselves. With that in mind, we investigate the relationship between religion and volunteering in different countries and examine whether it is a characteristic of (the predominantly Protestant) Northwestern Europe, for example, or whether it is also found in other parts of the continent. In a number of studies (including in the Netherlands), it has been found that Protestants are more socially active than Catholics. Does that produce contextual effects? Does a predominantly Protestant environment also encourage an active attitude among Catholics (and among those not affiliated to any church)? Can Lutheran countries (Denmark, Norway, Iceland) be distinguished from Roman Catholic countries (Austria, Ireland, Italy, Poland), Orthodox countries (Greece, Romania, Cyprus) and religiously mixed countries (the Netherlands, Germany)? Another finding from earlier research is that churchgoers are generally more active than nonchurchgoers. Does this mean that a predominantly secular environment is an impediment to social activism?

The somewhat large Table 9.1 presents an overview of data on religious involvement and volunteering for 44 countries. Where the table states 'church attendance', this obviously includes attendance at mosques, temples and synagogues, but for the sake of legibility, in the table and the rest of this chapter, we have used terms drawn from the Christian tradition. Volunteering was measured by asking people whether they carried out unpaid voluntary work for a combination of organisations,

Table 9.1 Religious involvement and volunteering in 44 countries in 2008/2009, ranked by declining proportion of volunteers, as percentages of the population aged 18 years and older

Country	Code	Regards self as belonging to a religion[a]					Church attendance[b]	*Volunteering*[c]
		None	RC	PC	Orthodox	Islam		
Netherlands	NL	52	23	21	0	1	24	**47**
Luxembourg	LU	27	65	3	1	2	23	**40**
Finland	FI	25	0	73	1	0	10	**38**
Norway	NO	20	2	74	1	1	13	**38**
Switzerland	CH	29	32	29	2	4	19	**37**
Denmark	DK	12	1	85	0	0	10	**36**
Belgium	BE	43	51	1	1	3	19	**34**
Slovenia	SI	30	65	0	2	2	25	**32**
Sweden	SE	37	2	58	1	1	8	**30**
Czech Republic	CZ	72	24	2	0	0	12	**29**
Iceland	IS	9	2	87	0	0	12	**29**
Austria	AT	17	73	6	1	2	29	**27**
Germany	DE	28	34	34	1	2	21	**26**
France	FR	51	42	1	0	3	12	**26**
Latvia	LV	35	19	22	23	0	16	**23**
Estonia	EE	69	1	11	16	0	9	**23**
Macedonia	MK	8	0	0	75	17	25	**22**
Italy	IT	20	79	0	0	0	49	**22**
United Kingdom	UK	44	11	36	0	2	20	**21**
Ireland	IE	15	80	3	0	0	53	**21**
Albania	AL	30	9	0	9	52	14	**20**
Moldavia	MD	7	0	0	89	0	29	**18**
Cyprus	CY	0	2	0	96	1	51	**17**
Greece	GR	4	1	0	93	2	40	**17**
Lithuania	LT	16	79	0	4	0	25	**16**
Croatia	HR	18	79	0	0	0	41	**15**
Malta	MT	3	96	1	0	0	82	**15**
Portugal	PT	19	76	2	0	0	37	**14**
Belarus	BY	29	9	1	61	0	20	**14**
Slovak Republic	SK	24	68	7	0	0	44	**14**
Romania	RO	3	5	2	86	0	47	**13**
Bulgaria	BG	27	0	0	59	12	15	**13**
Spain	ES	26	56	0	1	1	24	**13**
Hungary	HU	45	41	13	0	0	15	**12**
Serbia	RS	32	5	1	60	2	21	**11**
Kosovo	XK	10	1	0	19	69	49	**10**
Ukraine	UA	25	9	2	48	1	24	**9**
Poland	PL	7	91	0	1	0	71	**9**
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BA	24	11	0	32	33	45	**8**
Montenegro	ME	43	3	0	39	13	14	**8**
Armenia	AM	6	0	0	90	0	41	**7**
Turkey	TR	2	0	0	0	98	39	**6**

(continued)

Table 9.1 (continued)

| Country | Code | Regards self as belonging to a religion[a] | | | | | Church attendance[b] | Volunteering[c] |
		None	RC	PC	Orthodox	Islam		
Russia	RU	39	0	0	55	4	14	**5**
Georgia	GE	2	0	0	91	6	38	**5**

Source: European Values Study 4 (2008/2009)

[a]'Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religion?' If yes: 'Which?' on average, 2 % in each country have a religion that is not mentioned here (outliers: Ukraine (14 %) and Spain (15 %))

[b]'Not including events such as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often do you attend a religious service?' The percentages are those who report at least once a month

[c]Based on a list of 15 types of organisation and activity (see text), the question was: 'Do you undertake unpaid voluntary work for these organisations or activities? Which?' The percentages are those who do this at least once

movements and activities.[4] Volunteering rates range from 47 % in the Netherlands to 5 % in Georgia and Russia.

Because this richly populated table does not give up its secrets immediately, in Fig. 9.1 we also present a visual representation of the relationship between religion and volunteering, plotting religiosity (regarding oneself as belonging to a religion) against the performance of nonreligious or secular voluntary work.[5] If religion is a source of social engagement, this relationship is more interesting than that between sermons and working for one's own parish. The figure has the appearance of a swooping flock of birds, headed by Turkey and Georgia, with a great deal of religiosity and very little volunteering, and at the rear the Czech Republic and Estonia (with the least religiosity) and the Netherlands (with the most volunteering). It transpires that there is a *negative* relationship: the more religious people there are in a country, the less secular voluntary work is performed ($-0.36*$; $n=44$).

---

[4]The list in the Dutch questionnaire was as follows: (1) Welfare work for older people, people with disabilities or underprivileged people; (2) A religious or church organisation; (3) Education, art, music or cultural activities; (4) Trade unions; (5) Political party or group; (6) Local activities in relation to poverty, employment, housing, racial inequality; (7) Development problems in the Third World or human rights; (8) Nature protection, environmental protection, animal welfare; (9) Professional association or organisation; (10) Youth work (e.g. Scouts, Guides, youth clubs); (11) Sport or recreation; (12) Women's groups; (13) Peace movement; (14) Voluntary work in the field of health care; and (15) Other groups. This list appears rather arbitrary, but the concluding 'other groups' should make it fairly comprehensive. The question of whether people do unpaid voluntary work for one or more of these causes gives the respondents a fair degree of freedom in terms of period (now? At some point in the last few months or years?), extent (occasionally helped clear up or only been involved in larger activities on a regular basis?) and also in terms of content (only work-like activities without self-interest or also coaching at the sports club of one's own children?). The possibility cannot be ruled out that some of the differences between countries are more a reflection of differences of interpretation than differences in actual activities, but nothing can be done about that. On the instability of measurements of volunteering, see Dekker and Van den Broek (2006).

[5]This means voluntary work with the exception of activities for 'religious and church organisations' (item two in the previous note).

Fig. 9.1 Religiosity and secular volunteering (Source: European Values Study 4 (2008/2009); for country code, see Table 9.1)

From a Dutch perspective, this is a remarkable finding. The finding that religion is good for participation in voluntary work is a consistent research result for the Netherlands, and the expectation would then be that countries with more religious inhabitants also have more volunteers.

What is going on here? To find out, Table 9.2 offers more information on the relationships between different aspects of religiousness and three types of voluntary work: all activities together (shown in Table 9.1), secular volunteering (shown in Fig. 9.1) and the complementary religious volunteering, in other words voluntary work for 'religious and church organisations'.

The table presents information about the relationships on two levels: the top half shows correlations between country characteristics (how do national percentages of religiosity and volunteering relate to each other?), while the bottom half summarises the statistical correlations at individual level for all 44 countries (how does an individual being religious or not correlate with the chance that he or she will do voluntary work in each country?). In the bottom half of the table, we show the average statistical relationship and also in each case the two countries with the strongest negative and strongest positive relationship.

The *country comparison* in the top half of the table shows that the higher the proportion of people in a country who regard themselves as belonging to a religion, the smaller the percentage of secular volunteers (as we have already seen in Fig. 9.1) but also the lower the percentage of participants in all kinds of voluntary work. It does however matter which religion a person belongs to. The positive relationship between the proportion of Protestants and the percentage of (secular) volunteers is mirrored by negative relationships in the case of followers of Orthodox religions and Muslims.

Table 9.2 Macro and micro-relationships between religious involvement and volunteering, population aged over 18 years in 2008/2009

Macro: 44 countries[a]	% all volunteering	% secular volunteering	% religious volunteering
% religious	−0.33*	−0.36*	−0.04
% Catholic	0.06	0.04	0.18
% Protestant	0.58***	0.57***	0.25
% Orthodox	−0.47**	−0.48**	−0.31*
% Islam	−0.30*	−0.27	−0.10
% church attendance	−0.43**	−0.46**	0.02
Micro: (range) and country average[b]	All volunteering	Secular volunteering	Religious volunteering
Religious	(TR −0.11*** – NL 0.13***) 0.02	(AL −0.14*** – NL 0.08**) 0.00	(MK −0.03 – NL 0.36***) 0.09
Catholic	(BY −0.06* – RO 0.14***) 0.02	(CZ −0.08** – RO 0.15***) 0.01	(XK −0.03 – AL 0.20***) 0.04
Protestant	(IE −0.05 – LV 0.19***) 0.03	(IE −0.04 – LV 0.18***) 0.02	(DK −0.06* – NL 0.41***) 0.05
Orthodox	(RO −0.14*** – BG 0.10***) −0.03	(EE −0.16*** – BG 0.10***) −0.02	(RO −0.19*** – BA 0.06*) −0.02
Islam	(AL −0.14*** – BY 0.08**) −0.02	(AL −0.12*** – BY 0.09**) −0.02	(AL −0.10*** – RS 0.17***) 0.02
Church attendance	(XK −0.04 – AT 0.27***) 0.10	(GR −0.07** – AT 0.21***) 0.05	(XK 0.00 – NO 0.55***) 0.23

Source: European Values Study 4 (2008/2009); for country codes, see Table 9.1
[a]Pearson correlation coefficients; significance * <0.05, ** <0.01 and *** <0.001 (two sided)
[b]Phi coefficients; significance * <0.05, ** <0.01 and *** <0.001 (two sided). The figures are the average values for the available countries (due to the lack of a religion, in 66 of the 792 ($44 \times 6 \times 3$) this is less than 44). The countries with the lowest and highest values are shown between brackets

If we look at the bottom half of Table 9.2, showing the relationships at individual level *within countries*, we see that the averages of those relationships are often close to zero. Exceptions to this are the average positive relationships between church attendance and participation in religious voluntary work (0.23). The averages around zero usually do not stem from a lack of relationships in these countries, however, but rather from the existence of *opposing* relationships. In Turkey, for example, religiosity is associated with a reduced inclination to do voluntary work, whereas in the Netherlands it is associated with a greater inclination. Members of the Romanian Orthodox religion do less voluntary work than others, whereas their counterparts in Bulgaria do more. Serbian Muslims do more religious voluntary work than other groups, whereas Muslims in Albania do less and Catholics do more. Protestants in the Netherlands do more religious voluntary work than others; Protestants in Denmark do less.

These differences may stem from the fact that members of minority religions are more inclined to do voluntary work for their own group. Members of majority religions will identify less with their own group, and there will be fewer religious organisations asking for volunteers. In religious market models, as have been developed in the United States especially, competition is the driving force behind

Fig. 9.2 Volunteers as a percentage of various groups in country types, according to their dominant religion (Source: European Values Study 4 (2008/2009))

religious vitality. State interference and favouritism (through a state religion) should be prevented, will it be able to manifest itself (e.g. Iannaccone 1992; Finke and Stark 1992). But leaving aside the group relationships, the specific religion and whether or not people regularly take part in religious services appear to make a difference in the least some countries.

We cannot begin investigating the combinations of potential effects for 44 countries. Before focusing further on the analysis of one country, we divide the countries in Fig. 9.2 into five clusters based on the dominant religion: countries which are predominantly Roman Catholic, predominantly Protestant, predominantly a mix of Protestant and Catholic, predominantly Orthodox and predominantly Islamic.[6] For each country type, we draw a distinction between people who do or do not belong to the dominant religion and whether or not they regularly participate in religious services. To what extent does the participation in voluntary work (secular and religious together) differ between these groups?

As may be expected, the total participation in the total amount of voluntary work is greatest in countries where Protestantism is dominant, in combination with Catholicism or otherwise. Churchgoing Protestants (and Catholics)[7] are clearly the most active, but religious participants with other religious convictions and people

---

[6]Based on the percentages in Table 9.1 and Table 3.1 in Chap. 3, we categorise AT, BE, CY, ES, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, MT, PL, PT, SI and SK as predominantly Roman Catholic; DK, FI, IS, NO, SE and UK as Protestant; CH, DE and NL as Roman Catholic/Protestant; AM, BG, BY, GE, GR, MD, ME, MK, RO, RS, RU and UA as Orthodox; and AL, TR and XK as Islamic. BA, CZ, EE and LV are left out.

[7]In the predominantly mixed Catholic/Protestant countries, churchgoing Protestants do voluntary work fractionally more often than churchgoing Catholics (54 and 49 %, respectively); nonchurchgoers Protestants and Catholics do not differ (32 and 31 %, respectively).

who do not participate at all and who do not regard themselves as belonging to any religion also score above the average in Europe. There thus appears to be an environment in which broad layers of people are more often mobilised as volunteers.

The difference between countries which are predominantly Orthodox Christian or Islamic is considerable, with an intermediate position being taken by countries that are predominantly Roman Catholic. In all three categories, participants in minority religions are active as volunteers at least as often. In sharp contrast to countries where Protestantism dominates, people in predominantly Islamic countries who are not involved in religious life are more often active as volunteers.

To what extent the differences are primarily a matter of cultural variation in social norms and values or are more connected to 'opportunity structures', in the sense of differences in the presence of associations and other organisations that carry out voluntary work, is not a question we can answer, let alone being able to isolate the specific role of religion and religious communities and providing the key to the way in which they have played and continue to play a role.[8] Comparative analyses in which countries are merely combinations of a few quantitative characteristics also add little in this regard. That would require rather more in-depth studies of the history and social functioning of specific religious communities. Other chapters explore developments in primarily Catholic (Chap. 7), Orthodox (Chaps. 11 and 12) and Islamic countries (Chap. 14). Here, we continue with the Netherlands, a country with a traditionally shared dominance of Catholics and Protestants (and, as far as the latter are concerned, primarily Calvinists, instead of Lutherans, who form the mainstream in Chaps. 6 and 10).

9.3   Church Affiliation and Volunteering in the Netherlands

We focus on the Netherlands, the country with the highest percentage of volunteers in Table 9.1 and in Table 9.2 the strongest positive relationship between religiosity and (secular) voluntary work, as well as a strong positive relationship between being Protestant and performing religious voluntary work. This begs a question: how much does the greater volunteering by religious people in the Netherlands have to do with their denomination and how much with their church affiliation? Or are other aspects also involved? According to Bekkers (2004), the endorsement of interpersonal values (altruism, trusting others) is the most important explanation for the high level of volunteering by religious people in secular institutions. He has also pointed to differences between Dutch Reformed and other religious people in the desire to associate with other religious people when doing voluntary work (a form of 'social pressure'). In Table 9.3 we explore the effect of a number of factors on

---

[8]It is not necessarily enough to look for effects of religion and religious life at this point in time. It may also be that religion played a major role in the past and continues to have an impact in an increasingly secularised society via social organisational structures and public preferences that were established in the past ('path dependency').

Table 9.3 Participation in secular voluntary work, Dutch population aged over 16 years in 2010/2011

	% secular volunteering[a]	Adjusted odds ratios[f]					
		Religious membership	+ Religious participation	+ Demographics	+ Values	+ Social skills	+ Religious volunteering
Not a member of a church or religion	21	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Roman Catholic church	27	1.36*	0.91	0.94	0.91	0.96	0.88
Main Protestant church	40	2.49***	1.71**	1.73**	1.68**	1.80**	1.54*
Other church or religious group	27	1.36	0.94	1.04	0.99	1.05	0.85
Does not attend church	19		ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Less than once a fortnight	32		1.95***	1.95***	1.96***	1.91***	1.88***
At least once a fortnight	34		1.91**	1.88**	1.84**	1.79**	1.10
Man	26			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Woman	23			0.79*	0.81*	0.82	0.81
18–34 years	17			0.49***	0.50***	0.51***	0.50***
35–54 years	29			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
55+ years	25			0.87	0.86	0.87	0.88
Low education level	17			0.57***	0.56***	0.57***	0.57***
Intermediate	24			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
High	31			1.32*	1.30*	1.29*	1.26
Social trust: thinks most people can be trusted	27				1.07	1.06	1.06
Thinks helping neighbours is a duty[b]	31				1.42**	1.39*	1.37*

	%						
Regards itself as having good social skills[c]	28					1.34*	1.37**
Readily does something new[d]	30					1.34*	1.33*
Does religious voluntary work[e]	49						3.34***
Nagelkerke pseudo R^2		0.02	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.13

Source: Culturele veranderingen in Nederland (2010/2011)

[a]Indicates average time available for and spent on 'unpaid voluntary work' each week for one or more organisations, but not for 'religious or ideological organisation' (24 % do this)

[b]Agrees that 'Neighbours have a duty to look after their neighbours if they need help'

[c]Finds it easy to 'Start a conversation with someone that you don't know very well'

[d]Finds it easy to 'Do something that is completely new for you'

[e]Performs unpaid voluntary work for our 'Religious or ideological organisation' (9 % do this)

[f]Significance* <0.05, ** <0.01, and *** <0.001 (two sided)

participation in secular volunteering. In addition to the percentages of these volunteers per population group or of groups of people with a particular view or performing a particular activity, the table also presents odds ratios. These indicate the extent to which – adjusted for effects of other elements included in the same column – the category in question, when compared with all others or with a reference category ('ref.'), makes doing voluntary work more likely (a value greater than 1) or less likely (a value smaller than 1).

Membership of the mainstream Protestant church is associated with doing more secular voluntary work, and this remains the case after controlling for the effects of other characteristics. Members of the Catholic Church also volunteer slightly more often than nonchurch members, but this difference disappears after adjusting for church attendance.[9] Church attendance increases the chance of volunteering, though strikingly enough (and in contrast to comparable analyses in earlier years) it makes little difference how often someone goes to church. Men, 34–54-year-olds and those with a higher education level volunteer more often than others,[10] but this has no influence at all on the religious factors. This also applies for values and social skills; they have an effect – apart from the 'social trust' which often occupies a central role in the literature – but do not reduce the statistical effects of religion. That does happen if we add in participation in religious voluntary work: the effect of regular church attendance then disappears. Religious volunteering is probably an important 'stepping stone' between participation in the religious community and volunteering outside it. Other research has also found a similar spill-over effect (Bekkers 2004; Ruiter 2008).

9.4 Volunteering and Spirituality

As stated, we begin this section with a look at six religious categories that can be distinguished in the Dutch population. The first type is the *religiously not interested*. At more than 30 % they constitute the largest category among the unchurched. This is the group with the largest religious distance: these people not only maintain no ties with church life but also do not regard themselves as believers and reject the

---

[9]Strikingly, the findings of research on differences between Catholics and Protestants in the Netherlands show little consistency. For a long time, the substantially greater social engagement of Protestants was a stable given (with the historical explanation being the Protestant communities which developed bottom-up from voluntary associations versus the top-down organisation of the Catholic parishes), but here we find relatively little difference, and other recent research has actually found more volunteering among Dutch Catholics (Bekkers and Schuyt 2008; Vermeer and Scheepers 2012). This calls for further research.

[10]The higher participation by the better-educated is a consistent finding in research on volunteering in the Netherlands. The gender difference is not, and as regards age, other research also often finds an overrepresentation of older people. These differences are related to the way in which respondents are asked about volunteering: here, this was done primarily on the basis of membership organisations for which people can perform voluntary activities. If we focus more on unpaid work in the care sector, at schools and in the services sector, we find more women and older people.

central dogmas of the Christian tradition, without orientating themselves towards alternative spirituality. The 'not interested' category includes more men than women, more young people and more residents of the three most northern provinces of the country. Not all unchurched people are so radically outside the Christian tradition. A first example is the proportion of the population (10 %) that we refer to as *new spirituals*. They do have an interest in spiritual and general religious topics and regularly read magazines on these subjects, but their interests have no relationship with church life. Much of their spirituality is self-spirituality; self-realisation and personal growth are the creed. Women are overrepresented among the new spirituals, as are the middle-aged and inhabitants of the most urbanised areas; we find relatively few lower-educated people in this group. The *solo religious* group (accounting for 20 %) form the third articulation among the unchurched. They take no part in collective religious life and are not focused on alternative spirituality, but practise their religion individually (e.g. through prayer); they are much less opposed to the Christian tradition than the first group.

In addition, we also distinguish three groups among the section of the population that is affiliated with a church or religious community. We make this distinction based on the intensity of religious participation and degree of Christian orthodoxy, two things that are strongly related in the Dutch context. The first group (12 %) consists of people who are affiliated to one of the two largest (and liberal) denominations in the country, but who do not go to church, or do not go regularly, referred to here as *nominal liberal believers*. Then there are the *churchgoing liberals* (19 %): regular churchgoers among those affiliated to the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Church in the Netherlands. They differ from the previous group not only in their church attendance but also in their more intense practising of various individual aspects of faith and their stronger bond with the Christian tradition. The last group (7 %) are the *fundamentalist believers*: members of a number of small Protestant denominations, for whom their faith has a great meaning in their lives and who subscribe to fundamentalist aspects of the central elements of the Christian tradition. Of all the categories mentioned here, they are the *homo religiosus* par excellence. In terms of age structure, they do not show a characteristic profile; people living in rural areas are overrepresented in this group.

The following table compares the six groups as regards their participation in the voluntary sector. As expected, we find a strong motivation to perform voluntary work among church-affiliated Dutchmen, in particular, with the religiously conservative circles investing the most time in volunteering. Looking at the two bottom rows in the table, we see a difference compared with the more liberal churchgoers: Orthodox believers devoted a very large part (85 %) of their voluntary work to activities focusing on their own ecclesiastical community; this is much less the case among liberal churchgoers, where more than half the volunteers do not limit their volunteering to their own group, but are (also) active for causes with a broader scope. The 'religiously not interested' and the 'solo religious' groups contain relatively few volunteers; the 'new spirituals' do not lag behind the average for the population as a whole, either in terms of the percentage of participants or in their time investment (Table 9.4).

Table 9.4 Volunteers in six religious categories, population aged over 17 years in 2006/2007: participation in all volunteering and volunteering aimed at own religious community (parish, local church or other group)

	General		For own religious community	
	% volunteers	Hours per volunteer	% volunteers	Hours per volunteer
All	36	5.3	22	4.4
1. Religiously not interested	28	4.4		
2. New spirituals	43	5.5		
3. Solo religious	25	4.1		
4. Nominal liberal believers	33	5.7	3	
5. Churchgoing liberal believers	53	6.0	25	3.7
6. Fundamentalist believers	53	6.8	45	5.8

Source: 'God in Nederland' survey (2006/2007)

Table 9.5 Connection of social networks around alternative spirituality with volunteering (adjusted odds ratios)[a]

Intensive participation in social networks of spirituality[b]	1.9**	1.5*	1.5*
Weekly church attendance (rather than less)		2.4**	2.4**
Education: college or university (rather than less)			1.5*
55+ years (rather than younger)			0.9
Female (rather than male)			1.2

Source: Culturele veranderingen in Nederland (2008/2009)

[a]Significance* <0.05, and ** <0.01 (two sided)

[b]'Intensive participation' – engaged in spirituality (i.e. 'the deeper meaning or spiritual dimension of life') in several of the following ways: talking to or exchanging emails with others who are interested; joining a discussion group; going to a fair, event or other large meeting focused on spirituality; joining a course with others (rather than being engaged in individual ways)

We will look at this last point in a little more depth. As indicated, much less is known from the existing literature about new spirituals in terms of their participation in volunteering and other forms of social commitment than about church members. Earlier we saw that church networks are key in mobilising people to volunteer. Does something similar apply for new spirituals? Do new spiritual networks form the social mechanism by which people in the alternative spiritual scenes are motivated towards social activism? Table 9.5 shows the results of an analysis of the net effect of the interest in alternative spirituality on volunteering. Elsewhere we have demonstrated that, as is the case with doing voluntary work, having an interest in new spirituality and attending courses, etc. on that subject is related to education, gender and age differences (De Hart 2011). In the following table, therefore, the statistical effects on volunteering of the modes of engagement with alternative spirituality with a social dimension are compared with the effects of church attendance, after correction for these demographic characteristics.

Social networks built around spiritual interests have a significant effect on volunteering. It is somewhat reduced after making allowance for religious participation, but it does not disappear, and it is not affected by the background characteristics included in the analysis. The effects of social contacts around new spirituality thus seem to correspond to the strong direct effects of religious networks which we have analysed previously (and which also appeared to be little affected by background characteristics; cf. Dekker and De Hart 2006).

9.5   Conclusions and Discussion

Both theologically and in terms of historical practice, in the Netherlands and some other countries, there always has been a strong relationship between religious beliefs and social commitment. To what extent is this a broader international phenomenon? Is the relationship still present in the modern, secularising Netherlands? Is it limited to ecclesiastical religiousness or do we also find it in the circles of alternative spirituality? These are the main questions we have sought to answer.

A first conclusion is that one cannot speak in general terms about religion as a stimulus of social commitment. There are very religious countries with little volunteering (e.g. Turkey and Georgia) and there are far less religious countries with a high percentage of volunteers (e.g. the Netherlands). Comparing countries at European level, the relationship with secular volunteering is negative: the more religiosity, the less secular volunteering there is. Further analyses reveal clear religious differences: the greater the proportion of Protestants in a country, the more volunteers there are, but the greater the proportion of Orthodox believers and Muslims, the fewer volunteers are found. This is the general picture; at individual level, things sometimes look different. In some countries (e.g. Serbia), Muslims are comparatively heavily involved in volunteering, while in other countries they are not; similarly, Dutch Protestants are heavily involved in volunteering, but Danish Protestants less so.

We have looked in more depth at the relevance of various aspects of religions by viewing the Netherlands as a highly secularised, traditionally mixed Catholic-Protestant country. We have shown that both religious participation (church attendance) and denomination are correlates of secular volunteering. Taking into account evidence from other research in the Netherlands, being a member of a religious community with regular face-to-face contact (indicated by church attendance) seems to be more important than the content of religious beliefs (indicated by denomination and support for statements about religious beliefs and norms). Volunteering in church-related activities might be an important stepping stone to volunteering in the wider world. With regard to alternative, nonchurch-related spirituality, we found that in those circles, a similar social mechanism operates as among churchgoers: the more people experience spirituality in a social context, the more they are encouraged to volunteer.

However, it is not just being an active member of a specific local community that makes church attenders and other religious participants more likely to volunteer for general purposes. As we have shown, fundamentalist Christians, the most frequent church attenders in the country, are more active as volunteers but focus more strongly on their own religious community. There is less secular volunteering among fundamentalist than among liberal Christians. Comparing churches and sports clubs in another research project, we found no indications of such spill-over effects; active members and volunteers of sports clubs more often limit their volunteering to their own associations (Dekker and De Hart 2006). In another project, we found less secular volunteering among religiously active Muslims than among Christians. Rather like Orthodox Christians, Muslims seem to limit their involvement more to their own communities.[11] The content of religion and the norms and values of religious communities matter, then; it is not just about associational ties and social interaction.

All this seems to refer to the old tension between real life and religious teachings. In all world religions, human solidarity and commitment to others are recommended, but whether and how people practise these recommendations is determined not only by their beliefs and what they hear in their temples and houses of prayer but also to a considerable extent by national, religious and local contexts and by their contacts with other people within and outside their own communities.

References

Ashmos, D., & Duchon, D. (2000). Spirituality at work. *Journal of Management Inquiry, 9*(2), 134–145.

Becker, P. E., & Dhingra, P. H. (2001). Religious involvement and volunteering: Implications for civil society. *Sociology of Religion, 63*(3), 315–335.

Bekkers, R. (2004). *Giving and volunteering in the Netherlands: Sociological and psychological perspectives*. Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht.

Bekkers, R., & Schuyt, T. (2008). And who is your neighbor? Explaining denominational differences in charitable giving and volunteering in the Netherlands. *Review of Religious Research, 50*(1), 74–96.

Beyerlein, K., & Hipp, J. R. (2006). From pews to participation. *Social Problems, 53*(1), 97–117.

Bowle, J. (1968). *Western political thought*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Bruce, S. (2002). *God is dead: Secularization in the West*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Burack, E. (1999). Spirituality in the workplace. *Journal of Organizational Change Management, 12*(4), 280–291.

---

[11] In the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant populations in the Netherlands, the overall participation in voluntary work is considerably lower than in the native population. On the other hand, Muslims who attend the mosque volunteer more than those who do not. The highest percentage of volunteering is found in the small group who do not follow Islam. These are mainly younger people with a high education level who are closely integrated into Dutch society. Religious participation and social integration are to some extent competing stimuli for participation in voluntary work (cf. Chap. 13 on the impact of the minority position).

Carr, W. (2001). Spirituality and religion. In H. Orchard (Ed.), *Spirituality in health care contexts* (pp. 21–32). London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

Carrette, J. R., & King, R. (2004). *Selling spirituality: The silent takeover of religion*. Londen: Routledge.

Carson, V. B. (1989). *Spiritual dimensions of nursing practice*. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Co.

Castillo Guerra, J., Wijsen, F., & Steggerda, M. (2006). *Een gebedshuis voor alle volken*. Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum.

Chandler, S. (2008). The social ethic of religiously unaffiliated spirituality. *Religion Compass, 2*(2), 240–256.

Cnaan, R. A., Wineburg, R. J., & Boddie, S. C. (1999). *The newer deal: Social work and religion in partnership*. New York: Columbia University Press.

De Hart, J. (1999). Vrijwilligerswerk in Nederland in historisch perspectief. In P. Dekker (Ed.), *Vrijwilligerswerk vergeleken* (pp. 33–68). Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

De Hart, J. (2011). *Zwevende gelovigen: Oude religie en nieuwe spiritualiteit*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.

De Hart, J., & Dekker, P. (2005). Churches as voluntary associations. In S. Roßteutscher (Ed.), *Democracy and the role of associations* (pp. 168–196). London/New York: Routledge.

Dekker, P., & De Hart, J. (2006). Kerkgangers, investeerders in de civil society. In SCP (Ed.), *Investeren in vermogen* (pp. 317–338). Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

Dekker, G., & Peters, J. (1989). *Gereformeerden in meervoud*. Kampen: J.H. Kok.

Dekker, P., & Van den Broek, A. (2006). Is volunteering going down? In P. Ester, M. Braun, & P. Mohler (Eds.), *Globalization, value change, and generations* (pp. 179–205). Leiden/Boston: Brill.

Euser, H., Goossen, K., De Vries, M., & Wartena, S. (2006). *Migranten in Mokum: De betekenis van migrantenkerken voor de stad Amsterdam*. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit.

Finke, R., & Stark, R. (1992). *The churching of America, 1776–1990: Winners and losers in our religious economy*. New Brusnwick: Rutgers University Press.

Gerard, D. (1985). Values and voluntary work. In M. Abrams, D. Gerard, & N. Timms (Eds.), *Values and social change in Britain* (pp. 201–226). London: Macmillan.

Giacalone, R. A., & Jurkiewicz, C. L. (2003). *Handbook of workplace spirituality and organizational performance*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Greeley, A. M. (1997). The other America: Religion and social capital. *The American Prospect, 32*, 68–73.

Heelas, P. (1996). *The New Age movement: The celebration of the self and the sacralization of modernity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Heelas, P. (2008). *Spiritualities of life*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2005). *The spiritual revolution: Why religion is giving way to spirituality*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Hodgkinson, V. A., Weitzman, M. S., & Kirsch, A. D. (1990). From commitment to action. In R. Wuthnow & V. A. Hodgkinson (Eds.), *Faith and philanthropy in America* (pp. 93–114). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Hoge, D. R., Zech, C., McNamara, P., & Donahue, M. J. (1998). The value of volunteers as resources for congregations. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37*(3), 470–480.

Höllinger, F. (2004). Does the counter-cultural character of new age persist? *Journal of Contemporary Religion, 19*(3), 289–309.

Iannaccone, L. (1992). Introduction to the economics of religion. *Journal of Economic Literature, 36*(3), 1465–1495.

Jackson, E. F., Bachmeier, M. D., Wood, J. R., & Craft, E. A. (1995). Volunteering and charitable giving. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 24*(1), 59–78.

Jansen, M., & Stoffels, H. M. (Eds.). (2008). *A moving God: Immigrant churches in the Netherlands*. Wenen: Lit Verlag GmbH & Co.

Jongeneel, J. A. B., Budiman, R., & Visser, J. J. (Eds.). (1996). *Gemeenschapsvorming van Aziatische, Afrikaanse en Midden- en Zuidamerikaanse christenen in Nederland*. Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum.

Krahnke, K., & Hoffman, L. (2002). The rise of religion and spirituality in the workplace. *Journal of Behavioral an Applied Management, 3*(3), 277–287.

Lam, P. Y. (2002). As the flocks gather: How religion affects voluntary association participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41*(3), 405–422.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Reitsma, J. (2007). *Religiosity and solidarity: Dimensions and relationships disentangled and tested*. Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen.

Renesch, J. E. (2000). *Getting to the better future*. San Francisco: New Business Books.

Ruiter, S. (2008). *Association in context and association as context*. Wageningen: Ponsen & Looijen.

Ruiter, S., & De Graaf, N. D. (2010). National religious context and volunteering. *American Sociological Review, 75*(1), 179–184.

Sabine, G. H., & Thorson, T. L. (1973). *A history of political theory*. Hinsdale/Tokyo: Dryden Press/Holt Saunders.

Schnabel, P. (1982). *Tussen stigma en charisma: nieuwe religieuze bewegingen en geestelijke volksgezondheid*. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus.

Schwadel, P. (2005). Individual, congregational, and denominational effects on church members' civic participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 44*(2), 159–171.

Sheldrake, P. (1999). Spirituality as an academic discipline. In A. Thatcher (Ed.), *Spirituality and the curriculum* (pp. 55–78). London: Cassell.

Stoffels, H. C. (1990). *Wandelen in het licht*. Kampen: Kok.

Uslaner, E. (1997). *Faith, hope and charity*. College Park: University of Maryland, Department of Government and Politics.

Van der Sar, J., Lombo-Visser, R., & Boender, W. (2008). *Moskeeën gewaardeerd*. Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.

Vellenga, S. J. (1991). *Een ondernemende beweging. De groei van de evangelische beweging in Nederland*. Amsterdam: VU-uitgeverij.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vermeer, P., & Scheepers, P. (2012). Religious socialization and non-religious volunteering: A Dutch panel study. *Voluntas, 23*, 940–958.

Williams, O. F. (2003). *Business, religion, and spirituality: A new synthesis*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Wilson, J., & Janoski, T. (1995). The contribution of religion to volunteer work. *Sociology of Religion, 56*, 137–152.

Wuthnow, R. (1991). *Acts of compassion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Yeung, A. B. (2004). An intricate triangle. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33*(3), 401–422.

Chapter 10
The Spiritual Revolution and Social Capital in Denmark

Peter Lüchau

10.1 Introduction

Social capital is basically the idea that who you know, that is, your social network, is a resource in itself. There is physical capital which is material objects such as tools and property and there is human capital which is skills and education. To these are added social capital which is the network of the individual. Because you know people these may be able to help you as they have things beneficial to you. Knowing others can also have beneficial effects if the people in your network are a diverse group. In this case you will become more tolerant of others. According to Putnam this reciprocity of the social network fosters interpersonal and generalized trust, which tend to make societies more efficient (Putnam 2000: 21). In societies where people trust each other, there is less need for resource-consuming control institutions. Also a high level of interpersonal trust makes transactions between people and organizations more flexible. In general societies with high levels of trust will function better, both economically and politically, than societies with low levels of trust.

Particularly after September 11, 2001, but also before that (confer the New Christian Right in the 1980s), religion has reentered the public sphere. Theories of secularization had expected that the differentiation of society would push religion out of the public sphere and confine it to the private (Luckmann 1967). Instead as Casanova (1994) contends, religion has returned and now has an impact on the societal level. Whether this is actually true can be debated. As Norris and Inglehart have shown, the more wealthy countries become, the less religious their populations become. This is countered by the fact that the developing countries tend to have more religious populations and at the same time much higher rates of population

P. Lüchau (✉)
Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: pl@soc.ku.dk

growth than the developed countries, e.g., the Western European countries. The general tendency over time is a decline in religion but it is temporarily halted by demographical developments (Norris and Inglehart 2004). This makes it look as though religion is on the rise. In Europe the return of religion in the public sphere is probably better described as an increased interest in and debate about religion. This has been combined with a growing scholarly as well as political interest in social capital and civil society. From here the idea of using religious organizations to produce or foster social capital is not far away. Suddenly the societal impact of religion becomes a focal point. Question is whether this is worth the trouble. Not only would theories of secularization predict the inability of religious organizations and religiosity to influence society as a whole (Bruce 2002) but one also has to take into account the changing nature of religion in modern Europe.

10.2   The Production of Social Capital

According to Putnam church-related religiosity in the United States, alongside education, is an important predictor of membership in voluntary organizations (Putnam 2000: 66). In an American context church-related religiosity most importantly means church attendance. People who pray together apparently also do other things together. Those who attend church regularly are more likely to be members of secular voluntary organizations and do secular voluntary work. Of course many of the organizations focusing on secular activities, such as helping the poor, are run by religious organizations or individuals but their focus is still secular. This suggests that religion may influence society as a whole by promoting civic involvement outside the strictly religious sphere. Those who are Christians and attend church regularly are more likely to be members of a voluntary organization and more likely to do unpaid voluntary work.

Putnam makes a distinction between bridging and bonding social capital. Bridging social capital connects the individual with individuals outside their core group. Bonding social capital, on the other hand, connects the individual with individuals within the core group. Putnam contends that bridging social capital benefits society as it reaches out beyond the limits of the core group whereas bonding social capital does not. In a religious context the distinction could mean that extrovert religious groups would tend to produce bridging social capital, while introvert religious groups would tend to produce bonding social capital. Within a Christian context the distinction does not seem to be of vital importance, however a study has shown that evangelical Protestants were more likely to give money to religious than secular causes compared to mainline Protestants and Catholics. This suggests the production of bonding social capital. But the evangelicals were still more likely to donate money to secular causes than secular individuals (Putnam and Campbell 2010: 453). Evangelical Protestants were also more likely to be civically involved than secular individuals although less likely than mainline Protestants and Catholics (Putnam and Campbell 2010: 456).

Even though the above observations are based on American data, they should still be relevant for the European case. It could be argued that the state-run universal welfare systems of the Nordic countries undermine the need for voluntary organizations, at least in the social sector. Previous research has shown, however, that there is a positive relationship between church attendance and membership of voluntary organizations, including ones in the social sector, in Denmark (Koch-Nielsen and Clausen 2002: 250). This suggests that the relationship between church attendance and social capital should also hold for the Danish case.

The above approach to social capital posits that membership in voluntary organizations produces social capital. It is basically asserted that social capital is produced only in civil society, that is to say outside the state system. There are several problems inherent in this approach. It can be argued that the empirical basis for claiming that social capital is exclusively produced outside the state system is severely lacking. The claim that civil society produces social capital, and the state does not, is in many cases based upon a normative and ideological claim (Stolle 2003: 21). It can be argued that the state, particularly in the Nordic countries with their universal welfare systems, has a large positive impact upon the production of social capital. This has to do with the high degree of economic equality these welfare states produce, which again fosters high levels of trust (Stolle 2003: 32). One can go one step further and claim that social capital in the Nordic countries is produced mainly due to the actions of the state (Stolle 2003: 33) and hence that the impact of voluntary organizations is irrelevant.

It is not possible to include the impact of the Danish welfare state upon the production of social capital in the following analysis, but it should be noted that there may very well be a large impact of the welfare state behind whatever results the following analysis may produce.

10.3   The Spiritual Revolution

According to Heelas a spiritual revolution is taking place in Europe and should have progressed the farthest in the Nordic countries (Heelas 2007). Based on previous work (Heelas and Woodhead 2005) it is claimed that life-as religion is being replaced by inner-life spirituality. The relationship between the two types of religiosity is a zero-sum game. If one grows, the other declines. Life-as religion is identified with traditional Christian religion. It is centered around an external godhead and is based on submission to religious authority. God is seen as acting upon the individual hence forcing the individual to submit to externally given religious dogma. The individual is forced to live as the religion prescribes as defined by religious authorities. Inner-life spirituality on the other hand is centered around an inner religious source usually referred to as the-god-within. Hence, religiosity is no longer dependent on an external godhead nor a religious authority structure. Religiosity develops from inside the individual and the individual itself becomes the religious center. This makes for a highly

individualized religiosity. No two individuals need to have the same religiosity. They will, however, agree on the basic premises that god is within and that the individual is the final judge of what is true religion. Whether something is religiously beneficial is based on individual experience rather than abstract thought or, as is the case in life-as religion, external authorities.

It has been established that church attendance promotes membership of voluntary organizations which again produces social capital. If Christianity is giving way to spirituality, it raises an interesting question: What consequences does inner-life spirituality have for the individual with regard to membership of voluntary organizations and by extension the production of social capital? Since spirituality encompasses an individualistic religiosity which dispenses with external religious authority, it should give little impetus for communal activities be they religious or secular. Religious organizations tend to include religious authority which is scorned upon in spirituality. Spirituality tends to have little impact without communal activities and does not promote such activities (Voas and Crockett 2005). Hence, inner-life spirituality should not produce social capital.

From the previous the following two hypotheses can be stated:

H_1 Christian religiosity is correlated positively with membership in and/or doing unpaid work for voluntary organizations.
H_2 Spirituality is not correlated with membership in and/or doing unpaid work for voluntary organizations.

To these can be added a third hypothesis. According to Putnam social capital fosters social trust. Hence, individuals who attend church regularly should be more likely to be involved in voluntary organizations. This in turn should make these individuals more likely to show higher levels of social trust. Hence, it can be expected that:

H_3 Christian religiosity is correlated positively with involvement in voluntary organizations which again is correlated positively with social trust.

10.4   Measurements and Methods

10.4.1   Inner-Life Spirituality and Life-As Religion

Data from the Danish part of the European Values Study (EVS) 2008 will be used for the analysis. The EVS does not contain items specifically constructed to measure inner-life spirituality. Through extra funding from the Danish Research Council and through the work of The International Network On Religious Studies (INORS), five extra items were added to the Danish EVS questionnaire. These items were designed to measure inner-life spirituality specifically and included the belief in alternative medicine, belief in a God within, being spiritual, belief in a spirit force outside the individual, and the view that the body was more than just a machine.

Some items worked better than others, and in the end, four items remained that together constituted a single measure of spirituality:

- Do you believe in reincarnation, that is, that we are born into this world again?
- Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs? There is a personal God/There is some sort of spirit or life force/I don't really know what to think/I don't really think there is any sort of spirit, God, or life force.
- How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following …? At heart I am a spiritual being.
- How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following …? There exists some sort of spirit or life force outside the individual.

The four items were combined into a scale measuring inner-life spirituality ranging from zero to four.[1] A low score meant that the individual could not be considered spiritual, while a high score meant the individual could be considered highly spiritual. The score reflects the specific concepts the individual agrees with. Individuals who score one agrees only to being a spiritual being, while individuals who score three agree to being a spiritual being and believing in an outside spiritual force as well as God as a life force.

It is interesting to note that belief in a God within did not form part of the final scale. Theoretically speaking it should have as it is one of the central religious concepts of inner-life spirituality according to Heelas and Woodhead. Belief in alternative medicine should also have been part of the spirituality scale as Heelas and Woodhead consider it an integrated part of the spiritual milieu (Heelas and Woodhead 2005: 42–45). Why both concepts failed to form part of the scale is difficult to say. The fact that the scale could be constructed suggests that there is such a thing as spirituality. That two central concepts failed to be part of the scale suggest that either the description of inner-life spirituality by Heelas and Woodhead is somewhat inaccurate or that spirituality in Denmark is different in content from spirituality in England.

Traditional Christian religiosity (life-as religion) was measured using the following items:

Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? God, Hell, Heaven, and Sin.

The items were combined into a scale ranging from zero to four.[2] A low score meant that the individual could not be considered Christian, while a high score meant the individual could be considered strongly Christian.

---

[1] All items where recoded into binary variables. The item regarding belief in God was recoded into those who believed in a spirit or life force and those who did not. The last two items were scored on a five-point Likert-like scale (agree strongly, agree, neither/nor, disagree, disagree strongly). They were recoded so that the two positive answers (agree strongly, agree) were coded as spiritual while the three others, including neither/nor, were coded as not spiritual. The four recoded items were interrelated to the extent that they could be combined into a scale. The scale conformed to a Mokken model (Loevinger's $H = 0.37$) which is a probabilistic Guttman scale (Van Schuur 2003).

[2] The four items were binary (yes/no) and therefore did not need recoding. They conformed to a Mokken model and formed a strong scale (Loevinger's $H = 0.70$).

Normally an item on belief in a life after death would have been included in the list of Christian beliefs (see Draulans and Halman 2005). The scale on inner-life spirituality included belief in reincarnation, and it could be argued that life after death for some is indistinguishable from reincarnation. Hence, it is best to remove the item from the life-as religion scale. The Christian belief scale was chosen as a measure of life-as religion instead of church attendance to make the two scales more comparable. Instead of comparing activity to beliefs, the analysis will compare belief to belief.

It could be argued that some of the items included in the life-as religion scale are rather traditional if not old fashioned. The belief in Hell, Heaven, and Sin are rather traditional and many Christians today have rejected exactly those beliefs while still seeing themselves as Christians (Andersen and Lüchau 2011). It could on the other hand be argued that it is exactly those traditionally believing Christians who attend church often and who are more likely to be members of voluntary organizations. It could also be argued that Heelas and Woodhead claim that Christianity is being replaced by spirituality rather than Christianity itself becoming more individualistic. For those two reasons it makes sense to use a Christianity scale that emphasizes traditional Christianity in the analysis to sharpen the results.

10.4.2   Christian Religiosity and Spirituality

Contrary to Heelas' theoretical expectations, the two scales are highly correlated (gamma = .47). Life-as religion and inner-life spirituality seem to overlap quite a bit. A Latent Class Analysis (see McCutcheon 1987) of the eight items that comprise the two scales shows that individuals can be grouped into four classes. The first are those who are not religious. The second group are those who are a little Christian and a little spiritual. The third group are those who score high on the inner-life spirituality items but low on the life-as religion items. These could best be considered inner-life spiritual in Heelas' sense. The fourth group is comprised of those who score high on the life-as religion items and medium on the inner-life spirituality items – a hybrid group of individuals who are mainly Christian but also very spiritual. The Latent Class Analysis suggests that there is no pure life-as religion group. Spirituality has become an integrated part of Christian religiosity for the majority of the Danes. This means that there does not really exist a group of pure Christian believers anymore.

10.4.3   A Multivariate Approach

The overlap between the life-as religion and inner-life spirituality groups makes it difficult to compare their impact upon social capital. If there is a correlation between one of the two religion scales and involvement in voluntary organizations, it could

be argued that it is the product of their overlap. One solution for this is to use a multivariate approach so that the impact of both scales upon involvement in voluntary organizations and each other can be taken into account. Since the variables on involvement in voluntary organizations are not interval level and since the multivariate model has to be able to handle strong correlations between the independent variables, the most suitable approach is a chain graph model (see Whittaker 1993). A chain graph model can handle variables of all types including nominal-level variables and assume interrelatedness of dependent variables from the start. This way a more accurate picture of the impact of life-as religion and inner-life spirituality upon involvement in voluntary organizations can be established while taking their high intercorrelation into account. To further refine the model, several standard background variables were included in the multivariate models because it could be argued that they had an impact upon involvement in voluntary organizations. These control variables were gender, generation, urbanization, education, and political orientation. This means that the analysis will show the impact of religiosity upon involvement in voluntary organizations when controlled for the interrelatedness of spirituality and Christian religiosity as well as several important socioeconomic variables.

The Danish EVS 2008 asked about membership of 14 different types of voluntary organizations. It also asked respondents whether they did unpaid work for any of these organizations. While there were a reasonable number of respondents who were members of voluntary organizations, only a very small fraction of respondents reported doing unpaid voluntary work. To include both membership and unpaid work in the analysis, the two variables were combined for each type of voluntary organization into a variable measuring involvement in voluntary organizations.[3]

The 14 voluntary organizations ranged from social welfare organizations over peace movements to women's groups. The percentage of the respondents who were members of these organizations reflects both the general interests of the Danes as well as certain institutional arrangements. The two most popular types of voluntary organizations were religious organizations and trade unions (see Table 10.1, second column). The former included membership of the Danish national church as well as membership of grassroots religious organizations within existing religious organizations. The high membership of a trade union is the product of the highly organized Danish labor market system. It could be argued that these two voluntary organizations are not so much voluntary as integrated into the way Danish society functions. They do not necessarily reflect individual choice as such. Most become members of the Danish national church by infant baptism and most are members of a trade union in order for the trade union to negotiate salaries with the business and industrial

---

[3]The two variables were combined so individuals who were not members scored zero while members scored one and members doing unpaid work scored two (it was not possible in the questionnaire to do unpaid work for an organization without being a member). Hence, an ordinal-level variable on involvement in voluntary organizations was created for each type of voluntary organization.

Table 10.1 Involvement in voluntary organizations

	% of all	Christian	Spiritual	Edu.	Pol.	Gender	Urban.	Gen.
Social welfare	12	0.15	0.17	–	–	–	–	–0.36
Religious	62	0.23	–	–	–	–	–	–
Education and culture	23	0.10	–	0.39	–	–	0.07	–
Trade union	56	0.01	–	0.01	–0.23	–	–	0.30
Political party	7	–	–	0.29	–	0.43	–	–0.17
Local community group	8	–	–	0.18	–	–	–	–0.24
Development and human rights	9	–	–	0.47	–	–	0.17	–
Environmental group	16	–	0.16	0.24	–0.17	–	–	–
Professional association	13	–	–	0.48	–	0.36	–	–0.12
Youth work	8	0.21	–	–	–	–	–	0.30
Sports	41	–	–	0.12	–	0.02	–	0.21
Women's group	3	–	–	0.27	–	10.00	–	–0.26
Peace movement	1	–	–	–	–0.65	–	–	–
Health	8	–	–	0.20	–	–0.30	–	–0.32

Using Mokken scales on being Christian and spiritual

Chain graph model, controlling for education, political orientation, gender, urbanization, and generation

Partial gammas shown

organizations. Some are even members of a trade union because it is mandatory in some workplaces. The rest of the voluntary organizations are voluntary in the traditional sense as membership of them is not integrated into larger societal structures.

10.5   Results

10.5.1   Christian Religiosity and Involvement in Voluntary Organizations

Comparing the life-as religion scale to involvement in voluntary organizations reveals that life-as religion was correlated with involvement in several types of voluntary organizations even when controlling for generation, gender, education, urbanization, political orientation, and, of course, spirituality (see Table 10.1, third column). The higher respondents scored on the life-as religion scale, the more likely they were to be involved in a voluntary organization that was religious (partial gamma = .23[4]) or focused on youth work (partial gamma = .21), social welfare

---

[4]The relationship between membership of voluntary organizations and religiosity and between trust and religiosity is measured using partial gammas, that is, gammas that are controlled for other variables. Gammas can go from zero to plus/minus one with zero being no relationship and plus/minus one being a perfect relationship.

(partial gamma = .15), or culture and education (partial gamma = .10). They were also more likely to be involved in trade unions but the correlation was so small as to be negligible. This means that hypothesis H_1 is confirmed: Christian religiosity is correlated in a positive way to involvement in (some) voluntary organizations.

Christian religiosity was related to involvement in a religious organization. This is hardly surprising since religious organization includes the Danish national church which had 82 % of all Danes as members in 2008. Christian religiosity was also related to involvement in voluntary organizations working with the young and voluntary organizations working with social welfare. Around 8 and 12 % of all respondents were involved in the two organizations, respectively (see Table 10.1, second column). With regard to both types of organizations, the strongest predictor of involvement was generation, and in both cases the correlation was higher than that of Christian religiosity (see Table 10.1, ninth column). Younger generations were more likely to be involved in organizations working with the young (partial gamma = .30), and older generations were more likely to be involved in organizations working with social welfare (partial gamma = −.36). Christian religiosity was correlated with involvement in voluntary organizations working with education and culture. Here the strongest predictor was education. Respondents with higher educations were more likely to be involved in organizations working with education and culture (partial gamma = .39). Urbanization was also a factor but its impact was weaker than that of Christian religiosity (partial gamma = .07).

Hypothesis H_1 was confirmed, but it is important to notice that Christian religiosity was not the strongest predictor of involvement in secular voluntary organizations. Generation and education were correlated more strongly with involvement in a secular voluntary organization than Christian religiosity. It is also important to note that the impact of Christian religiosity upon involvement in voluntary organizations was limited to only four out of 14 types, one religious and three secular. Of those three secular types of voluntary organizations two, it could be argued, were focused on helping relatively weaker groups of society, the young and the poor, and hence organizations that produce bridging social capital. Whether voluntary organizations that work with education and culture produce bridging or bonding social capital is difficult to say.

The results match those of the American studies even though Denmark's universal welfare system was supposed to limit the need for voluntary organizations especially with regard to social welfare. The welfare system may have limited the percentage of Danes who are involved in voluntary organizations working with social welfare, but it has not eliminated the impact of Christian religiosity upon involvement in these organizations.

10.5.2   Spirituality and Involvement in Voluntary Organizations

The inner-life spirituality scale was correlated with involvement in voluntary organizations working with social welfare and environmental groups (see Table 10.1,

fourth column). Respondents who scored high on the spirituality scale were more likely to be involved in organizations working with social welfare (partial gamma = .17) and environmental protection (partial gamma = .16). This means that hypothesis H_2 must be rejected. Spirituality was correlated in a positive way to involvement in (some) voluntary organizations. This is surprising since spirituality is not supposed to promote common religious practice and the creation of community which are the factors that are supposed to be behind the correlation between Christian religiosity and involvement in voluntary organizations. Either spirituality promotes common religious practice and community even though it is individualistically oriented or else common religious practice and community are not necessary for the promotion of involvement in voluntary organizations.

Spirituality was correlated with involvement in voluntary organizations working with social welfare. Since the relationship between spirituality and involvement was tested in the same model as Christian religiosity, it means that generation was a better predictor of involvement in voluntary organizations working with social welfare, than spirituality. Involvement in an environmental group was predicted better by education and political orientation than by spirituality. Respondents with higher educations were more likely to be involved in an environmental group (partial gamma = .24) and so were left-wing respondents (partial gamma = −.17).

Hypothesis H_2 had to be rejected because spirituality was correlated in a positive way to involvement in two types of voluntary organizations. Voluntary organizations working with social welfare are probably the ones that most clearly produce bridging social capital. So even though spirituality was not supposed to involve common religious practice or community, it still managed to promote the production of bridging social capital just as Christian religiosity did. And since this was tested in a multivariate model that included both measures of religiosity (life-as religion and inner-life spirituality), it means that the relationship between spirituality and social capital was not the product of the overlap between the two types of religiosity. Even if the spiritual revolution thesis had been confirmed for the Danish data, it still would have made little difference with regard to involvement in voluntary organizations working with social welfare which is one of the more important vehicles for the production of bridging social capital.

Spirituality was correlated with involvement in environmental groups, whereas Christian religiosity was correlated with involvement in youth organizations and voluntary organizations working with education and culture. Whether environmental groups produce bridging or bonding social capital is difficult to say. Their focus is often global which suggests the production of bridging social capital. The goal is to help the environment and hence people in all parts of the world. This suggests that it would be wrong to conclude that spirituality supports the production of bonding social capital. Even if the spiritual revolution thesis had been confirmed for the Danish data (which it was not), it would not have changed the type of social capital being produced by the growing non-Christian religiosity, i.e., spirituality.

10.5.3   Religiosity, Involvement in Voluntary Organizations, and Social Trust

Involvement in voluntary organizations should foster trust, according to Putnam. There are several kinds of trust measured in the EVS 2008 but only social (or generalized) trust will be analyzed here. Social trust was measured by the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" The question is supposed to measure respondents' general approach to other people; can they be trusted or not? High levels of social trust should make societies run smoother since they remove the need for resource-consuming control institutions. High levels of social trust should also make democracies function better.

Hypothesis H_3 claims that Christian religiosity should be correlated with involvement in voluntary organizations and that involvement in voluntary organizations should be correlated with social trust. Hence, there is a chain of relationships between Christian religiosity and social trust. To analyze this, the multivariate model used to make Table 10.1 was expanded. The variables measuring involvement in different voluntary organizations were replaced by a combined variable measuring involvement in voluntary organizations in general.[5] The above variable on social trust was also added to the model.

The multivariate model confirms hypothesis H_3. There was a correlation between Christian religiosity and involvement in voluntary organizations (partial gamma = .16) and a correlation between involvement in voluntary organizations and social trust (partial gamma = .28). Hence, Christian religiosity fosters social capital which again fosters trust.

Looking at the multivariate model in its entirety shows a much more complicated picture (see Fig. 10.1[6]). Three variables influenced involvement in voluntary organizations: Christian religiosity, education, and generation. The stronger the Christian religiosity, the higher the education, and the younger the generation, the more likely the individual was to be involved in at least one voluntary organization. Spirituality was not a factor in the multivariate model, but this can be attributed to the collapsed measure of involvement in voluntary organizations since spirituality was only correlated with two types of voluntary organizations whereas Christian religiosity was correlated with five.

Three variables influenced social trust: education, involvement in voluntary organizations, and Christian religiosity. The strongest influence came from education (partial gamma = .43), the second strongest from involvement in voluntary organizations (partial gamma = .28), and the third strongest from Christian religiosity (partial gamma = −.22). This means that education was a much better

---

[5] Respondents who were not members of any voluntary organization scored zero, respondents who were members of at least one voluntary organization scored one, and respondents who did unpaid work for at least one voluntary organization scored two. Hence, the variable ignored the possible effect of being involved in more than one voluntary organization.

[6] In the chain graph model effects move from right to left. Circles represent variables while lines and arrows represent correlations when controlling for the other variables in the model.

Fig. 10.1 Religiosity and social capital and social trust. Chain graph model controlling for education, political orientation, gender, urbanization, and generation

predictor of social trust than involvement in voluntary organizations. This suggests that maybe social capital, which is produced by involvement in voluntary organizations, was not as important a factor for social trust as Putnam would expect, at least in Denmark.

The effects of Christian religiosity in the multivariate model were ambivalent. On the one hand Christian religiosity was correlated in a positive way with involvement in voluntary organizations. The stronger the Christian religiosity, the greater the chance of the individual being involved in a voluntary organization. Since there was a positive correlation between involvement in voluntary organizations and social trust, this means that Christian religiosity had a positive indirect effect upon social trust. On the other hand there was negative direct effect of Christian religiosity upon social trust. The stronger the Christian religiosity, the weaker the social trust. Since the multivariate model included generation, education, gender etc. this effect was not the product of the age distribution of the Christians, their degree of urbanization, or their educational level. It seems as though Christian religiosity was related to lower levels of social trust but that the Christians' higher levels of involvement in voluntary organizations alleviated at least some of this effect. The relationship between Christian religiosity, social capital, and trust is a bit more complicated than theories would lead one to believe.

10.6 Conclusion

From the data there is not much to suggest that life-as religion is being replaced by inner-life spirituality in Denmark. For that to be the case, the two types of religiosity should either be unrelated or correlated in a negative way. Instead they are correlated

in a positive way. This suggests that the majority religion in Denmark, Christianity, is changing rather than being replaced. It is becoming spiritualized and probably individualized. There was no pure Christian group among the respondents but rather a mixed group of individuals who scored at least medium on both religiosity scales. Because life-as religion and inner-life spirituality are intertwined among Danish respondents, the claim of a spiritual revolution in Denmark is somewhat misplaced.

As expected Christian religiosity was correlated in a positive way with involvement in voluntary organizations. Since these produce social capital, Christian religiosity can be said to foster social capital in Denmark. Christian religiosity was correlated in a positive way to involvement in voluntary organizations concentrating on religion, youth work, social welfare, and education and culture. It can be argued that in general Christian religiosity hence fosters social capital of the bridging kind.

Spirituality contrary to expectations was also correlated in a positive way to involvement in voluntary organizations. This was unexpected since spirituality should not promote common religious practice or community which is what is supposed to foster involvement in voluntary organizations. But spirituality was, nonetheless, correlated in a positive way to involvement in voluntary organizations dealing with social welfare and environmental issues. It can therefore be argued that spirituality fosters social capital of the bridging kind just like Christian religiosity.

As expected Christian religiosity was correlated in a positive way with involvement in voluntary organizations which again was correlated in a positive way to social trust. Hence, Christian religiosity promoted social capital which again leads to social trust. It turned out, however, that Christian religiosity itself promoted lower levels of social trust. It was only when it worked through involvement in voluntary organizations that Christian religiosity promoted social trust. The effect of Christian religiosity upon social trust was ambivalent which suggests that the causal order suggested by Putnam and Campbell should be taken with a grain of salt at least in the Danish case.

In the end there is little to suggest that a spiritual turn in the religiosity of the Danes, if it should come about, would change the relationship of religiosity to the production of social capital. First of all there does not seem to have been a spiritual revolution in Denmark and secondly both Christian religiosity and spirituality promote the production of social capital.

References

Andersen, P. B., & Lüchau, P. (2011). Individualisering og aftraditionalisering af danskernes religiøse værdier. In P. Gundelach (Ed.), *Små og store forandringer. Danskernes værdier siden 1981* (pp. 76–96). Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag.

Bruce, S. (2002). *God is dead: Secularization in the west*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Casanova, J. (1994). *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Draulans, V., & Halman, L. (2005). Mapping contemporary Europe's moral and religious pluralist landscape: An analysis based on the most recent European Values Study data. *Journal of Contemporary Religion, 20*(2), 179–193.

Heelas, P. (2007). The spiritual revolution of Northern Europe: Personal beliefs. *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, 20*(1), 1–28.

Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2005). *The spiritual revolution: Why religion is giving way to spirituality*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Koch-Nielsen, I., & Clausen, J. D. (2002). Værdierne i det frivillige arbejde. In P. Gundelach (Ed.), *Danskernes værdier 1981–1999* (pp. 232–259). København: Hans Reitzels Forlag.

Luckmann, T. (1967). *The invisible religion: The problem of religion in modern society*. New York: The MacMillan Company.

McCutcheon, A. L. (1987). *Latent class analysis*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, R. D., & Campbell, D. E. (2010). *American grace. How religion divides and unites us*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Stolle, D. (2003). The sources of social capital. In M. Hooghe & D. Stolle (Eds.), *Generating social capital: Civil society and institutions in comparative perspective* (pp. 19–42). Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Schuur, W. H. (2003). Mokken scale analysis: Between the Guttman scale and parametric item response theory. *Political Analysis, 11*, 139–163.

Voas, D., & Crockett, A. (2005). Religion in Britain: Neither believing nor belonging. *Sociology, 39*(12), 11–28.

Whittaker, J. (1993). Graphical interaction models: A new approach for statistical modelling. In K. Dean (Ed.), *Population health research: Linking theory and methods* (pp. 160–180). London: Sage Publications.

Chapter 11
Religion and Social Participation in Postcommunist Europe

Mălina Voicu and Claudiu Tufiş

11.1   Introduction

Social participation is at very low levels in Central and Eastern European countries, postcommunist citizens being less interested in politics (Martin 2003) and less involved in civic associations (Howard 2003; Valkov 2009) as compared to other European citizens.[1] This lack of activism was considered a legacy of the communist past, which hampered the development of civil society in the region (Letki 2004; Coffe and van der Lippe 2010) in various ways: strictly controlling (even forbidding, in some cases) free civic association; changing the voluntary character of civic work into a compulsory one, controlled by the state (Voicu and Voicu 2003); or eroding interpersonal trust, leading to lower levels of involvement into the civic life (Coffe and van der Lippe 2010).

In this chapter we investigate the way in which religion influences social participation in postcommunist societies. Previous studies have shown that religion has a positive effect on civic engagement, both beliefs and behaviors increasing the level of social participation (Verba et al. 1995; Curtis et al. 2001). The relationship between religion, state, and society, however, is different in postcommunist countries. The communist regimes imposed a forced secularization, isolating religion into the

M. Voicu (✉)
Data Archive for the Social Sciences, GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences,
Cologne, Germany

The Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy of Sciences,
Bucharest, Romania
e-mail: malina.voicu@gesis.org

C. Tufiş
Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania
e-mail: claudiu.tufis@fspub.unibuc.ro

private life and reducing its impact on public affairs (Tomka 1991, 2002). Thus, we investigate how postcommunist legacy shapes social participation in countries from Central and Eastern Europe. We focus our analyses on social participation, understood as membership in civic organizations, excluding religious organizations. Using European Values Study data collected in 2008 in 36 countries, out of which 21 are former communist countries, we test the research hypotheses using multilevel logistic regression. Our analysis exploits only data collected in postcommunist countries.

The first section of the chapter is an overview of the relationship between religiosity and social participation, paying special attention to the way in which religiosity shapes civicness in postcommunist societies. The second part introduces the indicators and the strategy used for analysis, followed by the data analysis. The final section is dedicated to conclusions and to a short discussion.

11.2 Religion, Social Participation, and the Communist Legacy

Previous studies have approached the relationship between religion and participation focusing on three different aspects of religious life: beliefs, behaviors, and denomination. Religious beliefs shape the ways in which the individual perceives the human nature (Smidt 1999) and instill norms of altruism (Ruiter and de Graaf 2006) and feelings of responsibility for others, as well as trust in fellow citizens (Bekkers and Schuyt 2008). All these elements exert a positive influence on social participation, motivating people to get involved in actions aimed towards producing public goods.

Various aspects of religious behavior have a significant impact on social involvement. Church attendance and participation in church activities connect people with social networks, which is a key element of social participation (Ruiter and de Graaf 2006; Lam 2006; Verba et al. 1995); encourage charitable behavior (Smidt 1999); and provide civic skills and information (Lam 2006; Smidt 1999; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). Private prayer psychologically empowers the individuals, who feel more politically effective and more inclined to participate (Loveland et al. 2005).

Social participation, however, is learned during primary socialization and is highly dependent on the social context existing during the formative years (Kirlin 2002). Therefore, people who socialized in Central and Eastern Europe during the communist period are less likely to participate in voluntary associations because these associations were strictly controlled. Moreover, family plays an important role in preparing children for social activism, with children of people characterized by higher rates of social participation being more likely to participate as well (Khane and Sporte 2008; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Langton 1984; Janoski and Wilson 1995). Consequently, the communist legacy of civic passivity affects not only the cohorts socialized during the former regime but also the younger generations, which grew up in a culture of civic passivity and lacking a model of social participation among the older generations.

The communist regime affected social participation both directly by controlling civil society and restricting civic life and, indirectly, by impeding religious life. These societies have experienced a dual process of secularization, a self-induced as well as

an enforced one, imposed by the totalitarian regime (Meulermann 2000, 2004; Need and Evans 2001; Pollack 2001). Marxist ideology considered religion "the opium of people," and the communist regimes did their best to exclude religion from public and private life. All around the region, churches were eliminated from the political and social life, religious education was forbidden, while religious practices were strictly controlled (Stan and Turcescu 2007; Tomka 1991, 2002; Voicu 2007).

As a consequence of these policies, religion did not completely disappear, but was mainly a private matter, while churches continued to exist but were not allowed to be involved in the public life (Tomka 1991). The believers were discriminated against and excluded from public office (White et al. 2000). The church focused on the individual's spiritual needs, ignoring aspects related to public life, such as charity or volunteering. Moreover, since the church was not allowed to organize such activities, it lost its role as provider of civic skills and information useful for civic engagement. At the same time, the public and the political space were perceived, in the communist states, as characterized by lying and cheating (Voicu 2005), promoting different moral standards as compared to those imposed by the church. The involvement in public space was not desirable for a churchgoer because of the different moral norms. In the long run, religion detached from the public life and did not support social involvement.

Even if previous studies found a positive effect of religiosity on social participation in Western societies, this relationship does not hold for postcommunist societies. First, due to the forced secularization imposed by the communist regime, religion detached from the public area and exerted no effect on political or civic issues. Moreover, in communist societies, the public space was perceived by the population as one of lying and cheating and of moral values opposed to those supported by the religion. Therefore, the real believers chose not to get involved in activities characterized by values and moral norms opposed to those promoted by the church. Unlike in Western societies, where the norms and values promoted by the civil society and by religion were largely congruent, in communist societies this congruence was completely missing. This leads us to expect a negative relationship between religious practices and beliefs and social participation in postcommunist societies.

The dominant religious denomination represents an additional religious factor having a different effect on social participation in Central and Eastern Europe. Previous studies, carried out in long-established democracies from Western Europe and North America, point out that social participation varies by religious denomination (Lam 2006; Ruiter and de Graaf 2006; Suanet et al. 2009; Jeong 2010). Thus, religious denomination exerts an effect at both individual and country level, by shaping individual values and creating a specific context for civic engagement.[2]

---

[2] In analyzing the relationship between religion and civic participation, we distinguish between the individual level and the country level. At the individual level we are interested in the relationship between individual's religious denomination and his or her degree of civic participation. At the country level, we are interested in the relationship between the distribution of the population by religion and the average level of civic participation. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, we also denote the individual level by microlevel or level 1 and the country level by macro level, level 2, aggregate level, or context.

Many studies have focused on the distinction between Catholics and Protestants. The two denominations differ with respect to the values induced to the church members and in creating an institutional context, which may encourage or hamper civic involvement (Lam 2006). Thus, at individual level, Protestantism encourages social tolerance and "extra-familial orientation," weakening kinship ties and stimulating associational activities. The organizational differences between the two denominations produced differences across societies, with an impact on the level of social participation (Lam 2006). According to Verba et al. (1995), the Protestant denominations are organized in smaller congregations and allow for a higher participation of lay on the liturgy, as compared to Catholic churches, which have a hierarchical strict organization and do not allow for a significant involvement of the people on the religious services. Thus, the Protestant denomination stimulates participation and creates the opportunity for practicing civic skills by stimulating the development of civic associations. The result is a higher propensity of people belonging to Protestant denominations and living in Protestant countries to participate in civic activities. Previous empirical research supports these assumptions (see Verba et al. 1995; Lam 2002, 2006; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006).

The repression experienced by the Catholic and Protestant churches under the communist regimes from Central and Eastern Europe differently shaped the relationship between religious denomination and social participation. Catholic churches from countries experiencing a communist regime received a strong international support from the international structure of Catholic Church and great support from Vatican. This better protected them against the communist repressions and helped them to survive. By contrast, Protestant churches did not get any external support and were more affected by the communist repression (Pollack 2001; Stark 2001; Froese 2004). While the Catholic Church openly opposed the political power and contributed to organizing political opposition in countries like Poland, the activity of the Protestant church was drastically reduced. The strict control on associational activities practiced by the communist power impeded the Protestant church to develop its associational structure and provided less opportunities for Protestant believers to practice their civic skills. Because the Catholic Church was more active than the Protestant churches, we expect to find stronger contextual effects of the Catholic denomination in Central and Eastern Europe. Summarizing, at the individual level, we expect people belonging to the Catholic denomination to be less civically active; at the same time, at the country level, we expect a larger proportion of the population to be involved in civic activities in those countries in which a higher proportion of the population belongs to the Catholic denomination. On the other hand, as previous studies pointed out, Protestant churches instill values of tolerance and stimulate extra-familial ties, stimulating individuals to get involved in civic actions. Thus, at the individual level, we expect to find a positive effect of belonging to a Protestant denomination on social participation.

Orthodox denomination shapes social participation in a different way. Throughout history, the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the state was governed by the concept of *symphonia*, which involved a subordination of the religious institution to the political power (Stan and Turcescu 2000, 2007). In the Byzantine

Empire, the emperor was coordinating the church's activity and he led it as one department of the state (Wach 1955). The relationship remained unchanged over time, regardless of who was representing the state. While political power controlled public life, the Orthodox Church was in charge only with spiritual life, but its dominance in this area was challenged, from time to time, by political leaders (Stan and Turcescu 2007).

The total subordination of the Orthodox Church to the political power and its excessive concentration on spiritual issues had significant consequences for the public role of the church and for its impact on shaping civic life. In societies dominated by Catholicism and Protestantism, there was a strict separation between political and ecclesiastical power (Huntington 1997). The two types of power were involved in the public life, sometimes competing, other times supporting each other. In the Orthodox world, the political power subordinated the spiritual one and monopolized the public space. Even when the church got involved in public affairs, its involvement was controlled by the state. Consequently, the church was in charge only with spiritual life and did less to transmit civic information and to create civic skills. Moreover, the model promoted by the Orthodox Church resembles what Jepperson (2002) calls a statist society, a society dominated by the state, which represents a separate and superior order of political governance. Previous studies pointed out that statist societies do not stimulate the development of civil society and of social participation (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). Based on these arguments, we assume that belonging to the Orthodox denomination will exert a negative effect on civic engagement at the individual level. Moreover, at the country level, we expect to find lower levels of civic engagement in those countries in which the proportion of people belonging to the Orthodox Church is higher.

Studies dedicated to social participation identify various individual and contextual factors influencing people's propensity to engage in such activities. At the individual level, studies have shown that characteristics such as education, employment status, income, family, and gender have a significant impact on social participation. Age, education, being married, being male, and being employed have a positive impact on volunteering and membership in civic organizations (Ruiter and de Graaf 2006; Curtis et al. 1992; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001).

Previous studies have also shown that membership in voluntary organizations is linked to political values and attitudes. Interest in politics is positively associated with social participation (Verba et al. 1995; van Deth and Elff 2004; Bekkers 2005). Interpersonal trust is also considered to be linked to associational membership (Levi and Stoker 2000; Letki 2004; Sonderskov 2010). In addition to values and attitudes, membership in voluntary associations can also be influenced by evaluations of government (Levi 1998).

Starting from the theoretical approaches presented above and controlling for all the relevant predictors, we test four hypotheses regarding the relationship between religion and social participation. The first hypothesis (H1) refers only to the relationship between religion and social participation at the individual level. The other three hypotheses reflect our expectations about the relationship between social participation and belonging to a specific denomination, both at the individual and

at the country level, assuming interactions between individual-level influences and aggregate-level influences.

(H1) Religious beliefs and behaviors have a negative impact on social participation in postcommunist societies.

(H2) Catholic religious affiliation exerts a negative effect on social participation at the individual level, while at the aggregate level, the predominance of the Catholic denomination increases the social engagement in postcommunist countries.

(H3) Protestant religious affiliation exerts a positive effect on social participation, at the individual level, while, at the aggregate level, the predominance of the Protestant denomination has no effect on civic engagement in postcommunist countries.

(H4) At the individual level, Orthodox religious affiliation exerts a negative effect on social participation, while at the aggregate level, the predominance of the Orthodox denomination decreases the social engagement in postcommunist countries.

11.3 Data, Measurement, and Methods

The analyses presented here use data from the 2008 wave of the European Values Study.[3] The sample we use contains all 21 postcommunist countries included in the first official release of the data (the number of cases for each country is included in parentheses): Albania (1,534), Azerbaijan (1,505), Armenia (1,500), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1,512), Bulgaria (1,500), Belarus (1,500), Czech Republic (1,821), Estonia (1,518), Georgia (1,500), Hungary (1,513), Latvia (1,506), Lithuania (1,500), Moldavia (1,551), Montenegro (1,516), Poland (1,510), Romania (1,489), Russian Federation (1,504), Serbia (1,512), Slovak Republic (1,509), Slovenia (1,366), and Ukraine (1,507).

11.3.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is *membership in voluntary organizations*. The variable indicates whether the respondent belongs (coded 1) or not (coded 0) to any of the following voluntary organizations and activities: social welfare services for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; education, arts, music, or cultural activities; trade unions; political parties or groups; local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; third world development or human rights; conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights; professional associations;

---

[3]For more details about the European Values Study, see www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu

youth work; sports or recreation; women's groups; peace movement; voluntary organizations concerned with health; other groups. Given our focus on the effect of religion on social participation, we did not include in the dependent variable membership in religious or church organizations.[4]

11.3.2 Independent Variables

11.3.2.1 Individual Level

We have included four groups of variables measured at individual level in the estimated models. The first group of variables controls for sociodemographic characteristics: gender (coded 1 for male respondents and 0 for female respondents), age (measured in years), education (indicated by the age when respondents completed full-time education), and town size (ordinal variable with eight categories). We also included in this group controls for other variables shown in previous studies to have an effect on social participation: employment (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who are employed), marital status (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who are married or in a couple), and immigrant (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who are immigrants).

The second group of variables includes indicators of religious beliefs and behaviors: importance of god in respondent's life (variable ranging from 1 "not at all important" to 10 "very important"), frequency of praying to god outside religious services (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents praying at least once a week), church attendance (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents attending church services at least once a month), and church attendance during childhood (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents attending church services at least once a month during childhood).

The third group of variables is represented by a set of dummy variables indicating the respondents' religious denomination. We have included dummy variables for Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and other religion, with the reference category being represented by respondents who indicated they do not belong to any religious denomination.

The fourth group of variables controls for a series of political values and attitudes related to social participation. We have included in this group variables measuring the importance of politics in respondent's life, frequency of political discussions with friends, interpersonal trust, evaluations of government, and concern about the living conditions of children in poor families. By adding these variables in the model, we estimate the effects of religion on social participation while controlling for other factors that might have an effect on the dependent variable.

---

[4]We have estimated the final model with the dependent variable including membership in religious or church organizations as well (the results, not shown here, can be obtained from the authors), but the results do not differ substantively from the models presented here.

11.3.2.2 Country Level

The models we estimate use two variables measured at country level. The first variable is an aggregate measure of church attendance at country level, constructed from individual-level data, indicating the percentage of the population declaring at least monthly church attendance. The second variable represents the percentage of the population belonging to the Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox denomination, depending on the model.

11.4 Results

The EVS data shows significant variation in the level of social participation across postcommunist Europe: the percentage of people belonging to at least one voluntary organization (see Fig. 11.1) varies from a low of 8 %, in Georgia, to a high of 51 %, in Belarus, with the sample average being 24 %. With the exception of only four countries (Belarus, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Estonia), the rate of social participation in all other postcommunist countries is below a third of the population.

Fig. 11.1 Percentage of population belonging to at least one voluntary organization (Note: Religious or church organizations not included. Data source: EVS 2008)

These results confirm previous studies, which show postcommunist citizens to be less interested in social participation (Miszlivetz and Jensen 1998).

In order to assess the relationship between different aspects of religion (denomination, beliefs, and behaviors) and social participation, we have estimated a series of multilevel logistic regression models. The first model we estimated was the null model (results not presented here). The results of this model show that there is significant variation between countries with respect to membership in voluntary organizations.[5]

The three models presented in Table 11.1 have the same set of independent variables at the individual level, but they differ at the country level, each model taking into account the percentage of the population belonging to one of the three main religious denominations we analyze (Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox) and corresponding, thus, to the last three hypotheses stated above.[6] Due to the reduced number of cases on the aggregate level, we cannot simultaneously control for the effect of the main religious denomination in the country and we have run different models for each denomination.

The individual-level results confirm most of the findings of previous studies: social participation is higher among respondents who are younger, better educated, and who are employed.[7] Membership in voluntary organizations is lower among respondents living in large cities and among immigrants. Gender and marital status do not have a significant effect on social participation in postcommunist European countries. All indicators of political values and attitudes have significant positive effects on the dependent variable.

Moving on to the relationship between religion and social participation, the results show that three of the variables measuring religious beliefs and behaviors (church attendance during childhood, frequency of prayer, and importance of God) do not have significant effects on social participation. The only variable with a significant effect on membership in voluntary organizations is the present-time church attendance: people who attend church services at least once a month have higher levels of social participation, compared to people who attend church services less than once a month.

This is, however, only part of the story. At the country level, the aggregate church attendance has a significant negative effect, indicating that the rate of social participation is lower in countries in which the percentage of the population going to church at least once a month is higher. In addition to this, the interaction term between individual church attendance and aggregate church attendance is significant and negative

---

[5]The χ^2 test for the variance component between countries has a value of $\chi^2 = 2,192.93$, with 20 degrees of freedom and $p < 0.001$.

[6]Basically, the three models are composed of an individual-level model and a country-level model. In the individual-level part, which is common to all three models, we predict whether an individual is belonging to a voluntary organization or not. In the country-level part, which is specific to each model, we predict the average level of participation at the country level.

[7]We have also estimated a model testing for a curvilinear effect of age, but the coefficient for age squared was not statistically significant.

Table 11.1 Multilevel logistic regression analyses of membership in voluntary organizations

	Model 1: Catholic	Model 2: Protestant	Model 3: Orthodox
	Odds ratio p	Odds ratio p	Odds ratio p
Intercept	0.02***	0.03***	0.04***
Church attendance	0.98**	0.98*	0.98*
% Catholic	1.01*		
% Protestant		1.00	
% Orthodox			0.99*
Religious denomination			
Catholic	0.99	1.00	1.00
Protestant	1.58***	1.59***	1.58***
Orthodox	1.00	0.99	1.00
Other religion	0.79**	0.78**	0.78**
Religious behaviors and beliefs			
Church attendance	1.33**	1.33**	1.33**
*Aggregate church attendance	0.99*	0.99*	0.99*
Church attendance childhood	1.01	1.01	1.01
Frequency of prayer	1.01	1.01	1.01
Importance of God	0.99	0.99	0.99
Controls			
Gender	1.04	1.04	1.04
Age	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***
Education	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***
Town size	0.97***	0.97***	0.97***
Marital status	0.99	0.99	0.99
Employed	1.80***	1.80***	1.80***
Immigrant	0.86*	0.86*	0.86*
Importance of politics	1.10***	1.10***	1.10***
Frequency of political discussions	1.36***	1.36***	1.36***
Interpersonal trust	1.09*	1.09*	1.09*
Evaluation of government	1.03***	1.03***	1.03***
Concern for poor children	1.13***	1.13***	1.13***
Level 2 variance	0.27***	0.36***	0.28***

Notes: Level-1 $N=31{,}873$. Level-2 $N=21$. Listwise deletion. Random intercept, Bernoulli. Reference category for religious denomination: no religious denomination
*$p \leq 0.05$; **$p \leq 0.01$; ***$p \leq 0.001$

in all three models, indicating that the interpretation of the relationship between church attendance and membership in voluntary organizations should take into account both individual and aggregate church attendance.

Figure 11.2 presents this relationship in a graphical format, which is easier to interpret. The results show that in countries in which the percentage of population attending church services at least once a month is low, people who go to church at least once a month are more likely to be members in a voluntary organization by comparison to those who go to church less often. In more religious contexts, however, the likelihood of being civically active decreases, and this

Fig. 11.2 Relationship between membership and aggregate church attendance for low-high individual church attendance groups (This graph is computed using the results of model 1. Since the graphs computed based on the results of the other models are identical, they are not presented here)

decrease is more accentuated for those with high church attendance than for those with low church attendance, so that in highly religious contexts, the relationship between individual church attendance and membership in voluntary organizations is reversed.

The results discussed so far offer only partial support for our first hypothesis. First, only church attendance has a significant effect on social participation, while the other variables indicating religious beliefs and behaviors do not have significant effects. Second, although the effect of church attendance at the individual level is positive, contrary to our expectations, the results show that the relationship between church attendance and membership in voluntary organizations is negative at the aggregate level. Third, the results also show that the context matters: being a highly religious person in a highly religious society is not the same as being a highly religious person in a less religious society.

We turn our attention now to the set of variables indicating membership to specific religious denominations. In all three models we estimated, the results at the individual level are similar: people belonging to the Protestant denominations are more likely to belong to a voluntary organization, while belonging to the Catholic Church or to the Orthodox Church does not have a significant effect on our dependent variable.

The models we estimated also test for the effect of religious denomination on the dependent variable at the aggregate level, using the percentage of population

belonging to the Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox denomination as a country-level independent variable. The predominance of the Catholic denomination in a postcommunist country is associated with higher levels of social participation (see Model 1 in Table 11.1). Model 2 shows that the percentage of Protestants in a population does not have a significant effect on membership in voluntary organizations. Finally, the model taking into account the percentage of population belonging to the Orthodox Church (see Model 3) shows that countries with higher proportions of people belonging to the Orthodox Church are characterized by lower levels of social participation. All these results confirm our expectations regarding the relationship between the predominance of a certain religion in the population and membership in voluntary organizations. The history of the three religious denominations in Central and Eastern Europe seems, thus, to have a continuing effect on social participation. The activism of the Catholic Church in the region and its open opposition, fueled by the external support it received, to the communist regimes have offered a model of social participation that seems to have been adopted by those living in countries with a strong Catholic Church. At the same time, the Orthodox Church, controlled by the communist regimes, could not offer such a model, and as a result, people living in countries where Orthodoxy is dominant are less inclined towards social participation.

11.5   Conclusions

In this chapter we have investigated the relationship between religion and social participation in a sample of 21 postcommunist European countries, paying particular attention to the effects of belonging to a specific religious denomination and to the effects of religious variables indicating beliefs and behaviors in the postcommunist context. The results presented here lead to a series of significant conclusions, but, at the same time, they also indicate the need for additional research that could explain some of our results.

The results presented here offered only partial support for our first hypothesis: out of the groups of variables measuring religious beliefs and behaviors, church attendance is the only variable with a significant effect on social participation. The results suggested, however, that this relationship is highly dependent on the religious context: high individual church attendance has a positive effect on social participation in contexts characterized by low religiosity, while in contexts characterized by high religiosity, high individual church attendance has a negative effect on social participation.

Our expectations regarding the effects of the predominance of a particular denomination at aggregate level on civic activism were supported by the data: people's involvement in voluntary organizations is higher in countries in which the Catholic Church is strong and lower in countries in which the Orthodox Church is dominant. At the individual level, however, belonging to the Catholic or the Orthodox Churches does not have an effect on social participation, and only belonging to a Protestant denomination is associated with increased involvement in civic activities.

After the breakdown of the communist regime, a religious revival was registered in most of the postcommunist countries, but this was a short-time effect and most of these societies followed the secularization pathway after the first years of transition (Pickel 2009). Based on our results, we could expect a decrease in social participation in highly secularized countries from Central and Eastern Europe, such as Czech Republic or Slovenia, because a reduction in the number of churchgoers in these countries will reduce their social engagement. At the same time, it should be noted that, despite the fact that religion has a significant effect on social participation, this effect is rather small by comparison to the effects of different values and attitudes or those of different characteristics of the respondents. This suggests that changes in social participation are more likely to result from changes in these determinants than from changes in religious beliefs and behaviors.

For further research we suggest two new directions of investigation. The first one is to investigate the effect of religion on social participation in Central and Eastern Europe from a longitudinal perspective. As we have pointed out before, the end of communist regime was followed by an increasing and then by a decreasing in religiosity. In this context, further research can focus on the impact of the dynamic of the religious field on social participation in postcommunist societies. A second direction should focus towards identifying those characteristics of different denominations that have an effect on social participation at the individual level and that may explain why belonging to a Protestant denomination has a positive effect on civic activism, while belonging to the Catholic or Orthodox Church has no significant effect, despite the hierarchical modes of interaction they promote.

References

Bekkers, R. (2005). Participation in voluntary associations: Relations with resources, personality, and political values. *Political Psychology, 26*(3), 439–454.

Bekkers, R., & Schuyt, T. (2008). And who is your neighbor? Explaining denominational differences in charitable giving and volunteering in the Netherlands. *Review of Religious Research, 50*(1), 74–96.

Coffe, H., & van der Lippe, T. (2010). Citizenship norms in Eastern Europe. *Social Indicators Research, 96*(3), 479–496.

Curtis, J., Grabb, E., & Baer, D. (1992). Voluntary association membership in fifteen countries: A comparative analysis. *American Sociological Review, 57*(2), 139–152.

Curtis, J., Baer, D., & Grabb, E. (2001). Nations of joiners: Explaining voluntary association membership in democratic societies. *American Sociological Review, 66*(6), 783–805.

EVS Foundation/Tilburg University: European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset. GESIS Cologne, Germany, ZA4800 Dataset Version 1.0.0 (2010-06-30). doi:10.4232/1.10059. http://dx.dot.org/10.4232/1.10059

Froese, P. (2004). After atheism: An analysis of religious monopolies in the post-communist world. *Sociology of Religion, 65*, 57–75.

Howard, M. M. (2003). *The weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, S. (1997). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simion & Schuster.

Janoski, T., & Wilson, J. (1995). Pathways to voluntarism: Family socialization and status transmission models. *Social Forces, 74*(1), 271–292.

Jeong, H. O. (2010). How do religions differ in their impact on individuals' social capital? The case of South Korea. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 39*(1), 142–160.

Jepperson, R. (2002). Political modernities: Disentangling two underlying dimensions of institutional differentiations. *Sociological Theory, 20*(1), 61–85.

Jones-Correa, M., & Leal, D. (2001). Political participation: Does religion matter? *Political Research Quarterly, 54*(4), 751–770.

Khane, J., & Sporte, S. (2008). Developing citizens: The impact of civic learning opportunities on students' commitment to social participation. *American Educational Research Journal, 45*(3), 738–766.

Kirlin, M. (2002). Civic skills building: The missing component in service programs? *Political Science & Politics, 35*(3), 571–575.

Lam, P. Y. (2002). As the flocks gather: How religion affects voluntary association participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41*(3), 405–422.

Lam, P. Y. (2006). Religion and civic culture: A cross-national study of voluntary association membership. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 45*(2), 177–193.

Langton, K. (1984). Persistence and change in political confidence over the life-span: Embedding life-cycle socialization context. *British Journal of Political Science, 14*(4), 461–481.

Letki, N. (2004). Socialization for participation? Trust, membership and democratization in East-Central Europe. *Political Research Quarterly, 57*(4), 665–679.

Levi, M. (1998). A state of trust. In V. Braithwaite & M. Levi (Eds.), *Trust and governance* (pp. 77–101). New York: Russell Sage.

Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. *Annual Review of Political Science, 3*, 475–507.

Loveland, M., et al. (2005). Private prayer and civic involvement. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 44*(1), 1–14.

Martin, I. (2003). Interest in politics and the political culture approach: The case of the new democracies of Southern and Eastern Europe. In D. Pollack et al. (Eds.), *Political culture in post-communist Europe: Attitudes in new democracies* (pp. 71–90). Aldershot: Ashgate.

Meulermann, H. (2000). Beyond unbelief. Religious uncertainty and religious indifference in countries with self-induced and enforced secularization. *European Societies, 2*(2), 167–194.

Meulermann, H. (2004). Enforced secularization – Spontaneous revival? Religious belief, unbelief, uncertainty and indifference in East and West European countries 1991–1998. *European Sociological Review, 20*(1), 47–61.

Miszlivetz, F., & Jensen, J. (1998). An emerging paradox: Civil society from above? In D. Rueschemeyer et al. (Eds.), *Participation and democracy East and West: Comparisons and interpretations* (pp. 83–98). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Need, A., & Evans, G. (2001). Analyzing patterns of religious participation in post-communist Eastern Europe. *The British Journal of Sociology, 52*(2), 229–248.

Niemi, R., & Sobieszek, B. (1977). Political socialization. *Annual Review of Sociology, 3*, 209–233.

Pickel, G. (2009). Secularization as a European fate? Results from the church and religion in an enlarged Europe project 2006. In G. Pickel & O. Muller (Eds.), *Church and religion in contemporary Europe. Results from empirical and comparative research* (pp. 145–166). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften.

Pollack, D. (2001). Modification in the religious field of Central and Eastern Europe. *European Societies, 3*(2), 135–165.

Ruiter, S., & De Graaf, N. D. (2006). National context, religiosity and volunteering: Results from 53 countries. *American Sociological Review, 71*(2), 191–210.

Schofer, E., & Fourcade-Gourinchas, M. (2001). The structural contexts of civic engagement: Voluntary association membership in comparative perspective. *American Sociological Review, 66*(4), 806–828.

Smidt, C. (1999). Religion and civic engagement: A comparative analysis. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 565*, 176–192.

Sonderskov, K. M. (2010). Does generalized social trust lead to associational membership? Unraveling a bowl of well-tossed spaghetti. *European Sociological Review, 27*(4), 419–434.

Stan, L., & Turcescu, L. (2000). The Romanian Orthodox Church and post-communist democratization. *Europe – Asia Studies, 52*(8), 1467–1488.

Stan, L., & Turcescu, L. (2007). *Religion and politics in post-communist Romania*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stark, R. (2001). God, rituals and moral order. *Journal for Scientific Study of Religion, 40*, 619–636.

Suanet, B., et al. (2009). Changes in volunteering among young old in the Netherlands between 1992 and 2002: The impact of religion, age-norms, and intergenerational transmission. *European Journal of Ageing, 6*(1), 157–165.

Tomka, M. (1991). Secularization or anomy? Interpreting religious change in communist societies. *Social Compass, 38*(1), 93–102.

Tomka, M. (2002). Introduction. *Social Compass, 49*(4), 483–495.

Valkov, N. (2009). Membership in voluntary organizations and democratic performance: European post-communist countries in comparative perspective. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 42*(1), 1–21.

Van Deth, J., & Elff, M. (2004). Politicisation, economic development and political interest in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research, 43*(3), 477–508.

Verba, S., et al. (1995). *Voice and equality. Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Voicu, B. (2005). *Penuria postmodernă a postcomunismului*. Iaşi: Expert Projects.

Voicu, M. (2007). *România religioasa*. Iaşi: Institutul European.

Voicu, M., & Voicu, B. (2003). Volunteering in România: a rara avis. In P. Dekker & L. Halman (Eds.), *The values of volunteering: Cross-cultural perspective* (pp. 143–160). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.

Wach, J. (1955). *Sociologie de la religion*. Paris: Payot.

White, S., et al. (2000). Religion and political action in postcommunist Europe. *Political Studies, 48*(4), 681–705.

Chapter 12
Religion and Civil Society in Ukraine and Russia

Olga Balakireva and Iuliia Sereda

12.1 Introduction

Deep economic crisis, budget deficits and hyperinflation, widespread corruption, ineffective privatisation and shadow economies created an ideological vacuum after the demise of communism. Religious organisations some way were able to fill that vacuum. Following years of suppression, religious institutions have played an important role in the post-Communist transformation of the former USSR countries and in the activities of civil societies within them. Numerous faith-based organisations emerged providing additional support for the development of the non-governmental sector, expansion of various patterns of ownership and adjustments in the free market ethics. Churches have a potential as social organisations to influence their followers, not just in a prayer or faith encounter but even in social and political matters. However, the development of civil society in the post-Soviet space is facing several barriers. In weak democracies, laden with an unelaborated and anti-democratic past, NGOs often are the creatures of the governments, parties or individuals aiming toto enhance their power, prestige or material interests. In such cases, civil society is strong only statistically. Taking into account the growing importance of religion, as both an institution and a personal faith, it could be an important agent of civic initiatives and contribute to the further development of civil society.

In this chapter we aim at developing a conceptual framework about the relationship between religion and civil society in the former USSR countries by elaborating issues of religion and its relationship with civil society's structure, its environment and civic values. The question about the extent to which religion contributes to civil society has been widely discussed before, but this debate focused mainly on the civic role of religion in the secular world. However, while most of West European

O. Balakireva (✉) • I. Sereda
Department of Monitoring-Based Research Towards Social and Economic Transformations,
NAS Institute for Economic and Forecasting, Kiev, Ukraine
e-mail: bon_smc@inet.ua; iuliia.sereda@gmail.com

countries experienced the decline of religiosity, a religious revival takes place in many former Soviet countries. We investigate the relationship between religion and civil society in countries where the religiosity increase contributed to development issues in general. For this reason we compare religion and civil society in Ukraine and Russia. These countries are perfect cases because of their Communist past, dramatic democratic transitions, state atheism policy and religious resurgence after the collapse, dominance of the Orthodox Church among denominations and the so-called third wave of civil society development. First, let us set the context.

12.2   Religious Revival After USSR

The religious situation has changed dramatically since the early 1980s. According to sociological studies, during the 1970s, the level of religiosity (belonging to a denomination) in USSR ranged from 10 to 15 % in the cities and from 20 to 30 % in rural areas.[1] Almost 40 years later, in 1999 EVS 58 % of the Ukrainians and 52 % of the Russians said to belong to a denomination. In 2008 the percentage of believers in terms of belonging to a denomination increased again: 76 % in Ukraine and 63 % in Russia. According to the theory of post-Communist trauma, the turn towards religion was a strategy of adjusting to the new market reality and preparing for radical change (Borowik 2006; Titarenko 2008). Religion became a significant integrating factor and a place for constructing social solidarity by means of moral and spiritual support. For instance, Orthodoxy is not only a denomination but also a part of popular cultural and national identity in Russia. According to Borowik (2006), contemporary post-Soviet social and political conditions are favourable for the functioning of religious institutions and for the religious self-realisation of people. Religion has transformed into a human right, free to follow or not, in total contrast to the previous necessity for individuals to be, or at least to declare themselves atheists. Former USSR countries were pushed into a global market of religions when obligation shifted to consumption and religion became a matter of personal choice and lifestyle (Davie 2004). New cultural patterns of public and interpersonal respect and behaviour emerged through the development of trust, tolerance, spirituality and morality.

However, the literature remains divided about the consequences of the religious revival in post-Communist countries.[2] Has the growth of religion taken place in post-Communist nations as a result of only declared religiosity (belonging without believing), or is there a real renaissance of religiosity following the fall of communism? Need and Evans who compared patterns of religiosity in 1993–1994 in ten post-Communist countries including Ukraine and Russia report that church participation rates usually

---

[1] Data of Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM).

[2] That is also a problem of data limitations: poor official statistics concerning religious affiliation and church attendance during communism and lack of representative surveys.

show a linear decline as one moves from older to younger generations (Need and Evans 2001). Borowik (2002a, b) concluded that although the number of those who believe in God and adhere to the Orthodox tradition rose in the short term immediately after the fall of communism, the level of religious practice is as low today as in the most secularised Western European societies (Borowik 2002a, b). Several studies emphasised that new forms of 'individualised' spirituality outside the church are emerging, also in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, Kaariainen found that in late 1990s, Russians went to church less often than other Europeans (Kaariainen 1998). In contrast, Greeley argues that generational comparisons of faith in God and in reincarnation suggest a curvilinear 'U'-shaped curve, with the oldest and the post-1960s generation being more likely to express faith than the middle aged (Greeley 2003). Based on ISSP data from nine former Communist countries, he concludes that a revival in religious convictions has occurred among the younger generation in the region, although this has not, as yet, been accompanied by a rise in church attendance. This supports the supply-side theory claiming that religiosity in post-Communist states is mainly confined to an increase in numbers of religious organisations competing actively for 'hearts and minds' and in particular by the degree of state regulation of the church (Norris and Inglehart 2004).

Recent EVS data shows that Ukraine is as secularised as many Western European countries,[3] while Russia is even more secularised (Table 12.1). About 25 % of Ukrainians and 15 % of Russians admit their affiliation to a religious denomination and regularly take part in religious rituals. Both Ukraine and Russia are characterised by the prevalence of individual religious patterns concerning regular practice of prayer/meditation without regular church attendance or even regular practice without identification as a religious person. A quarter of Russians only declare their religiosity, identifying themselves as religious with lack of any religious practice. This pattern is less prevalent in Ukraine and more comparable with the percentage of declared religiosity in average European country. Thus, although Russia and Ukraine both have been influenced by the same policy of atheism, Russian society is more secularised at the moment. More than one-third of Russians are not religious, which resembles the Western European average, while 13 % of the people in Ukraine can be classified as not religious.

Over the last 10 years, traditional and individual religiosity has significantly increased in both post-Soviet countries used in the analysis. The religious revival in Ukraine and Russia occurred not only in terms of belonging but also of practising religion. This is opposed to what has happened in Western Europe, which became more atheistic and less religious in the traditional sense and remained almost on the same level concerning individual and declared religiosity. Also the majority of Eastern European countries experienced similar growths of individual religiosity

---

[3] In this article, religiosity is not understood in terms of belonging to a certain confession but as a set of community practices that imply beliefs, rituals, and visits to church, i.e., all practices that are envisaged by the laws of both Christianity and Islam that are the most common religions in Ukraine and Russia. In this context, the traditional religiosity is juxtaposed to individual religiosity that includes beliefs and rituals but does not imply visits to church.

Table 12.1 Religiosity profiles of Ukraine and Russia compared to average European patterns, %[a]

	Ukraine		Russia		Western Europe[f]		Eastern Europe[f]		The whole Europe	
	1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008
Religiosity among total population										
Traditional religiosity[b]	19.3	25.6	9.5	15.5	34.4	26.5	28.4	29.3	31.8	28.1
Individual spirituals[c]	35.0	41.4	25.8	33.6	21.7	22.8	26.1	33.8	23.6	29.0
Declared religiosity[d]	21.8	20.1	31.1	25.4	17.6	17.5	17.4	18.5	17.5	18.1
Not religious[e]	23.9	13.0	33.6	25.5	26.3	33.1	28.1	18.3	27.1	24.7
Religiosity among young people (under 35 years)										
Traditional religiosity	13.6	25.9	7.4	14.1	23.7	18.9	23.6	27.7	23.6	24.3
Individual spirituals	33.6	37.0	18.8	28.4	22.6	21.9	25.8	32.6	24.0	28.4
Declared religiosity	26.8	22.6	36.8	29.8	19.6	16.3	18.2	19.5	19.0	18.3
Not religious	26.1	14.5	37.0	27.7	34.1	42.9	32.4	20.1	33.4	29.1

Source: EVS, 1999–2008

[a]EVS data was used. Religiosity combines three variables: religious identity (self-identification as a religious person or nonreligious person/convinced atheist), frequency of prayer/meditation outside religious institutions (every day, more than once week, once a week, at least once a month, several times a year, less often, never) and frequency of church attendance (more than once week, once a week, once a month, only on specific holy days, once a year, less often, never). Calculated in this way, religion can be grouped into four classes: not religious (lack of identity and practice (prayer and/or church attendance)), declared religiosity (presence of identity but lack of practice), individual (regular prayer/meditation without regular church attendance or regular practice without identity) and traditional religiosity (identity, regular prayer/meditation and church attendance)

[b]Identity as religious person, regular prayer/meditation and church attendance

[c]Regular prayer/meditation with a lack of regular church attendance or regular practice without identity

[d]Presence of identity but lack of regular practice (church attendance, prayer/meditation)

[e]Lack of identity and practice (prayer and/or church attendance)

[f]Western and Eastern Europe division is based on United Nations classification of European countries participated in EVS. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Eastern Europe: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine

and a reduction of atheism as both Russia and Ukraine. Also between Ukrainian and Russian youth, traditional as well as individual religiosity increased which substantiates Greely's thesis. For the last 10 years, the percentage of young people regularly practising religious rituals increased twofold in Ukraine as well as Russia.

The religious revival was not followed by any significant changes in the confessional structure. Orthodoxy remains the predominant religion in both countries. According to the EVS 2008, 93 % of the Russians and 81 % of the Ukrainians identified themselves as Orthodox Christians (among those who claimed any religious affiliation). Muslims (7 %) prevail in Russia and Roman Catholics (15 %) in Ukraine among non-Orthodox confessions. Protestant denomination was self-identified by about 3 % of Ukrainians and less than a percent of Russians.

Fig. 12.1 Religiosity among the Orthodox and non-Orthodox denominations in Ukraine (**a**) and Russia (**b**) during 1999–2088, % (Taking into account the small numbers of non-Orthodox denominations in both countries for the analysis on the basis of EVS data, the level of religiosity among people affiliated with these confessions is compared in general terms and in relation to the representatives of the Orthodox confession. It should be noted that the majority of representatives of non-Orthodox confessions are Catholics in Ukraine and Muslims in Russia)

All other denominations (Judaism Buddhism, etc.) are not widespread and amount less than a percent in both countries.

It should be noted that the Orthodox self-identification in both countries does not imply traditional religiosity, i.e. the presence of not only religious identity, but attendance of religious practices as well (Fig. 12.1). In 2008 in Ukraine, almost half of representatives of non-Orthodox confessions (43 %) regularly visited church and prayed, while among the Orthodox Christians this number amounted to 26 %. The level of traditional religiosity was even higher among Ukrainians belonging to non-Orthodox confessions in 1999 (61 %), which is mainly explained by the difference in the confessional structure. At that time, nontraditional religions and sects were more widespread. In Russia, differences in the levels of religiosity between the representatives of Orthodox and non-Orthodox confessions have been also obvious. In 2008, 23 % of the Russians who represented the Orthodox confessions and 35 % of representatives of non-Orthodox confession were regularly visiting church and observing other religious practices.

The correlation dynamics between different types of religiosity depending on confession demonstrate the growing share of traditional/individual religiosity among the Orthodox believers in Russia, while in Ukraine these changes are manifested insignificantly. Nevertheless, Orthodox believers in Ukraine attend church service and pray beyond the church institutions more frequently than the Orthodox believers in Russia. There are no significant changes in the growth of the traditional/individual religiosity share of non-Orthodox confessions in Russia, while in Ukraine it is quite the opposite, with the growing number of non-Orthodox believers, who just declare their religious affiliation, i.e. perceive the religion as an element of cultural tradition of a nation to which they belong.

12.3   Religious Organisations as a Significant Subsystem of Civil Society

Civil society has developed fast in the former USSR countries in recent years. Thousands of NGOs, professional and interest-based groups, advocacy, watchdog structures and foundations emerged. They began to address many social, economic, political and cultural issues facing the region and to articulate the diversity of both public and private interests. Ukraine remains a leader by the number of civil society organisations among other former USSR countries, having 358 NGOs per 100,000 individuals in 2011, and the number of NGOs increased every year for the last 5 years (Fig. 12.2).[4] In contrast, there are 81 NGOs per 100,000 individuals in Russia and the number of NGOs declined since 2008 (Fig. 12.2).

According to the worldwide CIVICUS Civil Society Index[5] estimates, Ukraine achieved a 1.7 rate, of 3 being the highest level of development, while the average rate for Eastern European countries was 1.5 and the rate for Russia is 1.1. However, the recent growth of civil society structures does not highlight the enlargement of civil activity. Thus, in Ukraine in 2009, only 37.5 % of the total number of NGOs registered by the Ministry of Justice reported on their activities. Others were not found by their registration addresses. Apparently, they are just 'organisations on the paper' that are formally registered, but not really active. It should be emphasised that in recent years, these figures have worsened. According to the estimates of the Counterpart Creative Centre, active and ongoing NGOs in Ukraine represent only 8–9 % of the total registered organisations. National polls show that third-sector membership in Ukraine and Russia both remained constant for the last 5 years, with no major changes. However,

---

[4]Estimates are based on the national statistics. Political and religious organisations are not included because of different statistical methodology for such kind of non-governmental organisations in the selected countries.

[5]The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) is a participatory needs assessment and action planning tool for civil society around the world. The CSI most recent phase 2003–2006 covered over 50 countries worldwide. Official site: http://csi.civicus.org/

Fig. 12.2 Religious organisations and other NGOs during 2005–2011 in Russia and Ukraine, number

the number of NGO members has been reducing with time. According to EVS, in the last 10 years, the percentage of NGO members has reduced by 11 % in Ukraine (up to 22 %) and by 13 % in Russia (up to 18 %). It should be noted that the estimates of the number of members of civil society organisations significantly depend on which organisations should be regarded the third sector. For example, in Ukraine and Russia, political parties and trade unions are often not included in the general structure of NGOs, though reduction of membership in these organisations is the most visible. In the 1990s, membership in the trade unions in Ukraine reduced by nine million people, that is, by almost one-third. Even without taking trade unions and political parties into account, in recent 10 years, the percentage of the NGO members reduced by 5 % (up to 10 %) in Ukraine and remained practically the same in Russia (dropped from 11 to 9 %).

NGOs in Ukraine and Russia are facing a lack of mass support, shortage of financial resources, problems in relations with governmental institutions and the lack of qualified staff. Moreover, there is a prevalence of stereotypes presenting NGOs as 'eaters of grants' and GONGOs (NGOs organised and controlled by the government). This is a consequence of the development of NGOs in the former USSR countries which meant that these organisations emerged mostly 'under the patronage' of certain politically or economically active people, who pursued their own goals, not as a result of natural self-organisation of certain groups. Churches and religious organisations have better credibility. Although the expansion of religious organisations seems to be less dynamic compared to other NGOs, religious institutions are among the highest trusted in both countries. About two-thirds of respondents in Ukraine and Russia have confidence in church and other religious organisations, while confidence in NGOs is characterised by only one-third of population in both countries.

Table 12.2 Number of religious organisations per 100,000 people, during 2001–2011, by the most common denominations

Russia	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Religious organisations (total)	13.8	14.1	14.8	15.0	15.4	15.8	16.1	16.1	15.9	16.6	16.8
Orthodox	7.8	7.9	8.1	8.3	8.6	8.9	9.1	9.2	9.0	9.4	9.6
Protestants	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.4
Muslims	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.0
Catholics	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Buddhism	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Judaism	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Others	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Ukraine	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Religious organisations (total)	49.7	53.5	57.2	60.4	62.9	65.1	67.0	69.1	70.8	72.6	74.3
Orthodox	26.9	28.8	30.8	32.2	33.4	34.5	35.6	36.7	37.7	38.8	39.6
Catholics	8.7	9.0	9.2	9.4	9.6	9.8	10.0	10.2	10.4	10.5	10.7
Muslims	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3
Protestants	12.5	13.9	15.3	16.3	16.8	18.0	18.6	19.2	19.7	20.1	20.5
Buddhism	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Judaism	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7
Others	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.3	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1

The religious organisations are more common in Ukraine than in Russia. There are 74.3 organisations in Ukraine and 16.8 organisations in Russia per 100,000 people. Thus, Russia is not only less religious in terms of belonging and practising, but also in an institutional aspect (the number of religious organisations). More than a half of organisations are Orthodox in both countries (Table 12.2).

More than every fourth organisation in Ukraine and every fifth one in Russia relates to Protestant denomination. Even though Catholics in Ukraine and Muslims in Russia are the second most popular denominations in terms of belonging, both of them have a lesser number of organisations compared to Protestants in the region.

12.4 Religion and Civil Society

Robert Putnam (2000) argues that non-political civil society organisations are crucial to democracy because they build social capital, trust and shared values, which are transferred into political sphere and help to hold society together, facilitating an understanding of the interconnectedness of society and interests within it. Faith-based organisations as mediating institutions generate social capital differently than other social institutions, making up for the democratic deficit caused by the relative weakness of trade unions, national federations and anonymous

umbrella organisations (Coleman 2003; Verba et al. 1995; Becker and Dhingra 2001; Campbell and Yonish 2003). In Ukraine and Russia, both religious institutions are engaged in the process of democratisation, assisting a more complete realisation of human rights and freedoms. The considerable increase in the number of religious organisations is also reflected in their expansion and outreach into civil society, supporting solutions to social problems and aiding marginal groups. Because the post-Soviet governments turned out to be incapable to solve these problems, the churches and other religious organisations became crucial to take civic initiatives such as the provision of food to the homeless, visiting orphanages to distribute humanitarian aid collected in the parish and provision of disaster relief at nursing homes. A considerable part of work is devoted to HIV prevention. All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations became prestigious and influential institutions of civil society in Ukraine. They promote interfaith consensus; consider ways of improving the existing legislation relating to freedom of thought, religion and religious organisations in a dialogue with public authorities; and also develop mechanisms for the protection and promotion of public morality. There is also an interfaith organisation in Russia: the Interreligious Council which brings together religious leaders and representatives of the four traditional religions in Russia: Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism.

However, there are several barriers in developing civil society through religion in the post-Soviet era. Denominations have adjusted to the new social realities rather slowly. Not all religious organisations have managed to develop a post-totalitarian theological strategy. Some churches and denominations, finding themselves in the fundamentally new social and political realities with no experience of serving in environments rich in cultural and religious diversity, have not been able to supply answers to the questions related to their own survival, the preservation of their identities and how to deal with 'competition' with foreign religious movements. Sometimes there has been nostalgia for some of the more traditional church structures from the era of state religious patronage. But, as Titarenko has stressed, the Orthodox Church does not control believers' behaviours to the same degree as the Roman Catholic or Protestant churches, mainly because of the lower level of 'external religiosity' in the former Soviet countries, as well as non-effective instruments for increasing regular church attendance (Titarenko 2008). There is a common joke in Russia that whether you go to church or not is not the critical issue, but if you choose not to go, it should be the Orthodox Church.

Such a heritage affects the levels of involvement in civil activity, less among Orthodox organisations compared to the Protestant, Catholic or other Christians. It is also important to emphasise the incomplete institutionalisation of civil society structure that makes the civil activity of religious institutions less effective. According to the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, the most developed dimensions for civil society in the former Soviet countries are the structure and values dimensions, while scores for civil society environment and impact are quite low (CIVICUS 2006). This results from the dominance of moral attitudes and intentions, rather than the actual activities of civil society, and the poor attitudes of government, the public and business towards civil society.

Collaboration between religion and civil society is further challenged by conflicts between different denominations. Confrontation is caused by misunderstanding economic and territorial claims as well as competition and diverse political sympathies that exist between religious communities and between different faiths. Conflict between inter-Orthodox churches is more critical in Ukraine, where Orthodox Christianity is represented by three churches: Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate as part of the Russian Orthodox Church (57 % of believers), Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate[6] (29 % believers) and the Ukrainian Autocephaly Orthodox Church[7] (13 % believers).[8] Affiliation with any of these churches is dictated by the political choice and ideological differences, creating barriers to social integration and solidarity. For instance, the Kiev Patriarchate is associated with a 'true' Ukrainian identity, while the Moscow Patriarchate is seen as the expansion of a Russian identity. In Russia, the monopoly share of the Moscow Patriarchate in the overall structure of Orthodox religious organisations is 97 %. A new impulse to transform the relationships between the Orthodox believers of different patriarchates of Ukraine into a more acute political dimension was given by the XVI Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Cyril, who suggested the 'Russian World' doctrine. In his speech at the III Assembly of the Russian World, the patriarch named three pillars of such 'civilisational project': the Orthodox belief, Russian language and historical heritage (Russian tradition) that link Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as a nucleus of the Russian World.

Inter-Christian opposition between the Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism as well as Protestantism seems to be not only a competition for believers but also a struggle for church property and religious buildings, which influence the civic initiatives of churches. In 2002 the Russian Orthodox Church stressed the inviolability of its canonical territory, blaming the evangelistic activity of Catholic monks in establishing Catholic youth centres, summer camps for children, health centres, nursing homes and the spread of Catholic literature through direct mail.

The dark side of civil society development in the post-Soviet period is associated with the revival of Islamic fundamentalist organisations and the threat of Muslim extremism. Clericalism could also make further civil society enlargement challenging. In particular, Russia was included in the 2009 watch list of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom because of the adoption of the federal law 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations' in 1997, which stated 'the

---

[6]Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate has no official recognition per se from the Orthodox world and is not in communion with any of the canonical Orthodox Churches of the world. It emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union through the merger of two church groups advocating independence from the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate): Representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church.

[7]Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church emerged after the February Revolution of 1917 as a result of the movement for the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the government and simultaneously from the Russian church. Canonical status and the relationship UAOC with other Orthodox churches remain unresolved.

[8]Distribution of denominations is based on EVS data, 2008.

special role of the Orthodoxy in Russia's history in the development of its spirituality and culture', that indirectly leads to the restrictions and discrimination of other religious groups. Religious revival is often used as a means for political elites to incorporate traditional conservative ideology into their state ideology and mentality of the people, in order to establish and apply strong political power through totalitarianism rather than democratic values.

12.5 Religiosity and Civil Society

Though religious organisations remain an important subsystem of civil society in the post-Soviet space, from our perspective, the core issue is to assess the potential impact of general religiosity in terms of faith and practice and certain denominations as cultural forms on the development of civil society.

To answer the question, we should first determine what civil society is and what is the role of religiosity in the development of its elements. Civil society exists when there is (1) societal self-organisation independent of the state and yet able to cooperate with the state; (2) a legal system that is enforced and which derives from a democratic framework of government and that guarantees to individuals and organisations basic human and civil rights; (3) cultural patterns of public and interpersonal respect and behaviour, connected with respect for community traditions; and (4) a presence of public opinion that is able to influence the decisions of the state and is expressed through free media, restricted only by its own code of behaviour and respect for community traditions (Alexander 1998). Generally, civil society is not limited only to NGOs but rather implicates the space that beyond the power, business and family relationships where individuals are united on a voluntary basis to promote common interests. In such perception of civil society, religion contributes to its establishment by shaping the social capital and solidarity within the organised religious structures (church, faith-based NGOs, etc.) as well as by the development of spiritual and moral basis of civil values (trust, honesty, care, etc.). Religiosity is often considered an important part of civil society by stressing religion as community and social identity, religious beliefs and networks as the context for social and political mobilisation and religion and its instrumental aspects, including the provision of education, culture and social welfare. However, several papers referred to the 'dark side' of social capital, referring to the creation of trust, sociability and bonding among regressive religious and ethnic groups (Putzel 1997; Chambers and Kopstein 2001).

12.5.1 Religiosity, NGOs and Volunteering

Civil society and charitable activities in response to the challenges of the time are becoming ever more popular among the faith-based organisations in Russia and Ukraine. In 2000, the 'Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church'

and also the 'Basic Guidelines of the Social Program of Russian Muslims' were adopted. In 2003 the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Associations of Russia developed the social concept for the Jews in Russia and released the 'Social Position of the Protestant Churches of Russia'. The social concepts of traditional religions that exist in Russia offer a broad range of civil activities such as peacekeeping on the international, interethnic and community levels; contribution to the mutual understanding and cooperation between individuals, peoples and countries; activities to preserve morality in the society; spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic education and upbringing; charity and development of joint social programmes; restoration and development of historic and cultural heritage; dialogue with the state power bodies; work with law enforcement officers and provision of spiritual and moral education to them; prevention of crimes; humanitarian research; environment protection activities; and support to the institute of family, motherhood and childhood. Religious brotherhoods and associations often create charitable foundations that provide funds to conduct educational activities among children and adolescents and to support disabled children and hospitals for low-income believers. The famous Russian Club of Orthodox Maecenases is the most active Orthodox non-for-profit union that admits Orthodox businessmen involved in charity. The leading position among the Catholic non-governmental faith-based organisations in Ukraine is held by the International Fund Caritas, which has a well-established network in practically all regions of the country and which focuses on the provision of humanitarian, social and financial aid and charitable services to people in need irrespective of their confessions. Ukrainian Protestants perform social work within the organisation Adventist Development and Relief Agency, which is focused on the promotion of healthy lifestyle and offers individual consultations of the doctors, family consultants, psychologists and social workers. Faith-based organisations also test the new forms of social service. For example, since 2008, a non-governmental church pension fund has begun its official activities in Ukraine; it was founded by the Primate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and has the goal to ensure a decent pension to the priests and laity. The Russian Orthodox Church opened 30 health-care centres that provide pregnancy management services in different cities of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The only difference of these clinics with the regular ones is that they would not perform an abortion if there is no threat to the mothers' health.

Several studies reveal that both religious tradition and church attendance play an important role in fostering civic engagement in faith-based organisations (Strømsnes 2008; Greeley 1997; etc.). However, religiosity plays an important role in motivating NGO membership and volunteering not only in terms of religious organisations, but also secular NGOs (Berger 2003). Wilhelm et al. advanced the hypothesis that charity perse is associated with religion, which encourages people, even those who do not practice any religion, to make donations to religious organisations; at the same time, people who practice religion are ready to donate much more (Wilhelm et al. 2007). The few publications on empirical data about the relationship of civil activism, charity and religiosity in Ukraine and Russia focus mainly on civil activism of believers within specific religious communities. In particular, the research

conducted by Mersiyanova demonstrate that both Muslim communities and Orthodox congregations do not yet serve as the real sources of mutual assistance for the majority of believers in Russia, let alone a large-scale charity beyond the parish (Mersiyanova 2010).

As argued before, Ukraine has better-developed civil society structures and is less secularised than Russia. Therefore, we can hypothesise that religiosity will contribute to the involvement in civil society organisations and charity activities more in Ukraine than in Russia (H1).

12.5.2   Religiosity and Political Action

Several studies suggest that religion serves as both an organisational and a psychological resource for individual and collective political actions that are important element of civil society. Kristin Strømsnes asserts that there are significant differences in all forms of political participation between those who frequently go to church and those who do not (Strømsnes 2008). There appear, however, to be striking differences in the political mobilisation capacity between different confessions. American Protestants appear most active, while religious Jews and other Christians are least (Adelman and Omoto 2007). Also in Eastern Europe, churchgoers are generally more politically engaged. In Estonia, the Orthodox believers are more participatory than Catholics, but in Russia there is no significant effect of churchgoing on any of the measures of political participation. The evidence for Ukraine is mixed. It is important to underscore the special character of relationships between the dominating Orthodox Church and the state in Russia. While the spiritual foundation of Western civil society is in the creation of personal independence from state social institutions, Slavic Orthodoxy emerged in close relations with state policy and institutes. During the entire post-Soviet period, the Russian Orthodox Church that existed beyond the state control and was based on the foundation of all its symbolic capital could not implement its ideological capacity without the state intervention and support. It has rather used the governmental bureaucratic and legal mechanisms to create favourable conditions in order to expand its social base (legal assignment of the 'special role' of the Orthodoxy, anti-sectarian policy, active attempts to infuse its doctrine into the secular education, etc.) and not to perform its missionary activities. Within the context of political activities and mobilisation, it contributed to the strengthening of the image of the Orthodox Church as an ally of the state. Although by its social concept the Russian Orthodox Church is not supposed to cooperate with the state in the areas of political fight, election campaigns and support campaigns in favour of certain political parties and public and political leaders, in reality it does perform such activities. For instance, in the run-up for the opposition meetings before the presidential elections in Russia in 2012, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Cyril urged the believers not to attend the demonstrations and said that the Orthodox people should prefer prayers in the quiet of the monastery to the meetings.

In Ukraine the situation is slightly different. Firstly, unlike Russia, it has a number of faith-based political parties, even though they do not enjoy any significant population support (Christian Popular Union Party, All-Ukrainian Christian Association, Republican Christian Party, Muslim Party of Ukraine, Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine and Christian Liberal Union). Secondly, the split in the Orthodox Church is closely linked to political course, and different patriarchies are associated with different political movements throughout the country (Moscow Patriarchy, which is pro-Russian and supports the present authorities, and Kiev Patriarchy, which is nationalistic and supports opposition). Civil activities of non-Orthodox communities in Ukraine are less politicised within the context of political relations at the national level; their non-partisan political activities are more related to the specific religious issues. There is an example of protest movement of the Catholic communities in Odessa where the city mayor, who is adherent to the 'Russian World' ideology, had actually prohibited traditional Catholic religious processions and created obstacles to the social work of the national and religious minorities. In spring 2012, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and Roman Catholic Church urged the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) of Ukraine to change the legislation and prohibit abortions in Ukraine, and to support this call, they organised a number of meetings of Ukrainian Catholics. Muslim community in both countries is not consolidated and becomes politically active only to resolve their individual interests. Ideologically and politically, the Muslims are subdivided into the moderate ones that present the majority and the radical ones, who prefer implementing partisan political activities. A significant portion of Ukrainian Protestants, first of all Adventists and Baptists, support the idea that the believers can participate in the public and political activities for the benefit of the society and the state. However, non-participation in any political activity is a mandatory requirement to all staff clergymen.

Such observations make it likely to hypothesise that both in Russia and in Ukraine, political participation is related to individual confessions but not to the general level of religiosity (H2).

12.5.3   Religiosity and Democracy

Religious institutions and their believers have played essential roles in opening up of authoritarian regimes to democratising pressures in Eastern Europe, in raising new democratic demands in established democracies and in providing democratic skills and organisational strength in civil society (Levine and Mainwaring 1986; Casanova 1994; Verba et al. 1995). Civil society in general and churches in particular strengthen democracy by providing citizens access to financial and informational resources, preparing them for their effective participation in political life. Huntington claims Western Christianity and democracy are strongly linked, while predominantly Muslim countries are usually not democratic (Huntington 1996, p. 73). Inglehart (1997), however, asserts that the links between Protestantism, democracy

and economic growth are weakening. He refers to those, of high economic growth rates in the 'Asian Tigers' countries, which are predominantly Confucian and Buddhist. Weithman (2002) shows the strong correlation between membership in congregations and voting behaviour. In predominantly Orthodox countries such as Ukraine and Russia, the official church documents state, 'the Church does not give preference to any political system, or to any existing political doctrine'. At the same time the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church declares that theocracy and monarchy 'are higher forms of the state structure from the religious point of view' compared to democracy. According to sociological studies of ideological and political preferences of the Orthodox adepts in Russia conducted by different organisations, the doctrine of an independent 'Russian way' of societal development and the need in a strong leader find the majority support in this group. For example, studies of Reisinger and Miller show that values that are most supportive of democracy are characteristic for less religious Ukrainians and Russians (Reisinger and Miller 1994).

Taking into consideration the social and cultural context of relationship between the church and the state, as well as the previous studies of democracy and religion in the predominantly Orthodox post-Soviet countries, we hypothesise no links between religiosity and the value of democracy in both Russia and Ukraine (H3). We can add to this that Orthodoxy in both countries can encourage the support of authoritarian alternatives in the religious population.

12.5.4 Religiosity and Institutional Confidence

According to Fukuyama, low levels of trust at the societal and institutional levels reflect a general decline of social interest and trust to the ideals of the 'civil society' (Fukuyama 1995). Also Putnam demonstrated a close correlation between the number and activism of non-governmental organisations and civil associations on the one hand and mutual trust of the society members on the other hand (Putnam 2000). According to national surveys in Russia and Ukraine, confidence in the church and religious organisations appears positive and stable. Other institutions are far less trusted, the Parliament least of all. Religion has until recently remained relatively unexplored in the trust literature in terms of to what extent religiosity promotes or discourages social trust. Usually negative effects are found (La Porta et al. 1997; Zak and Knack 2001; Berggren and Jordahl 2006; Bjørnskov 2007). Protestantism seems an exception (Uslaner 2002; Guiso et al. 2003; Delhey and Newton 2005). Welch et al. (2004) report that while affiliation with Christian churches is related to lower levels of trust, those who participate a lot and who consider religion important demonstrate a positive effect. Berggren and Bjørnskov argue that the link between religiosity and social trust might be positive as well as negative (Berggren and Bjørnskov 2009). Although religion teaches honesty and generosity towards others and provides social arenas that foster cooperation, it may cause division and rift, religious people may distrust those who do not share their beliefs and who are not

subject to the same enforcement mechanisms as they are. In Latin America countries, religiosity is consistently associated positively with greater confidence in institutions (Valenzuela et al. 2009). The Russian Independent Institute for Social and National Problems found that the level of trust of believers to social institutions is close to that of the Russian society as a whole; at the same time, the Islam adepts are characterised with lower trust to public institutions (Mchedlov et al. 2006).

It has been noticed that the crisis of institutional trust in Ukraine and Russia is characteristic for the general population. Therefore, we do not expect a relationship between religiosity and a trust to institutions (H4).

12.5.5   Religiosity and Social Cohesion

Although social cohesion is a broad term used to describe the bonds that bring people together, we consider social cohesion as the opposite to what Tocqueville called 'individualism' which 'disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and his friends, so that after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself' (Tocqueville 1945, p. 98). In this sense the extent of social cohesion might be considered as an indicator strengthening an environment favourable to civil society. Religious traditions can also help to tie a society together by reinforcing a feeling of unity in its people. Religion appears a facilitator of social cohesion and in-group solidarity. Durkheim and Weber defined religion as a system of beliefs and rituals referring to the sacred, which binds people together into social groups. The interest to religion as a factor of social consolidation in Russia and Ukraine is primarily linked with a complete or partial destruction of other consolidating forces. Some Russian analysts argue that the Russian Orthodox Church should become the foundation for social cohesion and development of civil society (Legoyda 2003). At the same time, the tendency to fill the 'ideological vacuum' with Orthodox-oriented ideology called for resistance in some regions where Orthodoxy has never been dominant (Silantieva 2011). According to some, the consolidating role of the Christianity in Ukraine depends on conformity of religious organisations with the transformational processes, with the degree to which the church would be able to adjust to the changes in the outside world and to reinterpret its traditional values in the modern context (Grabovetz and Yakovenko 2001). According to Ukrainian national monitoring conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the NAS of Ukraine since 1994, faith is not a decisive factor for the most important issues of social life. Believers and non-believers do not differ in their political views, attitudes towards economic transformations and in life satisfaction. Religion has also been seen as a potential risk for social cohesion. For instance, Paronikyan asserts that as long as Ukrainians remain religious, the problems in the field of religion can have much stronger influence compared to many other European countries, meaning that any ill-considered actions of the state in this field may provoke an increased tension (Paronikyan 2011).

Such considerations lead to the hypothesis (H5) that the growth of religiosity is not followed by the strengthening of consolidating functions of religion or that the role of religion in the *social cohesion* is either very weak or lacking.

12.5.6 Religiosity and Transparency

Corruption in both Ukraine and Russia seems inevitable and has become the 'normal' way of the functioning of authorities and acquired a systemic character. At the same time, according to the World Bank, the Governance Score for rule of law in religious Ukraine and less religious Russia is similar, around −0.7 on a scale from −2.5 (negative) to +2.5 (positive), positioning these countries in the lowest third of countries globally (WGI 2009). High levels of tolerance of corruption appear in national sociological surveys. Approximately half of Ukrainians regard corruption as a regular part of life. Corruption can sometimes or always be justified, e.g. as a kind of market mechanism to get things done faster or to balance low salaries (Yemelianova 2010).

In line with the current World Bank strategy, it is important to support the countries to improve their transparency by facilitating a more active participation and surveillance measures on the part of civil organisations. However, an extended network of NGOs involved in anticorruption initiatives is limited by the low access to information about the activity of the authorities and local self-government bodies, by the absence of legislatively provided mechanism of the authorities' reaction to reports of such organisations about corruption facts revealed by them and by attempts of some bodies of power and political forces to establish control over such organisations. Moreover, there are not many NGOs performing 'watchdog' roles. In this context, there is a growing attention to the need for in-depth analyses of ethics in the anticorruption agenda stressing the role of religious beliefs. Beets assumed that religious leaders might be recruited to fight corruption because religious people are less likely than nonreligious people to engage in corruption (Beets 2007). This idea stems from the argument that fairness and honesty form the basis of many religions.

Contrary to the assumption, many of the most corrupt countries in the world also rank high in terms of religiosity. Mass media in both Russia and Ukraine have published extensively about the penetration of corruption in the religious organisations. As an example, the news media once published the photo of Patriarch of All Russia Cyril, at which one could clearly see his very expensive wristwatch (more than US$ 100,000). In this case, the nature of 'religion-transparency' relationship might be contingent on the presence of democratic institutions: in democracies, where political institutions are designed to inhibit corrupt conduct, the morality provided by religion is related to attenuated corruption; conversely, in systems lacking democratic institutions, religion would not be associated with decreased corruption (Sommera et al. 2012). Research of the links between religiosity and transparency in Ukraine and Russia is still lacking in the scientific discourse.

In the current social and economic situation characterised with institutional corruption in Ukraine and Russia, we hypothesise (H6) that religiosity has not become a factor that strengthens counteraction to corruption and promotes the values of transparency.

12.5.7 Religiosity, Concern and Tolerance

It is often claimed that religion is conducive to tolerance and morality, either directly, e.g. via rituals, or indirectly via psychological effects (Iannaccone 1990). Religion can heal divisions and reduce tensions but can also exacerbate them.

Many analysts in Russia and Ukraine believe that the increasing level of public religiosity will become salutary and hope that faith will contribute to overcoming immorality and xenophobia and to the conviction to care for other people (in particular, the socially disadvantaged). Though public opinion surveys in Russia demonstrate that belonging to some religion has a stronger impact on daily practices (participation in traditional rituals) than on his or her philosophy (perceptions of the sense of life in general and morality in particular (Kofanova 2008)), Naletova argues that Orthodoxy is a significant moderating power in Russia. Religious beliefs make people more tolerant towards other religions (Naletova 2002). According to the research almost half of Russians (41 %) believe that truth is contained in all religions, and that 21 % are convinced that there is only one true religion are thought provoking.

Moral and ethical components of civil values are poorly related to the level of religiosity. When it comes to marginalised fellow citizens and concern about the living conditions of marginalised groups, we hypothesise (H7) that these values are correlated with certain confessional domains but not with religious beliefs and religious practices.

12.5.8 Religiosity and Environmental Ethics

A goal of civil society is to provide a favourable ecological environment and solve ecological problems, as well as facilitate a sustainable development. Studies on religion and ecology is focused on the role religion can play in regulating ecosystems that supports traditional livelihoods and prevents environmental deterioration (Rappaport 1999) and on the negative effect of religions fostering environmentally destructive attitudes and behaviours (Merchant 1980). As for Christianity, Truelove and Joireman showed that the Orthodox Christianity was negatively related to all measures of environmental behaviour, in particular the awareness of the consequences of environmental problems (Truelove and Joireman 2009). The religious organisations of Ukraine and Russia have only recently become interested in the issues of environmental protection. So, the Russian Orthodox Church is currently

developing a document 'Basic Principles of Ecological Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church'.

The links between religiosity and environmental ethics in Ukraine and Russia are either absent, or are very weak, in particular, due to the insufficient attention of the major confessions to the environmental protection issues. We hypothesise that religion has no effect on environmental values (H8).

12.6   Variables and Analysis

Between religion and civil society in Ukraine and Russia, we investigate the data of European Values Survey (waves 1999 and 2008) focusing on the methodology of The Civil Society Index Program realised by CIVICUS. We estimate associations between religion and civil society along the structure of civil society, the external environment in which civil society exists and functions and values practised and promoted in the civil society arena. In particular, the structural aspect includes participation in non-governmental organisations, the practice of volunteerism and non-partisan political actions. The environmental aspect describes how auspicious is the context for the development of civil society; the value aspect measures distribution and perception of civil values. Of course we do not include all indicators of civil society focusing on major elements of its structure, environment and values owing to the limited empirical data.

Dependent variable 'religiosity' was computed as a factor that combines next variables: religious identity (religious person, nonreligious person and convinced atheist); frequency of prayer/meditation (never, less often, several times a year, at least once a month, once a week, more than once week, every day); frequency of church attendance (never/practically never,[9] less often, once a year, only on specific holy days, once a month, once a week, more than once a week); beliefs in God, life after death, hell, heaven and sin; and importance of religion in life (very important, rather important, not very important, not at all important). The scale of religiosity varies from 57 (not religious) to 143 (very religious). Cronbach's Alpha of selected scale for Russia and Ukraine is 0.852; factor 'religiosity' explains 64 % of variance in both countries.

The dependent variable is related in a regression framework to an array of explanatory variables. These explanatory variables are 'membership in non-governmental organisations', 'volunteering', 'non-partisan political action', 'rejection of authoritarian alternatives', 'support of democracy', 'institutional trust', 'social cohesion', 'transparency', 'tolerance', 'concern' and 'environmental ethics'.

'Membership in non-governmental organisation' was constructed as a dummy variable showing a membership in one or more NGOs (social welfare services for

---

[9]In 1999 survey there were eight categories of response for church attendance, whereas there were seven alternatives in 2008. We recoded the 1999 data to the format of 2008 survey.

elderly, handicapped or deprived people; trade unions; political parties or groups; local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; third world development or human rights conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights; professional associations; youth work; women's groups; peace movement; voluntary organisations concerned with health and other groups). Experience of unpaid voluntary work for one or more above listed NGOs was used to create a variable 'Volunteering'. Religious organisations were excluded, because that can misrepresent the link between NGO membership as an integrated variable and religiosity. The research shows that all members of religious organisations are highly religious persons.

Dummy variable 'Non-partisan political action' means presence of experience in signing a petition, joining in boycotts or attending lawful demonstrations.

'Rejection of authoritarian alternatives' shows a weak demand for political system, having a strong leader that does not have to care about Parliament and elections. 'Four' means that a person does not support such political system totally and 'one' that a person totally supports such political system.

'Support of democracy' (min = 41, max = 160) is a variable constructed within four statements: 'In democracy, the economic system runs fine', 'Democracies are not indecisive and do not have too much squabbling', 'Democracies are good at maintaining order' and 'Democracy may have problems but is better'. Cronbach's Alpha of selected scale is 0.811 for Russia and 0.804 for Ukraine. Factor 'support of democracy' explains 64 % of variance in both countries.

'Institutional trust' was measured as a trust to non-political organisations (min = 31, max = 155). Variable is based on estimates of the confidence to education system, press, labour unions, police social security and health-care systems. Cronbach's Alpha of selected scale is 0.765 for Russia and 0.797 for Ukraine. Factor 'institutional trust' explains 47 % of variance in both countries. Variable 'social cohesion' (min = 1, max = 5) is based on the support of statement 'People should not stick to their own affairs and show a lot of interest in what others say or do'.

'Transparency' (min = 75, max = 210) is a factor constructed within three variables that describe justification of tax cheating and bribes. The variable describes the scale from justification to non-justification (transparency). Cronbach's Alpha of selected scale is 0.689 for Russia and 0.736 for Ukraine; factor 'transparency' explains 54 % of variance in both countries.

'Tolerance' (min = 0, max = 9) is a variable based on the estimates of social distance that was measured by the permissiveness of marginalised neighbours (people with a criminal record, people of a different race, heavy drinkers, emotionally unstable people, immigrants/foreign workers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals). 'Zero' means that a person does not care who might be a neighbour, and 'nine' means that a person would not like to live close to any of marginalised neighbours.

'Concern' (min = 15, max = 146) is a factor based on estimates to what extent people feel concerned about the living conditions of marginalised groups (elderly people, unemployed people, immigrants, sick and disabled people, children in poor

families). Cronbach's Alpha of selected scale is 0.778 for Russia and 0.764 for Ukraine; factor 'concern' explains 61 % of variance in both countries.

'Environmental ethics' (strongly disagree = 1, strongly agree = 4) is based on the support of the statement: 'I would give part of my income if I was certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution'.

We have applied multiple regression to test these hypotheses about the connections between several civil society elements and religiosity (criteria: PIN (0.05) and POUT (0.10)). First, associations between religiosity and civil society structure, environment and values were measured for both countries in the basis of EVS datasets, waves 1999 and 2008. Second, given that the effect of religion might differ not only in terms of religiosity level but also particularities of certain denominations, we measured connections between civil society components and main denominations (as self-identifications) represented in Ukraine and Russia. These are the Orthodox in both Russia and Ukraine, Roman Catholics and Protestants in Ukraine and Muslims in Russia. Because of the low proportions of non-Orthodox denominations in both countries, we estimated associations using the integrated 1999–2008 EVS dataset. The data is weighted to make the samples correspond to the national distribution. Furthermore, 'don't know' and missing values are excluded. The description of selected variables is presented in Table 12.3. Results of regressions are offered in Tables 12.4 and 12.5.

Table 12.3 Brief description of religiosity and civil society in Ukraine and Russia

	Ukraine		Russia	
	1999	2008	1999	2008
Religiosity				
Average religiosity level (min = 57, max = 143)	102.7	110.5	92.5	99.7
% of population identified themselves as religious (religious identity)	77.0	86.6	66.9	75.7
% of population having 5 main religious beliefs for Christians/Muslims (beliefs in God, life after death, hell, heaven and sin)	20.8	28.7	17.0	24.7
Frequency of church attendance (average rate) (never = 1, more than once a week = 7)	3.2	3.6	2.4	2.8
Frequency of prayer (average rate) (never = 1, every day = 7)	3.7	4.6	2.9	3.6
Importance of religion (average rate) (not at all important = 1, very important = 4)	2.6	2.8	2.4	2.5
% of main denominations				
Orthodox	90.8	80.5	92.8	92.0
Roman Catholic	2.0	14.6	0.5	0.5
Protestant	4.7	3.3	0.5	0.4
Muslim	0.5	1.4	5.9	6.9
Buddhist	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Jew	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0

Table 12.3 (continued)

	Ukraine		Russia	
	1999	2008	1999	2008
Civil society structure				
% of NGO membership	33.0	21.9	31.0	18.4
% of volunteering	13.0	9.4	7.8	5.7
% of participators in non-partisan political action (have done)	23.3	21.2	28.6	14.2
Civil society environment				
Rejection of authoritarian alternatives (average rate) (min=1, max=4)	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.3
Support of democracy (average rate) (min=41, max=160)	106.4	99.6	94.0	105.1
Institutional trust (non-political organisations) (average rate) (min=31, max=155)	97.8	102.7	100.7	97.7
Social cohesion (average rate) (min=1, max=5)	2.5	2.7	2.4	2.4
Civil society values				
Transparency (average rate) (min=75, max=210)	104.5	93.7	98.5	105.1
Tolerance (average rate) (min=0, max=9)	4.8	4.4	4.2	4.7
Concern (average rate) (min=15, max=146)	102.0	101.7	100.7	95.5
Environmental ethics (average rate) (min=1, max=4)	2.8	3.1	2.7	2.6

Table 12.4 Religiosity and civil society: Beta coefficients with significance levels

	Ukraine		Russia	
	1999	2008	1999	2008
Control variables				
Age	0.039†	Excl.	0.033*	Excl.
Sex (male)	−0.190***	−0.172***	−0.183***	−0.114***
Orthodox denomination	0.489***	0.592***	0.597***	0.601***
Non-Orthodox denomination	0.483***	0.637***	0.301***	0.325***
Civil society structure				
Membership in CSO	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	0,077***
Volunteering	0.076***	0.077***	Excl.	Excl.
Non-partisan political action	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.
Civil society environment				
Rejection of authoritarian alternatives	Excl.	−0.035†	−0.031*	Excl.
Support of democracy	0.045*	Excl.	−0.027†	Excl.
Institutional trust (non-political organisations)	Excl.	−0.039*	−0.027†	−0.061**
Social cohesion	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.
Civil society values				
Transparency	Excl.	0.038†	−0.027†	Excl.
Tolerance	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.
Concern	0.069**	0.093***	0.071***	0.056**
Environmental ethics	0.048*	0.034†	0.028*	0.098***
R^2	0.444	0.418	0.482	0.449
N (*respondents*)	1,195	1,507	2,500	1,504

Dependent variable: 'Religiosity' (see 'Variables and Analysis')
Excl. excluded variable because of no significant effect
†$p \leq 0.10$; *$p \leq 0.05$; **$p \leq 0.01$; ***$p \leq .001$

Table 12.5 Denominations and civil society (among population reported that they belong to a denomination (1999–2008)): Beta coefficients with significance levels

	Orthodox (UA)	Orthodox (RU)	Muslims (RU)	Roman Catholics (UA)	Protestants (UA)
Control variables					
Age	0.09***	0.047*	−0.045*	−0.048†	−0.071**
Sex (male)	−0.133***	−0.061**	0.062**	0.076**	0.06*
Religious identity	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.
Religious beliefs	−0.085***	−0.108***	0.104***	0.063*	Excl.
Frequency of church attendance	−0.141***	0.047*	−0.068**	0.142***	0.143***
Frequency of prayer	−0.085**	−0.061*	0.057*	Excl.	0.058†
Importance of religion	−0.19***	Excl.	Excl.	0.196***	0.046†
Civil society structure					
Membership in CSO	Excl.	−0.044*	Excl.	−0.06*	0.079**
Volunteering	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	−0.055*	0.05†
Non-partisan political action	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	0.088***	−0.091***
Civil society environment					
Rejection of authoritarian alternatives	Excl.	0.075***	−0.075***	Excl.	Excl.
Support of democracy	−0.112***	Excl.	Excl.	0.164***	−0.044†
Institutional trust (non-political organisations)	Excl.	0.063*	−0.072***	Excl.	Excl.
Social cohesion	−0.06**	Excl.	Excl.	0.086***	Excl.
Civil society values					
Transparency	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	0.063*
Tolerance	Excl.	0.083***	−0.064**	Excl.	−0.057*
Concern	Excl.	0.049*	−0.04†	Excl.	0.047†
Environmental ethics	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.	Excl.
R^2	0.162	0.044	0.040	0.150	0.074
% of the denomination in the country	84.4	92.5	6.3	9.9	3.8

Dependent variable: 'Religiosity' (see 'Variables and Analysis')

Excl. excluded variable because of no significant effect

†$p \leq 0.10$; *$p \leq 0.05$; **$p \leq 0.01$; ***$p \leq .001$

12.7   Results

In Ukraine, compared to Russia, the average level of religiosity is higher, mostly because a larger share of the population considers themselves to be believers and supports the major religious principles. Differences in the practices of churchgoing and prayers beyond the church are significant. Average Ukrainian more frequently attends church and prays outside religious institutions than average Russian. At the same time, these components of religiosity vary in some confessions significantly.

Though Ukraine is characterised with a better-developed civil society structures and a lower level of secularisation compared to Russia, the regression analysis did not demonstrate any statistically significant links between the religiosity and participation in the NGO neither in 1999 nor in 2008. Perhaps the believers in Ukraine are more inclined to manifest their social activity within exclusively religious NGO that were excluded at the development of the variable to avoid spurious effects. In Russia the positive effect of mutual relationship between religiosity and participation in the NGO was observed in 2008, though in 1999 no statistically significant links were identified. This means that today in Russia religious individuals are more inclined to participate in civil society structures, even if they are secular ones, compared to nonreligious population.

While studying the differences between individual confessions, one should note the positive effect of participation of Ukrainian Protestants in civil society organisations and a similarly negative effect of that among Ukrainian Catholics. No significant differences in participation in civic organisations were found both among Ukrainian Orthodox believers and Muslims. At the same time, in Russia, the representatives of Orthodox confessions are less inclined to be members of secular civic organisations.

Ukraine shows a significant positive relationship between religiosity and secular volunteering during 1999–2008. No statistically significant links were found in Russia. A possible explanation for this is the large proportion of Protestants there, who are usually more active in various volunteer projects. Correlation between volunteering and confessions demonstrates that the Protestants are the only group where a positive effect is observed. From our point of view, a negative regression ratio between volunteering and belonging to the Catholic Church is a demonstration of Putnam effect of internal orientation of the Catholic Church, as in the case of membership in secular civic organisations. Another possible reason for the lack of a significant relationship between volunteering and religiosity in Russia is the weak development of volunteering as a social institute: around 5 % of respondents are volunteering for CSOs on a regular basis, while there is twice as much in Ukraine (EVS 2008). In addition, in many Eastern Europe countries, volunteerism is perceived as an affiliation to communism and, as a result, remains weak. The memory of the Communist era's 'forced volunteering' appears to be still alive and seems to keep people away from engaging in volunteer activities. We should also mention differences in the role of volunteerism in East and West European countries. For instance, volunteering is a kind of responsibility and can be important for the

curriculum vitae of the West Europeans; in former USSR countries, volunteerism is seen as a kind of individual choice without any particular outcome for the person.

In both Ukraine and Russia, participation in non-partisan political actions (signing petitions, participating in strikes and demonstrations) and/or potential readiness to participate in them is not associated with religiosity; in other words, participation in non-partisan political actions neither particularly refers to highly religious people nor to atheists. There is no statistically significant correlation between participation in non-partisan political actions and belonging to the Orthodox confession in both countries, as well as belonging to the Islam. Ukrainian Protestants are rather less inclined to participate in signing petitions, strikes and demonstrations. Only among Ukrainian Catholics there was a positive correlation.

The level of religiosity does not determine attitudes towards democracy neither in Russia nor in Ukraine, which confirms the third hypothesis. It should be noted that in 1999 there was a weak correlation between religiosity and support to democracy in Ukraine. In 2008 the Ukrainian believers became more inclined to authoritarian alternatives, although correlation in the terms of religiosity-atheism and authoritarian regime – democracy is very weak. This can be the outcome of the Russian Orthodox Church policy, i.e. of an active promotion of ideas of the 'Russian World' and the need of a strong leader. However, the crisis of political elites in Ukraine does not contribute to the population support of democratic principles either. In Russia, statistically significant links between the level of religiosity and provision of support to a certain political regime were observed in 1999, when believers, as a rule, gave more support to the authoritarian political regime. As far as confessional distinctions are concerned, Muslims in Russia give stronger support to a strong leader, while Catholics in Ukraine give more support to democracy. Despite the clear position of the Russian Orthodox Church in relation to the strong leader, the analysis results demonstrate that the Orthodox believers in Russia are rather inclined against the authoritarian alternatives of political regime.

The fourth hypothesis was also not confirmed. The level of trust in non-political social institutions was negatively correlated with religiosity in both Ukraine and Russia. Although in both countries institutional trust is in crisis, the manifestations of this crisis among believers are even more significant. At the same time, Russians, who identified themselves as the Orthodox believers, demonstrated higher levels of trust in social institutions, while Russian Muslims are less inclined to trust them. No statistically significant links between belonging to a certain confession and the level of trust were found in Ukraine.

Both in Ukraine and Russia, religiosity does not contribute to the development of a stronger social cohesion. Two research waves have demonstrated lack of statistically significant links between religiosity and social cohesion in both countries. In accordance with the fifth hypothesis, the strength of faith and frequency of religious practices do not determine a more individualist or a more collective attitude. At the same time, the Ukrainian Catholics are more likely to support the statement 'People should not stick to their own affairs and show a lot of interest in what others say or do', while the Ukrainian Orthodox are conversely more inclined towards individualism compared to other confessions. No statistically significant links were found in this respect between the Orthodox and Muslims in Russia.

Ukraine is the only Orthodox country where religiosity is able to provide support for transparency and therefore the rule of law. Atheists are more likely than religious people in Ukraine to accept the association of business with government, a shadow economy and criminalisation of the economy. At the same time, the link between religiosity and transparency in Ukraine is rather weak and was found only in 2008. A positive correlation was found only among Protestants. In 1999 in Russia, the believers rather justified bribing, tax fraud and other forms of corruption. However, these correlations were weak and the 2008 study did not find any statistically significant associations between religiosity and transparency. All in all, it can be concluded that the fifth hypothesis has been confirmed.

The sixth hypothesis has been partially confirmed. Both in Ukraine and Russia, tolerant relations with neighbours occur neither among the highly religious population nor among atheists; i.e. religious values and activities are not powerful tools to overcome intolerance and xenophobia. Nevertheless in Russia, the Orthodox believers are more cautious in respect to marginal groups, while Muslims tend to be less tolerant. We found a statistically significant negative association between belonging to a Protestant denomination and tolerance in Ukraine. However, religiosity highly promotes concern about the living conditions of marginalised groups in both countries – i.e. the elderly, unemployed people, immigrants, sick and disabled people and children in poor families. In this context, religiosity matters more than belonging to a certain denomination, and this effect is stable during 1999–2008.

Neither representatives of the Orthodox Church nor those belonging to other denominations are likely to donate part of their income to the development of ecology in Russia as well as Ukraine, which indicates that denomination does not contribute much to the development of ecological consciousness and sustainable approach. However both 1999 and 2008 EVS surveys show that general religiosity is positively associated with ecological values in both Ukraine and Russia, in spite of the fact that the doctrines of the major churches do not practically pay attention to the promotion of ecological values.

12.8 Conclusions and Discussion

In this chapter, we investigated the role of religion in the development of civil society in Ukraine and Russia. We focused on the context of development of faith-based and civic organisations in these countries in the period of transformations, related to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and also studied how religiosity, as the system of identities, beliefs and practices, and belonging to certain confession as a cultural form contributed to the development of civic values, promotion of civil participation and the development of a favourable context for civil society to function in the conditions of democratisation, consolidation and institutional trust.

Summarising the findings, it should be noted that the actualisation of civil society and religion and putting their development on the agenda at the state level have

taken place simultaneously, namely, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The recent collaboration between religion and civil society, the underdeveloped civil society and the weak orientation of traditional Orthodox religious institutions on civic activism all create barriers to the successful cooperation between religion and civil society. Poor socio-economic and cultural contexts – expressed in high rates of corruption, lack of total equality of all before the law, distrust and intolerance – are challenges to the development of civil society and religion. Moreover, strong roots of resignation and submission inherent to Orthodox ethics make this denomination in the former USSR countries more akin to authoritarian society than to democratic ones.

There is the experience of social initiatives by the church, pursuing a legal and social state, although such initiatives are taking place in the discourse religious conflicts, the struggle for distribution of church resources, which negatively influences the civil and ethnic consensus and deepens the instability of society. The politicisation of religion in the post-Soviet era is a complicating factor for the revitalisation of religion as a subsystem of civil society. Moreover, the civil society itself is rather fragmented; ties between its separate elements are not wide and intensive enough. This also may be a reason why religious organisations are not ready for a constant dialogue. On the one hand, civil society exists and functions; on the other hand, it is still too weak to fulfil its functions to the utmost, to guarantee real involvement of citizens to formation of national policy.

Russia and Ukraine, despite sharing the common histories of communism and atheism, as well as a similar dominant denomination, currently have different levels of religiosity/secularism and slightly different relationships between religiosity and civil society. Although in terms of religious practices and beliefs, Ukraine is secularised practically to the same extent as any average Western European country, and Russia is secularised even more, in the recent decade religiosity grew in both countries, unlike the situation in Western Europe. If this trend continues, the role of religious organisations in Ukrainian and Russian societies will presumably strengthen. Taking into account the high level of trust to faith-based organisations even among the non-believers and an ever-stronger focus of the major confessions on the civic initiatives, the religion may become an important factor that would contribute to the civil society development.

At the same time, today the link between religiosity and civil society is quite weak in both countries. Of 12 selected CIVICUS indicators that characterise the structure of civil society, the external environment in which civil society exists and functions and values practised and promoted in the civil society arena, 4 positive correlations were found in Ukraine in 1999 and the same number in 2008. Religiosity in this country can be a good instrument to develop volunteering, support democratic values, counteract corruption and develop moral, ethical and ecological values. In Russia, a positive link between religiosity with two indicators was found in 1999 and with three indicators – in 2008. Here the strength of religious beliefs and frequency of practices has a positive correlation with participation in secular civil society organisations and contributes to the expression of concern about the living conditions of

marginalised groups to the development of environmental ethics. As opposed to Ukraine, in Russia religious people are more inclined towards authoritarian political regimes and are not ready to promote democratic values on which the civil society is based; also, they have less trust to social institutions and are more likely to justify corruption.

In terms of self-identification with certain confessions, the Orthodox in Ukraine appears less religious and shares similar civil values, but there is no positive correlation with the civil society indicators. In Russia, however, being Orthodox is related to the disapproval of authoritarian political regime, higher tolerance and concern, while belonging to the Islam does not correlate with any civil society indicator. In Ukraine key agents of civil society development in the religious sphere are Catholics and Protestants.

Our analyses confirm the findings of Strømsnes, Smidt and Greeley about the fact that religion plays an important role in fostering civic engagement and volunteering, but the fact that this activity would rather be observed among non-Orthodox denominations should be viewed as a result of different levels of religiosity in terms of community practices (churchgoing) among the Orthodox and non-Orthodox confessions. Research in Ukraine and Russia contradicts the conclusions of Kristin Strømsnes, who argues that churchgoers are more active in non-partisan political actions (Strømsnes 2008). Conclusions about authoritarian preferences among the religious Ukrainians and Russians, emphasised, for instance, in the study by Reisinger and Miller (1994), were not confirmed; there is a weak link between the support to such initiatives and denial of democracy by the believers. At the same time, an active policy of the Russian Orthodox Church to promote the 'Russian World' ideas can contribute to the strengthening of such links in the future, in particular, taking into account the fact that the Ukrainian Orthodox are less optimistic about the democratic regime. The general crisis of institutional trust in both countries facilitates to the fact that religiosity does not contribute to the promotion of a larger confidence in social institutions with the exclusion of faith-based organisations. So, the statement of Valenzuela et al. (2009) that religiosity is consistently associated positively with greater confidence in institutions does not work in the Russian and Ukrainian social environment. The identified weak role of religion for the enlargement of civil society in Ukraine and Russia is most probably related to the fact that major religious organisations are not aligned with the transformational processes, while the church is poorly adjusted to the changes in the outside world. Although many scientists including the classics of sociology of religion emphasised that the religious traditions can also help to tie a society together by reinforcing a feeling of unity in its people, to date, this function is characteristic only to the Catholic Church in Ukraine, while the predominant Orthodox Church has not yet become the source of social cohesion. Moreover, institutionalisation of corruption and poor development of democratic institutions contribute to the fact that religiosity in general cannot become a factor that reinforces counteraction to corruption and promotes the transparency values. Only Ukrainian Protestants appear less likely to justify corruption compared to other confessions. The development of a more

tolerant attitude is also beyond the influence of religiosity both in Ukraine and in Russia. It was unexpected to find that religious individuals both in Ukraine and Russia are likely to demonstrate environment protection values, though the major religions organisations pay practically no attention to the promotion of environmental ethics, and the previous studies have demonstrated that the Orthodox Christianity was negatively related to all measures of environmental behaviour (e.g. Truelove and Joireman 2009).

Although our analyses yield some interesting results, one has to realise that the number of non-Orthodox confessions in both countries in the EVS samplings is very small, and because such data is also not available from other studies, analysis over time is not possible and we were forced to analyse the 1999 and 2008 data separately. However, in these 10 years the level of religiosity grew and some changes in confessional structure occurred (the number of Catholics grew in Ukraine). Moreover, the small number of non-Orthodox confessions even with the use of integrated data did not allow comparisons of Ukrainian and Russian Muslims, Catholics and Protestants, because these confessions have their own distinctions in Russia and Ukraine. Other limitations include the issues with alignment of statistical data – there is a different understanding of which structures are included in the faith-based and civic organisations in Russia and in Ukraine as well as the availability of data about the registered organisations that were actually inactive. Studies on the relationship between religion and civil society in ex-Communist countries are rare; Ukraine is practically absent in scientific articles on the issues of religion and civil society, and Russia is often analysed separately. Comparing Ukraine and Russia is advantageous because of their confessional structures, a special role of the Orthodox Church and its religious and social-political influence that is characteristic for both countries, fragmentation of civil society structures as well as similarity of normative and value systems and historic heritage in terms of the impact of Soviet atheism, rapid modernisation and democratisation. Besides, another advantage of our study is the analysis of the role of religion within the context of different civil society indicators within the structure of civil society, the external environment in which civil society exists and functions and values practised and promoted in the civil society arena, while other studies were primarily focused on civic- or faith-based organisations, thus narrowing the understanding of civil society.

To conclude, we have seen that religion is affirming its position in the social structure and is becoming more influential in both countries. Faith-based organisations have a strong foundation and a guaranteed financial support in both Ukraine and Russia, which is often not available for 'initiative groups' of non-governmental organisations. High rates of confidence in religious institutions in the post-Soviet era might be considered as an indicator of the consolidating power of religion, a potential tool for preventing confrontation, manifestations and violent conflicts in different areas of social life. However, currently weak connection between religiosity and civil society requires changes in the framework of state-church relations and relations among churches from de facto protection to the social partnership.

References

Adelman, J. R., & Omoto, A. M. (2007). *Does religion matter in political action? An examination of religious predictors of political action in Europe and the US*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Classical Chinese Garden, Portland, OR. Retrieved from: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p204612_index.html

Alexander, J. C. (1998). Civil society between difference and solidarity: Rethinking integration the fragmented public sphere. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, 92*, 1–14.

Becker, P. E., & Dhingra, P. H. (2001). Religious involvement in volunteering. *Sociology of Religion, 62*, 313–350.

Beets, D. (2007). Global corruption and religion: An empirical examination. *Journal of Global Ethics, 3*(1), 69–85.

Berger, J. (2003). Religious non-governmental organizations: An exploratory analysis. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14*(1), 15–39.

Berggren, N., & Bjørnskov, C. (2009). *Does religiosity promote or discourage social trust? Evidence from cross-country and cross-state comparisons*. Unpublished manuscript, SSRN, DMCA. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478445

Berggren, N., & Jordahl, H. (2006). Free to trust? Economic freedom and social capital. *Kyklos, 59*, 141–169.

Bjørnskov, C. (2007). Determinant of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison. *Public Choice, 130*, 1–21.

Borowik, I. (2002a). Between orthodoxy and eclecticism: On the religious transformations of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. *Social Compass, 49*(4), 497–508.

Borowik, I. (2002b). The Roman Catholic Church in the process of democratic transformation: The case of Poland. *Social Compass, 49*(232), 239–252.

Borowik, I. (2006). Orthodoxy confronting the collapse of communism in post-soviet countries. *Social Compass, 53*(2), 267–278.

Campbell, D. E., & Yonish, S. J. (2003). Religion and volunteering in America. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common good* (pp. 87–106). Waco: Bayler University Press.

Casanova, J. (1994). *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chambers, S., & Kopstein, J. (2001). Bad civil society. *Political Theory, 29*(6), 837–865.

CIVICUS. (2006). *Civil society in Ukraine: Driving engine or spare wheel for change? Civil Society Index report for Ukraine*. Kyiv: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

Coleman, J. A. (2003). Religious social capital: Its nature, social location, and limits. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital* (pp. 33–49). Waco: Baylor University Press.

Davie, G. (2004). New approaches in the sociology of religion: A western perspective. *Social Compass, 51*(1), 73–84.

de Tocqueville, A. (1945). *Democracy in America*. New York: Knopf.

Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2005). Predicting cross-national levels of social trust: Global pattern or nordic exceptionalism. *European Sociological Review, 21*, 311–327.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: Free Press.

Grabovetz, O., & Yakovenko, Y. (2001). Religion as a social technology for society consolidation. *Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing, 3*, 111–122 (in Russian).

Greeley, A. (1997). Coleman revisited: Religious structures as a source of social capital. *American Behavioral Scientist, 40*(5), 587–594.

Greeley, A. M. (2003). *Religion in Europe at the end of the second millennium*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2003). People's opium? Religion and economic attitudes. *Journal of Monetary Economics, 50*, 225–282.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Iannaccone, L. R. (1990). Religious participation: A human capital approach. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 29,* 297–314.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaariainen, K. (1998). *Religion in Russia after the collapse of communism*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Kofanova, E. N. (2008). Is morality religious? Notes about contemporary believers. *Public Opinion Monitoring, 4*(88), 94–101 (in Russian).

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Trust in large organizations. *American Economic Review, 87,* 333–338.

Legoyda, W. R. (2003). *Civil religion: pro et contra*. Unpublished manuscript, Religion and the Media. Retrieved from: http://www.religare.ru-article1555.htm (in Russian).

Levine, D. H., & Mainwaring, S. (1986). *Religion and popular protest in Latin America*. Notre Dame: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.

Mchedlov, M., Gavrilov, Y., & Shevchenko, A. (2006). *Whom do they trust? The modern believer: A portrait of the social, political and social positions*. Unpublished manuscript, NG Religii. Retrieved from: http://religion.ng.ru/caesar/2001-10-10/7_trust.html (in Russian).

Merchant, C. (1980). *The death of nature: Women, ecology and the scientific revolution*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Mersiyanova, I. V. (2010). The participation of Russians in cash donations: Factors and level of involvement. *Economic Sociology, 11*(5), 26–53 (in Russian).

Naletova, I. (2002). *The Orthodox Church in the mirror of public opinion: An analysis of recent polls and surveys*. Unpublished manuscript. IWM Junior visiting fellows conferences, Vol. 12. Retrieved from: http://www.iwm.at/publ-jvc/jc-12-03.pdf

Need, A., & Evans, G. (2001). Analyzing patterns of religious participation in Postcommunist Eastern Europe. *The British Journal of Sociology, 52*(2), 229–248.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paronikyan, A. (2011). Place and role of the institute of religion in contemporary Ukraine. *Social Technologies, 50,* 326–334 (in Russian).

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putzel, J. (1997). Accounting for the 'dark side' of social capital. *Journal of International Development, 9*(7), 939–949.

Rappaport, R. A. (1999). *Ritual and religion in the making of humanity*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Reisinger, W. M., & Miller, A. H. (1994). Political values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and implications for democracy. *Political Science Publications, 24,* 183–223.

Silantieva, M. V. (2011). Religion as a factor of social cohesion in modern Russian society. *Puncta, 1–2*(10), 27–30 (in Russian).

Sommera, U., Ben-Nun, B., & Arikanc, G. (2012). Does faith limit immorality? The politics of religion and corruption. *Democratization*, 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.650914

Strømsnes, K. (2008). The importance of church attendance and membership of religious voluntary organizations for the formation of social capital. *Social Compass, 55*(4), 478–496.

Titarenko, L. (2008). On the shifting nature of religion during the ongoing post-communist transformation in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. *Social Compass, 55*(2), 237–254.

Truelove, H. B., & Joireman, J. (2009). Understanding the relationship between Christian orthodoxy and environmentalism. The mediating role of perceived environmental consequences. *Environment and Behavior, 41*(6), 806–820.

Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Valenzuela, J. S., Scully, T. R., & Somma, N. (2009). *Social and political effects of religiosity and religious identities in Latin America*. Unpublished manuscript, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame. Retrieved from: http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/362.pdf

Verba, S., Schlozman, K., & Brady, H. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Weithman, P. J. (2002). *Religion and the obligations of citizenship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Welch, M. R., Sikkink, D., Sartain, E., & Bond, C. (2004). Trust in god and trust in man: The ambivalent role of religion in shaping dimensions of social trust. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 43*, 317–343.

Wilhelm, M. O., Patrick, M. R., & Eugene, R. T. (2007). Changes in religious giving reflect changes in involvement: Age and cohort effects in religious giving, secular giving and attendance. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 46*(2), 217–232.

World Bank. (2009). The worldwide governance indicators (WGI). Retrieved from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

Yemelianova, A. (2010). A diagnosis of corruption in Ukraine. *Working Paper Series, 14*, 2–18.

Zak, P. J., & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. *The Economic Journal, 111*, 295–321.

Chapter 13
The Impact of Religion on the Political Participation of Muslims: The Case of Switzerland

Marco Giugni, Matteo Gianni, and Noémi Michel

13.1 Introduction

The search for a nexus between religion and politics is a long-standing endeavor in political science (see Grzymala-Busse 2012). For example, religious cleavages form according to Rokkan's (1970; see further Lipset and Rokkan 1967) seminal work a major basis both on the formation of modern party systems and the integration of citizens into the political system. More specifically, religion and various measures of religiosity are traditionally key variables for explaining political involvement and participation. In this context, starting from the classical work by Lazarsfeld et al. (1948), religion has often been found to be a strong predictor of political behavior, in particular voting behavior (Broughton and Ten Napel 2000; Converse 1974; Tresch and Nicolet 2010). During the past decades, however, a number of scholars have observed a diminishing impact of religion on politics (Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin 1992; Norris and Inglehart 2004) as well as a transformation of the forms of religiosity in the western world (Hervieu-Léger 1999; Luckmann 1967; Pollack and Pickel 2007).

In this chapter we investigate the religion-politics nexus for a specific group, namely, Muslims living in Switzerland. More specifically, we study the impact of different aspects of religion on the political participation of Muslim residents. By political participation, here, we do not mean voting turnout but rather involvement in a range of

M. Giugni (✉) • M. Gianni • N. Michel
Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
e-mail: marco.giugni@unige.ch; matteo.gianni@unige.ch; Noemi.michel@unige.ch

other political activities, ranging from contacting public officials for political purposes to participating in mass demonstrations. These non-electoral forms of participation have become more important in Western Europe during the past decades (Dalton 2008). Furthermore and most importantly in our case, they are available to migrant residents who have not access to elections because they do not hold citizenship.

The Muslim population in Switzerland amounts to about 500,000 people (less than 10 % of the population) and is mainly composed by immigrants. Muslims have recently become the second-higher religious group in Switzerland. The Muslim immigration is a relatively new and recent phenomenon: this population has increased almost 20 times between 1970 and 2000 (from about 16,000 to 315,000). Moreover, while the presence of the first generation of immigrants was considered as temporary (because of the guest worker status), Muslims are nowadays permanently settled in Switzerland. They come from three main geographic locations: Turkey, the Balkans, and North Africa. It is therefore social and ethnic heterogeneity which characterizes this population and not homogeneity as it is often suggested in public debates. As in many other European countries, this population has become the target of political debates over the meaning of Swiss multiculturalism and national identity and is often depicted as the main example of "otherness" which western societies have to deal with (Gianni and Clavien 2012). The best illustration of this trend is the launch, in May 2007 by the Swiss People Party, of the now famous popular initiative "against the minarets." The initiative aimed at forbidding the building of minarets in Switzerland. It was set as respecting the right of Muslims to practice their religion but to provide a clear message and formal stop to what the Swiss People's Party termed the "Islamization" of Swiss public space. In November 2009, more than 57 % of Swiss voters accepted the ban. The public debate created by and around this initiative has strongly contributed to foster the idea that Muslims are a "problem" in Switzerland and that public institutions should limit the expression and the social and political visibility of Muslims' cultural and religious values and practices.

This trend can be linked to the fact that, during the past decade, the Muslims' presence has gained higher public and political visibility, namely, through the claims for recognition of some Muslim religious leaders and intellectuals. Unlike the previous immigrant groups, the leaders of Muslim associations voice their willingness to be integrated into Swiss polity and society not despite, but with their cultural particularities. The question is whether such willingness expresses itself through increased political participation. According to previous research (Gianni et al. 2005), Muslim respondents conceive citizenship in a very passive and apolitical way. Answers to the question "In your view, what does it mean to be a citizen and/or a good citizen?" emphasized a very pragmatic understanding of citizenship, related mainly to its practical advantages (passport for travelling easily in other country, residence permit, etc.); a conception of citizenship as strict adaptation to dominant social, legal, and political norms; and an apolitical representation of citizenship, conceived only as a status providing right and duties to which one must conform. In other word, citizenship was not perceived – as one would expect from individuals who, in part, have been socialized in the Swiss highly participatory

democratic system – as a status providing the resources enabling Muslims to act politically in order to modify some laws according to their interests or faith. Instead, it is seen as the final step of the adaptation process (or the acculturation process) to Swiss-dominant norms.

Do these representations of citizenship indicate a lack of political integration which becomes visible, among other, in low levels of political participation of Muslims? So far the political engagement of Muslims in the Swiss society has not been studied on the basis of systematic evidence. This chapter aims to advance knowledge of the role of religion for the political participation of Muslims using original survey data. We do so by asking two interrelated questions. First, does religion has an impact on the political participation of Muslims or is the latter depending rather on other factors? Second, if there is such an impact, what is about religion that affects political participation?

Let us be a bit more specific. Concerning the first question, the aim is not only to observe an effect or a lack thereof but also to ascertain the direction and magnitude of such an effect. Concerning the second question, the religion-politics nexus can be framed in terms of individual or collective components. To be more specific, we suggest to distinguishing between two kinds of effects that religion may have on political participation: through the role of individual religiosity (expressed in both religious beliefs and practices) and through the role of belonging to religious collectivities. Once we will have ascertained which of these effects matters most, we will speculate about the mechanisms linking religion to political participation.

13.2   A Methodological Note

To study the impact of individual and collective dimensions of religion on political participation, we use survey data originating in a research project on the cultural, social, and political orientations of Muslims in Switzerland financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (National Research Program 58).[1] Since

---

[1]The data come from a survey on a random sample of Muslims formed by three subsamples according to the three main areas of origin of Muslims in Switzerland (Turkey, Maghreb, and former Yugoslavia) as well as a control group formed by non-Muslim residents, conducted between the 6th of April and the 6th of September 2009. The sample of Maghrebis includes people from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The sample of former Yugoslavians includes people from Serbia (Kosovo), Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Muslim respondents were selected on the basis of nationality from the lists of addresses provided by the Federal Office for Migration. A number of screening questions were then used to control whether respondents retrieved from the lists could be considered as Muslims either ethnically (being of a Muslim culture or heritage) or religiously (being of Islamic religion). The sample of the control group of Swiss nationals was generated randomly from the Swiss phone book. The interviews were conducted by telephone (CATI method) using a standardized multilingual questionnaire. Muslim respondents had the possibility to answer in their mother tongue or in the language spoken in their place of residence. The average duration of each interview was around 40 minutes. In total, 302 Turks, 298 Maghrebis, 301 former Yugoslavians, and 305 Swiss were interviewed.

our sample of Muslims is formed by foreigners, we measure political participation by looking at other forms than electoral participation. To do so, following standard practice, we created a measure of overall political participation based on a list of 15 specific forms of political activities. This variable is coded 1 if the respondent has taken part in at least one of the forms listed during the year prior to the survey and 0 if she or he has used none of them. In order to have a more differentiated picture of political involvement, we also created three indicators of participation in the three major forms of political activities, namely, participation in contacting activities, in group activities, and protest activities.[2] These distinctions, however, will be used only to show patterns of political participation across the three groups of Muslims (coming from three geographic area, namely, Turkey, Maghreb, and former Yugoslavia) and the control group of non-Muslim Swiss, while our analysis of the impact of religion will focus on the overall indicator of participation.

Political participation thus operationalized will be related to a number of variables pertaining to three sets of potential explanatory factors: individual religiosity, collective religious embeddedness, and several individual characteristics as control variables. Individual religiosity is measured through three indicators: the subjective level of religiosity (response options: extremely nonreligious, very nonreligious, somewhat nonreligious, neither religious nor nonreligious, somewhat religious, very religious, extremely religious), the practice of Ramadan (response options: no; yes, but not every year; yes, every year), and following Islamic alimentary rules (response options: no; yes, some of them; yes, very strictly). To capture collective religious embeddedness, we look at two indicators: involvement in religious organizations (this refers to membership and/or participation in at least one activity carried out by a religious organization in the year prior to the survey) and the frequency of attending the mosque or another place of worship (response options: never, a couple of times a year, once a month, once a week or more, several times a day). Finally, we include the following control variables in the analyses: age, gender, education, political interest (both on Swiss politics and homeland politics), political trust, language proficiency, the proportion of life spent in Switzerland, attachment to the country of residence, and feeling of discrimination. These are all variables that may potentially influence the political participation of Muslims and therefore need to be controlled for.

---

[2]Contact activities include the following items: contacted a politician, contacted a national or local government official, contacted the media, and contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for nonpersonal reasons. Group activities include the following items: worked in a political party, worked in a political action group, and donated money to a political organization or group. Protest activities include the following items: worn or displayed a badge, sticker, or poster; signed a petition; taken part in a public demonstration; boycotted certain products; deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; taken part in a strike; participated in an illegal action (e.g., blockade, building occupation); and participated in a violent action (e.g., violent demonstration, physical attack).

Table 13.1 Political activities by group (percentage of yes)

	Turks	Maghrebis	Former Yugoslavians	Swiss	Cramer's V
Contacting activities	29.8	23.5	16.3	32.5	0.143***
Group activities	14.9	21.5	14.3	27.9	0.140***
Protest activities	41.4	56.7	30.9	71.8	0.310***
Overall political participation	52.3	61.1	40.9	78.4	0.278***
N	302	298	301	305	

Notes: Contact activities include the following items: contacted a politician, contacted a national or local government official, contacted the media, and contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for nonpersonal reasons. Group activities include the following items: worked in a political party, worked in a political action group, and donated money to a political organization or group. Protest activities include the following items: worn or displayed a badge, sticker, or poster; signed a petition; taken part in a public demonstration; boycotted certain products; deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; taken part in a strike; participated in an illegal action (e.g., blockade, building occupation); and participated in a violent action (e.g., violent demonstration, physical attack)

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$

13.3   Do Muslims Participate Politically?

Before we address the religion-participation nexus, it is worth taking a descriptive look at the patterns of political participation of Muslims in Switzerland. Table 13.1 shows aggregate-level distributions of political participation of the three main groups of Muslims. We examine both the overall participation and the three more specific forms outlined earlier.[3] In addition, we included the figures for the control group of non-Muslim Swiss in order to have a baseline for assessing the level of participation by Muslims. To be sure, these figures are likely to be higher than actual levels of participation. Survey respondents usually tend to overestimate their own participation, for a number of reasons such as for example social desirability (DeMaio 1984). However, we have no reason to suspect that such an overstatement varies across groups.

The general pattern is quite clear: Muslims display a lower level of political participation than non-Muslim Swiss, regardless of their origin. We can see that in the first place in the last row of Table 13.1, which shows the figures for the overall indicator of participation, almost 80 % of non-Muslim Swiss have been involved in at least in one political activity, while the only between 40 and 60 % have done so. To be sure, since we are dealing not only with people with migration background but also with foreigners who do not have citizenship rights, this difference could at least in part be due to the lower propensity towards political participation of migrants. The latter have been shown often to be politically less

---

[3]Since we are dealing with a sample of foreigners, most of whom do not have voting rights, we exclude this form of participation.

active than nationals, not only in Switzerland (Eggert and Giugni 2010) but more generally across Europe (Morales and Giugni 2011). Indeed, when one focuses on Muslims regardless of whether they are citizens of the country of residence or not, such differences seem to cancel out to a large extent (Eggert and Giugni 2011), suggesting that citizenship status rather than religion is responsible for their lower level of participation. However, ethnicity or at least national origin could play a role as well. This is suggested by the fact that we also observe significant differences among the three groups of Muslims distinguished in our analysis. In this regard, Muslims from Maghreb clearly are the most active among the respondents, followed at distance by those from Turkey and then by those from former Yugoslavia. Immigrants from the Maghreb are the most active despite the fact that they arrived in Switzerland later than the immigrants of the other two groups. Muslim leaders from Maghreb are also very active at the associational level, having worked, especially in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, to the constitution of several umbrella organizations in order to represent and federate Muslims (Behloul and Lathion 2007).

Significant differences across groups and in particular between Muslims and non-Muslim respondents can also be observed in the three more specific forms of participation. Generally speaking, all three forms of political activities are more often used by Swiss nationals than by all the three groups of Muslims. However, the gap is particularly large for protest activities, while it is much less pronounced when it comes to contacting activities or group activities. Thus, collective action types of political participation seem to be those differentiating the most Muslims from non-Muslims, at least in Switzerland. Concerning cross-group differences in the specific forms of participation, Turks engage in contacting activities more often than both Maghrebis and former Yugoslavians, while Maghrebis are more involved than the other two groups in group activities and protest activities.

It is not our goal here to explain these patterns of political participation. We simply wanted to provide some background information about the political involvement of Muslims in our sample, especially in regard to that of non-Muslim Swiss. The resulting picture is quite clear: the former are less politically engaged than the latter on all kinds of activities and sometimes much less so, as in the case of protest activities. The question now is: How does religion impact on the political participation of individual Muslims? More specifically, which dimensions of religion are likely to encourage Muslims to participate politically?

13.4   Does Religion Matter?

According to the literature on religion and political participation, religion plays an important role for explaining the political participation of migrants and ethnic minorities in general (Eggert and Giugni 2011; Levitt 2008; see Cadge and Ecklund 2007 for a review) and of Muslims more specifically (Jamal 2005; Ayers and Hofstetter 2008). A great deal of the existing works focus on what we have

called the collective dimension of religion, namely, the role of migrants' or minorities involvement in religious institution, such as ethnic churches, mosques, or religious associations. Although they differ in their theoretical explanations, most of these studies agree on one point: involvement in religious organizations or institutions has a positive impact on political participation and allows migrants to overcome formal and structural barriers to participation. We therefore may expect the collective dimension of religion to favor the political participation of Muslims, while the individual dimension of religion should not matter much. Following this perspective, what matters is being embedded in a religious setting, which we call collective religious embeddedness, and its consequences, rather than individual religiosity as such.

Table 13.2 shows the effects of the indicators of the individual and collective dimensions of religion on our measure of the overall political participation of Muslims.[4] We run two separate models: one for the individual dimension and another for the collective dimension. The third row shows the full model including all the variables. The results suggest that only the collective dimension of religion matters, while the individual dimension displays no effect. As we can see, both indicators of collective religious embeddedness are significantly correlated to political participation. More specifically, involvement in at least one religious organization increases the likelihood to be politically active by almost a factor two.[5] Similarly, respondents who go to the mosque at least once a week display a higher level of participation than those who attend less than that. The effect of the frequency of mosque attendance disappears in the full model, but this might be due to too high a collinearity between the measures of individual religiosity and those of collective religious embeddedness. In contrast, neither the subjective level of religiosity nor the two indicators of religious practices have a statistically significant effect. Concerning mosque attendance, this is contrary to what has been found in the case of the United States (Jamal 2005).

At this stage, it is worth mentioning the role played by the other variables included in the models. To begin with, confirming previous work, both on political participation in general (Dalton 2008; Teorell et al. 2007; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995) and the political engagement of migrants and ethnic minorities (Berger et al. 2004; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Jacobs et al. 2004; Togeby 2004; Tillie 2004; Morales and Giugni 2011), our analysis also points to education and political interest as strong predictors of participation. The effect of education is particularly strong as it increases the chances to be politically involved by almost a factor eight in the full model. Concerning political interest, it is worth stressing that interest in Swiss politics shows a significant effect, while that in homeland politics is not

---

[4] Since the dependent variable (overall political participation) is a dummy variable that takes either value 0 or 1, we run a logistic regression. Odds ratios are shown in the table.

[5] Odds ratios are the exponentials of the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) and can be interpreted as showing a multiplying effect on the dependent variable. Odds ratios above 1 indicate a positive effect, while odds ratios below 1 indicate a negative effect.

Table 13.2 Effects of individual and collective dimensions of religion on overall political participation (odds ratios)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Religion: collective dimension			
Involved in a religious organization	1.94**		1.88*
Frequency of mosque attendance (ref: never)			
A couple of times a year	0.85		0.75
Once a month	1.08		0.94
Once a week or more	1.61*		1.50
Several times a day	0.83		0.80
Religion: individual dimension			
Subjective level of religiosity		0.96	0.92
Practice of Ramadan (ref: no)			
Yes, but not every year		1.06	1.05
Yes, nearly every year		1.44	1.31
Following of Islamic alimentary rules (ref: none of them)			
Some of them		1.52	1.65
Yes, I follow these rules very strictly		1.43	1.38
Controls			
Political trust	0.99	0.99	0.99
Interest in Swiss politics	1.60***	1.64***	1.65***
Interest in homeland country politics	1.04	1.05	1.04
Attachment to Switzerland	1.00	1.01	1.01
Age	1.00	1.00	1.00
Female	0.80	0.68*	0.78
Education	8.09***	7.56***	7.77***
Language proficiency	1.00	1.00	1.00
Proportion of life in Switzerland	0.81	0.84	0.79
Feeling of discrimination	1.20*	1.22*	1.20*
Group (ref: Turks)			
Maghrebis	0.77	0.75	0.72
Former Yugoslavians	0.65*	0.62*	0.62*
Constant	0.21*	0.18*	0.18*
−2 Log likelihood	984.43	978.88	957.23
Nagelkerke *R* square	0.23	0.21	0.23
N	817	807	804

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$

significant, suggesting that what matters is being interested in the political affairs of the country of residence, rather than political interest per se. Political trust also shows a significant effect but only in the model referring to the collective dimension of religion. In contrast, the more one feels to be discriminated on the basis of race, religion, or nationality, the more she or he is likely to participate. Finally, the group-related variable we included in the models shows that the three groups of Muslims do not have the same chances to be politically involved.

Specifically, Former Yugoslavians are significantly less active than Turks (reference category), while we observe no effect for Maghrebis.

These findings suggest two main answers to our research questions. Firstly, they show that religion matters, favoring the political participation of Muslims. However, secondly, not all the aspects relating to religion matter. Individual religiosity does not seem to play a role: being a more religious person or following strictly the precepts of Islam does not lead one to be more politically involved (nor to be less so, for that matter). These results are quite similar to what found by Ayers and Hofstetter (2008: 21) about American Muslims, namely, that "(1) religious resources, like mosque attendance, increased participation; but (2) religious beliefs, like religious salience, were negatively associated with political participation." Therefore, what seems to really matter is the fact of being involved in a religious organization and, to some extent, the frequency of mosque attendance. In other words, neither believing not behaving but rather belonging seems to be the crucial dimension of religion affecting political participation. Why? In the next section we speculate about some tentative answers to this further question.

13.5   Why Are Religious Organizations Important?

As we have seen, religion matters but only inasmuch as the collective dimension is concerned. We therefore focus now on this dimension, trying to ascertain what kinds of resources are involved in this process. To do so, we discuss what makes religious organizations important. More precisely, we speculate about the mechanisms that may explain the linkages between the collective dimension of religion, which we found to matter more than its individual dimension, and the political participation of Muslims.

Simplifying a more variegated picture, we can distinguish between three theoretical perspectives helping us making sense of the connection between collective religious embeddedness and political participation: the civic voluntarism, the social capital, and the group consciousness perspectives.[6] The civic voluntarism perspective is directly linked to the well-known resource model of political participation. It posits that religious organizations and institutions may provide key political resources to be mobilized in political engagement. In particular, religious organizations may increase the civic skills that are a crucial determinant of political participation but also certain important political attitudes such as the sense of political efficacy, political knowledge, as well as political competence and sophistication. In this perspective, participation in religious-related associational life provides the social contacts and organizational skills necessary to understand political action and to exert effective influence. It also offers the opportunities to

---

[6]These three theoretical perspectives are not focused on the participation of migrants and ethnic minorities, but are more general theories of political participation.

practice civic skills that can then be applied to political life. This has especially been studied with regard to the relationship between church involvement and political activities (Verba et al. 1995). Thus, religious life has been found to promote civic behavior outside the institutional life of the church (Tate 1993). In this perspective, churches matter insofar as they function as civic associations (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). In addition, they are important channels of political information and recruitment (Ammerman 1997), hence serving as direct channels of political mobilization. Thus, churches influence political participation by directly recruiting their members into the political process (Djupe and Grant 2001). Jamal (2005) found evidence that, as churches, mosque participation has an effect on the political activity of American Muslims.

Perhaps to an even greater extent, the social capital perspective stresses the crucial role played by voluntary associations in favoring political participation. Spurred by the work of Putnam (1993, 2000), this approach has become quite popular in recent years. Although there are various approaches to social capital and its consequences (see Stolle 2007 for a review), in particular distinguishing between a group-level approach and an individual-level approach, the main thrust of this perspective is that voluntary associations provide social and political trust which, in turn, have a positive impact on political participation. At the individual level, "voluntary associations create social trust, which spills over into political trust and higher political participation" (Jacobs and Tillie 2004: 421). A number of survey-based studies have shown the strong impact of associational involvement on the migrants' political participation and have framed such an impact in terms of social capital (Berger et al. 2004; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Jacobs et al. 2004; Togeby 2004; Tillie 2004; Morales and Pilati 2011). However, beyond generic statements about trust being the crucial link between associational involvement and political participation, proponents of the social capital perspective have not really addressed, even less so demonstrated, the underlying mechanisms, in particular with regard to the impact of individual religiosity or collective embeddedness in religious associations.

While the civic voluntarism and the social capital perspectives stress the role of resources such as civic skills, political resources, and trust, the group consciousness perspective relies more on the collective benefits provided by voluntary associations, such as collective identity and an awareness of prejudice against minorities. Although there exists various definitions and conceptualizations of group consciousness, the latter may be defined as "a in-group identification politicized by a set of beliefs about one's group social standing as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests" (McClain et al. 2009). In this perspective, which stresses sociopsychological effects and identity formation, religious organizations bring together people with similar experiences, thereby creating a group consciousness favoring political participation. Group consciousness, however, is more than simply group identification. It also involves political awareness regarding the group's position in society as well as commitment to collective action (Gurin et al. 1980; Jackman and Jackman 1973; Miller et al. 1981). More generally, group consciousness has been said to be a multidimensional concept which includes the following components: group identification, polar affect, polar

power, and individual versus system blame (Miller et al. 1981). The concept of group consciousness has first been used to explain the political participation of Blacks in the United States and has subsequently been extended to the study of the political engagement of other minorities. In this perspective, religious collective organizations, such as black churches, have psychological effects reinforcing a sense of group consciousness and mobilizing members of a group around salient collective issues. For example, politicized Black churches were found to foster a sense of group consciousness by collectivizing the interests of the subgroup in an effort to counter prejudice and discrimination from mainstream society (Calhoun-Brown 1996). The same can be said for Muslims (especially Arab American Muslims) involved in mosques (Jamal 2005).

13.6 Evidence from the Switzerland: A Case for the Group Consciousness Approach?

While it is plausible to think that all three theoretical perspectives play a role in explaining Muslims political participation in Switzerland, the little existing available evidence on Muslims in Switzerland helps us to speculate on the relationship between embeddedness in religious associations and political participation. In particular, here we address two contextual aspects that may help us better assess the contours of that relationship.

The first aspect is the structural political weakness of Muslim groups. In particular, the ethnic heterogeneity of the Muslim population in Switzerland entails that the latter is very weakly organized both at the national and cantonal levels. Apart from a few national organizations and some locally strong associations (such as in Geneva and Zurich), in general Muslims suffer from a lack of political resources, both at the formal and the informal level, that give them little chances to influence the political agenda. At the formal level, for example, there are very few Muslim representatives in local assemblies and none in the national parliament. While several European governments are dealing with the question of what types of Islamic organizations they should engage with as they seek to encourage the creation of a dialogue and greater Muslim political participation,[7] the Swiss government does not seem to be willing to set up an institution organizing Muslims' religious or political representation. At the informal level, apart from personal contacts, Muslim leaders still do not have clear and sustained relations with key actors (political parties, public authorities, etc.) to push forward their claims.

Having said that, there is some evidence that, in the wake of the vote against minarets, some Muslim organizations were partly shifting from a strategy based on loyalty to one based on voice. Three examples may illustrate this trend. Firstly, a

---

[7]See, for instance, the creation of a representative council for observant Muslims (*Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*) created in 2004. For an overview of such trend in other countries, see Laurence (2012).

Swiss-converted Muslim who advocates a literalist conception of Islam as well as an increased visibility of the latter in Switzerland created in 2009 the Swiss Islamic Central Council. This organization has very quickly acquired public visibility (especially in the media) and gained hundreds of members. Secondly, the two main Muslim umbrella organizations in Switzerland are working the project of creating a representative national parliament of Muslims living in Switzerland.[8] Named "Swiss Umma," the parliament should be in place in 2013 and is supposed to be a forum for the consultation and coordination on issues related to Muslims' life and condition in the country. The main goal of this organization, which according to some Muslim leaders may become a political party, is to become a privileged interlocutor of the state, speaking with one voice and ending the fragmentation and dispersion of claims that contributes to the political weakness of Muslims in Switzerland. It is precisely the inability to federate common claims and to counter negative stereotypes that has led to the ban of minarets. Thirdly, the vote against minarets is also the foundational act of the Rally of Swiss Muslims, a think-tank organization whose purpose is to engage the public debate about Muslims in Switzerland and to make recommendations to public authorities in order to promote better forms of mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims.[9] Formed by Swiss Muslims, one of the main aims of the organization is precisely to encourage their political participation and civic engagement, in brief, to empower them.

Is there a common logic underlying these three examples? The creation of these organizations arguably shows how external factors can foster Muslim's participation. Negative events such as the ban of minarets may encourage the mobilization of groups and the politicization of individuals. Important events as well as the anti-Muslims discourses surrounding them can spur Muslim activism and raise a political consciousness in a previously largely apolitical population. In this light, the group consciousness perspective seems to be a relevant analytical tool in order to understand present and future changes in the political participation of Muslims, such as an increase in the civic and political participation as a means to counter negative stereotypes against Muslims or decisions like the ban of minarets that discriminate against them.

The second aspect is the assimilationist stance of the Swiss model of citizenship and, more generally, of the Swiss public philosophy of integration shaping institutional and discursive opportunities for the political mobilization of Muslims as well as of migrants more generally (Koopmans et al. 2005). As already mentioned above, the Muslim population living in Switzerland is mainly composed by foreigners and therefore by people whose possibility to remain in the country rests upon the discretionary power of the state. As a result, not only this makes citizens more likely than foreigners to feel that they can influence collective decisions,

---

[8]These are the KIOS (Coordination of Swiss Islamic Organizations) and the FOIS (Federation of Swiss Islamic Organizations). It is interesting to notice that the Swiss Islamic Central Council is not part of this project.

[9]See http://www.iras-otis.ch/publikationen/2012/Rassemblement%20de%20Suisses%20%20%20Musulmans_brochure%20fr-de-it.pdf.

leading to a lower political participation, but the perception of the public authorities of the supposed lack of integration of Muslims may also have important implications for Muslims.

The Swiss public philosophy of integration is grounded on implicit communitarian premises with regard to territorialized (i.e., linguistic) minorities but follows a strict liberal-individualistic view when non-territorialized (e.g., religious) minorities are concerned. Concerning the latter, this means that, one the one hand, references to vertical or political forms of integration – such as for example the public recognition of cultural differences of foreigners, the engagement of the state in the promotion of multiculturalism, or the self-definition of Switzerland as an immigration country – are not part of the integration policy. According to this view, the most important factor leading to integration is the individual willingness of foreigners to adapt to common norms, values, and practices (Gianni 2009). As a result, any claim that might be made by Muslims about the need to reinterpret the content or scope of the application of some civil laws in order to provide better ways of accommodating their religious practices is seen in the public debate as a lack of loyalty to Swiss society and, hence, as poor integration. Paradoxically, therefore, what could be taken as a sign of integration – namely, the fact that individuals feel recognized enough to participate in public debates and to express dissent towards some public decisions – is transformed into the opposite, that is, a sign of disloyalty or of poor integration (Gianni 2013). In such a context, the political participation of Muslims, although enhanced by their embeddedness in religious associations, is neither valued nor encouraged.

13.7   Conclusion

In this chapter, based on an analysis of the Swiss case, we have examined the role of religion for the political participation of Muslims and explored some connections between these two terms. Our findings are twofold. Firstly, we found that the collective dimension of religion, and more specifically the embeddedness of Muslims in religious organizations (as measured by associational involvement) and institutions (as measured by the frequency of mosque attendance), has a positive impact on participation, while individual religiosity has not. Secondly, we argued that the linkage between collective religious embeddedness and political participation may be explained by three theoretical perspectives that have stressed the role of voluntary associations for political engagement, namely, the civic voluntarism, the social capital, and the group consciousness perspectives. In other words, the mechanisms through which the collective dimension of religion could be translated into higher levels of political participation of Muslims may lie in different kinds of resources provided by collective religious embeddedness: civic skills and political resources as stressed by the civic voluntarism model, political trust and norms of reciprocity as put forward by the social capital model of group identity, and empowerment as outlined by the group consciousness model.

We have suggested some empirical and analytical elements in order to ascertain the relevance of the three models to understanding the political participation of Muslims in Switzerland. Although our data do not allow a statistical test of it, there are hints that the group consciousness model plays an important role, particularly in explaining the increase in the mobilization and the creation of Muslim religious organizations in the wake of the controversial vote on the ban of minarets.

To be sure, our study is a very tentative one, for several reasons. In particular, our analysis of the religion-participation nexus has only dealt with a very rough measure of the overall political participation. Further analyses could expand our approach to other, more specific forms, in particular to protest behavior. In addition, we did not empirically test for the effect of the kinds of resources stressed by the three theoretical perspectives for explaining the connections between religion and political participation. Instead, we advanced some speculations about why religious associations are important for the political participation of Muslims in Switzerland.

References

Ammerman, N. T. (1997). *Congregation and community*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Ayers, J. W., & Hofstetter, C. R. (2008). American Muslim political participation following 9/11: Religious belief, political resources, social structures, and political awareness. *Politics and Religion, 1*, 3–26.

Behloul, S., & Lathion, S. (2007). Les musulmans et l'islam en Suisse: les multiples facettes d'une religion du monde. In M. Baumann & J. Stolz (Eds.), *La nouvelle Suisse religieuse* (pp. 199–213). Genève: Labor et Fides.

Berger, M., Galonska, C., & Koopmans, R. (2004). Political integration by a detour? Ethnic communities and social capital of migrants in Berlin. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30*, 491–507.

Broughton, D., & Ten Napel, H.-M. (Eds.). (2000). *Religion and mass electoral behavior in Europe*. London: Routledge.

Cadge, W., & Ecklund, E. H. (2007). Immigration and religion. *Annual Review of Sociology, 33*, 359–379.

Calhoun-Brown, A. (1996). African American churches and political mobilization: The psychological impact of organizational resources. *The Journal of Politics, 58*, 935–953.

Converse, P. E. (1974). Some priority variables in comparative research. In R. Rose (Ed.), *Electoral behavior: A comparative handbook*. New York: Free Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2008). *Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies* (5th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Dalton, R. J., Flanagan, S. C., & Allen Beck, P. (1984). *Electoral change in the advanced industrial democracies: Dealignment or realignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DeMaio, T. J. (1984). Social desirability and survey measurement: A review. In C. F. Turner & E. Martin (Eds.), *Surveying subjective phenomena* (Vol. 2). New York: Russell Sage.

Djupe, P. A., & Grant, J. T. (2001). Religious institutions and political participation in America. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40*, 303–314.

Eggert, N., & Giugni, M. (2010). Does associational involvement spur political integration? Political interest and participation of three immigrant groups in Zurich. *Swiss Political Science Review, 16*, 175–210.

Eggert, N., & Giugni, M. (2011). The impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. In L. Morales & M. Giugni (Eds.), *Social capital, political participation and migration in Europe: Making multicultural democracy work?* Houndmills: Palgrave.

Franklin, M. N. (1992). The decline of cleavage politics. In M. N. Franklin, T. T. Mackie, & H. Valen (Eds.), *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gianni, M. (2009). Citoyenneté et intégration des musulmans en Suisse: adaptation aux normes ou participation à leur définition ? In M. Schneuwly Purdie, M. Jenny, & M. Gianni (Eds.), *Musulmans en Suisse: intégrations et identités plurielles* (pp. 73–93). Genève: Labor et Fides.

Gianni, M. (2013). Muslims' integration in Switzerland: Securitizing democracy, weakening democracy? In X. Guillaume & J. Huysmans (Eds.), *Security and citizenship: The constitution of political being*. London: Routledge.

Gianni, M., & Clavien, G. (2012). Representing gender, defining Muslims? public discourse in Switzerland. In C. Flood, S. Hutchings, G. Miazhevich & H. Nickels (Eds.), *Islam in the plural: Identities, (self-)perceptions and politic*. Brill: Leiden.

Gianni, M. (with Schneuwly Purdie, M., Lathion, S., & Jenny, M) (2005). *Vie musulmane en Suisse. Profils identitaires, demandes et perceptions des musulmans en Suisse/éléments qualitatifs*. Berne: Commission Fédérale des Etrangers.

Grzymala-Busse, A. (2012). Why comparative politics should take religion (MOFE) seriously. *Annual Review of Political Science, 15*, 421–442.

Gurin, P., Miller, A. H., & Gurin, G. (1980). Stratum identification and consciousness. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 43*, 30–47.

Hervieu-Léger, D. (1999). *Le pélerin et le converti: La religion en mouvement*. Paris: Flammarion.

Jackman, M. R., & Jackman, R. W. (1973). An interpretation of the relation between objective and subjective social status. *American Sociological Review, 38*, 569–582.

Jacobs, D., & Tillie, J. (2004). Introduction: Social capital and political integration of migrants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30*, 419–427.

Jacobs, D., Phalet, K., & Swyngedouw, M. (2004). Associational membership and political involvement among ethnic minority groups in Brussels. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30*, 543–559.

Jamal, A. (2005). The political participation and engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque involvement and group consciousness. *American Politics Research, 33*, 521–544.

Jones-Correa, M. A., & Leal, D. A. (2001). Political participation: Does religion matter? *Political Research Quarterly, 54*, 751–770.

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). *Contested citizenship. Immigration and cultural diversity in Europa*. Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press.

Laurence, J. (2012). *The emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The state's role in minority integration*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B. R., & Gaudet, H. (1948). *The people's choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Levitt, P. (2008). Religion as a path to civic engagement and civically-infused religion. *Racial and Ethnic Studies, 31*, 766–791.

Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: An introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), *Party systems and voter alignments*. New York: Free Press.

Luckmann, T. (1967). *The invisible religion: The problem of religion in modern society*. New York: Macmillan.

McClain, P. D., Thomson Cafew, J. P., Walton, E., Jr., & Watts, C. S. (2009). Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: Measures of facial identity in American Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science, 12*, 471–485.

Miller, A. H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. (1981). Group consciousness and political participation. *American Journal of Political Science, 25*, 494–511.

Morales, L., & Giugni, M. (Eds.). (2011). *Social capital, political participation and migration in Europe: Making multicultural democracy work?* Houndmills: Palgrave.

Morales, L., & Pilati, K. (2011). The role of social capital in migrant's engagement in local politics in European cities. In L. Morales & M. Giugni (Eds.), *Social capital, political participation and migration in Europe: Making multicultural democracy work?* Houndmills: Palgrave.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pollack, D., & Pickel, G. (2007). Religious individualization or secularization? Testing hypotheses of religious change – The case of Eastern and Western Germany. *The British Journal of Sociology, 58*, 603–632.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Rokkan, S. (1970). *Citizens, elections, parties*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Stolle, D. (2007). Social capital. In R. J. Dalton & H.-D. Klingemann (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tate, K. (1993). *From protest to politics: The new black voters in American elections*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Teorell, J., Torcal, M., & Montero, J. R. (2007). Political participation: Mapping the terrain. In J. W. van Deth, J. R. Montero, & A. Westholm (Eds.), *Citizenship and involvement in European democracies: A comparative analysis*. London: Routledge.

Tillie, J. (2004). Social capital of organisations and their members: Explaining the political integration of immigrants in Amsterdam. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30*, 529–541.

Togeby, L. (2004). It depends… How organisational participation affects political participation and social trust among second-generation immigrants in Denmark. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30*, 509–528.

Tresch, A., & Nicolet, S. (2010). Changing religiosity, changing politics? The influence of traditional and post-traditional forms of religiosity on political attitudes. In H. Kriesi & S. Hug (Eds.), *Value change in Switzerland*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). *Participation in America*. New York: Harper & Row.

Verba, S., Scholzman, K., & Brady, H. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chapter 14
Democracy, Civil Society, and Islam

Yilmaz Esmer

> *In the light of modern liberal democratic thought, Islam is no more, nor any less democratic than Christianity or Judaism. All three monotheistic religions, if proposed as constitutional foundations of the state, and if understood as providing an ineluctable authority for the guidance of all significant human choice, are undemocratic or non-democratic. (Binder, L. (1998). Exceptionalism and Authenticity: The Question of Islam and Democracy, Arab Studies Journal 6, 33–59)*

> *For Islamists, democracy, expressing the will of the people, is the road to power, but it is a one-way road, on which there is no return, no rejection of the sovereignty of God, as exercised through his chosen representatives. Their electoral policy has been classically summarized as 'One man (men only), one vote, once.' (Lewis, B. (2003), The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (pp. 111–112). New York: The Modern Library)*

14.1 Introduction

Ever since the founding of the secular Turkish Republic in the 1920s, the relevance of the "Turkish model" for other Middle Eastern, in fact, for other Islamic majority countries regardless of geography, has been a topic of discussion by academics, policymakers, journalists, and others. The existence of a "model" with a democratic (or at least an aspiring democratic) system of government, a secular (for some, even "too secular")[1] constitution and laws, and finally a clear Western orientation has been a

---

[1] For some examples of criticisms of the Turkish (and also French) brand of secularism, see Gole (1996), Yavuz (2005), and Yavuz and Esposito (2003).

Y. Esmer (✉)
Political Science, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yilmaz.esmer@bahcesehir.edu.tr

source of optimism for many. The sweeping and radical reforms of modernization (at the time, a synonym for Westernization) of the early decades of the Republic met with profound interest and even admiration on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond. The young Turkish Republic and its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, were sources of inspiration in varying degrees for a number of Muslim leaders of the period as well.[2] Commenting on the renewed interest in the "Turkish model" after the end of the cold war, Altunisik (2005: 45) quotes Anthony Blinkmen[3]: "…because of what it is – a nation of mainly Islamic faith that is secular, democratic, and modernizing – Turkey must be a leader and can be a role model for a large swath of the world."

After 9/11 and especially after the uprisings that began in Tunisia and initiated the process that has been dubbed the "Arab Spring," references to the so-called Turkish model have become ever so ubiquitous. In addition to the analyses in academic journals, the popular media as well as political leaders devoted considerable attention to the subject. The BBC World, for instance, debated the topic for a worldwide audience.[4] Various polls were also conducted in a number of Arab countries to gauge public attitudes on the Turkish example. In one poll dated February 2012, no less than 72 % of the respondents in Arab countries opined that Turkey was a desirable model for the newly established regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. However, rather remarkably, Arab citizens told the pollsters that they favored the Turkish model "because they believe Turkey is close to the Arab world in terms of culture, religion, and traditions and also because it has '*integrated Islam into politics*.'" (Idiz 2012; italics mine).

The interesting question about the recent popularity of the "Turkish model" is its very source. One could rightly ask why Turkish and not, for example, Dutch or British or Swedish, to name but few countries whose democracies are much more advanced, consolidated, and perfect than the Turkish and whose human rights records are much more solid. After all, it is no great secret to anyone that Turkish democracy has numerous defects and shortcomings. If the idea is to establish a democratic system of government in Arab countries, would it not make more sense to look up to one of the less faulty democracies as a model? The answer to this question is, more than anything else, cultural: Turkey's population is almost exclusively (98.3 % according to the PEW Forum on Religion) Islamic. The model, it is believed, must be one that "can integrate Islam into politics" – presumably, democratic politics.

Implicit in this approach are two assumptions from which this chapter takes off:

(a) There is a correlation between cultural values and the system of government. In other words, *culture matters* for politics and political regimes as well.

---

[2]For example, Reza Shah of Iran, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan.

[3]President Clinton's Special Assistant and Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council.

[4]The reference is to "The Doha Debates," February 12, 2012. The question debated was whether Turkey is a good or bad example for Arab states. The BBC notes that the program is available for viewing at 400 million homes around the globe.

(b) The relationship between Islamic values and democracy as a system of government is problematic. Put differently, it is assumed that Islam is less conducive to democracy compared to other major religions.

The first assumption has been argued, explicated, discussed, debated, and evidenced so widely and competently that there is no need for us to spend any time on it here. To get to the roots of the culturalist approach, one can go as far back as Plato and Aristotle. Suffice it to note that the present author is also convinced that cultural values set limits to the sustainability of any legal-institutional structure.

Currently, the debate on the second assumption does not suffer from any lack of popularity either.[5] The burning question is whether or not a society whose value system rests on the principles of Islam can build up and sustain a secular and democratic system of government. The discussions and widespread doubts about Islam's compatibility with democracy are based upon both empirical observations and theoretical considerations. We begin with the former and briefly review the evidence about the relationship between religious, more specifically Islamic, values, and political regimes. In the second part of the chapter, we discuss some of the theoretical arguments which inevitably take us to the core values of Islam.

14.2 Empirical Evidence

A review of the existing literature based on empirical data reveals two main approaches to the subject: macro (country)-level evidence and micro (individual)-level evidence. While the former utilizes aggregate data about the characteristics of countries, the latter is almost exclusively based on survey data.

14.2.1 The Macro Level

A number of international organizations routinely calculate indices of democracy that score and rank countries on how "democratic" and "free" they are. Many of these indices are highly correlated among themselves. While the best known and most widely used democracy and freedom index is the one put out by the Freedom House, Germany's Bertelsmann Foundation and *The Economist*, among others, also calculate similar indices. Furthermore, individual academics have contributed to the rather popular field of "index of democracy" construction (e.g., Bollen 1993) providing the analyst with a wide choice. Scholars working on the correlates of democracy routinely use these indices – and most commonly the Freedom House Index – as a measure of the degree of democracy in a country.

---

[5]For a brief bibliography of academic works on "Islam and democracy," see "Select Bibliography on Islam and Democracy' by Sarsar, Saliba, and Keller Alexander," www.library.cornell.edu/coll-dev/mideast/islmdem.pdf (downloaded on 25 March 2012).

In our attempt to assess the relationship between Islam and democracy at the macro level, we use the democracy index calculated by Alexander and Welzel[6] and which is a combination of the Freedom House Index and Rule of Law Index from the World Bank's Good Governance Project (Kaufmann et al. 2008). The index is known as "the Effective Democracy Index" and, as noted by its authors, takes into account not just the theoretical existence or nonexistence of freedoms and human rights in a country as stipulated by its constitution and laws but also how effectual these written rules are in actual reality.[7]

No sophisticated analyses of the Welzel-Inglehart Index are needed to get a view of the overall picture. The index ranges between 0 (Libya, Sudan, Turkmenistan) and 97.10 (Finland). Of the 88 countries in the upper half of the distribution of Effective Democracy Index, only four are Muslim-majority countries: Turkey (26.91), Kuwait (29.05), Senegal (30.21), and Mali (32.92). More strikingly, only one Muslim-majority country (Mali) barely made it to the top 40th percentile, while none even approached the top quartile.[8] It may also be worth noting that there are 38 Muslim-majority countries in the lower half of the index.

Although a casual glance at the Effective Democracy Index (or any other measure of democracy for that matter) easily reveals the rather unfavorable positions of Muslim societies on a democracy and/or freedom scale, examining the relevant correlation and regression coefficients will be more instructive.

Scholars who have investigated the relationship between Islam and democracy at the macro level have used either the proportion of Muslims in a given country (Muller 1995; Fish 2011) or a binary variable (usually with 50 % as the cutting point) to define Muslim-majority countries (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Anckar 2008). Neither one of these measures is perfect. However, we believe that the proportion of Muslims is a comparatively better measure despite its shortcomings. Furthermore, it is comforting to know that the correlations we are about to report are robust regardless of the measure used.

The simple bivariate linear correlation coefficient between the percentage of Islamic population[9] and the Effective Democracy Index is no less than $-.50$ ($n=166$). Clearly, this is not a finding that one can dismiss readily.[10] A look at the scattergram

---

[6]First proposed by Welzel et al. (2003); criticized by Hadenius and Teorell (2005) and Knutsen (2010); response to criticism Alexander et al. (2011). Index scores for 2006 are available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org

[7]Our preference for the "Effective Democracy Index" may be criticized on a number of grounds. A comparison of the performances and technical attributes of the various indices of democracy is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, we note that all major indices produce similar results concerning the correlation between Islam and democracy.

[8]Rather ironically, at the time of this writing, a military coup had taken place in Mali, the Islamic country with the highest effective democracy score in 2006. The coup brought a halt to 20 years of democracy, closing down the parliament and suppressing the opposition. The country's democracy score will no doubt have to be revised in the future versions of the index.

[9]Religion data (for the year 2008) are taken from World Christian Database.

[10]We may note that the correlation between percent Muslim and the Freedom House scores (total score) even larger at 0.52. (Freedom House assigns higher scores to less democratic and less free countries; hence the positive sign of the correlation coefficient.)

with percent Muslim on the horizontal and effective democracy on the vertical axes reveals that a second degree polynomial will provide a better fit to the data. A regression equation with effective democracy as the dependent and percent Muslim plus percent Muslim squared as the independent variables yields an adjusted R squared of 0.27 with all coefficients statistically significant at 0.01 level or better.

Borooah and Paldam (2006: 25) use Bayesian probability analysis to calculate the "risk" for Muslim and non-Muslim countries of being undemocratic. They conclude that "by 2004, a country which was undemocratic was more than twice as likely to be Muslim than one which was highly/moderately democratic. Using a complementary concept of risk, we were also able to show that by 2004, even though only a third of the world's countries were Muslim, the chance of an undemocratic country being Muslim was 85 % of the chance of an undemocratic country being non-Muslim."

Simple analyses similar to the one above have been carried out time and again yielding similar correlation and regression coefficients. However, such bivariate statistics, without any control variables, could easily result from spurious associations.

In a seminal and still influential work, Lipset (1959) argued that democracy was associated with economic and social development as well as an equalitarian value system. Since Lipset, it has been commonly accepted that economic development (or rather the more broadly defined concept of socioeconomic development) and democracy are correlated. Hence, one has to ask whether or not the high bivariate correlation coefficients (between democracy and religion) approach zero when one controls for development.

To test the spuriousness hypothesis, we run the above regression twice: once with a purely economic indicator (GDP/cap 2005) and once with a more widely accepted indicator of socioeconomic development, that is, the Human Development Index published by UNDP. The results are given in Table 14.1. When income is controlled for, not only is the religion effect still very highly significant ($p < .000$) but the beta coefficient – which allows a comparison of the relative magnitudes of independent variables – for the percent Muslim variable is more than twice greater than the income coefficient. And the two variables explain close to 30 % of the total variance in Effective Democracy Index. It is customary to use the logarithmic transformation of per capita income to smooth out the distribution and get rid of the outliers. Using log gnp/cap elevates the R squared to 0.41 and the beta coefficients for percent Muslim and income are about the same. The religion effect is still loud and clear when GDP/cap is replaced by HDI as control variable. Furthermore, the R squared jumps to 0.56. This finding corroborates Diamond (1992) who argued that HDI was a better predictor of democracy than per capita income.

Clearly, development, both economic and socioeconomic, is a significant predictor of the level of democracy in a society, but religion also plays a vital role over and above the development effect. This is a robust and hard-to-deny finding regardless of one's preferences for indicators and measurement models. One may justifiably argue that these models are too simplistic to be conclusive and that they do not demonstrate causality. No doubt, this is true. But it is equally true that there is a story here that one would be well advised not to ignore.

Table 14.1 Regression of Effective Democracy Index on percent Muslim and socioeconomic development (standardized beta coefficients)

	Standardized coefficient (beta)		
	I	II	III
Percent Muslim	−0.46	−0.40	−0.33
I. GDP/cap 2005	0.22		
II. lnGDP/cap 2005		0.43	
III. HDI 2005			0.59
Adjusted R^2	0.28	0.41	0.56
Number of cases	161	161	162

Note: All coefficients significant at 0.00 or better

Up to this point we have treated the democratic system of government as a unified concept and have not analyzed any of its components separately. Given the myriad definitions of democracy, identifying its components would be complicated theoretical task indeed. However, there is no disagreement on the principle that democracy, above all, means equal rights for all citizens regardless of gender. It is also a fact that, as of yet, no country in the world has been able to achieve complete equality between its male and female citizens. Nevertheless, this is not a binary, yes-or-no variable, but rather an interval scale. Some societies, although not perfect, are much more advanced with respect to this all important aspect of democracy than others.

As comparative data compiled by various international organizations have shown, gender inequality is exceptionally high in Islamic societies. So much so that, many scholars have concluded that if there is one major area of divergence between Islamic and non-Islamic societies as well as Muslims and non-Muslims, it is related to gender equality and the status of women. Put differently, comparatively speaking, gender inequalities are greater in Islamic countries both at the institutional and individual values levels.

Comparing the values of Muslims with non-Muslims in an attempt to test the "clash of civilizations thesis," Norris and Inglehart (2002: 260) conclude that the major cultural cleavage is not related to democratic values but rather in "social beliefs about gender equality and sexual liberalization. In this regard, the West is far more egalitarian and liberal than all other societies, particularly Islamic nations." Esmer (2002) reaches a similar conclusion and underlines that a distinguishing characteristic of Islamic culture is its outlook on women (and sex). Fish (2011) explores the status of women in public life and popular attitudes towards gender equality and writes that "All the findings point in the same direction…. In none of the results is Islam associated with better status for females relative to males, and in most of the analyses it is clearly correlated with inferior conditions for females" (Fish 2011: 201). Nevertheless, he is cautious about making causal inferences from these findings and considers a number of alternative hypotheses that could explain the correlations.

The World Economic Forum annually publishes a global "gender gap" report which ranks countries on various dimensions of gender equality.[11] We repeat the regression results reported in Tables 14.1, only replacing the Effective Democracy

---

[11] WEF gender equality statistics are available at www.wef.org

Table 14.2 Regression of Gender Gap Index on percent Muslim and socioeconomic development (standardized beta coefficients)

	Standardized coefficient (beta)		
	I	II	III
Percent Muslim	−0.60	−0.54	−0.48
I. GDP/cap 2005	0.10*		
II. lnGDP/cap 2005		0.31	
III. HDI 2005			0.43
Adjusted R^2	0.37	0.45	0.52
Number of cases	110	110	110

*Not significant at .05; all other coefficients significant at .000

Index with the Gender Gap Index of the WEF as the dependent variable. (To facilitate comparison with the Effective Democracy Index, we use the 2006 scores for the Gender Gap Index as well.) The results given in Table 14.2 need no further interpretation. Proportion of Muslims in a country has a strong negative effect on gender equality net of the effects of both economic and social development. In fact, religion effects are greater than development effects which, at least in one case, is not even statistically significant (Table 14.2).

As noted, for consistency, we have used the Gender Gap scores for 2006. But the situation has not changed at all since then. The correlation between the 2006 and 2011 Gender Gap scores is almost perfect at 0.94. Of the 15 lowest ranking countries on the 2011 Gender Gap Index, 12 are Muslim-majority countries, the 3 exceptions being Cote d'Ivoire (28 % Muslim), Benin (18 % Muslim), and Nepal (4 % Muslim). If these indices (including the ones published by various UN agencies) have any validity, gender equality is a serious problem in Islamic societies which, in turn, translates into a democracy problem.

14.2.2 The Micro Level

A number of authors (Norris and Inglehart 2002; Rose 2002; Tessler 2003; Al-Braizat 2003; Inglehart 2007; Kotze and Garcia-Rivero 2009; Tausch 2009) have concluded that Muslims, as individuals, are just as democracy oriented as non-Muslims. One scholar has even reversed the "common wisdom" and, in a study of eight countries, argued that Muslim respondents espoused democratic values more than Christian (Eastern Orthodox, to be more precise) respondents at least in the countries included in the study (Hofmann 2004). Most, if not all, of these writers, however, have analyzed responses to questions that ask directly about attitudes towards democracy such as "how important is it for you to live under a democratic system of government?" or "would it be very good, etc. to have a democratic political system for governing this country?" It has been shown that responses to these and similar direct questions vary little from one society to another perhaps due to the fact that after what Huntington has called the "third wave," democracy has become the "only game in town." Whatever the underlying reason, it seems like one has to look beyond direct questions and rhetoric and try to unearth the existence or nonexistence of core democratic values in devout

Muslim populations. This is not to say that the findings mentioned above need to be revised. It only points out the need for further analyses using questions that tap democratic values.

To gain further insight into the support for democracy at the individual level, we propose to define "the minimal democrat" with few core democratic values or attitudes. Taking the 2008 EVS Questionnaire as our starting point, our "minimal democrat" is the following individual. He/she:

– Thinks that being ruled by a democratic system of government would be *very* good
– Thinks that having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections would be fairly bad or very bad
– Does not categorically reject the possibility of signing a petition even if he/she has not done so yet
– Has no objections to having persons of different race or color as his/her neighbor
– Does not believe that there is only one true religion (obviously one's own)
– Does not think that men should have priority over women when jobs are scarce

It is easy and perhaps tempting to expand this list of six items, but we would like to keep the number to a bare minimum since we are after the "minimal democrat." The dimensions of this six item list are obvious. These are:

(a) Strong faith in democracy, parliament, and elections
(b) Acceptance of conventional political participation
(c) Tolerance for different races and religions
(d) Gender equality

Using the latest round of EVS (2008–2009) and recoding the above questions as 1 (democrat) or 0 (not democrat), we obtain a simple additive index[12] that ranges between 0 and 6. We then try to assess the impact of religion on this index in 47 European countries.

A simple frequency distribution reveals that our index, intended to identify the "minimal democrat," is rather optimistic. If this definition of the "minimal democrat" were accepted, one would have to concede that democratic individuals are a rare breed in Europe (Fig. 14.1). Indeed, only about 17 % of Europeans scored as "democrats" on all six questions. Again striking a pessimistic note, no less than a third of Europeans are on the nondemocrat side with respect to at least three of the six items.

Examining the relationship of the index to religion, we first note that those who do not claim to belong to a religion score higher on the index than those who identify with a religion or religious denomination (mean 4.41 vs. 3.94; data unweighted).

The EVS data allows us to compare the scores of four major denominations (for others the number of observations is insufficient). The means and the standard

---

[12] In a statistical sense, the six variables do not comprise a highly reliable index (Cronbach's alpha = 0.47). However, our concern here is theoretical rather than statistical. We believe the index includes the minimal core values of a "democrat." Whether the items are highly correlated among themselves or not is not irrelevant but is a different issue.

Fig. 14.1 Distribution of the "minimal democrat index" in 47 European countries

Table 14.3 Minimal democrat index means for religions/denominations

	Mean	St. dev.	N
Protestant	4.97	1.11	5,875
Roman Catholic	4.25	1.29	13,805
Orthodox	3.40	1.35	10,902
Muslim	3.13	1.37	5,902

deviations for these four denominations are given in Table 14.3. Among the four religion groups, Protestants score the highest and Muslims the lowest. The difference between Protestants and Muslims is quite sizeable and the difference between Roman Catholics and Muslims is not negligible either.

To be certain that the difference between denominations observed in Table 14.3 are religion effects, one must hold constant possible confounding variables. Levels of income and education are the first such variables that come to mind. Thus, we run a regression with our minimal democrat index as dependent, religious denominations (dummy variables for Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim) as independent, and education (ISCED one digit coding) plus income (purchasing power parity in Euros) as control variables. The results are given in Table 14.4. With such a large sample size, it is very unusual not to get statistical significance; therefore, we do not comment on that. However, two things in Table 14.4 are worthy of our attention: (1) the signs of the coefficients and (2) the proportion of total variance explained. We observe that all four independent variables have positive effects on the minimal democrat index while the sign is negative only for Muslims. Furthermore, the R squared is quite respectable particularly taking into account that this is individual-level data.

To sum up the analysis so far, one thing is clear. Both at the macro and the micro levels, the relationship between Islam and democracy is problematic – at least more problematic than other religions/denominations. Why? That question leads us to Part 2 of the chapter: the theoretical considerations that might be responsible for these findings.

Table 14.4 Regression of the "minimal democrat" index (data unweighted)

	Unstandardized coefficient (B)	Standard error of B	Beta	t value
Constant	3.087***	0.018		173.05
Protestant	0.810***	0.020	0.185	39.63
Catholic	0.305***	0.015	0.094	19.80
Muslim	−0.572***	0.020	−0.135	−29.09
Education (ISCED)	0.158***	0.005	0.152	33.31
Income (ppp in Euros)	0.262***	0.005	0.245	52.27

Number of cases: 41,278 adjusted R squared: 0.21
***significant at 0.001 level

14.3 Theoretical Arguments

There are two clearly demarcated and opposing camps with respect to the relationship between Islam as a faith (and its core teachings) and democracy. On one the side are those who claim that Islam is fully and entirely compatible with democracy. Not only is it compatible, they argue, but Islam is a call for democracy when its basic principles are considered – human rights, equal status of all human beings before Allah, rejection of racism, principles of justice, etc. Some go as far as asserting that the idea of democracy originated in Islam. Their evidence for this rather unsustainable claim is the "shura" principle that requires the leader of an Islamic polity to consult and seek the advice of believers before making important decisions. According to one vocal spokesman, "*Shura* constitutes one of the *four cardinal principles* in the Islamic perspective on socio-political organization. The other three are *justice, equality,* and *human dignity*" (Sulaiman 1999; italics original).

The opposing camp argues that no other religion is as comprehensive and all-encompassing as Islam which leaves no room for civil society. In Islam, every aspect of human existence, it is argued, is governed by immutable rules – at least in principle. According to the proponents of this line of reasoning, Islam has no room for democracy as we know it.[13]

14.3.1 Democracy and Civil Society

Defined as the "…sphere of voluntary associations and of voluntary involvement at some distance to the state, to the market and to the intimate sphere of family" (Dekker and van den Broek 2005: 46), a vibrant civil society is regarded as a prerequisite for democracy because it ensures pluralism and limits state power. Indeed, civil society is a term with a positive connotation because it is assumed to be the antidote of absolutism and totalitarianism. As stated by

---

[13]Fish (2011: 6–7) gives a partial list of the leading scholars on both sides of this debate.

Therborn ([2002](): 45) "it [civil society] has a number of attractive futures: a plurality of autonomous groups and associations; public institutions of culture and communication; privacy for individual choices and pursuits; a system of general rights demarcating plurality, privacy, and publicity from the state; perhaps also from the economy."

In any geography, civil society does not come into existence abruptly or by decree, but it requires a hospitable cultural tradition. Put differently, the societal value map must be conducive to the well-functioning of civil society. In Gellner's words, the central premise of civil society is "unconstrained and secular individual, unhampered by social or theological bonds, freely choosing his aims" (Gellner [1994]() quoted in Sunar [2002](): 9).

From Gellner's perspective, then, we have two prerequisites for a healthy civil society: secularism and individualism. Ozdalga ([2002](): 74–75) agrees that "secularization is a necessary condition for the development of civil society. Individuals who are not able to act independently from the community of believers cannot become the building stones of intermediary organizations on which civil society is built." There is a vast literature on the association between civil society and democracy which is hardly contested by anyone. Within the context of Europe and using EVS data, Dekker et al. ([2003](): 220) provide empirical evidence for "The assumed positive relationships between civil society and political democracy" both at the macro and micro levels. We would go one step further and argue that the relationship is not just assumed but demonstrated as well with reliable data. Blaydes and Lo's ([2012](): 112) conclusion that "democracy occurs when regime liberalizers who prefer democracy to a narrowed dictatorship interact with a civil society that will honor democratic principles" may be debatable, but the emphasis on a "civil society that will honor democratic principles" has been widely accepted.

Recognizing crucial importance of civil society for a sustainable democracy, the next question that needs to be asked is the conduciveness of Islam to civil society. If Islam is not compatible with or at least not hospitable to civil society, this may provide an explanation for the empirical findings observed both at the macro and micro levels and summarized above. If, on the other hand, Islam does not constitute a barrier to civil society neither in theory nor in practice, we will have to look for an explanation elsewhere.

14.3.2 *Islam and Civil Society*

According to Gellner, let alone being conducive to it, Islam is the rival of civil society just like Marxism and Fascism. The reason for this unequivocal stance is Gellner's assessment of Islam as a "secularization resistant" religion (Gellner [1992](), [1994]()).

If we recall Gellner's reasoning that secularization is one of the two main requisites of civil society and if Islam does not allow secularization, it follows that civil society

cannot flourish in an Islamic society. Prophet Mohammad was not only a religious and spiritual leader but, at the same time, a political and military leader and the ultimate distributor of justice. This is why, it is argued, Islam cannot secularize, that is, exist outside the realm of politics. According to Huntington (1984: 208), in Islam "no distinction exists between religion and politics or between the spiritual and the secular…."

At a more general level, the major reasoning for the assumed incompatibility of Islam with civil society is based on the all-comprehensive nature of the Islamic faith. It would not be unfair to say that it regulates all aspects of social and political existence. Islam establishes principles in areas ranging from civil law to criminal law and from state formation to economic institutions. And in many cases, these principles are not just general and abstract codes but rather finely detailed and concrete obligations on the part of believers. This all-encompassing nature of the Islamic religion, it is said, leaves no room for civil society.

Gellner is not alone in regarding Islam as a rival of civil society. Mazlish (2005), for instance, sees global Islam, along with global America and global civil society, as contenders for future global society although he predicts that Islam will not be a winner in this competition.

To recapitulate the line of reasoning we have been summarizing:

(a) Democracy needs civil society.
(b) Civil society needs secularization and individualization.
(c) Islam, in principle, allows neither secularization nor individualization mainly because it does not confine itself to the spiritual.
(d) Therefore, Islam is not conducive to democracy.

To be sure, those who disagree with the line of reasoning represented here by Gellner would be in distinguished company as well. We have already mentioned a number of scholars who emphasize that Islam is not different from any other world religion with respect to its compatibility with democracy.

Once again, we need to look at the evidence in order to take a position concerning the association between religion and civil society. This is not going to be easy if only because there is little agreement on the precise meaning of the term civil society (Anheimer 2005). Nevertheless, an attempt in that direction is not completely futile. The Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg has made available some indicators of civil society for a large number of countries. We use two of these measures[14]: (1) civil society organizations working on corruption and civil society organizations per million population. We regress these two indicators on the proportion of Muslims as the independent and UNDP/HDI as the control

---

[14]These measures are: (1) civil society organizations working on anti-corruption issues, the media's effectiveness in reporting on corruption and public access to information taken from Global Integrity Report, and (2) number of civil society organizations per million population; data compiled by Grimes taken from CIVICUS. For more information on the indicators and raw data: www.qog.pol.gu.se

Table 14.5 Regression of civil society (corruption) on percent Muslim and UNDP/HDI

	Unstandardized coefficient (B)	Standard error of B	Beta	t value
Constant	55.98***	7.841		7.14
Percent Muslim	−0.156**	0.052	−0.380	−3.02
HDI 2005	26.90*	10.243	0.330	2.62

Number of cases: 48 adjusted R squared: 0.28
***significant at 0.001 level
**significant at 0.01 level
*significant at 0.05 level

Table 14.6 Regression of civil society organization/million population on percent Muslim and UNDP/HDI

	Unstandardized coefficient (B)	Standard error of B	Beta	t value
Constant	35.239***	8.970		3.93
Percent Muslim	−0.142*	0.057	−0.202	−2.52
HDI 2005	−19.823	11.555	−0.138	−1.72

Number of cases: 159 adjusted R squared: 0.03
***significant at 0.001 level
*significant at 0.05 level

variable. The results are given in Tables 14.5 and 14.6. We see that, with both indicators, the proportion of Muslims has a statistically significant and negative effects net of the effects of HDI (which in one case is negative and nonsignificant). Taking into account the low precision (and possibly low validity) of our civil society indicators, we can only tentatively conclude that Islam decreases the ubiquity and effectiveness of civil society.

14.4   Islam and Civil Society in Europe

Finally, we test the relationship between civil society and Islam within the European context making use of the EVS data. The question we will address is whether or not there is a correlation between religious affiliation and the attitudes and values that are conducive to civil society.

Our indicators will be the two premises of civil society proposed by Gellner (secularism and individualism) in addition to membership in voluntary organizations that form the essence of civil society. Furthermore, we will look at data related to interpersonal trust and political participation – two important correlates of civil society (Dekker et al. 2003). To sum up, then, we will be comparing Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe with respect to:

(a) Premises of civil society (Gellner)
(b) Major correlates of civil society (Dekker et al. 2003)
(c) Essence of civil society

The survey questions we will use to tap these dimensions are the following:

Secularism

Question 1   Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office (agree/disagree).

Question 2   Religious leaders should not influence government decisions (agree/disagree).

Individualism

Question 1   Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them, or one does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behavior and attitudes.

Question 2   Please use this scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out (a 10-point scale with higher scores indicating more freedom).

Interpersonal trust

Question   Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Political participation

Question   Signing a petition (have done/might do/would never do under any circumstances).

Membership in voluntary organizations

Mean number of membership in 15 different types of voluntary organizations.

Table 14.7 summarizes responses to all seven indicators according to religious denomination. Admittedly, this is a very elementary analysis that is only intended to serve as a first step. It needs to be expanded to include controls for socioeconomic and demographic variables as well as tests for nation effects which we do not include in this chapter due to space limitations. However, with these caveats, we can say that on the premises, essence, and correlates of civil society, European adherents of Islam lag *far* behind Protestants and behind Roman Catholics as well. Members of the Orthodox Church in Europe come closest to Muslims – a finding that calls for further investigation.

14.5   Conclusions

We start with the rather commonplace empirical observation that regardless of which international index of democracy, freedom, or good governance one uses, Muslim-majority countries fare worse than non-Muslim nations at similar levels of economic and social development. Using Alexander and Welzel's "Effective

Table 14.7 Behavior and values related to civil society (data unweighted)

Religion	Nonbelievers in God unfit for office (% disagree)	Religious leaders should *not* influence government decisions (% agree)	Parents must earn love and respect of their children (%)	Mean score on freedom of control over life scale	Most people can be trusted (%)	Have signed a petition (%)	Mean number of membership in voluntary organizations
Protestant	72	62	49	7.3	56	60	1.76
Catholic	56	61	23	6.7	28	39	0.75
Orthodox	32	58	15	6.7	21	17	0.42
Muslim	25	61	12	6.0	20	17	0.52

Democracy Index," we once again demonstrate this rather strong negative association. This being the case at the macro level, the next obvious question – and one that many social scientists have tackled – is whether or not Muslims, as individuals, are less democratic. In other words, is there a significant difference between Muslims and adherents of other religions with respect to the core values related to democracy? Unlike the macro-level data, there is much disagreement on the nature of the relationship between individual Muslims' value systems and democracy.

Using the EVS data, we compare the values of Muslims and Christians (Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox) in Europe on the "Minimal Democrat Index" composed of six core democratic values. The differences are significant even after controlling for education and income. However, as we have noted more than once, many scholars working on global, regional, or country data disagree with this outcome. Regardless of that debate (which is not a trivial issue, to be sure), we have to ask why is it that Muslim-majority countries are less hospitable to democracy.

One possible explanation, among others, is the incompatibility of Islam with a vibrant civil society which, in turn, is a prerequisite for a healthy and sustainable democracy. We test this hypothesis at two levels: (a) using two global civil society indices and (b) using indicators of the premises, essence, and correlates of civil society in Europe. Islam effect is still observable particularly in analyses with the global civil society indices as the dependent variable. With respect to the civil society indicators at the individual level in Europe, however, Orthodox Christians and Muslims have rather similar attitudes and values. Overall, the civil society hypothesis does not seem to be one that can be discarded easily, although further analyses both in Europe and in other regions of the World are needed.

References

Al-Braizat, F. (2003). Muslims and democracy: An empirical critique of Fukuyama's culturalist approach. In R. Inglehart (Ed.), *Islam, gender, culture and democracy* (pp. 46–76). Ontario: de Sitter Publications.

Alexander, A. C., Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2011). *Measuring effective democracy: A defense*. APSA 2011 annual meeting paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1899724

Altunisik, M. B. (2005). The Turkish model and democratization in the Middle East. *Arab Studies Quarterly, 27*, 45–63.

Anckar, C. (2008). Size, islandness, and democracy: A global comparison. *International Political Science Review, 29*, 433–459.

Anheimer, H. K. (2005). Introducing the Journal of Civil Society: An editorial statement. *Journal of Civil Society, 1*(1), 45–59.

Blaydes, L., & Lo, J. (2012). One man, one vote, one time? A model of democratization in the Middle East. *Journal of Theoretical Politics, 24*, 110–146.

Bollen, K. (1993). Liberal democracy: Validity and method factors in cross-national measures. *American Journal of Political Science, 37*(4), 1207–1230.

Borooah, V. K., & Paldam, M. (2006). Why is the world of democracy? A cross-country analysis of barriers to representative government. *International Centre for Economic Research* (Working paper 28/2006). Turin, Italy.

Dekker, P., & Van den Broek, A. (2005). Involvement in voluntary associations in North America and Western Europe: Trends and correlates 1981–2000. *Journal of Civil Society, 1*(1), 45–59.

Dekker, P., Ester, P., & Vinken, H. (2003). Civil society, social trust and democratic involvement. In W. Arts, J. Hagenaars, & L. Halman (Eds.), *The cultural diversity of European unity* (pp. 217–249). Leiden/Boston: Brill.

Diamond, L. (1992). Economic development and democracy reconsidered. In G. Marks & L. Diamond (Eds.), *Reexamining democracy: Essays in honor of Seymour Martin Lipset* (pp. 93–138). Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Esmer, Y. (2002). Is there an Islamic civilization? *Comparative Sociology, 1*(3–4), 265–297.

Fish, S. M. (2011). *Are Muslims distinctive? A look at the evidence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gellner, E. (1992). *Postmodernism, reason and religion*. London/New York: Routledge.

Gellner, E. (1994). *Conditions of liberty: Civil society and rivals*. London: Viking Adult.

Göle, N. (1996). Authoritarian secularism and Islamist politics. In A. R. Norton (Ed.), *Civil society in the Middle East* (Vol. 1, pp. 17–43). Leiden: Brill.

Hadenius, A., & Teorell, J. (2005). Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy. *Studies in Comparative International Development, 39*, 87–106.

Hofmann, S. R. (2004). Islam and democracy: Micro-level indications of compatibility. *Comparative Political Studies, 37*, 652–676.

Huntington, S. P. (1984). Will more countries become democratic? *Political Science Quarterly, 99*(2), 193–218.

Idiz, S. (2012, February 28). Do Arabs know what the Turkish model is? *Hurriyet Daily News*.

Inglehart, R. F. (2007). The worldviews of Islamic publics in global perspective. In M. Moaddel (Ed.), *Values and perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern publics* (pp. 25–46). New York: Palgrave.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2008). *Governance matters VII: Aggregate and individual governance indicators, 1996–2007* (World Bank Policy Research working paper No. 4654). Washington DC. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148386 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1148386

Knutsen, C. H. (2010). Measuring effective democracy. *International Political Science Review, 31*(2), 109–128.

Kotze, H., & Garcia-Rivero, C. (2009). Islam and democracy: Arab Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa compared. In Y. Esmer & T. Pettersson (Eds.), *The international system, democracy and values* (pp. 169–182). Uppsala: Acta Universitat Upsaliensis.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review, 53*, 69–105.

Mazlish, B. (2005). The hi-jacking of global society? An essay. *Journal of Civil Society, 1*(1), 5–17.

Muller, E. N. (1995). Economic determinants of democracy. *American Sociological Review, 60*(6), 966–982.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2002). Islamic culture and democracy: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis. *Comparative Sociology, 1*(3–4), 235–263.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ozdalga, E. (2002). Civil society and its enemies: Reflections on a debate in the light of recent developments within the Islamic student movement in Turkey. In E. Ozdalga & S. Persson (Eds.), *Civil society, democracy and the Muslim world* (pp. 73–84). Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute.

Rose, R. (2002). How Muslims view democracy: Evidence from Central Asia. *Journal of Democracy, 14*(4), 102–111.

Sulaiman, S. J. (1999). *The Shura Principle in Islam*. http://www.alhewar.com/SadekShura.htm; (consulted on March 5, 2012).

Sunar, I. (2002). Civil society and Islam. In E. Ozdalga & S. Persson (Eds.), *Civil society, democracy and the Muslim world* (pp. 9–15). Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute.

Tausch, A. (2009). *What 1.3 billion Muslims really think*. New York: Nova.

Tessler, M. (2003). Do Islamic orientations influence attitudes toward democracy in the Arab world? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Jordan. In R. Inglehart (Ed.), *Islam, gender, culture and democracy* (pp. 6–26). Whitby: de Sitter Publications.

Therborn, G. (2002). Beyond civil society: Democratic experiences and their relevance to the 'Middle East. In E. Ozdalga & S. Persson (Eds.), *Civil society, democracy and the Muslim world* (pp. 45–54). Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute.

Welzel, C., Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H. D. (2003). The theory of human development. *European Journal of Political Research, 42*(2), 341–380.

Yavuz, H. M. (2005). *Islamic political identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yavuz, H. M., & Esposito, J. L. (2003). Introduction: Islam in Turkey: Retreat from the secular Path? In H. M. Yavuz & J. L. Esposito (Eds.), *Turkish Islam and the secular state* (pp. xiii–xxxiii). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Chapter 15
Does Praying Together Mean Staying Together? Religion and Civic Engagement in Europe and the United States

Pippa Norris

15.1 Introduction

Chapters in this volume have considered a broad range of issues to explore whether religious affiliations contribute toward the social and political involvement of European citizens. Several questions are at the heart of this debate and these can be seen as three concentric circles, where the impact of religious participation diffuses like widening ripples in a pool. Does belonging to churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, and sects directly strengthen activism in faith-based charities and philanthropic work? Does it reinforce broader dimension of social engagement in the local community, such as membership in nonreligious associations, exemplified by the Rotary club, YMCA, school boards, and social networks? And, finally, does it mobilize civic activism, expressed through voting turnout, party affiliations, campaign donations, and protest politics? In the United States, the answer to these questions is usually assumed to be "yes." Mainline Protestant churches—Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Lutherans—have long been regarded as playing a vital role in their local communities. The underlying mechanisms are poorly understood but in general they are believed to do so by providing places for people to meet, fostering informal social networks of friends and neighbors, developing leadership skills in religious organizations and church committees, informing people about public affairs, delivering welfare services, providing a community forum, drawing together people with shared beliefs from diverse social and ethnic

P. Norris (✉)
Department of Comparative Politics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney,
Sydney NSW, Australia
e-mail: Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu

backgrounds, and encouraging active involvement in associational groups concerned with education, youth development, and human services (Wuthnow 1999, 2002; Wuthnow and Evans 2002). Through bridging diverse social groups with common beliefs, in particular, the informal bonds of community are assumed to be strengthened, thereby fostering social tolerance, interpersonal trust, and the cultural roots of democratic processes.

But do religious institutions actually function in this way in the United States? And do they perform similar functions in comparable European societies, thereby encouraging faith-based voluntary work, associational membership, and political engagement? There is a wealth of research on American churches but the answer to this second question in the scientific literature is far less clear-cut. In earlier studies, Norris and Inglehart have examined these issues worldwide, comparing in diverse countries around the globe (Norris and Inglehart 2010). This concluding chapter study allows these questions to be explored in more depth within Europe compared with the United States. To understand these issues, the first section of this chapter outlines alternative theories why religious organizations are believed to link citizens with their communities, focusing upon Robert Putnam's argument about the role of religion in generating social capital. The study then compares cross-national empirical evidence to see how far religious participation (defined by frequency of attendance at religious services) shapes voluntary activism for religious organizations, membership of a broader range of secular community associations, and patterns of political activism. Comparisons are examined across a wide range of 34 European societies, as well as between Europe and the United States. Data is drawn from waves of the World Values Survey conducted since the mid-1990s. The conclusion summarizes the major findings—demonstrating considerable similarities in the positive effects of religious participation in strengthening civic engagement in Europe and the United States, although with contrasts in the effects on social trust— and considers their implications.

15.2   Theories of Religion and Civic Engagement

In the political science literature, religious organizations have long been regarded as one of the classic mechanisms mobilizing civic engagement, political participation, and voting behavior. The foundations were laid by Almond and Verba's seminal study comparing *The Civic Culture* during the late 1950s. This study regarded membership in a range of organizations, such as trade unions, business associations, and churches, as critical for citizens' feelings of civic competence and internal efficacy: "Voluntary associations are the primary means by which the function of mediating between the individual and the state is performed" (Almond and Verba 1989: 245). Nevertheless Almond and Verba recognized that patterns of organizational membership varied substantially across countries; one-fifth (19 %) of Americans reporting membership in religious organizations during the late 1950s, compared with few of those living in the UK (4 %), Germany (3 %), and Italy (6 %) (Almond and

Verba 1989: 247). Many subsequent studies have highlighted the central role of church networks in fostering civic engagement in America. Hence, Verba et al. (1995: 389) found that being recruited through church, work, or other nonpolitical organization was an influential predictor of political participation, being approximately as powerful as the well-known effects of education or political interest. As well as the "push" of motivational attitudes such as feelings of duty and a sense of political efficacy, and the availability of resources such as time and money, Rosenstone and Hansen (1995, cf. Cassel 1999) argue that people are "pulled" into political activism by social networks, including through church membership.

The seminal theory of electoral behavior in Western Europe by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan also emphasized that during the mid-twentieth century, religious identities formed one of the traditional building blocks underpinning party support and voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; cf. Alford 1967; Rose and Urwin 1970; Rose 1974). In this account, contemporary European party systems were stamped by social divisions established decades earlier, including the regional separation of urban center vs. rural periphery, the class struggle between workers and owners, and the religious cleavages that split Christendom between Catholics and Protestants. Churches in Western Europe were thought to have created organizational networks, fostering close political ties with Christian Democratic and other religious parties, just as trade unions mobilized workers into supporting socialist, social democratic, and communist parties.

Thus theories of political participation have long provided several plausible reasons to suspect that religious organizations (churches, temples, and mosques) can play a critical role by mobilizing civic engagement in postindustrial societies, whether through providing active members with ways to mobilize and lobby government around common policy issues and thereby increasing psychological feelings of political efficacy and competence among their congregations (the Almond and Verba claim), through shaping social identities and partisan politics (the Lipset and Rokkan argument), or through actively recruiting members of religious organizations to participate (the Verba, Scholzman and Brady theory).

During recent decades, much of the research literature on civic engagement has been dominated by theories of social capital, emphasizing how social ties and shared norms derived from membership in voluntary associations are thought to be important for societal well-being, economic efficiency, and the health of democracy. These theories originated in the seminal ideas by Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman.[1] In recent years these arguments have been revived and popularized by Robert Putnam, notably in *Making Democracy Work* (1993), *Bowling Alone* (2000), and, most recently, *Amazing Grace (2010)*.[2] In Putnam's version of this theory, social capital is conceptualized as "connections among individuals – social

---

[1] See Bourdieu (1970) and Coleman (1988, 1990). For a discussion of the history of the concept, see also the introduction in Baron et al. (2000).

[2] See also Putnam (1996b, 2002) and Pharr and Putnam (2000).

networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam 2000: 19).[3] This is understood as both a *structural* phenomenon (social networks of friends, neighbors, and colleagues) and a *cultural* phenomenon (social norms which facilitate collaborative cooperation). Putnam's account rests on three key claims.

The first is that horizontal networks embodied in civic society, and the norms and values related to these ties, have important *social consequences*, both for the people in them and for society at large, by producing private goods and public goods. In particular, networks of friends, colleagues, and neighbors are associated with norms of generalized reciprocity in a skein of mutual obligations and responsibilities. Churches are seen as critical for fostering faith-based community links in American society. Bridging networks, in particular, which span diverse sectors and groups, are thought to foster the conditions for collaboration, coordination, and cooperation to create collective goods. Voluntary organizations such as churches, synagogues and mosques, philanthropic and charitable organizations, parent-teacher associations, women's groups, and youth clubs are regarded as particularly important for this process, because active engagement is thought to bring local people into face-to-face contact, to achieve specific community goals, and to encourage broader traits, including interpersonal trust and social tolerance. Patterns of religiosity have become increasingly polarized in America, dividing believers and nonbelievers, as well as adherents to different sects and denominations, but at the same time Putnam and Campbell emphasize that religious pluralism and tolerance is maintained, largely because of the "churn" of fluid denominational identities, as like-minded people sort themselves out into different religious communities (Putnam and Campbell 2010). In turn, social capital is believed to function as an important resource leading towards a diverse array of benefits from individual health and happiness to child welfare and education, social tolerance, economic prosperity, reduced ethnic violence, and good institutional performance: "social capital makes us smarter, healthier, safer, richer" (Putnam 2000: 290).

Moreover, in *Bowling Alone*, Putnam argues religious organizations, particularly Protestant churches, are uniquely important for American civic society: "Faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America" (Putnam 2000: 66). Religious involvement is seen as central for American communities, with faith-based organizations serving civic life directly by providing social support for members and services to the local area, as well as indirectly, by nurturing organizational skills, inculcating moral values, and encouraging altruism among members. If churches have traditionally played a vital role in American civic life, then the process of secularization may have significantly undermined community activism. "Americans are going to church less often than we did three or four decades ago, and the churches we go to

---

[3] Putnam also offers a related definition: "By 'social capital' I mean features of social life—networks, norms and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (Putnam 1996a).

are less engaged with the wider community. Trends in religious life reinforce rather than counterbalance the ominous plunge in social connectedness in the secular community" (Putnam 2000: 79). The decline in religious involvement during the twentieth century, he suggests, is most evident among the younger generations. Putnam suggests that the United States is far from unique as a fall in church attendance is also evident in similar affluent societies elsewhere: "The universal decline of engagement in these institutions is a striking fact about the dynamics of social capital in advanced democracies" (Putnam 2002: 409).

Putnam also argues that social capital has significant *political consequences*, both for democratic citizenship and ultimately for government performance. The theory can be understood as a two-step model which claims that civic society directly promotes social capital (the social networks and cultural norms that arise from civic society), which in turn facilitates political participation and good governance. "Civic engagement" refers to a variety of activities, ranging from the act of voting to more demanding forms of participation exemplified by campaign work, party membership, contacting officials, and protesting. Drawing on the American survey evidence available since the late 1960s and early 1970s, Putnam documents an erosion of traditional forms of conventional political engagement, exemplified by attending public meetings, working for a political party, and signing petitions, which he links with the decline in voluntary associations during the postwar era (Putnam 2000: 27). Putnam demonstrates that membership in many forms of civic associations, including labor unions, social clubs like the Elks and the Moose, and community organizations such as the PTA, expanded in the early twentieth century but then faded in postwar America.

These arguments have been widely influential yet, with the notable exception of *Making Democracy Work*, the vast bulk of the empirical evidence used to buttress these arguments has been derived from American survey research.[4] Contemporary European societies differ sharply from America in many regards, notably the historical and institutional legacy of established churches, the experience of state repression of religion under Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, persistently lower levels of church attendance among European publics in most (but not all) nations, and weaker adherence to religious cultural values (Berger 1999; Greeley 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2010). To illustrate some of the key contrasts, Fig. 15.1 shows the strength of religious participation (frequency of attendance at religious services) and the importance of religion (or religious values) across the postindustrial societies under comparison, based on data drawn from the World Values Survey. Among these countries, as expected, Americans indeed prove highly religious whether measured by frequency of attendance at religious services or adherence to religious values (measured by the importance of God scale). Nevertheless the United States is not an

---

[4] It should be noted that a major survey-based study, *The Harvard-Manchester project on the Transatlantic Comparison of Religion's Role in Society*, is currently underway comparing religiosity in Britain and the United States. http://www.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/socialchange/research/social-change/Religion.html

Notes:
Religious Participation: Q186 *"Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never." (Coding reversed)*
Importance of religion: Q192: *"How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means 'very important' and 1 means 'not at all important'.*
Classification of the predominant religious culture: Based on the largest plurality group as a proportion of the population in each society, CIA Yearbook.

Fig. 15.1 Religious values and religious participation (*Source*: World Values Survey 3rd and 5th waves)

absolute outlier compared with all other European nations in either regard (knocking one fallacy on the head); levels of church attendance are slightly higher in Poland and Italy, while religious values are similar or even marginally stronger in Romania and Cyprus. As we shall see, however, the United States does have exceptionally widespread membership and activism in a wide range of voluntary associations (a less well-known, although not novel, observation).

It therefore remains unclear whether generalizations based on evidence drawn from the American context can also be observed more broadly across a wide and diverse range of European societies. Indeed, as earlier chapters in this volume have

emphasized, and as can be observed in Fig. 15.1, there are also striking contrasts in the strength of religiosity observable within continental Europe, such as among predominately Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim societies, as well as significant variations seen among the Nordic region, postcommunist societies, and Mediterranean Europe. Wide disparities are also evidenced within Europe, for example, separating religious Poland and secular Sweden, or religious Italy and secular France. One of the primary factors which studies have found to contribute towards such contrasts concerns levels of human security, meaning the vulnerability to multiple threats and risks in the world, whether arising from lack of income and wealth, poor health, unemployment, and old age, or the perceived or actual threat of crime, violence, and physical harm. In general, more secure societies such as Sweden are also usually the most secular in their values (Inglehart and Norris 2012). Less secure societies, such as Bosnia, Georgia, and Romania, are usually more religious in their values. The disparities within Europe's postindustrial economies are not as extensive as the gap between rich and poor societies worldwide, but they remain evident. But the gap is not simply the result of economic differences; comparisons also reveal persistent differences in the vitality of civic society within different cultural regions in Europe, which may plausibly relate to the imprint of historic relationships between civic society and the state decades or even centuries earlier. In Poland, for example, the Catholic Church generally supported the solidarity movement (*Solidarność*), coming out on the right side of history, while Hungarian church leaders collaborated more closely with the Communist party, with enduring consequences for religiosity after the transition from autocracy (Borowik 2002; Froese 2001; Froese and Pfaff 2001; Zrinscak 2002).

Comparisons also need to be drawn because of cross-national contrasts in the vitality of membership in traditional civic organizations in Western Europe (Aarts 1995). Historical case studies of civic associational membership in particular nations have generally reported complex trends over time. For example, Peter Hall examined trends in support for voluntary associations in Britain, concluding that membership had been roughly stable since the 1950s, rising during the 1960s, and subsiding only modestly subsequently (Hall 2000, 1999; cf. Maloney et al. 2000). While he found that churchgoing has faded in popularity in recent decades, environmental organizations and charities have simultaneously expanded, so that overall the voluntary sector in Britain remains rich and vibrant. Case studies in Sweden, Japan, and Australia confirmed similar complex trends (Rothstein 2000). An emerging array of studies comparing postcommunist and developing societies also belie the existence of any simple decline in social capital (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000; Rose 2000; cf. Rose et al. 1997). There is clear evidence that adherence to religious values and religious participation have weakened in nearly all affluent societies (including in the United States; Norris and Inglehart 2010). Yet it remains unclear from the research literature whether this process has thereby eroded faith-based organizations across Europe, such as church-related charities, social networks, and youth clubs, as might be expected. Emptying pews could have reduced more peripheral adherents, while the core faithful continue to belong to community associations.

15.3   Comparing Associational Membership

To examine these issues, this chapter will scrutinize systematic evidence derived from the World Values Survey to test some central empirical propositions. According to social capital theory, religious *participation* (defined as regular attendance at services of worship) is predicted to affect several dimensions of civic engagement, as depicted schematically in Fig. 15.2, including:

1. *Membership in closely related religious organizations*, exemplified by active membership in faith-based charitable and philanthropic associations, where the effects of churchgoing can be expected to be strongest and most direct
2. *Belonging actively to a broader range of nonreligious voluntary organizations and community associations in civic life*, exemplified by active membership in diverse educational and cultural groups, sports clubs, and trade unions, where any effects are expected to be moderate
3. *Civic engagement more generally*, including both attitudes (feelings of social trust, political interest, social tolerance, and support for democracy) and behavior (exemplified by voting turnout and protest politics), where religious participation can be expected to have a weaker and more indirect impact

Fig. 15.2 The predicted effects of religious participation

Any comprehensive models need to control for a range of intervening variables that could influence these relationships. In particular it is important to determine whether any patterns vary among different types of faith, for example, if there are contrasts in civic engagement between more "horizontal" and egalitarian organization typical of Protestant churches and the more "hierarchical" organization found in the Catholic Church. Denominational differences may matter; Robert Wuthnow has noted that in the USA, membership in mainline Protestant congregations generates the kinds of social networks, norms, and relationships that help individuals and communities attain important goals, encouraging volunteering, civic engagement, and political participation—but that membership in evangelical churches does *not* have these effects. He suggests that social capital in America may have fallen due to the demographic shrinkage of mainline Protestant congregations since the 1960s, in contrast with the rapid growth of Baptist churches and evangelicals such as Pentecostals, fuelled by trends in population and immigration (Wuthnow 1999, 2002). For these reasons, we also examine whether religious participation causes significant differences in activism in voluntary associations controlling for the predominant type of religious faith in each society. European regions also vary substantially in their historical experiences of democracy and democratization, influencing the strength of civil society and opportunities to join voluntary organizations, so models control for the duration of liberal democracy during the third wave era.[5] Individual-level characteristics, such as age, gender, education, and income, are also often systematically associated with participation in religious services, as well as consistent predictors of membership in community associations and patterns of civic engagement. The multivariate regression models analyzing the impact of religious participation therefore include with prior controls for the length of experience of liberal democracy, as well as individual-level education, income, gender, and age.

The empirical analysis utilizes the third and fifth waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) that carried identical measures of associational membership, as follows[6]:

---

[5]This is measured by the average standardized score on the Freedom House index monitoring political rights and civil liberties from 1972 to 2005.

[6]Unfortunately the wording of the questions used to monitor membership and activism in voluntary associations varied over different waves of the WVS survey, as follows:

> Wave I: Early 1980: *"Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?"*
> Wave II and IV: Early 1990 and 1999–2001: *"Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say… a) which, if any, do you belong to? b) Which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?"*
> Wave III: Mid-1990s: *"Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?"*
> Wave IV: 2000: *"Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say… a) Which, if any, do you belong to? b) Which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?"*
> Wave V: 2005: *"Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?"*

This makes it difficult to compare *activism* among all waves, although here we can use the identical items carried in Wave III and V. The questions on voluntary associations were also excluded from the fifth wave of the survey conducted in many Muslim nations.

> Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?

In contrast to earlier research, this study focuses upon *active* membership, the most demanding form of engagement. Both waves of the survey were included for analysis to facilitate comparison of a broad range of 34 European societies and the United States. These waves of the survey list nine types of social groups, including church or religious organizations, sports or recreational organizations, political parties, art, music or educational organizations, labor unions, professional associations, charitable organizations, environmental organizations, and any other voluntary organization. The diverse range therefore includes traditional interest groups and mainstream civic associations, as well as some new social movements. These items were recoded and summed so that the strength of activism in a range of nonreligious voluntary associations was measured on a standardized 10-point scale. The study also examines both the structural and cultural dimensions of social capital—that is, the strength of *social networks* (measured by activism in a wide range of associational groups) and the strength of *cultural norms* (gauged by feelings of social trust).

Religious participation was gauged using the standard measure, monitoring frequency of attendance at religious services. This measure has its flaws, in particular "frequency" does not necessarily reflect the *strength* of religiosity; certain faiths require adherents to observe religious practices more frequently than others. The measure is most appropriate within Christian churches, but it is particularly problematic when comparing certain Eastern religions and new forms of spirituality with collective religious practices. Moreover frequency of attendance may reflect a sense of habitual duty, or social norms and conventions, as much as the strength of religious adherence. Nevertheless this measure has become the standard indicator used in the comparative sociology of religion, and frequency of attendance at religious services is closely correlated with others types of religious behavior, such as frequency of prayer or meditation.

15.3.1 Explaining Membership in Religious Organizations

The study examines the impact of religious participation on active membership in church or religious-based voluntary associations, with the latter measured as a dummy variable. We hypothesize that attending religious services on a regular basis will be closely related to engagement in other church groups, typified by congregations volunteering to help with Protestant Sunday schools, Jewish charities, or Catholic youth programs. The results of the multivariate logistic regression model presented in Table 15.1 confirms that in Europe, active membership in religious organizations increased with experience of democracy; the spread of civic society which often accompanies the process of democratization boosts membership in church-related associations, as well as strengthening belonging to many other

Table 15.1 Explaining active membership in religious organizations

	Europe			United States		
	B	s.e.	Sig	*B*	s.e.	Sig
Societal controls						
Historical experience of liberal democracy	0.030	0.001	***			
Individual controls						
Age (years)	0.005	0.001	***	0.010	0.003	***
Gender (male = 1, female = 0)	−0.093	0.040	*	−0.276	0.096	N/s
Educational scale (from low to hi)	0.005	0.010	N/s	0.013	0.026	N/s
Income (10 categories low to hi)	0.000	0.009	N/s	0.024	0.021	N/s
Religious participation and type of faith						
Religious participation	**0.894**	**0.014**	*******	**1.084**	**0.034**	*******
Protestant	0.002	0.157	N/s	0.751	0.257	**
Catholic	0.702	0.723	N/s	0.476	0.191	**
Orthodox	−18.8	273.226	N/s	−0.201	0.799	N/s
Muslim	−0.192	0.525	N/s	−21.22	211.602	N/s
(Constant)	−8.142			−5.670		
% Correctly predicted	93			52		
Nagelkerke R^2	0.343			0.637		
N. respondents	48,875			3,834		
N. societies	34			1		

Source: World Values Survey Waves III and V

Notes: The table presents the results of a binary logistic regression model where membership in a religious organization is the dependent variable. The figures represent the unstandardized beta (*B*), the standard error (s.e.), and the significance of the coefficient (Sig). *** $P = .001$, ** $P = .01$, * $P = .05$, *N/s* Not significant

Religious participation: Q185 "*Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special hold days, once a year, less often, never or practically never*"

Active membership in religious organization: "*Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an 'active' member, an 'inactive' member or 'not a member' of that type of organization?*" A religious or church-related organization (coded active (1)/inactive or not a member (0))

Type of religious faith: "Do you belong to a religious denomination?" If yes, "Which one?" Measured at individual level

interest groups and new social movements in civil society. Individual membership in religious organizations also rises with age in both Europe and the United States, characteristics associated with civic engagement in many studies, where the young are usually less participatory. Moreover gender also proves to be significant in Europe, although not reaching the level of statistical significance in the smaller US sample; the stronger religiosity of women, which has been widely documented, strengthens their propensity to join faith-based organizations (see Norris 2005; cf. Inglehart and Norris 2003; Moore 1990; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982). Education and income also prove to have no significant impact on membership of religious organizations in either Europe or the USA, contrary to the usual pattern of participation in many other civic organizations.

Most importantly for our purposes, even after this battery of controls has been applied, in both Europe and the United States, regular attendance at collective services in churches, mosques, temples, and synagogues has a significant impact on active membership in religious organizations, such as volunteering to help run faith-based charities, soup kitchens, and join social clubs. The coefficient was particularly strong in the United States. Among Europeans and Americans who attended a service of worship at least weekly, one third belonged to a religious or church-related association, compared with only 4 % of those who did not attend regularly. In America (although not in Europe) the relationship was strongest for Protestants and Catholics, where about one in four people belonged to a religious organization. But those of Orthodox or Muslim faith were not significantly more likely to be active in faith-based associations in either region, an observation which may well have important implications limiting the capacity to generalize globally from the American evidence, based on mainstream Christian churches.

15.3.2   Explaining Membership in Nonreligious Organizations

Confirmation that church attendance is linked with belonging to faith-based associations is far from surprising. If this were all that it claimed, social capital theory would be trivial. Putnam's account, however, makes a less obvious and more interesting claim: that civic society is denser and stronger if people belong to multiple overlapping categories, such as professional *and* philanthropic groups or unions *and* environmental organizations, so that church attendance strengthens other crosscutting linkages within the community. "Bridging" forms of social capital, which span different social sectors and ideological viewpoints, are thought to be strengthened by multiple memberships. Does participation in religious institutions therefore have the power to influence broader engagement in community life? To test this claim, we will analyze the average number of *nonreligious* community associations that people joined, using a 10-point standardized scale summarizing active membership in a variety of community organizations and voluntary associations, excluding the religious or church-related category. Overall about half (50 %) the public in the pooled sample reported belonging to no voluntary associations, one quarter (24 %) belonged to just one type of organization, while the remaining quarter of the public were members of more than one type of group.[7]

---

[7]Variations among different sectors, and the reason why people join, are discussed in detailed elsewhere (Norris 2002, chapter 8).

Table 15.2 Explaining active membership in nonreligious voluntary organizations

	Europe				United States			
	B	s.e.	Beta	Sig	B	s.e.	Beta	Sig
Societal controls								
Historical experience of liberal democracy	0.014	0.000	0.368	***				
Individual controls								
Age (years)	0.000	0.000	0.005	N/s	0.000	0.003	0.001	N/s
Gender (male = 1)	0.076	0.009	0.040	***	0.058	0.099	0.014	N/s
Education (scale from low to hi)	0.060	0.002	0.136	***	0.197	0.025	0.211	***
Income (10 categories low to hi)	0.023	0.002	0.061	***	0.177	0.022	0.216	***
Religious participation and type of faith								
Religious participation	**0.077**	**0.002**	**0.147**	***	**0.264**	**0.024**	**0.272**	***
Protestant	0.090	0.037	0.011	**				
Catholic	0.976	0.250	0.018	***				
Orthodox	−0.964	0.611	−0.007	N/s				
Muslim	0.434	0.144	0.014	**				
(Constant)	−0.878				−0.878			
Adjusted R^2	0.170				0.212			
N. respondents	41,300				5,775			
N. societies	34				1			

Source: World Values Survey Waves III and V

Note: The table uses OLS regression analysis where a 10-point scale measuring active membership of nonreligious organization is the dependent variable. The figures represent the unstandardized beta (*B*), the standard error (s.e.), the standardized beta (Beta), and the significance of the coefficient (Sig). *** $P = .001$, ** $P = .01$, * $P = .05$, *N/s* not significant

Religious participation: Q185 "*Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special hold days, once a year, less often, never or practically never*"

Active membership in nonreligious organization: "*Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an 'active' member, an 'inactive' member or 'not a member' of that type of organization?*" Each item is coded 0/1 for active membership and summed into a standardized 10-point scale, excluding belonging to a religious association

Table 15.2 analyzes factors predicting membership in voluntary organizations and community associations. Once again, historical experiences of democracy in Europe are positively linked with associational membership; as many have observed, the Communist state restricted civil society, whereas by contrast the growth of political rights and civic liberties, associated with the process of democratization, expanded opportunities for participation in grassroots voluntary organizations, although the residual legacy of the past persists. At the individual level, in Europe and the United States, higher education and income were also associated with belonging to more groups, a finding already well established in the general literature on political participation (Verba et al. 1978, 1995). There is usually a marked skew towards greater activism among higher socioeconomic sectors. In addition, in

Europe, men were more active than women in nonreligious voluntary organizations, although the standard age bias is (perhaps surprisingly) not evident in the analysis. The existence of social biases in membership depends, in part, upon the type of organizations which is compared; for example, participation in new social media is skewed heavily towards the younger generation, while membership in traditional economic organizations, such as trade unions, is more likely to be biased towards the older generations and towards men.

After applying these macro- and micro-level controls, the results demonstrate that in Europe and the United States, *religious participation is positively associated with active membership in a wide range of nonreligious community associations*. This confirms that in both places, members of congregations were more likely than average to belong to a diverse range of voluntary organizations, as social capital theory claims. This relationship is stronger in American than Europe, however. For example, in the United States those who attended religious services less than once a week report that on average they were active members of about 1.7 voluntary organizations, compared with active membership in 2.9 organizations among those who attend weekly. In Western Europe, absolute levels of membership were lower, but again those who attended religious services less than once a week report that on average they were active members of about 0.9 voluntary organizations, compared with active membership in 1.5 organizations among those who attended weekly, a statistically significant gap. Moreover this pattern varied in Europe by types of faith; Protestants and Catholics had significantly higher than average membership in these associations, as did those of Muslims' faith. Figure 15.3 illustrates the region pattern; the link between religious participation and active membership in nonreligious organizations proved strongest in the United States, moderate in Western Europe and Scandinavia, and weakest in Central and Eastern Europe. The role of the Orthodox churches may reflect the general problems facing civil society in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Communist state, after many party organs collapsed in popular support and new voluntary organizations were slow to develop. Nevertheless when interpreting these findings, it should be noted that it is not possible to determine the direction of causality in the relationship from the available cross-national survey evidence; it could be that a reciprocal relationship is at work, so that "joiners" are more likely than "loners" to be active in religious organizations, just as they are more active in many other types of social clubs and community groups. It could also plausible be argued that the relationship should be reversed, if people who are strongly embedded in local networks of neighbors and friends within their community are thereby encouraged through group norms and social conventions also to attend religious services on a regular basis. Yet it seems equally plausible to argue that the direction of causality flows from religious behavior (regular attendance at collective services of worship) towards broader involvement in other community activities and local networks. Research designs using historical case studies, panel surveys, or experimental data are required to determine these relationships more precisely.

Notes:
Religious Participation: Q186 *"Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never."*
Active membership in non-religious organization: *"Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an **active** member, an **inactive** member or **not a member** of that type of organization?" Each item is coded 0/1 for active membership and summed into a standardized 10-point scale, excluding belonging to a religious association).*

Fig. 15.3 Active membership of voluntary organizations rises with religious participation (*Source*: World Values Survey 3rd and 5th waves)

15.3.3   *Explaining Broader Patterns of Civic Engagement*

Social capital theory argues that associational membership is only one aspect of this phenomenon. The boldest claim in this argument is that religious participation has a positive impact upon (1) broader social attitudes, notably interpersonal trust and social tolerance; (2) political attitudes, exemplified by confidence in political institutions and support for democratic values; and (3) political activism, such as

voting turnout and engagement in political protest (see Newton and Norris 2000; Newton 2001).

Interpersonal trust is one of the most important components of social capital, for the social capital thesis holds that this lubricate cooperation and coordination, allowing communities to work together spontaneously without the formal sanction of laws or the heavy hand of the state (Fukuyama 1995). One measure of social trust in the WVS is the "classic" question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" This standard measure also has several well-known limitations. It offers a simple dichotomy, whereas most modern survey items today present more subtle continuous scales. The double negative in the latter half of the question may be confusing to respondents. No social context is presented to respondents, nor can they distinguish between different categories, such as relative levels of trust in friends, colleagues, family, strangers, or compatriots. Nevertheless this item has become accepted as the standard indicator of social or interpersonal trust, having been used in the Civic Culture Surveys and the American General Social Survey since the early 1970s, so it will be employed here to replicate previous studies. Given its shortcomings, however, alternative scaled indices of social trust in the WVS were also tested, including trust in people from other countries and from other religions, as well as whether "most people would try to take advantage of you" or whether they would "try to be fair." The measures of civic attitudes used for analysis include the expression of political interest, confidence in major political institutions (such as government, parties, parliament, and the civil service), democratic aspirations, and satisfaction with the performance of democracy (see Norris 2010). Measures of political behavior include voting turnout, the least demanding conventional form of political participation, and having engaged in political protest (the latter gauged as a composite index using the measures developed in the Political Action surveys, concerning signing a petition, supporting a consumer boycott, attending a lawful demonstration, and joining an unofficial strike).

Table 15.3 summarizes the relationship between religious participation and this range of indicators, after multivariate regression analysis controls for the same macro and micro-level factors used in the earlier models. The pattern is fairly consistent. We find that in Europe *and* the United States, *religious participation is positively associated with significantly slightly higher than average levels of civic attitudes and behaviors*, including political interest, institutional confidence, satisfaction with the performance of democracy, and voting turnout. For example, in the United States and Western Europe, among those who attend religious services less than one a week, 70 % report voting, compared with 84 % of those who attend weekly. In these regards, these results lend further confirmation to theories of social capital.

At the same time, when it comes to comparing the effect of religious participation on social trust, the findings consistently differ for the United States and Europe: religious participation slightly strengthens social trust in America but it weakens trust in Europe. This is true whether comparing the dichotomous "classic" measure of social trust or the alternatives indicators which are available concerning trust in

Table 15.3 The effects of religious participation on civic attitudes and political activism

	Europe			United States		
	B	s.e.	Sig	*B*	s.e.	Sig
Social attitudes						
Social trust	−0.006	0.002	**	0.002	0.005	***
Trust others	−0.065	0.010	***	0.050	0.014	***
"People fair" trust scale	−0.038	0.010	**	0.084	0.021	***
Social tolerance scale	−0.044	0.008	***	−0.085	0.013	***
Political orientations						
Political interest	0.016	0.004	***	0.027	0.009	**
Institutional confidence	0.426	0.057	***	0.342	0.110	**
Democratic aspirations	0.378	0.086	***	0.105	0.193	N/s
Democratic satisfaction	0.637	0.097	***	10.160	0.277	***
Voted	0.119	0.010	***	0.102	0.025	**
Have engaged in protest politics	−0.049	0.008	***	0.001	0.015	N/s

Source: World Values Survey 3rd and 5th waves

Notes: The models with dichotomous dependent variables (trust and voting) use binary logistic regression, while those variables measured with continuous scales use ordinary least squares regression. For details of the variables contained in the models, see Table 15.1. The models control for the historical experience of liberal democracy in each society, as well as for the effects of age, gender, education, and income at individual level (with the results of the control variables not presented here)

Religious participation: Q185 "*Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never*"

Social trust: V25. "*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted (1) or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (0)*"

Political interest: V133. "*How interested would you say you are in politics?*" (% "Very"/"somewhat interested" (1), "Not very"/"Not at all"/"Don't know" (0))

Institutional confidence scale: Confidence in parliament, the national government, parties, the civil service, the courts, the armed forces, and the police

Democratic aspirations: V162. "*How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is 'not at all important' and 10 means 'absolutely important' what position would you choose?*"

Democratic satisfaction: V163: "*And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is 'not at all democratic' and 10 means that it is 'completely democratic,' what position would you choose?*"

foreigners and the fairness of other people. The exact reasons for the different impacts of religious behavior on trust in America and Europe remain unclear; however this raises important questions about the generalizability of findings based exclusively on American research. Equally importantly, the analysis of social tolerance is also negatively related to religious participation in both Europe and the USA, in the contrary direction to that predicted by social capital theory. Some other indicators show more minor discrepancies, including democratic aspirations (which are not statistically significant in the smaller American sample) and protest activism (which is negatively related to religious participation in Europe). Overall, therefore, Europeans and Americans who are more frequent attenders at religious services

usually display stronger political attitudes and behaviors which strengthen the cultural foundation of democracy, as social capital theory predicts, with the important exception that religious behavior is associated positively with social trust and tolerance in America but negatively in Europe.

Moreover there is an important qualification to note when interpreting the direction of causality in any of these relationships. Social capital theory suggests that *because* people interact face-to-face in church-related organizations, they learn to become more engaged in the social concerns and public affairs of their community. But it remains possible that the reverse causal process could equally well be at work—with people who are "joiners" being most likely to engage in civic activity *and* to belong to religious associations. At this point, with the available evidence we can only conclude that *regular attendance at religious services does indeed go together with civic engagement in voluntary associations, with political attitudes (with the important proviso of inconsistent results on social trust and tolerance) and democratic participation,* as social capital theory suggests—but the direction of the causal linkage is not clear and the effects are not particularly large. Again, reciprocal relationships could always underlie these patterns, although it is more difficult to construct a plausible theoretical argument to explain why civic engagement leads towards religious behavior.

15.4   Conclusions

Social capital theory has generated considerable controversy in recent years. Economists, sociologists, and political scientists have debated the central claims that just as the investment of economic capital is productive for manufacturing goods and services, so social capital encourages the production of private and public goods. The American literature has emphasized the function of religious institutions in the generation of social capital, in particular that mainline Protestant churches play a vital role in drawing together diverse groups of Americans within local communities, encouraging into face-to-face contact, social ties, and organizational networks that, in turn, generate interpersonal trust and collaboration over public affairs. The theory suggests that people who pray together often also stay together to work on local matters, thereby strengthening grassroots communities.

The comparative evidence we have examined here extends the analysis from America to diverse societies in Europe. The results confirm many (but not all) of this theory's core propositions—firstly, that religious participation (as measured by the frequency of attending worship services) is positively linked with membership in closely related religious organizations. Secondly, attendance at religious services is also positively linked with belonging to a range of nonreligious voluntary organizations and community associations. Finally, we also found that attendance at religious services was significantly associated with many (although not all) indicators of civic engagement, including political attitudes and political behavior. The

available database is inadequate to determine the causality in these associations, which requires panel surveys or other research designs. Rather than a one-way process, the more conservative interpretation is that mutually reinforcing reciprocal causation is probably underlying these relationships, whereby "joiners" who are active in local sports clubs, arts associations, and youth work, as well as having a positive sense of political and social trust, are also more active within religious communities. But the implications are that despite the marked contrasts in both religiosity and civic engagement in the United States and Europe, as well as major contrasts within Europe, in fact fairly consistent and similar patterns can be observed. Attendance at religious services is usually far less common in most contemporary European societies than is found among our American cousins, but in fact the main impact of religious practices on civic engagement (although not social trust) is remarkably similar.

References

Aarts, K. (1995). Intermediate organizations and interest representation. In H.-D. Klingemann & D. Fuchs (Eds.), *Citizens and the state*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Alford, R. R. (1967). Class voting in the Anglo-American political systems. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), *Party systems and voter alignments*. New York: The Free Press.

Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1989 [1963]). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. London: Sage.

Baron, S., Field, J., & Schuller, T. (Eds.). (2000). *Social capital: Critical perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berger, P. L. (Ed.). (1999). *The desecularization of the world*. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center.

Borowik, I. (2002). The Roman Catholic Church in the process of democratic transformation: The case of Poland. *Social Compass, 49*(2), 239–252.

Bourdieu, P. (1970). *Reproduction in education, culture and society*. London: Sage.

Cassel, C. A. (1999). Voluntary associations, churches and social participation theories of turnout. *Social Science Quarterly, 80*(3), 504–517.

Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *The American Journal of Sociology, 94*, 95–120.

Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

Dasgupta, P., & Serageldin, I. (Eds.). (2000). *Social capital: A multifaceted perspective*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Froese, P. (2001). Hungary for religion: A supply-side interpretation of Hungarian religious revival. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40*(2), 251–268.

Froese, P., & Pfaff, S. (2001). Replete and desolate markets: Poland, East Germany, and the new religious paradigm. *Social Forces, 80*(2), 481–507.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: The Free Press.

Greeley, A. M. (2003). *Religion in Europe at the end of the second millennium*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Hall, P. (1999). Social capital in Britain. *British Journal of Political Science, 29*(3), 417–461.

Hall, P. (2000). Social capital in Britain. In R. D. Putnam (Ed.), *The dynamics of social capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2003). *Rising tide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2012). The four horsemen of the Apocalypse: Understanding human security. *Scandinavian Political Studies, 35*(1), 71–96.

Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross national perspectives*. New York: Free Press.

Maloney, W. L., Smith, G., & Stoker, G. (2000). Social capital and associational life. In S. Baron, J. Field, & T. Schuller (Eds.), *Social capital: Critical perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McPherson, J., & Smith-Lovin, L. (1982). Women and weak ties: Differences by sex in the size of voluntary organizations. *The American Journal of Sociology, 87*, 883–904.

Moore, G. (1990). Structural determinants of men's and women's personal networks. *American Sociological Review, 55*, 726–735.

Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civic society, and democracy. *International Political Science Review, 22*(2), 201–214.

Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture or performance? In S. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), *Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic phoenix: Reinventing political activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P. (2005). Gendering social capital: Bowling in women's leagues? In B. O'Neill (Ed.), *Gender and social capital* (pp. 73–98). New York: Routledge.

Norris, P. (2010). *Democratic deficits*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2010). *Sacred and secular* (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pharr, S., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.). (2000). *Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1996a, March). Who killed civic life? *The American Prospect,* pp. 66–72.

Putnam, R. D. (1996b). The strange disappearance of civic America. *The American Prospect, 24*, 3–15.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, R. D. (Ed.). (2002). *Democracies in flux*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Putnam, R. D., & Campbell, D. (2010). *Amazing grace: How religion unites and divides us*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Rose, R. (Ed.). (1974). *Electoral behavior: A comparative handbook*. New York: The Free Press.

Rose, R. (2000). Uses of social capital in Russia: Modern, pre-modern, and anti-modern. *Post-Soviet Affairs, 16*(1), 33–57.

Rose, R., & Urwin, D. W. (1970). Persistence and change in Western party systems since 1945. *Political Studies, 18*, 287–319.

Rose, R., Mishler, W., & Haerpfer, C. (1997). Social capital in civic and stressful societies. *Studies in Comparative International Development, 32*(3), 85–111.

Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1995). *Mobilization, participation and democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.

Rothstein, B. (2000). Social capital in the social democratic state. In R. Putnam (Ed.), *Democracies in flux*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Verba, S., Nie, M., & Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wuthnow, R. (1999). Mobilizing civic engagement: The changing impact of religious involvement. In S. Th & M. P. Fiorina (Eds.), *Civic engagement in American democracy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Wuthnow, R. (2002). Religious involvement and status-bridging social capital. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41*(4), 669–675.

Wuthnow, R., & Evans, J. H. (Eds.). (2002). *The quiet hand of God*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Zrinscak, S. (2002). Roles, expectation and conflicts: Religion and churches in societies undergoing transition. *Social Compass, 49*(4), 509–521.

About the Authors

Olga Balakireva is the Head of the Department of Monitoring-based Research towards Social and Economic Transformations, NAS Institute for Economics and Forecasting, Ukraine; bon_smc@inet.ua.

Joep de Hart is endowed Professor in the Sociology of Religion at the Protestant Theological University (Amsterdam/Groningen) and a research fellow of the Netherlands Institute of Social Research|SCP; j.de.hart@scp.nl.

Paul Dekker is Professor of Civil Society at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and Head of the Participation, Culture and Living Environment Department of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research|SCP; p.dekker@scp.nl.

Yilmaz Esmer is Professor of Political Science at Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey. He is country coordinator for Turkey of European Values Study, World Values Survey and European Social Survey; yilmaz.esmer@bahcesehir.edu.tr.

Franco Garelli is Professor of Sociology of Culture and Sociology of Religion at the University of Turin, Italy; franco.garelli@unito.it.

Matteo Gianni is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, and founding member of the Group of Researches on Islam in Switzerland (GRIS); matteo.gianni@unige.ch.

Marco Giugni is a Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations and Director of the Institute of Social and Political Research (resop) at the University of Geneva, Switzerland; marco.giugni@unige.ch.

Loek Halman is Associate Professor of Sociology at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and one of the coordinators of the European Values Study; loek.halman@uvt.nl.

David Herbert is Professor of Religion and Society at the Institute of Religion, Philosophy and History, Faculty of Humanities and Education, University of Agder, Norway; david.herbert@uia.no.

Peter Lüchau is a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Education and the Study of Religions, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark; pluchau@sdu.dk.

John T.S. Madeley is a research associate attached to the Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom; j.madeley@lse.ac.uk.

Noémi Michel is Teaching Assistant in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Geneva, Switzerland; Noemi.michel@unige.ch.

Pippa Norris is the Maguire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Harvard University and Laureate Fellow and Professor of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney; Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu.

Kingsley Purdam is a research fellow at the Centre for Census and Survey Research at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom; kingsley.purdam@manchester.ac.uk

Sigrid Roßteutscher is Professor of Political Sociology at the Social Science Department, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; rossteutscher@soz.uni-frankfurt.de.

Iuliia Sereda is a scientific associate at the Department of Monitoring-based Research towards Social and Economic Transformations, NAS Institute for Economics and Forecasting, Ukraine; iuliia.sereda@gmail.com.

Ingrid Storm is Marston Research Associate at the Institute for Social Change at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom; ingrid.storm@manchester.ac.uk.

Lars Trägårdh is Professor of History and Civil Society Studies at Ersta Sköndal University College, Stockholm, Sweden; lars.tragardh@esh.se.

Claudiu Tufiş is Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Bucharest, Romania; claudiu.tufis@fspub.unibuc.ro.

Erik van Ingen is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Tilburg University, the Netherlands; e.j.vaningen@uvt.nl.

Mălina Voicu is a research fellow at GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Germany and associate researcher with the Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy, Romania; malina.voicu@gesis.org.

Susanne Wallman Lundåsen is a researcher at Ersta Sköndal University College, Stockholm, Sweden, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall, Sweden; susanne.lundasen@esh.se.

Index