The Social Movements Reader

Cases and Concepts

Third Edition

Edited by Jeff Goodwin and James M Jasper

WILEY Blackwell

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Editors' Introduction

Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper

People have complained about the things they dislike throughout history. Sometimes they do more than complain; they band together with others to change things. In modern societies, more than ever before, people have organized themselves to pursue a dizzying array of goals. There are the strikes, pickets, and rallies of the labor movement, aimed at higher wages and union recognition, but also at political goals. In the early nineteenth century the Luddites broke into early British factories and smashed new "labor-saving" machines. There have been dozens of revolutions like those in France, Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran. The women's movement has tried to change family life and gender relations as well as the economic opportunities of women. We have seen Earth Day and organizations like the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council. Animal rights activists have broken into labs and "liberated" experimental animals. There have been plenty of conservative and right-wing movements as well, from Americans opposed to immigrants in the 1840s to those who fought federally mandated busing in the 1970s to those who have bombed abortion clinics in more recent years.

Some of these movements have looked for opportunities to claim new rights, while others have responded to threats or violence. Some have sought political and economic emancipation and gains, while others have promoted (or fought) lifestyle choices they liked (or feared). Some have created formal organizations, others have relied on informal networks, and still others have engaged in more spontaneous actions such as riots. Movements have regularly had to choose between violent and nonviolent activities, illegal and legal ones, disruption and persuasion, extremism and moderation, reform and revolution. *Social movements are conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means.* Movements are more conscious and organized than fads and fashions. They last longer than a single protest or riot. There is more to them than formal organizations, although such organizations usually play a part. They are composed mainly

> **Political or Social Protest**   Protest refers to the act of challenging, resisting, or making demands upon authorities, powerholders, and/or cultural beliefs and practices by some individual or group.

of ordinary people as opposed to economic elites, army officers, or politicians. They need not be explicitly political, but many are. They are protesting against something, either explicitly as in antiwar movements or implicitly as in the back-to-the-land movement which is disgusted with modern urban and suburban life.

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Why study social movements? First, you might be interested in understanding them for their own sake, as a common and dramatic part of the world around you. You might simply wish to better understand protestors and their points of view, perhaps especially when they seem to want things that to you seem undesirable. Why do some people think animals have rights, or others that the United Nations is part of a sinister conspiracy? Understanding social movements is a good way to comprehend the human condition and human diversity.

But there are other reasons for studying social movements, which are windows onto a number of aspects of social life. You might study social movements if you are interested in politics, as movements are a main source of political conflict and, sometimes, change. They are often the first to articulate *new* political issues and ideas, including new visions of a better world. As people become attuned to a social problem they want solved, they typically form some kind of movement to push for a solution. Established political parties and their leaders are rarely asking the most interesting questions, or raising new issues; bureaucracy sets in, and politicians spend their time in routine tasks. It is typically movements outside the political system that force insiders to recognize new fears and desires.

You might also study social movements because you are interested in human action more generally, or in social theory. Scholars of social movements ask why and how people do the things they do, especially *why* they do things *together*: this is also the question that drives sociology in general, especially social theory. Social movements raise the famous Hobbesian problem of social order: why do people cooperate with each other when they might get as many or more benefits by acting selfishly or alone? The study of social movements makes the question more manageable: if we can see why people will voluntarily cooperate in social movements, we can understand why they cooperate in general. Political action is a paradigm of social action that sheds light on action in other spheres of life. It gets to the heart of human motivation. For example, do people act to maximize their material interests? Do they act out rituals that express their beliefs about the world, or simply reaffirm their place in that world? What is the balance between symbolic and "instrumental" (goal-oriented) action? Between selfish and altruistic action?

> **Social Movement**   A social movement is a collective, organized, sustained, and noninstitutional challenge to authorities, powerholders, or cultural beliefs and practices.
> A **revolutionary movement** is a social movement that seeks, at minimum, to overthrow the government or state, and perhaps to change the economy and key institutions of the entire society.

You will also benefit from the study of social movements if you are interested in social change. This might be a theoretical interest in why change occurs, or it might be a practical interest in encouraging or preventing change. Social movements are certainly one central source of social transformation. Other sources include those formal organizations, especially corporations, that are out to make a profit: they invent new technologies that change our ways of working and interacting. Corporations are always finding new ways of extracting profits from workers, and inventing new products to market. These changes typically disrupt people's ways of life: a new machine makes people work harder, or toxic wastes have to be disposed of near a school. People react to these changes, and resist them, by forming social movements.

But, while formal organizations are the main source of technical change, they are rarely a source of change in values or in social arrangements. Why? In modern societies with tightly knit political and economic systems, the big bureaucracies demand economic and political control; they prize stability.

So they try to routinize everything in order to prevent the unexpected. They resist changes in property relations, for example, which are one of the key components of capitalism.

So innovation in values and political beliefs often arises from the discussions and efforts of social movements. Why don't societies just endlessly reproduce themselves intact? It is often social movements that develop new ways of seeing society and new ways of directing it. They are a central part of what has been called "civil society" or the "public sphere," in which groups and individuals debate their own futures.

If you have a *practical* interest in spreading democracy or changing society, there are tricks to learn—techniques of organizing, mobilizing, and influencing the media. There have been a lot of social movements around for the last 40 years, and people in those movements have accumulated a lot of know-how about how to run movements. This is not the main focus of this reader, but we hope there are a few practical lessons to be learned from it.

Finally, you might want to study social movements if you have an interest in the moral basis of society. Social movements are a bit like art: they are efforts to express values and sensibilities that have not yet been well articulated, that journalists haven't yet written about, that lawmakers have not yet addressed. We all have moral sensibilities—including unspoken intuitions as well as articulated principles and rules—that guide our action, or at least make us uneasy when they are violated. Social movements are good ways to understand these moral sensibilities.

Social movements play a crucial role in contemporary societies. We learn about the world around us through them. They encourage us to figure out how we feel about government policies, social trends, and new technologies. In some cases, they even inspire the invention of new technologies or new ways of using old technologies. Most of all, they are one means by which we work out our moral visions, transforming vague intuitions into principles and political demands.

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Research on social movements has changed enormously over time. Until the 1960s, most scholars who studied social movements were frightened of them. They saw them as dangerous mobs who acted irrationally, as slaves to their emotions, blindly following demagogues who had sprung up in their midst. In the nineteenth century, the crowds that attracted the most attention were those that periodically appeared in the cities of Europe demanding better conditions for workers, the right to vote, and other rights that we now take for granted. Most elites, including university professors, had little sympathy for them. Crowds were thought to whip up emotions that made people do things they would not otherwise do, would not want to do, and should not do. They transformed people into unthinking automatons, according to scholars of the time. The last hurrah of this line of thinking was in the 1950s, as scholars analyzed the Nazis in the same way as they had crowds: as people who were fooled by their leaders, whom they followed blindly and stupidly. For more than 100 years, most scholars feared political action outside of normal institutionalized channels.

These attitudes changed in the 1960s when, for one of the first times in history, large numbers of privileged people (those in college and with college educations) had considerable sympathy for the efforts of those at the bottom of society to demand freedoms and material improvements. The civil rights movement was the main reason views changed, as Americans outside the South learned of the repressive conditions Southern blacks faced. It was hard to dismiss civil rights demonstrators as misguided, immature, or irrational. As a result, scholars began to see aspects of social movements they had overlooked when they had used the lens of an angry mob. There were several conceptual changes or "turns" made in social movement theories.

First was an economic turn. In 1965 an economist named Mancur Olson wrote a book, *The Logic of Collective Action*, in which he asked when and why individuals would protest if they were purely rational, in the sense of carefully weighing the costs and benefits of their choices. Although Olson portrayed people as overly individualistic (caring only about the costs and benefits to themselves individually, not to broader groups), he at least recognized that rational people could engage in protest. Within a few years, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald worked out another economic vision of protest,

taking formal organizations as the core of social movements and showing that these social movement organizations (SMOs, for short) act a lot like business firms: they try to accumulate resources, hire staff whose interests might diverge from constituents', and "sell" their point of view to potential contributors. SMOs even compete against one another for contributions; together they add up to a *social movement industry*. Because of their emphasis on SMOs' mobilization of time and money, they came to be known as resource mobilization theorists. Just as Olson saw individuals as rational, so McCarthy and Zald saw organizations as rational. Protestors were no longer dismissed as silly or dangerous.

Around the same time, scholars also discovered the explicitly political dimension of social movements. Most older social movements, like the labor or the civil rights movements, were making demands directly to elites or the state. Foremost were claims for new rights, especially voting rights but also the right to unionize in elections recognized by the government. Thus the state was involved not only as the target but also as the adjudicator of grievances. In this view, which came to be known as *political process theory*, social movements were also seen as eminently rational; indeed, they were normal politics that used extra-institutional means. As in the economic models of mobilization theories, protestors were seen as normal people pursuing their interests as best they could. By highlighting social movements' interactions with the state, these process theories have focused on conflict and the external environments of social movements, to the extent that they even explain the emergence of social movements as resulting from "opportunities" provided by the state (such as a lessening of repression or a division between economic and political elites).

In the late 1980s, yet another dimension of social movements came to be appreciated: their cultural side. Whereas the economic and political turns had both featured protestors as straightforwardly rational and instrumental, scholars now saw the work that goes into creating symbols, convincing people that they have grievances, and establishing a feeling of solidarity among participants.

Two cultural components of movements have been studied more than others. One is the process by which organizers "frame" or publicly present their issues in a way that resonates with or makes sense to potential recruits and the broader public. The other is the *collective identity* that organizers can either use or create to arouse interest in and loyalty to their cause. Most fortunate are those activists who can politicize an existing identity, as when black college students in the South around 1960 began to feel as though it was up to them to lead the civil rights movement into a more militant phase. Other activists may try to create an identity based on membership in the movement itself, as socialists have done since the nineteenth century.

Recently scholars have begun to recognize and study even more aspects of social movements. For example, many movements have a global reach, tying together protest groups across many countries or establishing international organizations. The environmental movement and the protest against the World Trade Organization and the unregulated globalization of trade are examples. Yet most of our models still assume a national movement interacting with a single national state.

The emotions of protest are also being rediscovered. A variety of complex emotions accompany all social life, but they are especially clear in social movements. Organizers must arouse anger and outrage and compassion, often by playing on fears and anxieties. Sometimes these fears and anxieties need to be mitigated before people will protest. Typically, organizers must also offer certain joys and excitements to participants in order to get them to remain in the movement. These represent some of the future directions that research on social movements seems likely to take in coming years.

Our understanding of social movements has grown as these movements themselves have changed. Like everyone else, scholars of social movements are influenced by what they see happening around them. Much protest of the nineteenth century took the form of urban riots, so it was natural to focus on the nature of the crowd. In the 1950s it was important to understand how the Nazis could have taken hold of an otherwise civilized nation, so "mass society" theories were developed to explain this. Scholars who have examined the labor movement and the American civil rights movement recognized that claims of new rights necessarily involve the state, so it was natural for them to focus on the political dimensions of protest. Social scientists who came of age in the 1960s and after were often favorably disposed toward the social movements around them, and so portrayed protestors as reasonable people.

Many of the movements that came after the 1960s were not about rights for oppressed groups, but about lifestyles and cultural meanings, so it was inevitable that scholars would sooner or later turn to this dimension of protest. Likewise, in recent years, several important social movements have become more global in scope. Many movements are also interested in changing our emotional cultures, especially movements influenced by the women's movement, which argued that women were disadvantaged by the ways in which different emotions were thought appropriate for men and for women.

Research on social movements will undoubtedly continue to evolve as social movements themselves evolve.

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Scholars and activists themselves have asked a number of questions about social movements. We have grouped the readings in this volume around eight main questions. Foremost, of course, why do social movements occur, and why do they occur when they do? Who joins and supports them? What determines how long a person stays in a social movement: who stays and who drops out? Also, how are movements organized? And what do they do? In other words, how do they decide what tactics to deploy? How are movements shaped by their interactions with other institutions and groups? For example, how are they affected by the media? And by the state and elites? Why and how do they decline or end? Finally, what changes do movements bring about?

The pages that follow give a variety of answers to each of these questions. The readings gathered here, furthermore, answer these questions by examining a wide range of movements—movements in the United States but also in many other countries, movements of the 1960s but also more recent movements, reformist as well as revolutionary movements, and violent as well as nonviolent movements. No single movement is analyzed in great detail, but we hope this reader will spur students to explore those movements that interest them in greater detail—and to ask the right questions about the movements that are arising now and in the future.

Part II

When and Why Do Social Movements Occur?

Introduction

The most frequently asked question about social movements is why they emerge when they do. Not only does this process come first in time for a movement, but it is also basic in a logical sense as well. Until a movement takes shape, there is not much else we can ask about it. Where we think a movement comes from will color the way we view its other aspects too: its participants, goals, tactics, and outcomes. In general, theories of movement origins have focused either on the characteristics of participants or on conditions in the broader environment which the movement faces. Only in recent years have cultural approaches tried to link these two questions.

Theorists before the 1960s addressed the question of origins to the exclusion of almost all others, for they frequently saw movements as mistakes that were best avoided! For them, the urgent political issue was how to prevent them, and to do this you needed to know why they appeared. *Mass society* theorists, for instance, argued that social movements occurred when a society had lost "intermediary" organizations that discontented individuals could join (Kornhauser 1959). These might be trade unions, community groups, churches—or any other organization that could connect the individual to the government or larger society, aggregating individual preferences and providing outlets for letting off steam. These "regular" organizations were thought to be stable, normal, and healthy, unlike social movements.

Other theorists emphasized the kind of people they thought likely to join movements, which would form when enough people were "alienated" from the world around them, or had infantile psychological needs that absorption in a movement might satisfy (Hoffer 1951). In general, early theorists saw movements as a function of discontent in a society, and they saw discontent as something unusual. Today, scholars see social movements as a normal part of politics, and so these early theories are no longer taken very seriously.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a group of researchers known as the "resource mobilization" school noticed that social movements usually consisted of formal organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1977, excerpted in Chapter 16). And one prerequisite for any organization was a certain level of resources, especially money, to sustain it. They argued that there were always enough discontented people in society to fill

a protest movement, but what varied over time—and so explained the emergence of movements—were the resources available to nourish it. They accordingly focused on how movement leaders raise funds, sometimes by appealing to elites, sometimes through direct-mail fundraising (or, today, the Internet) from thousands of regular citizens. As a society grows wealthier, citizens have more discretionary money to contribute to social movement organizations, and so there are more movements than ever before. With this point of view, the focus shifted decisively away from the kinds of individuals who might join a movement and toward the infrastructure necessary to sustain a movement. Today, scholars still consider resources an important part of any explanation of movement emergence.

The paradigm that has concentrated most on movement emergence is the "political process" approach (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). In this view, economic and political shifts occur, usually independently of protestors' own efforts, which open up a space for the movement. Because these scholars perceive movements as primarily political, making demands of the state or elites and asking for changes in laws and policies, they see changes in the state as the most important opportunity a movement needs. Most often, this consists of a slackening in the repression that organizers are otherwise assumed to face, perhaps because political elites are divided (the movement may have found some allies within the government), or because political and economic elites have divergent interests. There may be a general crisis in the government, perhaps as a result of losing a foreign war, that distracts leaders or saps their own resources or legitimacy (Skocpol 1979). In many versions, the same factors are seen as explaining the rise of the movement and its relative success (Kitschelt 1986).

Alongside mobilization and process approaches, a number of scholars have emphasized the social networks through which people are mobilized into social movements. Although networks have been used primarily to explain *who* is recruited (as we will see in Part III), the very existence of social ties between potential recruits is seen as a prerequisite for the emergence of a social movement. If most process theorists emphasize conditions in the external world (especially the state) that allow a movement to emerge, network theorists look at the structural conditions within the community or population of those who might be recruited. Those with "dense" ties, or pre-existing formal organizations, will find it easier to mobilize supporters, and build a movement.

Jo Freeman's article, "The Origins of the Women's Liberation Movement" (excerpted in Chapter 2), was one of the first accounts of a movement to place networks front and center. Freeman was arguing against early theorists who saw discontented and unorganized masses as spontaneously appearing in the streets. (Freeman herself was one of the founders of the younger branch of the movement in Chicago.) She asserts that, if spontaneous uprisings exist at all, they remain small and local unless they have pre-existing organizations and social ties. Those networks are important for communication and vital to the spread of a movement. Like most network theorists, however, Freeman does not discuss the emotions that are the lifeblood of networks: people respond to the information they receive through networks because of affective ties to those in the network. She also admits that organizers can set about building a new network suited to their own purposes, an activity that takes longer than mobilizing or coopting an existing network.

John D'Emilio's account in Chapter 3 of the 1969 Stonewall rebellion in New York City and the subsequent development of a militant gay and lesbian movement also emphasizes the critical importance of social networks. This apparently spontaneous eruption of gay militancy in fact marked the public emergence of a long repressed, covert urban subculture. D'Emilio points out that the movement was also able to draw on pre-existing networks of activists in the radical movements then current among American youth. The gay liberation movement recruited from the ranks of both the New Left and the women's movement. It also borrowed its confrontational tactics from these movements. Many lesbians and gay men, D'Emilio notes, had already been radicalized and educated in the arts of protest by the feminist and antiwar movements.

These structural approaches redefined somewhat the central question of movement emergence. Scholars began to see movements as closely linked to one another, because leaders and participants shifted from one to the other or shared social networks, or because the same political conditions

encouraged many movements to form at the same time. So researchers began to ask what caused entire waves or "cycles" of social movements to emerge, rather than asking about the origins of single movements (Tarrow 1998: ch. 9).

In the cultural approach that has arisen in recent years, not all movements are seen as structurally similar. In one version, movements are linked to broad historical developments, especially the shift from an industrial or manufacturing society to a postindustrial or knowledge society, in which fewer people process physical goods and more deal with symbols and other forms of knowledge (Touraine 1977). Social movements are seen as efforts to control the direction of social change largely by controlling a society's symbols and self-understandings. They do this by shaping or creating their own collective identities as social movements (Melucci 1996).

In cultural approaches, the goals and intentions of protestors are not taken for granted but treated as a puzzle. For instance, the origin of the animal protection movement has been linked to broad changes in sensibilities of the last 200 years that have allowed citizens of the industrial world to recognize the suffering of nonhuman species—and to worry about it (Jasper and Nelkin 1992). Such concerns would simply not have been possible in a society where most people worked on farms and used animals both as living tools (horses, dogs, dairy cows) and as raw materials (food, leather, etc.). The point is to observe or ask protestors themselves about their perceptions and desires and fantasies, without having a theory that predicts in advance what protestors will think and feel. Perceptions are crucial in this view.

So are emotions, which Manuel Castells adds to the mix in the excerpt in Chapter 5 from his book *Networks of Outrage and Hope*, which sums up his definition of social movements. He focuses on the role of the Internet in both stoking outrage and getting people into the streets during the Egyptian uprising of 2011, but he also acknowledges that revolutions are about seizing public space as well. Only by being together in the streets and squares, and especially Tahrir Square, could the movement in Egypt foster the full feelings of excitement and solidarity and collective identity that kept people there. They felt they were making history. Castells also describes the measures the Mubarak government took to shut down the Internet, as well as the clever ways that the Internet community found to keep going. From the very beginning, protest is an ongoing engagement between protestors and the police.

Structural and cultural approaches disagree in part because they have examined different kinds of social movements (on the conflict between these two views, see Goodwin and Jasper 2004). Most process theorists have focused on movements of groups who have been systematically excluded from political power and legal rights— in other words, groups who are demanding the full rights of citizenship. Cultural approaches have been more likely to examine movements of those who already have the formal rights of citizens—who can vote, pressure legislators, run for office—but who nonetheless feel they must step outside normal political channels to have a greater impact (such as the so-called new social movements). In a related difference, structural theorists usually assume that groups of people know what they want already, and merely need an opportunity to go after it; culturalists recognize that in many cases people need to figure out what they want, often because organizers persuade them of it (e.g., that animals can suffer as much as humans, that marijuana is a danger to respectable society, that the U.S. government is the tool of Satan).

Movements almost always emerge unexpectedly, even though they appear inevitable in hindsight. (Alexis de Tocqueville said this of revolutions in the mid-nineteenth century.) The civil rights sit-ins of 1960 (analyzed by Aldon Morris in Chapter 20) spread rapidly across the South, to the surprise of many. Protest exploded in Egypt in January 2011 after years of relative quiescence. And no one predicted the rapid spread of the Occupy movement in the fall of 2011. As Ruth Milkman, Stephanie Luce, and Penny Lewis show in Chapter 4, however, Occupy was not a spontaneous eruption but carefully planned by seasoned activists who were inspired by events in Egypt and elsewhere. Occupy attracted supporters with a wide range of concerns—inequality, money in politics, student debt, labor rights, and so on—by purposely refusing to make formal demands on government or elites and by claiming to be open to virtually everyone ("the 99 percent") except the wealthiest elite ("the 1 percent") in American society.

There are a number of factors to look for in explaining why a movement emerges when and where it does, drawn from all these perspectives: political factors such as divisions between elites and lessened

repression from the police and army; economic conditions such as increased discretionary income, especially among those sympathetic to a movement's cause; organizational conditions such as social network ties or formal organizations among aggrieved populations; demographic conditions such as the increased population density that comes with industrialization (if you live a mile from your nearest neighbor, it is hard to organize collectively); and cultural factors such as moral intuitions or sensibilities that support the movement's cause. Usually, potential protestors must frame and understand many of these factors as opportunities before they can take advantage of them. Slogans, catchphrases, or demands that resonate with widely held beliefs and concerns are almost always necessary to attract large numbers of people.

Culturalists have reasserted the importance of perceptions, ideas, emotions, and grievances, all of which mobilization and process theorists once thought did not matter or could simply be taken for granted. But these are examined today in the context of broader social and political changes, not in isolation from them. It is not as though people develop goals, then decide to go out and form movements to pursue them; there is an interaction between ideas, mobilization, and the broader environment. But some people hold ideas that others do not, so that the question of the origins of a social movement begins to overlap with that of who is recruited to it.

Discussion Questions

1   What were the two branches of the women's movement of the late 1960s and how do they differ?

2   In what ways did the New Left and the women's movement spur the development of the gay liberation movement?

3   How do structural factors like social networks and cultural factors like emotions and meanings work together to create social movements?

4   Who participated in the Occupy movement, and what were their concerns? Why did Occupy occur in 2011 and not earlier?

5   What are the competing sets of factors that might explain popular participation in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011?

6   Why would lots of social movements appear in some periods, and few in others? In other words, why do they cluster together?

2

The Women's Movement

Jo Freeman

The emergence in the last few years of a feminist movement caught most thoughtful observers by surprise. Women had "come a long way," had they not? What could they want to be liberated from? The new movement generated much speculation about the sources of female discontent and why it was articulated at this particular time. But these speculators usually asked the wrong questions. Most attempts to analyze the sources of social strain have had to conclude with Ferriss (1971, p. 1) that, "from the close perspective of 1970, events of the past decade provide evidence of no compelling cause of the rise of the new feminist movement." His examination of time-series data over the previous 20 years did not reveal any significant changes in socioeconomic variables which could account for the emergence of a women's movement at the time it was created. From such strain indicators, one could surmise that any time in the last two decades was as conducive as any other to movement formation.

[…]

An investigation into a movement's origins must be concerned with the microstructural preconditions for the emergence of such a movement center. From where do the people come who make up the initial, organizing cadre of a movement? How do they come together, and how do they come to share a similar view of the world in circumstances which compel them to political action? In what ways does the nature of the original center affect the future development of the movement?

Most movements have very inconspicuous beginnings. The significant elements of their origins are usually forgotten or distorted by the time a trained observer seeks to trace them out, making retroactive analyses difficult. Thus, a detailed investigation of a single movement at the time it is forming can add much to what little is known about movement origins. Such an examination cannot uncover all of the conditions and ingredients of movement formation, but it can aptly illustrate both weaknesses in the theoretical literature and new directions for research. During the formative period of the women's liberation movement, I had many opportunities to observe, log, and interview most of the principals involved

in the early movement. The descriptive material below is based on that data. This analysis, supplemented by five other origin studies made by me, would support the following three propositions:

Proposition 1: The need for a preexisting communications network or infrastructure within the social base of a movement is a primary prerequisite for "spontaneous" activity. Masses alone don't form movements, however discontented they may be. Groups of previously unorganized individuals may spontaneously form into small local associations—usually along the lines of informal social networks—in response to a specific strain or crisis, but, if they are not linked in some manner, the protest does not become generalized: it remains a local irritant or dissolves completely. If a movement is to spread rapidly, the communications network must already exist. If only the rudiments of one exist, movement formation requires a high input of "organizing" activity.

Proposition 2: Not just any communications network will do. It must be a network that is *co-optable* to the new ideas of the incipient movement. To be co-optable, it must be composed of like-minded people whose background, experiences, or location in the social structure make them receptive to the ideas of a specific new movement.

Proposition 3: Given the existence of a co-optable communications network, or at least the rudimentary development of a potential one, and a situation of strain, one or more precipitants are required. Here, two distinct patterns emerge that often overlap. In one, a crisis galvanizes the network into spontaneous action in a new direction. In the other, one or more persons begin organizing a new organization or disseminating a new idea. For spontaneous action to occur, the communications network must be well formed or the initial protest will not survive the incipient stage. If it is not well formed, organizing efforts must occur; that is, one or more persons must specifically attempt to construct a movement. To be successful, organizers must be skilled and must have a fertile field in which to work. If no communications network already exists, there must at least be emerging spontaneous groups which are acutely attuned to the issue, albeit uncoordinated. To sum up, if a co-optable communications network is already established, a crisis is all that is necessary to galvanize it. If it is rudimentary, an organizing cadre of one or more persons is necessary. Such a cadre is superfluous if the former conditions fully exist, but it is essential if they do not.

Before examining these propositions in detail, let us look at the structure and origins of the women's liberation movement.

The women's liberation movement manifests itself in an almost infinite variety of groups, styles, and organizations. Yet, this diversity has sprung from only two distinct origins whose numerous offspring remain clustered largely around these two sources. The two branches are often called "reform" and "radical," or, as the sole authoritative book on the movement describes them, "women's rights" and "women's liberation" (Hole and Levine 1971). Unfortunately, these terms actually tell us very little, since feminists do not fit into the traditional Left/Right spectrum. In fact, if an ideological typography were possible, it would show minimal consistency with any other characteristic. Structure and style rather than ideology more accurately differentiate the two branches, and, even here, there has been much borrowing on both sides.

I prefer simpler designations: the first of the branches will be referred to as the older branch of the movement, partly because it began first and partly because the median age of its activists is higher. It contains numerous organizations, including the lobbyist group (Women's Equity Action League), a legal foundation (Human Rights for Women), over 20 caucuses in professional organizations, and separate organizations of women in the professions and other occupations. Its most prominent "core group" is the National Organization for Women (NOW), which was also the first to be formed.

While the written programs and aims of the older branch span a wide spectrum, their activities tend to be concentrated on legal and economic problems. These groups are primarily made up of women—and men—who work, and they are substantially concerned with the problems of working women. The style of organization of the older branch tends to be traditionally formal, with elected officers, boards of directors, bylaws, and the other trappings of democratic procedure. All started as top-down national organizations, lacking in a mass base. Some have subsequently

A Chronology of the U.S. Women's Movement

1961: President Kennedy forms President's Commission on the Status of Women, chaired by Esther Peterson and Eleanor Roosevelt; only 3.6 percent of law students are women

1963: Betty Friedan's book, *The Feminine Mystique*, becomes a best-seller; the Equal Pay Act is signed into law

1964: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is signed into law; Title VII of the Act bars sex discrimination in employment; Mary King and Casey Hayden write a paper decrying the treatment of women in the Student Nonviolent Coordination Committee (SNCC)

1965: The U.S. Supreme Court, in *Griswold v. Connecticut*, bans laws that prohibit the use of, or the dissemination of information about, birth control; King and Hayden's paper on "Sex and Caste" is circulated widely (and published in the journal *Liberation* in 1966)

1966: National Organization of Women (NOW) founded with Betty Friedan as president

1967: Women's consciousness-raising (CR) groups formed in Berkeley and elsewhere; CR groups proliferate, especially during 1968 and 1969

1968: Protests are staged against the Miss America Pageant in Atlantic City; Shirley Chisholm becomes the first African-American woman elected to Congress; women are hissed and thrown out of a convention of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) for demanding a women's liberation plank in the group's platform

1969: Feminist activists disrupt Senate hearings on the birth control pill for excluding testimony about its dangerous side-effects

1970: Tens of thousands participate in the Women's Equality March in New York City; much feminist work is published, including Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics*, Shulamith Firestone's *The Dialectic of Sex*, *The Black Woman*, edited by Toni Cade Bambara, and *Sisterhood is Powerful*, edited by Robin Morgan; the Feminist Press is founded; Rita Mae Brown spurs the "Lavender Menace" protest in favor of including lesbian rights as part of the women's movement; lesbian feminist CR groups proliferate during 1970 and 1971; the U.S. House passes the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA); four states, including New York, pass liberal abortion laws

1971: The first courses in women's history and literature are offered at many colleges; the National Women's Political Caucus is founded by Bella Abzug, Shirley Chisholm, Betty Friedan, and Gloria Steinem, among others

1972: Title IX of the 1972 education bill prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs (including sports programs) that receive federal assistance; 12 percent of law students are now women; Shirley Chisholm runs for the Democratic nomination for president; the first rape crisis and battered women's shelters open; *Ms*. magazine begins publishing

1973: Supreme Court, in *Roe v. Wade*, eliminates restrictions on first-trimester abortions; the National Black Feminist Organization is formed

1974: The Equal Opportunity Act forbids discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status; the Coalition of Labor Union Women is founded; the Combahee River Collective of Black Women begins meeting in Boston; eleven women are ordained as Episcopal priests in violation of church law

1978: The first "Take Back the Night March" is held in Boston

1979: The Moral Majority is founded by Rev. Jerry Falwell, opposing the ERA, abortion, and gay rights

Early 1980s: The women's movement is divided over the issue of pornography

1982: The ERA is defeated, falling three states short of the 38 needed for ratification

developed a mass base, some have not yet done so, and others do not want to.

Conversely, the younger branch consists of innumerable small groups—engaged in a variety of activities—whose contact with each other is, at best, tenuous. Contrary to popular myth, it did not begin on the campus nor was it started by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). However, its activators were, to be trite, on the other side of the generation gap. While few were

> **Social Networks** The web of social ties that connects individuals (and organizations) to others is often referred to as a social network. An individual's network typically includes friends, relatives, neighbors, and co-workers. One's ideas and attitudes are typically strongly influenced and reinforced by one's social network, and scholars have emphasized how recruitment to movements often occurs through network ties. (Finding a job typically depends on one's network ties, too. Friends of friends turn out to be especially important for job-seekers.) Movements, then, are often built upon pre-existing networks, although they also bring together previously unconnected networks and organizations. The individuals who bring together such networks are sometimes called **brokers**.

students, all were "under 30" and had received their political education as participants or concerned observers of the social action projects of the last decade. Many came direct from New Left and civil rights organizations. Others had attended various courses on women in the multitude of free universities springing up around the country during those years.

The expansion of these groups has appeared more amoebic than organized, because the younger branch of the movement prides itself on its lack of organization. From its radical roots, it inherited the idea that structures were always conservative and confining, and leaders, isolated and elitist. Thus, eschewing structure and damning the idea of leadership, it has carried the concept of "everyone doing her own thing" to the point where communication is haphazard and coordination is almost nonexistent. The thousands of sister chapters around the country are virtually independent of each other, linked only by numerous underground papers, journals, newsletters, and cross-country travelers. A national conference was held over Thanksgiving in 1968 but, although considered successful, has not yet been repeated. Before the 1968 conference, the movement did not have the sense of national unity which emerged after the conference. Since then, young feminists have

made no attempt to call another national conference. There have been a few regional conferences, but no permanent consequences resulted. At most, some cities have a coordinating committee which attempts to maintain communication among local groups and to channel newcomers into appropriate ones, but these committees have no power over any group's activities, let alone its ideas. Even local activists do not know how big the movement is in their own city. While it cannot be said to have no organization at all, this branch of the movement has informally adopted a general policy of "structurelessness."

Despite a lack of a formal policy encouraging it, there is a great deal of homogeneity within the younger branch of the movement. Like the older branch, it tends to be predominantly white, middle class, and college educated. But it is much more homogenous and, unlike the older branch, has been unable to diversify. This is largely because most small groups tend to form among friendship networks. Most groups have no requirements for membership (other than female sex), no dues, no written and agreed-upon structure, and no elected leaders. Because of this lack of structure, it is often easier for an individual to form a new group than to find and join an older one. This encourages group formation but discourages individual diversification. Even contacts among groups tend to be along friendship lines.

In general, the different style and organization of the two branches was largely derived from the different kinds of political education and experiences of each group of women. Women of the older branch were trained in and had used the traditional forms of political action, while the younger branch has inherited the loose, flexible, person-oriented attitude of the youth and student movements. The different structures that have evolved from these two distinctly different kinds of experience have, in turn, largely determined the strategy of the two branches, irrespective of any conscious intentions of their participants. These different structures and strategies have each posed different problems and possibilities. Intramovement differences are often perceived by the participants as conflicting, but it is their essential complementarity which has been one of the strengths of the movement.

Despite the multitude of differences, there are very strong similarities in the way the two branches came into being. These similarities serve to illuminate some of the microsociological factors involved in movement formation. The forces which led to NOW's formation were first set in motion in 1961 when President Kennedy established the President's Commission on the Status of Women at the behest of Esther Peterson, to be chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt. Operating under a broad mandate, its 1963 report (*American Women*) and subsequent committee publications documented just how thoroughly women are still denied many rights and opportunities. The most concrete response to the activity of the president's commission was the eventual establishment of 50 state commissions to do similar research on a state level. These commissions were often urged by politically active women and were composed primarily of women. Nonetheless, many believe the main stimulus behind their formation was the alleged view of the governors that the commissions were excellent opportunities to pay political debts without giving women more influential positions.

The activity of the federal and state commissions laid the groundwork for the future movement in three significant ways: (1) it brought together many knowledgeable, politically active women who otherwise would not have worked together around matters of direct concern to women; (2) the investigations unearthed ample evidence of women's unequal status, especially their legal and economic difficulties, in the process convincing many previously uninterested women that something should be done; (3) the reports created a climate of expectations that something would be done. The women of the federal and state commissions who were exposed to these influences exchanged visits, correspondence, and staff and met with each other at an annual commission convention. Thus, they were in a position to share and mutually reinforce their growing awareness and concern over women's issues. These commissions thus created an embryonic communications network among people with similar concerns.

During this time, two other events of significance occurred. The first was the publication of Betty Friedan's (1963) book, *The Feminine Mystique*. An immediate best seller, it stimulated many women to question the status quo and some to suggest to Friedan that a new organization be formed to attack their problems. The second event was the addition of "sex" to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Many men thought the "sex" provision was a joke. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) certainly treated it as one and refused to adequately enforce it. The first EEOC executive director even stated publicly that the provision was a "fluke" that was "conceived out of wedlock." But, within the EEOC, there was a "pro-woman" coterie which argued that "sex" would be taken more seriously if there were "some sort of NAACP for women" to put pressure on the government. As government employees, they couldn't organize such a group, but they spoke privately with those whom they thought might be able to do so. One who shared their views was Rep. Martha Griffiths of Michigan. She blasted the EEOC's attitude in a June 20, 1966 speech on the House floor declaring that the agency had "started out by casting disrespect and ridicule on the law" but that their "wholly negative attitude had changed—for the worse."

On June 30, 1966, these three strands of incipient feminism were knotted together to form NOW. The occasion was the last day of the Third National Conference of Commissions on the Status of Women, ironically titled "Targets for Action." The participants had all received copies of Rep. Griffiths's remarks. The opportunity came with a refusal by conference officials to bring to the floor a proposed resolution that urged the EEOC to give equal enforcement to the sex provision of Title VII as was given to the race provision. Despite the fact that these state commissions were not federal agencies, officials replied that one government agency could not be allowed to pressure another. The small group of women who had desired the resolution had met the night before in Friedan's hotel room to discuss the possibility of a civil rights organization for women. Not convinced of its need, they chose instead to propose the resolution. When the resolution was vetoed, the women held a whispered conversation over lunch and agreed to form an action organization "to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of American society now, assuming all the privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partnership with men." The name NOW was coined by

Friedan, who was at the conference researching her second book. Before the day was over, 28 women paid $5.00 each to join.

By the time the organizing conference was held the following October 29–30, over 300 men and women had become charter members. It is impossible to do a breakdown on the composition of the charter membership, but one of the first officers and board is possible. Such a breakdown accurately reflected NOW's origins. Friedan was president, two former EEOC commissioners were vice-presidents, a representative of the United Auto Workers Women's Committee was secretary-treasurer, and there were seven past and present members of the State Commissions on the Status of Women on the 20-member board. Of the charter members, 126 were Wisconsin residents—and Wisconsin had the most active state commission. Occupationally, the board and officers were primarily from the professions, labor, government, and the communications industry. Of these, only those from labor had any experience in organizing, and they resigned a year later in a dispute over support of the Equal Rights Amendment. Instead of organizational expertise, what the early NOW members had was media experience, and it was here that their early efforts were aimed.

As a result, NOW often gave the impression of being larger than it was. It was highly successful in getting publicity, much less so in bringing about concrete changes or organizing itself. Thus, it was not until 1969, when several national news media simultaneously decided to do major stories on the women's liberation movement, that NOW's membership increased significantly. Even today, there are only 8,000 members, and the chapters are still in an incipient stage of development.

In the meantime, unaware of and unknown to NOW, the EEOC, or to the state commissions, younger women began forming their own movement. Here, too, the groundwork had been laid some years before. Social action projects of recent years had attracted many women, who were quickly shunted into traditional roles and faced with the self-evident contradiction of working in a "freedom movement" without being very free. No single "youth movement" activity or organization is responsible for the younger branch of the women's liberation movement;

together they created a "radical community" in which like-minded people continually interacted with each other. This community consisted largely of those who had participated in one or more of the many protest activities of the sixties and had established its own ethos and its own institutions. Thus, the women in it thought of themselves as "movement people" and had incorporated the adjective "radical" into their personal identities. The values of their radical identity and the style to which they had been trained by their movement participation directed them to approach most problems as political ones which could be solved by organizing. What remained was to translate their individual feelings of "unfreedom" into a collective consciousness. Thus, the radical community provided not only the necessary network of communication; its radical ideas formed the framework of analysis which "explained" the dismal situation in which radical women found themselves.

Papers had been circulated on women, and temporary women's caucuses had been held as early as 1964, when Stokely Carmichael made his infamous remark that "the only position for women in SNCC is prone." But it was not until late 1967 and 1968 that the groups developed a determined, if cautious, continuity and began to consciously expand themselves. At least five groups in five different cities (Chicago, Toronto, Detroit, Seattle, and Gainesville, Florida) formed spontaneously, independent of each other. They came at a very auspicious moment. The year 1967 was the one in which the blacks kicked the whites out of the civil rights movement, student power had been discredited by SDS, and the organized New Left was on the wane. Only draft-resistance activities were on the increase, and this movement more than any other exemplified the social inequities of the sexes. Men could resist the draft; women could only counsel resistance.

What was significant about this point in time was that there was a lack of available opportunities for political work. Some women fit well into the "secondary role" of draft counseling. Many did not. For years, their complaints of unfair treatment had been ignored by movement men with the dictum that those things could wait until after the revolution. Now these movement women found time on their hands, but the men would still not listen.

A typical example was the event which precipitated the formation of the Chicago group, the first independent group in this country. At the August 1967 National Conference for New Politics convention, a women's caucus met for days but was told its resolution wasn't significant enough to merit a floor discussion. By threatening to tie up the convention with procedural motions, the women succeeded in having their statement tacked to the end of the agenda. It was never discussed. The chair refused to recognize any of the many women standing by the microphone, their hands straining upward. When he instead called on someone to speak on "the forgotten American, the American Indian," five women rushed the podium to demand an explanation. But the chairman just patted one of them on the head (literally) and told her, "Cool down little girl. We have more important things to talk about than women's problems."

The "little girl" was Shulamith Firestone, future author of *The Dialectic of Sex* (1971), and she didn't cool down. Instead, she joined with another Chicago woman, who had been trying to organize a women's group that summer, to call a meeting of those women who had half-heartedly attended the summer meetings. Telling their stories to those women, they stimulated sufficient rage to carry the group for three months, and by that time it was a permanent institution.

Another somewhat similar event occurred in Seattle the following winter. At the University of Washington, an SDS organizer was explaining to a large meeting how white college youth established rapport with the poor whites with whom they were working. "He noted that sometimes after analyzing societal ills, the men shared leisure time by 'balling a chick together.' He pointed out that such activities did much to enhance the political consciousness of the poor white youth. A woman in the audience asked, 'And what did it do for the consciousness of the chick?'" (Hole and Levine 1971, p. 120). After the meeting, a handful of enraged women formed Seattle's first group.

Groups subsequent to the initial five were largely organized rather than emerging spontaneously out of recent events. In particular, the Chicago group was responsible for the creation of many new groups in that city and elsewhere and started the first national newsletter. The 1968 conference was organized by the Washington

D.C. group from resources provided by the Center for Policy Studies (CPS), a radical research organization. Using CPS facilities, this group subsequently became a main literature-distribution center. Although New York groups organized early and were featured in the 1969–70 media blitz, New York was not a source of early organizers.

Unlike NOW, the women in the first groups had had years of experience as local-level organizers. They did not have the resources, or the desire, to form a national organization, but they knew how to utilize the infrastructure of the radical community, the underground press, and the free universities to disseminate ideas on women's liberation. Chicago, as a center of New Left activity, had the largest number of politically conscious organizers. Many traveled widely to Left conferences and demonstrations, and most used the opportunity to talk with other women about the new movement. In spite of public derision by radical men, or perhaps because of it, young women steadily formed new groups around the country.

Initially, the new movement found it hard to organize on the campus, but, as a major congregating area of women and, in particular, of women with political awareness, campus women's liberation groups eventually became ubiquitous. While the younger branch of the movement never formed any organization larger or more extensive than a city-wide co-ordinating committee, it would be fair to say that it has a larger "participationship" than NOW and the other older branch organizations. While the members of the older branch knew how to use the media and how to form national structures, the women of the younger branch were skilled in local community organizing.

From this description, there appear to be four essential elements contributing to the emergence of the women's liberation movement in the mid-sixties: (1) the growth of a preexisting communications network which was (2) co-optable to the ideas of the new movement; (3) a series of crises that galvanized into action people involved in this network, and/or (4) subsequent organizing effort to weld the spontaneous groups together into a movement. To further understand these factors, let us examine them in detail with reference to other relevant studies.

1. Both the Commissions on the Status of Women and the "radical community" created a communications network through which those women initially interested in creating an organization could easily reach others. Such a network had not previously existed among women. Historically tied to the family and isolated from their own kind, women are perhaps the most organizationally underdeveloped social category in Western civilization. By 1950, the 19th-century organizations which had been the basis of the suffrage movement—the Women's Trade Union League, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the National American Women's Suffrage Association—were all either dead or a pale shadow of their former selves. The closest exception was the National Women's Party (NWP), which has remained dedicated to feminist concerns since its inception in 1916. However, since 1923, it has been essentially a lobbying group for the Equal Rights Amendment. The NWP, having always believed that a small group of women concentrating their efforts in the right places was more effective than a mass appeal, was not appalled that, as late as 1969, even the majority of avowed feminists in this country had never heard of the NWP or the ERA.

   […]

   Other evidence also attests to the role of previously organized networks in the rise and spread of a social movement. According to Buck (1920, pp. 43–44), the Grange established a degree of organization among American farmers in the 19th century which greatly facilitated the spread of future farmers' protests. In Saskatchewan, Lipset (1959) has asserted, "The rapid acceptance of new ideas and movements… can be attributed mainly to the high degree of organization…. The role of the social structure of the western wheat belt in facilitating the rise of new movements has never been sufficiently appreciated by historians and sociologists. Repeated challenges and crises forced the western farmers to create many more community institutions… than are necessary in a more stable area. These groups in turn provided a structural basis for immediate action in critical situations.

   [Therefore] though it was a new radical party, the C.C.F. did not have to build up an organization from scratch." More recently, the civil rights movement was built upon the infrastructure of the Southern black church (King 1958), and early SDS organizers made ready use of the National Student Association (Kissinger and Ross 1968, p. 16).

   […]

   The development of the women's liberation movement highlights the salience of such a network precisely because the conditions for a movement existed *before* a network came into being, but the movement didn't exist until afterward. Socioeconomic strain did not change for women significantly during a 20-year period. It was as great in 1955 as in 1965. What changed was the organizational situation. It was not until a communications network developed among like-minded people beyond local boundaries that the movement could emerge and develop past the point of occasional, spontaneous uprising.

2. However, not just any network would do; it had to be one which was co-optable by the incipient movement because it linked like-minded people likely to be predisposed to the new ideas of the movement. The 180,000-member Federation of Business and Professional Women's (BPW) Clubs would appear to be a likely base for a new feminist movement but in fact was unable to assume this role. It had steadily lobbied for legislation of importance to women, yet as late as "1966 BPW rejected a number of suggestions that it redefine… goals and tactics and become a kind of 'NAACP for women'… out of fear of being labeled 'feminist'" (Hole and Levine 1971, p. 81). While its membership has become a recruiting ground for feminism, it could not initially overcome the ideological barrier to a new type of political action.

   On the other hand, the women of the President's and State Commissions on the Status of Women and the feminist coterie of the EEOC were co-optable, largely because their immersion into the facts of female status and the details of sex-discrimination cases made them very conscious of the need for change. Likewise, the young women of the

"radical community" lived in an atmosphere of questioning, confrontation, and change. They absorbed an ideology of "freedom" and "liberation" far more potent than any latent "antifeminism" might have been. The repeated contradictions between these ideas and the actions of their male colleagues created a compulsion for action which only required an opportunity to erupt. This was provided by the "vacuum of political activity" of 1967–68.

[…]

A co-optable network, therefore, is one whose members have had common experiences which predispose them to be receptive to the particular new ideas of the incipient movement and who are not faced with structural or ideological barriers to action. If the new movement as an "innovation" can interpret these experiences and perceptions in ways that point out channels for social action, then participation in social movement becomes the logical thing to do.

3. As our examples have illustrated, these similar perceptions must be translated into action. This is the role of the "crisis." For women of the older branch of the movement, the impetus to organize was the refusal of the EEOC to enforce the sex provision of Title VII, precipitated by the concomitant refusal of federal officials at the conference to allow a supportive resolution. For younger women, there was a series of minor crises. Such precipitating events are common to most movements. They serve to crystallize and focus discontent. From their own experiences, directly and concretely, people feel the need for change in a situation that allows for an exchange of feelings with others, mutual validation, and a subsequent reinforcement of innovative interpretation. Perception of an immediate need for change is a major factor in predisposing people to accept new ideas. Nothing makes desire for change more acute than a crisis. If the strain is great enough, such a crisis need not be a major one; it need only embody symbolically collective discontent.

4. However, a crisis will only catalyze a well-formed communications network. If such networks are only embryonically developed or only partially co-optable, the potentially active individuals in them must be linked together by someone. As Jackson et al. (1960, p. 37) stated, "Some protest may persist where the source of trouble is constantly present. But interest ordinarily cannot be maintained unless there is a welding of spontaneous groups into some stable organization." In other words, people must be organized. Social movements do not simply occur.

The role of the organizer in movement formation is another neglected aspect of the theoretical literature. There has been great concern with leadership, but the two roles are distinct and not always performed by the same individual. In the early stages of a movement, it is the organizer much more than any "leader" who is important, and such an individual or cadre must often operate behind the scenes. Certainly, the "organizing cadre" that young women in the radical community came to be was key to the growth of that branch of the women's liberation movement, despite the fact that no "leaders" were produced (and were actively discouraged). The existence of many leaders but no organizers in the older branch of the women's liberation movement and its subsequent slow development would tend to substantiate this hypothesis.

The crucial function of the organizer has been explored indirectly in other areas of sociology. Rogers (1962) devotes many pages to the "change agent" who, while he does not necessarily weld a group together or "construct" a movement, does do many of the same things for agricultural innovation that an organizer does for political change. Mass-society theory makes reference to the "agitator" but fails to do so in any kind of truly informative way. A study of farmers' movements indicates that many core organizations were organized by a single individual before the spontaneous aspects of the movement predominated. Further, many other core groups were subsidized by older organizations, federal and state governments, and even by local businessmen. These organizations often served as training centers for organizers and sources of material support to aid in the formation of new interest groups and movements.

Similarly, the civil rights movement provided the training for many another movement's organizers, including the young women of the women's liberation movement. It would appear that the art of "constructing" a social movement is something that requires considerable skill and experience. Even in the supposedly spontaneous social movement, the professional is more valuable than the amateur.

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Betty Friedan and *The Feminine Mystique*

Ideas are crucial to social movements, and in the literate modern world those ideas are often expressed in books. The volume that did the most to revive the women's movement in the 1960s was packaged as a critique of housewives written by one: *The Feminine Mystique*. Its author, Betty Friedan, was born in Peoria, Illinois, in 1921, only one year after the Nineteenth Amendment had given women the right to vote. Her father was an ambitious immigrant who had put himself through medical school. Her mother was a housewife who, when young, had wanted to go to Smith College, something her parents did not allow.

From childhood, Friedan was known to have a brilliant mind and a quick temper, two things girls were not supposed to have in Peoria. Having skipped a grade, she felt like an outsider, a status probably exacerbated by local anti-Semitism and her lack of traditional good looks. At Smith College she developed, despite her own affluent background, radical sympathies as well as a rabble-rousing reputation as editor of the school newspaper. She supported, for instance, a strike by the maids who cleaned students' rooms and served them in the dining halls. Between her junior and senior years she spent several weeks at the Highlander Folk School in Tennessee, a training ground for leftist labor organizers.

After graduating in 1942, Friedan went to Berkeley to study psychology. She shone there as well, and was soon offered a lucrative fellowship that would have supported her through finishing her Ph.D. She panicked when a boyfriend implied that his envy would ruin their relationship if she took the scholarship, and—feeling torn between love and career—she left the university. For the next nine years she would work for a left-wing news service, then the newspaper of a leftist union, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America.

At the age of 26, Friedan met a veteran named Carl Friedman and fell in love. He was a college drop-out, and no intellectual, but he loved the theater and seemed to love Betty. Despite misgivings on each side, they soon married. Their first child was born in late 1948, and Betty was given a maternity leave by the union (which was later cut short, however). She became pregnant again in 1952, during a crisis for the union, which had lost two-thirds of its members in the face of redbaiting by the government and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The four-person newspaper staff, two men and two women,

had to be cut in half, and both the women left (how voluntarily is not altogether clear). Brilliant, radical Betty became a housewife in Queens.

Sort of. She continued to write articles, now for women's magazines, in which any political and economic analysis, or anything that implied that women might be more satisfied working than raising children, was assiduously edited out. A serious debate was raging over whether women should go to college at all, or instead be schooled in the skills of managing a home, since that is what they were going to do. Many otherwise sensible scholars argued that college was wasted on women. Friedan wrote an article arguing the opposite, only to see it rejected by *McCall's* and published by the *Ladies' Home Journal* only after it was edited to make the opposite point. At the same time, she also helped organize community groups for various causes, from a rent strike to sex education in the schools. Friedan was not your typical housewife.

In 1957, Friedan and two of her Smith classmates wrote a lengthy questionnaire to distribute at their fifteenth reunion that spring. Inspired by their own experiences in therapy, and a sense from the tenth reunion that most of the women were overwhelmed with child-rearing, they asked a number of proto-feminist questions, like "What problems have you had working out your role as a woman?" Friedan did other research on women's issues, and realized that she might be able to publish her ideas as a book, since they were too controversial for most magazines. W. W. Norton gave her an advance, and in 1963 she published *The Feminine Mystique*.

Her book became a bestseller, in part due to her own ferocious self-promotion (she replaced her agent, forced Norton to hire an outside publicist for the book, and went on her own publicity tour). Even more, it touched a nerve among millions of women, and by 1970 it had sold 1.5 million copies. It described and analyzed the dissatisfaction felt by so many American housewives and mothers, each locked up in her own "comfortable concentration camp": "Each suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay beside her husband at night—she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question—'Is this all?'" Friedan had packaged the ideas of Simone de Beauvoir and Margaret Mead for middle-class housewives. She had also carefully avoided linking her analysis to Marxism, and suppressed any mention of her own years in the Left, now discredited by years of McCarthyism. The plight of women, it seemed, was distinct. To help sell her book, Friedan shrewdly but inaccurately presented herself as a simple suburban housewife who just couldn't take it any more.

The Feminine Mystique helped the women's movement coalesce in the mid-1960s, providing an ideology for the networks that had formed around the National Commission on the Status of Women (and state-level equivalents). Many of these women (and some men) were active in forming the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966. Its goal was to integrate women into the mainstream of American society and institutions, and it would remain the central organization of the liberal, reformist wing of the women's movement. Friedan, now a celebrity, was elected its first president. She would remain active in the cause for the rest of her life. But her foremost contribution was her writing, her ability to articulate discontent, to provide a rationale for what would become one of the most successful social movements of the twentieth century.

3

The Gay Liberation Movement

John D'Emilio

On Friday, June 27, 1969, shortly before midnight, two detectives from Manhattan's Sixth Precinct set off with a few other officers to raid the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar on Christopher Street in the heart of Greenwich Village. They must have expected it to be a routine raid. New York was in the midst of a mayoral campaign—always a bad time for the city's homosexuals—and John Lindsay, the incumbent who had recently lost his party's primary, had reason to agree to a police cleanup. Moreover, a few weeks earlier the Sixth Precinct had received a new commanding officer who marked his entry into the position by initiating a series of raids on gay bars. The Stonewall Inn was an especially inviting target. Operating without a liquor license, reputed to have ties with organized crime, and offering scantily clad go-go boys as entertainment, it brought an "unruly" element to Sheridan Square, a busy Village intersection. Patrons of the Stonewall tended to be young and nonwhite. Many were drag queens, and many came from the burgeoning ghetto of runaways living across town in the East Village.

However, the customers at the Stonewall that night responded in any but the usual fashion. As the police released them one by one from inside the bar, a crowd accumulated on the street. Jeers and catcalls arose from the onlookers when a paddy wagon departed with the bartender, the Stonewall's bouncer, and three drag queens. A few minutes later, an officer attempted to steer the last of the patrons, a lesbian, through the bystanders to a nearby patrol car. "She put up a struggle," the *Village Voice* (July 3, 1969, p. 18) reported, "from car to door to car again." At that moment,

> the scene became explosive. Limp wrists were forgotten. Beer cans and bottles were heaved at the windows and a rain of coins descended on the cops.… Almost by signal the crowd erupted into cobblestone and bottle heaving.… From nowhere came an uprooted parking meter—used as a battering ram on the Stonewall door. I heard several cries of "let's get some gas," but the blaze of flame which soon appeared in the window of the Stonewall was still a shock.

Reinforcements rescued the shaken officers from the torched bar, but their work had barely started. Rioting continued far into the night, with Puerto

Rican transvestites and young street people leading charges against rows of uniformed police officers and then withdrawing to regroup in Village alleys and side streets.

By the following night, graffiti calling for "Gay Power" had appeared along Christopher Street. Knots of young gays—effeminate, according to most reports—gathered on corners, angry and restless. Someone heaved a sack of wet garbage through the window of a patrol car. On nearby Waverly Place, a concrete block landed on the hood of another police car that was quickly surrounded by dozens of men, pounding on its doors and dancing on its hood. Helmeted officers from the tactical patrol force arrived on the scene and dispersed with swinging clubs an impromptu chorus line of gay men in the middle of a full kick. At the intersection of Greenwich Avenue and Christopher Street, several dozen queens screaming "Save Our Sister!" rushed a group of officers who were clubbing a young man and dragged him to safety. For the next few hours, trash fires blazed, bottles and stones flew through the air, and cries of "Gay Power!" rang in the streets as the police, numbering over 400, did battle with a crowd estimated at more than 2,000.

After the second night of disturbances, the anger that had erupted into street fighting was channeled into intense discussion of what many had begun to memorialize as the first gay riot in history. Allen Ginsberg's stature in the 1960s had risen almost to that of guru for many counterculture youth. When he arrived at the Stonewall on Sunday evening, he commented on the change that had already taken place. "You know, the guys there were so beautiful," he told a reporter. "They've lost that wounded look that fags all had ten years ago." The New York Mattachine Society hastily assembled a special riot edition of its newsletter that characterized the events, with camp humor, as "The Hairpin Drop Heard Round the World." It scarcely exaggerated. Before the end of July, women and men in New York had formed the Gay Liberation Front, a self-proclaimed revolutionary organization in the style of the New Left. Word of the Stonewall riot and GLF spread rapidly among the networks of young radicals scattered across the country, and within a year gay liberation groups had sprung into existence on college campuses and in cities around the nation.

The Stonewall riot was able to spark a nationwide grassroots "liberation" effort among gay men and women in large part because of the radical movements that had so inflamed much of American youth during the 1960s. Gay liberation used the demonstrations of the New Left as recruiting grounds and appropriated the tactics of confrontational politics for its own ends. The ideas that suffused youth protest found their way into gay liberation, where they were modified and adapted to describe the oppression of homosexuals and lesbians. The apocalyptic rhetoric and the sense of impending revolution that surrounded the Movement by the end of the decade gave to its newest participants an audacious daring that made the dangers of a public avowal of their sexuality seem insignificant.

In order to make their existence known, gay liberationists took advantage of the almost daily political events that young radicals were staging across the country. New York's Gay Liberation Front had a contingent at the antiwar march held in the city on October 15, 1969, and was present in even larger numbers at the November moratorium weekend in Washington, where almost half a million activists rallied against American involvement in Southeast Asia. Gay radicals in Berkeley performed guerrilla theater on the campus during orientation that fall and carried banners at the November anti-war rally in San Francisco. In November 1969 and again the following May, lesbians from GLF converged on the Congress to Unite Women, which brought to New York women's liberationists from around the East. Gay activists ran workshops at the 1969 annual convention of the National Student Association. In May 1970 a GLF member addressed the rally in New Haven in support of Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins, the imprisoned Black Panther leaders. A large contingent of lesbians and gay men attended the national gathering called by the Panthers in the fall of 1970, and the next year a gay "tribe" took part in the May Day protests in Washington against the war. In raising the banner of gay liberation at these and other local demonstrations, radical gays reached closeted homosexuals and lesbians in the Movement who already had a commitment to militant confrontational politics. Their message traveled quickly through the networks of activists created by the New Left, thus allowing gay liberation to spread with amazing rapidity.

The first gay liberationists attracted so many other young radicals not only because of a common sexual identity but because they shared a similar political perspective. Gay liberationists spoke in the hyperbolic phrases of the New Left. They talked of liberation from oppression, resisting genocide, and making a revolution against "imperialist Amerika." GLF's statement of purpose, printed in the New Left newspaper *RAT* (August 12, 1969), sounded like many of the documents produced by radicals in the late 1960s, except that it was written by and about homosexuals:

> We are a revolutionary group of men and women formed with the realization that complete sexual liberation for all people cannot come about unless existing social institutions are abolished. We reject society's attempt to impose sexual roles and definitions of our nature. We are stepping outside these roles and simplistic myths. We are going to be who we are. At the same time, we are creating new social forms and relations, that is, relations based upon brotherhood, cooperation, human love, and uninhibited sexuality. Babylon has forced us to commit ourselves to one thing—revolution!

Gay liberation groups saw themselves as one component of the decade's radicalism and regularly addressed the other issues that were mobilizing American youth. The Berkeley GLF, for instance, passed a resolution on the Vietnam War and the draft demanding that "all troops be brought home at once" and that homosexuals in the armed forces "be given Honorable discharges immediately." Its Los Angeles counterpart declared its "unity with and support for all oppressed minorities who fight for their freedom" and expressed its intention "to build a new, free and loving Gay counter-culture." Positions such as these made it relatively easy for previously closeted but already radicalized homosexuals and lesbians to join or form gay liberation organizations, and the new movement quickly won their allegiance.

Gay liberationists targeted the same institutions as homophile militants, but their disaffection from American society impelled them to use tactics that their predecessors would never have adopted. Bar raids and street arrests of gay men

in New York City during August 1970 provoked a march by several thousand men and women from Times Square to Greenwich Village, where rioting broke out. Articles hostile to gays in the *Village Voice* and in *Harper's* led to the occupation of publishers' offices. In San Francisco a demonstration against the *Examiner* erupted into a bloody confrontation with the police. Chicago Gay Liberation invaded the 1970 convention of the American Medical Association, while its counterpart in San Francisco disrupted the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association. At a session there on homosexuality a young bearded gay man danced around the auditorium in a red dress, while other homosexuals and lesbians scattered in the audience shouted "Genocide!" and "Torture!" during the reading of a paper on aversion therapy. Politicians campaigning for office found themselves hounded by scruffy gay militants who at any moment might race across the stage where they were speaking or jump in front of a television camera to demand that they speak out against the oppression of homosexuals. The confrontational tactics and flamboyant behavior thrust gay liberationists into the public spotlight. Although their actions may have alienated some homosexuals and lesbians, they inspired many others to join the movement's ranks.

As a political force, the New Left went into eclipse soon after gay liberation appeared on the scene, but the movement of lesbians and gay men continued to thrive throughout the 1970s. Two features of gay liberation accounted for its ability to avoid the decline that most of the other mass movements of the 1960s experienced. One was the new definition that post-Stonewall activists gave to "coming out," which doubled both as ends and means for young gay radicals. The second was the emergence of a strong lesbian liberation movement.

From its beginning, gay liberation transformed the meaning of "coming out." Previously coming out had signified the private decision to accept one's homosexual desires and to acknowledge one's sexual identity to other gay men and women. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, leaders of the homophile cause had in effect extended their coming out to the public sphere through their work in the movement. But only rarely did they counsel lesbians and homosexuals at large to

follow their example, and when they did, homophile activists presented it as a selfless step taken for the benefit of others. Gay liberationists, on the other hand, recast coming out as a profoundly political act that could offer enormous personal benefits to an individual. The open avowal of one's sexual identity, whether at work, at school, at home, or before television cameras, symbolized the shedding of the self-hatred that gay men and women internalized, and consequently it promised an immediate improvement in one's life. To come out of the "closet" quintessentially expressed the fusion of the personal and the political that the radicalism of the late 1960s exalted.

Coming out also posed as the key strategy for building a movement. Its impact on an individual was often cathartic. The exhilaration and anger that surfaced when men and women stepped through the fear of discovery propelled them into political activity. Moreover, when lesbians and homosexuals came out, they crossed a critical dividing line. They relinquished their invisibility, made themselves vulnerable to attack, and acquired an investment in the success of the movement in a way that mere adherence to a political line could never accomplish. Visible lesbians and gay men also served as magnets that drew others to them. Furthermore, once out of the closet, they could not easily fade back in. Coming out provided gay liberation with an army of permanent enlistees.

A second critical feature of the post-Stonewall era was the appearance of a strong lesbian liberation movement. Lesbians had always been a tiny fraction of the homophile movement. But the almost simultaneous birth of women's liberation and gay liberation propelled large numbers of them into radical sexual politics. Lesbians were active in both early gay liberation groups and feminist organizations. Frustrated and angered by the chauvinism they experienced in gay groups and the hostility they found in the women's movement, many lesbians opted to create their own separatist organizations. Groups such as Radicalesbians in New York, the Furies Collective in Washington, D.C., and Gay Women's Liberation in San Francisco carved out a distinctive lesbian-feminist politics. They too spoke in the radical phrases of the New Left, but with an accent on the special revolutionary role that lesbians filled because of their dual oppression as women and as homosexuals. Moreover, as other lesbians made their way into gay and women's groups, their encounters with the chauvinism of gay men and the hostility of heterosexual feminists provided lesbian liberation with ever more recruits.

Although gay liberation and women's liberation both contributed to the growth of a lesbian-feminist movement, the latter exerted a greater influence. The feminist movement offered the psychic space for many women to come to a self-definition as lesbian. Women's liberation was in its origins a separatist movement, with an ideology that defined men as the problem and with organizational forms from consciousness-raising groups to action-oriented collectives that placed a premium on female solidarity. As women explored their oppression together, it became easier to acknowledge their love for other women. The seeming contradiction between an ideology that focused criticism on men per se and the ties of heterosexual feminists to males often provoked a crisis of identity. Lesbian-feminists played upon this contradiction. "A lesbian is the rage of all women condensed to the point of explosion," wrote New York Radicalesbians in "The Woman-Identified Woman," one of the most influential essays of the sexual liberation movements:

> Lesbian is the word, the label, the condition that holds women in line…. Lesbian is a label invented by the man to throw at any woman who dares to be his equal, who dares to challenge his prerogatives, who dares to assert the primacy of her own needs…. As long as women's liberation tries to free women without facing the basic heterosexual structure that binds us in one-to-one relationships with our own oppressors, tremendous energies will continue to flow into trying to straighten up each particular relationship with a man…. It is the primacy of women relating to women, of women creating a new consciousness of and with each other which is at the heart of women's liberation, and the basis for the cultural revolution.

Under these circumstances many heterosexual women reevaluated their sexuality and resolved the contradiction between politics and personal life by coming out as lesbians. Lesbian-feminist organizations were filled with women who came not from the urban subculture of lesbian bars but

from the heterosexual world, with the women's liberation movement as a way station. As opponents of feminism were quick to charge, the women's movement was something of a "breeding ground" for lesbianism.

Besides the encouragement it provided for women to come out, women's liberation served lesbians—and gay men—in another way. The feminist movement continued to thrive during the 1970s. Its ideas permeated the country, its agenda worked itself into the political process, and it effected deep-seated changes in the lives of tens of millions of women and men. Feminism's attack upon traditional sex roles and the affirmation of a nonreproductive sexuality that was implicit in such demands as unrestricted access to abortion paved a smoother road for lesbians and homosexuals who were also challenging rigid male and female stereotypes and championing an eroticism that by its nature did not lead to procreation. Moreover, lesbians served as a bridge between the women's movement and gay liberation, at the very least guaranteeing that sectors of each remained amenable to the goals and perspectives of the other. Feminism helped to remove gay life and gay politics from the margins of American society.

By any standard of measurement, post-Stonewall gay liberation dwarfed its homophile predecessor. In June 1970 between 5,000 and 10,000 men and women commemorated the first anniversary of the riot with a march from Greenwich Village to Central Park. By the second half of the decade, Gay Freedom Day events were occurring in dozens of cities, and total participation exceeded half a million individuals. The fifty homophile organizations that had existed in 1969 mushroomed into more than 800 only four years later; as the 1970s ended, the number reached into the thousands. In a relatively short time, gay liberation achieved the goal that had eluded homophile leaders for two decades—the active involvement of large numbers of homosexuals and lesbians in their own emancipation effort.

Numerical strength allowed the new breed of liberationists to compile a list of achievements that could only have elicited awe from homophile activists. In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association altered a position it had held for almost a century by removing homosexuality from its list of mental disorders. During the 1970s

more than half the states repealed their sodomy laws, the Civil Service Commission eliminated its ban on the employment of lesbians and homosexuals, and several dozen municipalities passed antidiscrimination statutes. Politicians of national stature came out in favor of gay rights. Activists were invited to the White House to discuss their grievances, and in 1980 the Democratic party platform included a gay rights plank.

The stress gay liberation placed upon coming out also gave the movement leverage of another kind. Not only did men and women join groups that campaigned for equality from outside American institutions; they also came out within their professions, their communities, and other institutions to which they belonged. Gay Catholics, for instance, formed Dignity, and gay Episcopalians, Integrity. In some denominations gay men and women sought not only acceptance but also ordination as ministers. Military personnel announced their homosexuality and fought for the right to remain in the service. Lesbian and gay male academicians, school teachers, social workers, doctors, nurses, psychologists, and others created caucuses in their professions to sensitize their peers to the needs of the gay community and to combat discrimination. Openly gay journalists and television reporters brought an insider's perspective to their coverage of gay-related news. The visibility of lesbians and gay men in so many varied settings helped make homosexuality seem less of a strange, threatening phenomenon and more like an integral part of the social fabric.

Finally, the post-Stonewall era witnessed a significant shift in the self-definition of gay men and women. As pressure from gay liberationists made police harassment the exception rather than the rule in many American cities, the gay subculture flourished as never before. The relative freedom from danger, along with the emphasis the movement placed on gay pride, led not only to an expansion of the bar world but also to the creation of a range of "community" institutions. Gay men and lesbians formed their own churches, health clinics, counseling services, social centers, professional associations, and amateur sports leagues. Male and female entrepreneurs built record companies, publishing houses, travel agencies, and vacation resorts. Newspapers, magazines, literary journals, theater companies, and film collectives gave expression to a distinctive

cultural experience. The subculture of homosexual men and women became less exclusively erotic. Gayness and lesbianism began to encompass an identity that for many included a wide array of private and public activities.

Stonewall thus marked a critical divide in the politics and consciousness of homosexuals and lesbians. A small, thinly spread reform effort suddenly grew into a large, grassroots movement for liberation. The quality of gay life in America was permanently altered as a furtive subculture moved aggressively into the open.

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4

Occupy Wall Street

Ruth Milkman, Stephanie Luce, and Penny Lewis

Occupy Wall Street (OWS) suddenly burst into public view on September 17, 2011 when a group of about 2,000 protestors assembled in lower Manhattan and occupied a previously obscure "privately owned public space" called Zuccotti Park. Although the occupation initially attracted little attention, reports on it soon proliferated on the Internet and through social media, and after a week it made worldwide headlines. As word spread, similar occupations popped up across the United States and around the world. By mid-October demonstrations were underway or planned for 951 cities in 82 countries (Tedmanson 2011).

The Occupy phenomenon riveted the media and the public for the next two months, until November 15, when the New York Police Department (NYPD) forcibly evicted the inhabitants of Zuccotti Park, one in a wave of such evictions in cities across the country. OWS fragmented in the wake of the evictions, but has since reappeared in new arenas. It is still too early to assess its long-term impact, but at this writing, more than a year after the evictions, Occupy's impact on political discourse and on participants themselves remains palpable.

Where did OWS come from? Who were the protesters? What motivated them to join this new movement? And why did the occupations gain such enormous traction with the media and the wider public? We investigated those questions through in-depth interviews with 25 core Occupy activists as well as a representative survey of 729 people who participated in an OWS-sponsored May 1, 2012 rally and march. Our research is confined to New York City, where the movement began and home to its main target: Wall Street. Although the dynamics of Occupy in other cities may differ in some respects, we hope that our analysis will contribute to understanding the larger Occupy movement in the United States.

One of our key findings is that the Occupy movement has both a pre-history and an enduring impact. We are uncertain as to whether it marks the beginning of a new cycle of protest in the United States, as some have argued (Piven 2012) but we disagree with those commentators who characterize it as an ephemeral "flash" movement (Plotke 2012). We view the history of OWS as an historical arc, with the Zuccotti Park occupation at its peak. As we detail below, it has legible roots in earlier

social movements, and, post-occupation, the issues Occupy focused on and the distinctive form it assumed continue to affect the political landscape.

OWS was not a spontaneous movement that appeared out of nowhere. It was carefully planned by a group of experienced political activists, newly inspired by the Arab Spring and the surge of mass protest around the world in the first half of 2011. Although the OWS encampment in New York lasted only about two months, its impact, and that of the broader Occupy movement, continues to reverberate in at least three respects. First, although veteran activists were instrumental in planning the occupations, they also attracted numerous other participants who had little or no previous experience with political protest. Many of these individuals were deeply radicalized by their participation in Occupy and will likely continue on a life path that includes some type of progressive political activism.

Secondly, as many other commentators have noted, Occupy transformed U.S. political discourse. It elevated the issue of growing economic inequality to the center of public attention, and also highlighted the creators and beneficiaries of that inequality: "the 1%," the wealthy elites whose interests were opposed to those of the other 99% of the population. To a degree unprecedented in recent public memory, social class became a central focus of political debate.

Thirdly, OWS networks survived the evictions and have resurfaced in a variety of different contexts. Occupy activists have been visible in recent New York City labor and community organizing efforts, and have also been active as "Occupy" in various contexts. Most notably, Occupy Sandy organized tens of thousands of relief workers in New York City in the wake of "Superstorm Sandy," attracting a new wave of media attention. […]

In this report we offer a bottom-up account of the Occupy movement in New York City, drawing on interviews with activists as well as our survey of OWS supporters who participated in the May 1, 2012 rally and march. Many other observers have analyzed the Occupy movement in books, articles and blogs. We hope to contribute to this growing literature, offering a window into the perspectives of core activists as well as a profile of New Yorkers who continued to actively support OWS six months after the eviction of Zuccotti Park.

[…]

Based on the interviews and the survey (and in some cases additional data from other sources), we came to the following conclusions:

- Highly educated young adults were overrepresented among OWS activists and supporters, a group with limited ethnic/racial or class diversity.
- Many OWS activists and supporters were underemployed and/or had recently experienced layoffs or job loss; many were carrying substantial debt, especially those under 30. The issues our respondents cited in explaining their support for Occupy often reflected these personal experiences of economic hardship.
- Most OWS activists and supporters were deeply skeptical of the mainstream political system as an effective vehicle for social change. For some, this skepticism intensified after the election of Barack Obama in 2008 failed to produce the changes they had been led to expect.
- Despite being disillusioned with mainstream politics, many OWS activists and supporters remain politically active and civically engaged.
- The occupation of Zuccotti Park had a prehistory, with strong links to previous U.S. social movements, as well as a post-history, with activities continuing long after the eviction of the Park.
- OWS activists saw themselves as part of a global movement, linked to the Arab Spring and movements in Europe like that of the Spanish indignados, as well as to earlier protest movements in the United States.
- The New York City OWS was consistently non-violent, although this was the result of pragmatism rather than principle for many core activists.
- OWS was committed to non-hierarchal "horizontalism." This organizational form, as well as the structure of the occupation itself, were self-consciously politically prefigurative.
- OWS was able to attract supporters with a wide variety of specific concerns, many of whom had not worked together before. This was in large part because it made no formal "demands," and united around the "We Are the 99%" slogan.

- Occupy brought inequality into the mainstream of U.S. political debate, changing the national conversation.
- OWS was organized mainly by politically experienced activists, but it also created new political subjects: young people with limited or no previous involvement in protest movements, who were transformed by their experiences and developed a commitment to working for social change.

Occupy Wall Street's Emergence

A variety of activists responded to the July 2011 Adbusters on-line call for a "Tahrir moment" in downtown Manhattan on September 17, 2011, the anniversary of the signing of the U.S. constitution. This dovetailed with similar plans for protests directed at Wall Street and in D.C. that were already underway. The open nature of the Adbusters call meant that whatever happened on September 17th would reflect a degree of spontaneity, but the action itself was carefully planned.

In late July and August, various forces came together in a series of meetings to plan the action. These took the form of General Assemblies (GAs) in which anyone could participate, which would continue to meet in the park during the occupation itself. GAs were the movement's only official decision-making body; in addition, working groups were set up to focus on specific tasks.

The GA meetings that took place in the summer were devoted to discussion of how to go about taking public space in lower Manhattan, in close proximity to Wall Street, as well as how best to frame the protest. Meeting in various downtown locations a sizeable core gathered weekly to plan the action. Participants at this stage included both young political activists and older veterans of the anti-corporate globalization protests and other late 20th and early 21st century social movements, as well as an assortment of politically-minded artists, writers, and students.

Some of those who engaged in the planning for September 17 had personally witnessed or participated in the dramatic public protests in Egypt, Greece and Spain earlier in 2011; others were not physically present at those events but had monitored them closely. The planning group also included many people who had been active in recent protests inside the United States, most importantly the Madison, Wisconsin uprising in defense of collective bargaining rights, the New York May 2011 protests targeting Wall Street, and "Bloombergville," an encampment at New York City Hall opposing budget cuts and austerity measures in June 2011—some of which involved weeks-long occupations.

The Arab Spring in particular was a key inspiration for Occupy. "It made a lot of us feel, 'Oh, this is possible!' Just seeing those regimes topple by pretty much nonviolence, seeing that moment when people weren't afraid anymore," Sonny Singh, whose parents are South Asian immigrants, recalled. And 27-year-old Sandy Nurse told us, "Following Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and then seeing how it was spreading very quickly gave a real feeling that something was changing." Similarly, Iranian-American Nastaran Mohit, 30, recounted, "I was watching what was happening in Egypt every single day. I was watching what was happening in Greece, in Spain, where people were at a tipping point. They just couldn't take this anymore.… I just didn't imagine that it could happen here." Others were inspired by events closer to home. "Madison was really significant for showing that an uprising could happen on U.S. soil," North Dakotan-born Mary Clinton, 25, told us. Thus Occupy was building self-consciously on the wave of a surge of worldwide and domestic protest in 2011. "It was just this sense, like something is in the air," Nathan Schneider, 27, recalled. "Even Al Gore was saying, 'It's time for an American Spring.'"

Occupy Wall Street, in short, was not a spontaneous eruption but rather an action carefully planned by committed activists for whom the Adbusters call represented only the latest in a series of efforts to focus public attention on the injustices associated with the global economic crisis and the staggering growth of inequality in the 21st century. What would set Occupy apart from earlier such efforts was its spectacular success in attracting media attention and its ability to gain traction with the broader public, as we discuss below.

Activists and Supporters: A Profile

During the fall of 2011, Occupy activists and supporters participated in a wide range of activities. There were daily marches from Zuccotti Park to

Wall Street; GA meetings twice a day in the park; meetings of working groups organizing outreach, direct action, kitchen, security, and dozens of others; and the production of all kinds of media and spectacle. After Zuccotti Park was cleared, many of these activities continued, with meetings at 60 Wall Street and other locations around the city.

Respondents to our May 1 survey were asked whether or not they had participated in a series of specific OWS activities over the previous months. Table 4.1 summarizes their answers. (The total sums to over 100 percent because most respondents participated in multiple activities.) In this report, we refer to respondents who indicated that they had participated in at least six activities (from the list in Table 4.1 or another specific activity not included in the list) as "actively involved." This group makes up more than half (56 percent) of the 729 survey respondents.

The data reveal a degree of differentiation by age. Not only were respondents under 30 overrepresented among the most "actively involved" respondents, but they were also more likely to have lived in an Occupy camp, to have posted about OWS on social media, and to have been arrested for Occupy activity. Respondents age 30 and older, on the other hand, were more likely to have visited Zuccotti Park, and more likely to have donated money, food or goods to a camp.

We also asked respondents about their main sources of information about the Occupy movement. Over a third (35 percent) reported that they relied primarily on the Internet for this purpose, followed in importance by getting information through friends (24 percent). Ranking third was information from social media like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (14 percent). Relatively few respondents depended on mainstream media as a source of information: only 11 percent reported that radio or TV was their main source and even fewer (8 percent) cited newspapers and magazines. There were no statistically significant age differences in regard to information sources, but as one might expect, respondents who were actively involved in OWS were more likely to rely on social media (see Castells 2012) and on friends, while those least active in OWS were more likely to rely on newspapers and magazines.

The group that planned Occupy included many experienced activists, as well as some political neophytes eager to respond to the Adbusters' call. This early phase of the movement brought together distinct networks of activists who had not worked together in the past, reflecting the centrality of social media to the process. As Manuel Castells puts it, Occupy "was born on the Internet, diffused by the Internet" (2012: 168). Many of those who attended the GAs that convened in early August to plan the September 17 occupation recalled that they were surprised to see very few familiar faces at the meetings. "When I showed up on August 2, I didn't know anyone there, and none of my friends came to any of the subsequent general assemblies," 25-year-old Matt

Table 4.1   Respondents' participation in selected occupy Wall Street activities, May 2012

Activity	Percent
Visited the Occupy camp at Zuccotti Park	82.2
Marched in an Occupy protest (prior to May 1, 2012)	82.1
Posted about Occupy via Facebook, Twitter or other social media	66.3
Attended a General Assembly meeting	64.4
Monitored Occupy meetings or events on-line via Livestream or Ustream	60.5
Donated money, food, or goods to an Occupy camp	58.1
Participated in some other type of direct action related to Occupy	48.8
Visited another Occupy camp (other than Zuccotti Park)	44.9
Participated in an Occupy working group	33.7
Lived in an Occupy camp	10.3
Arrested for Occupy-related activities	8.2

N = 729

Note: Total adds to more than 100% because respondents could give more than one answer.
Source: Authors' survey.

Presto remembered. Marina Sitrin, 41, who had worked in the Direct Action Network and many other NYC groups, told us, "I went with a friend of mine and I remember saying to him, 'There's probably a lot of people here that I know from ten or fifteen years ago, and I might not remember some of their names and I apologize if I can't introduce you properly.' Then I got to the park, and I didn't know anyone!"

This sense of surprise at finding so many new faces continued as the occupation itself got underway. As Arun Gupta, 46, a journalist and long-time activist, recalled his experience on September 17. "It felt different. I didn't see that many people I knew. That was exciting to me. People came from across the country and some were unable to say precisely why they came except they felt drawn there by a greater force. It was like *Close Encounters of the Third Kind!*" And Sonny Singh, 32, told us, "I've been doing activism in New York City for a long time now, but I hardly recognized anybody there, which was really interesting to me, and kind of exciting."

"Occupy was kind of a mess, but it was a very exciting mess. It was this group of mostly young people who were full of energy and brilliant and kind of crazy and willing to put themselves in the way," independent journalist and activist Nathan Schneider remarked in an interview. "A lot of them had been involved in the Bloombergville occupation, so they had some experience with occupation. But everyone came with different experience. There were a lot of artists around who were kind of gonzo and willing to dream up weird ideas and then pull them off."

Two distinct age groups were visible at the summer 2011 GAs. The largest group was comprised of Millennials, the generation that came of age around the turn of the 21st century. "It was the 26 to 29 or 30 crowd that was the strongest in terms of presence—people my age, who maybe had grad school or weren't finding jobs, and had just blazed through college and a Master's program and then were like, 'What the hell is this?'" Sandy Nurse told us. But there was also an older group at these planning meetings, comprised of seasoned veterans of earlier social movements, who often acted as informal mentors. "There were a few older people and though there weren't very many of them, they were listened to, welcomed and respected," Nathan Schneider noted.

Across both age groups, nearly all of those involved in the planning phase of OWS were college-educated; they were also disproportionately white and male. The core organizers were "more privileged and more college-educated, and sometimes beyond college-educated," Sonny Singh, who joined OWS after the occupation began and who helped found the People of Color Caucus, pointed out. "Some were fresh out of college, and some, like me, not fresh out of college, stale out of college." The initial participants were "a predominantly young white male group," recalled Lisa Fithian, a 50-year-old veteran activist who conducted training sessions in the course of the planning.

As can be seen in Figure 4.1, our survey data also show that participants in the May 1 march and rally were disproportionately highly educated, young and white, with higher than average household incomes. Almost a fourth of our respondents (24 percent) were students, 44 percent of whom were in college and 41 percent in graduate school. Among respondents who had already completed their education, 76 percent had a four-year degree, and more than half of them (39 percent of the total) had post-graduate degrees. This is a much higher level of education than among New York City residents generally, only 34 percent of whom have completed college (among those age 25 or older).

Moreover, many respondents had attended or were currently students at elite colleges and universities: among those with a four-year degree, 28 percent had attended top-ranked colleges for their undergraduate degrees; among those currently in college or graduate school, 19 percent were enrolled in top-ranked colleges or universities.

As Figure 4.1 shows, there are other striking differences between survey respondents and the New York City population. Young adults were overrepresented among respondents: 37 percent were under 30 years old, compared to only 28 percent of New York City residents. The respondents who were "actively involved" in OWS were disproportionately youthful: 60 percent of those under 30 were actively involved, compared to 54 percent of those aged 30 and older, a statistically significant difference.

People of color were underrepresented: Non-Hispanic whites made up 62 percent of all

Figure 4.1   Selected demographic characteristics of New York City residents, all respondents, and actively involved respondents, 2011–12
Source: Authors' 2012 survey; American Community Survey (annual data for 2011).

respondents, and 67 percent of those who were "actively involved" in OWS, but only 33 percent of New York City residents. Immigrants were underrepresented as well: 80 percent of all respondents, and 84 percent of those "actively involved" were U.S.-born, compared to only 63 percent of New York City residents. White respondents were also significantly more likely to be "actively involved" than people of color (the figures were 60 and 48 percent, respectively).

In addition, 55 percent of the survey respondents were male, whereas a slight majority (52 percent) of New York City residents are female. Given the high levels of education and the racial and gender composition of survey respondents, it is not surprising that they were also relatively affluent: 36 percent reported household incomes of $100,000 or more; whereas only 24 percent of

New York City residents had household incomes that high in 2011.

As OWS grew, by all accounts it became increasingly diverse, although its diversity never approached that of the city as a whole. Sandy Nurse recalled that in the beginning "there were lots of men, and it was very white, also, but that started to change very quickly." Michele Crentsil, a 23-year-old African-American, remarked, "When people are saying, 'Occupy Wall Street is a white middle class thing,' I can't really fight them, because it's not true, but then it's not necessarily false either."

Almost 10 percent of survey respondents were unemployed by the official definition of that term (not employed and actively looking for work).

Six percent of all respondents were retired, and 4 percent were full-time students. The rest were employed, and as Figure 4.2 shows, a majority (71

Figure 4.2   Occupation of employed respondents, 2012
Source: Authors' survey.

percent) had professional occupations of some sort, as one might expect given their high levels of educational attainment. Many were educational professionals, including a sizable group of higher education professionals (14 percent of all employed respondents), as Figure 4.2 shows. […] Respondents were far more likely than New York City residents to be employed in education, arts and entertainment, and other professional occupations; conversely, respondents were far less likely than New York City residents to be employed in office, sales, and service jobs; or in management, business and financial occupations.

Despite their relative affluence and their over-representation in the professions, many of our respondents had substantial debt or had experienced recent job loss […] More than half of respondents under 30 were carrying over $1,000 in student debt, and over a third of those in this age group had been laid off or lost a job in the five years prior to the survey; in both cases the age difference was statistically significant. Older

respondents were significantly more likely to have credit card debt, while eviction rates were significantly higher among younger respondents. These experiences gave many respondents a personal connection to the issues Occupy raised.

In addition, despite the fact that they were over-represented in professional occupations, among respondents who were employed (excluding students and retirees) almost one in four (24 percent) reported working less than 35 hours a week. The figure was even higher for those under 30 years old, 29 percent of whom indicated that they worked less than 35 hours a week. And among respondents who were "actively involved," 33 percent worked less than 35 hours a week. This suggests that precarious employment was a common experience among our respondents, giving many of them another personal connection to the economic crisis that helped spur the Occupy movement.

Indeed, many OWS activists were prototypes of what social movements scholars call "biographical availability" (McAdam 1986), having

sufficient time and energy to become activists because they were unconstrained by highly demanding family or work commitments. Alongside the employed OWS supporters whose hours of work were relatively limited were many students and retirees. Most students had jobs as well, but nearly two-thirds of them (64 percent) worked less than 35 hours a week.

Our respondents' experience of underemployment and biographical availability reflects the broader pattern of underemployment—rather than outright unemployment—among highly educated Millennials in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Youth unemployment was high in September 2011 (14.6 percent among all 20–24 year olds), but it was far lower among the college-educated. For those with a bachelor's degree or more (25 years and older), unemployment was 4.2 percent, and for those with some college, 8.4 percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). But members of the Millennial generation were highly likely to be underemployed in the fall of 2011, and like those in our sample, many also were carrying substantial amounts of student debt.

Judson Memorial Church's Rev. Michael Ellick, 38, noted, "You have generations of people graduating from high school and college who are in debt for careers that don't exist anymore, were educated into a world that doesn't exist anymore." His impression is supported by recent research. A Pew Research Center survey of 18–34-year-olds conducted in late 2011 found that 49 percent of respondents had taken a job they didn't want "to pay the bills"; only 30 percent considered their current job a "career" (Pew Research Center 2012). Similarly, in a survey of 2006–11 college graduates, 60 percent of employed respondents reported that their job did not require a 4-year degree, 40 percent said their job was unrelated to their college major, and 24 percent were earning "a lot less" than they had expected (Stone et al. 2012). Two-thirds of all U.S. students who earned a bachelor's degree in 2011 had borrowed money to help pay for their education, and student loan debt in 2011 averaged $26,600—compared to $18,650 in 2004 (Project on Student Debt 2012).

As other commentators have noted, these economic realities help explain OWS's appeal to Millennials. Many participants were "forward-looking people who have been stopped dead in their tracks … their one strongest common fea-ture being a remarkably high level of education," anthropologist and activist David Graeber, who has been widely credited with helping to invent the slogan "We Are The 99%," suggested in an early analysis (Graeber 2011). He added that they were "young people bursting with energy, with plenty of time on their hands, every reason to be angry, and access to the entire history of radical thought."

Many of our interviewees agreed with this characterization. "The people going out to organize, at least at the beginning, were people who had expectations rather than people who've already been harmed. … College students in particular, who went to college so they could have a better life, and then finished college with debt and can't get a job," Marina Sitrin noted. "A lot of [OWS] people weren't working, or not working full-time," veteran labor organizer Stephen Lerner, 54, observed, adding that they were a group "with all sorts of talents and energies, a set of skills that allowed them to explode this out. And there's the fearlessness of young people." Suresh Naidu, a 34-year-old economist and OWS activist noted, "Because of the privilege of a lot of the people involved, they can work on this stuff in time that other working folks don't have." Janet Gerson, 64, observed, "People gave up their whole lives to be part of Occupy, and I wasn't one of the people who could do that."

Political Experience and Orientation

One of the most striking aspects of the interviews we conducted was the vast political experience of the core activists themselves. Our survey shows that this was also true of most participants in the May 1, 2012 rally and march. Only 6 percent of survey respondents reported that the May 1 demonstration was the first political protest in which they had participated. Just under 11 percent of all respondents (including those 6 percent) indicated that the first political protest they had been involved in had taken place within the past year.

Almost half (44 percent) of all survey respondents stated that they had been involved in some type of protest activity prior to their 18th birthday; another 38 percent had first done so when they were 18 to 22 years old (most likely as undergraduate students). Many had been part of

numerous previous protest marches or rallies: 42 percent of respondents reported that they had participated in 30 or more such events during their lifetimes. Over a fourth (26 percent) had been arrested for their political activities at some point in the past.

Many respondents were also civically engaged to an unusual degree. Almost half (47 percent) responded in the affirmative when asked, "Are you active in any other organization that works on issues that the Occupy movement has raised?" This was especially true of those over 30 years old, 52 percent of whom indicated that they were active in such an organization, compared to only 39 percent of the younger respondents, a statistically significant difference. Organizational affiliations varied widely, and included immigrant rights groups, antiwar organizations, human rights and women's rights groups, assorted community organizations, as well as more mainstream political groups.

Nearly a third (32 percent) of respondents who were in the labor force were union members, substantially above the level of union membership among New York City residents, which was 22 percent in 2011–12 (Milkman and Braslow 2012). More than half (53 percent) of all respondents who were union members indicated that their union had encouraged them to attend the May 1 rally and march. Like the other types of civic engagement discussed above, union membership was more common among respondents aged 30 or more, whose 44 percent unionization rate was over three times that of respondents under 30 (13 percent).

The disproportionate presence of union members reflects the large number of respondents employed in the highly-unionized education sector; in New York City, the unionization rate in education was 54 percent in 2011–12. Indeed, among respondents who were union members, almost one-fourth (24 percent) were members of the Professional Staff Congress/American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which represents staff and faculty at the City University of New York. Another 26 percent were members of the United Federation of Teachers or other education unions. The next largest group (8 percent) of unionized respondents were members of the health care workers' union commonly known as "1199," an affiliate of the Service Employees International Union.

> **Relative Deprivation** The poor are not always the most rebellious people in a society, nor do people always protest during the worst of times. Rather, people typically become angry and feel that their situation is unjust when there is a significant difference between the conditions of their lives and their expectations. In other words, people judge the fairness of their social situation and of the society in which they live not against some absolute standard, but relative to the expectations that they've come to hold about themselves or their society. Such relative deprivation may be found among quite comfortably off and even privileged people. Relative deprivation may also become widespread when a long period of prosperity is followed by an abrupt economic downturn (the J curve theory). When this happens, people cannot quickly or easily adjust their expectations to fit their new situation; instead, they may feel that something is badly wrong with the society in which they live. See Gurr (1970) and Gurney and Tierney (1982).

Almost 90 percent of our respondents were born before 1990 and eligible to vote in the United States. Within that group, well over half (57 percent) identified with or leaned toward the Democratic Party. [...] There were almost no Republicans among our respondents, but a large proportion (42 percent) identified as Independents who leaned neither Democrat nor Republican, supported third parties or other political entities, or stated that they did not identify with any political party. Over one-fourth of respondents under 30 said they did not identify with any political party, and another 21 percent either identified with a third party or stated that they were Independents with neither Republican nor Democratic leanings. Although the survey did not inquire directly about socialist or anarchist leanings, 7 percent of all respondents volunteered one of those political identities when asked about their political party affiliation, and another 4 percent volunteered that they identified as Greens.

Occupy has often been compared to the Tea Party in that it is a largely "middle class" and white

movement and in that its participants have views outside the political mainstream (albeit at the other end of the left-right spectrum). Like Occupy activists, many grassroots Tea Party leaders have extensive political experience in community organizations. But the Tea Party is dominated by older whites, including many retired people (who are thus also "biographically available," at the other end of life), and focuses much of its energy on influencing candidates for elected office, with enormous funding from right-wing advocacy groups (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). As we have seen, Occupy has a much younger profile, its supporters are more highly educated (although many Tea Party members did attend college, contrary to popular belief). Moreover, Occupy has never had a stable source of funding, and for its activists electoral politics is anathema.

[…]

A large proportion of respondents were deeply skeptical about the mainstream political parties. However, among respondents born before 1990 and eligible to vote in the United States, 90 percent did cast a vote in the 2008 general election. The vast majority of them (86 percent) voted for Obama. Only 1 percent voted for McCain, while 11 percent voted for another presidential candidate (the other 2 percent declined to reveal the candidate for whom they had voted).

National data show that Obama was extremely popular among Millennials in 2008, when 66 percent of voters under age 30 cast their ballots for him, compared to 50 percent of those aged 30 or more. That age disparity was larger than in any U.S. presidential election since exit polling began in 1972. Among our respondents, the percentage of those under 30 who voted for Obama was even higher (89 percent of those who voted in 2008). Nearly as many (85 percent) of respondents 30 and older voted for him, however, and the age difference was not statistically significant.

According to national surveys, many Millennials did more than vote in 2008: 28 percent of voters under age 30 in battleground states attended at least one Obama campaign event, far more than among those aged 30 and up (Pew Research Center 2010). Among our respondents, those under 30 years old also had a high level of participation in the Obama campaign. In addition, regardless of age, a large proportion of respondents donated money to or actively

worked on his campaign that year. Forty percent of respondents contributed actively (in time or money) to a presidential campaign in 2008, and within this group 58 percent worked for or donated money to Obama. […] However, respondents under 30 were less likely to have participated in the 2008 Obama campaign than their older counterparts.

Disenchantment with Obama was a driver of the Occupy movement for many of the young people who participated. "In politics, too, as in education, we are looking at a generation of young people who played by the rules, and have seen their efforts prove absolutely fruitless," noted David Graeber (2011). […]

Some of the core activists we interviewed had actively worked on the Obama campaign and were deeply disappointed in what followed. "I did election observation in Philly the day of. Because he [Obama] said everything right," Amin Husain, 36, told us. "And you wanted to believe. I didn't understand when pundits were saying, 'He's playing with fire.' I do now." Similarly, Mary Clinton recalled, "I definitely supported Obama and voted for Obama. I've done the door knocking and house calls and things like that." Isham Christie, 26, observed, "The Obama presidency was disillusioning to a lot of people, and that's why Occupy Wall Street spread so much. We'd tried to get the best liberal we could, and then we got more of the same shit. Then it's either cynicism or we're going to try something completely different. And people are, like, 'Let's try something completely different.'"

But many other interviewees did not fit this description, having become disillusioned with mainstream politics long before 2008. They did not share in the high hopes for the Obama presidency that were so widespread among Millennials generally. This was not only the case for the older activists: Matt Presto, for example, became disillusioned with mainstream politics after the 2000 election—when he was in 8th grade! This group, however, did witness the excitement and subsequent disappointment in Obama among their peers, and viewed the growth of Occupy in that light.

[…]

Yotam Marom, a 26-year-old activist whose parents were born in Israel, did not work for Obama himself, but agreed that the 2008 election

helped fuel the Occupy movement. "People voted for him because they thought he was what he said he was, which was change. People cried when he got elected. People thought it was a revolutionary moment. Because they earnestly wanted what he presented himself as—which actually is very similar to what we [OWS] actually are."

Respondents' views of the 2012 presidential election campaign, as reported in our May 1, 2012 survey, suggest far less enthusiasm for Obama than in 2008. […] Fewer respondents planned to vote or participate actively in a presidential campaign in 2012 than had done so four years earlier. To be sure, nearly as many respondents seemed likely to vote in the 2012 election as the 90 percent who had voted in 2008: only 12 percent of those eligible indicated that they had decided not to vote in 2012, while another 10 percent were undecided. In regard to campaign activity, similarly, the sum total of those who planned to be active in a 2012 presidential campaign and those who were undecided was about the same as the percentage who had been active in 2008.

Why Occupy Gained Traction

Most of the core activists we interviewed confessed that they had been skeptical when they first heard about the idea of a Wall Street occupation, and that they were surprised that Occupy attracted so much support from the wider public. Even those who were directly involved in planning the September 17 launch shared the view of Matt Presto, who recalled, "We were all expecting an occupation that would last maybe two days, and then the police would break it up. So we were not prepared for what was to come. We certainly didn't expect it to expand to other locations, either."

Isham Christie, similarly, recalled his initial skepticism. "It's a militarized zone down there. We're not going to get mass numbers. And someone's like, 'I'm here because this is going to be the start of the next major social movement in the United States,' and I was thinking, 'That person's crazy, that doesn't happen. Delusional.'" Yotam Marom agreed, "I didn't see any particular reason that this call would have any mass appeal that the other things we had done didn't have."

Presto, Christie and Marom are all in their twenties. The older activists we interviewed were even more doubtful about the occupation plan. "I was one that was very cynical about it. I did not believe that issuing the call would lead to a crowd," 54-year-old Stephen Lerner recalled. Similarly, David Graeber, 51, told us in an interview, "I thought the most likely scenario is that we'd all get beat up and put in jail. The thing that shocked us was how it just took off everywhere. We didn't expect that."

Similarly, Rev. Michael Ellick recalled: "I thought, this isn't going to work, and I told my friends so. I was wrong!" Community organizer Jonathan Smucker, 34, also began with a jaundiced view: "I was very skeptical of it; I think a lot of organizers were. *Adbusters* magazine was putting out a call to action for a Tahrir Square moment in the United States in New York's financial district. That seemed far-fetched to me." Smucker added that having a lot of political experience was not especially helpful in this situation:

> Occupy was a moment that needed somebody to not know what wouldn't work. Like me, I didn't think it would work, so I didn't do it at the beginning. You needed people who didn't know better. That's the brilliant thing about social movements and why they tend to be led by young people. They haven't learned all the things that won't work, and they get an audacious idea and move forward with it. That's a beautiful and humbling thing!

Isham Christie also emphasized the audacity of Occupy as a key element in its unexpected success. "There are some things where you know exactly how they're going to turn out, but this thing had a life of its own," he told us. "That audacity of trying to go for what's necessary and making it happen, rather than just working within what's possible now. That ability to recognize the world-historic changing times that we're in, which makes us dream a little bit bigger than we would before."

The fact that the NYPD did not attempt to evict the protesters immediately was another vital precondition for the occupation's success. "The police surrounded the park the first night and threatened to evict everyone by force. They could have smashed it, but didn't." Arun Gupta

pointed out. Nathan Schneider witnessed the NYPD decision not to do so firsthand. "At around 10:30 or 11 that first night, the police were ready to move in on the park. And then a big black Suburban arrived, and I saw a little bald man poke his head out of the window, take a look, and give the order to draw back. They could have moved in, but they decided not to." A few days later, the police approach abruptly changed. But their confrontational tactics soon backfired: the whole world was watching the pepper-spraying of nonviolent Occupy participants on September 24, and the arrests of 700 peaceful demonstrators on the Brooklyn Bridge on October 1, 2011.

These incidents drew enormous media attention to the Occupy protests, amplifying their appeal, and helped inspire other occupations around the country. Indeed, another ingredient in Occupy's success was the relative ease with which it could be imitated. "If you were in Boise, Idaho, and you saw what we were doing at Zuccotti, you'd know exactly what to do where you were at," Isham Christie pointed out. "So it had this short circuit that a lot of political work doesn't have. That tactical replicability really added to its ability to spread all over."

OWS famously refused to define its "demands," a stance that was widely criticized in some circles. But many of our interviewees passionately defended that aspect of OWS and indeed, argued that it was a key ingredient in the movement's appeal. "It was a wise decision for us to not really address this question about what our demand is. People can make of it what they want," Matt Presto commented. Arun Gupta agreed: "The chains of equivalence: anyone could come into the movement and see their grievance as equivalent to everyone else. If it's like, I don't have a job, I have student debt, I have huge medical bills, I'm thrown out of my house, the hydrofracking that's going on, the BP oil spill, it doesn't matter. Everyone felt it's Wall Street, it's the 1% that's to blame. Because they have all the economic power, they all have all the political power."

Similarly, Jonathan Smucker pointed out that OWS was a "floating signifier that everybody saw different things in …" And Rev. Michael Ellick asserted that the absence of formal demands was a brilliant—and deliberate—strategic move: "There were very smart, strategic reasons why there were

no asks. Not everyone knew that, but the strategists were thinking this way," he told us. "It allowed there not to be one issue. As soon as there's one issue, then I alienate the two of you who don't have my issue. But with this hashtag, t-shirt, icon style of organizing, everyone showed up. And we could project onto Occupy whatever our issues were."

The survey data suggest that a broad array of specific concerns motivated OWS participants' support for the movement. Table 4.2 summarizes the issues they cited when asked (in an open-ended question) to identify "the main issues that lead you to support Occupy." The issue most often mentioned was Occupy's trademark, namely inequality and "the 1%," which nearly half of our respondents cited as a motivating concern. Ranked next were "money in politics" and "corporate greed," followed by student debt and access to education. Taken together, these issues suggest the salience of Occupy's class analysis for the movement's participants and supporters.

As Table 4.2 also shows, "actively involved" respondents were especially concerned about "money in politics," issues involving capitalism as a system, and […] issues such as war, the environment, and women's rights. On the other hand, those less active in OWS were significantly more concerned about labor issues and unemployment, as well as immigrant rights. This may reflect the fact that labor unions and immigrant rights groups co-sponsored the May 1 march and rally.

There were some age differences: respondents under age 30, as one would expect, were significantly more concerned about student debt and access to education than older respondents. Those aged 30 and older, on the other hand, were significantly more concerned about inequality and corporate greed.

But what is perhaps most striking in Table 4.2 is the wide range of concerns that converged within Occupy. In the inclusive framework of the "99%", and in the absence of a formal list of OWS demands, as Sandy Nurse observed, it was easy for people to participate: "College students, people who were a little bit older, who'd lost homes, who really didn't know why they were upset. They didn't know all the stats, they didn't know all the details, but they just knew that it wasn't working, and they felt like they found something with people who were also pissed, and they didn't know

Table 4.2 Issues that led respondents to support OWS, by extent of involvement, 2012

Issue	All respondents	Less active	Actively involved
Inequality/The 1%	47.5%	50.0%	45.4%
Money in politics/Frustration with D.C.	25.5%	20.7%**	29.4%**
Corporate greed	18.5%	18.2%	18.8%
Student debt/Access to education	17.4%	15.4%	19.0%
Unions/Labor rights issues	13.0%	15.7%	10.9%*
Health care	12.4%	12.4%	12.4%
Jobs, unemployment	11.9%	14.5%*	9.9%*
Antiwar, environment, women's rights issues	11.4%	9.0%*	13.3%*
Solidarity with Occupy-like movements	11.0%	9.9%	11.9%
Immigrant rights	10.4%	14.8%**	6.9%**
Capitalism as a system	9.2%	4.3%**	13.1%**
Civil liberties issues	8.2%	6.8%	9.4%
Racism/race-related issues	7.1%	7.4%	5.4%
Housing/Foreclosures	6.5%	7.7%	5.4%

**P < .05
*P < .10
N = 727
Note: Total adds to more than 100% because respondents could give more than one answer. "Less Active" respondents participated in fewer than 6 of the activities shown in Table 4.1; "Actively Involved" respondents participated in 6 or more activities.
Source: Authors' survey.

why, but they just wanted to be there on the street, being a visual dissenting voice."

Michael Ellick made a similar observation: "Occupy's approach was not to organize by policy but to organize by spectacle, and by archetype, and by emotion and idea, and to find a different way of speaking to people. It hit a nerve." Amin Husain took this reasoning further, asserting, "This movement is post-identity. It opens space for a co-existence of various critiques, whether it is the military-industrial complex, or the Man, or the system or patriarchy, or racism, or all of the above. It isn't about having good ideas, it's about freeing up people's imaginations. A beautiful thing about Occupy is that it said, 'We're not going to deal with "isms." We don't know what those mean. We're interested in how we live and how we relate to one another.'" The notion that OWS would not deal with "isms" was not without controversy, as many participants felt that OWS had to address issues of race, gender, and other systems of oppression, both in society and within the movement itself, a topic to which we will return.

Several of our interviewees argued that the absence of specific "demands" from the movement's agenda invited a more broad, systemic critique. As Stephen Lerner commented:

They dealt with the biggest demand, that the whole thing's broken. That's what was powerful. There was total clarity on who the bad guys were. The fact that it was Occupy Wall Street, in Wall Street, versus Occupy the Post Office or Occupy the Senate, was critical. That's what made it different. They captured what everybody knows on some kind of subconscious level about who's really running the country and who's in charge. What excited them was that somebody was standing up and being furious, and that was the kind of thing you heard people say, "Finally somebody saying we're going to take a stand!"

Other interviewees agreed that making Wall Street the symbolic target of the movement was another important element in its success in gaining traction with the public. "It had a wide,

national appeal," 40-year-old union organizer Rob Murray observed. "It's a national target, it's Wall Street! That affects the entire country and the entire world." Jonathan Smucker agreed: "People are mad at the banks and Wall Street, so the initial Occupiers named the right target, a symbol that people resonated with. I think a lot of people, despite negative stereotypes about protest and protestors, were glad somebody was standing up to Wall Street and the banks." Phil Arnone added, "People appreciated the gutsiness of going out and stating that the emperor has no clothes. People really appreciated finally having something expressing the heartfelt discontent they had for the way things were. We'd been picking the lesser of two evils for so long, it's almost like we forgot what it was like to actually have a choice!"

Still another feature of Occupy that helped it attract widespread support was the tactic of occupation itself, and the fact that it maintained a continual presence in Zuccotti Park, in close proximity to Wall Street. "That it wasn't a one-day thing was hugely important," Stephen Lerner pointed out. "And having the central place that everybody could come to." Phil Arnone elaborated on this point: "It was really nice to have the 24-hour living spectacle, so no matter what time of day it was, what the weather was like, whatever, you can just go, and the movement is there, and you're plugged into it. With any other kind of demonstration, if it's for an hour, a day, whatever, by the time you've heard about it your chance to go down and check it out is gone. But this was living and continuous. It was intoxicating, and I think people could just feel the difference. It just felt like different air!"

Other interviewees also commented on the importance of the physical space in Occupy's success. "What was unique was the specific tactic,

having outside space did something," Michael Ellick said. "It hacked the media system." And Sonny Singh remarked, "It was like a magnet. People just came there without even knowing what they were going to do there. They just wanted to be there, and hang out and have conversations with people. It was such a beautiful thing. And all these people dedicating so much of their work to the logistics and to making it all work was also really powerful." Isham Christie agreed: "We had libidinal connections to that space, people felt identified with that space, because we transformed it. There were all these organizers who were just there all the time. You could go there and find people and figure out what's going on and get plugged in." Janet Gerson also commented on the emotional aspect of the space. "The sun was shining, the leaves were glowing with yellow, the helicopters were above, the police cameras were there, and the television broadcasting to the world was there. Oh, collective power!"

Nathan Schneider remembered "the excitement of being wrapped up in this community and constantly seeing other people and networking and having conversations, making connections, developing projects on the fly. You'd go there and get sucked in, and couldn't leave for hours, and all you had done was have conversations. That is such powerful fodder for organizing." Shen Tong, a Chinese-born activist agreed: "There's a lot of energy, which is very important for the movement, or people won't throw their body into it or leave their young family and work 16 hours in addition to their job. The easy access to the park, the magic in the air that you step into, a near-religious experience, that the moment you decide you're part of this, you are."

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5

The Egyptian Revolution

Manuel Castells

The 25 January Revolution (*Thawrat 25 Yanayir*), which in 18 days dethroned the last Pharaoh, arose from the depth of oppression, injustice, poverty, unemployment, sexism, mockery of democracy, and police brutality.

It had been preceded by political protests (after the rigged elections of 2005 and 2010), women's rights struggles (harshly suppressed as in the Black Wednesday of 2005) and workers' struggles, such as the strike in the textile mills of Mahalla-al-Kubra on April 6, 2008, followed by riots and occupation of the city in response to the bloody repression against the striking workers. From that struggle was born the 6 April Youth Movement, which created a Facebook group attracting 70,000 followers. Waleed Rashed, Asmaa Mahfouz, Ahmed Maher, Mohammed Adel and many other activists of this movement played a significant role in the demonstrations that led to the occupation of Tahrir Square on January 25. They did it together with many other groups that were formed in back-room conspiracies, while reaching out on the Internet. Most prominent among these initiatives was the network created around the Facebook group "We are all Khaled Said," named in the memory of

the young activist beaten to death by the police in June 2010 in an Alexandria cybercafé after he distributed a video exposing police corruption. The group, set up by Wael Ghonim, a young Google executive, and AbdulRahman Mansour, was joined by tens of thousands in Egypt and around the world (Ghonim 2012). These groups, and others, called for supporters on Facebook to demonstrate in front of the Ministry of the Interior to protest against the police brutality that had terrorized Egyptians for three decades. They chose January 25 because it was National Police Day.

However, the actual spark that ignited the Egyptian revolution, prompting protests on an unprecedented scale, was inspired by the Tunisian revolution, which added the hope of change to the outrage against unbearable brutality. The Egyptian revolution was dramatized, in the wake of the Tunisian example, by a series of self-immolations (six in total) to protest the rise of food prices that left many hungry. And it was conveyed to the Egyptian youth by one of the founders of the 6 April Youth Movement, Asmaa Mafhouz, a 26-year-old business student from the University of Cairo.

On January 18 she posted a vlog on her Facebook page, showed her veiled face, and identified herself by name before stating:

> Four Egyptians set themselves on fire … People, have some shame! I, a girl, posted that I will go down to Tahrir Square to stand alone and I'll hold the banner … I am making this video to give you a simple message: we are going to Tahrir on January 25th … If you stay home, you deserve all that's being done to you, and you will be guilty before your nation and your people. Go down to the street, send SMSs, post it on the Net, make people aware.

Someone uploaded the vlog to YouTube, and it was virally diffused by thousands. It came to be known throughout the Middle East as "The Vlog that Helped Spark the Revolution" (Wall and El Zahed 2011). From Internet networks, the call to action spread through the social networks of friends, family and associations of all kinds. The networks connected not only to individuals but to each individual's networks. Particularly important were the fan networks of soccer teams, mainly al-Ahly as well as its rival Zamolek Sporting, who had a long history of battling the police. Thus, on January 25, tens of thousands converged in Cairo's symbolic central square of Tahrir (Liberation) and, resisting the attacks of the police, occupied the square and transformed it into the visible public space of the revolution. In the following days, people from all conditions, including the urban poor, religious minorities (Copt Christians were highly present in the movement, alongside Islamists and secular protesters) and a large proportion of women, some with their children, used the safe space of the liberated square to stage their demonstrations by the hundreds of thousands, calling for the resignation of Mubarak and the end of the regime. It is estimated that over two million people demonstrated in Tahrir at different points in time. Friday, January 28 came to be known as the Friday of Rage, when a violent effort by the central security police to put down the demonstrations was met with determination by the protesters who seized control of areas of the city and occupied government buildings and police stations, at the price of hundreds of lives and thousands of wounded people. Similar events took place in Egypt at large, as many other cities, particularly Alexandria, joined the protest. Fridays—this one and many others—have a special meaning in the Egyptian revolution as well as in other uprisings around the Arab world because it is the day of congregational prayer (also known as *Fummah*), and it is a holiday, and people congregate in the mosques, or outside the mosques. This does not necessarily mean that these were religious movements inspired by the Friday sermons. In Egypt, this was not the case, but it was an appropriate time/space to meet other people, to feel the strength and the courage of being together, and so Fridays became the weekly moment to rekindle the revolution. Throughout the year of continuing struggle with the successors of Mubarak, the new rulers of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Fridays, with their symbolic tags, became the lightning moments of mass protests usually leading to violent repression by the military police: Friday of Anger (January 28), Friday of Cleaning (April 8), Second Friday of Anger (March 27), Friday of Retribution (July 1), Friday of Determination (July 7), the march of hundreds of thousands against SCAF (July 15), etc.

Thus, Internet networks, mobile networks, pre-existing social networks, street demonstrations, occupations of public squares and Friday gatherings around the mosques all contributed to the spontaneous, largely leaderless, multimodal networks that enacted the Egyptian revolution. In the assessment of Allagui and Kuebler: "If we learned political leadership and coalition building from the Russian Revolution, and popular initiative from the French Revolution, the Arab Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrated the power of networks" (2011: 1435).

Space of Flows and Space of Places in the Egyptian Revolution

There is no question that the original spaces of resistance were formed on the Internet, as traditional forms of protest were met with utmost ferocity by a police that had been torturing with impunity (occasionally subcontracted by the CIA for anti-terrorist operations) for as long as the thugs could remember. It is also clear that the calls to demonstrate on January 25, and then on

successive dates, were sent via Facebook, to be received by an active following made up of youth for whom social networks and mobile phones were a central part of their way of life.

At the end of 2010, an estimated 80 percent of Egyptians had a cell phone, according to research firm Ovum. About a quarter of households had access to the Internet as of 2009, according to the International Telecommunications Union. But the proportion was much higher among the 20- to 35-year-old demographic group of Cairo, Alexandria and other major urban centers, who, in their majority, be it from home, school or cybercafés, are able to access the Internet. In less than two years after Facebook launched its Arabic version in 2009, the number of users tripled, reaching 5 million users by February 2011, of which 600,000 were added in January and February, the months leading up to the start of the revolution. Once the message sent over the Internet reached an active, technology savvy, large group of young Egyptians, mobile phone networks expanded the message to a broader segment of the population.

Thus, social media networks played an important role in the Egyptian revolution. Demonstrators recorded the events with their mobile phones, and shared their videos with people in the country at large and around the world via YouTube and Facebook, often with live streaming. They deliberated on Facebook, coordinated through Twitter, and used blogs extensively to convey their opinion and engage in debates.

An analysis of the Google trends in Egypt during the days of the revolution shows the growing intensity of searches related to the events, peaking on the day of the first demonstration, January 25, and the following days.

Aouragh and Alexander emphasize the relevance of Internet spaces as spheres of dissidence, alongside other spheres of dissidence, such as those formed in the "new quarters" of the urban poor. Noha Atef, an activist interviewed during the revolution, points to the specific role of online-based mobilization:

> To have a space, an on-line space, to write and talk to people, to give them messages which will increase their anger, this is my favorite way of on-line activism … When you ask people to go and to demonstrate against the police, they were

ready because you had already provided them with materials which made them angry (Aouragh and Alexander 2011: 1348).

An analysis of a large data set of public tweets in Tahrir Square during the period of January 24–29 shows the intensity of Twitter traffic and provides evidence that individuals, including activists and journalists, were the most influential tweet originators, rather than the organizations present at the scene. In other words, Twitter provided the technological platform for multiple individuals to rise as trendsetters in the movement. On the basis of their observation, Lotan et al. concluded that "the revolutions were indeed tweeted" (2011: 1401).

Thus the activists, as some put it, planned the protests on Facebook, coordinated them through Twitter, spread them by SMSs and webcast them to the world on YouTube. Indeed, videos of security forces treating the protesters brutally were shared via the Internet, exposing the violence of the regime in unedited form. The viral nature of these videos and the volume and speed with which news on the events in Egypt became available to the wider public in the country and in the world was key to the process of mobilization against Mubarak.

The role of pre-existing offline social networks was also important, as they helped facilitate the canvassing of pamphlets in the digitally excluded slums, and the traditional forms of social and political gatherings in the mosques after the Friday prayers. It was this multimodality of autonomous communication that broke the barriers of isolation and made it possible to overcome fear by the act of joining and sharing.

Yet, the fundamental social form of the movement was the occupation of public space. All of the other processes of network formation were ways to converge on the liberation of a given territory that escaped the authority of the state and experimented with forms of self-management and solidarity. This is why Tahrir Square was attacked repeatedly to evict the occupiers, and why it was re-occupied again and again, at the cost of pitched battles with the security forces, every time the movement felt the need to step up the pressure, first against the dictatorship, and then against the military government that appeared determined to stay in power for as long as it would need to protect its business bounty.

This communal solidarity created in Tahrir Square became a role model for the Occupy movements that would spring up in the world in the following months. This solidarity was expressed in a variety of social practices, from the self-management of the logistics of daily life during the occupation (sanitation, food and water supply, medical care, legal assistance, communication) to gestures such as the protection of the square by Christian Copts during the siege of November 21 while Muslims were in their Friday prayers.

Moreover, by creating a public space where the movement could openly exist in its diverse reality, the mainstream media could report on the protests, give a face to their protagonists and broadcast to the world what the revolution was about. As in all Arab uprisings, Al Jazeera played a major role in communicating in Arabic to the Egyptian population and to the Arab audiences at large that the unthinkable was actually happening. It contributed to a powerful demonstration effect that fed the unfolding of the uprisings in the Arab countries. While Western mainstream media lost interest in daily reporting on Egypt once Mubarak was removed from power, Al Jazeera continued to connect the Egyptian protesters to the Egyptian and Arab public opinion. The quality of Al Jazeera reporting, conducted at great risk by its journalists, was supported by the station's openness to citizen journalism. Many of the feeds and information that it broadcast came from activists on the ground and from ordinary citizens who were recording history-making with their cell phones. By broadcasting live, and by keeping a permanent focus on developments in the public space, professional mainstream media created a certain mantle of protection for the movement against violent repression, as the international supporters of Mubarak first, and of SCAF later tried to avoid embarrassment vis-à-vis global public opinion because of unjustified repressive actions of their protégés. The connection between the Internet's social media, people's social networks, and mainstream media was made possible because of the existence of an occupied territory that anchored the new public space in the dynamic interaction between cyberspace and urban space. Indeed, activists created a "media camp" in Tahrir, to gather videos and pictures produced by the protesters. In one instance, they collected in a few

hours 75 gigabytes of images from people in the streets. The centrality of this hybrid public space was not limited to Cairo's Tahrir Square. It was replicated in all major urban centers in which hundreds of thousands of demonstrators mobilized at different points in time during the year: Alexandria, Mansoura, Suez, Ismailia, Tanta, Beni Suez, Dairut, Shebin-el-Kan, Luxor, Minya, Zagagig and even the Sinai peninsula where reports indicate that Bedouins battled the police for weeks, and then by themselves secured the borders of the country. The Internet revolution does not negate the territorial character of revolutions throughout history. Instead, it extends it from the space of places to the space of flows.

State's Response to an Internet-Facilitated Revolution: The Great Disconnection

No challenge to the state's authority is left unanswered. Thus, in the case of the Arab revolutions, and in Egypt, there was outright repression, media censorship and shutdown of the Internet.

Repression cannot be sustained against a massive movement supported by communication networks under global media attention unless the government is fully unified and can operate in cooperation with influential foreign powers. Because these conditions were not met in Egypt, the regime tried both violent repression and suppression of the Internet. In so doing, it attempted to do what no regime had dared before: the great disconnection, switching off Internet access in the whole country as well as mobile phone networks. Because of the significance of this event for the future of Internet-based movements, and because it actually echoes the implicit or explicit wishes of most governments around the world, I will dwell with some detail on what happened, how it happened, and, most importantly, why it failed.

Beginning on the first day of protests, the Egyptian government censored the media inside Egypt and took measures to block social media websites, which had helped to call for the protest and spread news about the events on the ground. On January 27, it blocked text messaging and BlackBerry messaging services. On the nights of

January 27 and 28, the Egyptian government blocked Internet access almost entirely. There was not a central switch button to be activated. The government used a much older and more efficient technology. It placed successive telephone calls to the four biggest Internet service providers—Link Egypt, Vodafone/Raya, Telecom Egypt and Etisalat Misr—and ordered them to turn off the connections. ISP's employees accessed each one of the ISP's routers, which contained lists of all the IP addresses connected through that provider, and deleted most or all of those IP addresses, thus cutting off anyone who wanted to access them from within or outside of the country. So each ISP did not have to physically turn off their computers; they simply had to change the code. Some 3,500 individual BGP routes were withdrawn. For two more days, Noor Data Networks, connecting Cairo's stock exchange, was still functioning. When it went offline, 93 percent of the Internet traffic in or from Egypt was eliminated. The shutdown was not total because some small ISPs, particularly in academic institutions, kept working. Web connections used by the government and military were also working, using their own private ISPs. A few Egyptian users were still able to access the Internet through old dial-up connections. The European-Asia fiber optic routes through Egypt were operational, but they could not be accessed from Egypt.

However, the most important obstacle governments face when trying to shut off the Internet comes from the vigilance of the global Internet community, which includes hackers, techies, companies, defenders of civil liberties, activist networks such as Anonymous, and people from around the world for whom the Internet has become a fundamental right and a way of life. This community came to the rescue of Egypt as it did with Tunisia in 2010 and Iran in 2009. Furthermore, the ingenuity of Egyptian protesters made reconnection possible within the movement, and between the movement and Egypt and the world at large.

In fact, the revolution was never incommunicable because its communication platforms were multimodal. Al-Jazeera was crucial in its continuing reporting on the uprising against the regime. The movement was kept informed by images and news received from Al Jazeera, fed from reports by telephone on the ground. When the government closed its satellite connection, other Arab satellite television networks offered Al Jazeera the use of their own frequencies. Furthermore, other traditional communication channels like fax machines, ham radio and dial-up modems helped to overcome the blocking of the Internet. Protesters distributed information about how to avoid communication controls inside Egypt. Activists provided instructions for using dial-up modems and ham radios. ISPs in France, Sweden, Spain, the US and other countries set up pools of modems that accepted international calls to channel information to and from the protesters. Companies waived fees for people to connect free of charge. The Manalaa blog gave advice to Egyptians about how to use dial-up by using a mobile phone, Bluetooth and a laptop. The advice was posted to many blogs and diffused virally.

The most important means of circumventing the blackout was the use of telephone landlines. They were not cut because countries nowadays cannot function without telephony of some kind. Using landlines, activists in Egypt reached telephone numbers abroad that would automatically forward the messages to computer networks provided by volunteers, such as those of TOR (The Onion Router network), which forwarded the messages back to Egypt by a variety of means. Using networks such as HotSpot Shield, Egyptian internauts could access proxies (alternative Internet addresses beyond the control of the government). Companies such as the French NDF offered free connection to the global Internet via a telephone call to a number in Paris. Engineers from Google and Twitter designed a speak-to-tweet program that automatically converted a voicemail message left on an answering machine accessed by a landline into a tweet. The message was then sent out as a tweet with the hashtag of the state from where the call came. Since Twitter accounts in Egypt were blocked, Twitter created a new account—@twitterglobalpr—dedicated to the speak-to-tweet system in Egypt. An international hacker organization, Telecomix, developed a program that automatically retrieved messages by phone from Egypt and forwarded them to every fax machine in the country. Many fax machines were managed from the universities that were often used as communication centers. From the universities' faxes, messages were distributed to the

occupied sites. Telecomix worked on receiving and decoding amateur radio messages, sent on frequencies recommended by the group of activists. Thus an old-fashioned technology became instrumental in overcoming government censorship. Altogether, these different means added to the formation of a dense, multimodal network of communication that kept the movement connected within Egypt and with the world at large. Activists published a manual of instructions on communicating by different channels, and any information that would be forwarded by any of the multiple channels still available would be distributed by leaflets printed and handed out by people gathered in the occupied squares and demonstrations.

On February 1, Internet access in Egypt was restored. Egyptian Internet service providers (ISPs) reconfigured their core routers, letting upstream providers and other networks reestablish data pathways. The speed with which the networks reconnected (in about half an hour, the Internet in Egypt was up and running) shows that rather than physically plugging in cables, Egypt's ISPs simply let other networks' routers know about their availability using BGP or "border gateway protocol." Thus, neither the disconnection nor the reconnection was physical. It was simply a matter of re-writing the code for the routers, once the government authorized the ISPs to operate again.

But why did the government restore the Internet while the movement was still in full swing? The first reason was to contribute, under some pressure from the United States, to a "return to normal," following Mubarak's announcement that he would not seek re-election in September. An army spokesman appeared on television to ask protesters to return home and help "bring stability back to the country." There were also economic reasons. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the five-day shutdown of Internet access in Egypt resulted in a loss of about US$90 million in revenue due to blocked telecommunications and Internet services, which account for around US$18 million per day; about 3 or 4 percent of Egypt's annual GDP. But this estimate did not include loss of business in other sectors affected by the shutdown such as e-commerce, tourism and call centre services. Indeed, IT outsourcing

firms in Egypt account for revenues of 3 million dollars a day, and this activity had to be interrupted during the Internet disconnection. Tourism, a fundamental sector in the Egyptian economy, was severely affected by the shutdown. Furthermore, foreign direct investors would be unable to operate in a country that would cut off the Internet for a prolonged period. In short, the Internet is the lifeline of the interconnected global economy, and so its disconnection can only be exceptional and for a limited period of time.

But the fundamental reason for the restoration of the Internet is that its shutdown was ineffective in stopping the movement. On the one hand, as argued above, the blackout was circumvented in many ways with the help of the world's Internet community. On the other hand, it was too late to have a paralyzing effect on the protest movement. Urban networks had taken over the role that Internet networks had played in the origins of the protest. People were in the streets, media were reporting, and the whole world had become aware of a revolution in the making. Indeed, the revolutionary potential of the Internet can only be tamed by permanent control and surveillance, as China attempts to do on a daily basis. Once a social movement has reached a certain threshold of size and impact, closing the Internet is neither possible nor effective. In the Internet Age, tyrants will have to reckon with people's autonomous communication capacity. Unless the Internet is constantly blocked or ad hoc mechanisms are ready to operate, as in China, once the movement has extended its reach from the space of flows to the space of places, it is too late to stop it, as many other networks of communication are set up in multimodal forms.

Who Were the Protesters, and What Was the Protest?

Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice were the main themes of the revolution, in the words of the demonstrators who took to the streets in January 2011. They wanted to bring down Mubarak and his regime, called for democratic elections and asked for justice and redistribution of wealth. Most protesters were young, and many were college students. But this is not a biased representation of the urban population, as two-thirds of

Egyptians are under the age of 30, and as the rate of unemployment among college graduates is 10 times higher than among the less-educated. Indeed, the majority of the labor force takes part in informal activities as a means of survival, so that to be truly unemployed is a luxury few can afford. The poor, who account for at least 40 percent of the population, must participate in some income-generating activity, however meager the income may be, or they would starve. But while the movement was largely enacted by an impoverished middle class longing for freedom and human rights, segments of the urban poor, desperate as a result of rising food prices, joined in. And industrial workers, with or without union support, staged a number of powerful strikes, particularly intense in Suez, leading to the occupation of the city for a few days. Some reports indicate that fear of the movement extending to the industrial labor force was a factor in influencing the business-wary Army generals to sacrifice the dictator on the altar of their own profits. The so-called pro-Mubarak masses, epitomized in the picturesque and ruthless charge of the camels on Tahrir occupiers on February 1, were in most cases connected to the *balgatiya* (gangs of thugs paid by the police) (Elmeshad and Sarant 2011). The real support for the regime was to be found among the hundreds of thousands of bureaucrats, Central security forces, policemen, informers, thugs and thieves, whose livelihood depended on the patronage networks of the dictator, his sons and their cronies. However, all of these beautiful people had to share power with the Egyptian Army, which still held some prestige among the population, as it had incarnated the nationalist movement that established modern Egypt and led the Arab world in the wars against Israel.

It was precisely the economic power struggle between the Army and Gamal's boys (the businessmen protected by Mubarak's son and heir apparent) that created the conditions for a decisive split within the ruling elites and prompted the downfall of Mubarak, his family and their clique. The Army is at the heart of a vast business empire that anchors the wealth and growth potential of the old, national Egyptian capital. The internationalization of business promoted by Gamal Mubarak since 2000, with the full support of American, British and French political leaders, threatened directly its control of the economy.

Thus, when the moment came, they were not ready to sacrifice their national legitimacy and their profitable business to support an aged dictator and a potentially dangerous successor. So, they refused to open fire against the demonstrators and, in due course, arrested the Mubaraks and their accomplices. By assuming full power, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) tried to appease and deactivate the revolutionary movement, draping itself in the mantle of revolution to make sure that as everything changed, everything would remain the same. However, this revolution was not a military coup. It originated from a popular uprising. And so, the more SCAF wanted to limit its measures to cosmetic changes, the more the movement pressured the new authorities, demanding retribution and prosecution of those responsible for the killings of protesters and of those who had robbed the national wealth. They stepped up demands for political freedom, democratic elections and a new Constitution. The whole of 2011 witnessed a relentless confrontation between the SCAF and the movement, while old and new political parties positioned themselves for the elections. Elections for the Constituent Parliament did take place, starting on November 28 and going on for several weeks. But it was finally accepted by SCAF only after a series of bloody confrontations between the movement and the military throughout the year, with 12,000 civilians sentenced in military courts, about 1,000 protesters killed and tens of thousands injured. But even during and after the elections, repression continued, people were imprisoned, the independent media were attacked, dissidents were tried and sentenced by military courts, Egyptian and foreign NGOs were harassed or prohibited, and dozens of demonstrators were killed in Tahrir and elsewhere. And yet, the movement did not budge in its determination to achieve full democratization of the country. The defense of the occupation of Tahrir Square, of free communication on the Internet, and of media independence, continued to be the ramparts for the conquest of freedom in a country suffering from dramatic economic and social problems.

The future of democracy is not clear, as the victory of moderate Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood (reborn as the Freedom and Justice Party, with 45 percent of the vote), together with the 25 percent of the vote obtained for the more

strictly Islamic coalition of Nour, raised doubts among the Western powers about the support to be given to a democracy that could slip away from their control. With the Egyptian army receiving US$1.3 billion annually in discretionary income from the United States, the Egyptian revolution may have to confront a military counter-revolution if the movement oversteps the geopolitical limits that it has been prescribed. However, the paths of revolution are always surprising, and some of the key struggles taking place in post-Mubarak Egypt have to do less with geopolitical strategies and class interests than with the cultural transformation of the society, starting with the conquest of new autonomy by women.

[…]

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Part III

Who Joins or Supports Movements?

Introduction

Once the initial activists in a social movement form groups and begin to think of themselves as a movement, their next step is usually to try to expand their ranks by recruiting others to their cause. Like theories of movement origins, theories of recruitment have evolved through several stages, from an emphasis on individual traits to one on structural availability, and finally toward a synthesis of these dimensions.

Before the 1960s, researchers tended to see protestors as swept up in crowds, acting in abnormal and sometimes irrational ways because of frustration with their individual circumstances. In some theories, marginal and alienated members of society were seen as most likely to join social movements (Kornhauser 1959); in others, it was those who were insecure or dogmatic (Adorno et al. 1950); still others saw protestors as loners hoping to make friends (Hoffer 1951). Such claims were usually demeaning to protestors, who were thought to be compensating for some sort of personal inadequacy, and subsequent empirical research did not generally support the image of protestors as more angry or alienated than others. They are in fact usually well integrated into their communities.

In 1965 an economist, Mancur Olson (1965), took the opposite view of potential protestors, arguing that they are so rational (and self-interested) that they will not join groups if they think they can gain the benefits that the groups pursue without taking the time to participate. In other words, they will be "free riders" on the efforts of others. You don't have to join the environmental

> **Free-Rider Problem** People who would benefit from a social movement may not in fact protest but rather "free ride" on the efforts of others. Such people calculate that their own contribution to the movement (assuming that its constituency is large) is likely to be minimal and that they will enjoy the achievements of the movement anyway. So why should they bother to protest? Of course, this problem assumes that (and only arises when) people are narrowly self-interested. But many people protest because they feel morally obligated to do so, or because they derive pleasure or benefits from protesting (e.g., new friends) whether or not they think it will succeed. See Olson (1965).

movement to enjoy the clean air that it wins for all of us, so why participate? One reason to free ride is that your own participation won't make a noticeable difference, something that is especially true in very large groups. To attract participants, Olson said, movements must provide "selective incentives" that go only to those who participate, such as insurance for trade union members or an interesting newsletter. Olson challenged scholars to show how organizers manage to overcome the free-rider problem (see Chapter 6).

Problems in the crowd paradigm, combined with Olson's challenge, helped inspire the resource mobilization paradigm, which shifted attention from what kinds of *people* protested to what kinds of *structural conditions* facilitated protest. Attitudes were summarily dismissed as unimportant or at least insufficient, for many people had the right attitudes (especially grievances) but did not participate. As part of this new structural agenda, "biographical availability" was seen as necessary for participation: those with few family or work obligations—especially young people—were available to devote time to movement activities (McCarthy and Zald 1973; McAdam 1986).

More importantly, researchers found that the best predictor of who will join is whether a person knows someone else already in the movement (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). In many movements, a majority of participants are recruited this way. Social networks were seen as a precondition for the emergence of a movement as well as the explanation for who exactly was recruited. In the extreme but rare case of "bloc recruitment," organizers bring a social network almost intact into a movement—for example, church congregations or sports clubs (Oberschall 1973). Social structures like these suggest that—contrary to Olson—people do not make choices as isolated, selfish individuals.

Different kinds of social networks can be used for recruitment. They may not be political in origin or intent. Black churches were crucial to the Southern civil rights movement in the 1950s (Morris 1984); fundamentalist churches helped defeat the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1980s (Mansbridge 1986); and mosques facilitated the Iranian Revolution (Snow and Marshall 1984). Networks developed for earlier political activities can also aid recruitment into a new movement—one reason that a history of previous activism makes someone more likely to be recruited (McAdam 1988). The clustering of movements in waves makes this mutual support especially important, as one movement feeds into the next (Tarrow 1998). Because of these networks, prior activism and organizational memberships help predict who will be recruited (and who will not be).

This view of recruitment is summed up in our excerpt (in Chapter 7) from Doug McAdam's book on the "Freedom Summer" of 1964, when hundreds of mostly white college students went South to help in voter registration drives and teach in "freedom schools." McAdam's methodological strategy is to look first at the kind of students who applied to the project (compared to college students generally), then at those who actually participated (as opposed to those who were accepted but did not show up). He finds three factors important in explaining who applied: biographical availability, ideological compatibility, and social network ties. In explaining those who showed up and those who did not, the first two factors drop out and the third factor becomes crucial. Those who knew others who were going were the most likely to follow through on their plans. In research on anti-abortion protestors, Munson (2009) found that some had been recruited through their networks even though they did not at first have anti-abortion ideologies; some were even mildly pro-choice.

Most recent work on recruitment has criticized the mechanical image of networks in much of the earlier research. Without denying the importance of personal contacts, this work has examined the cultural messages transmitted across these networks. Edward Walsh (1981), for example, described "suddenly imposed grievances": dramatic and unexpected events that highlight some social problem. In his case, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 alerted people to the risks of nuclear energy, giving a big boost to the antinuclear movement. Recruitment involves a cognitive shift for participants. McAdam (1982) called this "cognitive liberation," when potential participants begin to think they may have a chance of success. Recently, scholars have again begun to acknowledge that grievances matter (Pinard 2011).

Framing and Frame Alignment For people to be attracted to join and to remain committed to a movement, its issues must be presented or "framed" so that they fit or resonate with the beliefs, feelings, and desires of potential recruits. Like a picture frame that highlights what is in the frame but excludes everything outside it, frames are simplifying devices that help us understand and organize the complexities of the world; they are the filtering lenses, so to speak, through which we make sense of this world. Frames may take the form of appealing stories; powerful clusters of symbols, slogans, and catchwords, or attributions of blame for social problems. Social movement leaders and recruiters work hard to find the right frames, ones "aligned" with the understandings of potential recruits. Framing is thus one of the principal activities in which movement activists participate, and activists are often involved in framing contests, or "framing wars," with their opponents in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the public. See Snow et al. (1986) and Snow and Benford (1988).

In this view, direct personal contacts are seen as important because they allow organizers and potential participants to "align" their "frames," to achieve a common definition of a social problem and a common prescription for solving it (see Snow et al. 1986). In successful recruitment, organizers offer ways of seeing a social problem that resonate with the views and experiences of potential recruits. Networks are important *because* of the cultural meanings they transmit. Networks and meanings are not rival explanations; they work together.

Snow and Benford (1988) distinguish three successive types of framing necessary for successful recruitment: *diagnostic*, in which a movement convinces potential converts that a problem needs to be addressed; *prognostic*, in which it convinces them of appropriate strategies, tactics, and targets; and *motivational*, in which it exhorts them to get involved in these activities (this last seems primarily about arousing the right emotions). They argue that frames are more likely to be accepted if they fit well with the existing beliefs of potential recruits, if they involve empirically credible claims, if they are compatible with the life experiences of the audiences, and if they fit with the stories or narratives the audiences tell about their lives. Frames, in other words, must resonate with the salient beliefs of potential recruits. (Chapter 13 in Part IV discusses frames.)

Collective identity is another concept used to get at the mental worlds of participants that might help explain participation: in order to devote time and effort to protest, people must usually feel excited to be part of a larger group they think they can help (Melucci 1996). But collective identities pose strategic dilemmas: the same identity that attracts some recruits will turn off others; what works for members of the group may attract negative attention from outsiders (Bernstein 1997; McGarry and Jasper 2015). Pieces of culture such as frames and identities have audiences outside the movement as well as inside it.

This emphasis on culture challenges the arguments of many structuralists who promoted the idea that individual characteristics do not help explain who will be recruited to a social movement, an idea that is a kind of half-truth. The structuralists concentrated on arguing against personality traits as a predictor—without ever gathering serious evidence about personality traits (Klandermans 1983, 1989). They also rejected attitudes and grievances as part of an explanation, in favor of structural traits (Gurney and Tierney 1982; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Useem 1980). But this kind of argument went to ridiculous extremes: bigots don't join civil rights campaigns just because they are in the right network; leftists don't join right-wing movements because a "bloc" of their fellow parishioners do. The fact that not *everyone* with a set of beliefs or personality traits gets recruited does not mean that supportive ideas or other traits are not a necessary condition. They are just not sufficient.

Another cultural approach, broader than frame alignment, shows how attitudes and worldviews matter. Political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1977) has argued that new "postmaterial" values and beliefs have emerged in the advanced industrial nations since the 1960s. Through most of human history, in his view, people have been forced to worry about basic material needs such as food, shelter, and security, but since World War II the advanced industrial world has been largely spared these traditional privations. Those born after World War II (especially the college-educated and affluent middle class)

Moral Shocks   Sometimes in the course of daily life something happens to us that distresses, surprises, and outrages us. A loved one may be killed by a drunk driver. Our boss may ask us for sexual favors. Construction on a nuclear power plant may begin down the street. Sometimes we are shocked by information we receive (perhaps from a newspaper or political pamphlet) rather than by personal experience. We learn that cosmetics are tested by being put into the eyes of rabbits, or that NATO is deploying a new type of nuclear missile throughout Europe. These moral shocks are often strong enough to propel us into trying to do something. We may seek out a social movement organization if we know one exists. We may even try to found our own. Although people who join a social movement typically know someone involved in it, a moral shock may still be the trigger that gets them to join. In some cases it can even push us into participation when we do not know anyone at all in the movement. In such cases, we see a process of "self-recruitment" to a movement: people actively seek out a movement or movement organization in which they can participate, as opposed to being recruited by the movement itself. In addition, moral shocks can radicalize or renew the commitment of those already in social movements (Gould 2009). When protestors are entirely rebuffed or even violently repressed by their own government, their indignation may grow even stronger from the shock.

were "freed" to pursue "higher" goals such as control over their lives, satisfying work, and environmental protection rather than worrying primarily about their paychecks. The spread of mass communications and higher education contributed to the same trends. Together, the result has been less emphasis on economic redistribution, class-based political organizations, or the pursuit of political power. Instead we have seen movements critical of large bureaucracies, complex technologies, and many different forms of oppression.

In another excerpt (Chapter 8), Charles Kurzman shows that Osama bin Laden's followers tend to be well educated, middle class, and "modern." He is implicitly addressing a remnant of crowd theory, in which Westerners assume that the Islamic world is mired in religious superstition and rejects modern rationality. While they do question some aspects of the modern world, looking nostalgically backward to a golden age of Islam, they also use the latest technologies and media. We may not accept a particular religious orientation, but that does not mean we can dismiss it as irrational or primitive.

Recruitment involves more than cognitive beliefs about how the world works. Its moral and emotional dimensions are equally important. All the key concepts used to explain recruitment depend heavily on their emotional dynamics. The term "moral shock" is meant to incorporate some of these other dimensions, as events or information raise such a sense of outrage in people that they become inclined toward political action, with or without a network of contacts (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1997). Social networks are also grounded in the emotional bonds between their members: we pay attention to people in our networks because we are fond of them or trust them. This may be the real power of networks, more influential than the ideas they carry.

In a book (Viterna 2013) and an article (excerpted in Chapter 9), Jocelyn Viterna shows that all of these factors operated in recruiting women to guerilla warfare in El Salvador, but along different pathways. Some had relatives in the guerrilla movement (the FMLN), others lived in refugee camps protected by the guerrillas, and some were in groups sympathetic to or allied with the guerrillas. Even supposedly structural factors such as biographical availability turned out to have cultural components, namely other people's expectations of how a woman would act, what she could do, depending on her age and on whether she had children. The story gets complex with so many factors at play, but it brings us closer to a full picture of how people are recruited to activism (in this case, very high-risk activism).

The new synthesis pays more attention to what goes on inside people's heads (and hearts). Protest is no longer seen as a compensation for some deficiency, but as part of an effort to impose meaning on the world, to define and pursue collective interests, to forge a personal and collective identity, and to

create or reinforce affective bonds with others. These are things that all humans desire and pursue. There is today considerable consensus that structural positions in networks and cultural (including cognitive, moral, and emotional) orientations and transformations are equally important in recruitment. But there are also cases in which cultural messages can be used to recruit people in the absence of social networks, relying on moral shocks instead of personal contacts. For virtually all social movements, only a small fraction of potential recruits actually join, and it takes all the factors we have considered to understand who does and who does not sign up.

Discussion Questions

1   What is the role of daily life in affecting one's likelihood of joining a social movement, even a movement one is sympathetic to?

2   Why must social movement organizers take care how they "frame" their arguments and choose their symbols in trying to recruit members?

3   What are postmaterial values? Who is most likely to have them and why?

4   What were some of the ways that Osama bin Laden was "modern"? Did these help him to be more effective in recruiting followers? In attaining his goals?

5   How do individual traits and structural conditions interact in recruitment to social movements?

6   What do scholars mean by the "free-rider problem"? What would be an example of free riding? How might movements address this problem?

7   What are the pathways along which women were recruited to the revolutionary FMLN in El Salvador? What light do these differences shed on the main factors that explain recruitment?

8   What would get you involved in a social movement? Is there something that might shock you sufficiently to seek out a protest group?

6

The Free-Rider Problem

Mancur Olson

It is often taken for granted, at least where economic objectives are involved, that groups of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests. Groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their common interests much as single individuals are often expected to act on behalf of their personal interests. This opinion about group behavior is frequently found not only in popular discussions but also in scholarly writings. Many economists of diverse methodological and ideological traditions have implicitly or explicitly accepted it. This view has, for example, been important in many theories of labor unions, in Marxian theories of class action, in concepts of "countervailing power," and in various discussions of economic institutions. It has, in addition, occupied a prominent place in political science, at least in the United States, where the study of pressure groups has been dominated by a celebrated "group theory" based on the idea that groups will act when necessary to further their common or group goals. Finally, it has played a significant role in many well-known sociological studies.

The view that groups act to serve their interests presumably is based upon the assumption that the individuals in groups act out of self-interest. If the individuals in a group altruistically disregarded their personal welfare, it would not be very likely that collectively they would seek some selfish common or group objective. Such altruism, is, however, considered exceptional, and self-interested behavior is usually thought to be the rule, at least when economic issues are at stake; no one is surprised when individual businessmen seek higher profits, when individual workers seek higher wages, or when individual consumers seek lower prices. The idea that groups tend to act in support of their group interests is supposed to follow logically from this widely accepted premise of rational, self-interested behavior. In other words, if the members of some group have a common interest or objective, and if they would all be better off if that objective were achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group would, if they were rational and self-interested, act to achieve that objective.

But it is *not* in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest follows logically from

the premise of rational and self-interested behavior. It does *not* follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested. Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests*. In other words, even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest. The notion that groups of individuals will act to achieve their common or group interests, far from being a logical implication of the assumption that the individuals in a group will rationally further their individual interests, is in fact inconsistent with that assumption.

If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will *not* act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the group objectives. Nor will such large groups form organizations to further their common goals in the absence of the coercion or the separate incentives just mentioned. These points hold true even when there is unanimous agreement in a group about the common good and the methods of achieving it.

The widespread view, common throughout the social sciences, that groups tend to further their interests, is accordingly unjustified, at least when it is based, as it usually is, on the (sometimes implicit) assumption that groups act in their self-interest because individuals do. There is paradoxically the logical possibility that groups composed of either altruistic individuals or irrational individuals may sometimes act in their common or group interests. But, as later, empirical parts of this study will attempt to show, this logical possibility is usually of no practical importance. Thus the customary view that groups of individuals with

common interests tend to further those common interests appears to have little if any merit.

[…]

Consider a hypothetical, competitive industry, and suppose that most of the producers in that industry desire a tariff, a price-support program, or some other government intervention to increase the price for their product. To obtain any such assistance from the government, the producers in this industry will presumably have to organize a lobbying organization; they will have to become an active pressure group. This lobbying organization may have to conduct a considerable campaign. If significant resistance is encountered, a great amount of money will be required. Public relations experts will be needed to influence the newspapers, and some advertising may be necessary. Professional organizers will probably be needed to organize "spontaneous grass roots" meetings among the distressed producers in the industry, and to get those in the industry to write letters to their congressmen. The campaign for the government assistance will take the time of some of the producers in the industry, as well as their money.

There is a striking parallel between the problem the perfectly competitive industry faces as it strives to obtain government assistance, and the problem it faces in the marketplace when the firms increase output and bring about a fall in price. *Just as it was not rational for a particular producer to restrict his output in order that there might be a higher price for the product of his industry, so it would not be rational for him to sacrifice his time and money to support a lobbying organization to obtain government assistance for the industry. In neither case would it be in the interest of the individual producer to assume any of the costs himself. A lobbying organization, or indeed a labor union or any other organization, working in the interest of a large group of firms or workers in some industry, would get no assistance from the rational, self-interested individuals in that industry*. This would be true even if everyone in the industry were absolutely convinced that the proposed program was in their interest (though in fact some might think otherwise and make the organization's task yet more difficult). [...]

Some critics may argue that the rational person will, indeed, support a large organization, like a lobbying organization, that works in his interest,

because he knows that if he does not, others will not do so either, and then the organization will fail, and he will be without the benefit that the organization could have provided. This argument shows the need for the analogy with the perfectly competitive market. […] When the number of firms involved is large, no one will notice the effect on price if one firm increases its output, and so no one will change his plans because of it. Similarly, in a large organization, the loss of one dues payer will not noticeably increase the burden for any other one dues payer, and so a rational person would not believe that if he were to withdraw from an organization he would drive others to do so.

[…]

However similar the purposes may be, critics may object that attitudes in organizations are not at all like those in markets. In organizations, an emotional or ideological element is often also involved. Does this make the argument offered here practically irrelevant?

A most important type of organization—the national state—will serve to test this objection. Patriotism is probably the strongest non-economic motive for organizational allegiance in modern times. This age is sometimes called the age of nationalism. Many nations draw additional strength and unity from some powerful ideology, such as democracy or communism, as well as from a common religion, language, or cultural inheritance. The state not only has many such powerful sources of support; it also is very important economically. Almost any government is economically beneficial to its citizens, in that the law and order it provides is a prerequisite of all civilized economic activity. But despite the force of patriotism, the appeal of the national ideology, the bond of a common culture, and the indispensability of the system of law and order, no major state in modern history has been able to support itself through voluntary dues or contributions. Philanthropic contributions are not even a significant source of revenue for most countries. Taxes, *compulsory* payments by definition, are needed. Indeed, as the old saying indicates, their necessity is as certain as death itself.

If the state, with all of the emotional resources at its command, cannot finance its most basic and vital activities without resort to compulsion, it would seem that large private organizations might also have difficulty in getting the individuals in the groups whose interests they attempt to advance to make the necessary contributions voluntarily.

The reason the state cannot survive on voluntary dues or payments, but must rely on taxation, is that the most fundamental services a nation-state provides are, in one important respect, like the higher price in a competitive market: they must be available to everyone if they are available to anyone. The basic and most elementary goods or services provided by government, like defense and police protection, and the system of law and order generally, are such that they go to everyone or practically everyone in the nation. It would obviously not be feasible, if indeed it were possible, to deny the protection provided by the military services, the police, and the courts to those who did not voluntarily pay their share of the costs of government, and taxation is accordingly necessary. The common or collective benefits provided by governments are usually called "public goods" by economists, and the concept of public goods is one of the oldest and most important ideas in the study of public finance. A common, collective, or public good is here defined as any good such that, if any person X_i in a group $X_1, \ldots, X_i, \ldots, X_n$ consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group. In other words, those who do not purchase or pay for any of the public or collective good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the consumption of the good, as they can where noncollective goods are concerned.

Students of public finance have, however, neglected the fact that *the achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a public or collective good has been provided for that group*. The very fact that a goal or purpose is *common* to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by its achievement. Almost all groups and organizations have the purpose of serving the common interests of their members. It is of the essence of an organization that it provides an inseparable, generalized benefit. It follows that the provision of public or collective goods is the fundamental function of organizations generally. A state is first of all an organization that provides public goods for its members, the citizens; and other types of organizations similarly provide collective goods for their members.

And just as a state cannot support itself by voluntary contributions, or by selling its basic services on the market, neither can other large organizations support themselves without providing some sanction, or some attraction distinct from the public good itself, that will lead individuals to help bear the burdens of maintaining the organization. The individual member of the typical large organization is in a position analogous to that of the firm in a perfectly competitive market, or the taxpayer in the state: his own efforts will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of his organization, and he can enjoy any improvements brought about by others whether or not he has worked in support of his organization.

[…]

Marx's emphasis on self-interest, and his assumption that classes will be conscious of their interests, has naturally led most critics to think of Marx as a utilitarian and a rationalist. Some think that this is his main failing and that he emphasizes self-interest and rationality far too much. […] They feel that most people must not *know or care* what their class interests are, since class conflict is not the overwhelming force Marx thought it would be. […]

It is *not* in fact true that the absence of the kind of class conflict Marx expected shows that Marx overestimated the strength of rational behavior. On the contrary, the absence of the sort of class action Marx predicted is due in part to the predominance of rational utilitarian behavior. *For class-oriented action will not occur if the individuals that make up a class act rationally.* If a person is in the bourgeois class, he may well want a government that represents his class. But it does not follow that it will be in his interest to work to see that such a government comes to power. If there is such a government he will benefit from its policies, whether or not he has supported it, for by Marx's own hypothesis it will work for his class interests. Moreover, in any event one individual bourgeois presumably will not be able to exercise a decisive influence on the choice of a government. So the *rational* thing for a member of the bourgeoisie to do is to ignore his *class* interests and to spend his energies on his *personal* interests. Similarly, a worker who thought he would benefit from a "proletarian" government would not find it rational to risk his life and resources to start a revolution against the bourgeois government. It would be just as reasonable to suppose that all of the workers in a country would voluntarily restrict their hours of work in order to raise the wages of labor in relation to the rewards for capital. For in both cases the individual would find that he would get the benefits of the class action whether he participated or not. (It is natural then that the "Marxian" revolutions that have taken place have been brought about by small conspiratorial elites that took advantage of weak governments during periods of social disorganization. It was not Marx, but Lenin and Trotsky, who provided the theory for this sort of revolution. See Lenin's *What Is to Be Done* for an account of the communist's need to rely on a committed, self-sacrificing, and disciplined minority, rather than on the common interests of the mass of the proletariat.)

Marxian class action then takes on the character of any endeavor to achieve the collective goals of a large, latent group. A class in Marxist terms consists of a large group of individuals who have a common interest arising from the fact that they do or do not own productive property or capital. As in any large, latent group, each individual in the class will find it to his advantage if all of the costs or sacrifices necessary to achieve the common goal are borne by others. "Class legislation" by definition favors the class as a whole rather than particular individuals within the class and thus offers no incentive for individuals to take "class-conscious" action. The worker has the same relation to the mass of the proletariat, and the businessman has the same relation to the mass of the bourgeois, as the taxpayer has to the state, and the competitive firm to the industry.

[…]

If the individuals in a large group have no incentive to organize a lobby to obtain a collective benefit, how can the fact that some large groups are organized be explained? Though many groups with common interests, like the consumers, the white-collar workers, and the migrant agricultural workers, are not organized, other large groups, like the union laborers, the farmers, and the doctors have at least some degree of organization. […]

The large economic groups that are organized do have one common characteristic which distinguishes them from those large economic groups that are not, and which at the same time tends to

support the theory of latent groups offered in this work. [...]

The common characteristic which distinguishes all of the large economic groups with significant lobbying organizations is that these groups are also organized for some *other* purpose. The large and powerful economic lobbies are in fact the by-products of organizations that obtain their strength and support because they perform some function in addition to lobbying for collective goods.

The lobbies of the large economic groups are the by-products of organizations that have the capacity to "mobilize" a latent group with "selective incentives." The only organizations that have the "selective incentives" available are those that (1) have the authority and capacity to be coercive, or (2) have a source of positive inducements that they can offer the individuals in a latent group.

A purely political organization—an organization that has no function apart from its lobbying function—obviously cannot legally coerce individuals into becoming members. A political party, or any purely political organization, with a captive or compulsory membership would be quite unusual in a democratic political system. But if for some nonpolitical reason, if because of some other function it performs, an organization has a justification for having a compulsory membership, or if through this other function it has obtained the power needed to make membership in it compulsory, that organization may then be able to get the resources needed to support a lobby. The lobby is then a by-product of whatever function this organization performs that enables it to have a captive membership.

[…]

By providing a helpful defense against malpractice suits, by publishing medical journals needed by its membership, and by making its conventions educational as well as political, the American Medical Association has offered its members and potential members a number of selective or noncollective benefits. It has offered its members benefits which, in contrast with the political achievements of the organization, can be withheld from nonmembers, and which accordingly provide an incentive for joining the organization.

The American Medical Association, then, obtains its membership partly because of subtle forms of coercion, and partly because it provides noncollective benefits. It would have neither the coercive power to exercise, nor the noncollective benefits to sell, if it were solely a lobbying organization. It follows that the impressive political power of the American Medical Association and the local groups that compose it is a by-product of the nonpolitical activities of organized medicine.

[…]

Unorganized groups, the groups that have no lobbies and exert no pressure, are among the largest groups in the nation, and they have some of the most vital common interests. [...]

The white-collar workers are a large group with common interests, but they have no organization to care for their interests. The taxpayers are a vast group with an obvious common interest, but in an important sense they have yet to obtain representation. The consumers are at least as numerous as any other group in the society, but they have no organization to countervail the power of organized or monopolistic producers. There are multitudes with an interest in peace, but they have no lobby to match those of the "special interests" that may on occasion have an interest in war. There are vast numbers who have a common interest in preventing inflation and depression, but they have no organizations to express that interest.

Nor can such groups be expected to organize or act simply because the gains from group action would exceed the costs. Why would the people of this (or any other) country organize politically to prevent inflation when they could serve their common interest in price stability just as well if they all spent less as individuals? Virtually no one would be so absurd as to expect that the individuals in an economic system would voluntarily curtail their spending to halt an inflation, however much they would, as a group, gain from doing this. Yet it is typically taken for granted that the same individuals in a political or social context will organize and act to further their collective interests. The rational individual in the economic system does not curtail his spending to prevent inflation (or increase it to prevent depression) because he knows, first, that his own efforts would not have a noticeable effect, and second, that he would get the benefits of any price stability that others achieved in any

case. For the same two reasons, the rational individual in the large group in a socio-political context will not be willing to make any sacrifices to achieve the objectives he shares with others. There is accordingly no presumption that large groups will organize to act in their common interest. Only when groups are small, or when they are fortunate enough to have an independent source of selective incentives, will they organize or act to achieve their objectives.

The existence of large unorganized groups with common interests is therefore quite consistent with the basic argument of this study. But the large unorganized groups not only provide evidence for the basic argument of this study: they also suffer if it is true.

7

Recruits to Civil Rights Activism

Doug McAdam

The roots of the Summer Project are to be found in the strategic stalemate that confronted SNCC's Mississippi operation in the fall of 1963. For all the courage, hard work, and sacrifice its field workers had expended in the state since 1961, the organization had achieved few concrete victories. They had been able to persuade only a small number of prospective voters to try registering, and had succeeded in registering only a fraction of these. Three factors had combined to limit the effectiveness of SNCC's campaign in Mississippi. The first was simply the state's intransigence to any form of racial equality. The second was the absence of any aggressive federal presence in the state that might have blunted the effectiveness of state resistance. The third was SNCC's inability to generate the type of publicity that Martin Luther King, Jr. had used so effectively elsewhere in coercing supportive federal action.

[…]

At a loss as to how to counter these obstacles, the SNCC braintrust grasped at a straw of a plan offered it by Allard Lowenstein. Lowenstein, a peripatetic Democratic Party activist and sometime college administrator, had come to Mississippi in July of 1963 to investigate the racial situation. Never one to wait for a formal invitation, Lowenstein had made himself welcome in the SNCC office in Jackson, and in the course of discussion there had offered up a suggestion that spoke to the strategic impasse SNCC found itself facing. With the state's gubernatorial election scheduled for the fall, Lowenstein proposed a protest vote to demonstrate the desire of blacks to participate in the electoral process. In the context of the dilemma confronting SNCC, the plan offered much that was attractive. There was the distinct possibility that such a campaign might generate the kind of national publicity that had thus far eluded SNCC. Second, the very effort of coordinating a statewide campaign promised to strengthen SNCC's organizational presence throughout Mississippi. Finally, the symbolic nature of the project was likely to forestall the type of violent opposition that had undermined virtually all of SNCC's previous campaigns in the state.

With few workable alternatives before them, SNCC's Mississippi staff opted for the plan. The basic idea called for SNCC fieldworkers to conduct a mock gubernatorial election among Mississippi's black population. The first step in the process took place in August with the casting

of protest votes in the regular state Democratic primary. In all, some 1,000 blacks cast votes in the election, principally in Greenwood and Jackson. Encouraged by the success of the primary campaign, SNCC, under the direction of Bob Moses, set about planning for the regular gubernatorial election in November. Two changes were proposed and approved for the fall campaign. First, blacks would be asked to vote, not in the regular election, but in a parallel "Freedom Vote" designed to minimize the potential for violence, and thereby insure maximum voter turnout. To give Mississippi's black population someone to vote for, a slate of "freedom" candidates was selected, headed by Aaron Henry, the president of the Mississippi NAACP, and Tougaloo College's white chaplain, Ed King. Finally, to offset the increased need for staff during the "Freedom Vote" campaign, the decision was made to import Northern college students for the duration of the project. This decision was reached partly in response to Lowenstein's assurance that he could supply as many students as the project required. Lowenstein made good on his promise. Drawing upon contacts established during earlier administrative stints at Stanford and Yale, Lowenstein was able to recruit some 100 students to come South to help with the vote.

Most arrived late in October and stayed through the November 4 conclusion of the campaign. During that time, the volunteers worked with SNCC staffers in all phases of the project, from canvassing black neighborhoods and registering black voters to staging the actual election. In all, nearly 80,000 blacks cast votes in the election, testament both to SNCC's organizing skills and the electoral willingness of Mississippi's black minority.

SNCC insiders, most important, Bob Moses, deemed the project and the use of the white volunteers a success. While the presence of so many upper-middle-class whites had exacerbated racial tensions on the project, these new volunteers had also contributed a great deal of valuable labor to the effort. Moreover, their presence had also insured a great deal of favorable publicity for SNCC as well as the campaign itself. Then too, the attention lavished on the volunteers helped popularize Southern civil rights work among Northern college students. […]

Back in Mississippi, Bob Moses wasted little time in proposing an ambitious extension of the Freedom Vote campaign. At SNCC's November 14–16 staff meeting in Greenville, Mississippi, the idea of bringing an even larger, though unspecified, number of white students to Mississippi for the summer of 1964 was raised. Debate on the proposed plan was heated. Opponents used the occasion to raise the whole issue of white participation in the movement. Citing the Freedom Vote campaign as an example, several black staffers warned of the tendency of white students to appropriate leadership roles. This tendency, they argued, retarded the development of indigenous black leadership while also reinforcing traditional patterns of racial dominance and submission within the movement. Overall, though, sentiment at the Greenville meeting seemed to favor the plan.

[…]

Finally, there was the little matter of recruiting volunteers. How was SNCC to get word of the project to prospective applicants? How were applications to be handled? Who was to produce and distribute the forms? Who would select the volunteers? What criteria would guide the selection process? These and hundreds of other details of the recruitment process were still to be worked out. In one sense, though, the underlying rationale for the project had long since resolved the most important issue of all, that being the basic aim of the recruiting process. The fundamental goal of the project was to focus national attention on Mississippi as a means of forcing federal intervention in the state. For the project to be successful, then, it had to attract national media attention. What better way to do so than by recruiting the sons and daughters of upper-middle-class white America to join the effort? Their experiences during the Freedom Vote campaign had convinced the SNCC high command that nothing attracted the media quite like scenes of white college kids helping "the downtrodden Negroes of Mississippi." The SNCC veterans had also learned that the presence of well-heeled white students insured the conspicuous presence of federal law enforcement officials. Describing the Freedom Vote campaign, SNCC veteran, Lawrence Guyot, said:

Wherever those white volunteers went FBI agents followed. It was really a problem to count the number of FBI agents who were there to protect the [Yale and Stanford] students. It was just

that gross. So then we said, "Well, now, why don't we invite lots of whites … to come and serve as volunteers in the state of Mississippi?"

(Quoted in Raines, 1983: 287).

In a 1964 interview, Bob Moses (quoted in Atwater, 1964) put the matter a bit more obliquely when he remarked that "these students bring the rest of the country with them. They're from good schools and their parents are influential. The interest of the country is awakened and when that happens, the government responds to that issue." Or as James Forman, SNCC's Executive Director at the time of the Summer Project, put it more recently, "we made a conscious attempt … to recruit from some of the Ivy League schools … you know, a lot of us knew … what we were up against. So that we were, in fact, trying to consciously recruit a counter power-elite."

The financial straits SNCC found itself in on the eve of the project served to reinforce the strategic decision to recruit at elite colleges and universities. The organization simply lacked the resources to subsidize the participation of the summer volunteers. […]

Faced with such severe financial constraints, SNCC would have been hard pressed to pay the volunteers even had strategic considerations argued for doing so. In the end, the strategic and financial imperatives of the project combined to convince project organizers to pitch their recruiting appeals to those who could bear the costs of a summer in Mississippi. Practically, this translated into a recruitment campaign geared to the nation's elite colleges and universities. Schools, such as Stanford, Harvard, and Princeton, offered project recruiters large numbers of students who not only could pay their own way, but whose social and political connections fit the public relations aims of the project.

[…]

The Applicants: A Profile

The information from the applications provides a broad-brush portrait of the Freedom Summer applicants. There are three components to this portrait: the applicants' background characteristics, motives for applying, and what might be called their "social relationship" to the Summer Project.

Background Characteristics

No doubt the single most salient characteristic of the Freedom Summer applicants is the comfortable, if not elite backgrounds from which they were drawn. […] That meant that some of the least privileged persons in America were to play host to the offspring of some of the most privileged. This clash of class backgrounds was to produce some of the most poignant and eye-opening moments of the summer for both volunteers and residents alike.

The privileged character of the applicants makes sense, given two features of SNCC's recruiting efforts. First, SNCC's policy requiring the volunteers to be self-supporting encouraged the class bias noted above. Secondly, SNCC's stress on recruiting at elite colleges and universities also favored the well-to-do over the average student. Again, the figures show clearly just how much emphasis SNCC placed on recruiting at high-status colleges and universities. While 233 schools contributed applicants, the majority of students who applied came from the top thirty or so schools in the country. Elite private universities, such as Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and Princeton, accounted for nearly 40 percent of the total. In fact, those four schools alone contributed 123 of the 736 students who applied to work on the project. An additional 145 applicants were drawn from among the dozen most prestigious state universities—including Berkeley, Wisconsin, Michigan—in the country. All told, then, students from the nation's highest ranking public and private colleges and universities made up 57 percent of the total applicant pool.

The class advantages that account for the elite educational backgrounds of the volunteers may also help to explain the relatively small numbers of blacks who applied to the project. Less than 10 percent of the applicants were black. […]

A bit more surprising is the relatively large number of women who applied to the project. Forty-one percent of all applicants were female. This represents a slight overrepresentation of women among the applicants when compared to their proportion among all college students. In 1964, women comprised only 39 percent of all undergraduates. Then, too, it must be remembered that the women applicants had come of age during one of the more romanticized and

traditional eras of gender socialization in this country's history. For them to have even applied required a level of rejection of traditional sex roles not demanded of the male applicants.

[…]

Taken together, these various bits and pieces of information yield a reasonably coherent portrait of the applicants. The central theme of that portrait is one of biographical availability. For all the social-psychological interpretations that have been proposed to account for the conspicuous role of students in social protest there may be a far more mundane explanation. Students, especially those drawn from privileged classes, are simply free, to a unique degree, of constraints that tend to make activism too time consuming or risky for other groups to engage in. Often freed from the demands of family, marriage, and full-time

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A Chronology of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement

1896: Supreme Court upholds "separate but equal" doctrine in *Plessy v. Ferguson*

1905: W. E. B. Du Bois and others form the Niagara Movement, demanding abolition of racially discriminatory laws

1909: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is formed

1941: Labor leader A. Philip Randolph threatens massive march on Washington; President Roosevelt orders the end of racial discrimination in war industries and government

1948: President Truman ends segregation in the armed forces

1954: Supreme Court, in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, rules that segregated public schools are unconstitutional

1955: Emmett Till is lynched in Mississippi; Rosa Parks is arrested for violating the bus segregation ordinance in Montgomery, Alabama; the Montgomery bus boycott begins

1956: Supreme Court rules that segregation on public buses is unconstitutional

1957: Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) is formed with Martin Luther King, Jr., as president; President Eisenhower sends paratroopers to Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce school integration

1960: Sit-ins at segregated lunch counters begin in Greensboro, North Carolina, Nashville, Tennessee, and elsewhere; student activists form the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC, pronounced "Snick")

1961: "Freedom Riders" expose illegal segregation in bus terminals

1963: Major demonstrations are begun by the SCLC in Birmingham, Alabama, to protest segregation; Medgar Evers, head of the Mississippi NAACP, is assassinated; the March on Washington attracts hundreds of thousands of demonstrators to Washington, DC; four black girls are killed by a bomb at Birmingham's 16th Street Baptist Church

1964: Hundreds of white college students participate in Freedom Summer, a Mississippi voter registration project; three civil rights workers are murdered near Philadelphia, Mississippi; the Civil Rights Act of 1964, banning discrimination in voting and public accommodations, is passed; the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party challenges the state's all-white delegation to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, NJ; Martin Luther King, Jr., receives the Nobel Peace Prize

1965: Malcolm X is assassinated in New York City; police brutally attack a planned march in Selma, Alabama; a massive march takes place from Selma to Montgomery after a U.S. District Court rules that protestors have the right to march; President Johnson signs the Voting Rights Bill into law; riot in the Watts section of Los Angeles is the largest race riot in U.S. history up to that time

1966: SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael popularizes the slogan "Black Power"; the Black Panther Party is formed in Oakland, CA; riots occur in major cities, continuing through 1967; the SNCC votes to exclude white members

1968: Martin Luther King, Jr., is assassinated in Memphis; riots occur in more than 100 cities; Richard Nixon is elected president

employment, students are uniquely available to express their political values through action. Certainly, this view is consistent with the information we have on the applicants. Only 22 percent of those who applied held full-time jobs, and nearly 70 percent of this group were teachers out of school for the summer. The rest of the applicants were spared the need to work during the summer by virtue of their advantaged class backgrounds. The same story applies on a personal level. Barely 10 percent of the applicants were married, more often than not to another applicant. Less than 2 percent were parents.

Attitudes and Values

[…]

The applicants were exactly who we would have expected them to be, given the era in which they were raised and the class advantages most of them enjoyed. To the extent that they were drawn from that privileged segment of the American middle and upper-middle classes who came of age in postwar America, they shared in the generalized optimism, idealism, and sense of potency that was the subjective heritage of their class and generation.

[…] The following excerpts capture the dominant tone of the applications:

> As Peter Countryman said at the Conference on Racial Equality held at Pomona in February, "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for the good men to do nothing." … I have always known that discrimination was wrong and that *now* is the time to overcome these obstacles. … Until we do, all that we stand for in democracy and Christianity is negated, mocked while such oppression exists.… I can not sit by idly, knowing that there is discrimination and injustice, knowing that there is terror and fear, while I do nothing.

> I want to work in Mississippi this summer because … there is a great deal of work to be done and … just as great [a] need for workers.… But more than that, I feel that I *must* help. There is so much to do, so many barriers between men to be broken, so much hate to be overcome. I think that this is most acutely true of Mississippi, where barriers of ignorance, fear and hate are only now beginning to be effectively attacked.

Cognitive Liberation People will not usually rebel against the status quo, no matter how wretched they are, unless they feel that it is unjust or illegitimate (as opposed to natural or inevitable) and that they have the capacity to change it for the better. Together, these feelings of injustice and efficacy constitute what Doug McAdam (1982) has called "cognitive liberation." Of course, it is possible that people only develop or discover a sense of efficacy or empowerment *after* they have begun protesting with others. At first, and sometimes for a long time, people may be uncertain as to whether their protests will actually make a difference. In this sense, cognitive liberation is sometimes a product rather than a cause of protest.

> I want to contribute what I can to the effort so that we might at long last build a truly colorblind [*sic*] society "with liberty and justice for all."
>
> […]

What strikes the reader first about these statements is the depths of idealism they express. Indeed, that idealism is so passionately stated that it occasionally sounds naive and a bit romanticized. That it does may tell us as much about the lack of idealism in contemporary America as it does about any lack of sophistication on the part of the applicants. In any case, what is more important than *our* reaction to the statements is, first, the consistency with which these views were expressed, and second, what they tell us about the applicants. These were deeply idealistic individuals, dedicated to achieving equal rights and human dignity for all. What sets the applicants apart from a good many others who espouse similar values was their optimism that these values could be realized through a kind of generational mission in which they shared. Wrote one applicant:

> I no longer can escape the tension, the spirit, the anxiety that fills my heart and mind concerning the movement in the South. It is impossible for me to deny the fact that the fight against racial prejudice, intolerance, ignorance—the fight for

Civil Rights—is the most significant challenge and the most crucial war my generation will ever be called to fight.

[…]

So the applicants' idealism was informed by a sense of generational potency that made them extremely optimistic about the prospects for social change. One even referred to the need "to solve the racial question, so we can move on to eliminate hunger and poverty in America." Never let it be said that the applicants lacked either imagination or confidence!

These quotes also say something about the ideological diversity of the applicants on the eve of the Summer Project. Clearly, their perceptions of the world were not being filtered through a single dominant interpretive frame. Their narrative statements predate the emergence of the mass New Left and the dissemination of its political perspective throughout mainstream youth culture. So unlike activists in the late Sixties, for whom the "correct" *political* analysis became de rigueur, the Freedom Summer applicants display a remarkably eclectic mix of world views and reasons for wanting to go to Mississippi. In fact, many of the answers on the applications make no mention of larger political issues or motivations. As Elinor Tideman Aurthur told me in the course of her interview:

> [D]uring that period [prior to Freedom Summer] I was … apolitical … I was into the humanities, and culture … and literature. I was kind of impatient with my father and his involvement with social causes. I felt that was dead … I wanted to write … I didn't have the confidence to write but I saw myself as a writer, and I did not do anything political.

[…]

Those applicants whose statements evidence the least political orientation to the project fall into one of two groups. The first are teachers or education majors whose primary motivation for applying represents a simple extension of their occupational roles or future career plans.

[…]

The second group of "nonpolitical" applicants consists of persons whose reasons for applying appear to be primarily religious. For them the project represented an extension of the social gospel in action or, reflecting the existential theology of the day, an opportunity to bear "personal witness" to the idea of Christian brotherhood. One applicant put it this way: "Christ called us to *act* in the service of brotherhood, not just talk about it. I'm tired of talking. Mississippi is my opportunity to act."

The widespread salience of religious motives among the applicants may surprise some readers unfamiliar with America's longstanding tradition of church-based activism. From religious pacifists to Quaker abolitionists to Catholic settlement workers, much of America's activist history has had deep roots in the church. With its ministerial leadership and strong ideological ties to Southern black theology, the civil rights movement merely continued this tradition. It is hardly surprising, then, to find religious sentiments being voiced by many of the volunteers.

Among the more political applicants, a kind of conventional patriotic rhetoric was more often invoked than a radical leftist analysis. Many applicants cited a desire to "honor the memory" or "carry out the legacy of John F. Kennedy" as their principal reason for applying. Another sounded particularly Kennedyesque when he said that he was attracted to the project "by a desire to enhance the image of the United States abroad, thereby undercutting Communist influence among the underdeveloped nations of the world."

[…]

The impression that one gets from reading the applications, then, is one of healthy ideological diversity. All of the groups identified here seem to have been present in roughly equal numbers in the ranks of the applicants. What is interesting is that these ideological differences mask a common source of inspiration for whatever values the applicants espouse. Regardless of ideological stripe, the vast majority of applicants credit their parents with being the models for their actions. […]

This, then, is one case in which the popular view of the Sixties activist is *not* consistent with the evidence. Far from using Freedom Summer as a vehicle for rebellion against parents, the applicants simply seem to be acting in accord with values learned at home. This finding is consistent with most previous research on the roots of student activism.

Social Relationship to the Project

Were freedom from adult responsibilities and sympathetic attitudes enough to account for the applicant's decision to apply to the project? Or were there ways in which concrete social ties served to "pull" people into the project? The answer to this last question would appear to be "yes." The image of the activist as a lone individual driven only by the force of his or her conscience applies to very few of the applicants. Rather, their involvement in the project seems to have been mediated through some combination of personal relationships and/or organizational ties.

Organizationally the applicants were a very active group. Only 15 percent of the prospective volunteers reported no group memberships, while 62 percent list two or more. The percentage of volunteers listing various types of organizations is shown below:

Civil rights organization	48%
Student club or social group	21
Church or religious group	21
Socialist or other leftist organization	14
Democrat or Republican party affiliate	13
Academic club or organization	13
Teachers' organization	10

Not surprisingly, the highest percentage of memberships are to civil rights groups. Within this category, CORE or Friends of SNCC chapters account for better than half of all the affiliations. Given that SNCC and CORE supplied 100 percent of the field staff for the Summer Project, it seems reasonable to assume that membership in one of their chapters would have insured a certain knowledge of and loyalty to the project.

The remaining organizational categories mirror the ideological diversity touched on above. Each of the informal divisions discussed in the previous section corresponds to one of the next six largest organizational categories. [...]

The real importance of these organizations lies not so much in the ideological divisions they reflect as in the role they played in drawing the applicants into civil rights activity *before* Freedom Summer. One volunteer described her initiation into the Movement in this way:

[The] Church was very important to me. I was studying to be a minister at the time that I went to Mississippi and actually that is how I got involved in it [Freedom Summer] because I went to Beaver College which was an all female institution, wanting to be a missionary eventually, got involved in the YWCA there and was sent on a voter registration drive, which Al Lowenstein headed, in Raleigh, North Carolina … he … told us about the Mississippi summer project and after having my eyes opened by the whole Raleigh experience I knew I wanted to go.

[…]

For the vast majority of applicants, then, Freedom Summer did *not* mark their initial foray into the civil rights movement. Instead, through a variety of sponsoring organizations, some 90 percent of the applicants had already participated in various forms of activism. Not that the nature of their involvements was in all cases terribly significant. Most of the applicants had confined their activities to such safe forms of participation as "on-campus civil rights organizing" (36 percent) or fund-raising (10 percent). But it is not the intensity of these earlier involvements as much as the fact that they took place that is significant. Extremely risky, time-consuming involvements such as Freedom Summer are almost always preceded by a series of safer, less demanding instances of activism. In effect, people commit themselves to movements in stages, each activity preparing the way for the next. The case of the volunteer, who engaged in voter registration work in Raleigh, North Carolina, prior to Freedom Summer, illustrates the process. While in Raleigh, three very important things happened to her. First, she met activists she had not known previously, thus broadening her range of movement contacts. Second, talking with these activists and confronting segregation firsthand clearly deepened the volunteer's understanding of and commitment to the movement. Finally, at the level of identity, the week in Raleigh allowed her to "play at" and grow more comfortable with the role of activist. As the research on identity transformation suggests, it is precisely such tentative forays into new roles that pave the way for more thoroughgoing identity change. Playing at being an activist is usually the first step in becoming one. As a result, the volunteer left

Raleigh knowing more people in the movement and more ideologically and personally disposed toward participation in the Summer Project. As she herself said, "the trip to Raleigh really laid the foundation for Mississippi … I don't think I would have even applied to the project otherwise."

So most of the applicants were already linked to the civil rights movement either through the organizations to which they belonged or their own modest histories of civil rights activism. But what about their links to one another? How extensive were the ties *between* prospective volunteers on the eve of the summer? The presumption, of course, is that an individual would have found it easier to apply had they known someone else who had done so.

Fortunately, one question on the application allows for a very conservative estimate of the extent of such ties. That question asked the applicant to "list at least ten persons who … would be interested in receiving information about your [summer] activities." These names were gathered in an effort to mobilize a well-heeled, Northern, liberal constituency who might lobby Washington on behalf of protection for civil rights workers as well as other changes in civil rights policy. Judging from the names they listed, most of the applicants seem to have been well aware of this goal. The names most often provided by the applicants were those of parents, parents' friends, professors, ministers, or other noteworthy or influential *adults* with whom they had contact. On occasion, however, the applicant also included another applicant in their list of names. Just how often was surprising.

Exactly a fourth of the applicants listed at least one other prospective volunteer on their applications. What makes this figure impressive is the fact that the intent of the question was not to have the applicants identify other applicants. That 25 percent did so suggests that the personal ties between the applicants were extensive. Interviews with the applicants confirm this impression. Forty-nine of the eighty applicants said they knew at least one other applicant in advance of the summer. And their accounts make it clear that these ties were important in their decision to apply to the project. Several even described their decision to apply as more a group than an individual process. As one volunteer put it:

> [T]he group that went down to Raleigh … were from Cornell, Dartmouth, Amherst, BU [Boston University], Yale … and I just felt that I was with a very special group of people and I wanted to be with them for as long as I could and we would sit up at night talking about whether we would go down [to Mississippi] and [then] we communicated with each other after that Raleigh experience … [and] talked each other into going.

Together, the bits and pieces of information presented above yield a fairly coherent portrait of the Freedom Summer applicants. The central themes embodied in this portrait are those of "biographical availability," "attitudinal affinity" and "social integration." Raised by parents who espoused values consistent with the project, the applicants found themselves disposed to participate on attitudinal grounds. Then too, their freedom from family and employment responsibilities (the latter owing largely to their privileged class backgrounds) made it possible for them to act on their attitudes and values. Finally, a combination of organizational ties, personal links to other applicants, and their own histories of activism served to pull the applicants into the project even as their values were pushing them in that direction. […]

The Survivors: Distinguishing Volunteers from No-Shows

Confronted by various hurdles, roughly a quarter of the applicants fell by the wayside prior to the start of the project. Can these no-shows be distinguished from those who did make it to Mississippi? Are there specific factors that account for the different courses of action taken by those in each group? The answer is yes. Expressed in terms of the three broad factors touched on earlier in the chapter, it appears that going or not going to Mississippi had more to do with the applicants' biographical availability and social links to the project than to any apparent differences in attitude between the volunteers and the no-shows. What is more, it would seem that the impact of these factors is closely related to the three major hurdles—staff rejection, parental opposition, and applicant fears—already noted.

[…]

Biographical Availability Many people are deterred or prevented from protesting by the responsibilities and constraints of daily life which are imposed by work, parents, spouses or partners, children, or friends. Not everyone, in other words, is "biographically available" for protest, even if they are sympathetic to the cause. Of course, some people try to work around these constraints, or try to change them, if they are especially motivated to protest. In other words, people sometimes *make* themselves biographically available for protest. See McAdam (1988).

Together, the findings reported here offer a consistent picture of the Freedom Summer volunteers. Stated simply, the volunteers enjoyed much stronger social links to the Summer Project than did the no-shows. They were more likely to be members of civil rights (or allied) groups, have friends involved in the movement, and have more extensive histories of civil rights activity prior to the summer. The practical effect of this greater "proximity" to the movement would have been to place the volunteer at considerable "risk" of being drawn into the project via the application process. Having applied, the volunteer's close ties to the civil rights community would then have served another function. Given the extended time commitment expected of Freedom Summer volunteers and the highly publicized dangers of the campaign, it seems reasonable to assume that individual applicants—even highly committed ones—would have considered withdrawing from the campaign prior to the summer. What might have discouraged applicants from acting on these fears was the presence of strong *social* constraints discouraging withdrawal. If one acted alone in applying to the project and remained isolated in the months leading up to the campaign, the social costs of withdrawing from the project would not have been great. On the other hand, the individual who applied in consort with friends or as a movement veteran undoubtedly risked considerable social disapproval for withdrawal. One can also stress a more positive interpretation of the same process. In the months leading up to the summer, well-integrated applicants were no doubt encouraged to

make good on their commitment through the reinforcement and sense of strength they derived from other applicants. As one volunteer explained, his relationship with another applicant was "probably the key to me making it to Mississippi … [he] and I just sort of egged each other on … I'm pretty sure I wouldn't have made it without him and probably that was true for him too." Whichever interpretation one chooses, it is clear from the data that participants *do* differ significantly from no-shows in the extent and strength of their social links to the project.

Those applicants who finally made it to Mississippi, then, were an interesting and very special group. They were independent both by temperament and by virtue of their class advantages and relative freedom from adult responsibilities. They were not children, however, but young adults whose slightly older age granted them an immunity from parental control not enjoyed by the no-shows. Owing to the formidable obstacles the female applicants faced, the volunteers were disproportionately male. Academically, they numbered among "the best and the brightest" of their generation, both in the levels of education they had obtained and the prestige of the colleges and universities they were attending. Reflecting their privileged class backgrounds as much as the prevailing mood of the era, the volunteers held to an enormously idealistic and optimistic view of the world. More important, perhaps, they shared a sense of efficacy about their own actions. The arrogance of youth and the privileges of class combined with the mood of the era to give the volunteers an inflated sense of their own specialness and generational potency. This message was generally reinforced at home by parents who subscribed to values consistent with those of the project. Finally, the volunteers were already linked to the civil rights community. Whether these links took the form of organizational memberships, prior activism, or ties to other applicants, the volunteers benefited from greater "social proximity" to the project than did the no-shows. In fact, nothing distinguishes the two groups more clearly than this contrast. Biographical availability and attitudinal affinity may have been necessary prerequisites for applying, but it was the strength of one's links to the project that seems to have finally determined whether one got to Mississippi or not.

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Martin Luther King, Jr.: Prophet of Nonviolence

In the days following Rosa Parks's arrest for refusing to yield her bus seat to a white man, leaders of the African American community in Montgomery, Alabama, scrambled to organize a citywide bus boycott. It was a challenge to reach the 45,000 African Americans in this city of 120,000, and the social networks of the black churches were the only way to do it. Unfortunately, there were longstanding tensions between them, and several different preachers probably felt that they should be chosen to lead the new Montgomery Improvement Association. Perhaps for this very reason, a young 26-year-old preacher, who had been in Montgomery only two years and had not yet become embroiled in the infighting, was selected. Few outside his own Dexter Avenue Baptist Church knew who he was.

That night, Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered his first big speech to an audience of thousands. He spoke for only a few minutes. He began awkwardly, fumbling for images that would stir the crowd, most of whom could not fit in the church and were listening to him through loudspeakers outside. Then he said, "And you know, my friends, there comes a time when people get tired of being trampled over by the iron feet of oppression." The line was a winner, and occasional "yeses" and "Amens" combined into a great sustained cheer. King had the audience now, surprising himself and the members of his own congregation who were present. His rhetoric was only to improve during his remaining 12 remarkable years.

King was born into the African American elite, the son of an Atlanta preacher and educated at Morehouse College, Crozer Theological Seminary, and Boston University, where he earned his Ph.D. in 1955. He was ordained at age 19. But stardom was thrust upon him, through his rather accidental choice to lead the Montgomery bus boycott. His charisma was, some have argued, created by his structural position. At the same time, he more than lived up to expectations. King had a resonant voice, a good store of biblical allusions, a keen sense of what would rouse his audience, and a mastery of the theory and art of civil disobedience. Not everyone would have played the role so well.

The Montgomery boycott, which succeeded after a grueling year, helped bring national attention to the Southern civil rights movement and even propelled King to the cover of *Time* magazine. He helped form, and was selected leader of, a new organization that would apply Montgomery's lessons elsewhere in the South, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Black preachers, familiar figures in their dark blue suits, were respected leaders of the African American community. They brought to the civil rights movement important resources such as places to meet and organize, a flow of funds from African American churches in northern cities, and social networks that helped spread the word about successful tactics.

King's SCLC simply was the civil rights movement in the late 1950s. It eclipsed the older National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which pursued legal solutions to the problems of segregation, discrimination, and disenfranchisement. In 1960 the SCLC was joined by a more radical organization, composed of students, which grew out of lunch counter sit-ins, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Later, the Nation of Islam, the Black Panther Party, and other radicals and black "nationalists" would create a more separatist movement and pugnacious brand of protest. King, however, inspired by Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence, continued to favor large rallies, marches, and arrests for civil disobedience. His style of civil rights protest reached its apogee with the 1963 March on Washington, attended by a quarter of a million people. With "I have a dream," he delivered one of the most famous speeches in history. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the following year.

But King continued to evolve. After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, he increasingly turned his attention to states outside the South. He came to see poverty as the key problem of black Americans, and of America generally, and hoped to forge a broad antipoverty coalition. King's rhetoric became increasingly radical in his last years, calling for a "radical revolution of values." "You

can't talk about solving the economic problem of the Negro without talking about billions of dollars," he proclaimed in 1966. "Now this means that we are treading in difficult waters, because it really means that we are saying that something is wrong … with capitalism.… There must be a better distribution of wealth and maybe America must move toward a Democratic Socialism." In 1967 King initiated a "Poor People's Campaign" which focused on providing jobs for the poor of all races. He began planning a new march on Washington, which he did not live to see, to demand an Economic Bill of Rights guaranteeing employment for able-bodied individuals, incomes for those unable to work, and an end to housing discrimination.

King was also an early and vocal opponent of the Vietnam War, at a time when most liberals as well as conservatives supported it. He viewed the war as a grotesque waste of life and resources and encouraged young men to become conscientious objectors. He suggested that "A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death." King was assassinated on April 4, 1968, while supporting a strike of black sanitation workers in Memphis, Tennessee. In 1986 the third Monday of January was designated a federal holiday in his honor.

8

Who Are the Radical Islamists?

Charles Kurzman

As the United States wages war on terrorism, media coverage has portrayed the radical Islamism exemplified by Osama bin Laden as medieval, reactionary, and eager to return the Islamic world to its seventh century roots.

In one sense this is accurate: Islamists, like almost all Muslims, regard the early years of Islam as a golden era, and they aspire to model their behavior after the Prophet Muhammad and his early followers, much as Christians idealize the example of Jesus.

Islamists seek to regain the righteousness of the early years of Islam and implement the rule of *shari'a*, either by using the state to enforce it as the law of the land or by convincing Muslims to abide by these norms of their own accord. Litmus-test issues for Islamists, as for traditional Muslims, include modest dress for women—ranging from headscarves to full veils—abstention from alcohol and other intoxicants, and public performance of prayers. However, Islamists have no wish to throw away electricity and other technological inventions. Most have graduated from modern schools, share modern values such as human equality and rule of law, and organize themselves along modern lines, using modern technologies and—some of them—the latest methods of warfare.

Indeed, radical Islamists have much in common with Islamic liberalism, another important movement in the Islamic world. Both Islamic liberals and radical Islamists seek to modernize society and politics, recasting tradition in modern molds. Both Islamist movements maintain that there are multiple ways of being modern, and that modernity is not limited to Western culture. Islamists may ally themselves on occasion with traditionalist Islamic movements, and they may share certain symbols of piety, but they are quite distinct in sociological terms. Traditionalists such as the Taliban of Afghanistan, by contrast with Islamists such as bin Laden's Al Qaeda network, draw on less educated sectors of society, believe in mystical and personal authority, and are skeptical of modern organizational forms. For this reason, traditionalist movements are finding it increasingly difficult to survive in a competitive religious environment and occupy only isolated pockets of Muslim society. Modern movements have taken over the rest.

The Islamists' Roots in Secular Education

Start with bin Laden himself. Though he issued *fatwas* (religious judgments) as though he were a seminary-educated Islamic scholar, his training was in civil engineering. Similarly, many other Islamist leaders have university rather than seminary backgrounds: Hasan Turabi of the Sudan is a lawyer trained in Khartoum, London, and Paris; Necmettin Erbakan of Turkey studied mechanical engineering in West Germany; Hasan al-Banna of Egypt, who founded the first mass Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, in the 1920s, was a teacher educated and employed in secular schools.

These leaders railed against seminary-trained scholars, the *'ulama,* for being obscurantist and politically inactive. Bin Laden lambasted the *'ulama* of Saudi Arabia as playing "the most ominous of roles. Regardless of whether they did so intentionally or unintentionally, the harm that resulted from their efforts is no different from the role of the most ardent enemies of the nation." Even Islamist leaders with traditional seminary educations—such as Abu'l-'Ala Maudoodi of Pakistan, Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran, 'Abd al-Hamid Kishk of Egypt—frequently railed

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Charisma Some political or religious leaders are popular not simply because of their ideas, but also because they are viewed as possessing some extraordinary personal quality, a "gift" of superhuman power, which requires loyalty and obedience even in the face of great risks. Indeed, people are willing and even eager to sacrifice their lives for charismatic leaders. (If they are not, then the leader is not charismatic, by definition.) People seem to attribute or to project magical or prophetic powers on certain exemplary leaders during times of political chaos or uncertainty, when people have become frustrated with "politics as usual" and are looking for someone or something to lead them to a more glorious future. Notable charismatic leaders include the Ayatollah Khomeini and Nelson Mandela. (Note: Many people now use the word "charismatic" incorrectly as a synonym for "popular.")

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against their alma maters for similar reasons. Seminaries were considered so backward in Islamist eyes that for decades Maudoodi hid the fact that he had a seminary degree.

Not only the Islamist leaders but also the rank and file emerge disproportionately from secular universities. The classic study on this subject was performed in the late 1970s by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the Egyptian sociologist who was recently jailed for his pro-democracy activities. Of the 34 imprisoned Islamist activists whom he interviewed, 29 had some college education. In a follow-up study in the 1990s, Ibrahim found the Islamist movement had added poorer and less educated members, but as political scientist Carrie Wickham has discovered through interviews with Islamists in Cairo, Islamist recruitment efforts are still geared toward university graduates in Egypt. Outside of Egypt, too, bin Laden's 1996 open letter identified "high school and university students" and the "hundreds of thousands of unemployed graduates" as prime targets for mobilization. The 19 alleged hijackers of September 11, 2001 included a city planner, a physical education instructor, a business student, a teacher, and two engineers; even the Saudi "muscle" among them were largely middle-class youths educated in state-run high schools.

Contrast this with the Taliban. Afghanistan's school system was virtually demolished in two decades of civil war, so the Islamists' usual constituency of educated young men was unavailable. Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar had no advanced education. Other top officials had seminary backgrounds as well; according to reports, many were educated at the Haqqani seminary near Peshawar, Pakistan, and three of six members of the Taliban ruling council studied at the same seminary in Karachi. The foot soldiers were drawn largely from students at Haqqani and other refugee seminaries in Pakistan—hence the name *Taliban*, which means seminary students or seekers. (The singular is *talib*, so references to a single American Taliban are grammatically incorrect.) This force was created in large part by the Pakistani intelligence ministry, which is staffed at its higher ranks by well-educated Muslims from secular universities; it made an alliance with Al Qaeda, which also appears to draw on the highly educated. But these connections should not obscure the fact that the Taliban had an entirely

different social base. According to an Egyptian Islamist, top officials of Al Qaeda considered their Afghan hosts to be "simple people" who lacked the "ability to grasp contemporary reality, politics and management."

Indeed, the rise of Islamist movements in the 20th century is closely associated with the sidelining of the seminary educational system. Beginning in Ottoman Turkey and Egypt in the early 19th century and ending in the 1950s with the Arab emirates of the Persian Gulf, states—colonial or local—have founded their own schools to operate in competition with the seminaries. At first these were small elite schools, designed to produce government officials. In the past two generations, however, state-run school systems have expanded to include significantly larger sectors of the population. In one sample of 22 Muslim-majority countries, 70 percent of adults had no formal education in 1960; by 1990, this figure had been reduced to 44 percent. In 1960, only four of these countries had more than 1 percent of the adult population with some higher education; in 1990, only four of these countries had less than 1 percent with some higher education. Seminaries have grown, too, in some countries; but even where seminarians control the state, as in the Islamic Republic of Iran, these schools remain marginal to the nation's educational system.

The growth of secular education has led expanding numbers of Muslims to approach religious questions without the skills—or blinders, depending on one's perspective—inculcated in the seminaries. College graduates have turned to the sacred texts and analyzed them in a sort of do-it-yourself theology, developing liberal interpretations in addition to radical ones. In Pakistan, for example, a study group of educated Muslim women met and produced a feminist interpretation, "For Ourselves: Women Reading the Koran" (1997). In North America, a gay convert to Islam produced a Web site called Queer Jihad that espoused tolerance for homosexuality. In Syria, a soil engineer named Muhammad Shahrour decided that traditional scholarship on the Koran was un-scientific and that he had a better approach, one that happened to support liberal political positions. According to booksellers interviewed by anthropologist Dale Eickelman, Shahrour's tomes are best-sellers in the Arab world, even where they are banned.

In addition, governments have waded into the religious field throughout the Islamic world. In each country, the state has established its own official religious authorities, which may be pitted against every other state's religious authorities. Many states produce their own schoolbooks to teach Islamic values in the public schools. In Turkish textbooks, these values include secular government; in Saudi textbooks, these values include monarchy; in Palestine National Authority textbooks, according to a review by political scientist Nathan J. Brown, these values include the defense of the Palestinian homeland (though they do not, as often charged, include the destruction of Israel).

The result is a tremendous diversity of Islamic opinion and a corresponding diversity of Islamic authority. There is no universally recognized arbiter to resolve Islamic debates. For most of Islamic history, at least a symbolic arbiter existed: the caliph (*khalifa*), that is, the successor to the Prophet. Caliphs could never impose interpretive uniformity on all Muslims, although some were more inclined than others to try. But since the Turkish Republic abolished the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, even this symbol of authority is gone. Any college graduate in a cave can claim to speak for Islam.

Modern Goals, Modern Methods

Just as the social roots of Islamism are modern, so too are many of its goals. Do not be misled by the language of hostility toward the West. Islamist political platforms share significant planks with Western modernity. Islamists envision overturning tradition in politics, social relations, and religious practices. They are hostile to monarchies, such as the Saudi dynasty in Arabia; they favor egalitarian meritocracy, as opposed to inherited social hierarchies; they wish to abolish long-standing religious practices such as the honoring of relics and tombs.

Bin Laden, for example, combined traditional grievances such as injustice, corruption, oppression, and self-defense with contemporary demands such as economic development, human rights, and national self-determination. "People are fully occupied with day-to-day survival; everybody talks about the deterioration of the

economy, inflation, ever-increasing debts and jails full of prisoners," bin Laden wrote in 1996. "They complain that the value of the [Saudi] *riyal* is greatly and continuously deteriorating against most of the major currencies."

These mundane concerns do not mean that Islamist states look just like Western states, but they are not entirely different, either. The Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, has tried to forge its own path since it replaced the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979. Yet within its first year it copied global norms by writing a new constitution, ratifying it through a referendum with full adult suffrage, holding parliamentary and presidential elections, establishing a cabinet system, and occupying itself with myriad other tasks that the modern world expects of a state, from infrastructure expansion to narcotics interdiction. The 1986 Iranian census conducted by the Islamic Republic was scarcely different from the 1976 census conducted by the monarchy. Similarly in Pakistan and the Sudan, where Islamic laws were introduced in the 1980s, there were changes, but there were also massive continuities. The modern state remained.

Contrast this continuity with the traditionalist Taliban. While most well-educated Islamists disdain relics as verging on idol worship, Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar literally wrapped himself in the cloak of the Prophet—a cherished relic in Qandahar—one April day in 1996. While successful Islamist movements have ensconced themselves in the offices of their predecessors, Omar remained in his home province. The Taliban government reproduced a few of the usual ministries—foreign affairs, for example—but did not bother with most. The Taliban preferred informal and personal administration to the rule-bound bureaucracies favored by modern states.

Western bias tends to lump Khomeini's Iran and the Taliban's Afghanistan in the same category, and indeed both claimed to be building an Islamic state. However, one is a modern state and the other was not. Perhaps the most vivid distinction involved gender. While the Taliban barred girls from attending school, the Islamic Republic of Iran more than doubled girls' education from pre-revolutionary levels. While the Taliban barred women from working at most jobs, Iranian women entered the labor force in unprecedented numbers, as television anchors, parliamentary deputies, government typists, and sales clerks—even while dressed in headscarves and long coats. Iranian leaders were as outspoken as Western feminists in condemning Taliban policies on gender and other subjects and felt the Taliban were giving Islam a bad name.

The Taliban reintroduced tradition; Khomeini and other Islamists reinvented it. This process is entirely consistent with the "invention of tradition" identified by historians Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. The Victorians in England, for example, developed anthems, symbols, and a mythical lineage that they then projected backward in time, pretending that these were the outgrowth of an ancient tradition. Similarly, the Islamists' ideals of early Islamic society are contemporary constructions. The Islamists wish to return to God's law and the sacred practices of the first Muslims, but they downplay early Islamic practices such as slavery that are at odds with their modern values. In place of the clear social hierarchies in early Islam based on tribe, lineage, and seniority, Islamists emphasize human equality. In place of personal regimes, Islamists insist on codified law. In place of submission to authority, Islamists speak the language of individual rights. These modern values set Islamists apart from their precursors in earlier periods, such as Ibn Taymiyya in the 14th century and Muhammad Ibn 'Abd alWahhab and Shah Wali-Allah in the 18th century.

Not all Islamist demands are consonant with modern norms, of course. Islamists are openly hostile to certain elements of modernity in its Western forms, such as dating, decriminalized drug use, and separation of church and state. Moreover, certain high-profile Islamist goals such as corporal punishment, legalized polygyny, automatic male custody in divorce, restrictive garb for women, bans on heresy and apostasy, and judicial authority keyed to sacred texts are unpalatable to modern Western sensibilities. Yet even these demands are framed in the familiar modern idiom of rediscovering authenticity. The goal is to "Islamicize modernity," in the phrase of Moroccan Islamist leader Abdessalam Yassine: to forge an alternative modernity that combines basic elements of modernity with selected elements of Islamic heritage.

Ironically, the West, generally the underminer of tradition, now supports traditional elites in the Islamic world. The British and French installed monarchies in much of the Middle East after World War I. More recently, Western military might forced a republic to disgorge a monarchy—albeit a liberalized one—when Kuwait was liberated in 1991. Since that time, U.S. troops have been stationed in Saudi Arabia to defend an absolute monarchy. Bin Laden and other Islamists make repeated use of the irony: America, supposed proponent of democracy and rights, clings to a regime that detests these modern concepts.

Not just in ideology but also in practice, bin Laden and other radical Islamists mirror Western trends. They term their mobilization *jihad*, or sacred struggle, although many Muslims point out that the Prophet called struggle against others the "lesser jihad," with the internal struggle to lead a good life being the "greater jihad." Regardless of the ancient terminology, Al Qaeda and other Islamist groups operate globally like trans-national corporations, with affiliates and subsidiaries, strategic partners, commodity chains, standardized training, off-shore financing and other features associated with contemporary global capital. Indeed, insiders often referred to Al Qaeda as the "company."

Documents discovered by *The New York Times* in Afghan training camps after Al Qaeda's departure show a bureaucratic organization with administrative lines of authority and an insistence on budgeting. Islamists use the latest high-tech skills, not just airplane piloting and transponder deactivation, as the world learned tragically on September 11, 2001, but also satellite phones, faxes, wired money orders, and the like. Mullah Muhammad Omar was so suspicious of modern technology that he refused to be photographed; bin Laden, by contrast, distributed videotapes of himself to the world's media.

Like other covert networks, such as mafiosi and narcotraffickers, Islamists organize themselves through informal personal ties. Political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz was able to document this phenomenon among radical Islamists in Jordan, who allowed him to attend their illegal meetings. These activists are harassed by the security forces, frequently arrested, and barred from regular employment. In this repressive context their main avenue for collective action is to draw on friendship networks, people whom they trust to maintain the secrecy that their illegal activities require.

Some Islamists also benefit from "front" organizations that gain legitimacy and launder money. Indeed, some of these organizations do tremendous good works, such as supporting medical clinics in poor neighborhoods in Egypt, offering earthquake relief in Turkey, and mobilizing women into micro-enterprises in Yemen. Surprisingly, however, many of these welfare organizations are quite unsuccessful in mobilizing political support among the poor. Political scientist Janine Clark, who has conducted extensive fieldwork among these organizations in the Arab world, found that the beneficiaries of Islamic charity often receive such a pittance of financial aid that they are forced to seek benefits from other charities as well—state-run, missionary-run, secular, or otherwise—and have no particular loyalty to the Islamists.

Like other political movements, Islamists are divided as to how to achieve their goals. Some prefer a hearts-and-minds strategy, "calling" Muslims to increased piety. "There is no compulsion in religion," they argue, quoting the Koran, so conquering the state without preparing the populace is both morally impermissible and strategically foolhardy. Others argue that state conquest cannot be delayed. Oppression, foreign and domestic, operates through the state and can only be addressed at that level. But state-oriented Islamists are themselves divided: some seek to take power democratically, while others pursue putsches and terrorism. This division reveals one of the least-known aspects of the Islamist movement: for all their notoriety, Islamists remain unpopular among Muslims.

The Radical Minority

A minority of Muslims support Islamist organizations, and not just because they are illegal in many countries. There are only a handful of reputable surveys on the subject, but they show consistently that most Muslims oppose Islamists and their goals. Surveys in 1988 found that 46 and 20 percent of respondents in Kuwait and Egypt, respectively, favored Islamist goals in religion and politics. A 1986 survey in the West Bank and

Gaza found 26 percent calling for a state based on *shari'a*, and polls in the same regions showed support for Hamas and other Islamist groups dropping from 23 percent in 1994 to 13 to 18 percent in 1996–97. A 1999 survey in Turkey found 21 percent favoring implementation of *shari'a*, consistent with other surveys in the mid-1990s. In a Gallup poll of nine Muslim societies at the end of 2001, only 15 percent of respondents said they considered the September 11 attacks to be morally justifiable.

When free or partially free elections are held, Islamists rarely fare well. Islamist candidates and parties have won less than 10 percent of the vote in Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. They have won less than 25 percent of the vote in Egypt, Malaysia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. Their best showings have been in Kuwait, where they won 40 percent of seats in 1999, and Jordan, where moderate Islamists won 43 percent of seats in 1989 before dropping to 20 percent in the next election. Virtually the only majority vote that Islamists have ever received was in Algeria in 1991, when the Islamic Salvation Front dominated the first stage of parliamentary elections, winning 81 percent of the seats; it was about to win the second stage of voting when the military annulled the elections and declared martial law.

In the few elections where Islamists fared relatively well, success followed from promises to abide by democratic norms. The Algerian Islamist leader 'Abbasi Madani, who earned a doctorate in education from the University of London, developed a Muslim Democrat position analogous to the Christian Democrat parties of Europe: culturally conservative but committed to democracy. "Pluralism is a guarantee of cultural wealth, and diversity is needed for development. We are Muslims, but we are not Islam itself," Madani said while campaigning. "We do not monopolize religion. Democracy as we understand it means pluralism, choice and freedom." These sentiments may have been insincere, but we will never know. A secular military regime barred Madani from office before he could develop a track record, just as secular military officials in Turkey removed Necmettin Erbakan as prime minister in 1997, after less than a year in office. Islamists now cite Algeria and Turkey while debating whether it is naive to think that they will ever be allowed to play by the same rules as other parties.

Still, when given a choice between liberal and radical Islamists, Muslim voters prefer the liberal. In Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid's liberal party received 17 percent of the vote in 1999, and Amien Rais's semi-liberal party received 7 percent, compared with 11 percent for the more radical United Development Party. In Kuwait in 1996 and 1999, more than twice as many candidates associated with the moderate Islamic Constitutional Movement were elected than candidates associated with the more hardline Islamic Popular Movement. Most dramatically, in Iran, for years the role model for Islamists, the liberal reform movement swept a series of elections as soon as it was allowed to run against hard-liners: the presidency in 1997, city councils in 1998, parliament in 1999 and the presidency again in 2001. The reformists must still contend with other branches of government that the constitution sets aside as unelected. However, President Muhammad Khatami and his allies, all former radicals themselves, serve as high-profile defectors from the Islamist cause.

Islamists thus face a dilemma that is common to other radical movements of the past century: whether to water down their message to attract popular support or maintain a pure vision and mobilize a relatively small cadre. Like leftist splinter groups that rejected democratic socialism, bin Laden and his ilk have opted for the second path. Like radical leftists, radical Islamists fare best when the liberals are forcibly removed from the scene: by repressive regimes, as in Pahlavi-era Iran, contemporary Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere; or by the Islamists themselves, as in the Algeria, Chechnya, and Kashmir assassination campaigns, among others.

Sadly, the U.S.-led war on terrorism may inadvertently benefit the Islamists. This is the great debate among scholars of Islamic studies in the months since September 2001. Do the United States and its allies appear hypocritical in supporting autocrats in Muslim-majority countries while claiming to defend human rights and democracy? Will Muslims perceive the war on terrorism as evidence of Western hostility toward Islam? Will military action stoke Islamist radicalism or extinguish it?

In the short run, the war on terrorism has not generated the massive negative reaction

among Muslims that some observers expected. Yet there is evidence to suggest that Islamism is gaining in popularity. Gallup polls of nine Muslim societies at the end of 2001 found that a majority considered the United States and the West to be hostile to Islam and Muslims. Since the beginning of 2002, Israel's military operations in Palestinian territories, with Western acquiescence, may have further radicalized Muslim attitudes.

Longer term approaches to the war on terrorism also face ambivalences. The modernization of Muslim societies, promoted by the United States and its allies as a buffer against traditionalism, may wind up fueling Islamism. Modern schools produce Islamists as well as liberals; modern businesses fund Islamist as well as other causes; modern communications can broadcast Islamist as well as other messages. Western culture, we are learning, is not the only form that modernity may assume.

Recommended Resources

Abou El Fadl, Khaled. *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001. A thorough critique of Islamists' misuse of sacred sources as justification for terrorism.

Eickelman, Dale F., and James Piscatori. *Muslim Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. A valuable globe-trotting overview of variation in contemporary Muslim politics.

Ernst, Carl W. *Following Muhammad: An Introduction to Islam in the Contemporary World*. Boston: Shambala, 2002. A sensitive and insightful introduction to historical and contemporary developments in Islam.

Kurzman, Charles (ed.). *Liberal Islam: A Source-Book*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. An anthology of 32 influential writings, mostly late 20th century, by Muslims favoring democracy, multireligious coexistence, women's rights, and other liberal themes.

Kurzman, Charles (ed.). *Modernist Islam: A Source-Book, 1840–1940*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. An anthology of 52 influential writings by Muslims in the 19th and early 20th centuries favoring constitutionalism, nationalism, science, women's rights, and other modern values.

Lawrence, Bruce. *Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. A highly readable examination of key issues in contemporary Islamic debates.

Lubeck, Paul. "The Islamic Revival: Antinomies of Islamic Movements Under Globalization." In *Global Social Movements*, ed. Robin Cohen and Shirin M. Rai. New Brunswick, N.J.: Athlone Press, 2000. A provocative analysis linking economic globalization with global Islamic activism.

Wickham, Carrie. *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. The definitive work on Islamists in Egypt, documenting the methods through which secular university students are drawn to Islamist activism.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. A path-breaking study of radical Islamist groups in Jordan, based on extensive interviews with activists in illegal cells.

9

Women's Mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army

Jocelyn S. Viterna

Popular support is often considered the sine qua non of revolution (Wickham-Crowley 1992, p. 52). Nevertheless, there is little consensus among scholars about which causal factors are most important for generating popular mobilization (Kriger 1992). Some scholars portray popular participants as aggrieved individuals who become mobilized when structural conditions—for example, weak states, elite divisions, agrarian arrangements, or socioeconomic dislocations—are conducive to activism (Goldstone 1991; Paige 1975; Scott 1976; Skocpol 1979). For others, popular participants are rational actors who see opportunities for personal gain through revolutionary activism (Migdal 1974; Popkin 1979). Some scholars portray grassroots participants as identifying deeply with the ideals and goals of the movement because of their preexisting network memberships (Bearman 1993; Gould 1995; Pfaff 1996; Wickham-Crowley 1992). Still others depict participants as unwilling supporters of the cause, coerced to participate by threats of harm, denial of needed goods, or a lack of options to avoid activism (Goodwin 2001; Kriger 1992; Loveman 1998).

Yet, of the many individuals experiencing structural changes, of the many individuals in a position to benefit from revolutionary activism, of the many individuals embedded in identity-molding mobilizing networks, and of the many individuals caught in coercive situations, only a few actually participate in revolutionary movements. Herein lies the dilemma: if the characteristics that explain activism are shared by activists and nonactivists, then how can these characteristics be the critical causal factors behind popular mobilization? If they are not, what additional—or alternative—factors explain why some, but not all, members of a group or network take part in high-risk revolutionary activism?

Questions about the causes of revolutionary mobilization remain unresolved because mobilization scholars generally seek the one causal factor or set of factors that "typically" leads individuals to activism. These explanations assume that activists are a largely homogenous group who generally follow one path to participation. But activists are heterogeneous (McAdam 1992; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991) and, as I demonstrate, can follow strikingly different paths to the same mobilization

outcome. For example, the same causal factor that promotes mobilization in some people may actually inhibit mobilization in others. In this case, searching for the "typical" mobilization pattern obscures an important causal factor because its contradictory effects cannot be captured in a generalized explanation of all activism. These generalized explanations can therefore lead to inaccurate explanations of mobilization and distort our understanding of broader revolutionary processes.

In this article, I develop a novel theoretical approach for analyzing microlevel mobilization that complements mesolevel and macrocomparative studies. I argue that there are multiple, conjunctural causes of mobilization, even among individuals embedded within similar identity-producing networks and within similar structural contexts. These multiple paths to participation arise from the patterned interaction of individual-level biography, networks, and situational context. Because mobilization processes are patterned, scholars can identify the different paths that individuals follow to participation while still prioritizing parsimonious explanations. My analysis shows that distinguishing microlevel variation in participation processes yields more accurate theories of high-risk activism and, in turn, improves our macrolevel understanding of the causes, successes, failures, and unintended consequences of popular revolutionary mobilization.

The case of women revolutionaries in El Salvador illustrates the utility of this approach. In the 1980s, thousands of Salvadoran women joined the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a revolutionary guerrilla army engaged in combat with the oppressive Salvadoran state. These women, like their counterparts around the world, defied patriarchal traditions, abandoned their homes and families, and became militant members of rural guerrilla insurgencies.[1] By analyzing the multiple paths that Salvadoran women followed to the guerrilla camps, I refine existing explanations of women's revolutionary participation and suggest how these new insights may have important implications for macrolevel processes such as democratization and broader transformations in gendered rights and relations.

My conclusions are based on analysis of rich data from in-depth interviews with 82 female rank-and-file guerrilla combatants, guerrilla supporters, and nonparticipants in rural El Salvador. These data have two key advantages. First, they include the experiences of the grass-roots, whereas most mobilization studies focus solely on movement leadership. Second, they allow for comparisons between activists and similarly situated nonactivists, whereas most studies sample on the dependent variable and omit nonactivists. This rare representative sample of activists and nonactivists is uniquely suited to the identification of the multiple paths to activism that deepen sociological understandings of mobilization.

Theorizing Microlevel Mobilization Processes in Revolutionary Movements

Scholars of revolution typically identify the macrolevel conditions conducive to mobilizing popular support. Many suggest that the revolutionary potential of aggrieved peasants is consistently present across place and time and becomes activated when certain political, historical, or economic conditions emerge. For example, they find that modernization and commercialization bring institutional imbalances in society and result in weakened states (Skocpol 1979, 1994), a disrupted "moral economy" (Scott 1976), or increased participation incentives for rational, cost-calculating individuals (Popkin 1979). Others search for the group most likely to become revolutionary and argue, for example, that landless peasants (Paige 1975), or landowning middle peasants (Wolf 1969), are most likely to revolt. Macrolevel studies thus answer important questions about where and when revolutions may occur, but cannot explain why most individuals embedded in these "revolutionary" social locations or political-historical contexts do not, in fact, revolt. Thus, macrolevel models only take us so far in understanding the causes of revolution.

Scholars employing network analysis to explain revolutionary mobilization help connect macrolevel contexts to microlevel mobilization processes, as individuals interpret their larger social context through the networks in which they are embedded (Calhoun 1991). Peter Bearman (1993), for example, demonstrates how religious rhetoric in England created new social networks among elites, and that these new

networks corresponded with revolutionary activity. Steven Pfaff (1996) analyzes the role of small-scale social networks in generating the peaceful revolution against the communist regime in East Germany in 1989. Timothy Wickham-Crowley (1992) argues that political, religious, and family networks were critical for mobilizing Latin Americans into leftist guerrilla movements. Roger Gould (1995) demonstrates that the spatial proximity of individuals within a network is also critical to their mobilization.

Network analyses of revolutionary participation parallel a long tradition in the social movement literature that argues interests alone cannot move people to participate in movements (Briet, Klandermans, and Kroon 1987; Henig 1982; Klandermans 1984; Olson 1965; Walsh 1988).[2] Rather, interests must be embedded in structured social relations that highlight them as important and worthy of action (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Stryker 2000). A number of empirical studies demonstrate the importance of preexisting networks for mobilizing social action at the microlevel (see, e.g., Briet et al. 1987; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Gould 1995; Kim and Bearman 1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980).[3] Such networks are particularly important for mobilization into high-risk forms of collective action, because a high degree of trust helps counteract the selective disincentives to participate in dangerous activities (della Porta 1988; Loveman 1998; McAdam 1986; Morris 1984).

Problems arise, however, because social network studies, like macro-level studies of revolutionary mobilization, tend to be overly deterministic (McAdam 2000, p. xii). Movement participants are traced to a common network, but the failure of others embedded within the same network to participate is seldom acknowledged or analyzed.

Social psychological theories of identity-based mobilization processes provide insight into why networks mobilize some, but not all, of their members (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; McAdam 2000; Stryker 2000). According to these theories, individuals must develop a salient "participation identity" prior to mobilizing; that is, being a participant must become so important to a person's sense of self that to not participate would cause psychological and emotional harm. In addition, these scholars demonstrate that multiple identities are always competing for salience, even among people embedded in a common network. For example, a person's identity as "mother" may compete with a potential movement participation identity, especially if participation in the movement could jeopardize the woman's ability to be a good mother, and therefore her identity as a mother. Both identities may be important to the woman's sense of self, and both identities arise from social networks, but it is the interaction of these network-based identities with each other and with still other competing identities that determines whether the participation identity becomes salient enough to result in action (Stryker 2000). Being in a participation-supporting network therefore increases an individual's probability of mobilization, but does not guarantee it.

Very few studies model empirically the effects of overlapping networks on mobilization decisions. Of particular note, McAdam and Paulsen (1993) compared the social ties of both participants and nonparticipants in the Freedom Summer movement. They find that social ties inhibit as well as promote high-risk activism, and that intimate social ties are of greater importance for mobilization than more distant social ties. They also find that a person's "biographical availability," as determined by their education, gender, income, age, marital status, and occupation, affects participation decisions. People with fewer family and work responsibilities are more likely to participate. Nepstad and Smith (1999) tested the McAdam and Paulsen model with similar data from the high-risk Nicaragua Exchange movement. They confirm the importance of network ties, but question the importance of biographical availability; many respondents participated despite biographical barriers to mobilization.

Combining these findings with social psychological theories, I suggest that micro-level mobilization into high-risk activism can be modeled according to the following theoretical equation:

$$\text{net influence of all networks} -$$
$$\text{the net influence of all biographical barriers} =$$
$$\text{the probability of high-risk activism,}$$

where the first factor is the sum of a number of networks, each with its own influence on the participation identity in question. Some of these

networks may positively support the identity of the participant, while others may reject participation (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). The magnitude of each network's influence on the emergence of a salient participation identity increases or decreases according to (1) the number of social ties encompassed in the network, and (2) the emotional strength and spatial proximity of these ties (Stryker 2000; Gould 1995). The first factor in the equation, the net influence of all network ties, is a necessary requirement for mobilization; a person cannot be moved to activism without meaningful network ties that support the identity of the participant. The impact of the second factor is debated; biographical barriers to participation may be overcome in cases where the individual's participation identity is salient enough to overcome competing identities.

Theorizing Microlevel Mobilization Processes for Women Guerrillas

During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of women joining high-risk, militant, and indeed "masculine" revolutionary campaigns in Latin America increased dramatically.[4] To illustrate: when the FMLN guerrilla army laid down its weapons and reorganized as a political party in El Salvador under the 1992 peace accords, fully 30% of its approximately 13,000 officially "demobilized" members were women (Luciak 2001; Vázquez, Ibáñez, and Murguialday 1996). In Nicaragua and Guatemala, women were also estimated to make up 30% of the guerrilla armies (Chinchilla 1983; New Americas Press 1989; Thomson 1986), and in Peru, one-half of all *Sendero Luminoso* combatants were estimated to be female (McClintock quoted in Wickham-Crowley 1992). Furthermore, women, while never gaining equal status to men, did occupy significant leadership roles in guerrilla armies, including as battalion commanders and political liaisons (Chinchilla 1983; Reif-Lobao 1986; Ueltzen 1993). Several all-female units fought in direct combat with all-male, highly trained government forces (Saywell 1985; Thomson 1986).

To date, scholars have questioned why women entered guerrilla armies in the 1970s and 1980s and not in earlier movements of the 1950s and 1960s.[5] They answer that changes in Latin American social and economic structures led to men's out-migration and eventual abandonment of their families, and to a corresponding increase in the number of impoverished female heads of household (Kampwirth 2002; Mason 1992; Reif-Lobao 1986, 1998).[6] Women responded by moving into the paid labor force and mobilizing their communities around specifically women's interests (e.g., child care or familial nutritional needs). These new experiences in the labor force and in community politics increased women's contact with individuals and issues outside of the family and thus increased their potential for revolutionary mobilization.

All scholars highlight how changing structural conditions pushed women into new public roles, but early studies disagree on the catalyst that encouraged newly active women to join guerrilla armies. Reif-Lobao (1986, 1998) argues that new revolutionary ideologies combined with the global diffusion of feminist thought and encouraged political groups' recruitment of women. Mason (1992) argues that women's aboveground organizing was met with extreme repression from the state, and this repression in turn pushed women to clandestine political mobilization for survival (see also Wickham-Crowley 1992). Regardless, both agree that women were mobilized as guerrillas because they first assumed new "masculine" roles such as household heads, paid laborers, and political activists, and yet maintained their "feminine" prioritization of child care, household survival, and social welfare. By extension, both suggest that women who were mothers, workers, and activists were rationally drawn to guerrilla movements.[7] This argument parallels a large body of research that suggests women activists often legitimize their actions against the state by framing those actions as an integral component of their maternal responsibilities (Ferree and Mueller 2004).[8]

Recently, Kampwirth (2002) enhanced our understanding of women's guerrilla mobilization with individual-level interview data. Like previous studies, she finds that large-scale structural changes and international feminism generated new forms of women's activism. She expands on previous studies by arguing that family activism networks and newly emerging political and religious organizations were the agents of these new peaceful mobilizations. These new mobilizations

were then specifically targeted by state repression, and state repression was the catalyst forcing peaceful activists into clandestine guerrilla organizations. Kampwirth also analyzes the importance of biographical barriers to participation and finds that mothers were less likely to join revolutionary movements than nonmothers. This contradicts earlier studies that find that women household heads constituted the "typical" guerrilla (Mason 1992; Reif-Lobao 1986; see also Vázquez et al. 1996).

Kampwirth's analysis of women's guerrilla participation suggests that the mobilization path that women follow to guerrilla camps is initially very similar to the mobilization path that most participants follow in any type of social movement. Participation-supporting network ties intersect with high levels of biographical availability and result in women's participation in peaceful political organizations. However, when government repression targets peaceful activists, these activists are then forced into clandestine armed combat (Kampwirth 2002; see also Mason 1992). Borrowing from this analysis, I add the effects of state-sponsored repression to the heuristic mobilization equation above and suggest that theories of women's guerrilla mobilization can be modeled as follows:

$$\text{net influence of all networks} - \\ \text{the net influence of all biographical barriers} = \\ \text{the probability of movement activism,}$$

and then

$$\text{movement activism} + \text{state-sponsored repression} = \\ \text{guerrilla activism,}$$

where, as in the earlier equation, networks are considered indispensable, and biographical barriers surmountable.

Putting Theory into Practice

Existing theory, as modeled in the above equations, allows for the possibility that different processes may lead different individuals to the same mobilization outcome. One type of network might matter for some individuals but not for others, some networks might be important at one point in a person's life but not at another, or some networks might affect mobilization only in particular combinations. Nevertheless, micromobilization researchers in practice generally seek the one pattern that most closely approximates the mobilization experience of all individuals. I argue that this search for the "typical" path to activism erroneously imposes uniform explanations on what is in reality an integrative, conjunctural, and varied mobilization process.

The case of women's guerrilla mobilization illustrates the necessity of identifying the multiple paths people follow to mobilization. Conventional explanations of women's guerrilla activism do not take into account the different ways that social networks, biographical characteristics, and situational contexts may interact. For example, scholars identify repression as important for women's guerrilla mobilization, but they fail to account for how the context of repression changes over the course of the movement, or how repression affects individuals differently based on their individual-level biographies and network memberships.

Findings of uniformity in women's guerrilla mobilization, like findings of uniformity in other studies of mobilization, may be a product of the data employed. Researchers have studied only guerrillas; they have not gathered data that allow for comparisons with their nonguerrilla counterparts.[9] Moreover, the guerrillas chosen for investigation have been selected almost exclusively from an elite subset of guerrillas: urban, middle-to-upper class, educated, and active in present-day movement organizations (Kampwirth 2002; Kriger 1992; Vázquez et al. 1996). Other research (Byrne 1996, p. 35; McClintock 1998, pp. 266–7; Paige 1997, p. 379, n. 49), as well as my own interviews, indicate that most women in FMLN camps were poor, uneducated, and from rural areas, and that nearly half did *not* remain active in civil society after the war was over. The experiences of the majority—who may have experienced entirely different paths to guerrilla mobilization—have been largely ignored.

In the following analysis, I use the case of women guerrillas in El Salvador to develop a new approach to micromobilization that allows for multiple, conjunctural paths to participation. I do so by employing better data and analyzing the dynamic interaction of network-based identities, biographical barriers, and situational contexts for each respondent. I find that Salvadoran women

followed three distinct paths to guerrilla activism: I call them *politicized guerrillas*, *reluctant guerrillas,* and *recruited guerrillas*.

[…]

The data for this study are interviews conducted between September 2001 and May 2002 with 82 rural Salvadoran women. To ensure a representative group of both guerrilla and nonguerrilla women for interviews, I first selected six villages from three different *municipios* that were included on a United Nations list of the 25 *municipios* most violently disputed during the 12-year civil war. A *municipio* is similar to a U.S. county or parish in that it is a politically bounded geographic region that incorporates a number of smaller villages. The six villages were chosen to represent all five ideological branches of the FMLN and three distinct geographical regions. They range in size from 300 to 1,000 inhabitants.

[…]

The dependent variable, wartime participation, identifies three levels of activism in relationship to the FMLN: guerrillas, collaborators, and nonparticipants. These are described in Table 9.1. In my sample, 38 women are guerrillas, 12 are collaborators, and 32 are nonparticipants.

The independent variables measure each woman's objective conditions of mobilization. They include three measures of network ties prior to mobilization (previous organizational involvement, family ties with guerrillas, living in a refugee camp or repopulated community), three measures of biographical availability (motherhood, family completeness, age at mobilization), and one measure of changing situational context (time of mobilization).

Networks.—The literature highlights two networks as crucial for mobilizing individuals into guerrilla armies: family ties with guerrillas and relational ties generated through membership in organizations working for social change (Dodson and O'Shaugnessy 1985; Kampwirth 2002; Vázquez et al. 1996; Wickham-Crowley 1992). To these, I add the experience of living in a refugee camp or a repopulated community. This has not been mentioned as a mobilizing factor for women guerrillas. However, given that 1.5 million rural Salvadorans, or 20% of the total Salvadoran population, were displaced from their homes by 1983 (Commission on the Truth 1993), and given the documented political organizing that occurred within refugee camps (Cagan and Cagan 1991; Vázquez 2000), this is an important area for investigation.

Biographical availability.—Young women with no children and a missing parent at home are expected to have the fewest barriers to participation (Kampwirth 2002; see also Vilas 1986). Children are barriers because their needs limit the work a woman may perform outside the home. Parents are barriers because they may prevent their children from joining the guerrillas. However, some scholars suggest that motherhood encourages women to mobilize because their position as caretaker of the family motivates them to create a better world for future generations (Reif-Lobao 1986, 1998; Mason 1992; Vázquez et al. 1996).

Mobilization period.—The pervasiveness of state-sponsored violence varied greatly during the civil war. In the early years (1980–83), repression was widespread and indiscriminate, and opportunities to escape the violence were few. The Salvadoran Armed Forces, in their attempts to squelch civilian support for the nascent FMLN guerrilla organization, adopted a "scorched earth" policy. This included indiscriminate massacres of rural peasants, air attacks on rural communities, burning homes and crops, and killing livestock. The number of civilian deaths in 1982 alone was estimated at nearly 6,000, or three times the number of deaths among guerrilla combatants (Commission on the Truth 1993). In 1984, repression decreased momentarily in conjunction with talks of civilian elections and peace negotiations, but military activity on both sides increased again from 1985 to 1991. Unlike the earlier period of war, however, repression in the latter period was less prevalent and more discriminate. The government's scorched earth campaigns had been halted by international political pressure and the general ineffectiveness of the tactic, and international aid had provided civilians with a means to escape the violence; tens of thousands of rural Salvadorans were now living in refugee camps, mostly in Honduras, or were later moved to FMLN-sponsored "repopulated" communities well within guerrilla-controlled territory. I operationalize this changing context of repression by determining whether a woman was mobilized early in the war (1980–3) or late in the war (1985–91). None of my respondents was mobilized in 1984, the year when peace briefly seemed possible.

[…]

Table 9.1 Specifying the variables

Variable	Specification
Dependent variable (wartime participation):	
Guerrilla	Respondent lived and worked in or alongside an FMLN guerrilla camp as a primary, permanent residence, usually for a period of years, but for at least six months.
Collaborator	Respondent maintained a household as a primary residence, but held a formally defined role of support for the guerrilla camps. Support roles include but are not limited to making frequent trips to camps to deliver supplies and intelligence information; assisting with intelligence gathering, weapons preparation, or sabotage efforts; or allowing home to be used as guerrilla "safe house." Collaboration is highly dangerous work, but does not require a sacrifice of home and family.
Nonparticipant	Respondent maintained a household as a primary residence and did not hold any formal positions of support for the guerrilla. She may have sympathized with the guerrilla movement or helped on occasion, but this relationship was never formalized.
Independent variables (factors motivating or inhibiting guerrilla participation):	
Network ties:	
Previous organizational involvement	The respondent reported participation in a political or religious organization that advocated reforms similar to those advocated by the FMLN guerrilla organization. For guerrillas, the organizational involvement must predate guerrilla activism. For nonguerrillas, any organizational involvement prior to or during the war is included.
Family ties	The respondent had a mother, father, sibling, partner, or child who was active in the FMLN as a collaborator or guerrilla. For guerrillas, the family participation must predate or begin simultaneously with her activism. For nonguerrillas, any family participation prior to or during the war is included.
Refugee/repopulated community	The respondent lived in a refugee camp or a repopulated community. Guerrillas must have lived in the refugee camp or repopulated community at the moment of mobilization. Nonguerrillas must have lived in a refugee camp or repopulated community at some point during the war.
Biographical availability:	
Motherhood	For guerrillas, the respondent had children at the moment of mobilization into the FMLN. For nonguerrillas, the respondent had children prior to or during the war.
Family completeness	For guerrillas, the respondent lived with both her parents at the moment of mobilization into the guerrillas, or if she had already left the home of her parents, then the respondent's partner was present in the home at the moment of mobilization into the guerrillas. For nonguerrillas, the respondent had a complete family during the entire length of the war.
Age at mobilization	For guerrillas only: the respondent's age at the moment she was mobilized into the guerrilla army.
Situational context:	
Mobilization period	For guerrillas only: the respondent's mobilization into the FMLN either occurred early in the war (1980–3) or late in the war (1985–91).

A New Approach: Capturing Variation in Mobilization

The previous analysis demonstrates the inability of conventional "one-pattern" methods to explain the varied processes by which mobilization actually occurs. I do not doubt that the networks and barriers identified in previous research are central mobilizing factors for women guerrillas. Rather, I argue that the way these networks and barriers interact for individual women and within a particular situational context is the key. I further argue that because the variation in mobilization processes is patterned, scholars can identify multiple paths to activism while still prioritizing parsimonious explanations. Through analysis of my respondents' narratives, I found three clear mobilization patterns, which I have labeled politicized guerrillas, reluctant guerrillas, and recruited guerrillas. Next, I grouped women according to these three patterns, and I documented whether specific combinations of objective factors clustered together within each category. I also analyzed qualitatively how women discussed these objective factors within their mobilization narratives. I conclude that distinct combinations of objective factors consistently resulted in each particular mobilization narrative. I review these analyses below.

Politicized Guerrillas

> [I went to the guerrilla camp] to change this country. Because the government was corrupt and we had to fight.—Pati[10]

Politicized guerrillas were *pulled* into guerrilla participation by their strongly held beliefs in the political causes of the FMLN. Of the three mobilization patterns, this is the closest to the "typical" route to guerrilla activism proposed in the established literature. Politicized guerrillas developed a salient participation identity through their involvement in political organizations and then followed guerrilla recruiters to the FMLN camps. Surprisingly, only seven of the 38 guerrilla women in this study cite political reasons as their primary motivation for participation.[11]

[...] Looking first at the networks, each politicized guerrilla was previously involved in a political or religious organization that facilitated their recruitment into the FMLN.

> So when the women of AMES (Association of Salvadoran Women) held their meetings, I went. And when they said that whoever wanted to go to the guerrilla camps should raise their hand, well, I said me too. So fourteen of us, young girls, left together.… We said "we're going to go!" They told us that they were going to have a party to swear us in, so they swore us in and put the bandana of the FMLN around our left arm, since we've always been people of the left, they put the bandana here … then they sent us off for some short training courses.—Alicia

> We began to work in this ORMUSA, this group of women that worked in the communities raising crops, talking to the people, [finding out] what they needed, if they were sick, healthy. I was part of the board of directors of ORMUSA.… We worked a while and then we started coordinating with the people who worked in the clandestine.… Once you're involved in this it is difficult to leave.—Zoila

Politicized guerrillas were also embedded in family networks that supported guerrilla activism. Family ties to revolutionary activists are not specific to politicized guerrillas, but the qualitative data suggest that the depth of political activism of these family members is exceptional. For example, Alicia's father was a founding member of FECCAS (Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants), one of the largest and most important of all peasant political groups. Estela's parents joined forces with the Catholic Church to demand and win restitution when the government flooded the land on which they worked for wages. Vilma, Zoila, and Pati participated in political or religious organizations with other members of their families.

FMLN commanders also indicate that organizational and family ties were key vehicles for recruiting guerrillas, especially during the early period of the war. Designated recruiters targeted existing organizations as a means of appropriating networks already sympathetic to the FMLN cause, as well as to ensure that the new recruits could be trusted not to reveal the identity of clandestine FMLN sympathizers to the Salvadoran

Armed Forces. New recruits were then sent through a political education program designed with easily accessible language for poorly educated rural peasants. "At the very least we wanted to make sure they were clear on the most basic elements of why we were fighting the war," stated one commander.

The biographical characteristics of politicized guerrillas are not as central to mobilization as the network variables. The only consistent biography is complete family. Six of the seven report having lived with both parents or with their spouse at the time of mobilization. This is unexpected; complete families are hypothesized as barriers to participation. The depth of family members' participation in political activity (see above) may account for this seeming contradiction. The other biographical measures are inconsistent. Most politicized guerrillas mobilized in their mid-to-late teens, but some mobilized much later in life. Moreover, five politicized guerrillas were not mothers at the time of mobilization, but two overcame the barrier of motherhood to join the guerrilla army. Zoila joined after her two children had grown and left home (one had joined the FMLN). Pati joined with her husband and their two children (ages approximately 7 and 9). In her interview, she states that she wanted her children to learn of the necessity of social struggle. These two cases give tentative support to previous findings that strong participation identities may overcome biographical barriers to participation.

While biographical factors vary, the situational context of politicized guerrillas is similar; most mobilized in the early 1980s when repression was beginning to escalate.[12] Several politicized guerrillas mentioned the general hostile environment as a motivator for guerrilla participation, but none report being targeted for repression because of their organizational involvement. This differs from previous studies that suggest government repression forced peaceful activists to take their politics underground.

In sum, politicized guerrillas were pulled into the FMLN early in the war because they were already embedded in organizational and familial networks of activism. The catalyst moving peaceful activists into guerrilla camps appears to be that these networks were targeted by guerrilla recruiters, and not by state repression. In several instances, the salience of the participation identity generated through these networks overcame the potential biographical barriers of motherhood and older age.

Reluctant Guerrillas

> In this war, you don't get involved because you want to, but because you have to. Because if you don't, they kill you. Even though you didn't know anything about the war.—Julia

The 14 women classified as reluctant guerrillas were *pushed* into the guerrilla camps because a crisis left them with no other options. Their stated motivations focus on government repression, a need to flee hostilities, and a lack of resources for escaping to any other safe location.

> It wasn't that I wanted to go to the mountain, but like they say, *el amor a la vida es grande* [the love of life is strong]. And even though you might be suffering, if you're alive … —Lulu

Most crises that motivated the reluctant guerrillas to mobilize with the FMLN involved generalized violence against entire villages:

> I remember one time they (presumably members of the revolutionary movement) came and showed us a "butido." Butido is what they called this hole they had made, under the ground. Yes. So, they had a big meeting … we went, because this was a precaution for when the armed forces arrived, they said that we would get in there, because this thing had a long ventilation shaft, but the next day I was captured with my mom. … And so we didn't have the opportunity … well, nobody had the opportunity, to go to that place and hide and be free. That was when, this (military) operation was when all the people in this place died.—Yenifer

> They warned … they told us … one hears things … the plane, circling and circling, we knew that something was coming by land, and they told us, let's go, because the enemy is coming near, they said … before the massacre. They got us out … and the rest of the people they weren't able to get out because (the lake) was full of "lettuce" (green leafy water plants that prohibit passage by boat).… That's why they were left behind.—Andrea

Nevertheless, two cases involved violence targeted specifically against the respondent and her family:

> When I realized that my spouse was involved [with the guerrillas], because I didn't know before, was when they started "putting the finger on us" [identifying us as subversives], and then the army would arrive and interrogate us. The people knew that I was married and that he was my husband, and so every day the soldiers would arrive and I would tell them the same thing. And then they began to interrogate my father, and the next day my father told me that we should get out of there, so we waited for the clean clothes to dry and the next day we left there because they were going to kill us. A letter from my husband arrived saying that they were going to kill us, so I left with my little suitcase and my child. … My husband told me that I should go to the camp, because there we could have a separate life, where the army would not find us.—Mirna

[…] Network ties are inconsistent among women who cite a crisis as their motivation for mobilization. Nearly half were involved in previous organizational activities, but none invoked these activities when telling of their decision to move to the guerrilla camp. Moreover, most of those reporting previous organizational activity (five out of six) were mothers, suggesting that these politically active women were perhaps inhibited from earlier guerrilla activity because of the biographical barrier of young children; they only entered the guerrilla camp when a crisis made it unavoidable.[13] Nearly all reluctant guerrillas had family members working with the FMLN, and at least six of them went to the guerrilla camps at the moment of crisis because they were seeking family members already living there. Network ties therefore may not have motivated activism, but they may have provided a resource for escaping government repression into an FMLN camp.

Biographically, reluctant guerrillas are diverse. Crises, it seems, pushed all biographical categories of women (older and younger, mothers and nonmothers) into the guerrilla camps. Nevertheless, the qualitative data indicate that young, childless reluctant guerrillas had additional difficulty escaping guerrilla mobilization in times of crisis. Yenifer (quoted above) was captured by the Salvadoran Armed Forces when her village was attacked, and she and her mother were forced to cook and do laundry as they traveled with the soldiers for 30 days. When the military operation ended and the soldiers withdrew from the region, they were set free, but they feared remaining in their decimated and abandoned community. The FMLN offered her mother and sister escort to the refugee camp, but Yenifer stayed behind in the guerrilla camps. When I asked why she, too, did not go to the refugee camp, she responded:

> YENIFER: Because I was already about 11 years old and I couldn't go to the refugee camp because the Honduran soldiers would rape young girls.
>
> INTERVIEWER: But your sister went, didn't she?
>
> YENIFER: Yes, but she already had a child, my niece, in her arms. The baby was about 5 months old, something like that.
>
> INTERVIEWER: But why a guerrilla camp, at 11 years old?
>
> YENIFER: Because we couldn't just ask to live. If it wasn't the guerrillas, it was the Armed Forces. Because you see, here, if I stay, the Armed Forces kill me. If I go where the Armed Forces are in control, the guerrillas will kill me. That's why I went. What's more, the Armed Forces had killed nearly all our family, so I certainly couldn't follow them.
>
> INTERVIEWER: And you thought that it was safer to join the guerrillas than to go to a refugee camp?
>
> YENIFER: Yes! [with conviction] Since the very same guerrillas had taken my mother out of the house and to the refugee camp, since she could no longer live there, then I had to go to live with the guerrilla combatants. I couldn't stay in the house or in any other area that wasn't the guerrillas.
>
> INTERVIEWER: Who said that the Honduran soldiers would rape young girls?
>
> YENIFER: Everyone said so.

The case of Blanca represents the only young reluctant guerrilla who lived with both her parents at the time of crisis. She is also the only reluctant guerrilla who lived near the Honduran border at the time of crisis. These resources of family ties and proximity to a refugee camp nearly allowed her to mediate the crisis of villagewide

displacement by fleeing to a Honduran refugee camp under FMLN escort. When she arrived at the Honduran border, however, the FMLN escorts singled Blanca out and told her to return to the war zone with them:

> BLANCA: Because they didn't let us in, we had to stay here; they only took the little kids, up to 9 or 10 years old. Those who were already 14 or 15 they left here.
>
> INTERVIEWER: Who didn't let you enter [the refugee camp]?
>
> BLANCA: Those that were in charge up there, those that were in charge of getting the people out [of the war zones], because I was going to go with my mama and they sent me back to the border. From there they said, "This one is going to go with us," all of the people went up there, and all of the girls they sent back, they only let the old people and the little children stay.

Intrigued by the selection process, I had several informal conversations with my respondents about who granted refugee camp entrance, and what the entrance requirements were. I was told that the FMLN did indeed prevent young women from entering Honduran refugee camps, but only for the women's protection. Honduran soldiers reportedly accused all youthful women seeking refuge of being "guerillas" and denied their entrance into the camps, at times imprisoning, raping, or even killing them (I have since searched for confirmation that Honduran soldiers raped young females seeking refuge, and have not found any). I then questioned how the many women I had interviewed, who actually lived and worked in guerrilla camps, were able to leave the guerrilla camps for refugee camps when they became pregnant. These *actual guerrillas* apparently gained entrance without difficulty. "Of course," responded Gregoria, herself a guerrilla who gained entrance into a refugee camp while pregnant. "Young women were 'guerrillas,' but a pregnant woman, she had become a 'mother.'" These informal discussions provide further support for the idea that crisis, when combined with perceived biographical availability, made it very difficult for reluctant guerrillas to avoid mobilization despite their unwillingness to participate. Moreover, reluctant guerrillas who were mothers

of young children were all eventually transferred to refugee camps, while reluctant guerrillas who were not mothers were expected to stay in the guerrillas unless, as in the case of Blanca, they, too, became pregnant.[14]

The case of reluctant guerrillas complicates the role of biography in the mobilization process. Young women, and women who were not mothers, had fewer options to escape activism than did older women who were mothers. Thus, biography not only influences an individual's internally held identity, it also influences the identity assigned to that individual by others. An external expectation of who "should" become a guerrilla limited the options available to young, childless women in wartime El Salvador.

The situational context of mobilization for reluctant guerrillas was characterized by extreme repression. Most went to guerrilla camps very early in the war when state violence was at its worst and knowledge of refugee camps was limited. Joining forces with one of the warring parties appeared to be the only means for survival. Most reluctant guerrillas did not appear to have other financial or network resources that might have allowed them to avoid guerrilla activism.

In sum, reluctant guerrillas were pushed into the guerrilla camps because they did not have the necessary networks or resources to escape a crisis by any other means. Network ties were not the impetus for mobilization, but they may have provided reluctant guerrillas an opportunity to escape massacres in their villages by fleeing to FMLN camps. Neither do biographical characteristics effectively distinguish reluctant guerrillas from others, although certain biographies did apparently limit some women's ability to not participate. Women who were young and childless were at times not allowed entrance into refugee camps because they fit an external role expectation of who "should" be a guerrilla. This concept of an external role expectation, unexplored in current mobilization literature, gains further relevance in the following section.

Recruited Guerrillas

> [When I joined the guerrillas], I didn't have an objective, nothing more than seeing what it was like in the guerrillas, to have an adventure, nothing more.—Magaly

Recruited guerrillas lived in a refugee camp or a repopulated community, were specifically targeted by FMLN recruiters, and were *persuaded* to join the movement. They cite two common motivations. The first is the desire to have an adventure in the guerrillas. "I wanted to go," said Candelaria. "When you're young, you don't know why you go, you go because you see the rest in uniform, I guess." The second motivation is a desire for retribution. "I felt the desire," reported Elsy. "Like they say, I'm going to avenge myself, right, of all that they did to my family.… I wanted to fight like my father had fought. I wanted to defend, I wanted to release all of the bad that had happened to me." Lupe expressed a similar motivation. "We had always said that when we were big enough we were going to avenge the blood of my father and my sisters, and we did it." Recruited guerrillas' motivations differed from those of politicized guerrillas because they emphasized personal reasons (adventure and retribution) over more generalized political reasons (a sense of justice, seeking political change). Recruited guerrillas' motivations differed from those of reluctant guerrillas because they chose to join the FMLN from the relative safety of a refugee camp and did not feel forced to join because of their situation.

With one exception, recruited guerrillas share a common network that facilitated their mobilization: they all lived in the confined community of a refugee camp or an FMLN-supported repopulation. This all-encompassing network was strongly influenced by the FMLN; guerrillas or guerrilla supporters ran schools, organized protests, and even facilitated the transfer of supplies to FMLN combatants. Women living in refugee camps or repopulations were therefore frequently exposed to FMLN ideology and subjected to explicit invitations to join the guerrillas.

> In the refugee camp, they would call together a big group of girls. They taught us politics, and said that we had to come and fight here with the Frente. There were political meetings, in school, that's where they prepared us [for the guerrillas].—Dolores

> They arrived there and called together the people to talk about the motive of the war, what needed to be done. Of course they gave courses to motivate, to say that we had to fight, that we had to win this war. So you get animated—maybe with some little lies on their part, maybe—they would get you excited and you would come. Because of this a great number of adolescents left.—Marta

> [The recruiters would come up to small groups of young women] and they would say to us: *Bichas* [young girls], don't you want to go and participate with us guerrillas? Yes!!! We're going to go!!! we said. We thought it was a real big thing, you know?—Candelaria

The effects of other network variables are not consistent. Only two of the seventeen had participated in prior organizational activities, and the respondents highlight networks of friends and schoolmates more often than familial networks in their mobilization narratives. These networks were easily and often targeted by FMLN recruiters within the confines of a refugee camp.

Biographically, recruited guerrillas were young, and all but one were childless. Most had incomplete families. These biographies (no children to care for, fewer parents to prohibit guerrilla mobilization) certainly suggest few barriers to participation. Yet, as with reluctant guerrillas, biography also affected mobilization processes by determining whether women were perceived by the FMLN as potential participants and subsequently targeted for recruitment. To illustrate, refugee camp living technically freed mothers for guerrilla participation by providing food, education, health care, and day care services for young children, yet mothers were not generally invited to participate. Moreover, young refugee women who had lost a parent were significantly more likely to be targeted for recruitment than young refugee women with complete families. Recruiters may have targeted women with incomplete families because they were perceived as having fewer barriers to participation, and also because they were perceived as most susceptible to recruitment messages framed around retribution (many parents were missing because they had been murdered by the Salvadoran Armed Forces). Biography therefore not only affects internally held identity, it also shapes the external role expectation of who "should" become a guerrilla.

Recruited guerrillas shared a highly homogenous situational context. All were mobilized in the latter part of the war and, for the most part, did not fear indiscriminate violence from the

government armed forces. However, according to an FMLN commander, this time period also saw an expansion in the FMLN recruitment efforts:

> When I arrived to El Tigre and was responsible for that zone, we had 114 combatants, including the personnel in supplies, medicine, explosives, propaganda, and the kitchen. When the war ended, we had nearly the same number of people, but from the initial group to the final group, only 17 of us survived. One by one, our *compas* fell and were substituted by others, and then they fell as well. What we had in the end was like a third generation. Such human waste forced certain levels of flexibility [in recruitment practices].

He went on to say that, given the very basic need for bodies, it became common late in the war to give entrance to "people motivated purely by the desire for adventure."

In sum, recruited guerillas were persuaded to leave the refugee camps for the guerrilla camps by a member of the FMLN. They were not invited to participate because they shared common ideologies with the guerrillas, but rather were identified by their perceived biographical availability. Recruitment messages were unavoidable and appealed to women's emotions; all recruited guerrillas frame their mobilization as an effort to avenge the death of loved ones or to seek adventure outside refugee camp walls.

[…]

Conclusions

Using a rare representative sample of activists and nonactivists, I identify three distinct mobilization patterns that consistently led rural Salvadoran women to involvement in the FMLN guerrilla army: politicized, reluctant, and recruited guerrillas. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for studies of women guerrillas and revolutionary movements specifically, as well as for studies of microlevel mobilization processes in general.

[…]

This study improves our understanding of the mobilization processes that led impoverished women in patriarchal societies to participate in guerrilla armies. Previous research highlights the importance of networks (prior organizational involvement and family ties to activists), the absence of biographical barriers, and a situation of repression. My research confirms the importance of these factors but enhances our understanding of how each works individually and in combination with one another.

First, with regard to networks, I find that the organizational involvement cited as critical in all previous studies is central to some women's mobilization, but not to most. The importance of family ties to activists is also questioned; nearly all women in war zones, both guerrillas and nonguerrillas, had close family members serving the FMLN. I add to existing explanations the critical role of refugee camps as organizational sites of mobilization for many women guerrillas. The all-encompassing, totalizing nature of membership in a refugee camp may account for its particular effectiveness in propelling young, childless women into guerrilla armies.

Second, this study reiterates the importance of biography for explaining women's guerrilla mobilization. However, the ways in which biography matters are much more complex than the literature suggests. Biography not only influences a woman's internal participation decision, it also shapes the *external role expectation* held by powerful others who may have the ability to influence, or at times even require, her guerrilla participation. In the case of guerrilla activism, young, childless women were particularly vulnerable to recruitment, while women who were mothers or who had complete families were often protected from pressures to participate.

Third, previous conceptualizations of the effects of repression are too static. Levels and types of repression changed greatly over the course of the war, and this variation had a direct impact on how, when, and why women mobilized. Early in the war, repression directly mobilized even unlikely participants (women, young and old, with and without children, in patriarchal societies, and with no past political involvement) through mass dislocation and chaos. Later in the war, repression indirectly mobilized a more select group of women because earlier repressive periods forcefully forged new networks (within refugee camps and repopulations) and gave new meaning to existing biographies (young and childless), and these changes then continued to

powerfully shape mobilization processes long after the repression itself subsided. Yet in contrast with previous studies, I do not find that repression was a catalyst pushing already active women into the guerrillas. Rather, politically active women appear to have been pulled into clandestine activism by their already strong participation identities.

Finally, whereas previous studies propose one "typical" route to activism, I find that the variable interaction of networks, biographies, and situational contexts created three distinct paths to guerrilla participation for rural Salvadoran women. Moreover, the proposed "typical" path, most closely exemplified by politicized guerrillas, accounted for only a small portion of the guerrillas I interviewed. By contrast, I find that most women's mobilization was either directly (reluctant guerrillas) or indirectly (recruited guerrillas) motivated by state-sponsored repression, and not by previous political participation.

This microlevel finding has important implications for macrolevel explanations of popular mobilizations. Specifically, my analysis of women's guerrilla mobilization in El Salvador supports and extends Goodwin's (2001) model of popular revolutionary activism. In his cross-national comparison, Goodwin finds that repressive state structures mobilize antistate dissent through their use of indiscriminate violence, and in effect leave citizens with "no other way out" than revolution (Goodwin 2001). The experiences of my respondents verify the central role of state-sponsored repression for generating grassroots mobilization when individuals have no other way out. But my data further suggest that the more central role of repression in generating popular mobilization is in creating effective recruitment environments, and resounding recruitment frames, that movement leaders can then use to grow their movement. This recruitment may actually become most effective after state-sponsored repression subsides and movement leaders have more and better opportunities to pursue recruitment activities. Future studies of revolution should take into account how the changing intensity and motives of state-level repression may in turn generate new openings for movements' recruitment efforts.

The macrolevel implications of this study also extend to the maintenance and consequences of revolutionary mobilizations. For example, the different paths that individuals take to revolutionary mobilizations may in turn influence their long-term commitment to the movement. Can unwilling participants be converted into ideological supporters of the cause and be encouraged to stay involved, or will they leave their activist role behind at the first opportune moment? Likewise, the current literature on women revolutionaries continues to debate the consequences of women's revolutionary participation for whether women win new rights under new democracies. This study suggests that whether and how women continue their activism after the war may depend in part on their varied paths to participation. Will women guerrillas, who mobilized around identities and frames that were not connected to the traditional gender role of motherhood, carry their activism forward to new forms of postwar participation? Or will women who were "pushed" and "persuaded" into guerrilla participation return to more traditional gender roles once the war has ended?

[…]

Notes

1   In Latin America alone, large numbers of women have participated in left-wing guerrilla movements in Nicaragua, Guatemala, the Chiapas (Mexico), Colombia, and Peru. Around the world, women have been militant, antistate activists in such diverse nations as Russia (in Chechnya), Eritrea, Iraq (especially the Kurdish region), Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.

2   Specifically, interest-based explanations cannot explain why some injustices lead to action and others do not, or why some aggrieved individuals participate in movements while others sit back and allow the activists to fight for all similarly aggrieved people (i.e., Olson's [1965] "free-rider" problem).

3   Interests, especially categorical interests such as class, race, and gender, remain central to the concept of mobilizing networks. However, they are usually in combination with more finite social organizations. For example, Tilly's (1978) adaptation of Harrison

White's CATNET table shows how categorical membership can intersect with social network patterns to create extraordinary collective action potential, and McAdam's (1992) analysis of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee found that gender significantly affected recruitment decisions by movement leaders within targeted recruitment networks.

4   For discussions of how waging war is a gendered process, see El-Bushra and Piza Lopez (1994), El-Bushra and Mukarubuga (1995), Enloe (1990), Skaine (1999), Wechsler Segal (1995), and Wickham-Crowley (1992, pp. 21–23).

5   According to Wickham-Crowley (1992), very few women became involved in the "first wave" of antigovernment guerrilla armies of the 1950s and 1960s, and those who did were largely relegated to support roles for male combatants. By the "second wave" movements of the 1970s and 1980s, however, women's participation differed substantially from the earlier movements in both number and in form. Wickham-Crowley states that "in no other fashion does the second wave of guerrillas differ so thoroughly from the first wave" than through the burgeoning numbers of women in their ranks (Wickham-Crowley 1992, p. 215).

6   Reif-Lobao (1986, 1998) analyzed women guerrillas in Cuba, Colombia, Uruguay, Nicaragua, and El Salvador; Mason (1992) compared women's guerrilla activism in Nicaragua and El Salvador; and Kampwirth (2002) interviews women revolutionaries in Mexico, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

7   Vázquez et al. also suggest that motherhood may be a mobilizer, as mothers sometimes followed their older sons and daughters into guerrilla activism (Vázquez et al. 1996, pp. 108–9).

8   Motherhood often serves as both a collective identity and a collective action frame for women who participate in social and revolutionary movements (Molyneux 1985; Ferree and Mueller 2004). As a collective identity, motherhood allows women to develop a sense of "we-ness" with other women, even across political lines (Bayard de Volo 2001). As a collective action frame, mobilizing as mothers is not only strategically effective, but it also provides women some initial protection against state-sponsored violence. See, for example, Bouvard's (2002) discussion of "revolutionizing motherhood"

in the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, Naples's (1998) study of "activist mothering" in the U.S. war on poverty, and Noonan's (1995) analysis of women's anti-Pinochet protesting in Chile. Neuhouser (1995) found that the gendered division of labor shaped both strategies and outcomes in social movements in a Brazilian squatter community. Bayard de Volo (2001) provides a particularly nuanced discussion of the complex relationship between revolution and motherhood.

9   Nearly all social movement researchers only study movement activists (and not nonactivists) and thus are guilty of sampling on the dependent variable. Notable exceptions include McAdam (1992), McAdam and Paulsen (1993), and Nepstad and Smith (1999).

10 All names are pseudonyms, and all translations are my own.

11 The small number of guerrillas in this category may be attributed to their early entry into the war and their dedication to the causes of the war. It may be that politicized guerrillas were in the war for longer periods of time and took part in more dangerous types of guerrilla activities than women in other categories, so fewer politicized guerrillas may have survived the war to be included in my study.

12 Zoila is the only politicized guerrilla mobilized late in the war. Nevertheless, she had been an active guerrilla collaborator and community leader since 1983 and made the move into the guerrilla camps in 1989 immediately prior to the FMLN "final offensive."

13 None of the politically involved reluctant guerrillas suggested that they were specifically targeted by repression because of their activities, as suggested in the current literature. Rather, they were members of villages that came under indiscriminate state violence.

14 Many women who were childless when they joined the FMLN eventually left the guerrilla camps for the security of the refugee camps upon becoming pregnant. Several of my respondents even suggested that some women purposefully got pregnant when they tired of life in the guerrilla camp, as this guaranteed them safe escort to a refugee camp or repopulated community and a legitimate reason for exiting the fight for social justice.

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Part IV

Who Remains in Movements, Who Drops Out, and Why?

Introduction

Recruiting activists and supporters is one obvious challenge that movements confront. Keeping these recruits committed to and active within the movement is quite another. Meeting this challenge is important because a movement may need to work for many years or even decades to bring about desired changes. A movement that constantly needs to replace recruits who have dropped out is not likely to be very effective. And, of course, if too many people drop out and cannot be replaced, then the movement will decline or disappear altogether, an issue we take up more directly in Part VIII.

The reasons that people remain active in movements may be very different from the reasons they became involved in the first place. Recruits may greatly enjoy (or come to dislike!) their lives with other activists or movement supporters. The movement or movement organization may head in a direction that supporters either applaud or reject. Why people remain committed to a movement for some significant period of time, then, is a different question from why they joined in the first place; likewise, why some people drop out of movements is a different question from why some never joined in the first place.

Despite their importance, these questions have received less attention from scholars than the recruitment issue, but they have not been neglected altogether. The issue of commitment to a cause was taken up years ago by Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1972) in her study of nineteenth-century communes like Brook Farm and Oneida—communities that share a number of characteristics with social movements, including voluntary membership, moral idealism, and a rejection of certain aspects of the larger society (see also Hall 1988). Kanter emphasizes that commitment to a cause or group is simultaneously cognitive, affective, and moral—it involves people's beliefs, feelings, and moral judgments. Kanter catalogues a variety of "commitment mechanisms" that helped to keep people in the communes she studied, some of which lasted for many decades. Communes were more successful, for example, when they did not have to compete for their members' loyalties. The opportunities and temptations of the "outside world" would often pull people out of communes (just as they pull people out of movements), so they tried to insulate themselves in various ways, sometimes geographically. Radical movement groups, which generally demand a lot from their members, also typically try to limit members' relationships

Mass Society Before the 1960s, most scholars took a dim view of protest. They preferred politics within normal institutional channels. They usually argued that people protested because they were swept up in irrational crowds, or because they had personality flaws for which they were trying to compensate. One popular theory claimed that people joined social movements when they had lost other organized contacts with the main institutions of their society, like clubs or churches. This makes them susceptible to demagogues like Stalin or Hitler. (The theory was heavily influenced by fears of communism and fascism.) In today's "mass society," people watch television as individuals, the argument goes, rather than going out and joining bowling leagues and volunteer groups (Kornhauser 1959). Few scholars still accept this argument, now that it has been shown that protestors are usually well integrated into their communities and social networks.

Leaders Research tends to focus on networks, organizations, and groups, but individuals matter to mobilization in many ways. Some social movement "organizations" are actually the work of a single person, even though she may be able to mobilize others for specific events. In more complex organizations, decisions at various levels are often made, in the end, by one or a few individuals. Some individuals become leaders because they are effective **brokers**, bringing together previously unconnected groups and organizations. In addition to these *influential* individuals, there are *symbolic* ones. A person such as Martin Luther King, Jr. or Nelson Mandela may come to embody the aspirations, indignation, and other ideals of a movement in a way that can inspire members—or arouse opponents. This is one source of charisma.

with outsiders. Of course, the heavy time commitment that some such groups require of their members has the same practical effect, although activists notoriously "burn out" if too much is demanded of them for too long.

Another threat to commitment which Kanter found came from within the communes themselves, namely the possibility that members would spend too much time with family, friends, or people to whom they were romantically or sexually attracted, neglecting their obligations to the larger group. To prevent this, communes often separated family members, raised children communally, and prohibited monogamous marriages. Movements also face the potential threat of "dyadic withdrawal," when movement activists meet, fall in love, and gradually withdraw from public activities for the pleasures of a more private life (Goodwin 1997).

Kanter also found that communes lasted longer the more they engaged in collective activities that forged a strong group identity and *esprit de corps*. Working, eating, singing, playing, praying, and making decisions together—all these activities, which movements also practice, helped to develop strong affective bonds between commune members as well as a strong moral commitment to their common enterprise. The reading by Eric Hirsch (in Chapter 10) similarly emphasizes how collective "consciousness-raising" discussions and collective decision-making helped to build solidarity among members of a student movement opposed to university investments in South Africa. (Consciousness-raising groups were first popularized by the women's movement, especially its more radical wing, during the late 1960s and early 1970s.) Hirsch also argues that polarization and the escalation of conflict may build group solidarity as outside threats induce members to turn inward for mutual support and protection (intellectual, moral, and sometimes physical). The resulting "ideological purity" binds activists together, although it may also prevent them from understanding potential allies or making compromises.

The reading by Nancy Whittier (Chapter 11) explores how some women in Columbus, Ohio, continued to identify themselves as radical feminists, and remained committed to radical feminist principles, even though the women's movement as a whole had declined. They sustained their radical feminist identity through a number of mechanisms that overlap with those stressed by Hirsch: collective activities, including consciousness-raising groups and protest itself; interactions within a dense

network of like-minded friends and acquaintances; the use of feminist language; and, interestingly, the ritual telling of "cautionary tales" about women who have "sold out" their feminist principles. These and other factors established group boundaries between radical feminists and others. Whittier suggests, however, that while group boundaries often become rigid and exclusive when movements are in decline, the boundaries drawn by the radical feminists whom she studied generally became more permeable. Radical feminists became more accepting of and emotionally open to nonfeminists and men, especially gay men.

In contrast to "nice" movements like these, Janja Lalich has written about cults that demand the full commitment—sometimes even the lives—of participants (Chapter 12). Rescuing the idea of a "true believer" from older crowd and mass society traditions, she shows that people become true believers not because of their own personality flaws, but through group processes that remake participants' views of the world, pressure them to obey charismatic leaders, and limit their perceived options. Although she discusses extreme types of groups, the same kinds of pressure for conformity are present in milder forms in all groups that depend on a serious time commitment by members.

We can't understand commitment without understanding culture and psychology. The resource mobilization and then political process theorists simply assumed that protestors had rational goals, primarily the pursuit of their own economic, political, and legal interests. By assuming this, they did not have to investigate protestors' points of view any more than crowd theorists had. To them, the idea that protestors had strong emotions seemed to admit that protestors were not rational; the idea that protestors needed to do some cultural work to "construct" their grievances and goals seemed to make these less important, more arbitrary. Besides, if a group's interests were structurally determined—by their economic class position, say, or by racism in the laws—it was easy to concentrate on the mobilization of resources and other opportunities for action, which most interested these theorists. They assumed the willingness to protest was already there, and only needed an opportunity for expression. It should be obvious that grievances stimulate protest, but only recently have they been fully incorporated into models of social movements (Pinard 2011).

Ryan and Gamson (Chapter 13) show how cultural framings are intertwined with strategic activities. Good frames don't do anything by themselves, but must be combined with organizations and networks and other sorts of mobilizing activities. Frames are not especially useful for reaching anonymous audiences through the mass media; they are better as a means for carrying on conversations with allies and components of your own coalition. They allow different groups to talk to one another about how to proceed. Of course, the news media matter a lot, but they contain individuals and organizations with whom activists must carry on a dialogue.

Almost all scholars now admit that cultural meanings are an important dimension of social movements, that we need to look at how protestors view the world and at the kind of rhetoric they use to present this vision to others. There are still gaps in the literature. For all the process theorists' emphasis on the state and other players in a movement's environment, they have done little work to understand these other people's points of view. State bureaucrats, politicians, and police officers also have distinctive worldviews, and also try to persuade others that their arguments and perspectives are valid. Few scholars have approached these others from a cultural point of view (for one exception, see Jasper 1990). This has been left to neighboring fields of research such as that on moral panics (e.g. Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994).

Another big gap has been the emotions of protestors. Almost all the cultural work on social movements has been about their cognitive beliefs and moral principles, but an equally important part of culture consists of their feelings about the world, themselves, and each other. In Chapter 14 Elisabeth Wood looks at Salvadoran peasants' long war against the brutal regime that ruled El Salvador through the 1980s. These men and women could have avoided some of the costs of war by free riding, but instead they took enormous risks. Participation itself, regardless of whether they won or lost, was deeply satisfying, even joyful, to them. It allowed them to express moral outrage and to claim the basic dignity due to all human beings. Emotions such as anger and hope turn out to be the core of social movements.

Discussion Questions

1   What type of collective activities might help to sustain commitment to a particular movement? Might some such activities seem too demanding?

2   How might the escalation of a conflict between a movement and its opponents reinforce the solidarity of that movement? When might an escalating conflict lead people to disengage from a movement?

3   How do people sustain their commitment to a cause that has fallen on hard times?

4   What traits and actions make a leader charismatic? Why do people follow him or her?

5   Why do activists "burn out"? What might movements do to prevent this?

6   What are the possible satisfactions that come from protest itself, as opposed to victory?

7   How do songs help arouse emotions that might sustain protest? How about frames?

10

Generating Commitment among Students

Eric L. Hirsch

[…] This article develops an alternative perspective on recruitment and commitment to protest movements; it emphasizes the importance of the development of *political solidarity*, that is, support for a group cause and its tactics. Mobilization can then be explained by analyzing how group-based political processes, such as *consciousness-raising*, *collective empowerment*, *polarization*, and *group decision-making*, induce movement participants to sacrifice their personal welfare for the group cause. Empirical support for this perspective comes from a detailed analysis of a Columbia University student movement that demanded that the university divest itself of stock in companies doing business in South Africa.

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Impact of Group Processes

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Consciousness-Raising

Potential recruits are not likely to join a protest movement unless they develop an ideological commitment to the group cause and believe that only non-institutional means can further that cause. Consciousness-raising involves a group discussion where such beliefs are created or reinforced. It may occur among members of an emerging movement who realize they face a problem of common concern that cannot be solved through routine political processes. Or it may happen in an ongoing movement, when movement activists try to convince potential recruits that their cause is just, that institutional means of influence have been unsuccessful, and that morally committed individuals must fight for the cause. Effective consciousness-raising is a difficult task because protest tactics usually challenge acknowledged authority relationships. Predisposing factors, such as prior political socialization, may make certain individuals susceptible to some appeals and unsympathetic to others.

Consciousness-raising is not likely to take place among socially marginal individuals because such isolation implies difficulty in communicating ideas to others. And it is not likely to happen among a group of rational calculators

Affective Ties Social relationships based on friendship or sexual attraction are often important in recruiting people to protest events and social movements, and these relationships also help to keep people in a group or movement once they have joined. (It is alleged, for example, that many young men became involved in the Reverend Jim Lawson's civil disobedience workshops in Nashville in order to be close to Diane Nash.) Such affective ties are thus an important component of **indigenous organization**. These ties, however, may also hurt movements. Strong affective ties to people outside a movement may prevent one from joining that movement or developing a strong commitment to it; such ties, in other words, may make one biographically *un*-available for protest. And people may meet in a movement, fall in love, and drop out, a phenomenon known as "dyadic withdrawal." See Goodwin (1997).

because the evaluation of society and of the chances for change is often influenced more by commitment to political or moral values than by self-interest calculations (Fireman and Gamson 1979; Ferree and Miller 1985). Consciousness-raising is facilitated in non-hierarchical, loosely structured, face-to-face settings that are isolated from persons in power; in such *havens* (Hirsch 1989), people can easily express concerns, become aware of common problems, and begin to question the legitimacy of institutions that deny them the means for resolving those problems.

Collective Empowerment

The recruitment and commitment of participants in a protest movement may also be affected by a group process called collective empowerment. While recruits may gain a sense of the potential power of a movement in consciousness-raising sessions, the real test for the movement comes at the actual protest site where all involved see how many are willing to take the risks associated with challenging authority. If large numbers are willing to sacrifice themselves for the movement, the

chances for success seem greater; a "bandwagon effect" (Hirsch 1986) convinces people to participate in this particular protest because of its presumed ability to accomplish the movement goal. Tactics are more easily viewed as powerful if they are highly visible, dramatic, and disrupt normal institutional routines.

Polarization

A third important group process is polarization. Protest challenges authority in a way that institutional tactics do not because it automatically questions the rules of the decision-making game. The use of non-routine methods of influence also means that there is always uncertainty about the target's response. For these reasons, one common result of a protest is unpredictable escalating conflict. Each side sees the battle in black and white terms, uses increasingly coercive tactics, and develops high levels of distrust and anger toward the opponent.

Polarization is often seen as a problem since it convinces each side that their position is right and the opponent's is wrong; this makes compromise and negotiation less likely. Since it leads each side to develop the independent goal of harming the opponent, movement participants may lose sight of their original goal. Finally, escalation of coercive tactics by those in power can result in demobilization of the movement as individual participants assess the potential negative consequences of continued participation.

But if other group processes, such as consciousness-raising and collective empowerment, have created sufficient group identification, the protesters will respond to threats as a powerful, angry group rather than as isolated, frightened individuals. Under these circumstances, polarization can have a strong positive impact on participation (Coser 1956, 1967; Edelman 1971). The sense of crisis that develops in such conflicts strengthens participants' belief that their fate is tied to that of the group. They develop a willingness to continue to participate despite the personal risks because they believe the costs of protest should be collectively shared. Greater consensus on group goals develops because the importance of social factors in perception increases in an ambiguous conflict; protesters become more likely to accept the arguments of their loved fellow activists and less likely to accept those of their hated enemy. Because of

the need to act quickly in a crisis, participants also become willing to submerge their differences with respect to the group's tactical choices.

Collective Decision-Making

Finally, collective decision-making often plays an important role in motivating the continuing commitment of movement participants. Movements often have group discussions about whether to initiate, continue, or end a given protest. Committed protesters may feel bound by group decisions made during such discussions, even when those decisions are contrary to their personal preferences. Participation in a protest movement is often the result of a complex group decision-making process, and not the consequence of many isolated, rational individual decisions.

The Columbia Divestment Campaign: A Case Study

The importance of these four group processes—consciousness-raising, collective empowerment, polarization, and group decision-making—in recruitment and commitment in a protest movement is illustrated by the Columbia University divestment protest. In April of 1985, several hundred Columbia University and Barnard College students sat down in front of the chained doors of the main Columbia College classroom and administrative building, Hamilton Hall, and stated that they would not leave until the university divested itself of stock in companies doing business in South Africa. Many students remained on this "blockade" for three weeks. This was a particularly good case for the analysis of movement recruitment and commitment because the majority of the participants in the protest had not been active previously in the divestment or other campus protest movements.

Protest actions of this kind can create problems for researchers because the organizers' need for secrecy often prevents the researcher from knowing of the event in advance. The best solution is to use as many diverse research methods as possible to study the movement after it has begun. I spent many hours at the protest site each day observing the activities of the protesters and their opponent, the Columbia administration. I also discussed the demonstration with participants and non-participants at the protest site, in classrooms, and other campus settings; and examined the many leaflets, position papers, and press reports on the demonstration.

During the summer of 1985, I completed 19 extended interviews, averaging one and one-half hours each, with blockaders and members of the steering committee of the Coalition for a Free South Africa (CFSA), the group that organized and led the protest. The interviews covered the protester's political background, previous experience in politics and protest movements, her/his experiences during the three weeks of the protest, and feelings about the personal consequences of participation. All quotes are taken from transcripts of these interviews.

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Consciousness-Raising

The Coalition for a Free South Africa (CFSA) was founded in 1981 to promote Columbia University's divestment of stock in companies doing business in South Africa. It was a loosely structured group with a predominantly black steering committee of about a dozen individuals who made decisions by consensus, and a less active circle of about fifty students who attended meetings and the group's protests and educational events. The group was non-hierarchical, non-bureaucratic, and had few resources other than its members' labor. The CFSA tried to convince Columbia and Barnard students that blacks faced injustice under apartheid, that U.S. corporations with investments in South Africa profited from the low wages paid to blacks, that Columbia was an accomplice in apartheid because it invested in the stock of these companies, and that divestment would advance the anti-apartheid movement by putting economic and political pressure on the white regime of South Africa.

This consciousness-raising was done in a variety of small group settings, including dormitory rap sessions, forums, and teach-ins. Coverage of the CFSA's activities in the Columbia student newspaper and television reports on the violent repression of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa increased student consciousness of apartheid and encouraged many students to support divestment.

Even in this early period, conflict between the CFSA and the Columbia administration affected the views of potential movement recruits. At first, the CFSA tried to achieve divestment by using traditional avenues of influence. In 1983, the organization was able to gain a unanimous vote for divestment by administration, faculty, and student representatives in the University Senate, but Columbia's Board of Trustees rejected the resolution. As one protester pointed out, that action was interpreted by many students as an indication that traditional means of influence could not achieve divestment:

> I remember in '83 when the Senate voted to divest. I was convinced that students had voiced their opinion and had been able to convince the minority of administrators that what they wanted was a moral thing. It hadn't been a bunch of radical youths taking buildings and burning things down, to destroy. But rather, going through the system, and it seemed to me that for the first time in a really long time the system was going to work. And then I found out that it hadn't worked, and that just reaffirmed my feelings about how the system at Columbia really did work.

The result of CFSA's extensive organizing work was that many students were aware of the oppressed state of blacks in South Africa, the call for divestment by anti-apartheid activists, and the intransigence of the university President and Trustees in the face of a unanimous vote for divestment by the representative democratic body at the university.

Collective Empowerment: The Initiation of the Blockade

In the next phase of the movement, the CFSA sponsored rallies and vigils to call attention to the intransigence of the Trustees. Few students attended these demonstrations, probably because few supporters believed they would result in divestment. Deciding that more militant tactics were necessary, the CFSA steering committee began to plan a fast by steering committee members and a takeover of a campus building. The plan called for chaining shut the doors of the building and blocking the entrance with protesters; this, it was assumed, would lead to a symbolic

arrest of a few dozen steering committee members and other hard-core supporters of divestment. The intent was to draw media coverage to dramatize the continuing fight for divestment.

Because they had worked hard on publicity, the steering committee of CFSA expected a large turnout for their initial rally, but fewer than 200 students gathered at the Sundial in the center of campus on the morning of April 4. Speeches were made by a local political official, a representative of the African National Congress, several black South African students, and members of the CFSA steering committee. Many of those interviewed had been at the rally, but none felt that the speeches were any more or less inspiring than speeches they had heard at previous CFSA events.

At the conclusion of the speeches, nearly all of those present agreed to follow one of the CFSA steering committee members on a march around campus. Most expected to chant a few anti-apartheid and pro-divestment slogans and return to the Sundial for a short wrap-up speech. Instead, they were led to the steps in front of the already-chained doors at Hamilton Hall. The protesters did not understand at first why they had been led to this spot, and few noticed the chained doors.

The steering committee member then revealed the day's plan, stating that this group of protesters would not leave the steps until the university divested itself of stock in companies doing business in South Africa. At least 150 students remained where they were; no one recalls a significant number of defections. Within two hours, the group on the steps grew to over 250.

Why did so many students agree to participate in this militant protest? The CFSA steering committee did not have an answer. Student participation in their relatively safe rallies and vigils had been minimal, so they certainly did not expect hundreds to join a much riskier act of civil disobedience. According to one steering committee member:

> Needless to say, I was quite startled by the events of April 4. By noon, there must have been hundreds more people than I expected there would be. I was hoping for 50 people, including the hard core. We would all get carted off, and whatever obstacles were blockading the door would be cut, removed, or thrown up. That's what everyone was expecting. We would

have a story written and the press would report that we had done this. Jesus Christ, what happened that day was absolutely mind boggling! I still haven't gotten over it.

It was hard for anyone to predict the high level of mobilization based on the prior actions and attitudes of the participants because so few had been active in the divestment movement prior to April 4. Only 9 percent of the random sample of students reported that they had been at least somewhat active in the divestment movement, yet 37 percent participated in blockade rallies and/or slept overnight on the steps of Hamilton Hall. In fact, these students did not know that they would join this militant protest until it was actually initiated.

It is unlikely that the decision to participate was due to a narrow individual cost/benefit analysis including such costs as the time involved and the definite possibilities of arrest and/or disciplinary action by the university. Regarding personal benefits, it is hard to see how any Columbia student could gain from the divestment of South Africa-related stock.

Rather, participation was due to a belief in the cause and the conviction that this protest might work where previous CFSA actions had failed. Consciousness-raising had convinced these students of the importance of divestment, but they had not participated in the movement because they did not believe its tactics would work. Once several hundred were in front of the doors, many demonstrators felt that such a large group using a dramatic tactic would have the power to call attention to the evils of apartheid and cause the university to seriously consider divestment:

> Often when I would see a rally, I'd think that here was a bunch of people huffing and puffing about an issue who are going to be ignored and things are going to go on just as they were before this rally. The fact that there were a couple of hundred people out there with the purpose of altering the way the University does business gave me the feeling that this would be noticed, that people would pay attention.

The belief in the potential power of the tactic was reinforced by the willingness of several leaders of the movement to sacrifice their individual interests to achieve divestment. Two black South African students who spoke at the rally faced the possibility of exile or arrest and imprisonment upon their return home. About half a dozen CFSA steering committee members had fasted for nearly two weeks simply to get a meeting with the university President and Trustees; two of these students were eventually hospitalized. As one blockader testified:

> The fasters were doing something that personally took a lot of willpower for them, and that gave you a little extra willpower. To have to go into the hospital because you were off food for fifteen days, and the Trustees won't even speak to you. It really made me angry at the Trustees, so I was determined that this was not something that was just going to wimper off. At least I was going to be there, and I know others felt the same way.

The leaders of the protest recruited participants by taking personal risks that demonstrated their own commitment to the cause and to this particular tactic; other students in the blockade ignored individual interests in favor of the cause as well.

> I do think it has something to do with the support of peers, just seeing that there were people who were willing to extend themselves and put their own asses on the line. I guess it's the self-sacrifice aspect of it that appealed to me, that really drew my attention. These people were willing to sacrifice their own personal interests in a big way, or a larger way than usual. That's something that hit a chord with me. It was the degree to which people were willing to give up self-interest.

Another factor influencing participation may have been the fact that the protesters were not forced to decide to join the protest at all. Instead, they were led as a group to a position in front of the doors, unaware that this was an act of civil disobedience; the only decision to be made was whether or not to leave the protest. Although this was done because CFSA did not want to reveal its plans to campus security prematurely, the unintended consequence was to maximize participation; it was difficult for demonstrators to leave the steps because of the public example of self-sacrificing black South Africans and the fasters.

Of course, each protester had many less public opportunities to leave the protest during the three weeks after April 4th. Most stayed, partly because of growing evidence of the power of this tactic. The protest soon gained the public support of a variety of groups locally and nationally, including Harlem community groups and churches, the Columbia faculty, unions on and off the campus, the African National Congress, and the United Nations. Students on other campuses engaged in similar protests. This support made the blockaders believe that their challenge to the authority of the Columbia administration was moral, necessary, and powerful. One blockader described this as being "part of something that was much larger than myself." Another suggested:

> One thing I believe now is that people in a grassroots movement can actually have an impact, that we're not all completely helpless. I guess it was that sense of power that I didn't have before.

Polarization and Increased Commitment

Because the blockade was an unconventional attempt to gain political influence, the steering committee of CFSA was unable to predict how many would participate. For the same reason, they were unable to predict their opponent's reaction to their tactic. Based on the information they had on recent South African consulate and embassy protests, they assumed they would be arrested soon after the doors of Hamilton Hall were chained. As these expectations of a mostly symbolic arrest were communicated to the less politically experienced blockaders, a consensus developed that the blockade would be short-lived.

However, the administration did not order the arrest of the protesters. Instead, Columbia's President sent a letter to everyone at the university arguing that the students were "disruptive" and "coercive," and that they were trying to impose their will on the rest of the university. He suggested that "countless avenues of free speech" in the university community were open to them and that what they were doing was illegal, that divestment would probably hurt rather than help blacks in South Africa, and that the university was doing all it could to fight apartheid.

University officials began to videotape the protesters in order to prosecute them under university regulations on obstructing university buildings and disrupting university functions. They sent letters threatening suspension or expulsion to the members of the CFSA steering committee and a few others. Guarantees were given that those who reported for individual disciplinary hearings would be treated more leniently than those who did not. They also obtained a court order calling on participants in the blockade to cease and desist.

By threatening suspensions and expulsions, the administration had raised the stakes; the protesters felt much more threatened by these academic penalties than by symbolic arrests. There were other costs associated with participating in this protest, including dealing with the cold and freezing rain; missing classes, exams, and study time; and losing close relationships with nonblockaders. Ignoring these costs, the steering committee members who received letters refused to go to the disciplinary hearings, suggested that the administration was engaging in unfair selective prosecution, and reiterated their determination to remain in front of Hamilton Hall until the university divested.

Such actions were to be expected from the strongly committed CFSA steering committee. The surprise was that the less experienced majority of protesters also refused to be intimidated and remained on the blockade. They did so in part because of an example of self-sacrifice by one of their own. One of the politically inexperienced students, a senior with three weeks to go before graduation, received a letter threatening him with expulsion. Initially, he was scared:

> I was petrified, especially since Columbia has not been fun for me but rather painful. I really wanted to get out of here, and I was horrified by the thought that I would either have to come back to Columbia or go somewhere else and lose credits by transfering. My reaction was, "Why do they have to pick me? Why do I have to be the focal point of this whole thing?"

But he decided not to report for disciplinary action. He felt that he could not give in to his fears in the face of the sacrifices being made by the fasters and South African students.

Listening to the commitment on the part of the steering committee people who had received letters made me feel bad that I even considered leaving the blockade. One other factor was the fasters, the fact that there were South Africans involved in it, and that these people had more on the line than I did. I felt like I could not let these people down. I also felt that I was a sort of representative of a lot of people on the blockade and I felt I could not set a precedent by leaving and backing down.

His example was extremely important for the maintenance of commitment by the other inexperienced blockaders:

> They threatened (the blockader) with expulsion. It was sobering in a way. But it helped bond us together. It was stupid to do that because it just made people more furious, and it made people more resolved to stay. We just said we're not going to let him be expelled. We're all going to stick together in this.

The protesters responded as a group to administration threats, not as isolated individuals. Individual concerns about disciplinary actions were now secondary; each blockader saw her or his welfare as tied to the group fate. Paradoxically, the potential for high personal costs became a reason for participation; protesters wanted to be part of an important and powerful movement and they did not want fellow activists to face the wrath of the authorities alone. The night the threat of arrest was assumed to be greatest, Easter Sunday, was also the one night out of twenty-one with the greatest number sleeping out on the blockade. Soon after this, 500 students signed a statement accepting personal responsibility for the blockade.

Collective Decision-Making and the End of the Blockade

Another group process which influenced participation in this protest was collective decision-making. Open-ended rap sessions among the blockaders, lasting up to four or five hours, were begun after administration representatives delivered the first disciplinary letters to the protesters. In all cases, a serious attempt was made to reach consensus among all those on the

steps; votes were held on only a few occasions. One of the main questions was whether to continue the protest. This discussion was initiated by members of the CFSA steering committee because of their commitment to democratic decision-making, and because they understood that the blockaders would be more likely to continue the protest if they participated in a collective decision to do so. During the first two weeks of the protest, the consensus was to continue the blockade.

By the third week, though, some of the protesters began to feel that the protest should be ended. The sense of crisis had been dulled by the lack of action by the administration to back up their threats. It was now clear that there were no plans to call in the police to make arrests. As one blockader put it, the "university's policy of waiting it out was becoming effective." Also, an event can be news for only so long, and the image of Columbia students sitting on some steps became commonplace. Diminishing television and print coverage reduced the collective belief in the power of this particular tactic. As one protester suggested:

> It was during the third week that I started spending nights at home and coming up in the morning. During the last week I probably spent three nights out [on the steps] and four nights at home. During that third week a kind of mood of lethargy hit, and it became a chorelike atmosphere. There was a lot of feeling that it was kind of futile to stay out there.

In the face of declining participation, long and heated discussions were held about ending the protest. Proponents of continuing the action argued that protesters ought to honor their commitment to stay in front of the doors until Columbia divested. Those who advocated ending the protest argued that divestment was not imminent and that the blockade was no longer effective. As one protester put it:

> The blockade ended because a very thoughtful and carefully planned decision was made. It was a question of what we could do that would be most effective for divestment. We decided that the blockade had done a lot, but at this point other things would be better, seeing how the administration was willing to sit us out.

On the 25th of April, the blockade officially ended with a march into Harlem to a rally at a Baptist Church. Five months later, the Columbia Trustees divested.

[…]

Conclusion

[…] Years of well-organized activities by the CFSA were crucial in raising consciousness about the apartheid issue and on the need for noninstitutional means of influence to achieve divestment. The blockade itself was initiated only after two months of careful planning by the CFSA steering committee.

The blockaders were not just isolated individuals with preferences for divestment nor a set of confused, insecure people; rather, they were people who had been convinced by CFSA meetings that apartheid was evil, that divestment would help South African blacks, and that divestment could be achieved through protest. They joined the blockade on April 4th because it appeared to offer a powerful alternative to previously impotent demonstrations and because of the example of self-sacrificing CFSA leaders. The solidarity of the group increased after the administration's escalation of the conflict because group identification among the protesters was already strong enough so that they responded to the threat as a powerful group rather than as powerless individuals. Protesters remained at this long and risky protest partly because of the democratic decision-making processes used by the group.

This analysis of the 1985 Columbia University divestment protest indicates that useful theories of movement mobilization must include insights about how individual protesters are convinced by group-level processes to sacrifice themselves for the cause. This means asking new kinds of

questions in movement research: What kinds of arguments in what kinds of settings convince people to support a political cause? Why do potential recruits decide that non-institutional means of influence are justified and necessary? Under what circumstances is the example of leaders sacrificing for the cause likely to induce people to join a risky protest? Why do some tactics appear to offer a greater chance of success than others? Under what conditions do threats or actual repression by authorities create greater internal solidarity in a protest group? Under what conditions do threats or repression result in the demobilization of protest? What kinds of group decision-making processes are likely to convince people to continue to participate in a protest movement?

Generalizing from case studies is always difficult. Some aspects of student movements make them unusual, especially the ability of organizers to take advantage of the physical concentration of students on campuses. But the important impact of group processes on movement recruitment and commitment is not unique to the 1985 Columbia anti-apartheid movement. The development of solidarity based on a sense of collective power and polarization was also found in a Chicago community organization (Hirsch 1986). And these same group processes were crucial in the mobilization and development of the Southern civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Consciousness-raising occurred in black churches and colleges. The collective power of protest was evident to those who participated in bus boycotts, sit-ins, freedom rides, and in Freedom Summer. The movement relied heavily on the creation of polarized conflict between the white Southern segregationist elite and black protesters to recruit participants, to gain national media attention, and ultimately to force federal intervention to redress the social and political grievances of Southern blacks (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984).

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11

Sustaining Commitment among Radical Feminists

Nancy Whittier

Remaining Radical Feminists

What does it mean to say that a political genera-
tion has retained a radical feminist collective
identity? In terms of practices—women's real
lives—it means that participants have kept in
touch with each other, believe they have things in
common that they do not share with others, hold
fast to central tenets of feminist ideology, and
think of themselves as "radical feminists" and
therefore different from the mainstream.
Virtually all the women I interviewed continue
to identify with the term "feminist" and most
with "radical feminist," and this identification
remains important to them. "If someone asks
me, 'Who are you?' I'm a radical feminist,"
declared a woman who now works for a public
interest organization. "And I see radical femi-
nism as my life's work, even though I'm spending
most of my days, most of my weeks, most of my
years, doing something else." Seeing oneself this
way still sets women apart from the majority of
the population. As one woman succinctly put
it, "Like most radical feminists, I'm really odd
wherever I go." This "oddness" stems from her

beliefs or consciousness and from her member-
ship in a distinct group of women's movement
veterans. Radical feminists' political consciousness
about the world and their construction of group
boundaries both set them apart from others and
bind them together. I will first discuss conscious-
ness and how it has changed, then turn to group
boundaries and their changes.

Feminist Consciousness

Developing feminist consciousness was, and is, a
central task of the radical women's movement.
Most movements possess a formal body of writ-
ings and scholarship that communicate interpre-
tive frameworks and explain the group's position
in the social structure, and members also inter-
weave political understandings into their daily
life and interactions. The radical women's move-
ment of the 1970s took the meshing of politics
and everyday life to a new height. In conscious-
ness-raising groups and other settings, women
discussed their experiences and politics with the
aim of rethinking their understandings of the
world. From this work grew elaborate theoretical

Collective Identity Before members of any group can present "their" demands to authorities or strategize about how "they" can best bring about desired changes, they need to know who "they" are. In whose name do activists speak? Feeling part of a broader group can be exhilarating, providing a major incentive for collective action. Some collective identities are widely accepted, and activists can take them for granted. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, did not have to persuade African-Americans who lived in Birmingham in 1955 that they faced discrimination by virtue of their skin color. Under other circumstances, however, activists have to work hard to get a certain category of people to think of themselves as belonging to a group with distinctive problems and interests. Collective identities such as "Hispanic" or "gay" (or "queer") do not always come naturally to people (that is, they do not always result from ordinary, everyday interactions). These identities may have to be consciously created, and in fact they are often as much a result as a cause of protest. Some collective identities, in fact, are based solely on participation in a movement, such as "animal protectionist" or "human rights activist." Even a favored tactic can provide an identity, as with those who espouse nonviolent "direct action." And membership in an organization is also a potential basis for collective identity.

course of protest, or through a political orientation session, these transforming experiences forever changed the way a generation of feminist activists looked at the world. As one succinctly put it, "It's like once you realize that the world is round, you can never again believe that it's flat."

Most women I interviewed were emphatic that the beliefs they formed during the women's movement had endured, although they were aware of the popular stereotype of 1960s radicals selling out. A woman who has not remained active in feminist organizations maintained that her feminist principles still exist, saying, "We continued to believe that a better world is possible, that we do need a creation of a new culture." Another woman, who became part of WAC in the mid-1970s, explained that the women's movement had a lasting and profound effect on how she looks at the world despite her belief that feminism is now in "the doldrums."

> It helped me learn how to construct principles.… And that was in a sense the beginning of a real life for me, of choosing to live a principled life.… And so, even if the doldrums continue forever and ever, I am light years ahead of them, personally.

Participating in consciousness-raising groups, activist organizations, and political actions such as boycotts or pickets gave women a new interpretation of themselves and the events around them. A former member of WAC explained how her feminist framework grew from consciousness-raising groups.

> Everything that happens in the world, I have a framework for understanding it. And that framework comes from the consciousness raising first, and understanding women's common experiences and my own experiences and the validity of that, and then seeing the rest of that through that validity.… If I didn't have a feminist framework to look at the world, I'd be, like most people, kind of adrift.

frameworks that explained women's oppression, male dominance, and patriarchy, and politicized all aspects of life with the notion of the personal as political.

In the late 1970s, WAC's (Women's Action Collective, a radical feminist group in Columbus, Ohio, founded in 1971) orientation sessions were a political education for many women that included analyzing their own experiences through a feminist framework and constructing and learning theoretical analyses. As one woman explained, "It taught me everything I know about feminism, racism, classism." Whether individuals experienced "consciousness raising" through a consciousness-raising group, in the

The women's movement developed highly complex interpretive frameworks. Feminist theory analyzes the sources and operation of patriarchy and male dominance, women's economic and social oppression, violence against women, the links between sexism and racism and classism,

the role of homophobia in perpetuating female subordination, and a variety of other phenomena. Such analyses are widespread in written works but are not limited to the printed page. Women's movement organizations in Columbus and elsewhere discussed and refined feminist theory as part of their daily operation, and activists were sufficiently well-versed in feminist analysis to explain the reasons for a demonstration to the press, argue with each other, and interpret their own lives in light of feminist theory in conscious-ness-raising groups. The large number of discus-sion groups that emerged in the late 1970s around specific issues such as women and economics, the workplace, radical feminism, and white suprem-acy are a testimonial to the importance of theory to the women's movement. An antirape activist explained the centrality of theory development to WAC strategy during the 1970s.

> In the [Women's Action] Collective when we were doing theory [we used the process of] trying to fig-ure out what you are doing by starting with your metaprinciples, and then going down to your prin-ciples, and then your objectives, and your goals, and then your strategies, and then your tactics. Everything relates back up to your metaprinciple, which in the case of rape prevention was respect for persons. The easiest way to get rid of rape would be to kill all the men, but that's not respect-ful of persons, therefore you can't do it. You have to keep going up and down this, to try to figure out. Whatever you do is going to be principled.

Theory remained important. Many respondents reported forming discussion groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s on topics including femi-nist theory, women and economics, feminist art criticism, and "How do we keep hanging on?" in hard times.

Despite the complexity of feminist theory, the lasting beliefs that respondents attributed to their participation in the women's movement were a general ethic of personal responsibility, egalitarianism, skepticism, freedom, and a pol-icy of treating others well. Just over half of the women I talked to spontaneously mentioned the Golden Rule ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you") as part of their core values. Although the Golden Rule was part of feminist ideology earlier in the century, its biblical

origins make it widely known and consistent with mainstream culture. Yet longtime feminists translated it into a radical political context. The following statements by three different women illustrate the broad definitions of feminist principles.

> Just nonsexist, nonracist, nonclassist, treating people fairly, nonhomophobic, all those -isms.… Mostly, I just try to use the Golden Rule, I guess. I just try to treat people the same way I would want them to treat me.

> That ethic of the sixties is very egalitarian, politi-cal, and realizing there's politics in everything personal. And not always believing what your government says, and questioning everything. And questioning authority above all.

> I still have the same idealism. I'd still like people to be free to do what they want, and I'd still like people to have choices, and I'd like us all to be working on important issues. Bringing peace to the world, ending war.

Respondents have not forgotten or disre-garded the more specific and complex elements of feminist consciousness over the years. Rather, they take for granted the application of feminist theory to specific topics. Feminist analyses of rape, for example, as an act of violence rather than sex, of sexual harassment, and of sexism in advertising, have become so intrinsic to partici-pants' views of the world that they did not artic-ulate them when I asked about their feminist principles.

Most respondents thought that their feminist beliefs have been a positive force in their lives, even in the 1980s and 1990s, when support for radical feminism made them increasingly politi-cally marginal. One activist described the far-reaching effects.

> I think it's made me stronger. I think it's made me really clear about who I am. It's made me very clear about what the problems are that women face in society.… I almost feel like my life has a theme. It's not just like I'm this little ant out there living and working with all the other ants on the anthill. There are things that I care really, really deeply about, and that sort of infuses my whole life with meaning. And I've retained that, and I think I always will.

Attributing the difficulties in one's life to structural rather than personal causes (seeing the personal as political) is an important component of oppositional consciousness and helps motivate people to participate in collective action aimed at changing their circumstances. It also makes daily life easier for respondents and motivates activism, as one woman who is now a professor explained.

> If you really understand that the problems are out there, instead of blaming yourself, it makes you willing to take more risks. It makes you more motivated to fight the motherfuckers!… If I didn't have that base to latch onto, I would just go nuts.

A few respondents, however, felt that their feminist beliefs, although accurate, made their lives more difficult. As one woman who has not remained active in feminist organizations explained:

> From becoming active in the women's movement … I've gotten a different perspective on politics and how government is conducted, how business is conducted, almost everything that goes on in our society. And I don't like a lot of what I see. Much of what I see is extremely disturbing. Some of it frightens me or depresses me or angers me. And there are times that I wish I had never joined that first women's CR group and learned to look at the world differently.

Despite her regrets, she, too, has been changed irrevocably. Yet there have been some important changes in feminist consciousness as well as continuities over the past two decades.

Changes in Consciousness

Reflecting changes in the larger women's movement, respondents reported that they have become less concerned with "political correctness," or taking a strict political line on everything. Instead, they criticize some features of the 1960s–1970s movement, view feminism as broader and encompassing a variety of social reform issues, and are more aware of race and class differences. One woman articulated the declining significance of political correctness,

commenting, "I don't look at life now in terms of feminism and what's politically correct and what's not." This remark must be placed in the larger social context of the 1990s, where a backlash against multiculturalism has taken the form of attacks on so-called mandated political correctness within universities. It has become unfashionable and perhaps politically dangerous to appear to be overly concerned with language use, subtle forms of discrimination, verbal harassment, and the like.

Nevertheless, many participants reacted against what they perceived as the excess and mistakes of the women's movement in the 1970s. Many singled out collective structure as an experiment they did not want to repeat. One former member of WAC proclaimed that she no longer believed in the collective process.

> To be honest, we got really sick of consensual decision making … Some of us feel like, I wouldn't go to a meeting if that was the way it was going to be! I don't want to be part of it, I have no patience with it.

Another WAC veteran commented in a similar vein:

> We did a lot of experimentation with the collective process, thinking that was the ideal structure, and found out that it wasn't. And now, I wouldn't be involved in a collective if you paid me a million bucks. Absolutely not!

Participants' reactions against perceived errors in the women's movement of the 1970s have led not only to disillusionment but to new and perhaps more effective organizational structures as well. "I've got to have radicals [on the board of directors] who at this point are so mellow on their own stuff that they're going to say to me, 'It's your vision, do what you want. Run with it …,'" explained a woman who founded a feminist organization in the 1980s. "I wanted some way to counter the fact that we got so bound up by the end of the seventies. We've got to give women the chance in their lifetimes to fly, and this is mine." Further, some women commented that they simply wanted their lives to be less serious than in the 1970s. "We had some fun in the seventies, but we were also quite grim a lot of the time," commented

Movement Culture Social movements often have, and self-consciously cultivate, an internal culture that is different from the larger culture in which they are embedded. In other words, participants in movements often share beliefs; norms; ways of working together; forms of decision making; emotional styles; sexual practices; musical, literary, and sartorial tastes; and so on, that are distinct from those of the larger culture. Sometimes movement cultures are warm, jovial, and inviting; sometimes they are austere, serious, and even intimidating. Some are cultivated to attract the greatest number of people; some are intended to attract, or produce, a relatively small number of highly committed people. Distinctive types of movement culture may prove politically effective in certain contexts, yet be quite ineffectual in others.

one woman about her changing approach to activism. "And I want to have some good times for the rest of my life. I want to do some fun things."

A second major change in the women's movement in the 1980s and 1990s has been an increase in attention to differences among women, particularly to issues of race and class. Sustainers and others began discussing race and class in the late 1970s. These discussions and feminist writings by women of color changed the outlook of the entire political generation. Longtime feminists reported a growing awareness that women are not an undifferentiated group and reflected critically on the race and class homogeneity of the women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s. One woman described the changes in her consciousness as follows:

> Back in the Ohio days I would have described myself as a radical feminist and since then I'd describe myself as a socialist feminist … [In the early 1980s] we started wondering why we were all white, and what was wrong … So I had a heavy infusion of thinking about race and class. It means that instead of viewing women as this undifferentiated group that are oppressed more or less equally by men, there are differences of class as well as race.

Only three of the women I interviewed reported that their identification had changed from radical to socialist feminist, but most reported an increasing concern with race and class.

A third change is a broadening of the goals and analyses of feminism. The women I interviewed increasingly define feminism as encompassing other struggles such as peace, environmental protection, animal rights, humanism, lesbian and gay freedom, socialism, and human rights. One woman who has become involved with the movement for recovery from addictions articulated the shift in her consciousness this way:

> I haven't forgotten the women's movement. But to me it's a piece of this larger issue, in which we need to think about how all people can be empowered, as who they are. It's the feminist criticism, I think, that has expanded our consciousness to the point where we can even see that there's a problem. But I guess I don't see feminism as my guiding call anymore. It's sort of part of the whole picture.

[…] The broadening of concerns and the increasing incorporation of race and class issues do not signify a drastic or discontinuous shift in feminist consciousness for this generation. Rather, respondents are applying the basic principles of feminist consciousness to additional issues. In addition, women who came to the women's movement from the New Left are returning to some of their earlier concerns and examining them in a feminist light. When asked if her beliefs or view of the world had changed over the past twenty years, almost every interviewee first answered, "No," and then described some shifts. In other words, the core of feminist consciousness has remained consistent for this generation although there have been modifications. As one woman said, "I still retain my feminist principles absolutely, although they have evolved and changed."

Group Boundaries

Although participants construct their consciousness interactively in a movement context, individuals internalize it. Much of the foregoing evidence addresses this individual level. But collective identity is about far more than consciousness. At root it is about seeing oneself as

part of a group, a collectivity. The mechanism by which this is accomplished is the construction of group boundaries, or symbolic and material distinctions between members of the collectivity and others. Participants establish group boundaries through a symbolic system and by constructing an alternative culture or network that serves as a "world apart" from the dominant society. These manifestations of collective identity are visible in interactions among group members and in the actions of individuals; they are not limited to the attitudes or beliefs of individuals.

The notion of group boundaries may imply rigid delineation of who is permitted to be a feminist. But in fact it refers to a much more ambiguous process by which people try to make sense of their lives and of their similarities to and differences from others. Group boundaries can be rigid or permeable and vary in their importance. For longtime feminist activists, boundaries between themselves and others became less important in the 1980s even as their sense of self remained inextricably linked to feminism. Boundaries have both persisted and been transformed between feminists and nonfeminists, women and men, and different political generations. A network of relationships among feminist veterans helps them to maintain their collective identity.

Distinguishing feminists from nonfeminists. Despite the rhetoric of sisterhood, the "we" defined by radical feminists twenty-five years ago did not include all women. The labels "feminist" and "radical feminist" distinguished between women who adopted such labels and those who did not. For participants, a transformed individual identity as a woman meant seeing oneself as a member of the collectivity "feminists"; adopting "feminist" or "radical feminist" as a public identity signified membership in the group of women who had experienced such a transformation.

Despite the continuing importance of feminism for self-definition, the distinction between feminists and nonfeminists has become less significant in two ways. First, many women I interviewed said that they are less likely to form negative impressions of people who do not identify publicly as feminists. As one woman who now leads workshops on sexual harassment put it:

> I'm much kinder to women who aren't feminists and who are deferring to men when it's clearly against their best interests. I'm much better in discussing it with her and helping her overcome that than I would have been five years ago. Fifteen years ago I would have kind of jumped down her throat, and she would have had to avoid me. [*Laughs*]

Another woman, now a lawyer, remarked that she, too, is less critical of those who differ politically from her.

> I used to size people up in two minutes concerning their politics, and if their politics weren't right, I didn't have any use for them. I would cast them aside and be on my way… And that was stupid, and I've stopped doing that.

In other words, the boundary between feminists and nonfeminists has become more permeable, and feminists are willing to cooperate more with those outside the group.

Second, many longtime feminists reported that they are less likely to see themselves as part of a common group with someone simply because she calls herself a feminist. As one professor of women's studies declared:

> One thing I know now is that just because someone calls herself, or himself, a feminist does not mean that person's values or behavior or way of operating in the world is going to be something that I identify with … So I'm much less influenced by someone marching up to me and announcing they're a feminist. I'm much more wanting to watch how that person operates before I make a decision about whether I'm really in league with them.

[…]

Language use is an additional marker of the boundary between feminists and nonfeminists. The women's movement developed a sweeping critique of sexism in language that brought about substantial change in language use. Derogatory terms used to refer to women—chick, cunt, bitch, girl, and so forth—were a special target of feminists in the initial years of the movement and have remained so since then. Like the label "feminist," the use of language remains an important boundary marker, but, as one woman indicated, failure to conform to feminist terminology (indicating

"outsider" status) carries fewer consequences than it did during the 1970s.

> I paid too much attention to language [in the 1970s] as a means to assess politics. I think language is important, and to this day I'd have real problems having a close personal friendship with somebody who referred to women as chicks. But it got to be so crazy, and if people didn't use your exact terminology they were an enemy.

Other feminists suggested that even their own use of language has changed to include terms that would previously have been used only by outsiders, as this lawyer commented:

> I can remember the time that my tongue would have rotted in my cheeks before I would have said the word "girl" in relation to a woman at all. And at least now I've gotten to the point where I can joke with some of my friends and at least use the word. But I can't even imagine being in a meeting and talking about a young woman as being a girl. That still would really make me nuts.

In short, what would previously have been a fairly serious boundary violation has become acceptable, but only within limits and in certain settings.

Distinguishing women from men. Another means by which radical feminists established boundaries in the 1970s was by emphasizing women's difference from men and denigrating many masculine traits. Some feminists made this argument in essentialist terms—the view that the differences between women and men reflected the sexes' innate natures. Many others, however, viewed the differences as a socially constructed product of socialization and structural position. One woman explained how being a feminist kept her from forming close relationships with men during the 1970s.

> It made it impossible to be close to men anymore, because … I was entering a universe that [they] couldn't come into … All men became aliens when I realized that I didn't have to live as though I approved of patriarchy. They just can't relate.

Most feminist veterans reported that their close friendships and their political alliances are still primarily with women. Like other boundary markers, however, the division between women and men has lessened. Many lesbians reported increasing political work and a feeling of commonality with gay men. Both lesbian and heterosexual participants indicated a tension between a continuing view of men as untrustworthy and different from themselves and increasing cooperative contact with men. This woman's comment illustrates the ambivalence.

> I have to deal with men on a day-by-day basis, so I do deal with them. I'm not sure that I like them or I trust them any more than I did twenty years ago. But I've also learned that there are really some very, very good men out there who do try and are very supportive. And I don't think when I was truly involved with the women's movement that I would have admitted that, at all.

Like the distinction between feminists and non-feminists, the boundary between women and men is more permeable than it was ten years ago.

Two kinds of changes can occur in how challenging groups construct their boundaries when their social movement falls on hard times. One model is illustrated by the National Woman's Party in the 1950s, which developed an elite-sustained structure. Boundaries become rigidified, increasing the commitment of a small cadre of activists but keeping out new recruits and allies. The second possibility, which has occurred in the Columbus women's movement, is that boundaries may become more permeable and differences less salient. Although members still see radical feminists as a distinct group, they are more willing to cross the boundaries between their group and others, opening up the possibility for the coalitions that have developed in the 1980s.

Accompanying this development is a reframing of emotions, from anger to acceptance or openness. Almost everyone I interviewed said she felt an increasing "mellowness," more tolerance for people with different political views or lifestyles, less stridency, a growth in spirituality, and an increasing reluctance to be motivated by anger. One woman's comments were typical.

> In the early seventies, when I was eating and breathing and sleeping feminist activity, I was so angry! I was really fueled by fury a lot of the time. And at this point in my life, to be angry is too

hard. I just can't do it. It doesn't feel good to be angry, and I also had the realization that I didn't like the way things went for me when I was angry. When you're angry, other people are intimidated and they don't want to do what you want them to do. It really sets up an opposition.

Relationships among feminists, once stormy, calmed somewhat for these women. "Now I'm much more into why can't we all get along, and getting people to deal more on a one-to-one or in small groups of people," explained one. Many women saw their changed attitudes as a function of age, as this woman did.

When you reach your thirties and forties, you have a more overall view of life. I don't in any way think that I have become less radical or that I have mellowed, I think that's not a proper use of your greater age. It's just that I have a wider view of things and I'm more tolerant of other people because I'm more compassionate now than I was then.

It is difficult to know how much of this change is actually due to age, but "mellowing" in political attitudes is not biologically determined. Years of experience and the need for unity in a hostile environment made feminists less angry and more willing to compromise.

Generational boundaries. Unlike the differences between feminists and nonfeminists and between women and men, which have been socially reconstructed and minimized, the women I interviewed perceived a variety of differences between themselves and people who did not share their experiences in the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s because of age or politics. One woman who was very active in lesbian feminist protest during the mid- to late 1970s described her perception of younger lesbians who had not shared her experience in the women's movement.

When I am involved with women who have not been through the experience I've been through, I feel a little bit sad for them. I feel that they have lost a major part of what it is to be a feminist, and to be a lesbian…. And it's hard to convey to them what feminism is, let alone what lesbian feminism is, in the sense that I learned it, and how encompassing it is.

Another veteran of the earliest days of WL, who now works in a mainstream corporation, felt that her social movement participation set her apart from people of different ages.

I talk to some of these young kids at work, and it's like they don't know anything about the politics in El Salvador, they don't know anything about anything. They've just been yuppified. And they don't see the big political picture. Or people that are ten or fifteen years older. It's like [they say], "What's wrong with you?" when I start ranting about politics, or Bush, or Reagan.

Movement veterans symbolically underscore the importance of remaining true to one's political commitments by telling "cautionary tales" about women who were formerly radical feminists and have "sold out" in the 1980s and 1990s. One woman, who is employed by a nonprofit organization and owns a modest house, told such a tale.

I'm not a big consumer or a real high materialist. But I know some women who went the other way. I know one woman who makes a lot of money, well over a hundred thousand dollars a year. And she used to be in WAC.… And now she's just very different.

Another told a similar story about a woman who "went from being a radical lesbian to being a Reagan Republican who wanted to get rich." A variation on this theme concerns a rumored social group for professional lesbians, including former radical feminists, that limits membership to women above a certain income. A sense of identity and commonality is reinforced by those who are different. Thus, stories of women who have sold out serve to support others' status as "dedicated feminists" and symbolically underscore the boundary between those who have retained commitment and those who have abandoned it.

Lesbian feminist identity. Throughout the 1970s lesbians became more visible in the radical women's movement; lesbian feminist ideology developed, and in practice activists often conflated the categories "lesbian" and "radical feminist." By the end of the decade, heterosexual

women were a shrinking minority in radical feminist groups at the same time that a lesbian feminist subculture was growing. Large women's movement organizations embraced lesbian issues, but animosities remained between heterosexual and lesbian women. The new source of conflict was some heterosexual women's charge that lesbians dominated the movement. "I think that straight women have been pushed out of the women's movement by lesbian women," complained one heterosexual respondent, "and it's been pretty ugly.… The women's movement is the only place in the world where women have to come out of the closet as a heterosexual." Most of the heterosexual women I interviewed did not share this sentiment, but many felt left out of a predominantly lesbian movement. During the 1970s, the celebration of womanhood had made heterosexual women welcome as part of the mostly lesbian "women's community." But by the 1980s and 1990s, lesbians were increasingly unwilling to soft-pedal either their sexuality or their political demands. Both lesbian and heterosexual identity became more salient in the radical women's movement as a result.

At the same time, divisions among lesbians diminished. In the early and mid-1970s, lesbian feminists were often critical of longtime lesbians for "mimicking heterosexuality" in butch–fem roles, viewing women as sex objects, and not participating in feminist activities. For example, a fund-raising talent show in Columbus attempted to bring the bar and political worlds together. A humorous skit in which a woman adopted a "ditzy" feminine character, enjoyed by bar women, was loudly protested by political women, who disrupted the performance arguing that it parodied women. The talent show ended prematurely, and the alliance between the two groups stalled. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the local lesbian bar, Summit Station (commonly known as "Jack's"), sometimes hosted feminist fundraisers and became more of a hangout for lesbian feminists. At the same time feminists softened critiques of traditional butch–fem relationships and subculture and increasingly recognized political resistance by lesbians outside the formal women's movement. One longtime lesbian activist described the changes in relations between lesbian feminists and other groups of lesbians.

[In the 1970s] the community was fairly well segregated, so that the political community was separate from the softball community and was separate from the community of teachers.… Over time those sort of walls came down, among those groups at least, as women aged.… [Now] there's a great deal of mix and less separation between and among those women that define themselves variously.

[…]

In addition to the lessening of distinctions among lesbians, the division between lesbians and gay men has become more permeable in the 1980s, particularly with the rise of acquired immune-deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and lesbians' extensive participation in the AIDS movement. One woman who had been part of Lesbian Peer Support commented that she had become involved with a local AIDS organization because

for the first time I identified that this is happening to my tribe. These are my people, and I need to stand with them now, because this is important.

"My people" means lesbians and gay men for her now, whereas in the 1970s it meant women.

[…]

Another woman who has been active on gay and lesbian issues since the 1970s explained her continuing identification with gay men.

It doesn't have to do as much with an identity of being a woman as of being a gay and lesbian sort of outcast.… That's more direct and more related to my own set of things than other kinds of issues like childcare or abortion.

Seeing lesbianism, rather than womanhood, as the defining element of her identity is a significant change.

A final notable pattern is illustrated by three participants who identified as lesbian but reported having sexual relationships with men in the 1980s for the first time in two decades. Two of the three continued to identify themselves as lesbians, whereas the third identified as bisexual. One lesbian, who described her affair with a man as "totally peculiar," saw affairs with men as a widespread phenomenon, commenting that she has "discovered since that a whole lot of us,

lesbians, went through a phase like that." This "phase" occurred as lesbian feminist identity became more fluid, permitting sexual experimentation without the stigma of political betrayal. At the same time, it may be that as the feminist community weakened in the early 1980s, the ideal of being "woman-identified" came to seem less real and more difficult to maintain. In the early 1990s the counterintuitive notion of "lesbians who sleep with men" spread: The lesbian writer Jan Clausen published an article in a gay publication about her relationship with a man, singer Holly Near wrote in her autobiography about being a lesbian but having sex with men, and students at OSU (Ohio State University) formed a support group for "lesbians who just happen to be in relationships with politically correct men." Most of the women I interviewed still believed that sexuality was linked to politics and that the political implications of being a lesbian who slept with men were different from those of being a lesbian who did not. But the borders between lesbians and nonlesbians were undeniably blurred. The debate over whether one can identify as a lesbian and still be sexually involved with men is, at core, about collective identity: What behavior must one exhibit (or refrain from) in order to be considered a lesbian? A feminist?

The feminist network. Veterans of the Columbus women's movement have maintained an elaborate and meaningful network that makes them more than an abstract political generation; they are a community. The network is a material embodiment of group boundaries. Many participants kept in touch with each other, and even when they had not been in touch, often kept tabs on each other's locations and activities. One woman, for example, told me that each year she checked the new phone book listing for another activist to make sure that she was still at the same address, although they had not talked in years. Of course, not all women who were active in the Columbus radical women's movement have kept in touch with each other. More peripheral members, those who have become conservative, former lesbians, and those who were "trashed out" are all less likely to have retained contacts with others. But even though the network is partial and has many broken links, many women are integrated into it in some way.

In part, the network exists because women's political commitments still make them inclined to work together on social change issues. One woman who recently ran for political office noted that a former member of the Women's Caucus at OSU was the first person to send a contribution to her campaign. Another woman contacted a fellow activist who had established a new feminist organization and took publicity about the new organization to a local conference. A national feminist organization founded in the 1980s by a veteran of the Columbus women's movement now has a board of directors that includes several women who participated in feminist organizations together in the 1970s.

In addition, the network remains important because of the emotional and intellectual closeness that grows from sharing a common important experience. Many longtime feminists reported that friendships they formed in the women's movement of the 1970s have remained important in the 1980s and 1990s. One woman explained the quality of such relationships.

> Some of these people, I've known them for so long now that we can refer back to a certain event or series of events with just a word or two. It's that kind of communication you can have with someone you've known for a long time, so that we don't really discuss it, we know what we mean. And we get that kind of good feeling that you have with people that you've been through a lot with and you've known for so long.

Another woman described formalizing important relationships through the creation of what she terms "chosen kinship."

> I've been working on my own chosen family… [and] I run workshops for women on kinship and chosen kinship.… At this point, I have a ritual and I take people in only if they seem to be really staying powers in my life. I don't do this lightly.

Although her chosen family is not limited to women with whom she was active in the 1970s, several such women are part of her network. The formality of the notion of chosen kinship emphasizes the importance of a network for establishing group boundaries.

Such relationships serve to sustain commitment to feminist politics and collective identity. One woman who works in a non-feminist setting explained that in order to retain feminist commitment when social pressures urge her to be absorbed into the political mainstream, "I surround myself with all my friends … people that I think still have a political world ethic about them." Another woman who is in a committed relationship with a woman she met in the Columbus women's movement of the 1970s said simply:

> Without each other I don't know how we'd be surviving.… One of the things we are for each other more than anything else is a reality check. Without the reality check, we could fall off the edge. In the 1980s, I certainly could have fallen off the edge if [she] hadn't been here.

Perhaps, in the end, the "reality check" is the most important contribution of the network: the reminder that, despite opposition and sometimes invisibility, feminists are neither crazy nor alone.

The women who were the furthest removed from the organized women's movement and whose feminist identity was the least important to them were those who had lost contact with the feminist network. One woman, who had formerly identified as a lesbian and had later married a man, reported that her resulting loss of membership in the lesbian community made it difficult to remain a feminist activist at the same level. Three other women who had moved to conservative parts of the country similarly found it difficult to remain active feminists because of the loss of a feminist network.

Because the lesbian feminist movement remained vibrant and large in the 1980s and 1990s and built a social movement community and political culture, lesbians often were able to maintain their commitment more easily than heterosexual women. The lesbian feminist community has aided lesbians in maintaining a feminist collective identity and has provided support and opportunities for practicing political principles in daily life and mobilizing collective action. As a result, fewer of the lesbians than the heterosexual women I interviewed moved into mainstream careers or lifestyles, and more lesbians have continued to participate in organized collective efforts for social change. The four women I interviewed who have remained fulltime radical feminist activists are all lesbians. Even for lesbians, however, the highly politicized activist community of the 1970s no longer exists.

The loss of community that accompanied the decline of organized feminism in the early 1980s left all participants feeling a sense of loss, alienation, and nostalgia, and deprived them of the networks and culture that supported their collective identity and translated it into mobilization. Male participants in the civil rights and student movements of the 1960s described similar feelings of dislocation. Both in terms of the friendships they developed and the sense of shared political mission in life, participants felt that their experience in the women's movement of the 1970s in Columbus differed sharply from the communities of the 1990s. One woman expressed her nostalgia for the friendships she formed in the 1970s.

> I have never had the friendships, the significance, the meaning, everything that you could want in relationships, since then.… We saw ourselves as family. And I have never had that kind of family since, and I don't think I ever will.

Another woman compared the ease of making friends in a social movement culture with the difficulty she faces now.

> I find it very difficult to keep friends these days, because I don't run into anybody naturally. Like I used to just every day go into work [at WAC], you'd see all these people. You'd make plans to do things; it was just part of the flow. Now it's like you never see anybody, and you've got to call somebody up and make plans, it's this big effort.

The close-knit nature of women's movement culture fostered conflict, but it was nevertheless an important source of strength and continuing commitment for members, as this participant in WAC commented:

> We lived and worked together, literally.… It was just too much. You couldn't get away from anybody. And yet, the closeness of it was just not replicable.

Even in the absence of that "closeness," long-time feminists continued to rely on their connections to one another in the 1980s.

The clearest examples of how networks establish group boundaries come from separatist movements or those with separatist elements, such as utopian communes of the 1800s or the black nationalist movement of the 1960s. In such cases, movements create "a world apart" from the dominant culture in which participants can redefine their group. Feminists of the 1960s and 1970s have not created such a world apart in the present. Rather, they have dispersed, holding jobs where they may be one of only a few feminists. Yet friendship ties, political cooperation, and a sense of shared past bind them together.

The Survival of Feminist Commitment

The antifeminist backlash affected how longtime feminists understand themselves and their group. Changes in the external environment have not *determined* changes in feminist collective identity. They have, however, provided the context and events that feminists try to understand and interpret. Despite the hostility and opposition they encounter, the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s forever marked participants' understanding of the world and their own place in it. Of course, not every participant in the women's movement has retained her radical feminist identity and beliefs to the same degree. A few women repudiate their earlier beliefs, and others vary in how much their outlooks have changed over the years.

Regardless of how women think of themselves and what they believe is true about the world, their daily lives have changed greatly. It is the conflict between this generation's enduring radical feminism and their limited opportunities for action in a constricting economy and hostile political climate that shaped feminist actions in the 1980s and early 1990s. This loss of political community, for most women, made it more difficult to continue externally oriented activism. Faced with the loss of the community that had sustained their activism, they turned to their jobs and their families, attempting to continue living their lives in a political way.

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True Believers and Charismatic Cults

Janja Lalich

Systems of Control

The Democratic Workers Party had its begin-
nings in 1974. Full-time members, called "cadres"
or "militants," typically numbered between 125
and 150, but in certain periods there were
between 300 and 1,000 members at various grades
of affiliation. In the early 1980s the DWP
branched out into various locales around the
United States, but the headquarters always
remained in San Francisco. Throughout most of
its existence, the DWP was a highly controversial
organization. Marlene Dixon, the group's leader
throughout its life span, was a former professor of
sociology and a radical feminist of the sixties era.
Through charisma and chutzpah, Dixon was able
to gather around her extremely loyal followers,
known throughout the Left for their obsessive
devotion to her.

A feature that distinguished the DWP from so
many other leftist groups at the time was its
proudly feminist origins, as it had been founded
and was led by women. In addition, the group
was innovative and bold in its local, national,

and international interventions and activities.
Although most of the leadership personnel were
women, the DWP was never solely a women's
organization; almost from the beginning, the
membership included both men and women, and
throughout the years at least several men served
in middle- and upper-level leadership positions.

As a Marxist-Leninist organization with a
Maoist orientation, the DWP was part of the New
Communist Movement (NCM), or the party-
building movement. This movement was promi-
nent in the Left in the 1970s and 1980s. Before I
discuss the DWP's origins and evolution, I want
to explain the roots of the NCM and describe its
social milieu.

The NCM was a product of specific socio-
political developments in the United States, as
well as a direct by-product of the student move-
ments of the 1960s. Historically, the movement
was one outcome of the failures and inadequacies
of the Old Left and the New Left, as well as a
beneficiary of the perceived successes of certain
international revolutionary movements. The New
Communist Movement was, in fact, an umbrella

term for a radical trend that tended to dominate U.S. leftist politics in the early 1970s. The movement itself was affected by political ideologies imported from abroad but also by events at home in the United States.

Organizations within the NCM drew on general feelings of social alienation, growing economic polarization, and political unrest and distrust. According to the *Encyclopedia of the American Left*, groups and activists in the NCM reached thousands through their political actions and publications. As a movement, however, it did not have staying power. In addition to the growing crisis in the world Communist movement and in many socialist countries, which began in the 1960s but took hold in the 1980s, most NCM groups could not withstand the turmoil in their own ranks. By the end of 1989, almost all NCM groups had either disbanded or splintered into practical invisibility.

[…]

It was in that environment—serious and searching—that a confluence of factors and personalities resulted in the birth of the DWP, which drew on elements of the NCM while also being a creative concoction that had a particular appeal to certain types of activists. Marlene Dixon, with the support of her first circle of devotees, blended the seriousness of the Marxist-Leninist fighting party with a feminist perspective. This unique feature allowed the group to draw radicals from leftist circles as well as the women's movement. Dixon's theoretical orientation also meant that the DWP was aligned with a variant of political theory called world-systems theory that not only was sophisticated but also distinguished the party from the so-called China-liners or Soviet-liners.

Sanctions. Given the emphasis on obedience and discipline, members understood that they could be sanctioned for not following rules or for in any way breaking the discipline. Militants were "punished" in a variety of ways besides submitting to collective criticism sessions and writing self-criticisms.

More practical sanctions, for example, were increased quotas, extra work duty, demotion from a particular position or function, removal from a practice, and instructions to leave a workplace or cease contact with a particular person. In more serious cases, there were periods of probation, suspension, or even house arrest (which could mean being confined and guarded by security forces).

Expulsion was the ultimate sanction. Most expulsions were handled privately between the member and the leaders. Other members learned about them by means of Branch announcements. Some expulsions came at the conclusion of trials, formal meetings at which a militant came before the rest of the members to be charged and publicly criticized. Sometimes in trials the accused was allowed to respond; sometimes, after a typically lengthy and harsh public denunciation, the accused militant was given the verdict and sent away without a chance to speak.

There were two types of expulsion—without prejudice and with prejudice. To be expelled *without prejudice* meant that the ex-member could be spoken to if seen, sometimes was allowed to work with one of the DWP front groups, often was expected to give a regular monthly "donation," and, in some cases, after a certain amount of time determined by leadership, was able to apply to rejoin. To be expelled *with prejudice* meant the person was declared an enemy and for all intents and purposes was considered to no longer exist. The expelled person was to be completely shunned; if members saw someone who had been expelled with prejudice—for example, in a store or on the street—they were to act as though the person was not there.

It was always the decision of top leaders as to who merited the extreme punishment of expulsion with prejudice. Dixon gave the final approval on all expulsions, with or without prejudice, even when recommendations came from Eleanor or the Discipline and Control Board, a cadre committee that handled such matters. Most often, to be handed such a severe sentence had nothing to do with the actual thoughts or actions of the individual who was about to be shunned and become nonexistent. Generally, by means of criticism, staged trials, threats, and, at times, acts of violence, expelled members were intimidated into years of silence and would not think of speaking about their Party experiences, much less take any action against the group.

Examples of the kinds of actions against expelled members are as follows: a founder being expelled was whisked from her house, everything taken from her, and put on a plane to her parents'

home across the country; an expelled militant was thrown out of his house, all of his clothes and belongings discarded onto the street; a foreign-born, inner-circle militant was put on a plane to Europe without a penny in her pocket. Many of these actions were carried out by the Eagles, a special security force of select militants who received physical fitness training from a Party cadre who had been a Marine. Other expelled militants were threatened and extorted, given a schedule to repay the DWP for the "training" they had received—often an amount in the thousands of dollars.

That type of violence and isolationist technique contributed to an us-versus-them mentality, a feature found in many cults and certainly characteristic of this one. Declaring enemies drew battle lines and created a feeling of superiority and righteousness among members, as well as a sense of paranoia and hostility, as though these "enemies" truly posed a threat to the organization.

The Party's first purge. Because the first mass expulsion of members was central to the way in which the disciplinary structure took hold, it merits discussion here. Just after Christmas 1976, Dixon ordered the Party's first real purge. Formally, it was called the Campaign Against Lesbian Chauvinism and Bourgeois Feminism; in later years it was referred to simply as "the lesbian purge." Though the membership was always mixed (in both gender and sexual preference), in the early years there were quite a number of lesbian members because much of the recruiting had been done among friendship networks of the founders, eleven of whom were lesbians. The purge was carried out under the political pretext that a clique of lesbians in the Party were "bourgeois feminists"; Dixon provided a new theoretical line on homosexuality to support her actions. Overnight, a number of female members were gone, with no explanation, and an investigative panel was questioning the rest of the members about their activities and testing their loyalty; a strict seal of silence was imposed to control information. After about a week, a pamphlet was produced and all the members were called to meetings to learn about an internal campaign to root out enemies "in our midst"—a clique charged with being exploitative, oppressive, and preventing the Party's growth. The pamphlet explained

that some female members had been expelled by the judgment of the leadership. Others, who had not yet been expelled (their fates were uncertain), were brought to stand before their comrades as they were formally charged with "crimes" and denounced collectively. This first purge served many purposes.

First, it established the Party's right to intervene in any aspect of members' personal lives and asserted its unmitigated power over their lives. The investigation that took place left nothing sacred; it included probing interviews (more like interrogations) and search-and-seizure tactics. In addition, because the purge happened so unexpectedly, it generated unspoken fear and uncertainty: someone could be in the group one day and gone the next—including a mate or a spouse. That uneasy feeling contributed to an ongoing atmosphere of watchfulness, terror, and condemnation.

Second, the purge helped to institute one of the DWP's main control mechanisms—the method of pitting people against each other so as to breed mistrust and foster loyalty only to Dixon. Actually, that precedent was begun in the first year when Virginia, Esther's best friend, was chosen to lead the investigation that culminated in the charges against Esther before her expulsion. Dixon reaffirmed the use of that tactic during the lesbian purge; eventually, over the years, every possible grouping or type within the DWP was subjected to such divisive treatment. There were campaigns against and purges of men, parents (i.e., militants with children), intellectuals, middle-level leaders, friendship networks, militants with political pasts, those from a middle-class (PB) background, and those with PB skills. In other words, not only were there no boundaries, but there were to be no bonds other than to the DWP. Such divisive tactics were implemented strategically throughout the years, ensuring that no one would trust anyone else.

Third, the Campaign Against Lesbian Chauvinism set the tone and style for future purges and mass trials. A booklet was produced almost overnight and distributed Party-wide for study and discussion. Accused militants were named, their "crimes" described, their punishments highlighted. Some were expelled without trial, never to be heard from again; others were ordered to come before their peers to face

criticism and denunciation. After the trials, many women were suspended, unable to participate in any activity and cut off from contact with other members, for a period ranging from three weeks to six weeks.

And fourth, the purge served to break up a key friendship network. Among those named in the campaign were some of the founders and many who had been in the first ring of people to join soon after the founding. They were among the hardest workers, the most politically dedicated militants, and the most fervently loyal followers. Many were already in middle-level leadership positions. Perhaps Dixon thought they posed a threat to her, or perhaps she was testing the loyalty of her followers.

Forming Systems of Influence

Underlying the powerful systems of control in the DWP was what Dixon called unity of will. "Unity of will is the substance that harnesses us together," she wrote, "that creates our strength, endurance and flexibility. Unity of will is forged by discipline. *Discipline is the operation of the necessity of the party*… demanding the surrender of individualism into the greater social whole; the transformation of our bourgeois independence into a collective interdependence; and the subordination of our individual will to the collective will of the organization."

In addition to this notion of collective will, another concept was taught in Party School, namely, that each individual's will was to merge with the Party. It was referred to as "bone of his bone and blood of his blood." That image was used to convey the idea that eventually cadres would reach a point at which their will was so united with the Party that the two would be inseparable: at that point, the organization was no longer external to each person but an integral part of each militant's being.

Cadre tension. Cadre life was not easy, nor was it meant to be. Indeed, the very tension of "the constant pressure of Party authority" butting up against the member's independent spirit was recognized as the center of crisis and, therefore, growth for each militant. Militants were taught that cadre development did not even really occur until the ideal was internalized—that is how long

and hard the road was. At that point the hardship of daily life would become an accepted reality "because that is the way things must be if we are to achieve our purpose." Living with—and confronting—the tension between self and the Party was the heart of the struggle.

In practical terms, this meant that inner turmoil was standard fare; militants accepted that feeling stressed, feeling conflicted, feeling confused were indications not that something was wrong but that something was right. Such internal struggle indicated that the militant was engaged in the process of self-transformation. In the end, the militant was rewarded by understanding that "this is a cadre party": "The demands we make on ourselves come from us. It's not the Party doing it to you.… We are agents of our own change." This idea was critical to each militant's sense of ownership and personal responsibility for the organization. At the same time, it meant that anxiety, fear, and guilt were everyday, seemingly self-generated emotions.

Integral to the DWP belief system, then, was crisis and struggle, testing, and a heightened awareness of the Party. Leadership militants responsible for training worked hard to implement such guidelines as "Don't break their spirit, but their individualism." At the same time, the militants did their part by living by the exhortations of an internal voice that repeated the lessons from their cadre training: "Submit but never break. Submission is not mindless, not blind; but submit without reservation. Submit with energy and commitment." Those challenging and somewhat contradictory mottos kept militants confused and on edge. Anxiety was embedded in the life of each cadre member. Like all other aspects, it was wrapped in a political aura and given a political justification. In cadre training, militants learned that to be a good Communist meant to be self-conscious, to be in constant tension with the Party. The idea was to be in continual struggle to shed old habits and attitudes so that the new cadre man or woman could emerge. The more that tension was felt, the more the person was engaged in the struggle. In that sense, anxiety became an accepted state of mind.

Peer pressure. Meetings were one obvious place where peer pressure came into play. For example, the leaders would give a presentation on a change

in the direction of some work or would open up a denunciation of a militant for some error. Each militant present was expected to say how much he or she agreed with what was just said. Ideally, each person said something different from what had already been said; but more to the point, each person was expected to agree with ("unite with") the thrust of what was happening and support the leadership position. Questions, should there be any, had to be couched within overall agreement. After years of this kind of participation, militants became quite incapable of creative or critical thinking, could only parrot each other, and had shrunken vocabularies riddled with arcane internal phraseology. For example, "bourgeois careerism," "PB self-indulgence," "need-to-know," "commandism," and "mefirstism" became everyday expressions. Afterward many members spoke of feeling "deadened" by this undemocratic experience and as though they lost a sense of themselves as thinking persons.

Reporting was another mechanism of peer pressure. The "one-help" system was a means by which members learned about, and were desensitized to, the practice of reporting on each other. This was a type of buddy system by which new members were assigned a helper (the one-help) to assist them in their integration into Party life. In weekly meetings, new members were to reveal to their one-help all thoughts, questions, or feelings about the organization. One-helps were supposed to help new members become "objective" about things, assist them in seeing things from "a Party point of view," and coach them in how to schedule their time so that they could figure out how to do even more for the organization.

Each one-help wrote detailed weekly reports about everything the new member said and did. Those reports were sent to Branch leadership, New Members teachers, Party School teachers, and Staff/New Members (the administrative team, who under Eleanor's direct guidance oversaw the training and development of all new members). To facilitate "breaking" the new member, these reports were used to monitor development and to identify an action or attitude that could serve as the basis of a group criticism in a future meeting. The more meat for criticism in the one-help report, the better the one-help. Just about every militant, at one time or another, was assigned to be a one-help to a new member.

To be given that assignment was considered a sign of development and of the Party's trust. The one-help system helped to institutionalize incessant reporting on one another; it also helped to create an atmosphere of widespread fear of fellow comrades.

For example, I recruited a longtime friend, Stephanie, and we became housemates when she was still a relatively new member. (I needed a roommate because my two previous roommates had just been expelled during a campaign against middle-level leadership.) Although it was highly unusual to have a nonmember stay in a Party house, that summer Stephanie's mother was allowed to visit and stay with us for a week or two. This occurred while the Party was still completely clandestine. Shortly after her mother left, Stephanie was harshly denounced in her Branch meeting for having addressed me by my real name, instead of my Party name, during the time her mother was visiting. The short-sightedness exemplified here is twofold. First, Stephanie's mother already knew me (or at least knew of me) before she came to stay with us, as Stephanie and I had been friends for some time before we each joined the Party. Before moving in, she had told her mother that she was going to be my housemate (although she had not revealed our Party affiliation). Certainly, it would have seemed bizarre to her mother if suddenly I had a different name. Second, and perhaps even more startling, I was the one who reported Stephanie for the security violation of having used my real name in front of her mother. In retrospect, I view this as a classic example of what is sometimes called black-and-white thinking commonplace among cult members. And not only black-and-white, for its simplicity and lack of subtlety; but black-*is*-white, in what may be recognized by outsiders as ready acceptance of blatant contradictions.

Modeling. The top leaders were expected to be exemplary in terms of commitment, exhibited dedication, and willingness to struggle and be criticized. The motto was: "Don't ask of anyone what you yourself have not done." Certain members of the leadership circle underwent intense levels of criticism on a regular basis. Also, they were expected to make greater sacrifices and be willing to discuss them in meetings in order to be a model to lower-ranking militants.

Cross-Cutting Ties In some social contexts (institutions, cities, countries), people who belong to one social group (e.g., an economic class, ethnicity, religion, gender, etc.) have ongoing and even intimate social ties or connections with people in other types of groups. Irish Americans, for example, may have friends, lovers, coworkers, roommates, and so forth who are Italian American, African American, and so on. Their social ties, in other words, cut across two or more groups or categories of people. Other things being equal, these cross-cutting ties tend to reduce the likelihood that incompatible or contradictory identities, ideas, values, or interests will form between the groups in question; these ties thereby reduce the likelihood of group conflict. It is difficult (although not impossible) to feel that a group of people with whom you regularly and intimately associate are your enemies; you may have disagreements with such people, but you are likely to feel that such disagreements can be resolved through dialogue and compromise. By contrast, when no such cross-cutting ties exist, and religious groups (for example) only associate with their own kind, then distinctive identities, ideas, values, and interests are more likely to emerge within such religious groups, with the result that sectarian conflict is also more likely. Groups with which one seldom if ever associates are likely to seem more different, foreign, and inscrutable. In extreme cases, some groups may not even be considered human beings by others. In such instances, obviously, disagreements are likely to result in open conflict and even violence.

The following is an example of the model/enforcer role. Frieda was the first parent in the Party. After some struggle, Frieda submitted to and united with the idea that she could raise her child on her time off, and she assured the Party that being a mother would not affect her commitment. In actuality, Frieda rarely had time off, and the child was raised primarily in a Party-run child care facility, where children received "superficial care but no real sustenance." Eventually, the Party adopted the attitude that it was "a selfish choice to have a child." Setting an example for others, Frieda, a true believer, modeled an exemplary attitude about the policy and helped to enforce the prevailing norms on parenting. At times, Frieda admitted later, she "was harder on others than necessary" to compensate for what she recognized as her own weak point.

Another major aspect of modeling behavior was reflected in the relationship between leadership and nonleadership militants and the growing patterns of corrupt behavior. Essentially, nothing was to be questioned and there was no criticism of leadership, except on occasions when Dixon called for a campaign against specific individuals. Total unity was expected, even while, concomitantly, militants were told to think for themselves and take initiative in their work. Yet anyone who disagreed or offered a criticism—member or nonmember—was labeled an enemy of the Party and hence an enemy of the working class. Disagreements were a rarity in the DWP. Typically, ones that were aired were handled swiftly, by the militant's capitulation or expulsion.

Commitment. There was an overriding sense that one's commitment to the Party was supposed to outweigh everything else. "A militant's first desire must be to serve, and not to lead," taught *The Militant's Guide.* Such intense dedication was routinely studied, often by using the example of Rubashov in *The Training of the Cadre.* Although the text names Rubashov as the protagonist, this was actually the story of the Soviet Communist leader and theoretician Nikolai Bukharin. In 1938, during the Stalin era, Bukharin signed a false confession knowing he would be found guilty of treason and shot. Militants learned that after much struggle and while imprisoned, Rubashov saw the light and united with his party. Ultimately, he said he was happy to be executed by the party. This was held up as exemplary devotion on the part of the cadre. Another historical example of the requisite depth of devotion was that of Chairman Mao allowing his closest friend and most beloved comrade, Lin Piao, to be shot.

The lesson was, defend Communism and defend the Party to the end. In that vein, teachers asked militants in Party School, "Could you shoot someone?" Although a rhetorical question of

sorts, the level of tension in the room during such a discussion was high. To give one's life for the Party was regarded as the highest honor.

Cult Formation: The Self-Sealing Social System

In general, humans are knowledgeable about their situations and their interactions with others. According to Giddens, in most cases, if you ask a person why he or she did something, he or she can give you reasons. Yet such a point of view does not preclude individuals from being limited in their knowledge or their power, both of which tend to have an effect on one's decision-making capabilities. All is not equal on most if not all playing fields.

Not only was power centralized in the DWP and Heaven's Gate, but knowledge was centralized, and access to it was limited or blocked in many ways. The degree and depth of knowledge available to group members were severely hampered in all four dimensions of the social structure:

- Charismatic authority: Leadership was secretive and inaccessible.
- Transcendent belief system: Group doctrine was inviolable and came down from on high.
- Systems of control: Rigid boundaries defined inaccessible space and topics closed to discussion or inquiry.
- Systems of influence: Internalized norms, all-pervasive modeling, and constant peer monitoring ruled out inappropriate questioning.

In both groups, then, the boundaries of knowledge were shut tight and reinforced in three specific ways—through the process of resocialization, through the use of ideology, and through social controls.

Resocialization into the Cult Identity

The works of Erik Erikson and Erving Goffman are critical to any understanding of resocialization. Giddens relied on these works in his description of the resocialization process as the systematic breaking down of the person in order to instill trust in the authority figure. He and others have pointed out that typical patterns of resocialization are found in specific situations, including the battlefield, prison camps, religious conversion, and forced interrogation. Known patterns of resocialization include launching a deliberate, sustained attack on ordinary routines; producing a high degree of anxiety in the person; stripping away socialized responses; and attacking the foundation of the basic security system grounded in the trust of others. In the target person, one can expect to see an upsurge in anxiety, regressive modes of behavior, succumbing to the pressures, and adopting a new attitude of trust in and identification with the authority figure(s). Giddens wrote: "The radical disruption of routine produces a sort of corrosive effect upon the customary behaviour of the actor, associated with the impact of anxiety or fear. This circumstance brings about heightened suggestibility, or vulnerability to the promptings of others; the correlate of such suggestibility is regressive behaviour. The outcome of these is a new process of identification—transitory in the mob case, more permanent in protracted critical situations—with an authority figure."

The goal of resocialization, then, is the reconstructed personality. This reconstruction often revolves around one aim, "to get the individual to *identify* with the socializing agent." The desired effect is a new self whose "actions will be dictated by the imagined will or purpose of the actor he has identified with.… It is then that will which generates the internal sanctions for future actions." Such a process of resocialization was a central facet of membership in both the DWP and Heaven's Gate. It was the essence of the DWP's cadre transformation and of Heaven's Gate's transition to the genderless creature. The ultimate effect of such processes is not only a "violation of territories of the self" but also, and perhaps more important, the generation of a state of personal closure, as the person closes himself off to outside knowledge or disconfirming evidence that might challenge this "new self."

Resocialization is a great reinforcer of the status quo within the group. Equally significant, it serves as a hindrance to independent information gathering and a barrier to accessing sources of knowledge. In this context, the purpose of resocialization is to create a true believer—not a curiosity seeker or a critical thinker.

Using Ideology to Enclose the System

The second reinforcer of the boundaries of knowledge resides in the ideological realm. In the two cases examined here, the belief system became quite purposefully an ideological barricade. The constant striving for an impossible ideal that was the linchpin of membership caused members to feel consistently inadequate about themselves and their accomplishments. This kept them in a self-recriminating and self-critical behavioral and attitudinal mode.

This stultifying dynamic worked to stave off questioning the system or the "truths" of the system. Adherents were too busy criticizing themselves for their incessant failures and too consumed with working harder to achieve their goals—either the short-term ones set by the group or leader or the long-term goal of freedom and self-fulfillment as promised by the leader. The result was self-denial, exhaustion, and guilt. All of that was held neatly in place by the serious commitment each member made to the cause—and to the leader and other members of the group.

External and Internalized Mechanisms of Control

The third reinforcer of closed boundaries was the use of specific social controls. Given the invasive and all-pervasive nature of the systems of influence and control found in Heaven's Gate and the DWP, the sociological concept of total institutions is useful here. These closed social systems are recognized for their "totalizing discipline," reshaped identity, and constraint. The distinctive features of total institutions are interrogative procedures, removal of personal boundaries, forced and continual relations with others, and total control of time. Although many of the conditions of life in the DWP and Heaven's Gate are recognizably similar to those features, the differences must not be ignored. First, both groups were voluntaristic (except for children born or brought into the DWP), unlike the blatant confinement of the asylum, which was the locus of Goffman's class study on total institutions. Second, membership in the two groups involved an attraction to, affinity for, and eventual adoption of a belief system that undergirded the adherent's acquiescence to the systems of control. Again, that is quite a different milieu from that experienced by an inmate in a locked ward in a mental hospital.

However, Goffman's analysis was meant to have broader applications. Thus abbeys, monasteries, convents, cloisters, and other retreats from the world were included in the category of total institutions. Now this might work for the Heaven's Gate group, whose members at times even referred to themselves as monks. But it would be difficult to squeeze the DWP into that category, especially with its stated mission of mass practice and social change. Although it was seclusive, the DWP was quite involved in worldly matters and in that sense could not be described as a retreat from the world. Nonetheless, the extent to which DWP cadres created and lived in a world unto themselves revealed that on some level they were just as cut off from the larger society as nuns in a cloister.

Despite these differences from the classic definition of a total institution, the constraining features of the systems of control and influence kept DWP and Heaven's Gate members from obtaining certain key information or having access to certain knowledge. The dimension of power is most prominent here. Above all, these true believers knew that the systems of control ensured the continuity of the group and the ongoing special (charismatic) relationship between leader and followers. In that sense every rule had a context, and every demand on members was justified by the ideology and the normative system that flowed from it. The overriding power of group authority figures was accepted as a given. The normative system was understood as a necessary mechanism of commitment and change, ultimately for the good of each participant who was striving to meet the ideal. Power in such a situation is both very real and quite subtle. Giddens said it precisely when he wrote, "Power relations are often most profoundly embedded in modes of conduct which are taken for granted by those who follow them, most especially in routinized behaviour, which is only diffusely motivated." The success of these two groups was in their capacity to convince followers, who routinely convinced each other that they were acting of their own accord, for their own good.

Yet for all their efforts at good behavior, sanctions of all kinds existed in both groups. Members feared disapproval and punishment by means of

a wide range of structural and social mechanisms—from slippage meetings and criticism sessions to ostracism and public trials and expulsion. DWP sanctions also included various forms of physical punishment, from double-duty work shifts to bodily harm. In effect, fully committed DWP cadres and Heaven's Gate students knew where the line was drawn. Their daily practice was the expression of their commitment. Any error was to be rooted out—with pleasure.

But the harshest sanction of all was internal—the devoted member's inner capacity to control urges, desires, actions, thoughts, and beliefs that were contrary to the group's teachings. Self-condemnation was everyday fare. These internalized sanctions were among the most powerful mechanisms of control. Ultimately, the individual cult member's ability to enact freedom of action was not restricted by lurking external forces or even by the confines of the system. Rather, at this point of the fusion of personal freedom and self-renunciation, at this point of personal closure, the individual may well become his own source of constraint.

The Social Psychology of the Individual Change Process

Heaven's Gate and the DWP had widely divergent ruling ideologies. But the overall character of these groups was not belief-specific. Rather, what is relevant to our understanding here is the manifestation of broader principles of charismatic influence and control within the confines of each group's totalistic system. The demands in this milieu led to an individual worldview shift. The foundation for this was a social structure in which personal freedom (e.g., salvation), as aspired to by each participant, could be gained only through self-renunciation (transformation) of the highest order. The charismatic commitment of each individual was stretched to mold the adherent into a deployable agent, or true believer. This was not achieved for every member of the group, however. For some, commitment was not that strong; they doubted major aspects of the belief system; they failed tests and either left or were ejected from the group; they did not have enough faith or lost faith in the leader—for one reason or another, they were not ready to

take that leap. But for those who were, the parts were in place.

The interaction between the individual and the social structure is crucial at this stage. The four structural dimensions (charismatic authority, transcendent belief system, systems of control, and systems of influence) are interlocked and interdependent. They support and reinforce one another, creating the self-sealing system. For the person living within such a system, the conflation of these four dimensions generates an internal dualism, which, I believe, is the linchpin of a binding commitment and the genesis of the true believer. This internalized way of being becomes as much a part of the system as the mechanisms that engender it.

Let me explain what I mean by "internal dualism." Each of the structural dimensions creates a boundary inside and around the individual, and each dimension has a double-sided effect. These personal boundaries are grouped into four dualistic categories: purpose and commitment, love and fear, duty and guilt, and internalization and identification.

Purpose/Commitment

The cult member responds to the power of the group's beliefs and enjoys the strength of collective commitment. She believes she has found meaning and purpose. Yet this requires a commitment that demands single-mindedness, a way of thinking characterized by dogmatism and rigidity, and no identity outside the context of the group.

Love/Fear

As much as members love their leaders, so do they fear them because of the power they hold over the members' lives, the threat of disapproval, and the expressions of paranoia that raise the specter of the "evil" outside world. Members also enjoy group solidarity and feel a sense of personal power and elitism; yet, at the same time, they fear peer shunning or withdrawal of support. It is a tightrope walk, with little room for error.

Duty/Guilt

The member's sense of duty shares space with guilt, always a forceful human motivator. Feeling duty-bound and obligated, members find themselves

participating in activities that in other circumstances may have violated a personal ethical code. Now the leader is the only moral arbiter. In some cases, through repetition, ritual, and other group activities, the member becomes desensitized to behavior previously considered unthinkable or objectionable. The longer a person remains with a group, the more invested he is, and potentially all the more complicit with group-dictated actions and behaviors. Life outside the group seems less and less an option.

Identification/Internalization

Finally, by means of the processes of identification and internalization, the member feels in complete unity with the group and the leader. Although on occasion she may still experience dissonance or confusion over discrepancies, at the same time she has access to fewer and fewer outside sources of information and therefore little capacity for reality checks outside the bounds of the system. She feels completely separated from her own pregroup identities and cannot imagine life outside the group. Here the process has come full circle.

The State of Personal Closure

As these dualistic personal boundaries develop and strengthen, a state of personal closure begins to develop. We might think of personal closure as the individualized version of the self-sealing system on an organizational level. Closure is meant in the sense not of completion, which is one use of the term, but rather of a closing in of the self in a self-sealed world. Lifton described it as a "disruption of balance between self and the outside world." He wrote:

> Pressured toward a merger of internal and external milieus, the individual encounters a profound threat to his personal autonomy. He is deprived of the combination of external information and inner reflection which anyone requires to test the realities of his environment and to maintain a measure of identity separate from it. Instead, he

is called upon to make an absolute polarization of the real (the prevailing ideology) and the unreal (everything else). To the extent that he does this, he undergoes a *personal closure* which frees him from man's incessant struggle with the elusive subtleties of truth.

The personal closure that is the culmination of cultic life is profoundly confining because one is closed to both the outside world and one's inner life. This phenomenon is quite different from cognitive dissonance because it involves all aspects of one's life. It is also much more all-encompassing than our understanding of the normal processes of conformity because of the depth and extent of the internalization and identification. The quality of the belief change actually shifts members' value structure—either temporarily or permanently. When such a shift occurs, individual choice is not an individual matter.

[…]

In a group such as this, individual decisions are not a matter of satisficing, of choosing the "good enough" alternative. Rather, options are limited even further by the combination of the self-sealing nature of the system and the participant's rigid adherence to the norms and near-total identification with the leader and the stated goals. […] Through charismatic authority, the member has come to identify with the leader. Through the transcendent belief system, the member has adopted and internalized the utopian worldview. Through the systems of control, the member has accepted daily behavioral controls. And through the systems of influence, the member has internalized the group norms and attitudes. […] But in a context of bounded choice, a person's perceptions and, hence, decision-making processes are constrained even further. […] Not only are choices limited, but the actual decision-making process is hampered by the true believer's internal voices, which are in complete alignment with the self-sealing system. In this way, behaviors or actions that might look crazy or irrational to the outsider look completely rational from the perspective of the person inside the bounded reality of the cult.

13

Are Frames Enough?

Charlotte Ryan and William A. Gamson

"What is power? Power is the ability to say what the issues are and who the good guys and bad guys are. That is power."

Conservative pundit Kevin Phillips

Social movements in the United States have long recognized "framing" as a critical component of political success. A frame is a thought organizer, highlighting certain events and facts as important and rendering others invisible. Politicians and movement organizations have scurried to framing workshops and hired consultants who promise to help identify a winning message. In the current political climate, demoralized social movements and activists find this promise appealing.

After two decades of conducting framing workshops at the Media/Movement Research and Action Project (MRAP), which we codirect, we have concluded that framing is necessary but not sufficient. Framing is valuable for focusing a dialogue with targeted constituencies. It is not external packaging intended to attract news media and bystanders; rather, it involves a strategic dialogue intended to shape a particular group into a coherent movement. A movement-building strategy needs to ground itself in an analysis of existing power relations and to position supporters and allies to best advantage. Used strategically, framing permeates the work of building a movement: acquiring resources, developing infrastructure and leadership, analyzing power, and planning strategy. The following success story illustrates this approach.

October 2003: The setting was unusual for a press conference—a pristine, cape-style house surrounded by a white picket fence. The mailbox in front read A. Victim. The car in the driveway had a Rhode Island license plate, VICTIM. The crowd in front of the makeshift podium included film crews, photographers, and reporters from every major news outlet in Rhode Island.

The young woman at the podium wore a T-shirt and carried a coffee mug, both reading, "I'm being abused." Her mouth was taped shut. As the crowd grew silent, she pulled off the tape and began to speak. "Domestic violence is never this obvious. This could be any neighborhood, any

community. But as victims, we don't wear signs to let you know we're being abused." After a pause, she continued, "Look around you to your left and right. We are everywhere, in all walks of life." At that, the cameras swiveled around to capture a sea of faces in the audience. Scattered throughout the crowd were other survivors of domestic violence, each with her mouth taped shut. That evening and the following day, the press carried the words and images.

The press conference was the beginning of a campaign by the Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence (RICADV) in collaboration with its survivor task force, Sisters Overcoming Abusive Relations (SOAR). The campaign was part of a continuing effort to reframe how domestic violence is understood—as a widespread problem requiring social, not individual, solutions. Follow-ups to the press conference included events at schools and churches, soccer tournaments, and softball games involving police, firefighters, and college teams, dances, fashion shows, health fairs, self-defense classes, marches, and candlelight vigils, culminating in a Halloween party and open house sponsored by SOAR.

The campaign was a new chapter in a multiyear effort not only to reframe public understanding of domestic violence but to translate into practice this call for social, not private, responses. RICADV promoted a seven-point plan to close gaps in the safety net of domestic violence services and, along with SOAR and other allies, shepherded the plan through the Rhode Island legislature.

As recently as the mid-1990s, when RICADV began working with MRAP on using the media for social change, the media coverage and public understanding of domestic violence issues was very different. The Rhode Island media, like the media in general, framed domestic violence issues as private tragedies. A typical story told of a decent man who had lost control, cracking under life's burdens: "A model employee whose life fell apart," read one *Providence Journal* headline (March 22, 1999). Or neighbors say that they could never imagine their friendly neighbor shooting his wife and child before turning the gun on himself: "They seemed nice, you know. They always seemed to get along as far as I could see" (*Providence Journal*, April 29,

1996). The media coverage of domestic violence a decade later reflects a successful effort to reframe the political debate.

Why Framing Matters

Like a picture frame, an issue frame marks off some part of the world. Like a building frame, it holds things together. It provides coherence to an array of symbols, images, and arguments, linking them through an underlying organizing idea that suggests what is essential—what consequences and values are at stake. We do not see the frame directly, but infer its presence by its characteristic expressions and language. Each frame gives the advantage to certain ways of talking and thinking, while it places others "out of the picture."

Sociologists, cognitive psychologists, political scientists, and communications scholars have been writing about and doing frame analysis for the past 30 years. With the help of popular books such as psychologist George Lakoff's *Don't Think of an Elephant!*, the idea that defining the terms of a debate can determine the outcome of that debate has spread from social science and is rapidly becoming part of popular wisdom.

A Few Things We Know about Frames

- Facts take on their meaning by being embedded in frames, which render them relevant and significant or irrelevant and trivial. The contest is lost at the outset if we allow our adversaries to define what facts are relevant. To be conscious of framing strategy is not manipulative. It is a necessary part of giving coherent meaning to what is happening in the world, and one can either do it unconsciously or with deliberation and conscious thought.

  The idea dies hard that the truth would set us free if only the media did a better job of presenting the facts, or people did a better job of paying attention. Some progressives threw up their hands in dismay and frustration when polls showed that most Bush voters in 2004 believed there was a connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. The "fact" was clear that no connection had been found.

If these voters did not know this, it was because either the news media had failed in their responsibility to inform them, or they were too lazy and inattentive to take it in.

But suppose one frames the world as a dangerous place in which the forces of evil—a hydra-headed monster labeled "terrorism"—confront the forces of good. This frame depicts Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda as two heads of the same monster. In this frame, whether or not agents actually met or engaged in other forms of communication is nit-picking and irrelevant.

- People carry around multiple frames in their heads. We have more than one way of framing an issue or an event. A specific frame may be much more easily triggered and habitually used, but others are also part of our cultural heritage and can be triggered and used as well, given the appropriate cues. For example, regarding the issue of same-sex marriage, witness the vulnerability of the Defense of Marriage frame. What it defends is an idea—in the minds of its advocates, a sacred idea. The idea is that a man and a woman vow commitment to each other until death parts them and devote themselves to the raising of a new generation.

  Same-sex couples can and do enter into relationships that, except for their gender, fit the sacred idea very well—they are committed to each other for life and to raising a new generation. Part of the ambivalence that many traditionalists feel about the issue comes from their uneasy knowledge that same-sex couples may honor this idea as much or more than do opposite-sex couples. In the alternative frame, the focus of the issue is not on gender, but on the question, Why should two people who are committed for life be denied legal recognition of their commitment, with all of the attendant rights and responsibilities, just because they are of the same sex?

  One important reframing strategy involves making the issue less abstract and more personal. Sociologist Jeffrey Langstraat describes the use of this strategy in the debate in the Massachusetts State House. A generally conservative legislator, who somewhat unexpectedly found himself supporting same-sex marriage, called it "putting a face

on the issue." He pointed to a well-liked and respected fellow legislator involved in a long term, same-sex relationship. "How can we say to her," he asked his colleagues, "that her love and commitment [are] less worthy than ours?"

- Successful reframing involves the ability to enter into the worldview of our adversaries. A good rule of thumb is that we should be able to describe a frame that we disagree with so that an advocate would say, "Yes, this is what I believe." Not long ago, a reporter at a rare George Bush press conference asked the president why he kept talking about a connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda when no facts supported it. When the president responded, "The reason why I keep talking about there being a connection is because there is a connection," he was not lying or being obtuse and stupid, he was relying on an unstated frame. Frames are typically implicit, and although Bush did not explicitly invoke the metaphor of the hydra-headed monster or the axis of evil, we can reasonably infer that he had something like this in mind—the forces of evil are gathering, and only America can stop them.

- All frames contain implicit or explicit appeals to moral principles. While many analysts of conflicts among frames emphasize how frames diagnose causes and offer prognoses about consequences, Lakoff usefully focuses on the moral values they invoke. Rather than classifying frames into those that emphasize causes and consequences and those that emphasize moral values, however, it is even more useful to think of all frames as having diagnostic, prognostic, and moral components.

Why Framing Is Not All that Matters

Too much emphasis on the message can draw our attention away from the carriers of frames and the complicated and uneven playing fields on which they compete. Successful challenges to official or dominant frames frequently come from social movements and the advocacy groups they spawn. Although they compete on a field in which inequalities in power and resources play a major role in determining outcomes, some

movements have succeeded dramatically against long odds in reframing the terms of political debate. To succeed, framing strategies must be integrated with broader movement-building efforts. This means building and sustaining the carriers of these frames in various ways—for example, by helping them figure out how to gain access where it is blocked or how to enable groups with similar goals to collaborate more effectively.

Too narrow a focus on the message, with a corresponding lack of attention to movement-building, reduces framing strategy to a matter of pitching metaphors for electoral campaigns and policy debates, looking for the right hot-button language to trigger a one-shot response. Adapted from social marketing, this model ignores the carriers and the playing field, focusing only on the content of the message. In isolation from constituency-building, criticism of the media, and democratic media reform, framing can become simply a more sophisticated but still ungrounded variation on the idea that "the truth will set you free." The problem with the social-marketing model is not that it doesn't work—in the short run, it may—but that it doesn't help those engaged in reframing political debates to sustain collective efforts over time and in the face of formidable obstacles.

Political conservatives did not build political power merely by polishing their message in ways that resonate effectively with broader cultural values. They also built infrastructure and relationships with journalists and used their abundant resources to amplify the message and repeat it many times. Duane Oldfield shows how the Christian Right built media capacity and cultivated relationships with key political actors in the Republican Party, greatly expanding the carriers of their message beyond the original movement network. Wealthy conservatives donated large amounts of money to conservative think tanks that not only fine-tuned this message but also created an extended network of relationships with journalists and public officials.

Participatory Communication

The Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence did not succeed because it found a better way to frame its message but because it found a better model than social marketing to guide its work. Call it the participatory communication model. The social marketing model treats its audience as individuals whose citizenship involves voting and perhaps conveying their personal opinions to key decision makers. The alternative model treats citizens as collective actors—groups of people who interact, who are capable of building long-term relationships with journalists and of carrying out collaborative, sustained reframing efforts that may involve intense conflict.

Widely used in the Global South, this alternative approach—inspired by Paulo Freire—argues that without communications capacity, those directly affected by inequalities of power cannot exercise "the right and power to intervene in the social order and change it through political praxis." The first step is to map the power relations that shape structural inequalities in a given social and historical context. This strategic analysis informs the next phase, in which communities directly affected by structural inequalities cooperate to bring about change. This is empowerment through collective action. Finally, participatory communication models include a third, recurring step—reflection.

By encouraging reflection about framing practices, participatory communicators foster ongoing dialogues that build new generations of leaders and extend relational networks. "Everyone is a communicator," says RICADV, and all collective action embodies frames. SOAR's staging of the bit of street theater described at the beginning of this article did not come out of the blue. SOAR was part of the Rhode Island Coalition, which had been building communication infrastructure during a decade of collaboration with MRAP.

MRAP and RICADV began working together in 1996, but to begin our story there would be historically inaccurate. RICADV explains to all new members that they "stand on the shoulders" of the women who founded the domestic violence movement in the 1970s. The Rhode Island Coalition against Domestic Violence began in 1979 and, until 1991, operated roughly on a feminist consensus model. At this point an organizational expansion began that resulted in the hiring of new staff in 1995. The framing successes we describe, therefore, grew out of one of the more successful initiatives of the U.S. women's movement. Groups working to end domestic violence

during the last three decades can claim significant progress, including the establishment of research, preventive education, support systems, and the training of public safety, social service, and health care providers.

History matters. In this case, the efforts on which RICADV built had already established many critical movement-building components:

- Activists had established a social movement organization committed to a mission of social change—to end domestic violence in the state of Rhode Island.
- They had established a statewide service network with local chapters in each region of the state.
- They had created a statewide policy organization to integrate the horizontal network into focused political action at the state and national legislative levels.
- They had obtained government funding for part of RICADV's education and service work, protecting the organization against fluctuation in other revenue sources such as fundraisers, corporate sponsors, donations, and grants.
- On the grassroots level, RICADV had supported the growth of an organization that encouraged victims of domestic violence to redefine themselves as survivors capable of using their experience to help others.
- Finally, they had created a physical infrastructure—an office, staff, computerized mailing lists, internal communication tools such as newsletters, and institutionalized mechanisms for community outreach. The most prominent of these was Domestic Violence Awareness Month in October, during which stories about domestic violence are commonly shared.

In short, RICADV's framing successes were made possible by the generous donations of people who had formed a social movement that encouraged internal discussion, decision making, strategic planning, focused collective action, resource accumulation, coalition-building, reflection, and realignment. The conscious use of framing as a strategic tool for integrating its worldview into action ensured that the organization could consistently "talk politics" in all its endeavors.

By the mid-1990s, the organization had made great strides on the national framing front regard-ing the public portrayal of domestic violence. In the wake of several high-profile domestic violence cases, made-for-TV movies, and star-studded benefits, domestic violence was positioned as an effective wedge issue that cut across hardening Right–Left divisions. The Family Violence Prevention Fund headed a national public education effort, working hard through the 1990s to frame domestic violence as a public as opposed to a private matter. High visibility had gained recognition of the issue, but much work remained to be done on the grassroots level and in legislative circles.

Changing Media Frames and Routines

When MRAP and RICADV began to collaborate in 1996, we had a running start. Already, RICADV routinely attracted proactive coverage, particularly during Domestic Violence Awareness Month. But all was not rosy. RICADV and other state coalitions across the nation had discovered that, despite media willingness to cover domestic violence awareness events, reporters covering actual incidents of domestic violence ignored the movement's framing of domestic violence as a social problem. Their stories reverted to sensationalized individual framings such as "tragic love goes awry."

In part, such stories represented the institutionalized crime beat tradition that tended to ignore deeper underlying issues. Crime stories about domestic violence routinely suggested that victims were at least partially responsible for their fate. At other times, coverage would focus on the perpetrator's motive, while the victim would disappear. News beats created split coverage: a reporter might sympathetically cover an event sponsored by a domestic violence coalition and yet write a crime story that ignored the movement's framing of domestic violence as social. All these effects were intensified if the victims were poor or working-class women and/or women of color.

At the beginning of our joint effort, RICADV routinely experienced this split-screen coverage: in covering coalition events, the media routinely reported that domestic violence was everyone's business and that help was available. On the front

page and in the evening news, however, these coverage patterns isolated the victim, implying complicity on her part (more than 90 percent of victims in this study were female):

- She was a masochistic partner in a pathological relationship.
- She provoked her batterer.
- She failed to take responsibility for leaving.

Such stories undermined efforts to change policy and consciousness. They portrayed isolated victims struggling for protection while obscuring the social roots of domestic violence.

To address these and other framing issues systematically, RICADV Executive Director Deborah DeBare urged her board to hire a full-time communication coordinator in the spring of 1996. They chose Karen Jeffreys, a seasoned community organizer, who took a movement-building approach to communications. Jeffreys had previously drawn our MRAP group into framing projects on housing and welfare rights.

With MRAP support, she began an effort to make RICADV an indispensable source for news and background information about domestic violence in the Rhode Island media market. Gaining media standing was not an end in itself but a means to promote the reframing of domestic violence as a social problem requiring social solutions. By 2000, RICADV had published a handbook for journalists summarizing recommendations from survivors, reporters, advocates, and MRAP participants. Local journalists actively sought and used it, and it has been widely circulated to similar groups in other states.

To help implement the participatory communications model, Jeffreys worked out an internal process called a "media caucus" to ensure widespread participation in media work. Participants discussed how to respond to inquiries from reporters and how to plan events to carry the message. The media caucus conducted role-playing sessions, in which some participants would take the part of reporters, sometimes hard-ball ones, to give each other practice and training in being a spokesperson on the issue. RICADV encouraged the development and autonomy of SOAR, a sister organization of women who had personally experienced domestic violence. They worked to ensure that the voices of abused women were heard.

The press conference in 2003 was the culmination of years of work with reporters that succeeded in making the conference a "must attend" event for journalists. They had not only learned to trust RICADV and the information it provided but perceived it as an important player. RICADV and SOAR jointly planned the press conference, choosing the setting, talking about what clothes to wear, and planning the order in which people would speak. Without Karen Jeffreys' knowledge, but to her subsequent delight, the two spokespersons from SOAR, Rosa DeCastillo and Jacquelyn Kelley, had caucused again and added visual effects, including the tape over the mouths. The planning and support gave the SOAR women the courage and the skills to innovate and helped make the press conference an effective launching pad for the campaign that followed.

Conclusion

Framing matters, but it is not the only thing that matters. There is a danger in "quick fix" politics—the sexy frame as the magic bullet. Framing work is critical, but framing work itself must be framed in the context of movement-building. If those who aim to reframe political debates are to compete successfully against the carriers of official frames, who have lots of resources and organization behind them, they must recognize power inequalities and find ways to challenge them. This requires them to recognize citizens as potential collective actors, not just individual ones.

The participatory communication model appeals to people's sense of agency, encouraging them to develop the capacity for collective action in framing contests. You cannot transform people who feel individually powerless into a group with a sense of collective power by pushing hot buttons. Indeed, you cannot transform people at all. People transform themselves through the work of building a movement—through reflection, critique, dialogue, and the development of relationships and infrastructure that constitute a major reframing effort.

In the spirit of the communication model that we are advocating, it is only fitting to give our

RICADV partners the last words. The collaborative process inside the organization allows them to finish each other's sentences:

> **ALICE:** Each concerned group is a small stream. RICADV's job is to make the small streams come together, to involve the whole community and make social change for the whole state. And that's our mission—to end domestic violence in Rhode Island. But to do this, all RICADV's work—lobbying, policy, services, public relations—had to come together. We were moving … (pause)
>
> **KAREN:** … moving a mountain. As organizers, we think strategically. Organizers think of social justice, and social justice is always about changing systems. So we were trained to read situations differently, to see gaps in institutional layers and links. We saw the potential of … (pause)
>
> **ALICE:** … of social justice, of making that change. Whereas a traditional publicist thinks, "Let's get publicity for our organization's work," as organizers, we saw systems and movements. We were definitely going to move the domestic violence issue to another place!
>
> **KAREN:** It's our instinct to … (pause)
>
> **ALICE:** … to get the community involved and fix this. We saw a whole movement.

Recommended Resources

David Croteau, William Hoynes, and Charlotte Ryan, eds. *Rhyming Hope and History: Activist, Academics, and Social Movements* (University of Minnesota Press, 2005). Essays on the joys and frustrations involved in collaborations between academics and activists.

George Lakoff. *Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate* (Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004). Popularizes many of the most important insights of frame analysis, but implicitly adopts a social-marketing model that ignores movement-building and power inequalities.

Duane M. Oldfield. *The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party* (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). Describes the methodical movement-building process that helped the Christian Right succeed in its reframing effort.

Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence (RICADV). *Domestic Violence: A Handbook for Journalists* (www.ricadv.org, 2000). Offers succinct and practical lessons for journalists on the reporting of domestic violence.

Charlotte Ryan, Michael Anastario, and Karen Jeffreys. "Start Small, Build Big: Negotiating Opportunities in Media Markets." *Mobilization* 10 (2005):111–128. Detailed discussion of how the RICADV built its media capacity and systematic data on how this changed the framing of domestic violence in the Rhode Island media market.

14

The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador

Elisabeth Jean Wood

Beginning in the mid-1970s, Salvadoran peasants joined in a broad social movement against long-standing patterns of political and economic exclusion. Despite brutal repression by state security forces, some continued to participate throughout the subsequent civil war as members of the guerrilla forces, as civilian collaborators providing intelligence and supplies, and as members of opposition organizations aligned with the insurgent guerrilla force (the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, FMLN).

The conventional explanations for collective action, with their varied emphases on material interests, benefits directly resulting from participation, and widening political opportunities (Olson 1965; Popkin 1979; McAdam 1982), do not adequately explain political mobilization in the Salvadoran context of high risk and uncertainty. The material benefits made possible by the guerrilla movement and its affiliated organizations, such as access to land and (relative) autonomy from state forces, were available to residents of contested areas whether they participated in opposition organizations or not.[1] Moreover, at a number of key junctures, political participation deepened as political opportunities narrowed, contrary to the expected pattern (Brockett 1991; Goodwin and Jasper 1999).

Interviews with more than two hundred participating peasants carried out in militarily contested areas of El Salvador between 1987 and 1996 suggest a different account. Campesinos rebelled, I conclude, in order to defy long-resented authorities, to repudiate perceived injustices (particularly, egregious repressive acts by security forces), to claim what they considered their material interests, and to assert—and thereby to constitute—their dignity. The key to the logic of insurgent collective action emerging from these interviews is the assertion of dignity and defiance through the act of rebelling. Unlike other benefits of the insurgency, these emotional benefits were available only to participants.

This interpretation radically extends the usual account of in-process benefits: these reasons for action are *emotional in-process benefits*, by which I mean emotion-laden consequences of action experienced only by those participating in that action. That these reasons were emotional does not imply that participants were irrational: like

conventional explanations, this interpretation emphasizes intentional action taken with the purpose of realizing one's interests or values as the key element of the microfoundations of collective action. In short, despite the risks involved, peasants had cogent and enduring reasons for participating.

The particular emotional in-process benefits emphasized here have a specific form (not necessarily common to all such benefits). While the actions taken were intentional activities to realize interests and therefore of course involved the agency of participants, the particular emotional benefits turned on a more profound role for agency: for both moral outrage and pride, the *assertion of agency* itself constituted part of the meaning of those acts. Participation per se expressed moral outrage, asserted a claim to dignity, and gave grounds for pride.

My explanation emphasizes distinct combinations of motivations at different periods of the movement. Particularly early in the war, some campesinos acted *in order to act*: this assertion of agency (and thus a reclaiming of dignity) was itself a reason for acting—a constitutive and expressive reason. To express rage at the arbitrary and brutal violence of authorities was perceived by some campesinos as a necessary expression of being human, while not to do so was to be less than human. Later in the war, participants in the mobilization experienced a deepening pride—and indeed, pleasure—in their exercise of agency in the realization of their interests. To occupy properties, to refute elite perceptions of one's incapacities, and to defy the state was a pleasure, both individually experienced (as pleasure must be) and collectively expressed (shared with other participants as they jointly asserted their capacity for agency and their dignity as actors). Thus moral outrage, pride, and pleasure, along with more conventional reasons such as access to land, impelled the insurgency despite the high risk and uncertainty.[2]

Setting and Method

One way to find out why peasants act collectively is to ask peasants themselves why they collaborated, or why they didn't, and what the relevant conditions were at the time. As Nora Kriger

(1992) noted, much of the literature on peasant rebellion relies on government documents, police reports, or sources written by the intellectual leadership of revolutionary movements. There is no doubt that insight can be gleaned by reinterpreting the "prose of counter-insurgency" (Guha 1983). But the firsthand accounts of participants may add insights unavailable in these conventional sources; nor do such sources exist where authorities act with great autonomy and little accountability. For the Salvadoran case, it was possible during the civil war and the subsequent cease-fire to record detailed accounts by participating campesinos as to why they collaborated with opposition organizations.

The interpretation presented here draws principally on interviews I carried out in the town of Tenancingo and the department of Usulután between 1987 and 1996. Both sites were contested territory throughout the war: unlike many areas, neither the government nor the insurgents controlled the area. Many interviews were with individual campesinos or guerrilla members, others were with groups of representatives of cooperatives and other peasant organizations. Many informants were interviewed repeatedly over a period of four or five years. Here I focus on campesinos in their supporting role, not on those campesinos who joined the military ranks of the FMLN as full-time permanent members or on those who did not participate on the side of the insurrection.

An initial observation is that the campesinos interviewed responded to my questions at considerable length and sacrifice. Whether in private settings or in public meetings, campesinos of Tenancingo and Usulután appeared eager to participate in this research project, recounting the history of the war in their communities.[3] With groups I interviewed repeatedly over months and sometimes years, enthusiasm for this project was particularly evident on my return after an absence. I would often be greeted with words such as "Well, Elisabeth, do we have something to tell you!" or (to each other), "What did we say we should remember to tell Elisabeth?"

This joy in collaborating in this project appeared to reflect an impulse to testify, to recount the experiences of the war, and to celebrate the achievements of the cooperatives and other organizations.[4] While many stories were

histories of violence, suffering, loss, and injustice, many were also proudly told stories of the achievements of the conflict: of land occupied and defended, of new organizations founded, of new identities asserted. As Marcelo Suarez-Orozco argues, testimony plays a dual role in the aftermath of political violence: "testimony [is] a ritual of both healing and a condemnation of injustice—the concept of testimony contains both connotations of something subjective and private and something objective, judicial, and political" (cited in Green 1994: 244).

One indication of this commitment was the willingness of many campesinos to make pairs of maps showing the local area before and after the war. I asked a dozen teams of campesinos from across Usulután to draw (free-hand) such maps in order to understand how property boundaries and land use had changed during the course of the war, thus documenting how campesino collective action literally redrew the boundaries of class relationships during the war years. These map-drawing workshops involved considerable sacrifice of work time (with no recompense) on the part of individuals and forgone opportunities on the part of the campesino organizations: each pair of maps took two full days to draw, given the unfamiliarity of the task, the minimal literacy of participants, and the care with which they responded. While I promised that the maps would be returned to the communities, which may have provided some incentive, my impression was that they were motivated primarily by their commitment to recounting their history. The resulting maps not only documented the changes in de facto property rights and cropping patterns but documented cultural changes as well. I return to the maps below.

Reliance on personal interviews of course introduces other complications, among them the retrospective nature of some of the evidence. While the interviews suggest that the pride and pleasure that the campesino activists took in their achievements was not only an outcome of the movement but also directly motivated ongoing participation at the time, many of the interviews were carried out in the last months of the war and during the cease-fire. Retrospective reporting of participants in a social movement as to why, earlier, they had joined may reflect present interests as well as the intervening period of their own interpretation of their participation. Given the absence of surveys (until the close of the civil war), indeed their impossibility given the highly violent conditions in the case-study areas, this problem is not easy to address.

I suggest that the following observations adequately ground empirically my assumption that the pride and pleasure evident in the later interviews was also an important factor in motivating participation earlier.[5] Many of the interviews did occur earlier (in Tenancingo, 1987–91). In contrast to conventional explanations, my interpretation does account for the salient facts of mobilization in the case-study areas. Moreover, the existence of a distinct rebellious political culture is confirmed by a 1991 survey of contested areas in which those campesinos who had occupied land by the end of the civil war expressed a distinctly more rebellious set of political attitudes than farmers who owned land. For example, 69 percent of campesinos occupying land stated that one should trust the army "almost never"; only 19 percent of those who owned land held that opinion (Seligson et al. 1993: 2.25).

Peasant mobilization in El Salvador was characterized by three features.[6] First, political mobilization took place in a context where protest was highly dangerous. Consider the risks that participants ran. While the degree of danger varied, declining in the later years of the war, the threat of loss of life or severe abuse was very real throughout the war. In interview after interview during and immediately after the civil war, residents described in credible detail and with enduring grief the loss of family members, friends, and fellow participants:[7]

> Some armed themselves, others fled. We were all seen as guerrillas. Every time we went to the coast, we were searched at the intersection. Nineteen eighty-two was a year of desperation, almost everyone left. My brother disappeared in that year, one of hundreds who disappeared in 1982 and 1983—every day there were two or three bodies at the intersection. After all these years of war, the dead weigh heavily. (Resident, Comunidad La Peña, 1992)[8]

Second, nonparticipants as well as participants could share in the material benefits of the insurgency throughout much of the war. The obvious

benefits that the insurgency offered—access to abandoned land and some autonomy from the daily authority of landlords and security forces—*were* available to everyone who remained in these contested areas, and thus did not have the requisite structure (available only to those actually participating) required to overcome the obstacles to collective action in the usual account based on in-process benefits. In short, free-riding was possible. Indeed, most peasants in the case-study areas did "free-ride" in the sense that they benefited from the absence of landlords as long as they paid the (coerced) minimal cost of staying in the area (occasional provision of tortillas and water to guerrilla forces) and refrained from informing on them to the authorities. By a necessarily rough estimate, about a third of peasants who stayed in the areas directly supported the guerrillas beyond the coerced minimum.[9]

Third, the trajectory of participation evolved from traditional political mobilization, to covert collaboration with the insurgent guerrila forces, to overt support for the insurgents, to mobilization directly for land. Before the civil war, collective action took the form of widespread political protest: national rallies and marches drew tens of thousands of participants, many of whom were mobilized by networks of religious activists. Within the ruling regime, hardliners opposed to reform repeatedly defeated reformist elements and intensified repression of the movement. Participants faced difficult choices—to flee, to stay neutral, to collaborate with one side or the other. Some began working directly as civilian collaborators or as armed guerrillas with various small armed groups, which merged into the FMLN. As the rapidly growing FMLN proved strong enough to force landlords and the state to retreat from many areas of the countryside, a distinct second phase of collaboration began as participants began experiencing the pleasure of successful rebellion as they founded cooperatives, occupied land, and defended their holdings against efforts by the landlords to reclaim their property. Because access to land did not depend on participation, I argue that the pleasure of agency was increasingly the principal motivation for participants. Finally, once it was evident that negotiations would resolve the civil war and would include a transfer of land to peasants occupying land, the numbers of participants rapidly

increased and a wave of land occupations occurred at the close of the war (indeed, occupations threatened the fragile cease-fire in early 1992). Because participation in this last period poses no collective action puzzle (benefits outweighed the costs for each participant), I here focus on the earlier periods when there was a puzzle—one not accounted for by conventional explanations.

Moral Outrage and Pride in Agency

Given that participants faced high risks and that free-riders could also enjoy the immediate benefits, it is quite unlikely that the expected benefits should the revolutionary forces win were high enough to justify participation. Some other "benefits" must distinguish participants from nonparticipants. I suggest that *emotional in-process benefits* provide the key to explaining peasant political mobilization in support of the FMLN during the Salvadoran civil war. There are two such benefits that emerge from the interviews: expressing moral outrage and experiencing the pleasure of agency. As we shall see, participants were morally outraged at the social relations that prevailed before the war and at the repression that greeted initial protest. Participants also took profound pride and pleasure in their insurrectionary activities: they had proved capable of transforming those social relations in acting effectively to realize their interests in land and autonomy. As their activities were increasingly successful, their pride and pleasure increased as well as did their numbers as others joined. The interviews generally suggest that moral outrage provided initial motivation early in the war for those who participated then, and that pride and pleasure of agency later supplemented or replaced outrage for those participating as well as motivating participation for others. But because these two themes of moral outrage and pride were closely intertwined in the interviews—note that the pride expressed draws in large degree on the contrast with the humiliating deference that characterized relations with landlords before the war—I analyze them together.

For those who collaborated with the FMLN from early on, the motives appear to have been largely an expressive commitment to defiance, a refusal to acquiesce, and perhaps a desire for revenge against those who had wronged their

family, friends, or even strangers. In this first phase of collaboration with the insurgents, support was largely covert and on an individual basis:

> Quite a few people didn't want to do it, they were still terrified—they've experienced it [violence, the war] in their own body. I used to say, look, this struggle and the effort of the FMLN have cost blood. We have present this bloody body [Tenemos presente este cuerpo sangriente]. (Member, Cooperativa Loma Alegre, July 1992)

When asked to describe local conditions before the war, interviewees typically responded with detailed statements describing wages and working conditions as well as their resentment toward those conditions. One activist of a peasant organization closely allied with the FMLN stated:

> How did I become a militant of the popular movement? It was born out of social resentment, that's how to understand it. I am an unskilled farm worker, my father never gave me anything. I worked for the rich, it was heavy labor. I felt rage, resentment. It was a hard life, sometimes I would cry with resentment when I couldn't finish the assigned task. (FENACOA activist, April, 1992.)

One suggestion implicit in this statement, as in many others, is that this activist saw himself not choosing among a given set of alternatives but as acting on the only real choice available: to rebel against the injustice of a social structure that offered no choice or to acquiesce to it. Particularly resented was the arbitrariness with which authority was exercised before the war:

> We colonos had to behave with such obedience—we couldn't even disagree with whatever the authorities said. The only refuge: to go live alongside the national roadways when they kicked you out. The human person was just one more farming implement. (Leader, Cooperativa El Carrizal, 1992)

That labor relations before the war were governed by extra-economic coercive means rather than market mechanisms is shown by the inclusion on some of the maps of symbols indicating the presence of National Guardsmen billeted on large estates to quell nascent unrest, a traditional practice in agro-export areas before the war. One

campesino, when asked what it had been like before the war and how it was different now, performed an elaborate pantomime of exaggerated deference to the landlord (hands together, head humbly bent, chest and head bowing without eye contact) in sharp contrast to his subsequent pantomime of the wartime attitude (shoulders back, head pridefully up, fist beating the air). This could of course be mere bravado, but the successful defense of several properties against the threat of occupation by the landlords testifies instead to a significant transformation of attitude toward erstwhile patrons.

In contrast to the descriptions of poverty and humiliation endured before the war, reiterated assertions of pride and accomplishment characterize campesinos' descriptions of the legacy of the war:

> There were so many deaths of cooperative promoters—half a battalion of dead for the simple crime of lending help to the cooperatives. But I would say that this "crime" has been, simply, my accomplishment. (Leader, Cooperative Nuevo Amanecer, June 1992)

For some, persisting and enduring was itself an achievement:

> There was no opportunity to work your own land, only to work as a laborer. In 1979, the conflict began, and it began with a wave of violence. We suffered in all aspects, it became very difficult. They took out a brother of mine. But here we are, living here still. (Member, Cooperativa San Indas Escobares, March 1992)

Many interviewees reported with pride the tenaciousness that had enabled them to remain on their land, whether acquired legally or by occupation, despite frequent military conflicts in the area:

> Here, there is perhaps no one who has not collaborated. The truth is that it has been a deeply suffered war. We have suffered hunger, sometimes eating only bombs. It is God who has made us still be here. Here, the bombs have rained like water. (Resident, Comunidad La Peña, April 1992)

Essential to these assertions of pride is an undercurrent of asserted political and social

equality, in sharp contrast to their experience of prewar social relations. This emphatic leveling of social status marks a conscious shift in perceived relations, and was sometimes very explicit:

> My opinion is this: God the Father made the land for everyone. He didn't make the land for the rich—we are all sons of Mother Earth. We are in this struggle so that the land would belong to those who work it. The rich man is also the son of Mother Earth, and he has the right to land— but only to the same size of parcel, we don't want any haciendas. (Member, Comunidad El Palmo, April 1992)

This leveling of status draws on both Christian and indigenous cosmologies to justify the struggle for land.

Campesinos drew as well on agrarian images and practices:

> I was born here, my umbilical cord is buried here. Blood has run, many have died, but the harvest is at hand. But it's not everything, we have to keep fighting, although now without arms. We know from where we have come, and where we want to go. (Leader, Cooperativa La Maroma, January 1992)

Similarly, the following simple affirmation resounds with pride and the assertion of equality:

> We are capable of managing these properties. (Leader, Cooperativa San Judas Escobar, March 1992)

This is an assertion—in the face of landlords' expressed contempt toward campesinos, a frequent theme in interviews—of campesino capacities that before the war were denied in order to justify the hegemony of the landlords on the basis of their superior abilities:

> Before the war, we were despised by the rich. We were seen as animals, working all day and still without even enough to put the kids in school. This is the origin of the war: there was no alternative. The only alternative was the madness of desperation. (Member, Cooperativa Los Ensayo, March 1992)

In many interviews, the litany of achievements of the war mixes with a recitation of the injustices of prewar social relations to retrospectively justify the war itself. The language is frequently one of freedom, of political equality, and of rights, set against the context of repression and difficulty.

In the interviews, this assertion of equality was closely associated both with access to land and with pride in the achievements of activists and their organizations. Militants consistently claimed *authorship* of the changes that they identified as their work:

> I woke up during the process of the war and I collaborated in the midst of the war. We have already seen a new dawn—we created it despite the great pressure brought to bear by the army. (Leader, Cooperativa La Conciencia, 1992)

This desire for and claim to authorship would be difficult to account for on most accounts of collective action.

Some leaders and activists offer more nuanced assessments of the achievements of the war, while similarly emphasizing the justice of its aims and accomplishments to date. One activist, noting that access to land and better wages were not secure, remarked:

> This is what I think: what was the war for? For the solution to the land problem. We feel something already, and we're sure that we will be free—that is a point of the war that we have won. Salaries, who knows? But that we not be seen as slaves, that we've won. (Member of the Land Defense Committee, Las Marías, May 1992)

A similarly measured assessment of the achievements of the war was this:

> We passed these years with great suffering, it was difficult for us. In 11 years of war, we were never tranquil. But now, we feel a bit free, and not oppressed. Before we didn't have a single freedom, now we have begun to taste freedom. (Member, Cooperativa San Pedro Arenales, June 1992)

The benefits realized during the war are sometimes explicitly weighed against the costs:

> The war has given us land. This war—well, those of us who haven't died, we're living on a bigger piece.

The war did both: it hit us hard but we benefited too—a bit of fertilizer and a bit of suffering. (Member, Cooperativa Loma Alegre, July 1992)

According to one campesina:

We now work in a cooperative, we grow our food, and the kids are studying in school, we're no longer dominated by the landlord. How shameful that so many had to die to achieve these changes! (Resident, Comunidad La Noria, 1992)

As these excerpts from my interviews indicate, memories of fear and violence, evident in the reiterated images of blood and bodies as well as in explicit statements, remained troubling to many even in the relative security of the cease-fire. As Linda Green (1995) subtly explores in her work on war-torn areas of Guatemala, violence and terror leave behind a legacy of silence, fear, and uncertainty that can be deeply corrosive of self-confidence, trust, and hope. Yet—remarkably given this level of violence—activists in the case-study areas of El Salvador had continued to organize during the war. According to Juan Corradi (1992: 282), the clue to overcoming the culture of fear lies in breaking the sense of inevitability and inertia experienced during periods of extreme repression. The achievements of campesino organizations in these contested areas are a direct indication of their having overcome the effects of the repression that swept through their communities.

Supporting evidence for this emphasis on emotional in-process benefits comes from the mapmaking workshops described above. It was evident during the workshops that participants took pleasure and pride in the task, which was seen as an invitation to document the achievements of their cooperative. As well as much teasing of each other, particularly at the beginning of the out-of-the-ordinary task, the mapmaking occasioned explicit expressions of solidarity with fellow participants and pride in the redrawing of property boundaries and in the drawing of the maps. According to the mapmakers, secure access to land was one important motive for collaboration with opposition organizations. The maps themselves as well as the sacrifice involved suggest that an account of sustained collaboration requires a consideration of the

emotional dimensions of participation as well. For example, the authors of one pair of maps wrote the following—unprompted—notations (with the original idiosyncratic spelling):

Asía el serro del taurete propiedades tomadas por personas campesinas [This is how the Taburete hill was, properties taken by peasant peoples]. (Member, Cooperativa El Jobalito)

Grasias por un recuedo de mi trabajo [Thank you for a remembrance of my work]. (Member, Cooperativa El Jobalito)

These notations on the maps suggest that cooperative members saw the building of cooperatives in the difficult conditions of the war as a source of pride in the effectiveness of their historical intervention. The map-maker clearly intended this last phrase as a conscious play on "my work" as referring to the drawing itself and to the achievements of the cooperative (and perhaps also intended as a reminder that I return the maps).

As in the anecdote recounted above, the naming of names was also a powerful element of the mapmaking. Participants were not asked to sign the maps, but most chose to do so. Nearly all identified themselves with their titles as the leaders of the cooperative, a symbolic assertion of authority and ownership of the properties claimed. The mapmakers who inscribed their names did so after a discussion amongst themselves of the purpose of the exercise (eventual publication) and, among some of the groups, of the potential risks given the uncertain conditions of the ceasefire at the time. Judging by these conversations, to do so was an expression of commitment to tell their communal history. The naming of names, particularly for the express purpose of having them published with the maps, thus seemed to be an indication of a deep need to testify to the community's history.

Conclusion

What we hope for is to be equal before the law. We have lost the fear we had before the war, we have lost the fear. (Leader, Cooperativa La Maroma, January 1992)

My account of peasant political mobilization in El Salvador emphasizes the emotional benefits of participation, a particular kind of in-process benefit, as the key to understanding the willingness of campesinos to support the FMLN and its sister organizations. In the early years of the war, when the circumstances of risk and the uncertainty of material benefits meant that other reasons for acting were insufficient, acting against the state—in defiance, in outrage, for revenge, for justice, against the fear that could be paralyzing—brought emotional "benefits" to exactly that subset of campesinos who participated. As repression lessened and initial networks emerged, increasing numbers of peasants participated in the founding of cooperatives, the occupation of properties, and the building of organizations to articulate and defend their interests. A remarkable number of participants expressed the pleasure that they took in their unprecedented exercise of agency. This *exercise of agency in the realization of their interests* was experienced by participants as profoundly transformative: interviews demonstrate the emergence of a new insurgent political culture based on solidarity, citizenship, equality, and entitlement to contest the old-regime culture rooted in clientelism and coercion. The argument also suggests that agency per se may contribute to the "management of fear" (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001) among participants in social movements suffering a repressive response by the state.

A few qualifications of the argument should be kept in mind. Not all (or even most) residents of the contested areas of El Salvador participated in the movement, nor was all of El Salvador contested. Whether the transformation of political identity and culture in the field sites endured past the end of the civil war is not explored here.[10] Finally, the retrospective nature of many of the interviews may overemphasize the importance of pride-in-agency as a motivation in the earlier period; however, I have suggested reasons why it does not.[11]

This interpretation of political mobilization in El Salvador is similar to other analyses of social movements that emphasize dignity, citizenship, and emotional "returns" to participation.[12] In his study of peasant insurgency in colonial India, Ranajit Guha argues that the "urge to self-respect" and "prestige" was more important in rebellion than economic gains—indeed, he suggests that peasants may rebel even against their economic interests (Guha 1983: 59, 143–46). Sue Stokes, in her study of urban political culture in Peru, found that a new "rights-oriented militant version of citizenship" was one cause of the social movement that contributed to the end of military rule (Stokes 1995: 47). Similar arguments were advanced by Deborah Levenson-Estrada (1994) in her study of trade unionists active in Guatemala in the 1980s and by Gav Seidman (1994) in her analysis of the emergence of trade unions in South Africa in the 1970s. Dennis Chong similarly stresses the social and psychological benefits accruing to participants in the civil rights movement in the U.S.[13] What my interpretation contributes to this literature is an emphasis on pleasure in agency itself.

While various emotional benefits may motivate participation in a range of social movements, the particular emotional benefit emphasized here—pride in agency—will not be a powerful motivation in all social movements. For example, middle-class participants in environmental movements may experience and be motivated by the expression of moral outrage and the various pleasures of collective action such as marching, chanting, and singing together, but they are likely to take their agency for granted. In contrast, as suggested by the Salvadoran insurgency and the cases referred to above, where long-subordinate people act to reject their subordination and to create or affirm a more equal identity in which equality is claimed and rights asserted, pride in agency and the reassertion of a dignity long suppressed may be a powerful motivation for participation.[14]

Notes

1　During much of the war, most residents of the field sites (particularly those in more remote areas where the guerrillas were more persistently present) had

to contribute a (coerced) minimum amount of tortillas and water to the FMLN in order to stay in the area. But with the exception of a short period in

1986, participation was not otherwise coerced. Government forces also extracted food and water when present.

2 To refer to the "pleasure" of rebellion may evoke Banfield's "Rioting Mainly for Fun and Profit," in which he famously argued that the inner-city riots of the mid-1960s were not caused by race and could not be prevented by addressing the mistreatment of African-Americans (Banfield 1968). My argument differs from his in my emphasis on the pleasure subordinate people may take in exercising agency, a human function from which they had long been excluded. This is distinct from Banfield's "animal spirits" for thrills and from pillage due to the temporary suspension of law enforcement.

3 One clarification is important: very few of the communities of Usulután had been visited by journalists or researchers, in contrast to some of the communities of the "controlled zones" in the northern strongholds of the FMLN such as Perquín. In organizations that frequently host such visitors, there is a distinctly professional tenor to the testimonials offered, as if a script were being played once again. Tenancingo, on the other hand, had been much visited by journalists, development specialists, and diplomats. However, few lingered long enough to interview residents other than a few members of the community council.

4 In introducing the project to local organizations and again at some length at the beginning of the meeting, I always did my best to clarify that I did not represent any potential funding for community projects. I believe I succeeded, as I visited the case-study areas over an extended period of time without providing any material benefits and did not observe a decline in enthusiasm on the part of those interviewed.

5 However, I cannot tell from my interviews whether in the first instance the pleasure of pride-in-agency was anticipated or was an unintended consequence of participation. In any case, the interviews provide ample evidence that once experienced, such pleasure motivated continuing participation.

6 A detailed analysis is presented in Wood (2003).

7 The pattern of abuse and terror in the case-study areas reflects the general pattern throughout the country. The definitive assessment of human rights violations during the civil war is the report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador, the U.N.-sponsored organization mandated by the peace agreement to analyze the general pattern of violations as well as particularly salient or egregious cases (Truth Commission for El Salvador 1993).

8 All interviews were carried out by the author.

9 Nor does interpreting the insurgent movement as an alternative state offering "state-like collective goods" or an alternative social contract resolve this conundrum (Skocpol 1982; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Wickham Crowley 1987). The FMLN did indeed become an alternative governing authority to some extent in Tenancingo and Usulután. But campesinos could enjoy those benefits without directly supporting the FMLN beyond the coerced minimum. Nor do these authors adequately theorize the *process* through which such innovations come about.

10 Even if some "rollback" toward clientelist social relations occurred, it will probably not be the case that social relations returned to the status quo ante.

11 For a full discussion and detailed argument concerning insurgent participation, see Wood (2003).

12 See Jasper 1998 for an extended argument concerning the role of emotions in motivating participation in social movements.

13 Chong (1991) presents a similar stylized trajectory where "unconditional cooperators" build the movement initially, gaining interim victories demonstrating the possibilities of success until conditional cooperation becomes a rational response. However, Chong's argument emphasizes social sanctions and concerns for reputation rather than the pleasure in agency emphasized here.

14 Russell Hardin (1982: 108–12) and Albert Hirschman (1982: 89–90) also suggest that taking part in the making of history may motivate participation by the hitherto excluded or powerless.

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15

Classic Protest Songs
A List

Joe Hill, the legendary labor activist and songwriter, once wrote, "A pamphlet, no matter how good, is never read more than once. But a song is learned by heart and repeated over and over." Music has indeed been a rich source of political ideas and social analysis—an important popular form of public sociology. But which songs have moved Americans the most over the past century or offered the richest political insights? After consulting widely, we offer the following hit parade, in rough chronological order.—The Editors

"Lift Every Voice and Sing." Lyrics by James Weldon Johnson; music by J. Rosamand Johnson. Key lyric: "*We have come over a way that with tears has been watered / We have come, treading our path through the blood of the slaughtered.*" Known as the "Black National Anthem"—the antidote to "America, the Beautiful."

"Which Side Are You On?" By Florence Reece. "*Don't scab for the bosses, don't listen to their lies / Us poor folks haven't got a chance unless we organize.*" Written during the labor struggles in Harlan County, Kentucky, in the 1930s, it was later adopted by the civil rights movement.

"Strange Fruit." Performed by Billie Holiday. By Abel Meeropol (who later adopted the children of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg). "*Pastoral scene of the gallant south / The bulging eyes and the twisted mouth.*" A chilling protest against lynching. Maybe the greatest protest song of all time.

"Pastures of Plenty." By Woody Guthrie. "*Every state in this union us migrants has been / 'Long the edge of your cities you'll see us, and then / We've come with the dust and we're gone in the wind.*" Guthrie's ode to America's migrant workers.

"The Times They Are A-Changin'." By Bob Dylan. "*There's a battle outside and it's raging / It'll soon shake your windows and rattle your walls.*" Tough call between this and Dylan's "Blowin' in the Wind," "Only a Pawn in Their Game," "Masters of War," "With God on Our Side," etc., etc.

"We Shall Overcome." Adapted from a gospel song, the anthem of the civil rights movement. "*Deep in my heart, I do believe / We shall overcome some day.*" Infinitely adaptable.

"Ain't Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me 'Round." Also adapted from a Negro spiritual. "*I'm gonna keep on walkin', keep on talkin' / Fightin' for my equal rights.*" Another powerful civil rights anthem.

"I Ain't Marching Anymore." By Phil Ochs. "*It's always the old to lead us to the war / It's always the young to fall / Now look at all we've won with the saber and the gun / Tell me is it worth it all?*"

An antiwar classic, complete with a revisionist history of American militarism.

"For What It's Worth."   Performed by Crosby, Stills, and Nash. By Stephen Stills. "*There's something happening here / What it is ain't exactly clear / There's a man with a gun over there / Telling me I've got to beware.*" Eerily foreboding.

"Say It Loud (I'm Black and I'm Proud)."   By James Brown. "*Now we demand a chance to do things for ourself / We're tired of beatin' our head against the wall and workin' for someone else.*" A Black Power anthem by the Godfather of Soul.

"Respect."   Performed by Aretha Franklin. By Otis Redding. "*I ain't gonna do you wrong while you're gone / Ain't gonna do you wrong 'cause I don't wanna / All I'm askin' is for a little respect when you come home.*" The personal is political.

"Redemption Song."   By Bob Marley. "*Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery / None but ourselves can free our minds.*" Marley's "Get Up, Stand Up" is also a contender.

"Imagine."   By John Lennon. "*Imagine no possessions / I wonder if you can / No need for greed or hunger / A brotherhood of man.*" Lennon as utopian socialist.

"Fight the Power."   By Public Enemy. "*Got to give us what we want / Gotta give us what we need / Our freedom of speech is freedom or death / We got to fight the powers that be.*" An exuberant hip-hop call to arms.

Part V

How Are Movements Organized?

Introduction

Forty years ago, social movements were thought to be extremely disorganized affairs. Individuals were believed to drift into them for personal rather than political reasons; crowds were thought to be irrational and shifting in their focus, hence easily manipulated by demagogues. This is why movements were categorized as a form of "collective behavior," which implies less purpose and intention than the term "collective action." If politics occurred outside normal institutional channels such as parties and voting, it was thought not to have any form of organization at all.

Perhaps the biggest breakthrough in the field of social movements, beginning in the late 1960s, was the finding that social movements are thoroughly organized, both formally and informally. The informal organization consists of social networks through which individuals are recruited: it turns out they are not isolated and alienated but well integrated into society (see Part III). Networks like these also shape what movements can do once they emerge. On the formal dimension, movements usually create, even consist of, formal organizations, which are often legal entities recognized by the state. Part V examines these formal organizations (usually dubbed "SMOs" for social movement organizations) and the way they are related to each other in a social movement.

SMOs vary enormously. Some have a great deal of formal structure and rules, while others have nothing but informal traditions and habits. Some are centralized and hierarchical; others are decentralized, horizontal, and egalitarian. Some require a lot of money to function and survive, while others subsist on nothing more than the hours contributed by volunteers. They also differ in their sources of funding: some get grants from philanthropic foundations, others from broad direct-mail efforts; members themselves support some, while governments actually support others. There are great differences as well in the commitment required of members. For revolutionary cells and guerrilla armies, protest is a full-time job that usually entails curtailing or cutting ties with nonmembers. Other protest groups require nothing more than a Saturday afternoon every few months—or even just an occasional contribution (many SMOs have different kinds of members, ranging from financial supporters to those who volunteer their labor, to full-time staff).

Most of the "new" social movements that emerged in the 1960s, including student movements, the New Left, and later environmental, feminist, and antinuclear movements, thought it important to avoid bureaucratic organization. They preferred to be egalitarian groups that encouraged everyone to participate in decision-making. Joyce Rothschild and Allen Whitt (1986) described these alternative organizations as avoiding the traditional trappings of bureaucracy: paid staff, experts, hierarchy, impersonal rules, and a permanent division of labor. In other words, organizational forms are one area in which many protestors have tried to change the way their societies do things, in anticipation of ("prefiguring") the kind of future they envision (Breines 1982; Polletta 2002). One of the purposes of avoiding traditional bureaucracy is to foster "free spaces" in which creative alternatives to mainstream practices can be imagined, discussed, and tried out (Evans and Boyte 1986).

Social movements also vary as to how many component organizations they have, and how these are related to each other. At one extreme, there may be a single organization that directs the movement, as with some revolutionary movements. At the other, there may be many organizations with little coordination between them: each may be reassured by the existence of others but have little direct need for them. Most movements fall somewhere between these extremes. No matter how many SMOs they contain, movements still vary in the degree of coordination between them. Gerlach and Hine (1970) once described social movements as segmented, polycephalous, and reticulate: each group is relatively autonomous from the others, there is no definite head, and yet there are loose links between the parts.

John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, in a famous article excerpted in Chapter 16 (1977), looked at social movement organizations as though they were like business firms in a market. If an SMO is like a firm, then a movement is like an industry. The important implication is that SMOs may have to compete with each other over the same volunteers and contributors, even when they are in the same movement and thus have the same goals. The economic metaphor focuses our attention on the financing of SMOs, including the many different kinds of relationships they can have with contributors—who are not necessarily the beneficiaries. Paid staff, the "entrepreneurs" who put SMOs together, are crucial. This emphasis on resources helped create the "resource mobilization" approach to social movements. Their approach seems to work well in understanding moderate, well-behaved groups, such as mainstream environmental organizations that employ professional staffs and raise most of their funds through direct-mail solicitations.

Another tradition of research, exemplified by Charles Tilly (1978), used political rather than economic metaphors to understand social movement organizations. Research on labor unions and other groups that pursued economic and political benefits helped inspire what has come to be called the "political process" school. Researchers in this tradition view protest groups as being like political parties, except that they operate outside the electoral system. SMOs are a normal part of politics, whatever form they take. They are instrumental vehicles for the pursuit of group interests.

The weakness of these traditions that emphasize formal organizations was to depict protestors as invariably self-interested and indeed selfish. Having rejected the psychology of older traditions, these scholars inadvertently embedded the assumptions of neoclassical economics in their models: people were rational pursuers of

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Indigenous Organization   In order to sustain protest, people need to communicate with one another, strategize, advertise, recruit new protestors, and generally coordinate their activities. It often helps, accordingly, if would-be protestors already belong to the same (or linked) political or social organizations, churches, friendship networks, schools, sports clubs, workplaces, neighborhoods, and so on. Sometimes entire organizations or networks are recruited into a movement, a process known as **bloc recruitment**. If such "indigenous organization" (sometimes called **mobilizing structures**), whether formal or informal, does not already exist, would-be protestors have to create their own protest organizations. Self-organization or self-recruitment to movements, in other words, is sometimes as important as pre-existing organization. These connections are helpful not only for coordinating action and spreading information, but also for building affective ties and loyalties.

Participatory Democracy In the early 1960s the New Left promoted what it called participatory democracy (or sometimes "direct democracy"), as opposed to the regular channels of representative democracy. A basic goal was to allow people to make decisions directly, instead of voting for those who would make the ultimate decisions. Participatory democracy was meant to involve everyone in discussions of an issue before they voted on it as a group. Better yet, a consensus might emerge so that a formal vote would not be necessary. Needless to say, this approach, still popular with recent movements such as Occupy, works best with small groups with plenty of free time, and no one has yet quite figured out how to extend the principle to national decision-making or to link it to traditional representative democracy. Critics have pointed to the seemingly endless discussions it entails in practice, as well as to the possibility that golden-tongued informal leaders can dominate a group without the accountability they would face if they were formal leaders. Participatory democracy reveals some of the core values of the New Left, especially the idea that individuals should control the world around them by making decisions about issues that directly shape their lives.

their own narrow interests. These scholars ignored one of the central issues of social movements: how people come to perceive a shared grievance or interest, especially in something remote from their daily lives, such as global warming, nuclear energy, or human rights abuses in distant lands. There are many emotional and cognitive processes that go into the construction of movement goals, as we saw in Part IV. We can't lose sight of what people want from their protest organizations.

We can go further. Organizations themselves are more than instruments for attaining goals. They also carry symbolic messages in their very structures. Protestors want to attain their goals, to be sure, but they also want to show that they are certain kinds of people (e.g., compassionate, objective, outraged, maybe even dangerous). With certain kinds of organizational forms, they can show that they mean business, or that their new organizations are radically different from existing ones. A school of thought called the "new institutionalism" has arisen in organizational theory to show that organizational structures are never simply the most efficient means to given ends, but also reflect their surrounding cultures' assumptions about the world. An organization's structure often reflects cultural fads popular at the time of its founding (Clemens 1997).

The excerpt by Paul Wapner (Chapter 17) argues that many movements, including the environmental and human rights movements, increasingly organize across national boundaries. Transnational forms of organization, of course, make sense in an increasingly integrated world. Many contemporary social problems simply cannot be addressed at a national level. In this sense, transnational organization is a response to globalization. Transnational environmental activist groups (TEAGs, as Wapner calls them) pressure governments, but they do much more than this. They have been instrumental in disseminating an ecological sensibility to new groups, pressuring multinational corporations, and empowering local communities. Thus, they are an important component of an emerging "world civic politics," or "global civil society," that is independent of national states.

Jackie Smith (in Chapter 18) describes the complex transnational network of activists and organizations that has mobilized in recent years for global justice or for what she calls "democratic globalization." Smith sees this network as a potentially powerful tool that allows people to act effectively beyond their local and even national communities. The formation and coordination of the global justice movement, which some have called a *movement of movements*, has been facilitated by technological changes, including the Internet. Smith shows that the number of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) has increased dramatically in recent years, even as these have adopted decentralized forms of organization. In fact, paradoxically, as movements have taken on global issues, many have drawn on small-scale, face-to-face forms of organization, including the *affinity group*. Affinity groups are small, semi-independent groups of like-minded activists (they may live in the same neighborhood or have

similar political or aesthetic tastes) which typically coordinate their actions with other, similar affinity groups. The affinity group model of organization has some similarities with anarchism, including a distaste for all forms of hierarchy. Coalitions based on affinity groups typically display a great deal of tactical flexibility, but are inherently more difficult to direct and control than more centralized forms of organization.

Recent research has examined how formal protest organizations actually operate. Christoph Haug, in an article excerpted in Chapter 19, looks at the many things that people do through meetings. Meetings operate as arenas where decisions are made and tasks assigned. They are hubs in networks that bring people together for a purpose. They reinforce participants' collective identities. Despite the extensive preparation (including other meetings) that go into meetings, the outcomes are never certain. As arenas, meetings contain strategic interactions that are always open to surprises.

There have been debates over the effects of formal organization on social movements for a long time. William Gamson (1990) found that social movements with more bureaucratic organizations were more successful. They are certainly likely to survive longer, as the point of rules and formality is to persist. However, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1979), looking at a number of poor people's movements, argued that the most powerful tool of the oppressed is their ability to disrupt things. Bureaucratic organization usually interferes with this, as bureaucrats begin to develop an interest in maintaining the organization and their own positions and status, even if this means ignoring or suppressing the demands of the organization's rank and file. This debate continues, because it reflects an ineradicable tradeoff that Jasper (2014) calls the "organization dilemma."

Discussion Questions

1   In what ways do SMOs differ from each other?

2   When would SMOs have an advantage in being formal, and when informal? When hierarchical, and when egalitarian?

3   What are some of the symbolic messages that SMOs might wish to convey through their formal structures? To whom?

4   If you joined a movement, what type of organization would you find appealing? What would turn you off?

5   In what ways is transnational or cross-border organizing easier than it might have been, say, 100 years ago? What are some of the difficulties involved in organizing a transnational movement?

6   What are the advantages of the affinity group model of organization? What are its disadvantages?

7   What happens in meetings?

8   What are the advantages and disadvantages of participatory democracy?

16

Social Movement Organizations

John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald

For quite some time a hiatus existed in the study of social movements in the United States. In the course of activism leaders of movements here and abroad attempted to enunciate general principles concerning movement tactics and strategy and the dilemmas that arise in overcoming hostile environments. Such leaders as Mao, Lenin, Saul Alinsky, and Martin Luther King attempted in turn to develop principles and guidelines for action. The theories of activists stress problems of mobilization, the manufacture of discontent, tactical choices, and the infrastructure of society and movements necessary for success. At the same time sociologists, with their emphasis upon structural strain, generalized belief, and deprivation, largely have ignored the ongoing problems and strategic dilemmas of social movements.

Recently a number of social scientists have begun to articulate an approach to social movements, here called the resource mobilization approach, which begins to take seriously many of the questions that have concerned social movement leaders and practical theorists. Without attempting to produce handbooks for social change (or its suppression), the new approach deals in general terms with the dynamics and tactics of social movement growth, decline, and change. As such, it provides a corrective to the practical theorists, who naturally are most concerned with justifying their own tactical choices, and it also adds realism, power, and depth to the truncated research on and analysis of social movements offered by many social scientists.

The resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements. The shift in emphasis is evident in much of the work published recently in this area (J. Wilson 1973; Tilly 1973, 1975; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; Gamson 1975; Oberschall 1973; Lipsky 1968; Downs 1972; McCarthy and Zald 1973). The new approach depends more upon political, sociological, and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behavior.

This paper presents a set of concepts and propositions that articulate the resource mobilization approach. It is a partial theory because it takes as

given, as constants, certain components of a complete theory. The propositions are heavily based upon the American case, so that the impact of societal differences in development and political structure on social movements is unexplored, as are differences in levels and types of mass communication. Further, we rely heavily upon case material concerning organizations of the left, ignoring, for the most part, organizations of the right.

The main body of the paper defines our central concepts and presents illustrative hypotheses about the social movement sector (SMS), social movement industries (SMIs), and social movement organizations (SMOs). However, since we view this approach as a departure from the main tradition in social movement analysis, it will be useful first to clarify what we see as the limits of that tradition.

Perspectives Emphasizing Deprivation and Beliefs

Without question the three most influential approaches to an understanding of social movement phenomena for American sociologists during the past decade are those of Gurr (1970), Turner and Killian (1972), and Smelser (1963). They differ in a number of respects. But, most important, they have in common strong assumptions that shared grievances and generalized beliefs (loose ideologies) about the causes and possible means of reducing grievances are important preconditions for the emergence of a social movement in a collectivity. An increase in the extent or intensity of grievances or deprivation and the development of ideology occur prior to the emergence of social movement phenomena. Each of these perspectives holds that discontent produced by some combination of structural conditions is a necessary if not sufficient condition to an account of the rise of any specific social movement phenomenon. Each, as well, holds that before collective action is possible within a collectivity a generalized belief (or ideological justification) is necessary concerning at least the causes of the discontent and, under certain conditions, the modes of redress. Much of the empirical work which has followed and drawn upon these perspectives has emphasized even more heavily the importance of understanding the grievances and deprivation of participants. (Indeed, scholars following Gurr, Smelser, and

Turner and Killian often ignore structural factors, even though the authors mentioned have been sensitive to broader structural and societal influences, as have some others.)

Recent empirical work, however, has led us to doubt the assumption of a close link between preexisting discontent and generalized beliefs in the rise of social movement phenomena. A number of studies have shown little or no support for expected relationships between objective or subjective deprivation and the outbreak of movement phenomena and willingness to participate in collective action (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Mueller 1972; Bowen et al. 1968; Crawford and Naditch 1970). Other studies have failed to support the expectation of a generalized belief prior to outbreaks of collective behavior episodes or initial movement involvement (Quarantelli and Hundley 1975; Marx 1970; Stallings 1973). Partially as a result of such evidence, in discussing revolution and collective violence Charles Tilly is led to argue that these phenomena flow directly out of a population's central political processes instead of expressing momentarily heightened diffuse strains and discontents within a population (Tilly 1973).

Moreover, the heavy focus upon the psychological state of the mass of potential movement supporters within a collectivity has been accompanied by a lack of emphasis upon the processes by which persons and institutions from outside of the collectivity under consideration become involved; for instance, Northern white liberals in the Southern civil rights movement, or Russians and Cubans in Angola. Although earlier perspectives do not exclude the possibilities of such involvement on the part of outsiders, they do not include such processes as central and enduring phenomena to be used in accounting for social movement behavior.

The ambiguous evidence of some of the research on deprivation, relative deprivation, and generalized belief has led us to search for a perspective and a set of assumptions that lessen the prevailing emphasis upon grievances. We want to move from a strong assumption about the centrality of deprivation and grievances to a weak one, which makes them a component, indeed, sometimes a secondary component in the generation of social movements.

We are willing to assume (Turner and Killian [1972] call the assumption extreme) "… that

there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group" (p. 251). For some purposes we go even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations.

We adopt a weak assumption not only because of the negative evidence (already mentioned) concerning the stronger one but also because in some cases recent experience supports the weaker one. For instance, the senior citizens who were mobilized into groups to lobby for Medicare were brought into groups only after legislation was before Congress and the American Medical Association had claimed that senior citizens were not complaining about the medical care available to them (Rose 1967). Senior citizens were organized into groups through the efforts of a lobbying group created by the AFL-CIO. No doubt the elderly needed money for medical care. However, what is important is that the organization did not develop directly from that grievance but very indirectly through the moves of actors in the political system. Entertaining a weak assumption leads directly to an emphasis upon mobilization processes. Our concern is the search for analytic tools to account adequately for the processes.

Resources To sustain themselves over time, social movements need resources: money and the physical or professional capacities it can buy. Today, organizers need telephones, FAX machines, computers, direct-mail fundraising services, paid lobbyists, photocopiers, and postage. They need to rent offices and hire staff. They devote considerable time to raising the funds for such purposes. Some resources are "lumpy": you don't need a second bullhorn if your first works fine. And in all cases, there needs to be the know-how to put physical capacities to work. What is more, resources are not fixed in amount: activists work hard to mobilize more resources, to see their existing capacities in new and imaginative ways, and to find ways to protest that are within their means.

Resource Mobilization

The resource mobilization perspective adopts as one of its underlying problems Olson's (1965) challenge: since social movements deliver collective goods, few individuals will "on their own" bear the costs of working to obtain them. Explaining collective behavior requires detailed attention to the selection of incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or structures, and career benefits that lead to collective behavior (see, especially, Oberschall 1973).

Several emphases are central to the perspective as it has developed. First, study of the aggregation of resources (money and labor) is crucial to an understanding of social movement activity. Because resources are necessary for engagement in social conflict, they must be aggregated for collective purposes. Second, resource aggregation requires some minimal form of organization, and hence, implicitly or explicitly, we focus more directly upon social movement organizations than do those working within the traditional perspective. Third, in accounting for a movement's successes and failures there is an explicit recognition of the crucial importance of involvement on the part of individuals and organizations from outside the collectivity which a social movement represents. Fourth, an explicit, if crude, supply and demand model is sometimes applied to the flow of resources toward and away from specific social movements. Finally, there is a sensitivity to the importance of costs and rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement in social movement activity. Costs and rewards are centrally affected by the structure of society and the activities of authorities.

We can summarize the emerging perspective by contrasting it with the traditional one as follows:

1. Support base
    A. Traditional. Social movements are based upon aggrieved populations which provide the necessary resources and labor. Although case studies may mention external supports, they are not incorporated as central analytic components.
    B. Resource mobilization. Social movements may or may not be based upon the grievances of the presumed beneficiaries.

Conscience constituents, individual and organizational, may provide major sources of support. And in some cases supporters—those who provide money, facilities, and even labor—may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements.

2. Strategy and tactics
    A. Traditional. Social movement leaders use bargaining, persuasion, or violence to influence authorities to change. Choices of tactics depend upon prior history of relations with authorities, relative success of previous encounters, and ideology. Tactics are also influenced by the oligarchization and institutionalization of organizational life.
    B. Resource mobilization. The concern with interaction between movements and authorities is accepted, but it is also noted that social movement organizations have a number of strategic tasks. These include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers, achieving change in targets. Dilemmas occur in the choice of tactics, since what may achieve one aim may conflict with behavior aimed at achieving another. Moreover, tactics are influenced by interorganizational competition and cooperation.
3. Relation to larger society
    A. Traditional. Case studies have emphasized the effects of the environment upon movement organizations, especially with respect to goal change, but have ignored, for the most part, ways in which such movement organizations can utilize the environment for their own purposes (see Perrow 1972). This has probably been largely a result of the lack of comparative organizational focus inherent in case studies. In analytical studies emphasis is upon the extent of hostility or toleration in the larger society. Society and culture are treated as descriptive, historical context.
    B. Resource mobilization. Society provides the infrastructure which social movement industries and other industries utilize. The aspects utilized include communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, preexisting networks, and occupational structure and growth.

Theoretical Elements

Having sketched the emerging perspective, our task now is to present a more precise statement of it. In this section we offer our most general concepts and definitions. Concepts of narrower range are presented in following sections.

A *social movement* is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society. A *countermovement* is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement. As is clear, we view social movements as nothing more than preference structures directed toward social change, very similar to what political sociologists would term issue cleavages. (Indeed, the process we are exploring resembles what political scientists term interest aggregation, except that we are concerned with the margins of the political system rather than with existing party structures.)

The distribution of preference structures can be approached in several ways. Who holds the beliefs? How intensely are they held? In order to predict the likelihood of preferences being translated into collective action, the mobilization perspective focuses upon the preexisting organization and integration of those segments of a population which share preferences. Oberschall (1973) has presented an important synthesis of past work on the preexisting organization of preference structures, emphasizing the opportunities and costs for expression of preferences for movement leaders and followers. Social movements whose related populations are highly organized internally (either communally or associationally) are more likely than are others to spawn organized forms.

A *social movement organization* (SMO) is a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals. If we think of the recent civil rights movement in these terms, the social

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Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)
Some analysts have studied social movements as though they were composed primarily of formal organizations that act much as businesses do. This is partly just a metaphor and partly a reflection of the fact that many social movements are indeed composed largely of formal organizations. This means that one of their main activities is raising funds (or "mobilizing resources") to keep themselves afloat and their staffs paid. They compete with each other for contributions, especially from those who support the movement in no way other than financially. This development reflects modern laws governing nonprofit organizations, the affluence of societies in which many people have discretionary income to contribute to their favorite causes, and the ability of activists to find professional careers in social change organizations. In addition to social movement organizations (often abbreviated SMOs), scholars have also analyzed "social-movement industries," in which different SMOs compete for resources and attention, as well as the entire "social-movement sector" of societies.

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movement contained a large portion of the population which held preferences for change aimed at "justice for black Americans" and a number of SMOs such as the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). These SMOs represented and shaped the broadly held preferences and diverse subpreferences of the social movement.

All SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement constitute a *social movement industry* (SMI)—the organizational analogue of a social movement. A conception paralleling that of the SMI, used by Von Eschen, Kirk, and Pinard (1971), the "organizational substructure of disorderly politics," has aided them in analyzing the civil rights movement in Baltimore. They demonstrate that many

of the participants in a 1961 demonstration sponsored by the local chapter of CORE were also involved in NAACP, SCLC, the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), or the Young People's Socialist Alliance (YPSA). These organizations either were primarily concerned with goals similar to those of CORE or included such goals as subsets of broader ranges of social change goals. (The concept employed by Von Eschen et al. is somewhat broader than ours, however, as will be seen below.)

Definitions of the central term, social movement (SM), typically have included both elements of preference and organized action for change. Analytically separating these components by distinguishing between an SM and an SMI has several advantages. First, it emphasizes that SMs are never fully mobilized. Second, it focuses explicitly upon the organizational component of activity. Third, it recognizes explicitly that SMs are typically represented by more than one SMO. Finally, the distinction allows the possibility of an account of the rise and fall of SMIs that is not fully dependent on the size of an SM or the intensity of the preferences within it.

Our definitions of SM, SMI, and SMO are intended to be inclusive of the phenomena which analysts have included in the past. The SMs can encompass narrow or broad preferences, millenarian and evangelistic preferences, and withdrawal preferences. Organizations may represent any of these preferences.

The definition of SMI parallels the concept of industry in economics. Note that economists, too, are confronted with the difficulty of selecting broader or narrower criteria for including firms (SMOs) within an industry (SMI). For example, one may define a furniture industry, a sitting-furniture industry, or a chair industry. Close substitutability of product usage and, therefore, demand interdependence is the theoretical basis for defining industry boundaries. Economists use the *Census of Manufacturers* classifications, which are not strictly based on demand interdependence. For instance, on the one hand various types of steel are treated as one industry, though the types (rolled, flat, wire) are not substitutable. On the other hand, some products are classified separately (e.g., beet sugar, cane sugar) when they are almost completely substitutable (Bain 1959, pp. 111–18).

Given our task, the question becomes how to group SMOs into SMIs. This is a difficult problem because particular SMOs may be broad or narrow in stated target goals. In any set of empirical circumstances the analyst must decide how narrowly to define industry boundaries. For instance, one may speak of the SMI which aims at liberalized alterations in laws, practices, and public opinion concerning abortion. This SMI would include a number of SMOs. But these SMOs may also be considered part of the broader SMI which is commonly referred to as the "women's liberation movement" or they could be part of the "population control movement." In the same way, the pre-1965 civil rights movement could be considered part of the broader civil liberties movement.

Economists have dealt with this difficulty by developing categories of broader inclusiveness, sometimes called sectors. Even this convention, however, does not confront the difficulties of allocating firms (SMOs) which are conglomerates, those which produce products across industries and even across sectors. In modern America there are a number of SMOs which may be thought of as conglomerates in that they span, in their goals, more narrowly defined SMIs. Common Cause, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) are best treated in these terms as each pursues a wide variety of organizational goals which can only with difficulty be contained within even broadly defined SMIs. The *social movement sector* (SMS) consists of all SMIs in a society no matter to which SM they are attached. (The importance of this distinction will become apparent below.)

Let us now return to the resource mobilization task of an SMO. Each SMO has a set of *target goals*, a set of preferred changes toward which it claims to be working. Such goals may be broad or narrow, and they are the characteristics of SMOs which link them conceptually with particular SMs and SMIs. The SMOs must possess resources, however few and of whatever type, in order to work toward goal achievement. Individuals and other organizations control resources, which can include legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor.

Although similar organizations vary tremendously in the efficiency with which they translate resources into action, the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization. Some organizations may depend heavily upon volunteer labor, while others may depend upon purchased labor. In any case, resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is possible.

From the point of view of a SMO the individuals and organizations which exist in a society may be categorized along a number of dimensions. For the appropriate SM there are adherents and nonadherents. *Adherents* are those individuals and organizations that believe in the goals of the movement. The *constituents* of a SMO are those providing resources for it.

At one level the resource mobilization task is primarily that of converting adherents into constituents and maintaining constituent involvement. However, at another level the task may be seen as turning nonadherents into adherents. Ralph Turner (1970) uses the term bystander public to denote those nonadherents who are not opponents of the SM and its SMOs but who merely witness social movement activity. It is useful to distinguish constituents, adherents, bystander publics, and opponents along several other dimensions. One refers to the size of the resource pool controlled, and we shall use the terms mass and elite to describe crudely this dimension. Mass constituents, adherents, bystander publics, and opponents are those individuals and groups controlling very limited resource pools. The most limited resource pool which individuals can control is their own time and labor. Elites are those who control larger resource pools.

Each of these groups may also be distinguished by whether or not they will benefit directly from the accomplishment of SMO goals. Some bystander publics, for instance, may benefit directly from the accomplishment of organizational goals, even though they are not adherents of the appropriate SM. To mention a specific example, women who oppose the preferences of the women's liberation movement or have no relevant preferences might benefit from expanded job opportunities for women pursued by women's groups. Those who would benefit directly from SMO goal accomplishment we shall call *potential beneficiaries*.

In approaching the task of mobilizing resources a SMO may focus its attention upon adherents

who are potential beneficiaries and/or attempt to convert bystander publics who are potential beneficiaries into adherents. It may also expand its target goals in order to enlarge its potential beneficiary group. Many SMOs attempt to present their goal accomplishments in terms of broader potential benefits for ever-wider groupings of citizens through notions of a better society, etc. (secondary benefits). Finally, a SMO may attempt to mobilize as adherents those who are not potential beneficiaries. *Conscience adherents* are individuals and groups who are part of the appropriate SM but do not stand to benefit directly from SMO goal accomplishment. *Conscience constituents* are direct supporters of a SMO who do not stand to benefit directly from its success in goal accomplishment.

William Gamson (1975) makes essentially the same distinction, calling groups with goals aimed at helping nonconstituents universalistic and those whose beneficiaries and constituents are identical, nonuniversalistic. Gamson concludes, however, that this distinction is not theoretically important, since SMOs with either type of constituents have identical problems in binding them to the organization. It is not more "irrational," in Olson's sense, to seek change in someone else's behalf than in one's own, and in both cases commitment must be gained by other means than purposive incentives. The evidence presented by Gamson suggests that this dimension does not bear much relationship to SMO success in goal accomplishment or in the attainment of legitimacy. We argue below, however, that the distinction should be maintained: it summarizes important attachments and social characteristics of constituents. The problems of SMOs with regard to binding beneficiary and conscience constituents to the organization are different, not with regard to the stakes of individual involvement relative to goal accomplishment (the Olson problem) but with regard to the way constituents are linked to each other and to other SMOs, organizations, and social institutions.

A SMO's potential for resource mobilization is also affected by authorities and the delegated agents of social control (e.g., police). While authorities and agents of control groups do not typically become constituents of SMOs, their ability to frustrate (normally termed social control) or to enable resource mobilization is of crucial importance. Their action affects the readiness of bystanders, adherents, and constituents to alter their own status and commitment. And they themselves may become adherents and constituents. Because they do not always act in concert, Marx (1974) makes a strong case that authorities and delegated agents of control need to be analyzed separately.

The partitioning of groups into mass or elite and conscience or beneficiary bystander publics, adherents, constituents, and opponents allows us to describe more systematically the resource mobilization styles and dilemmas of specific SMOs. It may be, of course, to the advantage of a SMO to turn bystander publics into adherents. But since SMO resources are normally quite limited, decisions must be made concerning the allocation of these resources, and converting bystander publics may not aid in the development of additional resources. Such choices have implications for the internal organization of a SMO and the potential size of the resource pool which can be ultimately mobilized. For instance, a SMO which has a mass beneficiary base and concentrates its resource mobilization efforts toward mass beneficiary adherents is likely to restrict severely the amount of resources it can raise. Elsewhere (McCarthy and Zald 1973) we have termed a SMO focusing upon beneficiary adherents for resources a classical SMO. Organizations which direct resource appeals primarily toward conscience adherents tend to utilize few constituents for organizational labor, and we have termed such organizations professional SMOs.

Another pattern of resource mobilization and goal accomplishment can be identified from the writings of Lipsky (1968) and Bailis (1974). It depends upon the interactions among beneficiary constituency, conscience adherents, and authorities. Typical of this pattern is a SMO with a mass beneficiary constituency which would profit from goal accomplishment (for instance, the Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization) but which has few resources. Protest strategies draw attention and resources from conscience adherents to the SMO fighting on behalf of such mass groups and may also lead conscience elites to legitimate the SMO to authorities. As a result of a similar pattern, migrant farmworkers benefited from the transformation of authorities into adherents.

But a SMO does not have complete freedom of choice in making the sorts of decisions to which we have alluded. Such choices are constrained by a number of factors including the preexisting organization of various segments of the SM, the size and diversity of the SMI of which it is a part, and the competitive position of the SMS. Also, of course, the ability of any SMO to garner resources is shaped by important events such as war, broad economic trends, and natural disasters.

The Elements Applied: Illustrative Hypotheses

Let us proceed to state hypotheses about the interrelations among the social structure, the SMS, SMIs, and SMOs. Occasionally, we introduce specifying concepts. Because the levels of analysis overlap, the subheadings below should be viewed as rough organizing devices rather than analytic categories.

Resources, the SMS, and the Growth of SMIs

Over time, the relative size of the SMS in any society may vary significantly. In general it will bear a relationship to the amount of wealth in a society. Hence, hypothesis 1: *As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the SMS increases*. This hypothesis is more of an orienting postulate than a directly testable hypothesis, but it is central to our perspective. And some related supporting evidence can be given.

By discretionary resources we mean time and money which can easily be reallocated, the opposite of fixed and enduring commitments of time and money. In any society the SMS must compete with other sectors and industries for the resources of the population. For most of the population the allocation of resources to SMOs is of lower priority than allocation to basic material needs such as food and shelter. It is well known that the proportion of income going to food and shelter is higher for low-income families, while the proportion of income going to savings and recreation increases among high-income families. The SMOs compete for resources with entertainment, voluntary associations, and organized religion and politics.

There is cross-sectional evidence that the higher the income the larger the average gift to charitable activities and the greater the proportion of total income given (see Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1975). Moreover, Morgan et al. (1975) show that (1) the higher the education the more likely the giving of time, and (2) people who give more time to volunteer activities also give more money. As the total amount of resources increases, the total amount available to the SMS can be expected to increase, even if the sector does not increase its relative share of the resource pool. However, as discretionary resources increase relative to total societal resources, the SMS can be expected to gain a larger proportional share. This argument is based upon our belief that, except in times of crisis, the SMS is a low-priority competitor for available resources—it benefits from the satiation of other wants.

Of course, the validity of this hypothesis depends upon a *ceteris paribus* proviso. What might the other factors be? First, the existing infrastructure, what Smelser (1963) terms structural conduciveness, should affect the total growth of the SMS. Means of communication, transportation, political freedoms, and the extent of repression by agents of social control, all of which may affect the costs for any individual or organization allocating resources to the SMS, serve as constraints on or facilitators of the use of resources for social movement purposes. Also, the technologies available for resource accumulation should affect the ability of SMOs within the sector to mobilize resources. For instance, the advent of mass-mailing techniques in the United States has dramatically affected the ability of the SMS to compete with local advertising in offering a product to consumers. The organization of the SMIs will support or hinder the growth of the sector as additional resources become available. The greater the range of SMOs, the more different "taste" preferences can be transformed into constituents.

Hypothesis 2: *The greater the absolute amount of resources available to the SMS the greater the likelihood that new SMIs and SMOs will develop to compete for these resources*. This and the previous proposition contain the essence of our earlier analysis (McCarthy and Zald 1973). That study accounts in part for the proliferation in SMOs and SMIs in the 1960s in the United States by

demonstrating both the relative and the absolute increases of resources available to the SMS. The major sources of increase in financial resources were charitable giving among mass and elite adherents and government, church, foundation, and business giving among organizational adherents.

These two propositions attempt to account for the total growth of the SMS. They ignore variations in the taste for change over time. They imply nothing about which SMI will reap the benefits of sector expansion. Nor do they imply what types of SMOs will lead the growth of an expanding SMI. They explicitly ignore the relationship between the size of the SMS and the intensities of preferences within a SM.

Parallel hypotheses could be stated for the relationship of resources amongst different categories of SM adherents and SM growth. For instance, hypothesis 3: *Regardless of the resources available to potential beneficiary adherents, the larger the amount of resources available to conscience adherents the more likely is the development of SMOs and SMIs that respond to preferences for change*. The importance of this hypothesis in our scheme hinges upon the growing role of conscience constituents in American social movements. First, the greater the discretionary wealth controlled by individuals and organizations the more likely it is that some of that wealth will be made available to causes beyond the direct self-interest of the contributor. An individual (or an organization) with large amounts of discretionary resources may allocate resources to personal comfort and to the advancement of some group of which he or she is not a member. Second, those who control the largest share of discretionary resources in any society are also those least likely to feel discontentment concerning their own personal circumstances.

In a sense, hypothesis 3 turns Olson (1965) on his head. Though it may be individually irrational for any individual to join a SMO which already fights on behalf of his preferences, the existence of a SM made up of well-heeled adherents calls out to the entrepreneur of the cause to attempt to form a viable organization. To the extent to which SM beneficiary adherents lack resources, SMO support, if it can be mobilized, is likely to become heavily dependent upon conscience constituents.

This argument is also important in understanding the critique of interest group pluralism as a valid description of modern America. Many collectivities with serious objective deprivations, and even with preexisting preferences for change, have been highly underrepresented by social movement organizations. These SMs tend to be very limited in their control of discretionary resources. It is only when resources can be garnered from conscience adherents that viable SMOs can be fielded to shape and represent the preferences of such collectivities.

Organization Structure and Resource Mobilization

How do the competitive position of the SMS, processes within a SMI, and the structure of a SMO influence the task of resource mobilization? Some aspects of these questions have been treated by Zald and Ash (1966). To discuss SMOs in detail we need to introduce assumptions about relevant SMO processes and structures.

Assume that SMOs operate much like any other organization (J. Q. Wilson 1973), and consequently, once formed, they operate as though organizational survival were the primary goal. Only if survival is insured can other goals be pursued. Second, assume that the costs and rewards of involvement can account for individual participation in SMOs and that, especially, selective incentives are important since they tend to raise the rewards for involvement. Gamson (1975) and Bailis (1974) provide impressive evidence that selective material incentives operate to bind individuals to SMOs and, hence, serve to provide continuous involvement and thus resource mobilization.

For a number of reasons the term member has been avoided here. Most important, membership implies very different levels of organizational involvement in different SMOs. The distinction between inclusive and exclusive SMOs has been utilized in the past to indicate intensity of organizational involvement (Zald and Ash 1966), but intensity of involvement actually includes several dimensions, usefully separated. Let us attempt to partition constituent involvement in any SMO. First there is the *cadre*, the individuals who are involved in the decision-making processes of the organization. Cadre members may devote most of their time to matters of the organization or only part of their time. Those who receive

compensation, however meager, and devote full time to the organization, we term professional cadre; those who devote full time to the organization, but are not involved in central decision making processes, we term professional staff; those who intermittently give time to organizational tasks, not at the cadre level, we term workers. (Remember, constituents are those who give time *or* money.)

A *transitory team* is composed of workers assembled for a specific task, short in duration. Transitory teams are typically led by cadre members. Members of transitory teams and cadre have more extensive involvement than other segments of a SMO constituency. What distinguishes these constituents from others is that they are directly linked to the organization through tasks—they are involved directly in the affairs of the SMO. Since involvement of this sort occurs in small face-to-face groups, workers, whether through transitory teams or through continuous task involvement, can be expected to receive solidary incentives from such involvement—selective benefits of a nonmaterial sort.

Federated and Isolated Structure

A SMO which desires to pursue its goals in more than a local environment may attempt to mobilize resources directly from adherents or to develop federated chapters in different local areas. Federation serves to organize constituents into small local units. The SMOs which develop in this manner may deal with constituents directly as well as through chapters or only through chapters. But many SMOs do not develop chapters. These deal directly with constituents, usually through the mails or through traveling field staff. The important point is that constituents in nonfederated SMOs do not normally meet in face-to-face interaction with other constituents and hence cannot be bound to the SMOs through solidary selective incentives. We term these constituents, isolated constituents.

Federation may occur in two ways. One strategy assigns professional staff the task of developing chapters out of isolated adherents or constituents. To some extent SDS and CORE utilized this approach during the 1960s. Common Cause seems to have used it recently. Another strategy relies upon preexisting nonmovement

local groups which have heavy concentrations of adherents or isolated constituents. This latter style, termed group mobilization by Oberschall (1973), was typical of several waves of recruitment by the Ku Klux Klan. Federation developing out of preexisting groups can occur quite rapidly, while organizing unattached individuals probably requires more time and resources. To the extent that it utilized mass involvement in the South, SCLC operated through preexisting groups. We have argued elsewhere (McCarthy and Zald 1973) that nonfederated SMOs dealing with isolated constituents accounted for much of the SMS growth during the burst of SMO activity during the decade of the 1960s.

Empirically, SMOs will combine elements of the two major organizational forms we have identified here. The manner in which the organization garners the bulk of its resources should be used to characterize it during any time period. For instance, CORE would be deemed federated until the early 1960s, nonfederated at its peak during the early 1960s, and then federated again. It maintained a set of federated chapters during this entire period, but during the interim period its major resource flow was provided by isolated conscience constituents.

Hypothesis 4: *The more a SMO is dependent upon isolated constituents the less stable will be the flow of resources to the SMO.* Because isolated constituents are little involved in the affairs of the SMO, support from them depends far more upon industry and organizational (and counter-industry and counterorganizational) advertising than does support from constituents who are involved on a face-to-face basis with others. Advertising and media attention provide information about the dire consequences stemming from failure to attain target goals, the extent of goal accomplishment, and the importance of the particular SMO for such accomplishment.

Strickland and Johnston's (1970) analysis of issue elasticity is useful in understanding isolated constituent involvement in SM activities. At any time a number of target goals are offered to isolated adherents to any SM by one or more SMOs (and by other SMIs). Isolated adherents may choose to become constituents by allocating resources to one or another SMO based upon the goals propounded. The SMOs within any SMI will tend to compete with one another for the resources

of these isolated adherents. If they allocate resources, but remain isolated, their ties to the SMO remain tenuous. To the extent that any individual is an adherent to more than one SM, various SMIs will also be competing for these resources.

Treating SMO target goals as products, then, and adherence as demand, we can apply a simple economic model to this competitive process. Demand may be elastic, and its elasticity is likely to be heavily dependent upon SMO advertising. Products may be substitutable across SMIs. For example, while various SMOs may compete for resources from isolated adherents to the "justice for black Americans" SM, SMOs representing the "justice for American women" SM may be competing for the same resources (to the extent that these two SMs have overlapping adherent pools). Some adherents may have a high and inelastic demand curve for a SMO or SMI, others' demand curves may show great elasticity.

This suggests that effective advertising campaigns may convince isolated adherents with high-issue elasticity to switch SMOs and/or SMIs. Issue elasticity relates to what Downs (1972) terms "issue attention cycles." These apparent cycles, he observes, include the stages of a problem discovered, dramatic increases in adherence as advertising alerts potential adherents, attempts at problem solution, lack of success of such attempts, and a rapid decline in adherence and advertising. Isolated adherents may purchase a target goal product when offered but can be expected to base decisions about future purchases upon their conception of product quality. Tullock (1966) has argued that the consumption of such products is vicarious, not direct; thus, perceived product quality is not necessarily related to actual goal accomplishment. Much publicity is dependent upon a SMO's ability to induce the media to give free attention, as most SMOs cannot actually afford the high costs of national advertising. They do, however, use direct-mail advertising. The point is that the media mediate in large measure between isolated constituents and SMOs.

Perceived lack of success in goal accomplishment by a SMO may lead an individual to switch to SMOs with alternative strategies or, to the extent that products are substitutable, to switch to those with other target goals. It must be noted, however, that there is also an element of product loyalty in this process. Some isolated constituents may continue to purchase the product (to support a SMO) unaware of how effective or ineffective it may be.

One could treat individual SMO loyalty in the same way as political party loyalty is treated by political sociologists, but most SMOs do not command such stable loyalties from large numbers of people. Certain long-lasting SMOs, the NAACP and the AFSC, for instance, may command stable loyalties, and the process of socializing youth into SMO loyalty could be expected to be similar to that of socialization into party loyalty. This process, however, most probably occurs not among isolated constituents, but among those who are linked in more direct fashion to SMOs.

Advertising by SMOs recognizes that isolated constituents have no direct way of evaluating the product purchased; therefore it may stress the amount of goal accomplishment available to the isolated constituent for each dollar expended. The AFSC, for instance, informs isolated potential constituents in its mass mailings that its overhead costs are among the lowest of any comparable organization, and hence the proportion of each donation used for goal accomplishment is higher. Within an industry SMO products are normally differentiated by conceptions of the extremity of solutions required (Killian 1972) and by strategies of goal accomplishment (passive resistance, strikes, etc.). When products are not differentiated in either of these ways, we can expect differentiation in terms of efficiency.

These considerations lead to a subsidiary hypothesis, 4a: *The more dependent a SMO is upon isolated constituents the greater the share of its resources which will be allocated to advertising.* As indicated, SMO advertising can take the form of mailed material which demonstrates the good works of the organization. Media bargaining (Lipsky 1968) can also be conceptualized as SMO advertising. By staging events which will possibly be "newsworthy," by attending to the needs of news organizations, and by cultivating representatives of the media, SMOs may manipulate media coverage of their activities more or less successfully. Some kind of information flow to isolated constituents including positive evaluation is absolutely essential for SMOs dependent upon them.

The foregoing reasoning, combined with hypotheses 1 and 2, leads us to hypothesis 4b: *The*

more a SMO depends upon isolated constituents to maintain a resource flow the more its shifts in resource flow resemble the patterns of consumer expenditures for expendable and marginal goods. Stated differently, if a SMO is linked to its major source of constituent financial support through the advertising of its products, isolated constituents will balance off their contributions with other marginal expenditures. Time of year, state of the checkbook, mood, and product arousal value will influence such decision making.

The more attractive the target goal (product) upon which such a solicitation is based, the more likely that isolated adherents will become isolated constituents. Consequently, SMOs depending heavily upon such resource mobilization techniques must resort to slick packaging and convoluted appeal to self-interest in order to make their products more attractive. This should be especially true within competitive SMIs. The behavior in the early 1970s of environmental groups, which depend heavily upon isolated constituents, appears to illustrate this point. Many of those SMOs took credit for stalling the Alaskan pipeline and attempted to link that issue to personal self-interest and preferences in their direct-mail advertising. Slick packaging is evident in the high quality of printing and the heavy use of photogravure.

Another technique advertisers utilize to appeal to isolated adherents is the linking of names of important people to the organization, thereby developing and maintaining an image of credibility. In the same way that famous actors, sports heroes, and retired politicians endorse consumer products, other well-known personalities are called upon to endorse SMO products: Jane Fonda and Dr. Spock were to the peace movement and Robert Redford is to the environmental movement what Joe Namath is to pantyhose and what William Miller is to American Express Company credit cards.

The development of local chapters helps bind constituents to SMOs through networks of friendships and interpersonal control. But, hypothesis 5: *A SMO which attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organization through federated chapter structures, and hence solidary incentives, is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict.* Social movement analysts who have focused upon what we have termed conscience constituency participation

normally call it outsider involvement. Von Eschen et al. (1971), for instance, show that for a local direct action civil rights organization involvement on the part of geographical outsiders (both conscience and beneficiary) created pronounced internal conflict in the organization. Marx and Useem (1971) have examined the record of the recent civil rights movement, the abolitionist movement, and the movement to abolish untouchability in India. In these movements, "… outsiders were much more prone to be active in other causes or to shift their allegiances from movement to movement" (p. 102). Ross (1975) has argued the importance of friendship ties based upon geographical and generational lines to the internal conflict of SDS. The more unlike one another workers are, the less likely there is to be organizational unity, and the more likely it is that separate clique structures will form. If conscience constituents are more likely to be active in other SMOs and to be adherents of more than one SM, we would expect their involvement to be less continuous.

Now we can combine our earlier discussion of conscience and beneficiary constituents with our analysis of SMI and SMO processes. First, conscience constituents are more likely to control larger resource pools. Individuals with more resources exhibit concerns less directly connected with their own material interests. Consequently, conscience constituents are more likely to be adherents to more than one SMO and more than one SMI. Though they may provide the resources for an SMO at some point, they are likely to have conflicting loyalties.

This provides an account for why SMO leaders have been skeptical of the involvement of conscience constituents—intellectuals in labor unions, males in the women's liberation movement, whites in the civil rights movements. Conscience constituents are fickle because they have wide-ranging concerns. They may be even more fickle if they are isolated constituents—they are less likely to violate personal loyalties by switching priority concerns. But organizations which attempt to involve them in face-to-face efforts may have to suffer the consequences of the differences in backgrounds and outside involvements from those of beneficiary constituents. On the one hand, involving only conscience constituents in federated chapters, which might be a

method of avoiding such conflict, forces the SMO to pay the price of legitimacy—how can a SMO speak for a beneficiary group when it does not have any beneficiary constituents? On the other hand, depending exclusively upon mass beneficiary constituents reduces the potential size of the resource pool which can be used for goal accomplishment.

Not only may the involvement of conscience and beneficiary constituents lead to interpersonal tensions, it also leads to tactical dilemmas. Meier and Rudwick (1976) document the extent to which the question of whether the NAACP should use black or white lawyers to fight its legal battles has been a continuous one. Especially in the early days, the symbolic value of using black lawyers conflicted sharply with the better training and court room effectiveness of white lawyers. W. E. B. Du Bois came out on the side of court room effectiveness.

Rates of Resource Fluctuation and SMO Adaptation

We have focused thus far upon the development of resource flows to SMOs, primarily in terms of how they link themselves to their constituents and the size of the resource pool controlled by constituents. What are the implications of larger or smaller resource flows for the fate of SMOs, for careers in social movements, and for the use of different types of constituencies?

An interesting question concerns the staying power of new and older entries into a SMI. Hypothesis 6: *Older, established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline*. This is similar to the advantage of early entry for a firm in an industry: A structure in place when demand increases improves the likelihood of capturing a share of the market. Stinchcombe (1965, p. 148) points out that "as a general rule, a higher proportion of new organizations fail than old. This is particularly true of new organizational *forms*, so that *if an alternative requires new organization*, it has to be much more beneficial than the old before the flow of benefits compensates for the relative weakness of the newer social structure." All the liabilities of new organizational forms which Stinchcombe elaborates—new roles to be learned, temporary inefficiency of structuring,

heavy reliance upon social relations among strangers, and the lack of stable ties to those who might use the organization's services—beset new organizations of established forms as well, if to a lesser degree. Moreover, a history of accomplishment is an important asset, and, as Gamson (1975) shows for his sample of SMOs, longevity provides an edge in the attainment of legitimacy. Older organizations have available higher degrees of professional sophistication, existing ties to constituents, and experience in fund-raising procedures. Thus, as factors conducive to action based upon SM preferences develop, older SMOs are more able to use advertising to reach isolated adherents, even though new SMOs may of course benefit from the experience of older ones. The NAACP, for instance, already had a fund-raising structure aimed at isolated adherents before the increase in demand for civil rights goals increased in the 1960s. And CORE had the advantage of a professional staff member who was committed to the development of such techniques, but it took time for him to convince the decision makers of the organization to pursue such resource mobilization tactics (Meier and Rudwick 1973). Newer SMOs may capture a share of the isolated constituent market, but they will be disadvantaged at least until they establish a clear image of themselves and a structure to capitalize upon it. J. Q. Wilson (1973) cogently argues that competition between SMOs for resources occurs between organizations offering the most similar products, not between those for which competition in goal accomplishment produces conflict. Since SMOs within the same SMI compete with one another for resources, they are led to differentiate themselves from one another. The prior existence of skilled personnel and preexisting images are advantages in this process. In the same way that name recognition is useful to political candidates it is useful to SMOs when issue campaigns occur.

Hypothesis 7: *The more competitive a SMI (a function of the number and size of the existing SMOs) the more likely it is that new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies*. We have alluded to the process of product differentiation. As the competition within any SMI increases, the pressure to specialize intensifies. The decision of George Wiley to present the National Welfare Rights Organization as an organization aimed at winning rights for black welfare recipients was

apparently made partially as a result of the preexisting turf understandings of other civil rights organizations.

Hypothesis 8: *The larger the income flow to a SMO the more likely that cadre and staff are professional and the larger are these groups.* This proposition flows directly from an economic support model. It is obvious that the more money is available to an organization, the more full-time personnel it will be able to hire. Though this is not a necessary outcome, we assume that SMOs will be confronted with the diverse problems of organizational maintenance, and as resource flows increase these will become more complex. As in any large organization, task complexity requires specialization. Specialization is especially necessary in modern America, where the legal requirements of functioning necessitate experienced technicians at a number of points in both resource mobilization and attempts to bring influence to bear. The need for skills in lobbying, accounting, and fund raising leads to professionalization.

It is not that SMOs with small resource flows do not recognize the importance of diverse organizational tasks. In them, a small professional cadre may be required to fulfill a diverse range of tasks such as liaison work with other organizations, advertising, accounting, and membership service. Large resource flows allow these functions to be treated as specialties, though organizations of moderate size may have problems of premature specialization. Economies of scale should be reached only at appropriate levels of growth. In CORE we have a good example of this process: early specialization required constant organizational reshuffling in order to combine functions and staff members in what seemed to be the most efficient manner (Meier and Rudwick 1973).

Hypothesis 9: *The larger the SMS and the larger the specific SMIs the more likely it is that SM careers will develop.* A *SM career* is a sequence of professional staff and cadre positions held by adherents in a number of SMOs and/or supportive institutions. Such a career need not require continuous connection with a SMI, though the larger the SMI the more likely such continuous involvement ought to be. Supportive institutions might be universities, church bodies, labor unions, governmental agencies and the like (Zald and McCarthy 1975). Moreover, target institutions sometimes develop positions for SM cadre,

such as human-relation councils in local governments. Corporations have affirmative-action offices and antitrust lawyers.

When the SMI is large, the likelihood of SMI careers is greater simply because the opportunity for continuous employment is greater, regardless of the success or failure of any specific SMO. Though many of the skills developed by individuals in such careers (public relations, for instance) may be usefully applied in different SMIs, our impression is that individuals typically move between SMIs which have similar goals and hence have overlapping constituencies. While we might find individuals moving between civil rights and labor SMOs, we would be unlikely to find movement from civil rights SMOs to fundamentalist, anti-communist ones. (But it should be remembered that communists have become anticommunists, and that an antiwar activist such as Rennie Davis later took an active role in the transcendental meditation movement.) The relevant base for SMO careers, then, is usually SMIs or interrelated SMIs.

Funding strategies affect not only careers but also the use of beneficiary constituents as workers. Hypothesis 10: *The more a SMO is funded by isolated constituents the more likely that beneficiary constituent workers are recruited for strategic purposes rather than for organizational work.* This proposition is central to the strategy of the professional SMO. It leads to considering the mobilization of beneficiary constituent workers as a rational tool for attempts to wield influence, rather than as an important source of organizational resources. Earlier we mentioned the creation of senior citizen groups for purposes of bargaining by the AFL-CIO in the Medicare fight. The use of some poor people for strategic purposes by the Hunger Commission, a professional SMO, also illustrates the point. Also germane is the fact that of the groups in Gamson's study (1975) none that were heavily dependent upon outside sponsors provided selective material incentives for constituents. Binding beneficiary constituents to a SMO with incentives is not so important to an organization which does not need them in order to maintain a resource flow.

Much of our discussion has been framed in terms of discretionary money, but discretionary time is also of importance.

[…]

Conclusion

The resource mobilization model we have described here emphasizes the interaction between resource availability, the preexisting organization of preference structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demand. We have emphasized how these processes seem to operate in the modern American context. Different historical circumstances and patterns of preexisting infrastructures of adherency will affect the strategies of SMO entrepreneurial activity in other times and places. Our emphasis, however, seems to be useful in accounting for parallel activity in different historical contexts, including peasant societies, and in explaining the processes of growth and decline in withdrawal movements as well.

The history of the Bolshevik SMO (Wolfe 1955) shows how important stable resource flows are to the competitive position of a SMO. The Bolsheviks captured the resource flow to the Russian Social Revolutionary movement and, at certain points in their history, depended heavily upon isolated conscience constituents. Free media are probably necessary to mass isolated constituent involvement in resource flows, so isolated adherents with control over large resource pools are probably more important to SMI growth in societies without mass media. Leites and Wolf (1970) make a similar analysis of the revolutionary SMI in its relationship to the constant rewards of participation by the peasants in Vietnam. Of course, the extent of discretionary resources varies considerably between that case and the modern American case, but so did the ability of authorities to intervene in the manipulation of costs and rewards of individual involvement in the revolutionary SMO. The flow of resources from outside South Vietnam was important in the SMO's ability to manipulate these costs and rewards. Extranational involvement in the American SMS seems almost nonexistent.

Moreover, Oberschall (1973) has shown how important communal associations may be for facilitating mobilization in tribal and peasant societies. Although the number of SMOs and hence the size of the SMI may be smaller in peasant societies, resource mobilization and SM facilitation by societal infrastructure issues are just as important.

Withdrawal movements are typically characterized primarily by the way in which constituents are bound to the SMO (Kanter 1972). But SMOs in withdrawal SMs also encounter difficulties in developing stable resource flows, and they use a variety of strategies similar to those of other SMOs in response to their difficulties. The recent behavior of the Unification Church of America (led by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon) in the United States illustrates processes close to those we have focused upon for modern reform movements: heavy use of advertising and emphasis upon stable resource flows in order to augment the development of federated constituencies. The Father Divine Peace Mission (Cantril 1941) utilized rather different strategies of resource mobilization, including a heavier dependence upon the constituents themselves, but the importance of maintaining flows for continued viability was recognized in both of these withdrawal movements.

Our attempt has been to develop a partial theory; we have only alluded to, or treated as constant, important variables—the interaction of authorities, SMOs, and bystander publics; the dynamics of media involvement; the relationship between SMO workers and authorities; the impact of industry structure; the dilemmas of tactics. Yet, in spite of the limitations of our brief statement of the resource mobilization perspective, we believe it offers important new insights into the understanding of social movement phenomena and can be applied more generally.

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17

Transnational Environmental Activism

Paul Wapner

Interest in transnational activist groups such as Greenpeace, European Nuclear Disarmament (END), and Amnesty International has been surging. […] Recent scholarship demonstrates that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have changed state human rights practices in particular countries. Other studies have shown that environmental groups have influenced negotiations over environmental protection of the oceans, the ozone layer, and Antarctica and that they have helped enforce national compliance with international mandates. Still others have shown that peace groups helped shape nuclear policy regarding deployments in Europe during the cold war and influenced Soviet perceptions in a way that allowed for eventual superpower accommodation. This work is important, especially insofar as it establishes the increasing influence of transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on states. Nonetheless, for all its insight, it misses a different but related dimension of activist work—the attempt by activists to shape public affairs by working within and across societies themselves.

Recent studies neglect the societal dimension of activists' efforts in part because they subscribe to a narrow understanding of politics. They see politics as a practice associated solely with government and thus understand activist efforts exclusively in terms of their influence upon government. Seen from this perspective, transnational activists are solely global pressure groups seeking to change states' policies or create conditions in the international system that enhance or diminish interstate cooperation. Other efforts directed toward societies at large are ignored or devalued because they are not considered to be genuinely political in character.

Such a narrow view of politics in turn limits research because it suggests that the conception and meaning of transnational activist groups is fixed and that scholarship therefore need only measure activist influence on states. This article asserts, by contrast, that the meaning of activist groups in a global context is not settled and will remain problematic as long as the strictly societal dimension of their work is left out of the analysis. Activist efforts within and across societies are a

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Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN)
Some activists live in different societies and yet collaborate and assist one another across borders. These activists share common beliefs and concerns (e.g., the environment, human rights, international trade and investment), and they exchange information and resources in pursuit of common goals. Transnational networks of activists and organizations sometimes arise because certain problems can only be addressed at a transnational level. In some cases, these networks arise because activists or organizations in one society reach out to those in other societies who have more resources or more political clout. See Keck and Sikkink (1998).

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proper object of study and only by including them in transnational activist research can one render an accurate understanding of transnational activist groups and, by extension, of world politics.

This article focuses on activist society-oriented activities and demonstrates that activist organizations are not simply transnational pressure groups, but rather are political actors in their own right. The main argument is that the best way to think about transnational activist societal efforts is through the concept of "world civic politics." When activists work to change conditions without directly pressuring states, their activities take place in the civil dimension of world collective life or what is sometimes called global civil society. Civil society is that arena of social engagement which exists above the individual yet below the state. It is a complex network of economic, social, and cultural practices based on friendship, family, the market, and voluntary affiliation. Although the concept arose in the analysis of domestic societies, it is beginning to make sense on a global level. The interpenetration of markets, the intermeshing of symbolic meaning systems, and the proliferation of transnational collective endeavors signal the formation of a thin, but nevertheless present, public sphere where private individuals and groups interact for common purposes. Global civil society as such is that slice of associational life which exists above the individual and below the state, but also across national boundaries. When transnational activists direct

their efforts beyond the state, they are politicizing global civil society.

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Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, and Greenpeace target governments and try to change state behavior to further their aims. When this route fails or proves less efficacious, they work through transnational economic, social, and cultural networks to achieve their ends. The emphasis on world civic politics stresses that while these latter efforts may not translate easily into state action, they should not be viewed as simply matters of cultural or social interest. Rather, they involve identifying and manipulating instruments of power for shaping collective life. Unfortunately, the conventional wisdom has taken them to be politically irrelevant.

In the following I analyze the character of world civic politics by focusing on one relatively new sector of this activity, transnational environmental activist groups (TEAGs). As environmental dangers have become part of the public consciousness and a matter of scholarly concern in recent years, much attention has been directed toward the transboundary and global dimensions of environmental degradation. Ozone depletion, global warming, and species extinction, for instance, have consequences that cross state boundaries and in the extreme threaten to change the organic infrastructure of life on earth. Responding in part to increased knowledge about these problems, transnational activist groups have emerged whose members are dedicated to "saving the planet." World Wildlife Fund, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Conservation International, and Earth Island Institute are voluntary associations organized across state boundaries that work toward environmental protection at the global level. TEAGs have grown tremendously since the 1970s, with the budgets of the largest organizations greater than the amount spent by most countries on environmental issues and equal to, if not double, the annual expenditure of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Furthermore, membership in these groups has grown throughout the 1980s and 1990s to a point where millions of people are currently members of TEAGs. This article demonstrates that, while TEAGs direct much effort toward state policies, their political activity does not stop there but extends into global civil society. In the following,

I describe and analyze this type of activity and, in doing so, make explicit the dynamics and significance of world civic politics.

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Disseminating an Ecological Sensibility

Few images capture the environmental age as well as the sight of Greenpeace activists positioning themselves between harpoons and whales in an effort to stop the slaughter of endangered sea mammals. Since 1972, with the formal organization of Greenpeace into a transnational environmental activist group, Greenpeace has emblazoned a host of such images onto the minds of people around the world. Greenpeace activists have climbed aboard whaling ships, parachuted from the top of smokestacks, plugged up industrial discharge pipes, and floated a hot air balloon into a nuclear test site. These direct actions are media stunts, exciting images orchestrated to convey a critical perspective toward environmental issues. Numerous other organizations, including the Sea Shepherds Conservation Society, Earth-First!, and Rainforest Action Network, engage in similar efforts. The dramatic aspect attracts journalists and television crews to specific actions and makes it possible for the groups themselves to distribute their own media presentations. Greenpeace, for example, has its own media facilities; within hours it can provide photographs to newspapers and circulate scripted video news spots to television stations in eighty-eight countries. The overall intent is to use international mass communications to expose anti-ecological practices and thereby inspire audiences to change their views and behavior vis-à-vis the environment.

Direct action is based on two strategies. The first is simply to bring what are often hidden instances of environmental abuse to the attention of a wide audience: harpooners kill whales on the high seas; researchers abuse Antarctica; significant species extinction takes place in the heart of the rainforest; and nuclear weapons are tested in the most deserted areas of the planet. Through television, radio, newspapers, and magazines transnational activist groups bring these hidden spots of the globe into people's everyday lives, thus enabling vast numbers of people to "bear witness" to

environmental abuse. Second, TEAGs engage in dangerous and dramatic actions that underline how serious they consider certain environmental threats to be. That activists take personal risks to draw attention to environmental issues highlights their indignation and the degree of their commitment to protecting the planet. Taken together, these two strategies aim to change the way vast numbers of people see the world—by dislodging traditional understandings of environmental degradation and substituting new interpretive frames.

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Raising awareness through media stunts is not primarily about changing governmental policies, although this may of course happen as state officials bear witness or are pressured by constituents to codify into law shifts in public opinion or widespread sentiment. But this is only one dimension of TEAG direct action efforts. The new age envisioned by Hunter is more than passing environmental legislation or adopting new environmental policies. Additionally, it involves convincing all actors—from governments to corporations, private organizations, and ordinary citizens—to make decisions and act in deference to environmental awareness. Smitten with such ideas, governments will, activists hope, take measures to protect the environment. When the ideas have more resonance outside government, they will shift the standards of good conduct and persuade people to act differently even though governments are not requiring them to do so. In short, TEAGs work to disseminate an ecological sensibility to shift the governing ideas that animate societies, whether institutionalized within government or not, and count on this to reverberate throughout various institutions and collectivities.

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Consider the following. In 1970 one in ten Canadians said the environment was worthy of being on the national agenda; twenty years later one in three felt not only that it should be on the agenda but that it was the most pressing issue facing Canada. In 1981, 45 percent of those polled in a U.S. survey said that protecting the environment was so important that "requirements and standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost"; in 1990, 74 percent supported the statement. This general trend is supported around the world. In a recent Gallup poll majorities

in twenty countries gave priority to safeguarding the environment even at the cost of slowing economic growth; additionally, 71 percent of the people in sixteen countries, including India, Mexico, South Korea, and Brazil, said they were willing to pay higher prices for products if it would help to protect the environment.

These figures suggest a significant shift in awareness and concern about the environment over the past two decades. It is also worth noting that people have translated this sentiment into changes in behavior. In the 1960s the U.S. Navy and Air Force used whales for target practice. Twenty-five years later an international effort costing $5 million was mounted to save three whales trapped in the ice in Alaska. Two decades ago corporations produced products with little regard for their environmental impact. Today it is incumbent upon corporations to reduce negative environmental impact at the production, packaging, and distribution phases of industry. When multilateral development banks and other aid institutions were established after the Second World War, environmental impact assessments were unheard of; today they are commonplace. Finally, twenty years ago recycling as a concept barely existed. Today recycling is mandatory in many municipalities around the world, and in some areas voluntary recycling is a profit-making industry. (Between 1960 and 1990 the amount of municipal solid waste recovered by recycling in the United States more than quintupled.) In each of these instances people are voluntarily modifying their behavior in part because of the messages publicized by activists. If one looked solely at state behavior to account for this change, one would miss a tremendous amount of significant world political action.

A final, if controversial, example of the dissemination of an ecological sensibility is the now greatly reduced practice of killing harp seal pups in northern Canada. Throughout the 1960s the annual Canadian seal hunt took place without attracting much public attention or concern. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s and 1980s the International Fund for Animals, Greenpeace, the Sea Shepherds Conservation Society, and a host of smaller preservation groups saw this—in hindsight inaccurately, according to many—as a threat to the continued existence of harp seals in Canada. They brought the practice to the attention of the world, using, among other

means, direct action. As a result, people around the globe, but especially in Europe, changed their buying habits and stopped purchasing products made out of the pelts. As a consequence, the market for such merchandise all but dried up with the price per skin plummeting. Then, in 1983, the European Economic Community (EEC) actually banned the importation of seal pelts. It is significant that the EEC did so only after consumer demand had already dropped dramatically. Governmental policy, that is, may have simply been an afterthought and ultimately unnecessary. People acted in response to the messages propagated by activist groups.

When Greenpeace and other TEAGs undertake direct action or follow other strategies to promote an ecological sensibility, these are the types of changes they are seeking. At times, governments respond with policy measures and changed behavior with respect to environmental issues. The failure of governments to respond, however, does not necessarily mean that the efforts of activists have been in vain. Rather, they influence understandings of good conduct throughout societies at large. They help set the boundaries of what is considered acceptable behavior.

When people change their buying habits, voluntarily recycle garbage, boycott certain products, and work to preserve species, it is not necessarily because governments are breathing down their necks. Rather, they are acting out of a belief that the environmental problems involved are severe, and they wish to contribute to alleviating them. They are being "stung," as it were, by an ecological sensibility. This sting is a type of governance. It represents a mechanism of authority that can shape widespread human behavior.

Multinational Corporate Politics

In 1991 the multinational McDonald's Corporation decided to stop producing its traditional clamshell hamburger box and switch to paper packaging in an attempt to cut back on the use of disposable foam and plastic. In 1990 Uniroyal Chemical Company, the sole manufacturer of the apple-ripening agent Alar, ceased to produce and market the chemical both in the United States and abroad. Alar, the trade name for daminozide, was used on most kinds of red apples and, according to

some, found to cause cancer in laboratory animals. Finally, in 1990 Starkist and Chicken of the Sea, the two largest tuna companies, announced that they would cease purchasing tuna caught by setting nets on dolphins or by any use of drift nets; a year later Bumble Bee Tuna followed suit. Such action has contributed to protecting dolphin populations around the world.

In each of these instances environmental activist groups—both domestic and transnational—played an important role in convincing corporations to alter their practices. To be sure, each case raises controversial issues concerning the ecological wisdom of activist pressures, but it also nevertheless demonstrates the effects of TEAG efforts. In the case of McDonald's, the corporation decided to abandon its foam and plastic containers in response to prodding by a host of environmental groups. These organizations, which included the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, Earth Action Network, and Kids against Pollution, organized a "send-back" campaign in which people mailed McDonald's packaging to the national headquarters. Additionally, Earth Action Network actually broke windows and scattered supplies at a McDonald's restaurant in San Francisco to protest the company's environmental policies. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) played a mediating role by organizing a six-month, joint task force to study ways to reduce solid waste in McDonald's eleven thousand restaurants worldwide. The task force provided McDonald's with feasible responses to activist demands. What is clear from most reports on the change is that officials at McDonald's did not believe it necessarily made ecological or economic sense to stop using clamshell packaging but that they bent to activist pressure.

Uniroyal Chemical Company ceased producing Alar after groups such as Ralph Nader's Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) organized a massive public outcry about the use of the product on apples in the U.S. and abroad. In 1989 NRDC produced a study that found that Alar created cancer risks 240 times greater than those declared safe by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This was publicized on CBS's *60 Minutes* and led to critical stories in numerous newspapers and magazines. Moreover, activists pressured supermarket chains to stop selling apples grown with Alar and pressured schools to stop serving Alar-sprayed apples. The effects were dramatic. The demand for apples in general shrank significantly because of the scare, lowering prices well below the break-even level. This led to a loss of $135 million for Washington State apple growers alone. Effects such as these and continued pressure by activist groups convinced Uniroyal to cease production of the substance not only in the U.S. but overseas as well. Like McDonald's, Uniroyal changed its practices neither for economic reasons nor to increase business nor because it genuinely felt Alar was harmful. Rather, it capitulated to activist pressure. In fact, there is evidence from nonindustry sources suggesting that Alar did not pose the level of threat publicized by activists.

Finally, in the case of dolphin-free tuna, Earth Island Institute (EII) and other organizations launched an international campaign in 1985 to stop all drift-net and purse seine fishing by tuna fleets. For unknown reasons, tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean swim under schools of dolphins. For years tuna fleets have set their nets on dolphins or entangled dolphins in drift nets as a way to catch tuna. While some fleets still use these strategies, the three largest tuna companies have ceased doing so. TEAGs were at the heart of this change. Activists waged a boycott against all canned tuna, demonstrated at stockholders' meetings, and rallied on the docks of the Tuna Boat Association in San Diego. Furthermore, EII assisted in the production of the film *Where Have All the Dolphins Gone?* which was shown throughout the United States and abroad; it promoted the idea of "dolphin-safe" tuna labels to market environmentally sensitive brands; and it enlisted Heinz, the parent company of Starkist, to take an active role in stopping the slaughter of dolphins by all tuna companies. Its efforts, along with those of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and others, were crucial to promoting dolphin-safe tuna fishing. One result of these efforts is that dolphin kills associated with tuna fishing in 1993 numbered fewer than 5,000. This represents one-third the mortality rate of 1992, when 15,470 dolphins died in nets, and less than one-twentieth of the number in 1989, when over 100,000 dolphins died at the hands of tuna fleets. These numbers represent the effects of activist efforts. Although governments did eventually adopt domestic dolphin conservation policies and negotiated partial international standards to reduce dolphin kills,

the first such actions came into force only in late 1992 with the United Nations moratorium on drift nets. Moreover, the first significant actions against purse seine fishing, which more directly affects dolphins, came in June 1994 with the United States International Dolphin Conservation Act. As with the Canadian seal pup hunt, government action in the case of tuna fisheries largely codified changes that were already taking place.

In each instance, activist groups did not direct their efforts at governments. They did not target politicians; nor did they organize constituent pressuring. Rather, they focused on corporations themselves. Through protest, research, exposés, orchestrating public outcry, and organizing joint consultations, activists won corporate promises to bring their practices in line with environmental concerns. The levers of power in these instances were found in the economic realm of collective life rather than in the strictly governmental realm. Activists understand that the economic realm, while not the center of traditional notions of politics, nevertheless furnishes channels for effecting widespread changes in behavior; they recognize that the economic realm is a form of governance and can be manipulated to alter collective practices.

Perhaps the best example of how activist groups, especially transnational ones, enlist the economic dimensions of governance into their enterprises is the effort to establish environmental oversight of corporations. In September 1989 a coalition of environmental, investor, and church interests, known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), met in New York City to introduce a ten-point environmental code of conduct for corporations. One month later CERES, along with the Green Alliance, launched a similar effort in the United Kingdom. The aim was to establish criteria for auditing the environmental performance of large domestic and multinational industries. The code called on companies to, among other things, minimize the release of pollutants, conserve nonrenewable resources through efficient use and planning, utilize environmentally safe and sustainable energy sources, and consider demonstrated environmental commitment as a factor in appointing members to the board of directors. Fourteen environmental organizations, including TEAGs such as Friends of the Earth and the International Alliance for Sustainable

Agriculture, publicize the CERES Principles (formerly known as the Valdez Principles, inspired by the Exxon *Valdez* oil spill) and enlist corporations to pledge compliance. What is significant from an international perspective is that signatories include at least one Fortune 500 company and a number of multinational corporations. Sun Company, General Motors, Polaroid, and a host of other MNCs have pledged compliance or are at least seriously considering doing so. Because these companies operate in numerous countries, their actions have transnational effects.

The CERES Principles are valuable for a number of reasons. In the case of pension funds, the code is being used to build shareholder pressure on companies to improve their environmental performance. Investors can use it as a guide to determine which companies practice socially responsible investment. Environmentalists use the code as a measuring device to praise or criticize corporate behavior. Finally, the Principles are used to alert college graduates on the job market about corporate compliance with the code and thus attempt to make environmental issues a factor in one's choice of a career. Taken together, these measures force some degree of corporate accountability by establishing mechanisms of governance to shape corporate behavior. To be sure, they have not turned businesses into champions of environmentalism, nor are they as effectual as mechanisms available to governments. At work, however, is activist discovery and manipulation of economic means of power.

Via the CERES Principles and other forms of pressure, activists thus influence corporate behavior. McDonald's, Uniroyal, and others have not been changing their behavior because governments are breathing down their necks. Rather, they are voluntarily adopting different ways of producing and distributing products. This is not to say that their actions are more environmentally sound than before they responded to activists or that their attempt to minimize environmental dangers is sincerely motivated. As mentioned, environmental activist groups do not have a monopoly on ecological wisdom, nor is corporate "greening" necessarily well intentioned. Nonetheless, the multinational corporate politics of transnational groups are having an effect on the way industries do business. And to the degree that these enterprises are involved in issues of widespread public

concern that cross state boundaries, activist pressure must be understood as a form of world politics.

Empowering Local Communities

For decades TEAGs have worked to conserve wildlife in the developing world. Typically, this has involved people in the First World working in the Third World to restore and guard the environment. First World TEAGs—ones headquartered in the North—believed that Third World people could not appreciate the value of wildlife or were simply too strapped by economic pressures to conserve nature. Consequently, environmental organizations developed, financed, and operated programs in the field with little local participation or input.

While such efforts saved a number of species from extinction and set in motion greater concern for Third World environmental protection, on the whole they were unsuccessful at actually preserving species and their habitats from degradation and destruction. A key reason for this was that they attended more to the needs of plants and especially animals than to those of the nearby human communities. Many of the earth's most diverse and biologically rich areas are found in parts of the world where the poorest peoples draw their livelihood from the land. As demographic and economic constraints grow tighter, these people exploit otherwise renewable resources in an attempt merely to survive. Ecological sustainability in these regions, then, must involve improving the quality of life of the rural poor through projects that integrate the management of natural resources with grassroots economic development.

Often after having supported numerous failed projects, a number of TEAGs have come to subscribe to this understanding and undertake appropriate actions. World Wildlife Fund (WWF) or World Wide Fund for Nature, as it is known outside English-speaking countries, is an example of such an organization. WWF is a conservation group dedicated to protecting endangered wildlife and wildlands worldwide. It originated in 1961 as a small organization in Switzerland, making grants to finance conservation efforts in various countries. Over the past thirty years it has grown into a full-scale global environmental organization with offices in over twenty countries. Within the past decade, WWF has established a wildlands and human needs program, a method of conservation to be applied to all WWF projects linking human economic well-being with environmental protection. It structures a game management system in Zambia, for example, which involves local residents in antipoaching and conservation efforts, and the channeling of revenues from tourism and safaris back into the neighboring communities that surround the preserves. It informs a WWF-initiated Kilum Mountain project in the Cameroon that is developing nurseries for reforestation, reintroducing indigenous crops, and disseminating information about the long-term effects of environmentally harmful practices. Finally, it is operative in a project in St. Lucia, where WWF has lent technical assistance to set up sanitary communal waste disposal sites, improved marketing of fish to reduce overfishing, and protected mangroves from being used for fuel by planting fast-growing fuel-wood trees. WWF is not alone in these efforts. The New Forests Project, the Association for Research and Environmental Aid (AREA), the Ladakh Project, and others undertake similar actions.

In these kinds of efforts, TEAGs are not trying to galvanize public pressure aimed at changing governmental policy or directly lobbying state officials; indeed, their activity takes place far from the halls of congresses, parliaments, and executive offices. Rather, TEAGs work with ordinary people in diverse regions of the world to try to enhance local capability to carry out sustainable development projects. The guiding logic is that local people must be enlisted in protecting their own environments and that their efforts will then reverberate through wider circles of social interaction to affect broader aspects of world environmental affairs.

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World Civic Politics

The predominant way to think about NGOs in world affairs is as transnational interest groups. They are politically relevant insofar as they affect state policies and interstate behavior. In this article I have argued that TEAGs, a particular type of

NGO, have political relevance beyond this. They work to shape the way vast numbers of people throughout the world act toward the environment using modes of governance that are part of global civil society. […]

I suggested that the best way to think about these activities is through the category of "world civic politics." When TEAGs work through transnational networks associated with cultural, social, and economic life, they are enlisting forms of governance that are civil as opposed to official or state constituted in character. Civil, in this regard, refers to the quality of interaction that takes place above the individual and below the state yet across national boundaries. The concept of world civic politics clarifies how the forms of governance in global civil society are distinct from the instrumentalities of state rule.

At the most foundational level, states govern through legal means that are supported by the threat or use of force. To be sure, all states enjoy a minimum of loyalty from their citizens and administrate through a variety of nonlegal and noncoercive means. Ultimately, however, the authority to govern per se rests on the claim to a monopoly over legitimate coercive power. By contrast, civic power has no legally sanctioned status and cannot be enforced through the legitimate use of violence. It rests on persuasion and more constitutive employment of power in which people change their practices because they have come to understand the world in a way that promotes certain actions over others or because they operate in an environment that induces them to do so. Put differently, civic power is the forging of voluntary and customary practices into mechanisms that govern public affairs. When TEAGs disseminate an ecological sensibility, pressure corporations, or empower local communities, they are exercising civic power across national boundaries.

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Lois Gibbs: Housewife Warrior

Compared to many social movements, the American environmental movement has created few nationally prominent leaders. Much of the movement's work is not flamboyant enough to attract media attention, but many groups have consciously tried to avoid the kind of celebrity leaders who rose to fame in the 1960s, like Abbie Hoffman. What is more, most environmental groups since the 1980s have been local, not national, efforts. Lois Gibbs is an exception, thanks to the intense media attention that came her way. She lived in a housing development called Love Canal.

Love Canal was a neighborhood in the town of Niagara Falls, in upstate New York. The land had been owned by the Hooker Chemical Company from 1946 until 1953, when it sold it to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for one dollar. The condition was that the company not be held liable for the chemical waste (22,000 tons) it had buried there. The city built an elementary school on the site, then sold the remainder to real estate developers.

In the mid-1970s, Lois Gibbs' attention was focused on raising a family. She had a normal suburban existence, amidst tree-lined streets and weekend do-it-yourselfers. She and her husband, a chemical worker, had high-school degrees. When she was 26, they had bought their own modest three-bedroom house. They had two children, and Lois stopped working when they were born. Neither she nor her husband were interested in politics or active in any community organizations. Lois thought of herself as painfully shy, incapable of public speaking.

Gibbs began to see articles about Love Canal's health hazards in the *Niagara Falls Gazette*; at first she didn't realize it was her neighborhood. When she did, she grew alarmed, as her son Michael had just completed kindergarten in the school built right on top of the old canal. Could this, she wondered, explain the seizures he had begun having right after he started school, or the sudden drop in his white blood count during the winter? She turned to her brother-in-law, a biologist at the Buffalo campus of the State University of New York, who confirmed what the articles said: many of the chemicals buried in Love Canal are known to damage the central nervous system. They decided Michael should no longer go to the 99th Street School.

Concern for her own children quickly developed into a moral shock. The superintendent of schools for the district refused to allow Michael to attend a different elementary school, despite two doctor's letters pointing to his special sensitivities. The president of the PTA seemed uninterested as well. Shy Lois Gibbs began carrying a petition door to door, beginning with her own friends and acquaintances. She was surprised to hear about so many mysterious illnesses, crib deaths, and other cases of children suffering. When the New York Department of Health held a meeting in June 1978, she heard more: a pet dog had burned its nose just sniffing the ground, a toddler could not walk in her own backyard without burning her feet, basements with chemicals oozing through the walls. By now, she had the courage to ask questions, although she did not get serious answers.

Lois Gibbs was soon testifying before government hearings, addressing rallies of local residents, and leading a surging movement angry with the government for not doing enough to help. The Love Canal Homeowners Association, which she helped found, was a major reason that government eventually did respond, paying to relocate those residents who wished to move. It was their frequent, and frustrating, interactions with government bureaucrats which helped the Love Canal residents coalesce as a group, with considerable collective spirit and identity.

The New York State Health Department declared a health emergency, recommending that pregnant women and children under two leave the area closest to the old dump site. Eventually President Jimmy Carter declared it a federal disaster area. The state and federal government would spend nearly $300 million over the next twelve years studying and cleaning up the land, before declaring it safe again in 1990. Many homes in the most affected areas were purchased by the government. Love Canal helped inspire Congress to pass the Superfund cleanup program for toxic waste in 1980.

The battle also propelled Gibbs into an activist career. She left Love Canal, and her husband, moving to the Washington, D.C., area to establish the Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste. Its purpose was to provide information and advice to other local groups facing toxic waste and other hazards, just as the Love Canal neighbors had. Within a few years, there were thousands of groups associated with Gibbs's new organization, forming one of the most vital wings of the environmental movement in the 1980s.

18

The Transnational Network for Democratic Globalization

Jackie Smith

The network concept integrates the understanding that a wide variety of actors participate in social movements at various times and places. Analysts have used the concept of mobilizing structures to refer to the many different formal and informal entities that tend to be involved in a wide variety of different movements. A key idea here is that, as modern societies become increasingly bureaucratic, or formally and professionally organized, they generate many different spaces that have the potential to be appropriated for social change efforts. […]

At the same time, most broad-based and long-term movements contain a number of formal organizations whose primary goal is to advance movement-specific aims. But movements are not only made up of formal organizations, and some would argue that they are becoming increasingly decentralized and informal in their structure, as individuals and loosely defined networks become more common. McCarthy (1996) uses the concept of mobilizing structures to describe the variation in who participates in typical social movements. Table 18.1 draws from this work to describe the mobilizing structures that characterize transnational social movement networks.

The top, left-hand cell of Table 18.1 displays some of the *informal, non-movement structures* through which transnational movements can mobilize influence. National mobilizing structures are likely to include friendship and professional networks, or informal collections of individuals and/or organizations that because of social or work routines have either incidental or deliberate contact on a regular basis. However, their transnational importance has expanded with the greater ease of travel and communication. In addition, officials in international agencies and delegates on national missions to international governmental organizations can be important channels of transnational mobilization. There are also distinctly transnational networks of people likely to be responsive to movement goals, such as refugees, immigrant workers, or international students, who might bring pressure on their state of occupancy (or of their birth) to modify policies vis-à-vis their home (or host) states.

Table 18.1   Transnational mobilizing structures

	Non-movement	Movement
Informal	Friendship networks	Activist networks
	Professional networks	Affinity groups
	Expatriate networks	Refugee/exile networks
	Individuals in intergovernmental bureaucracies or national delegations	
Formal	Churches	TSMOs
	Unions*	Unions*
	Professional associations	SMOs (national and local)
	Regional cooperative associations	Protest committees (of other NGOs)
	Service organizations	Transnational NGO coalitions
	Intergovernmental and state bureaucracies	Movement research institutes
	National delegations	
	Foundations	

Sources: Adapted from McCarthy (1996: 145); Smith et al. (1997: 62).

*In some national contexts, unions may be more appropriately considered movement structures because their key operations challenge fundamental power structures. But in most Western societies their principal strategies and formal organizational missions do not include broad social change goals, and in other countries they are controlled by governments. Thus they are included in the non-movement column.

The *formal, non-movement* cell lists societal organizations that often support nascent movements or join broader social change campaigns. Some of these groups—including some labor unions and many service-providing organizations—may have grown out of earlier social movements. In trans-national settings, this category may include large organizations working on development projects, resettling refugees, and undertaking other humanitarian initiatives. In some countries, unions are more likely to be considered movement than non-movement actors, given their more confrontational approach to governments and capitalists.

[…]

The *informal movement* dimension of mobilizing structures may be the most dynamic and important one for contemporary global change. This category consists of networks of activists or like-minded individuals. Sometimes these networks take the form of affinity groups, which are informal structures characterized by clearly defined norms and shared expectations that emerged from early anarchist and direct action protests in the West. These were also important in the protests of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century against global financial institutions. These more informal networks might be even more important for trans-national movements than they are for national ones. […] Perhaps because social movements are most clearly engaged in "information politics" and communication-based political work, scholars have emphasized the importance of informal and fluid networks of actors to global social change processes.

Finally, the *formal movement* actors in transnational movements include trans-national social movement organizations as well as increasing numbers of national and locally organized social movement organizations. They can also include protest committees of other formal organizations such as professional associations or unions. Increasingly, movement activity generates formal transnational organizations that help coordinate action on particular issues or campaigns over time. And because modern politics involves extensive amounts of information and deliberation of a variety of scientific evidence and political viewpoints, think tanks and research institutes established to promote the aims of particular social movements are increasingly common and important.

Movement networks will vary over time in terms of which actors they integrate and how extensively different types of actors are involved in network activity. But an analysis of the mobilizing structures available in a given context helps

us identify the possibilities for broadening support for the more particular goals of global justice activists as well as for the more encompassing aim of enhancing global democracy in a given social setting. Also, it can help us assess the organizational, political, cultural, and technical capacities of the network.

Organizations and Episodes

Mobilizing structures help link people, ideas, and resources, but the essence of social movements is collective action in public spaces. Such actions might be called "episodes of contention," or instances where opponents mobilize public, collective challenges to authorities (McAdam et al. 2001: 85). Often these episodes involve mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, and even violence against property or (far less frequently) persons. Typical protest episodes today are shaped in important ways by social movement organizations, which devote extensive efforts to spreading particular understandings of problems and encouraging public support for social change ideas.

Social movement organizations facilitate demonstrations by specifying and publicizing the date and location of action, arranging with public authorities for permission to use public spaces, providing marshals and other facilities to accommodate protesters, and building alliances with social networks outside the movement in order to generate large numbers of demonstrators. […]

Contemporary transnational activism tends to involve a more diverse array of actors and a more complex and multilayered analysis of political issues than most local or national protests. Thus, we would expect that episodes of transnational contention would involve a different constellation of mobilizing structures than we are likely to see in more localized contexts. Table 18.2 illustrates some of the key organizations mobilizing around the 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle. It examines how different mobilizing structures contributed to that particular protest episode.

Table 18.2 illustrates the varying roles different movement actors played in one of the more prominent confrontations in the contemporary movement for global economic justice. A key idea

this map reveals is that the groups with the least formal and routine transnational ties were more likely to be engaged in the important work of grassroots-level education and mobilization. […]

In contrast, groups with more routine transnational ties and formal transnational structures were better able to monitor developments in international policy and to help people make connections between locally experienced grievances and global processes. Starhawk, a U.S.-based feminist/ecology/peace activist, defended the importance of this division of labor in her response to a "Manifest of Anti-capitalist Youth against the World Social Forum":

> I do think the NGOs serve a useful and necessary purpose—they're like a different part of an eco-system, that simply does a different job. But they wouldn't have much impact without people in the streets. We know that—they do too even if they don't always admit it publicly. They also have resources and information that can help our work, as long as we don't let them dictate our politics or our strategies. (Starhawk 2001)

[…]

The key point of this discussion of mobilizing structures is to demonstrate the range of different social actors that can become involved in social movement activities and to identify some of the actors that can be important to global movements or to global civic engagement more broadly. The strength of any movement will depend largely upon the extensiveness and range of different mobilizing structures it includes. Strong movements are those that can reach people in the *spaces of their everyday lives*, namely in the more informal and non-movement spaces where people socialize, recreate, worship, and nurture their families and communities.

The strongest democracies are ones where political spaces articulate with those of people's everyday routines. Where government policies and employers' practices help enable people to learn about and remain attentive to political issues and to participate in politics, we can expect to find strong democracies. Providing effective political education in public schools, promoting the emergence of spaces for public discourse about politics (such as labor unions or more participatory political parties), and scheduling

Table 18.2 Mobilizing structures and divisions of labor in the "battle of Seattle"

Intensity of transnational tie	Movement of mobilizing structures*	Major roles
No formal transnational ties	Local chapters of national SMOs (e.g., NOW)	Public education
	Neighborhood committees	Mobilizing participation in protest
	United for a Fair Economy	Localizing global frames
Diffuse transnational ties	Direct Action Network	Public education
	Reclaim the Streets	Mobilizing participation in protest
	Ruckus Society	Localizing global frames
	Coalition for Campus Organizing	Tactical innovations and diffusion
Routine transnational ties	Public Citizen	Public education
	Global Exchange	Facilitating local mobilization by others
	Rainforest Action Network	
	United Students Against Sweatshops	Tactical innovations and diffusion
	Council of Canadians Sierra Club	Articulating and disseminating global strategic frames
		Research/publication of organizing materials
		Facilitating transnational exchanges
		Monitoring international institutions
		Public education
Formal transnational ties	Greenpeace	Facilitating local mobilization by others
	Friends of the Earth	Articulating and disseminating global strategic frames
	International Forum on Globalization	
	Third World Network	Research/publication of organizing materials
	Peoples' Global Action	Monitoring of international institutions
	50 Years Is Enough Network	Coordinating transnational cooperation
	Women's Environment and Development Organization	Cultivating and maintaining global constituency
		Global symbolic actions

Source: From Smith (2005).
Note: The list of structures and divisions of labor in this table is illustrative, not comprehensive.
*Organizations vary a great deal in their levels of formalization and hierarchy. For instance, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have well-defined organizational structures and institutional presences while groups like Peoples' Global Action resist forming an organizational headquarters, and Reclaim the Streets seeks to sustain a loose, network-like structure relying heavily on electronic communications.

elections at times and places that do not conflict with voters' life and work routines are examples of pro-democracy policies. [...]

Many governments and economic elites do not have much direct interest in seeing broader public participation in the political life of society. In fact, they may see their interests as directly threatened by a more participatory system of governance. Thus, those actors with the most power tend to see their interests as preserving the status quo rather than the democratic ideals of contemporary political institutions. Herein lies the challenge for social movements and their pro-democracy alliance networks. Efforts to bring political education, discussion, and action into the places where people engage in their everyday routines of reproducing social life will expand the possibilities for people with fewer resources and less leisure time to be active participants in politics. Without such connections,

only those individuals with the most resources, free time, and skills can enjoy full rights of participation in political life. […]

Transnational Connections

Episodes of contention, such as the UN global conferences or the "battle of Seattle," have been important for generating new relationships and action by the transnational democratic globalization network. These episodes can also trigger the spread of new collective identities and relational forms. They help introduce activists from different countries who would otherwise never meet, and they challenge activists to conceptualize their concerns in broader terms. They also create spaces that encourage the formation of new interpersonal and inter-organizational relationships that can generate new transnational alliances. […]

As should be clear in this discussion, transnational connections among activists take a range of different forms, networks, campaigns, and organizations that reflect varying degrees of coordination and shared ways of thinking. Communication may be more or less frequent and more or less defined by explicit rules and procedures. Table 18.3 reproduces Jonathan Fox's

useful scheme for analyzing variation in the density and content of transnational ties.

Table 18.3 introduces three interconnected forms of transnational association: networks, coalitions, and formal trans-national organizations. At one end of the spectrum are networks, which involve the lowest density, fewest connections, and least commitment to transnational alliances. Networks themselves vary considerably in the extent to which they reflect a coherent and unified collection of actors. […]

Compared to networks, coalitions involve more routine communications, more clearly defined expectations and efforts at mutual support, and more explicit commitment to specific campaigns, such as the abolition of third world debt (as is the case of the coalition called Jubilee 2000). However, many of these tend to be defined around short-term goals, with few long-term commitments to *sustained* transnational cooperation. To minimize the need to engage in difficult discussions about collective decision making or otherwise to devote time to coordinate action and thinking, many coalitions tend to adopt very specific and limited objectives. They agree to promote only those specific aims as a collective, and they have varying levels of organization that can integrate coalition participants into decision making. The limited scope of coalitions makes

Table 18.3   Transnational networks, coalitions, and movements

Shared characteristics	Transnational networks	Transnational coalitions	Transnational movement organizations
Exchange of information and experiences	Yes	Yes	Yes
Organized social base	Sometimes more, sometimes less or none	Sometimes more, sometimes less or none	Yes
Mutual support	Sometimes, from afar and possibly strictly discursive	Yes	Yes
Joint actions and campaigns	Sometimes loose coordination	Yes, based on mutually agreed minimum goals, often short-term tactical	Yes, based on shared long-term strategy
Shared ideologies	Not necessarily	Not necessarily	Generally yes
Shared political cultures	Often not	Often not	Shared political values, styles and identities

Source: Fox (2002: 352).

it less necessary that the group have formal mechanisms for participation by members and for the resolution of conflicting interests within the coalition.

The most intense and integrated forms of transnational cooperation are formal transnational organizations, which reflect more frequent communication and cooperation across different political campaigns and a commitment to shared ideologies and cultures. A key difference here is that relations in transnational organizations are more explicitly or formally defined, meaning that structures for regular communication and cooperation are clearly established and actors can operate around shared sets of expectations and commitments. There are explicit guidelines for resolving disputes within the organization and most groups have mechanisms to incorporate input and participation from members. This helps generate trust among participants and helps sustain long-term transnational relationships that are needed to support multifaceted political actions that go beyond single-issue campaigns. Because behaviors are routinized within the organization, there is space for the emergence of a shared organizational culture marked by common political understandings, collective identities, and styles of communicating and engaging in political action.

As is true of most typologies, Table 18.3 may overstate the differences between networks, coalitions, and organizations. But the essence of these conceptual distinctions is that the extent to which transnational relations are routinized or defined as part of the regular practices of activists will affect the character of transnational alliances and their possibilities for generating collective action over the long term. Enduring and dense transnational alliances depend upon the cultivation of shared understandings of political realities and of mutual trust and respect. Not all transnational efforts seek or demand that quality of tie. For instance, some coalitions may simply come together to promote a particular aim, after which they find it most advantageous to return to their other priorities. In the short run, they may or may not generate more formalized transnational ties. However, they do generate interpersonal and inter-organizational connections that can, over the long term, stimulate future transnational networking, campaigning, or organizing efforts.

[…]

There is an uneasy relationship between social movements and formal organizations that surfaces frequently in social science analyses and in discussions among activists themselves. Key features of social movements are their fluidity, adaptability, and decentralization, while formal organizations require structure, stability, predictability, and some degree of centralization. Thus, activists face a constant tension between the need for more formalized and predictable decision-making processes and structures and the demand for flexibility and openness to participatory politics. More informal structures can also make movements more resistant to efforts by their adversaries to repress them. Although these conflicting demands for some level of formal organization and for flexibility are not unique to transnational movements, they seem especially daunting in struggles that bring together activists of widely varying cultural, political, and economic backgrounds to confront a complex and uncertain global political environment. An important response to this tension in the democratic globalization network is to encourage hybrid, network-like organizational structures that seek (with varying degrees of success) to allow coordination while maintaining decentralized and participatory relations within the organization (Chesters 2004).

Formal organizations provide predictability and stability needed for long-term campaigns, and they help secure steady flows of resources, ideas, and skills for movements. They also provide opportunities for organizers to make a living by doing the work of the movement, thereby supporting and cultivating personnel who help with mobilizing and supporting popular participation in movements as well as with the more detail-oriented tasks of monitoring political developments and "translating" international legal documents for the activist community. They also have been at the heart of heated debates among activists, some of whom decry the influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—a catch-all term used in the UN to include all civil society groups, including those created by business interests as well as the vast majority of organizations doing work outside the realm of political advocacy—in trans-national movements. Some critics see these groups as preferring reformist to

more transformative goals, reflecting the interests of more privileged activists, as largely based in the global North, and as placing the needs of organizational maintenance over the promotion of the movement's aims.

In the following section I summarize the broad outlines of what we might call the "organizational fraction" of the democratic globalization network, or the population of more-or-less formally organized trans-national social movement organizations (TSMOs). While some may see a fundamental incompatibility between organization and movement, most people with experience in activism recognize that movements need to adopt some structure to allow for predictable and regular communication and joint decision making. They must do so even as they resist organizational forms that promote hierarchy and reduce flexibility and spontaneity. Movements are made up of networks of formal organizations, individuals, and many informal associations and alliances that interact in a variety of ways. As Table 18.2 shows, formal transnational organizations play a particular role in a global division of labor within the network. Understanding this subset of network actors can help us better understand the makeup and capacities of the broader collection of actors.

The Transnational Social Movement Sector

Using data from the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, I have mapped the population of TMSOs working to promote social change. This will help us assess how social movement actors have responded to broad global political and economic changes and to assess some of the strengths and weaknesses of transnational movements. While these organizations often rely on the popular mobilizing potential of both formal and informal associations working at local and national levels, they help activists relate global forces to local conditions, and they help broker connections between local actors and transnational settings.

The predominant trend in this analysis is that we see rapid and dramatic growth in the population of TSMOs. Figure 18.1 charts this growth, from just around a hundred groups in the early

1950s to over a thousand by 2003. The most rapid growth occurred during the decade of the 1980s, probably in response to new openings created by the ending of the Cold War and the renewed hopes for multilateral problem solving this generated, hopes that helped launch a series of global conferences on issues ranging from the environment to development to human rights. Figure 18.1 shows that the last few decades of the twentieth century were marked by the expansion of an organizational infrastructure for trans-national social change activism. This growth appears to mirror that of other forms of transnational association, and may both support and respond to expansions in the numbers and intensity of intergovernmental organizations.

What issues have generated this kind of transnational organizational response? Certainly we would not expect people to organize transnationally around all possible issues, but we do anticipate that they would organize around problems that require international responses for their solution. The top issues attracting the attention of transnational social movement organizations were human rights, the environment, women's rights, peace, and economic justice. Table 18.4 displays these changes.

Throughout the late twentieth century, roughly a third of all TSMOs focused on human rights. About 10 percent focused on peace and another 10 percent addressed women's rights issues. Environmental issues attracted growing attention from TSMOs, with the percentage of groups rising from just 2 percent in the early 1960s (before the first major global environmental conference) to nearly 20 percent of all TSMOs in 2003. Economic justice also attracted growing support, rising from 3 percent to 11 percent of all TSMOs between the 1960s and 2000. Finally, groups adopting complex, multi-issue frames—often ones explicitly advocating for international law and multilateralism—expanded from around 17 percent of all groups in the 1960s to 28 percent in 2000.

Reviewing the TSMO population in the latter part of the twentieth century, we notice two important and consistent trends. First, there is a shift toward more decentralized organizational structures. Second, TSMOs are expanding their networks of ties to other groups in their environment, including both international nongovernmental

Figure 18.1   Growth of transnational social movement organizations
Source: Yearbook of International Organizations.

Table 18.4   Issue focus of TSMOs, 1963, 1983, 2003: Percentage of all groups with primary focus on issue

	1963 Total No. TSMOs = 179	1983 Total No. TSMOs = 429	2003 Total No. TSMOs = 1031
Human rights	34%	32%	33%
Environment	2	8	18
Peace	27	18	16
Women's rights	11	8	10
Development	4	5	8
Global economic justice	3	5	11
Multi-issue	18	18	28

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations.
Notes: These figures exclude labor unions. Figures do not total 100% because categories are not mutually exclusive (e.g., groups working on "human rights and peace" or "women and development" are counted in each of those issue categories as well as the multi-issue category).

and governmental organizations. Table 18.5 summarizes the data on these trends.

In the earliest decades of this study, TSMOs tended to adopt what I have called the "federated organizational structure." This structure has an international secretariat that retains the authority to grant or withhold affiliates' rights to use the organization's name, and that otherwise regulates the activities of member groups, which tend to be organized into national sections. Amnesty International is a prominent example of this more centralized structure. While this sort of federated structure might have proved effective in earlier times, technological change has reduced the need for such centralized and hierarchical structures. To sustain the voluntary participation of members, activist groups needed to find ways to satisfy a desire for more local autonomy. Moreover, a changing political environment demands new ideas and flexible responses, and

Table 18.5   Changes in TSMO network ties, 1973–2003

	1973	1983	1993	2003
Number of TSMOs	236	429	735	1031
Ratio coalition/federation structure	.62	.93	1.38	1.82
% TSMO headquarters in global South	11%	18%	24%	23%
% with UN consultative status	56%	49%	38%	42%
Average # NGO ties (st. dev.)	1.00	1.62	4.26	3.54
	(1.36)	(2.69)	(5.06)	(4.53)
Average # IGO ties (st. dev.)	1.43	1.42	2.19	2.30
	(1.81)	(1.97)	(3.32)	(3.07)

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations.
Notes: Counts exclude labor organizations. The reported average numbers of ties to IGOs and NGOs have been calculated using a maximum value of 10 for IGOs and 20 for NGOs, since a very small percentage of groups report unusually large numbers of contacts.

more decentralized structures better accommodate such needs. Not surprisingly, we find an almost directly parallel rise in the percentages of TSMOs adopting a more decentralized, coalitional structure alongside a precipitous decline in the percentage of groups maintaining more centralized, federated structures. Whereas about half of all TSMOs were coalitions in the 1970s, by the 2000s, there were twice as many coalitions as federations in the population of TSMOs. A related pattern of decentralization is reflected in the fact that, starting in the 1980s, we find more TSMOs forming *within* either the region of the global North or South than was true in the past, when most groups crossed this regional divide. […]

The second pattern we find in this analysis is a distinct tendency for TSMOs to be active networkers, forming ties to both nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations as they pursue their social change activities. The average number of ties transnational social change groups reported to other organizations increased during the past two decades. Whereas in the early 1980s TSMOs reported an average of fewer than two ties either to other inter-national NGOs or to intergovernmental organizations, by 2000 these organizations reported an average of 2.3 ties to intergovernmental bodies and about 3.5 ties to other international NGOs. These figures, moreover, do not reflect what are likely to be substantial increases in ties to national and local organizations.

In sum, the evidence available here shows a distinctive shift in the late twentieth century toward higher levels of transnational association

by citizens advocating social and political change. Over time, the organizational structures of TSMOs have become both more decentralized and more densely connected to other organizations in the political environment. This evidence supports my contention that the network concept is useful for analyzing the collections of actors involved in social change efforts. Below I explore the implications of the trends discussed in this chapter for our understandings of how transnational networks for global democracy operate in the contemporary global system.

Toward a "New Global Politics"?

The discussion thus far has demonstrated relationships between social movements, organizations, and broader institutions and processes. Social movements, while attempting to alter relations of power, are shaped in important ways by the political and economic institutions that reflect and seek to preserve existing power relations. At the same time, social movements are seeking to bring new actors and claims into the political arena in order to generate changes in those institutional rules and relationships. Over time, they help democratize these spaces by bringing new actors and issues to political agendas and by helping to give political voice to groups that are excluded by existing institutional arrangements.

Social movement actors have adopted the technologies used by states and private-sector actors and applied these technologies in new ways as they sought to mobilize new groups of people.

[…] Few activists in recent (and not-so-recent) protests would deny the importance of new information technologies to their work. Over the last decade especially, these technologies have dramatically transformed possibilities for transnational political organization and action in an increasingly global polity. Moreover, innovations in the subversive use of technologies are being met with new challenges as political and corporate elites seek to control and to better exploit their commercial potential.

Transnational social movement networks have clearly become more decentralized and more closely connected with the everyday routines of greater numbers of people. Local and national groups can more readily relate to transnational organizations and campaigns and can participate more directly in transnational political processes than they could in the past. Advances in information technologies as well as the professionalization and global integration of the global workforce have facilitated this decentralization (Smith and Fetner 2007). While the former process facilitates rapid and extensive information flows, the latter facilitates the ready interpretation and mobilization of information by diverse groups working at local levels. These changes have led growing numbers of activists to speak of a new global politics that is more participatory and innovative than that of earlier decades. […]

Because social movements are most clearly engaged in information politics and communication-based political work, scholars have emphasized the importance of informal and fluid networks of actors to global social change processes. Our notion emphasizes a complex multilateralism, global politics as increasingly made up of interactive networks of state, non-state, and intergovernmental actors. By facilitating communication and translation across different political spaces and levels of action, transnational networks help relate the practices and ideas in local contexts to global-level institutions and processes.

[…]

Table 18.6 shows several important shifts in transnational activism. First, the scope of transnational activism has expanded, including growing numbers of actors from the global South. Economic disadvantages and higher levels of political repression in the South are no longer preventing people in those countries from cultivating transnational activist networks that aim to remedy the problems they face. A second change is in the structure of transnational organizations, which has become less centralized and more connected to local and national activist networks. Third, the scale of transnational action has changed as well, moving from global to more locally oriented sites. In other words, transnational organizing efforts are becoming more connected to the daily routines of larger numbers of people. Fourth, strategies have shifted from a focus on global institutions in the earliest generation of activism toward the cultivation of issue-based campaigns led by key organizations to more permanent and Internet-based forms of mobilization with more decentralized leadership and individualized identities. […]

A final conclusion from Table 18.6 is that the capacities of transnational collections of activists have changed from more limited, elite-level lobbying toward increasingly mass-based political action. This has fundamentally altered the organizational demands of transnational movements, and more established organizations like Greenpeace are finding that they risk being "outflanked" by new movement actors, and they have adopted new strategies to respond to these developments (Chesters 2004). Chesters argues that the kinds of shifts documented here signal a need for analysts to adopt an approach that focuses less on specific organizations and more on the *processes* and *relations* among diverse actors. While some of these may indeed be captured within our more traditional understandings of organizations, many may be taking on new forms. The increasingly common reference to the idea of a "new politics" by trans-national activists suggests that many are noticing important changes in the character of global political organization and action.

[…]

Conclusion

This chapter presents evidence of the social infrastructure for an evolving democratic globalization network that is expanding possibilities for people to act collectively beyond their immediate local and national settings. We see

Table 18.6 Changing structures and "generations" of transnational activism

Generation	(1) Multilateralist	(2) Transitional advocacy networks	(3) Direct action
Timeframe	Pre-1980	Late 1980s–1990s: UN Conference era	Late 1990s: Seattle/ post-Seattle era
Geographic scope	Mostly Northern	Mostly Northern— growing participation from South	Rapidly growing Southern participation
Organizational structure	Small networks, strong role for individual leaders, transnational organizations central	NGO-centered issue networks, transnational organizations central but more national groups	More informal and polycentric; multi-issue/ multi-sectors; more national and sub-national organizations in addition to transnational
Scale of action	Mostly in global forums—limited mass mobilizing efforts	Mostly in global forums or focused on UN conferences or summits	More autonomous from inter-governmental agenda Connecting local problems/actions to global conditions— domestication of issues
Major strategies	Elite lobbying Formal lobbying	*Strategic campaigns:* Limited political goals Turned on and off by lead organizations Maintained organizational identities	*Permanent campaigns:* Diverse political goals Decentralized control and leadership Organizational and tactical innovation Foster movement identities
Capacity		Problem- and campaign-focused networking, some popular mobilization	Mass protest, value change Technological adaptations/innovation

Source: Adapted from Bennett (2005: 214).

Note: Activities to shape cultural and social spaces are common to all three "generations," and to most social movement activism generally, but they are more pronounced in the latest period.

some significant trends that are likely to generate more participation in the democratic globalization network over time, as expanding global institutions and interdependence strengthen demands for transnational cooperation. First, trans-national social movement organizations have expanded in recent decades, adopting more decentralized organizational structures. They also increasingly cultivate more ties to both non-governmental and intergovernmental actors. Information technologies have allowed more local and national groups to connect to transnational networks, limiting the need for formally structured trans-national movement organizations.

These trends help explain the expanding representation of people from outside the global North. We also find that more leadership and innovation in transnational campaigns has been coming from national and local levels of action rather than from trans-national sites, and at the same time we have seen more mass mobilizations around global issues. This decentralized, network pattern, moreover, mirrors a trend in governmental and corporate sectors, which have also seen a trend toward decentralization in the face of globalization forces. […]

The expansion of a more formally organized and more densely networked global civil society

might contribute to the democratization of the global political system. First, it helps increase flows of information between global and local contexts, thereby enhancing public awareness and debate on global problems and policies. Second, by helping empower groups that are marginalized by formal political processes and by structuring opportunities for them to participate in global politics, it increases the openness and representativeness of international institutions. Third, by expanding capacities for rapid transnational communication and public participation, it can enhance the transparency and accountability of governments to both their citizens and to other governments. Fourth, by cultivating transnational identities and shared organizational bonds, it can generate global notions of fairness that become a yardstick against which various proposals and policies can be evaluated. And finally, by providing for the sustained public attention to global problems, transnational organizations and networks can increase the effectiveness of global institutions through ongoing efforts to monitor and to mobilize pressure for compliance with international agreements.

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19

Meeting Arenas

Christoph Haug

A movement consists of diversified and autonomous units.… A communication and exchange network keeps the separate, quasiautonomous cells in contact with each other. Information, individuals, and patterns of behaviour circulate through this network, passing from one unit to another, and bringing a degree of homogeneity to the whole. Leadership is not concentrated but diffuse, and it restricts itself to specific goals. Different individuals may, on occasion, become leaders with specific functions to perform. This structure … makes it extremely difficult to actually specify the collective actor. Contemporary movements resemble an amorphous nebula of indistinct shape and with variable density.

Melucci (1996, pp. 113–14)

Introduction

In recent years, social movement scholars have shown increasing interest in the internal lives of social movements and what we might call the "backstage" of protest. They investigated questions of internal democracy and democratic practices (della Porta, 2009b; Graeber, 2009; Leach, 2009; Maeckelbergh, 2009; Polletta, 2002), consensus decision-making (Haug, 2011; della Porta, 2009a), deliberation (della Porta, 2005), multi-lingual communication and translation (Doerr, 2009), the role of online and offline communication (Kavada, 2010), various dimensions of social movement culture (Hart, 2001; Summers-Effler, 2010), the interactive formation of collective identity (Flesher Fominaya, 2010), practices of network organizing (Juris, 2008, 2012; Maiba, 2005), tensions between different approaches to political practice (Flesher Fominaya, 2007, 2014; Pleyers, 2010) and the related politics of organization (Böhm, Sullivan, & Reyes, 2005), the role of everyday routines (Glass, 2010), social movement scenes (Haunss & Leach, 2007), and the creation of public spheres within movements (Doerr, 2010; Haug, 2010b). Rather than studying the "frontstage" of protest where

Table 19.1 (Relatively) neglected dimensions in the study of social movements

	Broader phenomenon in social movement research	Commonly discussed dimension	Neglected dimension
A	social movement	collective actor	collective space
B	protest	frontstage	backstage
C	social change	macro/political system	meso/cultural
D	communication	mediated	face-to-face
E	social movement infrastructure	personal networks and SMOs	meeting arenas
F	mobilization	micromobilization	mesomobilization
G	framing	cognition	social interaction
H	face-to-face interaction	group	meeting
I	meeting	event	arena
J	organization	hierarchy	decision
K	leadership	charismatic	organizer
L	"anchors" in fieldwork	individuals and organizations	meetings
M	activism	mobilizing	organizing

social movements appear to the general public as more or less homogenous actors with a given goal and strategy, these studies attend to social movements as action *contexts* or collective *spaces* in which activists find themselves and which they aim to shape and organize according to their needs and visions. The concept of activism is thus extended from mobilizing actors to organizing spaces. The aim of this article is to theorize the previously neglected dimension of social movements that is emerging in this new body of literature. Table 19.1 summarizes what I mean by this (relatively) neglected dimension by juxtaposing it with the more commonly discussed aspects of social movements.

The turn from "social movements as actors" to "social movements as spaces" not only reflects the importance that contemporary activists have attributed to the internal structure and decision-making processes of their movements; it also reflects a growing recognition among researchers of the cultural dimension of social movements and social change (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004) (Table 19.1, C). In particular, a younger generation of scholars is looking for conceptual tools to grasp movements as (sub)cultural spaces in which the incitement of protest may only play a secondary role (Baumgarten, Daphi, & Ullrich, 2014).

Although a whole strand of social movement research known as the framing approach (Snow, 2004) has paid much attention to the role of communication, the focus has to a large extent been on mediated communication. In contrast, an emergent topic in the above diverse set of studies is the importance of face-to-face meetings and assemblies in activist life (Table 19.1, D). And indeed: who would deny the trivial fact that activists spend more time in meetings than in the street? Similar to Mintzberg's managers (1973) who spent 69 percent of their working time in meetings, "social movement entrepreneurs" use meetings to mobilize constituencies and to form alliances. In fact, even less-engaged activists probably spend most of their activist time in meetings. "Movements begin when people get together to think out loud about the kind of city they might help to create. One person said, 'Freedom is an endless meeting'" (an SDS paper quoted in Miller, 2004 [1987], p. 399). However, in contrast to management studies, where meetings have increasingly become a category of research (Asmuß & Svennevig, 2009; Bargiela-Chiappini & Harris, 1997; Boden, 1994; Cooren, 2007; Dittrich, Guérard, & Seidl, 2011; Hendry & Seidl, 2003; Schwartzman, 1989), no similar focus on meetings has yet been developed in social movement studies.

Free Spaces

There is, however, a body of social movement literature that has considered "free spaces" as a resource for the mobilization of oppositional identities (Polletta, 1999). An activist meeting can be a "free space" in relation to certain dominant structures of society, but in other respects it may well constitute a dominated space, as when

Evans and Boyte (1986, p. 102) identify the "margins of big meetings" in the American civil rights movement as a "specifically female social space" that allows women to develop alternatives to the male dominated "main" meeting. The analytic strength of the free space concept is hence to identify spaces in society that are free from control and surveillance by dominant powers and which therefore provide fertile grounds for social movements to thrive or to hibernate in times of abeyance. Free spaces are not necessarily constructed by the movement itself. In contrast, they "are often associated with the most traditional institutions: the church in Southern black communities; the family in Algeria and Kuwait; nineteenth-century French peasant communities" (Polletta, 1999, p. 5), but also schools, political parties, the American Friends Service Committee, or other established institutions (Polletta, 1999, p. 9). And Kellogg (2009, p. 686) identifies the "afternoon round" in a hospital as a free space that was critical for successfully challenging dominant work practices. What makes free spaces such a crucial resource for social movements as well as organizational change is that they facilitate meetings and other kinds of face-to-face encounters that provide the kinds of associational ties that foster the "capacity to identify opportunities, supply leaders, recruit participants, craft mobilizing action frames, and fashion new identities, tasks essential to sustained mobilization" (Polletta, 1999, p. 8).

The essential role of meetings in mobilizations is hardly surprising, given the "nebulous" structure of social movements, to use Melucci's term quoted above. In contrast to the formal organizations, the relationships among activists are not pre-defined by formalized rules and roles, and even their goal may be unclear and contested. Under these circumstances, meetings are the natural way to establish and stabilize social relations and to create a social order that facilitates collective action and fosters social change.

In fact, organizational research has found even formal organizations in constant need of meetings to stabilize and reproduce themselves (e.g., Boden, 1994; Schwartzman, 1989), rendering their formal structure little more than a "myth and ceremony" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). But while the need for meetings in formal organizations might be dismissed by some as failure of formal structures and workflows (Schwartzman, 1989, p. 52), a proliferation of social movement

meetings, in contrast, indicates the success of the movement (in the sense that participation is thriving). This is so because a social movement involves, by definition, "a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations" (Diani, 1992, p. 13), i.e., interaction *across* organizational boundaries, which means that they cannot easily be replaced by formal organizational structures.

One could, of course, contend that these interactions may be achieved by other means than face-to-face meetings. This is certainly true for certain periods and under certain conditions, but empirical evidence suggests that due to the crucial role of trust in social movements they cannot survive without face-to-face meetings (I discuss these studies in the final section of this paper). So when social movement research focuses on social movement organizations (SMOs) (and interpersonal networks) as the key mobilizing infrastructure, it neglects what I call meeting arenas as the place where these organizations and networks are (re-)produced (Table 19.1, E).

Mesomobilization

The current lack of conceptual tools to grasp the role of meeting arenas as a social movement infrastructure becomes apparent, when we consider the distinction between micromobilization and mesomobilization introduced by Gerhards and Rucht (1992): micromobilization is about mobilizing individuals, while mesomobilization is directed at groups and organizations. Activities at the level of mesomobilization fulfil two functions:

> First, they provide a *structural integration* by connecting groups with each other, collecting resources, preparing protest activities, and doing public relations. Second, they aim at a *cultural integration* of the various groups and networks in developing a common frame of meaning. (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992, pp. 558–9; original emphasis)

The clarification of the different functionality of these two levels of mobilization that Gerhards and Rucht provide constitutes an important step in the study of social movement infrastructure. By making it clear that mobilization is not just about mobilizing individuals to change their mind and join the right group or organization, but also

about forging solidarity *between* these diverse collectivities, the concept of mesomobilization takes the researcher's gaze away from SMOs, where it has lingered all too long, and directs it towards the *inter*-organizational domain (Table 19.1, F).

However, even though these authors move beyond organizations and micromobilization, their conceptualization of the meso level is still bound to an *actor*-centered view. It is striking that although they registered 475 preparatory meetings and similar activities (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992, p. 561), their study is not about meetings but about mesomobilization actors ("committees," "task forces," "preparatory teams"). And although it is evident that these actors must have had some lively discussions before they arrived at the joint statement signed by more than 100 groups, we learn nothing about these interactions. As so often in framing research, the authors merely reconstruct the negotiations as a *cognitive* process in which the diverse frames used by the supporting groups are distilled into the more general masterframes directed against "imperialism" and "hegemonic power" (Table 19.1, G). To flag the importance of social interaction in such framing processes I therefore introduce the term *mesomobilization meeting* to refer to a meeting whose purpose is to assess the mesomobilization potential and coordinate the activities of micromobilization actors. It is this type of meeting that ought to be at the center of analysis of a social movement *as a movement*, i.e., for an analysis at the movement level. Otherwise social movement research risks either being taken in by conceptions of the movement as a mere black box or an aggregate of black boxes or ending up studying a single group or SMO as representative of the movement as a whole.

As I will argue in more detail below, this implies a shift from the common conceptualization of face-to-face interaction as group interaction to interaction in meetings whose participants may not share a stable group identity (Table 19.1, H). Larger mesomobilization meetings are often preceded by a series of (smaller) preparatory meetings (Haug, Haeringer, & Mosca, 2009) and, in that sense, the infrastructure of a mobilization consists of meetings and sub-meetings preparing larger meetings preparing protest events. With different, sometimes competing, mesomobilization meetings oriented towards the same protest, this apparently linear infrastructure becomes a complex figuration of meetings and sub-meetings that researchers and activists find when they enter the "nebulous" reality of a social movement. Mapping this infrastructure can be a first step towards understanding a movement's scope and its internal dynamics and cleavages.

But does it make sense to conceive of meetings as an infrastructure? Are meetings not too transient to pass for "structure"? This brings us to the main argument of this paper. In the next section, I will examine the ambiguous character of meetings as event *and* structure, and as actor *and* space, and I will introduce the concept of meeting arena to refer to the structural and spatial side of the meeting (Table 19.1, I). I will then show how figurations of meeting arenas constitute an important infrastructure for social movements. In the subsequent section, I then examine more closely how meeting arenas produce the social order of a movement. Drawing on Ahrne and Brunsson's (2011) distinction between (partial) organization, institution, and network, I distinguish three types of social order that are under constant tension with each other and whose relative importance is negotiated in meetings. One important aspect of this discussion is that it moves us beyond the common view that organization implies hierarchy by seeing it as based on decision instead (Table 19.1, J). […]

Meeting Arenas as Social Movement Infrastructure

To avoid confusion with various common notions of "meeting", it seems advisable to start with a definition: a meeting can be defined as an episodic gathering of three or more co-present participants who maintain a "single focus of cognitive and visual attention" (Goffman, 1963, p. 89) while engaging in multi-party talk that is ostensibly related to some common business of the participants (see also Boden, 1994, pp. 90–9, 102–6; Schwartzman, 1989, pp. 7, 61, 274–5). The meeting has clearly marked boundaries in time and space and these boundaries partially suspend the social structures of its environment, creating a relatively autonomous unit of social life (Hendry & Seidl, 2003, p. 183; see also Giddens, 1984, p. 73). A meeting constitutes a public situation in the sense that the communication between two participants is subject to monitoring by a third, which hence distinguishes

it from private communication in networks (Haug, 2010b; Strydom, 1999).

According to this definition, meetings are distinct from other forms of interactions such as lectures (single-party talk), a chat at the checkout (no common business), an informal business conversation on the plane (no clear beginning and end), or a dinner with friends (multiple foci of attention possible). Larger meetings that allow for more "side involvements" (Goffman, 1963, p. 43) among participants without threatening the single common focus of the ongoing meeting are commonly called *assemblies*; and a *conference* is a set of meetings held in spatio-temporal proximity to each other.

Activity and Structure: Meeting Event and Meeting Arena

Meetings can be seen as both a structure and an activity; they are vivid illustration of what Giddens (1984, p. 25) called the "duality of structure." A meeting is the result of the participants' interactions, while it simultaneously structures these interactions. Put differently: for each participating actor, the meeting appears as an action space which constrains their agency in various ways; but at the same time, this structure is also produced and reproduced by these same actors.

In order to flag the dual character of meetings, I distinguish between the *meeting event* as the actual interactions of the participants on the one side and the *meeting arena* as structure or setting in which the meeting activity takes place. In this paper, I focus on the structural side, the meeting arena. In Giddens' terms: I engage in "institutional analysis" (Giddens, 1984, p. 288), leaving aside the systematic analysis of activities that produce, reproduce, and transform this infrastructure (for a more interactional perspective see Haug, 2011, 2012). Nevertheless, I will use the term "meeting arena" only when referring exclusively to the structural side of meetings, while using "meeting(s)" in all other cases where the distinction is not essential.

Spaces and Actors: Meeting Arenas and Groups

But why use the concept of arena to grasp the structural side of the meeting? Doesn't the group concept provide an adequate tool? Both the meeting arena and the group constitute a social structure that persists over time, and meetings are "a conditio sine qua non for the survival of groups" (Neidhardt, 1994, p. 140; my translation). But while a group is constituted through relatively permanent relations among its members (Neidhardt, 1994, p. 137) even when they are not assembled, an arena does not have permanent members.

A meeting arena is a socio-political setting which evokes expectations regarding appropriate conduct, the existence of certain roles, the definition of the situation and other aspects of the interaction order that potential participants can expect to find during a meeting event in a particular arena (e.g., an organization's staff meeting or the preparatory meeting for the anti-G8 protests). Typically, these expectations include an idea of the purpose of the meeting, its duration, the range of topics to be discussed, the types of participants, the rules of conduct, and the arena's relation to other arenas. Depending on the characteristics of the meeting arena, these expectations may *also* include a specific meeting place, seating arrangement or particular objects that are going to be part of the arena (e.g., a whiteboard or a microphone). But the participants do not simply "find" an arena, they construct it interactively. And the participants' expectations are not static but are continuously negotiated and adjusted to the situation in which they find themselves throughout the meeting.

It is true that groups are sometimes also understood as such a setting, and in some cases it may indeed be pointless to distinguish between the group and the arena in which it meets, but most groups have several arenas with different rules of conduct, legitimate topics, etc. Differently said: a group can have different types of meetings in which different aspects of the group's culture and identity come to bear. Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003, p. 737) are certainly right to identify a "group style" that characterizes a group across its different arenas. But just as their concept of group style sensitizes us to the variety of translations of a society's collective representations such as "the culture of individualism," the concept of meeting arena allows us to understand the variety of behavioral patterns *within* the same group in different settings.

But the concept of arena does not just allow us to "zoom in" and make further differentiations within a certain group. The main strength of the concept lies in its capacity to "zoom out" and theorize the collaboration *between* different groups and organizations. During my own research on

decision-making in social movement meetings (Haug, 2010a), I found it increasingly inaccurate to conceptualize these inter-organizational meetings as groups, not only because fluctuation between meetings was often high but also because participants in many cases did not perceive these meetings as the meetings of a designated group but as open meetings of different groups and individuals. Organizers of these meeting arenas often emphasized that they started convening these meetings in order to "establish a space" where the activities of various actors could be coordinated and where experiences could be shared. They are organizing spaces; and what's more, these spaces are themselves often spaces for organizing other spaces. It is not uncommon to have a preparatory meeting for the preparatory meeting for the meeting to prepare a big assembly, conference, or rally. In other words: meetings are organizing spaces in the double sense of the term.

As mentioned earlier, these organizing processes lead to complex figurations of meeting arenas that constitute a social movement infrastructure. I will now explain why it is important to acquire an overview of this figuration when studying a movement or a particular segment of it.

Figurations of Meeting Arenas

Schwartzman (1989, pp. 216ff) suggests that, rather than drawing organizational charts focused on individuals and their formal positions, we can learn more about an organization by mapping the meeting arenas of that organization. In the alternative healthcare center that she studied, "power … did not flow as much from individuals, or from individual offices, as it did from particular meeting contexts or groups." I suggest that it may be similarly instructive to map the complex figurations of meeting arenas of a movement or a particular mobilization to help us understand the role of each arena in a larger context. In fact, what gives social movement brokers influence is precisely this kind of contextual knowledge and overview. But also the "ordinary" participants of a meeting need a basic understanding of the relative position of the meeting arena in a larger context in order to make sense of the discussion and to be able to make meaningful contributions.

The meaning of an arena is defined by its relations to other arenas in its environment, i.e., in its position within a wider network of meeting arenas. Some of these relations are pretty straightforward. For example, a working group meeting is first and foremost defined through its relation to the meeting that initiated it (often referred to as a "plenary" or "main assembly") and to which it is expected to report back. Others are more difficult to grasp and are often contested. For example, in the mobilizing process for the G8 summit protests around Heiligendamm, Germany, in 2007, various sovereign mesomobilization arenas existed side by side, each attracting their clientele and coordinating specific activities. Most of these streams of preparations (i.e., multiple series of preparatory meetings) were not isolated from each other, they observed each other and even converged at regular "top-level meetings" as well as a number of action conferences during which a common "choreography of resistance" was negotiated. Similarly, various authors have written about the contested preparatory process for the European Social Forum in London in 2004 (e.g., Doerr, 2010; Dowling, 2005; Kavada, 2010; Maeckelbergh, 2009). These conflicts between the so-called "verticals" and "horizontals" were clearly conflicts between different organizing logics—especially logics of organizing meetings.

Meetings are, therefore, the site where actors negotiate not only their individual positions (and that of their organization) in a larger field of action but also the relative positions and legitimacy of the various meeting arenas in the field. "How do we relate to a breakaway meeting of a certain faction of the movement?", "Should we allow right-wing activists to participate in our meeting?", "Who shall convene the next meeting?" The answers to these questions are not usually re-negotiated at every meeting but become sedimented in the definition of the arena.

But meeting arenas are not only passively defined by their context, they can also be in a position to actively define some rules that govern a larger field, prescribing, for example, the use of nonviolent forms of protest. In that sense, meeting arenas constitute what Fligstein and McAdam (2011, p. 5) call "governance units" of "strategic action fields."

Another type of interrelation between meeting arenas is exemplified in a diverse series of mobilizations in 2011, all of which had in common the act of occupying squares and holding popular

assemblies there: the popular uprising in Egypt (Tahrir Square, Cairo), the *Indignados* in Spain (Puerta del Sol, Madrid; Plaça de Catalunya, Barcelona), the occupation of Syntagma Square in Athens, and the Occupy Wallstreet movement (Zuccotti Park, New York) which sparked similar occupations and rallies in hundreds of cities worldwide. The meeting arenas created in these public squares resemble and inspire each other. Holding a meeting under the label of #*Occupy < city name >* inevitably defines the arena in relation to the corresponding arenas around the world and creates expectations regarding meeting practices such as the use of the "human microphone."

The mapping of a meeting arena therefore has two sides: identifying the characteristics of the singular arena (meeting frequency, types and number of participants, organizers, typical topics, catchment area, meeting style, etc.) and identifying its relationships with other arenas in the same field of action, i.e., the figuration of arenas in the field. Meeting arenas can be mapped along many dimensions, perhaps the most important being time and space (when and where meetings take place), but one could also, for example, imagine an emotional map, a map of ideologies, cultures, discourses, or power. The location of a meeting arena on the map and its internal characteristics then reveals a description of the social order that characterizes this particular arena.

[…]

Organization: Meetings as Planned Events

Through the lens of organization, the meeting appears as a planned event. A plan is necessary because the coming together of multiple participants implies an almost infinite number of contingencies which constitute risks for achieving the goal of the meeting. For example, participants may not agree on the topics that need to be discussed, how they should be discussed, in what order, and what needs to be decided, or how decisions should be made. Participants may not trust each other or rivals may engage in infighting, jeopardizing the goal of the meeting.

The logic of organization attempts to address these risks through formalization, i.e., by deciding various aspects of the meeting. These decisions "are statements representing conscious choices about the way people should act or the distinction[s] and classifications they should make" (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011, p. 85). Ahrne and Brunsson's concept of partial organization helps us to observe different degrees and various qualities of organization, depending on how many and which elements of organization are present in a particular meeting: membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctions.

Membership. A meeting arena may be open for anyone to attend—which means that it does not distinguish between members and non-members—or it may be reserved to a specific group of people (members). Perhaps some guests are allowed with reduced participation rights. In order for an arena to be organized in terms of membership, these decisions about exclusion and inclusion need to be consciously and explicitly made. Given the aim of social movements to maximize participation, decisions about membership are rare. In fact, the act of asking for permission to participate may stigmatize you more as an outsider than not asking in the first place. Inclusion and exclusion in activist meetings tend to be informally regulated through style, sub-cultural codes, and shared knowledge, but some explicit decisions may be made based on certain unacceptable (sexist, racist, etc.) behavior or membership in organizations of the "enemy" (fascist groups, (secret) police, etc.).

Hierarchy. Social movements are known more for their informal hierarchies, but formal hierarchies do exist and the place to find them is in meetings. A formal hierarchy centralizes the right to make certain binding decisions and the source of this hierarchy is itself a decision—"the decision about who shall decide" (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011, p. 86). Meetings introduce decided hierarchy into social movement networks in two ways: first, by assigning certain roles that give participants privileges or authority during the meeting, such as the role as chair or facilitator, the minute taker, the expert, or the rapporteur; and second, by creating auxiliary arenas for certain tasks (e.g., working group meetings) which are subordinate to the main, sovereign arena and thus have to report back.

Rules. Even in formal organizations, meetings are often held in an informal way in order not to jeopardize the friendly atmosphere. You cannot ask a friend to be formal with you: "To demand or

initiate formal communication is a way to avoid tests of trust and to achieve more certainty—often at the expense of the network, which is thereby de facto rendered superfluous" (Luhmann, 2006 [2000], p. 23; my translation). Nevertheless, meetings still seem to be the most rule-prone entities at the movement level. Time and place of meetings need to be decided, their frequency, their purpose, their agenda. In order to facilitate equal participation, it is sometimes decided that the maximum speaking time per speaker is limited to 3 minutes, or that every second speaker should be a woman, or that participants who have not yet spoken may skip the queue (Haug, 2012).

While many such rules are short term or ad hoc, there may also be more durable rules governing not just one or a few but all meetings in a particular arena. Such rules are commonly referred to as by-laws or statutes. In social movements, such rules are rarely drawn up specifically for a particular meeting arena but they exist as standards (see Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011, p. 87) in the form of procedural handbooks such as *Robert's Rules of Order* for "deliberative assemblies," first published in 1876 and widely used in all sectors of society in the United States. Not surprisingly, activists try to establish their own (emancipatory) standards (e.g., Gelderloos, 2006; Haverkamp et al. 2004 [1995]), but many times, meeting participants shy away from deciding on formal rules and still manage to hold meetings reasonably well (Haug & Rucht, 2013), while in other cases participants cannot overcome fundamental disagreements about the meaning of consensus (see, e.g., Maeckelbergh, 2009, pp. 77–9) for a vivid example). Yet others, especially radical activists with an anarchist background, routinely decide on formal rules and use them to organize in an egalitarian manner (Graeber, 2009, pp. 287–356; Haug, 2012; Juris, 2008, pp. 199–231).

Monitoring. The democratic equivalent to top-down monitoring is transparency. And as we have seen above, mutual monitoring is part of what characterizes meetings as a social form. The decision to meet is simultaneously a decision to monitor. One of the main functions of mesomobilization meetings is to exchange information about what is going on in different parts of the movement, but also to follow up on issues that have been discussed in previous sessions, to check if tasks have been fulfilled and how. Many meetings are set up exclusively for the purpose of sharing experiences and general discussion.

We can distinguish a number of deliberately decided monitoring mechanisms: first, *evaluation meetings* are set up after protest events or conferences with the explicit aim to jointly monitor and assess what has been achieved and what mistakes were made. Second, *reports* from working groups or leaders often take up significant amounts of time in meetings. This allows participants to monitor those parts of the organizing process in which they do not directly participate. Third, a meeting can be monitored by non-participants through *written minutes*, which are taken care of by one or more official minute takers. Fourth, almost every face-to-face arena is paralleled by an email-listserv to which participants and often also non-participants can subscribe and thereby monitor discussions related to that meeting arena. In some cases, such a joint mailing list is also the place where the agenda for the next meeting is prepared so that its genesis becomes more transparent to all (potential) participants.

Sanctions. Activists participate voluntarily in their meetings. They attend a meeting either because they want to use it as a platform to reach a larger audience or because they are interested in what others have to say (or both). One way to sanction their behavior is therefore to exclude them from the meeting or to deny them the right to speak. Such negative sanctions are rare in practice since such a decision is likely to be contested and would hence lead to even more trouble. Positive sanctions (incentives) are more common as meetings have positions of power to offer. These may be confined to the meeting event (e.g., the chair) or reach beyond it (e.g., the right to report on behalf of the meeting). Even when such offices are not attractive in themselves, they—like a formal award or diploma—increase a person's status as a trusted and merited activist. In some cases, when mesomobilization meetings get to decide about funds, participants may even compete over an employment position as campaign-coordinator.

In sum, then, we can see that meetings are partially organized entities. Some of the practical limits of formalizing all organizing decisions have already been mentioned. But there are also some inherent limits to the logic of organization.

Who decides? The inherent limits of organization. An important feature of *deciding* various aspects of the meeting is that decisions not only "resolve" contingencies but also make them explicit as such and, in doing so, make themselves prone to criticism: calling something a decision always actualizes the fact that alternative (and possibly better) choices could have been made (Luhmann, 2006 [2000], p. 170). Compared to network and institution, organization is therefore a rather fragile order as it "constitutes *attempts* to create a specific order" (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011, p. 90).

This ever-looming possibility of failure entails the question of responsibility. Organization emphasizes human control which is deemed to be in the hands (and free will) of the decision-maker(s): "Making decisions is, perhaps, the most effective way of assuming responsibility available to us" (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011, p. 90). This, in turn, raises questions of accountability. Accountability is a problem within the particular logic of organization rather than that of institutions or networks. Institutionalized norms make evident what is right and wrong so that accounts are superfluous, and in networks trust substitutes control; friends do not keep accounts of each other's mistakes.

Consequently, decisions often raise more questions than they answer: Who can decide what and on what grounds? If we attempt to answer this question through another decision, the logic of organization ultimately subverts itself by diverting energy from goal achievement to decision-making, from ends to means. The blind spot of the organization logic is therefore in the decider. Who decides who shall decide? Trying to find an answer to this question within the logic of organization leads to infinite regress. The vicious circle can only be broken by either taking the decider for granted or by trusting him or her. In other words, organization has to rely on at least one other form or social order, institution or network.

[…]

Network: Meetings as Hubs

From the network perspective, finally, the meeting appears as an event where personal ties are created and fostered, similar to a hub in computer technology where "hub" refers to a technical device used to connect various computers into a network, i.e., "a non-space, an empty centre that facilitates 'plugging in'" (Nunes, 2005, p. 300). The purpose of a meeting in this logic is to enhance communication among the different parts of the network and to facilitate the free association of the participants.

A network meeting allows participants to engage with multiple friends at the same time (rather than communicating individually with each of them) and it provides an opportunity to get to know the friends of friends and their friends in turn. There is no need for common norms or for a common goal or plan as participants are mobilized through their friends and by their individual goals. Not sameness, but difference, is the resource of the meeting, because difference provides opportunities for learning and sharing a variety of experiences. Yet, this diversity is not arbitrary as in an anonymous crowd; in a network meeting the participants belong to the same network through which they have been recruited, which means there is a sense of trust, even with regard to participants one does not know, because one knows that they are second- or third-order friends.

But it remains unclear what exactly this vague sense of trust towards friends of friends is really based on. This is why the introduction of a friend's friend often includes a brief mention of *how* they know each other, i.e., what kind of friends they are. Meetings, in short, are transparency devices in networks because they allow the network to observe itself. It allows individuals in the network to "see" much further than they can on the basis of dyadic communication with individual friends.

The meeting, in this logic, is not the place for making collective decisions but to generate trust, for example, by making overlapping interests and experiences apparent. The aim is not necessarily to identify one smallest common denominator among *all* meeting participants, but clusters of overlapping interests among the participants (affinities). These more like-minded sets of participants may then converge in a different meeting where they may become organized or institutionalized as a group (e.g., an affinity group, see Graeber, 2009, pp. 288f).

Unlike working group meetings with a specific task, these smaller meetings are not defined or

decided upon by the bigger "hub-meeting" from which they resulted. There is no hierarchical relationship between the hub-meeting and the affiliated affinity groups. Yet they do not exist in a social vacuum. They are defined in relation to the other meetings and nodes of the network (which in turn may be offspring of other hub-meetings). In other words, the meetings themselves have a network relation to each other; they are not defined in terms of super- and subordination but in terms of a horizontal division of labor in an emergent network process.

Network meetings are often described as creative, inspiring, or even as a transformative experience for individual participants. They are sites of mutual learning and storytelling and, as such, ends in themselves. A prominent example of meetings within the network logic are the meetings of the consciousness-raising groups of the feminist movement in the late 1960s (Gordon, 2002). Young (2002, p. 73) characterizes these as "local public[s]" in which participants "identify one another, and identify the basis of their affinity."

Yet, the network logic of meetings is not only positive, at least from the perspective of participatory democracy in social movements. It often happens that the network of trust that existed before the meeting overshadows the meeting as a public space: those who know and trust each other seem to be talking among themselves while interventions from less connected participants are ignored. This phenomenon of "net-talk" is often associated with a hidden agenda of those involved, but it can also be an unintended consequence of friendship. Net-talk can easily lead to a hegemony of informal leaders or other dominance structures in network meetings (on the role of friendship in participatory democracy see also Polletta, 2002, pp. 207–8). Making these networks visible is another aspect of the transparency function of meetings in networks.

So what are the inherent limits of the network order?

How to act collectively? The inherent limits of the network. To be friends with someone who in turn is friends with others is a trivial fact of social life: infinite networks exist happily without "doing" much more that connecting individual actors through hubs. But when these networks become a mobilizing structure for a social

movement (Kitts, 2000), they suddenly face the problem of becoming a collective actor.

This is when the logic of network meetings is transformed. For a collective actor to emerge from a network of interpersonal relations, a sense of collective identity is necessary. But the creation of such an identity requires that the actors in the network not only know and trust their respective neighbors, but all or most other actors in the network too. Trust needs to be generalized within the collectivity.

Meetings are obviously a good occasion for such identities to emerge, but this institutionalization of a collective identity runs counter to the network logic, which welcomes any friends to join the meeting, regardless of their identity. With a collective actor emerging, those friends who do not share the actors' collective identity will not feel comfortable at these "network" meetings any longer. While they may be trusted by some as their friends, they are eyed suspiciously when they don't "fit in." Differently said: at a network meeting, I might find out that I don't want to be friends with my friends' friends.

But forming a collective identity is not the only way for a network to become a collective actor. Alternatively, the diversity of individual (networked) actors can be integrated around an organizational goal—an organization is formed, and the members of this organization neither need to know and trust the other members nor do they need to share institutionalized norms. It suffices that they contribute to the goal of the organization by respecting the organizational decisions regarding membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctions.

[…]

Theory: What Answers We Give

Finally, the meetings perspective might also have some theoretical implications because of its potential to bridge the micro–macro divide as well as different research traditions within social movement studies and between organization theory, communication and media studies, and social movement studies.

Micro versus macro? This is not the place to enter into the multitude of discussions around the micro–macro distinction. Suffice it to say that attending to meetings can prevent us from equating "micro" with "agency" and "macro" with

"structure." Meeting arenas are micro-structures that enable and constrain the interactions of the participants. At the same time, meeting events often make a difference far beyond the face-to-face interactions of its participants and therefore can be seen as having macro (or collective) agency, for example, when delegates from previously unconnected sectors manage to create a new collective identity or master frame that allows these sectors to work together. But perhaps most of all, meetings are the site for (potential) contention where dominant actors in the field are (or can be) subjected to a form of public scrutiny and lose or reinforce their authority. Using the terminology recently introduced by Fligstein and McAdam (2011), meeting arenas can thus be understood as "governance units" of a wider strategic action field which they oversee. This view reminds us that meeting arenas are rarely neutral platforms of deliberation. Most

> governance units bear the imprint of the influence of the most powerful incumbents in the field and the logics that are used to justify that dominance … Ordinarily, then, governance units can be expected to serve as defenders of the status quo and are a generally conservative force during periods of conflict within the [strategic action field]. (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p. 6)

When Fligstein and McAdam speak of internal governance units, they have formal organizations in mind which "are charged with overseeing compliance with field rules," such as the trade association of a particular industry (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p. 6). The conceptualization of meeting arenas as partial organizations allows us to apply their innovative theory of meso-level social orders to social movements without assuming that movements have fully fledged organizations as internal governance units. It will suffice to identify the most influential meeting arena (or perhaps several competing ones) as mentioned above. This may help address a long-lamented gap in the social movement literature: already in the late 1980s Klandermans (1989, p. 215) noted that "there is an extensive literature on democracy in movement organizations, but studies of actual decision-making are rare." In 1997, he repeated this diagnosis (Klandermans, 1997, p. 133), and eight years later Minkoff and

McCarthy (2005, p. 289) came to the similar conclusion that processes of decision-making in social movements are "typically treated as 'black box' processes." These shortcomings have led to a "desire to reinvigorate studies of SMOs" (Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin, 2005, p. 201) and calls to study SMOs "in their own right" (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004, p. 156). The message is: to understand decision-making and other internal process of social movements, we need to study SMOs and we need to do so without repeating the mistakes of resource mobilization theory which "discarded symbolic interactionism along with assumptions of the irrationality and spontaneity of mobilization" (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004, p. 156).

There is, of course, nothing wrong with focusing on SMOs and placing them "center stage as arenas of interaction" (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004, p. 157), but the argument of this article suggests that social movement decision-making takes place *between* rather than *within* SMOs so that focusing on SMOs runs the risk of either missing the mesomobilization level or identifying particular SMOs with the broader movement. At times, this risk is being met by stretching the concept of SMO to an extent that it can include anything from a "classic" organization to an informal group of activists, to a network organization with indistinct boundaries. If the aim of such sloppy use of the concept of organization is to make space for more interactionist or process-oriented studies of social movement decision-making (or sense-making, framing, etc.), then the concept of meeting arena as a partial organization may have more to offer. While Clemens and Minkoff (2004) rightly criticize the assumption that SMOs are necessarily hierarchical, the concept of partial organization takes this criticism several steps further by calling into question all five elements of complete organizations and making them subject to decision. Decision-making in social movements is, hence, not just a matter of decision-making within given organizational structures, but it is also to a large degree the (decision-)making of the social movement infrastructure itself. This constant need to (re-)decide its meeting infrastructure is perhaps the key difference between organizations and social movements.

Given that communication is a key activity in meetings, studying meeting arenas also invites us to pay more theoretical attention to the role of

communicational processes in the constitution of social movements. Of course, communication has been crucial, especially in culture- and identity-oriented approaches, but these relate mostly to the mobilizing dimension of social movements (e.g., collective action frames) and less to their organizing activity. Furthermore, there seems to be a bias towards the cognitive dimension of communication and less attention is paid to the interactional one. The Montreal School of organizational communication is addressing precisely these issues when it affirms that communication is constitutive of organization (Clark, Cooren, Cornelissen, & Kuhn, 2011; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009) and it is only logical that these researchers were able to produce a whole volume about a single meeting (Cooren, 2007). Similar studies in the social movement field could contribute to a better understanding of how face-to-face interaction contributes to broader patterns and dynamics, for example, through decision-making.

Culture versus structure? Such a trajectory would also feed into a debate that has vitalized social movement studies since the late 1990s: that between culturalist approaches and structuralist or rationalist approaches (see Goodwin & Jasper, 2004; Minkoff, 2001). Minkoff claims that the integration of "organizational and cultural processes in the study of social movement dynamics" is "a central problem for future social movement theory" (2001, p. 283). But the communication between these different strands of research is often difficult, not just because of different vocabularies and background assumptions but because of different units of analysis. Although scholars from both sides agree on the need to open up the black box of internal social movement processes (Minkoff & McCarthy 2005, pp. 289, 304; Polletta, 1999, p. 2) they seem to have somewhat different boxes in mind and expect to find different "things" once they open them. On the one side, we have individual entrepreneurs and their formal SMOs as the black boxes and on the other there are "free spaces" and the interactions *between* individuals that they help to sustain. Typically, those who want to open the former type of black box expect to reveal leadership- and decision-making processes, while in the latter case the hidden treasure is cultural practices and narratives.

So considering that meetings are the site for all of these—leadership, decision-making, culture in interaction, and storytelling—why not award meetings the official status of a theoretically relevant category rather than condemning them to a Cinderella existence, unworthy of entering the high spheres of the theoretical ballroom? The strengths and weaknesses of the competing approaches could be much more easily assessed with meetings as a common point of reference. If scholars could attend to and describe key meetings in whatever internal process they are studying, these events could be used as hinges for comparison and fruitful dialogue.

Organizing versus mobilizing. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the recognition of meeting arenas as the organizing spaces that constitute a social movement infrastructure also suggests an analytical distinction that has received little explicit attention in the study of social movements: the distinction between mobilizing and organizing. If we define mobilizing as *the activation of actors for a cause*, and organizing as *developing a decided order among actors*, then social movement theory is not only about how mobilization for change comes about, but also how change is organized. In fact, mobilizing and organizing can then be studied as two analytically distinct ways of bringing about social change.

> Mobilization not only exerts power on leaders, but also serves to inspire and rededicate those who need social change. Through large demonstrations, pageantry, publicity, and sometimes by threatening disruption, mobilizations can force concessions from the powerful … Leaders mobilize people to bring them together, to get them to vote for a candidate or a union, to fire them up, to let them experience solidarity viscerally. (Gordon, 2002, pp. 104–5)

Mobilization is therefore inherently instrumental and, if mobilizers use organization to mobilize, they are likely to do so in an instrumental manner. This has led social movement theorists to confound the two, sometimes to a degree where organization practically becomes synonymous with (resource) mobilization. The idea of meetings as organizing spaces makes the organizing dimension of a social movement more tangible

as a dimension in its own right. As argued above, meetings are (partially) organized spaces which themselves may serve an organizing or mobilizing purpose. Putting some flesh on the bones of the basic definition above, organizing can be seen as different from mobilizing,

> not just [as] a different tactic but actually a different vision of what freedom and democracy can mean. An organizer aims to self-destruct as a leader—that is, to make people need her less, to build leadership in others. Organizing works through developmental politics, in which the immediate objective may matter less than bringing people to see themselves as having the right and the capacity to have a say in the community or polity. (Gordon, 2002, p. 105)

Organizing, therefore, is not purely instrumental in the sense that it prescribes a fixed goal but it is rather aimed at consciously creating the conditions for self-empowerment. This may be achieved by creating adequate meeting arenas or other spaces or activities that serve this vision. Understanding the organizing dimension of social movements is critical for understanding the #Occupy movement which has been criticized for not formulating any demands (around which people would then be mobilized to exert pressure on leaders). One activist succinctly explained the importance of the organizing dimension of the #Occupy movement (OWS) like this:

> We all sat around and talked both about how amazing the march was but then we also asked the inevitable question of "What's next?" And as this question was being asked, I realized that it was the wrong question for OWS. It is the wrong question for a few reasons: because when we are reproducing everyday life we don't need to ask "What's next?" because this question is already answered. But it is also the wrong question because in a movement without leaders and without demands, the question isn't "What's next?" but rather: "What do I want to do next?" (McCleave Maharawal, 2011)

If the reproduction of "everyday live" is a key element of organizing, then the gender dimension of the division of labor in social movements becomes evident and also reveals the gender bias in social movement theory when it focuses on mobilizing rather than organizing:

> The mobilizing/organizing distinction has everything to do with gender. One could say that organizing operates out of a female-style discourse and manner of relating. By female style I do not mean something that women necessarily have and men do not. (Most of my women friends do not and neither do I.) But in many different cultures, women develop skills at listening, connecting, nurturing, and, of course, doing without the limelight. (Gordon, 2002, pp. 106–7)

I have suggested the distinction between organizing and mobilizing as an *analytic* distinction between two forms of activism that are particularly visible in meetings and I then illustrated this distinction with various empirical accounts that seem to suggest that organizing and mobilizing are clearly distinguishable *empirical* phenomena. This is the price for concise illustrations, but it should be clear that, in practice, organizing a meeting requires that participants are mobilized to attend, and mobilizing people will always involve some organizing. But keeping the two social movement activities theoretically distinct could spawn new ways of theorizing social movements. Take for instance Tarrow (1998) when he concludes his discussion of mobilizing structures:

> The dilemma of hierarchical movement organizations is that, when they permanently internalize their base, they lose their capacity for disruption, but when they move in the opposite direction, they lack the infrastructure to maintain a sustained interaction with allies, authorities, and supporters. This suggests a delicate balance between formal organization and autonomy—one that can only be bridged by strong, informal, and non-hierarchical connective structures. (Tarrow, 1998, p. 137)

Plausible as this observation might be, it does not tell us what this balance might look like, where we might find it, or how it can be organized. The flexible and yet sufficiently stable infrastructure that Tarrow is looking for is the amorphous nebula of meeting arenas that a cycle of contention brings about and which are often sustained for years. Once these arenas become defunct, a cycle

of contention—and possibly the movement—has come to an end. The balance that a movement has to strike between different ways of structuring itself is in how it organizes its (mesomobilization) meetings and hence in how it organizes its organizing and mobilizing processes.

Don't get me wrong: Tarrow is not to blame. The problem is the lack of conceptual tools to study the organizational dimension of social movements that are not biased towards a particular organizational model, i.e., that of hierarchical organization. This lack is also apparent in Melucci's chapter on "The organization of movements" (1996, pp. 313–31). Throughout the chapter, he uses the term "organization" in two senses without making the difference clear: in one sense he refers to the "organization of the movement" and in the other to organization as in "social movement organization." While the latter meaning is clear, the former conveys little more than the common place that the movement is organized without giving any indication as to *how* it is organized, *who* organizes it, or even what the organizational structures are. Melucci seems to avoid looking more into the organizational structures of the movement because that would inevitably mean to equate a movement with an organization.

But recent developments in organization theory defy this narrow concept of organization. As I have tried to show here, the concept of partial organization (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011) is one such development that can help to conceptualize the organizational dimension. It can be fruitfully combined with another approach that is currently gaining momentum: the communication-as-constitutive of organization (CCO) approach (Cooren et al., 2011). It fundamentally alters the widespread view according to which communication takes place within and between organizations. It contends that organization does not precede communication but is a result of communication. Now, given the prime importance that social movement scholars have ascribed to communication and given that meetings are the type of communicational events that CCO scholars have laid much emphasis on, it seems only logical that the CCO approach to organizational communication provides an excellent theoretical repertoire for studying the communication constitution of social movements in meetings and other communicational events.

In order to go beyond the analysis of single meetings, Blaschke, Schoeneborn, and Seidl (2012) have shown that it is possible to study "organizations as networks of communication episodes." Their idea of "turning the network perspective inside out" by conceptualizing the network nodes as communication and the links between them as individuals rather than the other way around is precisely what has been suggested above as "figurations of meeting arenas" and the relational constitution of these arenas. Meetings are the nodes of the social movement infrastructure and individuals link these nodes by participating in different meetings.

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Part VI
What Do Movements Do?

Introduction

If you are in a social movement, the most pressing question you face is: what is to be done? How do you choose tactics that will help your cause? How do you recruit more people, attract the news media, and pressure elites and decision makers? Tactical decisions are the real "stuff" of social movements. Yet, oddly, few scholars have taken a serious look at how these decisions are made, how or when protestors innovate in their tactics, or what the tradeoffs are between different kinds of tactics. Most of those who have written about issues like these have been practitioners rather than academics.

One reason scholars have avoided the question of tactical choice may be that movements have a hard enough time simply surviving. For researchers in the mobilization tradition, this was an impressive accomplishment for movement organizations. As a result, they examined how these organizations raised funds, took advantage of tax laws, and recruited members. Similarly, process theorists concentrated on movements (labor, civil rights) that faced considerable repression from the state, so again simple survival was an accomplishment.

Scholars have also avoided questions of tactics because choices made in the heat of conflict are hard to explain in a rigorous fashion. Much depends on the instincts of movement leaders, who may not always be able to explain why they made one choice rather than another. Decisions are sometimes made quickly, and it may be difficult to reconstruct the process later—when they are interviewed by researchers, for instance.

Tactical choices are usually made during the course of interaction with other decision makers: with one's opponents, of course, but also with the police, the media, legislators, potential allies, and many others. To take just one example: before many rallies or marches in the United States today, leaders negotiate with the police over where they will go, what they will do, how many will be arrested, and so on. Leaders must also make tactical choices with regard to their own followers: how to placate disaffected factions, how to keep members coming back to future events, how to increase the membership. As a result, any given action will probably be designed for several different audiences at the same time. An action that satisfies one may not please another.

Civil Society Civil society refers to the sphere of association and conversation which falls outside the direct control of the state and other authorities. Civil society encompasses the dialogues and interactions through which political views are formed and through which groups come to understand their interests vis-à-vis those of other groups and the state. Civil society includes voluntary associations, friendship networks, religious groups, unions, independent newspapers, and the like. Social movements generally emerge out of civil society and often attempt to expand it, and movements are themselves an important component of civil society.

Repertoires of Protest What do protestors do to further their cause? In any given society, there are a handful of routine ways in which people protest. In modern Western societies, for example, most social movements choose from a surprisingly small number of tactics, especially petitions, demonstrations, marches, strikes, boycotts, and sit-ins (and similar forms of civil disobedience). This is their "repertoire of protest." Widespread knowledge of one or more of these routines both facilitates protest and constrains the tactical options available. At the same time, expectations about what protestors are likely to do may also help authorities contain or suppress them. A repertoire is learned, shared, and occasionally modified. Innovative forms of protest are not easy to invent, even when they would seem to be helpful or necessary. According to Charles Tilly, who first coined the term, a repertoire is shaped by a society's sense of justice (which a tactic must appeal to or at least not violate), the daily routines and social organization of the population (a tactic should fit with these), their prior experience of collective action (so they have the know-how), and the patterns and forms of repression they are likely to face (which a good tactic will minimize). Tactics endure because they are relatively successful and/or deeply meaningful to people.

In regard to their opponents, protestors hope to change behavior through persuasion or intimidation or by imposing costs on them, and to undermine their opponents' credibility with the public, media, and the state. With state agencies, protestors hope to change laws, policies, regulatory practices, administrative rules, and to avoid repression. In the courts, protestors typically strive to have unfavorable laws struck down. With both courts and police, they hope for tolerance of their own protests. Social movements seek to use the news media to spread their message, and sometimes to undermine their opponents. Protestors may also approach professional groups, such as doctors or engineers, to change their standards and practices. They may seek allies in other protest groups. And, from the public at large, they may hope for sympathy, contributions, changes in awareness. Finally, they even have goals for their own members: personal transformations and continued fervor for the cause. In other words, movements have a lot of goals to balance when choosing tactics.

As a result of this complexity, scholars have usually dealt with strategy and tactics by trying to make them a structural issue. Charles Tilly developed the concept of a repertoire of collective action to explain the range of tactics available to protestors in any given society in a particular period. Most social movements in that society will then draw on the same repertoire, because it is largely structurally determined. But this concept says little about how any given leader applies the existing repertoire: why a march rather than a letter-writing campaign? why wait a week before responding to your opponents' actions rather than acting immediately? why choose one cultural frame rather than another for a speech?

But Tilly's instincts are solid: protestors adapt their tactics to their resources, opportunities, and daily life. James Scott (1985, 1990) has described what resistance looks like in slave and peasant societies, where there is close surveillance and few legal and political freedoms. He calls these tactics "weapons of the weak." Only with industrialization and urbanization did protestors have newspapers

Weapons of the Weak Today, social movements are one common way in which people protest against something they fear or dislike. But organized movements are rare in many other kinds of societies, especially where those in power are likely to repress any organized efforts. In most agricultural societies, like those of feudal Europe, peasants or slaves have been carefully watched by landlords or overseers. In situations of close surveillance, people find other ways to resist. They may work very slowly or poorly when doing tasks for their lord or master. They may do the wrong thing and "play dumb" when confronted by their bosses. They may subtly sabotage a construction project. At night they may poach or pilfer from local elites. They may also tell jokes or spread gossip about their superiors as a way of undermining their power. For thousands of years, slaves and serfs have used "weapons of the weak" like these to get back at those exploiting them. See Scott (1985).

and (later) television at their disposal. Workers lived and worked more closely together, so planning and coordination were easier than they had been for peasants. Large numbers of people could be mobilized. A broad range of tactics—from the formation of national organizations to mass rallies—became available to movements in industrial society which had not been available to peasants in agricultural society.

Protestors in different societies face different political structures within which they must operate, even controlling for level of economic development. In an article that helped define the process approach, Herbert Kitschelt (1986) argued that antinuclear protestors in Europe and the United States chose different strategies because their countries contained different kinds of political machinery. French protestors could not bring lawsuits as their American counterparts did, in part because they lacked the grounds on which to sue. French political parties are also less open to new grassroots issues, compared to American parties, and so French antinuclear protestors could not work through the electoral system either. As a result, they took to the streets more quickly than the Americans did, forced to work outside the system because that system lacked openings for their input.

If tactical choice is a difficult topic to model rigorously, that of tactical innovation is even more so. In our first reading in Chapter 20, Aldon Morris's analysis of civil rights sit-ins exemplifies the resource mobilization approach to tactics. He is not so much concerned with the origins of this tactic or the strategic thinking behind its use. Rather, he shows the indigenous organizations and social networks through which it rapidly spread, primarily arguing against a view of protest as spontaneous eruptions. In this excerpt Morris also touches on another important issue: the emergence of "movement centers" with resources, social ties (especially preachers and NAACP activists), and regular meetings (usually at churches). Other theorists have called these "free spaces," places relatively free from surveillance where oppositional ideas and tactics can develop.

Gay Seidman (Chapter 21) and Robert Brym (Chapter 22) look at the use of violent strategies by social movements and try to dispel some of the myths surrounding these. They point out that guerrilla warfare and terrorism are rational political responses to state violence and conflicts over territory, not the handiwork of psychopaths or religious fanatics, as the media often suggest—though religion may play an important role in political violence. Scholars as well as journalists, Seidman points out, are often hesitant to emphasize the rationality or achievements of political violence, in part because of their moral discomfort with it. In the case of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, this has led some scholars to avoid discussing violence altogether and to portray the movement, misleadingly, as a completely nonviolent civil rights struggle like that in the United States—a portrayal that conveniently ignores the urban riots of African-Americans in the 1960s. But political violence, like war, is routine politics by other means.

Javier Auyero, in Chapter 23, emphasizes the connections between routine politics and protest strategies. By closely examining a protest in Argentina, Auyero shows how this protest grew out of the routine politics familiar to people with a specific local history. In so doing, Auyero also shows how

political strategy is shaped by the biography of activists—by their experiences, memories, cultural understandings, and identities.

Deborah Gould (Chapter 24) examines tactics of a very different type: the way movements try to generate and manage emotions in order to sustain themselves. Movements sometimes try to create new emotional habits and dispositions (an "emotional habitus," as she calls it) in the place of older ones which may encourage quiescence. Specifically, Gould looks at how the group ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) tried to generate and sustain anger among a gay population which, like other Americans, tended to view anger as an immature and irrational impulse. (Gould also stresses, however, that much of the "emotional work" of movements is unintentional.)

The reading by Verta Taylor, Katrina Kimport, Nella Van Dyke, and Ellen Ann Andersen, in Chapter 25, examines the tactical repertoire of advocates of same-sex marriage. They stress that tactics have both an "external" function of challenging opponents and an "internal" function of generating collective identity and solidarity. The authors examine a "catalyzing moment" in February 2004 when throngs of gay and lesbian couples descended on San Francisco's City Hall, demanding marriage licenses—and, to their surprise, received them. Most of these couples explicitly viewed their marriages as political acts—a tactic—intended to challenge discriminatory marriage laws. But the marriages also became a public festival of joy and camaraderie and fostered a strong sense of solidarity among those who wed or witnessed the event.

We should note, finally, that even though social movements are defined, in part, by their use of "extra-institutional" means to pursue political goals, protest can also take place *within* institutions. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, in her book *Faithful and Fearless* (1998), looks at how feminists have worked within both churches and the military to pursue gains for women. She focuses on the kinds of language feminists use, the rhetorical claims they make, but at the same time she precisely describes the settings in which they make these claims. She calls these feminists' "habitats" in the institutions they hope to change. "Free spaces" *outside* normal organizations, in other words, are not always necessary for movements to flourish; sometimes they can thrive *within* dominant institutions. (Lee Ann Banaszak's aptly titled book, *The Women's Movement Inside and Outside the State* (2010) makes this case for the larger women's movement of the 1960s.) Movement messages (in both words and actions), and the audiences they are aimed at, remain the essence of what social movements do.

The choice of strategies and tactics is certainly an area in which additional research is needed. One limitation has been that most scholars have thought about movements as their unit of analysis: how each grows, operates, and affects the world around it. But tactical choices are made in close interaction with others in the same "field of conflict." Similarly, the internal structure of movements may affect their ability to innovate and choose the most effective courses of action.

Discussion Questions

1   Why do social movements in different societies and different periods of history have different repertoires of collective action available to them?

2   How and why do new tactics spread?

3   What roles do "movement centers" and other "free spaces" play in social movements?

4   In what ways can identity claims be seen as strategic?

5   Why do some movements use violence to obtain their objectives? Under what conditions do you think violence is justifiable?

6   How are the strategies activists employ connected to more routine politics, and to activists' every-day lives?

7   Which emotions might movements wish to generate and sustain? How can they do so? Which emotions hurt movements? How can these be avoided or mitigated?

8   Can you think of tactics that both powerfully challenge opponents *and* build solidarity within a movement? Can you think of tactics that are good at one of these functions but poor at the other?

Tactical Innovation in the Civil Rights Movement

Aldon D. Morris

Roots of a Tactical Innovation: Sit-Ins

During the late 1950s activists associated with direct action organizations began experimenting with the sit-in tactic. The 1960 student sit-in movement followed naturally from the early efforts to mobilize for nonviolent direct action that took place in black communities across the South. Analysis of sit-ins of the late 1950s will reveal the basic components of the internal organization that was necessary for the emergence of the massive sit-ins of 1960.

In earlier chapters it was demonstrated that the NAACP Youth Councils, CORE chapters, and the SCLC affiliates were the main forces organizing the black community to engage in nonviolent protest. It was emphasized that these groups were closely tied to the black church base. The adult advisers of the NAACP Youth Councils were often women, who supervised the activities of fifteen to twenty young people, but it was not unusual to find men functioning as advisers also. Some of the Youth Councils felt a kinship with the direct action movement and were not rigidly locked into the legal approach of the NAACP.

> **Tactical Innovation** Sometimes people may have intense grievances, they may be fairly well organized, and they may even believe that some authorities might be willing to listen to them, yet they do not protest because they are not quite sure how to do so effectively. The types of protest with which they are familiar may seem too difficult to carry out or may not strike them as likely to make a difference. However, certain tactical innovations—the discovery (or rediscovery) of new forms of protest—may spread very quickly and mobilize many people if these new tactics are relatively easy to adopt, resonate with people's moral views, and seem likely to succeed. The rapid spread of the sit-in tactic in 1960 is an example of how a tactical innovation can sometimes lead to an explosion of protest.

The Southern CORE chapters, operating primarily in South Carolina and several border states, were organized by James McCain and Gordon Carey, were headed largely by local ministers, and

had a disproportionate number of young people as members. These groups were preparing the way for the massive sit-ins of 1960 by conducting sit-ins between 1957 and 1960 at segregated facilities, including lunch counters.

Early Sit-Ins: Forerunners

On February 1, 1960, four black college students initiated a sit-in at the segregated lunch counter of the local Woolworth store in Greensboro, North Carolina. That day has come to be known as the opening of the sit-in movement. Civil rights activists, however, had conducted sit-ins between 1957 and 1960 in at least sixteen cities: St. Louis, Missouri; Wichita and Kansas City, Kansas; Oklahoma City, Enid, Tulsa, and Stillwater, Oklahoma; Lexington and Louisville, Kentucky; Miami, Florida; Charleston, West Virginia; Sumter, South Carolina; East St. Louis, Illinois; Nashville, Tennessee; Atlanta, Georgia; and Durham, North Carolina. The Greensboro sit-ins are important as a unique link in a long chain of sit-ins. Although this book will concentrate on the uniqueness of the Greensboro link, there were important similarities in the entire chain. Previous studies have presented accounts of most of the earlier sit-ins, but without due appreciation of their scope, connections, and extensive organizational base.

The early sit-ins were initiated by direct action organizations. From interviews with participants in the early sit-ins and from published works, I found that civil rights organizations initiated sit-ins in fifteen of the sixteen cities I have identified. The NAACP, primarily its Youth Councils, either initiated or co-initiated sit-ins in nine of the fifteen cities. CORE, usually working with the NAACP, played an important initiating role in seven. The SCLC initiated one case and was involved in another with CORE and FOR. Finally, the Durham Committee on Negro Affairs, working with the NAACP, initiated sit-ins in Durham. From these data we can conclude that the early sit-ins were a result of a multifaceted organizational effort.

Those sit-ins received substantial backing from their respective communities. The black church was the chief institutional force behind the sit-ins; nearly all of the direct action organizations that initiated them were closely associated with the church. The church supplied those organizations with not only an established communication network but also leaders and organized masses, finances, and a safe environment in which to hold political meetings. Direct action organizations clung to the church because their survival depended on it.

Not all black churches supported the sit-ins, and many tried to keep their support "invisible." Clara Luper, the organizer of the 1958 Oklahoma City sit-ins, wrote that the black church did not want to get involved, but church leaders told organizers "we could meet in their churches. They would take up a collection for us and make announcements concerning our worthwhile activities." Interviewed activists revealed that clusters of churches were usually directly involved with the sit-ins. In addition to community support generated through the churches, the activists also received support from parents of those participating in demonstrations.

The early sit-ins were organized by established leaders of the black community. The leaders did not spontaneously emerge in response to a crisis but were organizational actors in the fullest sense. Some sit-in leaders were also church leaders, taught school, and headed the local direct action organization; their extensive organizational linkages gave them access to a pool of individuals to serve as demonstrators. Clara Luper wrote, "The fact that I was teaching American History at Dungee High School in Spencer, Oklahoma, and was a member of the First Street Baptist Church furnished me with an ample number of young people who would become the nucleus of the Youth Council." Mrs. Luper's case is not isolated. Leaders of the early sit-ins were enmeshed in organizational networks and were integral members of the black community.

Rational planning was evident in this early wave of sit-ins. As we have seen, during the late 1950s the Reverends James Lawson and Kelly Miller Smith, both leaders of Nashville Christian Leadership Council, formed what they called a "non-violent workshop." In them Lawson meticulously taught local college students the philosophy and tactics of nonviolent protest. In 1959 those students held "test" sit-ins in two department stores. Earlier, in 1957, members of the Oklahoma City NAACP Youth Council created what they called their "project," whose aim was to

eliminate segregation in public accommodations. The project comprised various committees and groups that planned sit-in strategies. After a year of planning, the project group walked into the local Katz Drug Store and initiated a sit-in. In 1955 William Clay organized an NAACP Youth Council in St. Louis. Through careful planning and twelve months of demonstrations, its members were able to desegregate dining facilities at department stores. In Durham, North Carolina, in 1958 black activists of the Durham Committee on Negro Affairs conducted a survey of "five-and-dime" stores in Durham. It revealed that such stores were heavily dependent on black trade. Clearly, the sit-ins in Durham were based on rational planning.

Rational planning was evident in CORE's sit-ins during the late 1950s. CORE prepared for more direct action, including sitins, by conducting interracial workshops in Miami in September 1959 and January 1960. Dr. King assisted in the training of young people in one of the CORE workshops. In April 1959 a newly formed Miami CORE group began conducting sitins at downtown variety store lunch counters. In July 1959 James Robinson, writing to affiliated CORE groups and others, stated: "You have probably read in the newspaper about the dramatic all-day sitins which Miami CORE has conducted at a number of lunch counters. Up to 50 people have participated at many of these sit-ins." In early September 1959 CORE conducted a sixteen-day workshop on direct action in Miami, called the September Action Institute. Robinson wrote of it: "The discussion of the theory and techniques of nonviolent direct action will become understandable to all Institute members precisely because their actual participation in action projects will illuminate what otherwise might remain intangible." While the institute was in session, sit-ins were conducted at the lunch counters of Jackson's–Byrons Department Store. According to Gordon Carey of CORE, "Six days of continuous sit-ins caused the owners of the lunch counter concession to close temporarily while considering a change of policy." Immediately following that store's closing, CORE activists began sitting in at Grant's Department Store. Carey wrote: "We sat at the lunch counter from three to six hours daily until the 2-week Institute ended on September 20." On September 19, 1959, officials of the

Jackson's–Byrons Store informed CORE that Negroes would be served as of September 21. Four black CORE members went to the store on September 21 but were refused service. Carey's account continues:

> Miami CORE determined to return to Jackson's–Byrons every day. The lunch counter has about 40 seats: On September 23 we had 40 persons sitting-in. It is not easy to get 40 persons on a weekday to sitin from 10 A.M. till 3 P.M., but we maintained the demonstrations throughout the week. One woman who sat with us daily, works nights from 10 P.M. to 6 A.M. Cab drivers and off-duty Negro policemen joined us at the counter.

On September 25, 1959, city officials in Miami began arresting CORE members, and local whites physically attacked the protesters. Carey was told to be "out of Miami by Monday." Yet, Carey reports, "That day we had 80 persons sitting-in—half of them at Grant's." The Grant's store closed rather than serve blacks. On November 12, 1959, CORE made plans to sit in at the "white" waiting room of the Greenville, South Carolina, airport. The action was planned to protest the fact that the black baseball star Jackie Robinson had been ordered to leave the "white" waiting room a few days earlier. On January 23, just ten days before the famous sit-in at Greensboro, North Carolina, the CORE organization in Sumter, South Carolina, reported that its teenage group was "testing counter service at dime store: manager says he plans to make a change." Again, the action in Sumter had long-range planning behind it: A year earlier, at CORE's National meeting of 1959, the Sumter group had reported that students were involved in its activities. The Sumter CORE organization also had expressed the opinion that "emphasis should be on students and children. In future projects [we] hope to attack employment in 10¢ stores, food stores and chain stores."

In the summer of 1959 the SCLC, CORE, and FOR jointly held a nonviolent workshop on the campus of Spelman College in Atlanta. When the conference ended, James Robinson, Executive Secretary of CORE, along with the Reverend Wyatt Walker, James McCain, Professor Guy Hershberger, and Elmer Newfield, headed for Dabbs, a segregated restaurant in Atlanta. This

interracial group shocked everyone by sitting down and eating. In a CORE news release, James Robinson humorously wrote: "We all had agreed that it was the best coffee we had ever had—the extra tang of drinking your coffee interracially across the Georgia color bar is highly recommended!" Besides providing an example for the other workshop participants, these acts of defiance showed everyone how to protest. Marvin Rich of CORE explained: "They were being demonstrated in a public form, so people would just walk by and see it. And people who didn't think things were possible saw that they were possible, and six months later, in their own home town, they may try it out."

Finally, the early sit-ins were sponsored by indigenous resources of the black community; the leadership was black, the bulk of the demonstrators were black, the strategies and tactics were formulated by blacks, the finances came out of the pockets of blacks, and the psychological and spiritual support came from the black churches.

Most of the organizers of the early sit-ins knew each other and were well aware of each other's strategies of confrontation. Many of the activists belonged to the direct action wing of the NAACP. That group included such activists as Floyd McKissick, Daisy Bates, Ronald Walters, Hosea Williams, Barbara Posey, and Clara Luper, who thought of themselves as a distinct group because the national NAACP was usually disapproving or at best ambivalent about their direct action approach.

The NAACP activists built networks that bypassed the conservative channels and organizational positions of their superiors. At NAACP meetings and conferences they sought out situations where they could freely present their plans and desires to engage in confrontational politics and exchange information about strategies. Once acquainted, the activists remained in touch by phone and mail.

Thus it is no accident that sit-ins occurred between 1957 and 1960. Other instances of "direct action" also occurred during this period. Daisy Bates led black students affiliated with her NAACP Youth Council into the all-white Little Rock Central High School and forced President Eisenhower to send in federal troops. CORE, beginning to gain a foothold in the South, had the explicit goal of initiating direct action projects.

We have already noted that CORE activists were in close contact with other activists of the period. Although the early sit-ins and related activities were not part of a grandiose scheme, they were tied together through organizational and personal networks.

The Sit-In Cluster of the Late 1950s

Organizational and personal networks produced the first cluster of sit-ins in Oklahoma in 1958. In August 1958 the NAACP Youth Council of Wichita, Kansas, headed by Ronald Walters, initiated sit-ins at the lunch counters of a local drug store. At the same time Clara Luper and the young people in her NAACP Youth Council were training to conduct sit-ins in Oklahoma City. The adult leaders of the two groups knew each other: They worked for the same organization, so several members of the two groups traded numerous phone calls to exchange information and discuss mutual support. Direct contact was important, because the local press often refused to cover the sit-ins. Less than a week after Wichita, Clara Luper's group in Oklahoma City initiated its planned sit-ins.

Shortly thereafter sit-ins were conducted in Tulsa, Enid, and Stillwater, Oklahoma. Working through CORE and the local NAACP Youth Council, Clara Luper's friend Shirley Scaggins organized the sit-ins in Tulsa. Mrs. Scaggins had recently lived in Oklahoma City and knew the details of Mrs. Luper's sit-in project. The two leaders worked in concert. At the same time the NAACP Youth Council in Enid began to conduct sit-ins. Mr. Mitchell, who led that group, knew Mrs. Luper well. He had visited the Oklahoma Youth Council at the outset of its sit-in and had discussed sit-in tactics and mutual support. The Stillwater sit-ins appear to have been conducted independently by black college students.

The network that operated in Wichita and several Oklahoma communities reached as far as East St. Louis, Illinois. Homer Randolph, who in late 1958 organized the East St. Louis sit-ins, had previously lived in Oklahoma City, knew Mrs. Luper well, and had young relatives who participated in the Oklahoma City sit-ins.

In short, the first sit-in cluster occurred in Oklahoma in 1958 and spread to cities within a 100-mile radius through established organizational

and personal networks. The majority of these early sit-ins were (1) connected rather than isolated, (2) initiated through organizations and personal ties, (3) rationally planned and led by established leaders, and (4) supported by indigenous resources. Thus, the Greensboro sit-ins of February 1960 did not mark the movement's beginning but were a critical link in the chain, triggering sit-ins across the South at an incredible pace. What happened in the black community between the late 1950s and the early 1960s to produce such a movement?

In my view the early sit-ins did not give rise to a massive sit-in movement before 1960 because CORE and the NAACP Youth Council did not have a mass base. The SCLC, which did have a mass base, had not developed fully. Besides, direct action was just emerging as the dominant strategy during the late 1950s.

As the SCLC developed into a Southwide direct action organization between 1957 and 1960, it provided the mass base capable of sustaining a heavy volume of collective action. It augmented the activities of CORE and the NAACP Youth Councils, because they were closely tied to the church. Thus the SCLC, closely interlocked with NAACP Youth Councils and CORE chapters, had developed solid movement centers by late 1959. The centers usually had the following seven characteristics:

1. A cadre of social change-oriented ministers and their congregations. Often one minister would become the local leader of a given center, and his church would serve as the coordinating unit.
2. Direct action organizations of varied complexity. In many cities local churches served as quasi-direct action organizations, while in others ministers built complex church-related organizations (e.g. United Defense League of Baton Rouge, Montgomery Improvement Association, Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights of Birmingham, Petersburg Improvement Association). NAACP Youth Councils and CORE affiliates also were components of the local centers.
3. Indigenous financing coordinated through the church.
4. Weekly mass meetings, which served as forums where local residents were informed of relevant information and strategies regarding the movement. These meetings also built solidarity among the participants.
5. Dissemination of nonviolent tactics and strategies. The leaders articulated to the black community the message that social change would occur only through nonviolent direct action carried out by masses.
6. Adaptation of a rich church culture to political purposes. The black spirituals, sermons, and prayers were used to deepen the participants' commitment to the struggle.
7. A mass-based orientation, rooted in the black community, through the church.

From the perspective of this study, the period between the 1950s bus boycotts and the 1960 sit-ins provided pivotal resources for the emerging civil rights movement. My analysis emphasizes that the organizational foundation of the civil rights movement was built during this period, and active local movement centers were created in numerous Southern black communities.

21

Armed Struggle in the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement

Gay Seidman

An odd silence marks recent discussions of social movements. If writers in the past sometimes glorified armed struggle, treating it as the highest stage of resistance to colonial authority (Fanon 1968), in the last twenty years social movement theorists have generally avoided the subject entirely. Recent social movement analysts appear reluctant to engage directly with movements' use of violent tactics, remaining silent about the interplay between violent and nonviolent tactics, or about how the clandestine presence of armed activists might affect processes within a larger social movement. With rare exceptions, recent social movement analysts fail to ask a glaringly obvious question: what difference does the adoption of armed struggle make to the internal dynamics of above-ground social movements?

Nowhere is the silence around violence more deafening than in discussions of South Africa's anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s. All too frequently, the anti-apartheid movement is presented as a victory for peaceful protest, as if the movement directly paralleled the mainstream American civil rights movement of the late 1950s. The truth, of course, is very different: South Africa's visible popular movement was deeply entwined with a clandestine guerrilla struggle. The anti-apartheid movement was as much an anti-colonial movement for national self-determination as a civil rights movement working within an existing legal framework. In South Africa, the armed struggle played a key role: it attracted popular support to the anti-apartheid movement, it demonstrated the persistence of resistance to white supremacy despite repression, and it served as a complicated badge of commitment for anti-apartheid activists.

[…]

Social movement theorists tend to treat armed struggle either as the unproblematic extension of ordinary social movement processes (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), or conversely, as a pathological effect of competition or decline within social movements (Braungart and Braungart 1992; della Porta and Tarrow 1986). Several recent studies of clandestine movements in industrialized countries see the shift to armed struggle as both cause and symptom of movement decline, as isolated small networks of activists move away from their communities and become distant from above-ground activists (della Porta 1992; della Porta 1995; Moyano 1992; Neidhardt

1992). Even when social movement analysts consider the possibility that clandestine activists might sustain links to above-ground social movements, they generally suggest that the very fact of working underground prompts activists to privilege military concerns over popular mobilization, thereby undermining the possibility that clandestine activists could retain leadership positions in open social movements.

Perhaps reflecting that theoretical vision, many scholars of South Africa try to fit the anti-apartheid movement into the framework of Western social movement theory—a framework that focuses on the mobilization of popular protest, ignoring questions of recruitment to clandestine networks, military supply, and training, or how activists' involvement in armed struggle or underground networks affects their participation in public debate. Generally, descriptions of anti-apartheid activism stress the role of student groups, political activists, unions, and women's groups, rarely mentioning the way these groups interacted and cooperated with armed activists within the national liberation movement. Some descriptions virtually ignore the armed struggle (Marx 1991); others mention only its symbolic importance, relegating to footnotes any mention of concrete links between clandestine ANC strategies and open tactics (Murray 1994; Seidman 1994; Wood 2000). Even the rare description which acknowledges that armed struggle mattered (Younis 2000) generally mentions it almost apologetically, neglecting questions about the impact of choices of military targets or sources of military supply and training on movement processes, or how armed struggle might have been consciously integrated with popular mobilization.

The failure to fully engage the clandestine side of the anti-apartheid movement involves a theoretical parallel: the silence around South Africa's armed struggle echoes a broader silence in contemporary social movement theory, whose recent focus on peaceful mass protest virtually excludes or dismisses all other forms of mobilization. Especially for anti-colonial movements, however, a broadly-supported armed struggle introduces a host of complex social processes: the construction of a "national" project across disparate ethnic groups or social classes; the decision to take up arms and the mobilization of popular support for an impossible undertaking; the problems of maintaining discipline and control in a guerrilla army; the logistics involved in providing supplies and infiltrating guerrillas; the relation between guerrillas and local populations.

[…]

Practical and Ethical Considerations

Obviously, much of the deafening silence about the dynamics of armed struggle stems from immediate concerns about safety and practicality, both for researchers and their subjects. Above all, while an authoritarian regime is still in place, it is almost impossible to research the dynamics of armed struggle in any objective way. Access to clandestine activities is obviously difficult; researchers considered sympathetic enough to gain access to clandestine armed-struggle processes are unlikely to be able then to claim objectivity.

But even beyond the access problem, ethical concerns limit any researcher's ability to talk openly about armed struggle. In South Africa, for example, naming any links between popular collective mobilization and armed struggle during the 1980s would have seriously endangered participants in each, giving an authoritarian regime access to information it could use against its opponents, and an excuse to ban aboveground popular organizations because of their links to clandestine guerrilla activities.

Specific problems confronted foreign researchers who wanted to explore the ANC's clandestine role within the above-ground popular movement, especially within the legal and open coalition called the United Democratic Front (UDF) during the 1980s. First, of course, the government denied visas to anyone who expressed an interest in underground ANC activity or clandestine links. In the mid-1980s, for example, Pretoria refused a research visa to an American researcher because he said he hoped to write a history of white activism within the non-racial movement—and then, the American Fulbright committee withdrew promised funding because he could not enter South Africa.

But even more frequently, foreign researchers were kept in the dark by their South African

A Chronology of the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement

1912: The Native National Congress is founded, later renamed the African National Congress (ANC)

1913–14: Civil disobedience campaign led by Indian activist Mohandas Gandhi

1948: The National Party takes power and enacts policy of apartheid ("separateness") aimed at continued white domination of the black majority

1950: The Group Areas Act segregates blacks and whites; the multiracial Communist Party is banned

1952: The ANC begins a campaign of civil disobedience—the Defiance Campaign—led by Nelson Mandela; over 8,000 are arrested

1955: The multiracial Congress of the People adopts the Freedom Charter, based on the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights; its signers (including Mandela) are later charged with treason, but eventually acquitted

1959: The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) splits from the ANC over the issue of collaborating with whites

1960: Protests against the "pass laws" (requiring blacks to carry passbooks to regulate their movement); 69 black demonstrators are killed at Sharpeville and thousands are arrested; the ANC and PAC are banned and go underground

1961: South Africa leaves the British Commonwealth; Mandela and activists from the ANC and Communist Party establish a military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation"), which launches a sabotage campaign; the PAC also establishes a military wing

1962–63: Mandela and other ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe leaders are arrested

1964: Mandela and seven other ANC leaders are sentenced to life imprisonment

1970s: Over 3 million blacks are forcibly resettled in "homelands"

1976: Soweto uprising; over 600 people are killed in clashes between black protesters and security forces; some flee to ANC camps in nearby African countries

1977: Steve Biko, leader of the "Black Consciousness" movement, dies in police custody; thousands attend his funeral; the UN enacts a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa

1984–89: general uprising in black townships; government declares a state of emergency

1984: Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize

1986: South African military attacks ANC camps in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Dutch Reformed Church declares apartheid an error

1989: F. W. de Klerk becomes president and secretly meets with Mandela; many ANC activists are released from prison; public facilities are desegregated

1990: Mandela is released after 27 years in prison; the ANC is unbanned and declares an end to armed struggle

1991: Start of multi-party talks; de Klerk repeals remaining apartheid laws, including Group Areas Act; international sanctions against South Africa are lifted; bloody clashes occur between the ANC and the Zulu Inkatha movement

1993: Mandela and de Klerk receive Nobel Peace Prize

1994: The ANC wins South Africa's first elections based on universal suffrage; Mandela becomes president (1994–99); South Africa's Commonwealth membership is restored, and South Africa rejoins the United Nations after a 20-year absence

1996: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, led by Archbishop Tutu, begins hearings on human rights abuses committed by former government and liberation movements during the apartheid era

informants. Of course, many South Africans were themselves unaware of the presence of people with clandestine ANC links in above-ground activist groups. White South African progressives, who often served as important social and political links for outside researchers because of their academic connections, were perhaps especially likely to be kept out of clandestine loops; South Africa's linguistic diversity and racial divisions made it relatively easy for those activists

aware of clandestine links—activists who were generally though not invariably black—to restrict knowledge of underground activities. But even activists or South African academics who were "witting" were unlikely to tell outside researchers about any illegal connections they might know about. They simply lied, protecting the clandestine links between armed networks and open, legal groups. By the late 1980s, the hints were becoming ever broader, but even then, most above-ground activists continued to maintain a plausible facade, distancing their organizations from any activities that could jeopardize their group. One prominent activist who served as a key informant for an American social scientist writing about the "internal" struggle for freedom in the 1980s, for example, explicitly denied that the anti-apartheid UDF had any ANC links; but when the ANC was unbanned in 1990, that same informant was immediately named ANC treasurer, a trusted position that supports his claim that he had been working with clandestine networks for years (VK, interview, Harare 1989).

Nevertheless, the practical problems of studying armed struggle can be exaggerated. There are many ways that researchers might discuss armed struggle without endangering informants, and without going into any details about specific links between "internal" protests and guerrilla activity. In the South African case, two examples demonstrate that the ANC was not, in fact, completely off-limits. American political scientist Stephen Davis (1987) was able to research and write about the ANC's guerrilla structures, although he was unable to link them directly to "internal" activities in the 1980s. Even more impressively, South African sociologist Jacklyn Cock (1991) was able to complete the research for an excellent book on the gender dynamics of the ANC's guerrilla forces at a time when a conviction for "furthering the aims of a banned organization" could have landed her in jail.

The problem is not simply that researchers were worried about protecting sources, although those concerns were very real. The deeper difficulty lies in our inability to incorporate questions about the dynamics of armed struggle and clandestine networks into the theoretical prisms through which we view social movements. Some of that silence can be attributed to the Cold War: for decades, many theorists felt little need to ask how armed struggle worked, or how

it mattered, because the Cold War seemed to explain everything. In the context of the great conflict between the communist East and the capitalist West, questions about the local dynamics of armed conflict were overshadowed and virtually irrelevant. In the South African case, the fact that the ANC received weapons and military training from the Soviet bloc often defined researchers' vision of the armed struggle. Western researchers who saw Africa as a Cold War battleground tended to support the South African government against the Communist threat, viewing apartheid's racial exclusion as a lesser evil (e.g., Crocker and Lewis 1979). Even Western researchers who opposed apartheid frequently dismissed the ANC's guerrillas as irrelevant, or feared that Soviet-influenced agitators might subvert the anti-apartheid movement's noble goals (Murray 1987).

The Cold War apparently meant that researchers faced a dichotomous choice in their approach to armed struggle. Those who supported a guerrilla movement's aims frequently emphasized its indigenous character, naturalizing the participation of local racially-defined communities, ignoring divisions and conflicts within the "national" support base, and steadfastly ignoring evidence of external support for specific strategies or specific definitions of "national liberation." Those who were less sympathetic, on the other hand, tended to emphasize the role of outside support and guidance, and in the process, to overlook questions about why and how local participants were drawn into the struggle, or what kind of support the "armed struggle" received internally.

In the South African case, at least, this dichotomous vision impoverished our description and understanding of the dynamics of popular protests as well as of the guerrilla struggle itself. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the link between armed struggle and township protests begged discussion, but researchers consistently avoided asking questions, refusing to consider obvious evidence that the popular resistance inside the country was directly aware of, and concerned with, guerrilla campaigns, or that the ANC's persistent popularity stemmed precisely from its engagement in an almost-suicidal armed struggle.

Throughout the 1980s, although street protests frequently included symbols and references to the armed struggle, journalists or researchers rarely mentioned them or explored the clandestine

relationship between above-ground protest and clandestine activism. Symbols of the armed struggle pervaded anti-apartheid protests: songs and slogans celebrated guerrilla efforts, while signs welcoming "Comrade Joe" Slovo and his MK cadres were as common as cardboard cut-outs of bazookas at political events. Journalists in the 1980s consistently described the *toyi-toyi*—the high-stepping dance performed at township funerals and protests throughout the 1980s—as a traditional African dance; but whatever the truth of its origins, in the mid-1980s activists in several different locations claimed that they danced the *toyi-toyi* in explicit imitation of guerrilla military training exercises (interviews, Johannesburg and Durban 1987). When activists' coffins were draped in the ANC colors, everyone understood that the dead person had been part of what activists referred to as the ANC's "underground structures."

Similarly, researchers rarely acknowledged the importance of specific guerrilla attacks in mobilizing popular protests, or explored how township activists learned of these events despite newspaper censorship, or how township youths contacted underground ANC networks before they left the country to join the guerrilla struggle. We never asked what resources flowed from the external ANC leadership to the "grass-roots" groups inside the country, and what other links existed between clandestine networks and above-ground popular protest—or if we did, we stayed silent about the answers in our academic work, hoping to protect activists or to preserve the cover of an appropriately dispassionate stance.

But surely now some of these questions can be reopened. In the aftermath of decolonization and the Cold War, it should be possible to go back to re-examine some of these processes as a basis for better understanding the legacies of armed struggle and their implications for post-colonial politics. How did popular movements decide to take up strategies involving armed struggle? How did activists mobilize support for that decision or quash opposition to it? What were the organizational links between guerrillas and their supporters? How do national liberation movements manage to garner resources from impoverished colonial populations and sustain popular support in the face of repeated defeats by superior forces? How were strategic choices made about targets

and campaigns of armed struggle, and what were the implications of those choices for post-colonial politics?

Blurring the Line

Aside from practical considerations, however, the fact that so many researchers have avoided discussing the recurrent evidence of popular South African support for, and involvement in, the "external" armed struggle—from the township songs and slogans calling on the ANC's guerrilla army to march across the border, to the heroic stature accorded leaders of the ANC's armed wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* or Spear of the Nation—begs further consideration. Some of the reluctance to deal with armed struggle, I suspect, comes from an unconscious moral distinction, between "good" popular grassroots mobilization and "bad"—or at least ambiguous—armed struggle: as researchers, do we perhaps fear tarnishing the moral righteousness of the anti-apartheid struggle if we admit that some of the heroic popular struggles of the townships might have been linked directly to clandestine networks involved in armed attacks? Throughout the 1980s, Amnesty International refused to adopt Nelson Mandela or any other South African convicted of belonging to the ANC as a prisoner of conscience, because of the ANC's persistent support for armed struggle; has a similar distinction unconsciously shaded descriptions of the anti-apartheid movement? Most researchers in the late twentieth century feel far more ambivalent about armed struggle than they do about unarmed protestors in the street. In contrast to the way some Western student protestors glorified anti-imperialist guerrilla struggles in the late 1960s, most social movement analysts writing after the early 1980s seem to be drawn, consciously or not, to idealize non-violent popular mobilization, linking it in some vague way to Gandhian non-violence or to the passive resistance of the American civil rights movement.

At least in the case of South Africa's anti-apartheid movement, the lines between different types of collective action may be more blurred than this distinction implies. As is well known, the turn to armed struggle in South Africa came after several decades in which anti-apartheid protests seemed to have had little impact. Passive resistance relies

heavily on appeals to the oppressor's humanity; by 1960, many South African activists believed the apartheid regime would not listen. The South African government—elected in 1948 by less than half the electorate, in an election basically restricted to the 20 percent of South Africans legally classified as white—was firmly committed to maintaining white domination. The government viewed as subjects the 80 percent of South Africans who were not racially classified "white," refusing to recognize their claims to political rights or inclusion. […]

In the early 1950s, anti-apartheid activists sought to imitate Gandhi's recent successes in India. In 1952, thousands of volunteers joined the ANC's Defiance Campaign, refusing to obey segregationist rules at bus stops, train stations, post offices and so on, generally in an orderly and non-violent manner. In terms of mass mobilization, the campaign was a huge success. Eight thousand people were arrested between June and November, 1952; popular enthusiasm for the campaign swelled the ANC's membership, from about 7000 to about 100,000. In terms of political achievement, however, the campaign was a dismal failure: the government made no concessions, and took firm steps to crush the campaign. Thousands of volunteers were jailed, and when jails grew overcrowded, the government rushed through new laws allowing judges to sentence resisters to floggings as well as to three-year jail terms. Meetings were outlawed, leaders were placed under house arrest. Drawing on the language of the Cold War, the government redefined resistance to racial segregation as communism, and then charged the campaign's leaders with treason; repression disorganized resistance and immobilized the campaign (Kuper 1957; Lodge 1983: 33–66; Mandela 1994: 176–227).

Over the next decade, repeated attempts to engage in non-violent tactics—bus boycotts, demonstrations, petitions, pass-burning campaigns—provoked violent reactions. The 1960 massacre outside the Sharpeville police station, where 69 people were killed and 178 wounded, shot in the back as they tried to run from a police attack, symbolized the government's refusal to permit any kind of peaceful protest. In an earlier era, South African prime minister Jan Smuts released Gandhi from jail when he led non-violent demonstrations. After 1948, however, South

Africa's leaders explicitly rejected compassion; regretfully, a prominent South African proponent of non-violence concluded that it seemed unlikely that South Africa's rulers could "be converted by extreme suffering when they are so strongly confirmed in the ideologies of white domination" (Kuper 1957: 94).

Faced with an intransigent regime at home, South Africans looked beyond their borders for help. From the early 1960s, black South Africans repeatedly appealed to the international community to impose economic sanctions, arguing that South Africans would take up arms unless political and economic pressure from the outside offered a peaceful way to undermine the powerful and repressive apartheid state. But again, South Africans found no audience. In India and in the American South, London and Washington had each sought to avoid embarrassment on the international stage, intervening on the side of resisters to overcome the intransigence of local colonial officials, states' rights advocates and white elites. But by the mid-1960s, no Western power had direct colonial or federal links to Pretoria, and no Western power appeared to feel much moral responsibility for ending apartheid. From 1960 to 1990, Britain and the United States routinely vetoed efforts at the United Nations to impose sanctions on South Africa, allowing only a loophole-riddled arms embargo in 1976. […]

In the intervening decades, however, anti-apartheid leaders argued they could no longer ask their followers to risk their lives in unarmed confrontation. In the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre, when the government arrested 20,000 political activists and banned political parties that demanded political rights for all South Africans, anti-apartheid leaders concluded they had no choice but to establish armed wings. Despite the arrest in the early 1960s of most major anti-apartheid figures—including Nelson Mandela, a popular political organizer who served as the ANC's first military commander—the ANC managed over the next fifteen years to establish a network of cells and arms caches, linked to camps of guerrillas located farther north, in Angola, Tanzania, and Uganda.

It is important to place the ANC's "turn to armed struggle" in its historical context. Discussions in South Africa were clearly influenced by prominent examples of contemporary

nationalist struggles, including Algeria and Kenya; parallel discussions were going on in nationalist movements in Angola, the then-Congo, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Obviously, the willingness of Eastern European countries and Libya to support armed nationalist movements with resources and training helped persuade ANC leaders that this turn was a logical one. Conversely, in the months immediately after the Sharpeville massacre, the decision by U.S. banks to extend a very large loan to shore up South Africa's capital reserves undermined those ANC activists who preferred appeals to the West. But again, these are questions that future researchers will have to ask: what were the internal dynamics of this discussion? How did activists understand the choices facing them? How did leaders evaluate their chances of success through armed struggle, and how were opponents of this strategy either persuaded or excluded? These questions have pragmatic correlates: how were decisions made about specific alliances and types of military training, or about sites for guerrilla camps? Who was recruited for armed struggle, and how, and through what networks were they spirited out of South Africa? What were their experiences in traveling north through different parts of the continent and in training camps and schools spread across Eastern Europe, and how did these experiences shape their vision of South Africa's future?

In terms of social movement theory, perhaps the most important question revolves around how the existence of an exiled guerrilla army affected popular protests inside the country. Especially as decolonization proceeded down the continent, politically aware South Africans recognized both the difficulties confronting a struggling guerrilla army, and the possibility that some day, guerrilla campaigns might intensify. For example, although the 1976 Soweto uprising was of course primarily a protest against Afrikaans as medium of instruction, student protestors at the time also celebrated the recent collapse of Portuguese control in Angola and Mozambique, a collapse which removed colonial buffer zones which had protected South Africa's borders from guerrilla incursion. Thousands of black South Africans had left the country after 1960, living for years in guerrilla camps in the forests of independent African countries, or traveling to Eastern

Europe for military training. From the late 1960s on, small groups of ANC soldiers tried to infiltrate through Angola, Mozambique, or Rhodesia, but they were usually imprisoned or killed by colonial police before they even reached South Africa. In 1976, student protestors recognized new possibilities for guerrilla infiltration—possibilities that were given substance when thousands of young South Africans left the country to join the ANC's "external" army.

By the early 1980s, the ANC's armed wing could claim to have attained some real visibility (Davis 1987), especially after some of its most dramatic attacks: the 1977 down-town shoot-out between South African police and Solomon Mahlangu, a student protestor who had left the country for military training after 1976, returning with a highly-symbolic AK-47; the 1980 attack on a coal-into-oil refinery, Sasol, which created a three-day smoke-plume that could be seen from Johannesburg; a 1983 explosion that destroyed the South African Air Force intelligence headquarters; or the 1984 rocket attack on an army camp near Pretoria. None of these attacks came close to bringing down the state, but they provided physical evidence of a tangible *potential* threat to the regime—reinforcing the sense, as Nadime Gordimer (1984) put it, that "something out there" represented a shadowy threat to the long-term future of white supremacy.

It did not hurt the ANC's popularity, either within the country or internationally, that the ANC's armed wing was believed to follow unusually principled rules. Where guerrillas linked to the PLO, for example, chose to attack civilians in Israel/Palestine, and to attack Israeli targets outside of the Middle East, the ANC leadership claimed it pursued a more restrained approach. From the early 1960s, South African guerrillas were supposed to concentrate on sabotage and military attacks, avoiding civilian targets. In a deeply segregated society, it would have been easy to kill random whites. Segregated white schools, segregated movie theaters, segregated shopping centers meant that if white deaths were the only goal, potential targets could be found everywhere. But Oliver Tambo, the ANC's leader in exile, insisted that a Christian like himself could not condone a single unnecessary death. Only a handful of ANC attacks caused civilian deaths, white or black. For the most part, ANC guerrillas

limited their targets to military installations and economic sabotage, to electric pylons, military installations, power plants—and when they did not, the ANC leadership could always deny responsibility, since guerrillas cut off from their base might be described as acting outside instructions.

While highly principled, this strategy was not particularly successful militarily: despite the rhetoric, most anti-apartheid activists concluded by the mid-1970s that in a highly urbanized, industrialized society, facing a well-equipped and sophisticated enemy army, a guerrilla insurrection could not succeed. Instead, anti-apartheid activists put their energy into political organizing, bringing people together around local issues, and looking for ways to protest which would not provoke immediate repression. […] By 1976, more than half of black South Africans lived in urban areas and worked in industrial settings— sites which offered new possibilities for organization. Especially as more experienced activists began to be released from the jail terms which began in the early 1960s, they began to look at how black students could paralyze urban school systems, black workers could paralyze production, black communities could demand better urban services. Like poor people elsewhere, anti-apartheid activists discovered the power of disruption: black South Africans learned that by mobilizing collective protests at school, at work, or in segregated black townships, they could disrupt the smooth functioning of apartheid, through boycotts, strikes, and demonstrations— without exposing individual leaders to arrest, or provoking immediate police attacks.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa moved into a period of rolling insurgency. In 1973, a scattering of illegal wildcat strikes among black factory workers showed that some employers would rather negotiate than fire and replace striking workers; by 1985, South Africa had one of the world's most militant labor movements, and employers often begged police to release trade unionists so they could have someone with whom to negotiate. Similarly, the 1976 Soweto uprising revealed the capacity of high school students to disrupt township life; by the late 1980s, black high schools and universities were regularly disrupted by boycotts, to such an extent that employers and even white government officials expressed concerns about future shortages of skilled workers. From the early 1980s, township activists began to organize community groups around local issues, ranging from bus fares to high rents; by the mid-1980s, these township "civic associations" organized rent and consumer boycotts, funerals for activists killed by police, and other forms of protest. In all these cases, activists focused on local issues; but beneath all the various demands and tactics was a common demand for political rights, democracy, and human dignity (Marx 1991; Price 1991; Seidman 1994). As these community protests escalated, most ANC activists came to believe any real prospect of bringing down the South African government by force had been postponed indefinitely. By the early 1980s, the ANC was putting most of its resources and energy into supporting popular mobilization in townships, with clandestine networks linking activists across the country with the ANC leadership-in-exile.

Yet although most published accounts continue to treat these unions, community organizations, and student groups as strictly separate from the ANC's military efforts, the links between above-ground protests and clandestine guerrilla campaigns were far stronger than activists or researchers generally acknowledged at the time. Through the mid-1980s, the ANC leadership called its attacks "armed propaganda," describing their aim in terms of raising black South Africans' morale, rather than a full-scale war. Public accounts regularly understated the symbolic importance of even small guerrilla actions—or even the way the well-publicized capture and trial of yet another ANC guerrilla often seemed to reinforce activists' determination. […]

Guerrilla attacks held a prominent place in the culture of the anti-apartheid movement. In the 1980s, although most ANC activists had abandoned the idea that a guerrilla movement would ever manage a military overthrow of the highly organized South African state, many township activists' commitment to armed struggle—and respect for those who participated actively in it— was almost visceral. Almost certainly, at least some part of Nelson Mandela's extraordinary popularity stems from his role as first commander of "MK"—as *Umkhonto*, the ANC's armed wing, was popularly nicknamed. Twenty-seven years later, Mandela garnered even more admiration in

the townships when the government revealed that Mandela had repeatedly rejected government offers to release him from prison if only he would renounce armed struggle (Sparks 1994: 49). Even when ANC resources had shifted to emphasize popular organization and protests over military attack, it retained its rhetorical commitment to armed struggle, describing its strategy as one that used "the hammer of armed struggle on the anvil of mass action." Indeed, as the anti-apartheid movement moved into a phase marked by popular unrest in 1985, the exiled ANC leadership announced intensification of its guerrilla efforts—a shift from what it called "armed propaganda" to "people's war." Even government data suggest that this announcement was in fact followed by a marked increase in attacks involving land-mines, hand-grenades, or AK-47s (SAIRR 1986: 542).

Of course, few South Africans ever participated actively in the armed struggle, or were even touched by it directly. Moreover, it will be difficult to tease out retroactively how many people really participated, or who knew even sketchy details of underground activity. The government routinely rejected any distinction between peaceful support for the ANC and clandestine involvement, construing even so mild an act as scraping "Free Nelson Mandela" on the side of an enamel mug as support for armed struggle. Student activists, trade unionists, community organizers were all detained without charges, tortured, and convicted under security legislation that treated them as "terrorists." Throughout the 1980s, "above-ground" activists routinely denied any connection to illegal organizations in hopes of finding some legal space in which to mobilize anti-apartheid resistance.

Ironically, however, just as security police insisted on blurring the line between different kinds of anti-apartheid resistance, many black South Africans also considered these categories intertwined: the struggle against apartheid, as activists often repeated, continued on many fronts. And the symbolic importance of the armed struggle even for those anti-apartheid activists who retained a strong moral commitment to non-violence should not be underestimated. Even someone as explicitly pacifist as Archbishop Desmond Tutu avoided condemnation of those who had chosen armed struggle. Throughout the

1980s, the ANC was regularly named by over half of black South Africans as the party they would vote for if allowed to vote, partly because of its history as the oldest anti-apartheid organization, but also, almost certainly, because of a popular perception in black townships that the ANC embodied armed resistance to an oppressive regime.

But aside from the symbolic importance of the armed struggle, we do not yet have a clear picture of how far clandestine guerrilla networks extended, nor of the role played by activists linked to clandestine ANC networks in coordinating mass mobilization. Many of the "non-violent" protests of the 1980s were coordinated by activists who were secretly linked to the ANC, and whose understanding of the anti-apartheid strategy embraced the armed struggle—even if they personally chose to focus on work in unions, community groups, or other forms of collective action. Many anti-apartheid activists avoided learning anything about guerrilla activities, hoping to protect mass protest and themselves from the kind of repression invited by participation in guerrilla activities, and to protect clandestine guerrilla networks by reducing their visibility to the police. But some seepage was inevitable: a guerrilla needing help, including shelter or money, would frequently turn first to township activists whose statements suggested they might have ANC loyalties, even if they had no direct involvement in the armed wing, and frequently, those activists responded with support and aid.

Perhaps more importantly, through the 1980s ANC military strategists frequently planned attacks that would be popularly understood in terms of links to on-going mass mobilization. "Armed propaganda" boosted activists' morale, and reminded them that an army of clandestine guerrillas might already have infiltrated the country from their bases farther north on the African continent. As the popular uprising intensified after 1984, even smaller, less-dramatic attacks had an immediate impact on the conversations in union meetings, church groups, and student groups the following day, raising morale among activists and providing proof that resistance would continue despite repression. Small attacks made large impressions when they were linked to popular struggles: where police had cordoned off a township, a postoffice might be hit by a

hand-grenade; in the middle of a bus boycott, an empty bus might be bombed. Press censorship meant that these attacks were rarely reported in the national press, but activists' networks spread the news rapidly, often adding exaggerated details for good measure. […]

As future historians re-examine the relationship between the "internal" opposition, the ANC's political leadership, and the ANC's military wing, they will also have to explore links between ANC underground networks and the violence that often accompanied township protests during the 1980s—episodes which should not be seen as somehow tarnishing the moral claims of the anti-apartheid movement, but rather as underscoring how problematic it can be to grade political protest against an absolutist moral score card. The strategy of disrupting apartheid from below required that nearly all black South Africans participate in campaigns entailing personal risk and daily difficulties; strikes, consumer boycotts, bus and rent boycotts were generally called by groups affiliated to the UDF, but were often enforced by groups of young militants who identified explicitly with the ANC. Efforts to initiate and extend such campaigns often provoked violent conflict between black South Africans who thought ending apartheid was worth any sacrifice, and those who felt that in the short term at least, they had more to lose than to gain. While nationally-visible leaders often dismissed acts like "necklacing"— placing a burning tire on a suspected informer— as the work of police provocateurs, such behavior was often widely condoned in townships. This kind of violent enforcement of mass mobilization was probably not centrally planned, but it reflected and reinforced the ANC's strategy of making the townships ungovernable—a coordinated strategy that underscores the importance of re-examining the role of a clandestine network of activists linked across the country to each other and to the ANC leadership-in-exile.

The Impact of Armed Struggle

Almost certainly, South Africa's armed struggle was more important in shaping the "above-ground" anti-apartheid movement than is generally acknowledged in contemporary scholarly analysis, and its legacies continue to play out in post-apartheid politics. In this section, I briefly suggest some ways in which a more integrated understanding of the anti-apartheid movement would alter our vision of the movement's internal dynamics. I then suggest that our silence about armed struggles in the past may undermine our ability to understand South African contention in the present.

A more integrated vision of the anti-apartheid movement would rearrange any description of the internal dynamics of above-ground protest. Evidence, of course, remains sketchy; if, on the one hand, the legacy of repression and danger makes most activists—and even more, most scholars—nervous about admitting knowledge of clandestine activities even twenty years later, there remains the converse danger that respondents will exaggerate their past links to underground activities. But there is significant evidence suggesting that clarifying the role of armed campaigns will require that we re-examine the anti-apartheid movement as a whole—specifically, re-examining the networks on which the anti-apartheid movement was built, the resources on which anti-apartheid groups relied, and the culture, identity, and emotions involved in mobilizing resistance to the apartheid regime.

There is a great deal of evidence suggesting that activists' persistent support for the armed struggle played an important role in the associational networks of the anti-apartheid movement more broadly—not only in terms of recruiting young activists to leave the country for military training and supporting guerrillas when they returned, but also in terms of linking activists' strategies in different parts of the country to overall ANC strategy. Often built around veteran ANC activists or prominent activist families, these clandestine networks were frequently involved in coordinating campaigns in different parts of the country, and perhaps even more importantly, in coordinating guerrilla attacks with above-ground campaigns. Written descriptions of open protest meetings rarely mention the frequency with which speakers would allude to their participation in clandestine networks: by the late 1980s it was not unusual for activists to indirectly acknowledge links to illegal cells by opening their remarks with references to "the line," indicating special knowledge and implying direct communication with the exiled ANC leadership.

Needless to say, many of these activists probably exaggerated reality, since the very fact of clandestinity meant that most listeners could not check the claimants' true status; moreover, activists claiming access to "the line" often contradicted each other, since there were many different voices and opinions even within the networks. Nevertheless, especially in UDF groups or in a few specifically ANC-linked unions, individuals' links to clandestine networks often gave a special status to their knowledge or suggestions.

That status was probably invisible to most outside researchers, revealed only if the activist was arrested for involvement in military activities; but it may well have been known or guessed by many listeners in township groups. Glenn Adler, an American researcher in the 1980s, has written movingly of his realization that a key informant, Themba Dyassi, was widely known to fellow unionists as a footsoldier in a clandestine MK cell. Apparently, the union shop stewards asked Dyassi to be Adler's first interviewee, to investigate Adler while Adler interviewed him. Although Dyassi and other MK members in the factory held no formal role in the union leadership—in a conscious effort to insulate the union from the legal repression that would have accompanied any discovery of union ties to MK—their status among politically aware activists in the factory was linked to their status in clandestine networks (Adler 1992, 1994).

I do not mean to suggest that the links between underground networks and above-ground groups were entirely clear or straightforward: tensions plagued aboveground groups, revolving around their relation to clandestine networks, their relationship to activists known to be involved in illegal activities, and the extent to which their organizational strategies should reflect specifically local issues as well as national ones (Seekings 2000). Similarly, MK activists were constantly engaged in discussion about whether or not specific targets were appropriate, or would alienate popular sentiment (interview, TM, Botswana, 1987). Perhaps now that activists can discuss their clandestine roles more openly, more researchers can re-examine the way the concerns of secret networks played out in aboveground discussions, and give a fuller picture of the interaction between clandestine and aboveground debates.

If we know little about networks, we know even less about how material resources coming from clandestine networks may have affected the anti-apartheid movement as a whole. Obviously, the military resources provided by Eastern Europe to the exiled ANC played an important role in ideological discussions within the ANC; countries that provided military support and training became special allies for the ANC, strengthening the weight of the South African Communist Party within the ANC alliance. But we have very little understanding of how clandestine resources funneled to internal, above-ground groups may have shaped strategic choices and ideological debates within the open anti-apartheid movement. In impoverished black communities, the anti-apartheid movement struggled to find money to sustain protests. Organizing in the townships required money not only for leaflets, gasoline and cars, and meeting spaces, but, especially in the repressive 1980s, for housing and feeding activists who were hiding from the police, for lawyers' fees to support detainees, for sustaining families during consumer boycotts, strikes, and stay-aways. Through the early 1980s, the UDF received much of its funding from church groups and other international supporters. Some of these, like the prominent British anti-apartheid organization International Defence and Aid or the Dutch anti-apartheid movement, took advice directly from the exiled ANC about which South African groups to fund. But the UDF also received clandestine funding from the exiled ANC, sometimes smuggled into the country by the same methods used to smuggle guns and explosives (interview, FS, Botswana, 1984).

How did access to donor funds and to smuggled cash alter the dynamics of debates within aboveground groups? What difference did it make to the strategies of aboveground groups that activists linked to clandestine networks could sometimes draw on additional resources, providing support for one kind of protest organization rather than another? In the early 1980s, for example, debates over whether activists should pursue "non-racialism" compared to a separatist black consciousness approach were frequently described in purely ideological terms; but clandestine resources gave greater visibility to "Charterist," or non-racial, approaches—and probably attracted new recruits more easily to non-racial organizations than might have otherwise been the case.

Neither networks nor resources alone would have sustained township support, however, if the idea of armed struggle had not retained a place at the symbolic core of the national liberation struggle. This strong symbolic role was neither natural nor accidental: ANC-affiliated activists worked hard through the 1980s to construct a culture of support for MK's guerrillas, in which those who chose to join the armed struggle—a choice that obviously involved enormous risks and sacrifice—were often considered heroes, even by activists who explicitly avoided clandestine work. Broad public campaigns like the 1981 campaign to "Unban the Freedom Charter," which used a loophole in South Africa's press censorship to discuss the ANC's goals and strategies, were conscious efforts to promote the ANC's visibility above ground. At the same time, however, more secretive efforts built community support for the ANC's armed struggle. Above-ground activists frequently traveled, legally and illegally, to neighboring states, where they met exiled ANC activists, sharing ideas and information, and discussing strategy. Some of these meetings are described in trial transcripts, when in-country activists were charged with "furthering the aims"; but many more went unnoticed, and undiscussed in public forums. In some of these discussions—including the very visible 1982 "Culture and Resistance" conference held in Botswana, where several hundred in-country, above-ground activists met ANC exiles and each other—ANC supporters worked hard to reinforce a township discourse that treated the armed struggle as a legitimate, perhaps essential, part of the anti-apartheid movement.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the ANC was only one of several parties within the anti-apartheid movement; by 1990, it had emerged as the government's primary negotiating partner. In those rare social movement discussions that mention armed struggle, some ethnic support for armed struggle tends to be portrayed as natural (e.g., Waldmann 1992); but in the case of South Africa, the construction of community support for the ANC's guerrilla efforts was slow and painstaking. The growth of support did not reflect an innate black South African community consensus, but required movement resources and energy, and careful efforts to create a culture affirming the armed struggle.

As social movement analysts re-examine the 1980s anti-apartheid movement, perhaps we should explore more carefully how the actual armed struggle intersected with the construction of a culture of support for that struggle. In the definition of a militant national project, how and to what extent did support for the armed struggle express an oppositional national identity, challenging settler domination and racial supremacism and symbolically linking the anti-apartheid struggle to other anti-colonial struggles for self-determination?

Finally, it is worth noting that the armed struggle within the anti-apartheid movement is not important only for its historical symbolism: its legacy remains deeply embedded in Southern African politics, shaping collective memories and national aspirations as well as individual careers. Collective memories of nationalist struggles often give special place to guerrillas, as heroes and martyrs whose commitment went beyond the ordinary. Such glorification of armed struggle lends legitimacy to particular political claims in the present. It could be argued, for example, that the ANC's popular commitment to a "non-racial" ideology, which welcomes white participation, was greatly shored up by the visible participation of several key whites in the guerrilla command structure, some of whom still serve in the ANC cabinet. […]

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Nelson Mandela: "I Am Prepared to Die"

Nelson Mandela must be reckoned as one of the greatest leaders—real and symbolic—of the twentieth century. Mandela came to lead the movement against white supremacy (known as apartheid or "separate-ness") in South Africa. He spent 27 years in prison for those efforts, becoming a symbol of defiance against injustice. Upon his release from prison, Mandela helped negotiate South Africa's transition to democracy. He won the Nobel Peace Prize and became South Africa's first president to be elected under universal suffrage.

Rolihlahla Mandela was born on July 18, 1918, to an elite family in the Transkei region of South Africa. He attended a Christian mission school and later the College of Fort Hare. He was given the name Nelson, after the British admiral, by a primary school teacher who had trouble pronouncing his given name. Mandela eventually chose to become a lawyer and opened a law practice with Oliver Tambo, another important anti-apartheid leader.

Mandela joined the Youth League of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1944 and soon rose to the top leadership of the ANC. The ANC, which advocated "non-racialism" (or what would today be called "multiracialism"), was the main black anti-apartheid organization in South Africa, although it did not engage in mass politics or movement activities (demonstrations, civil disobedience, and the like) before 1949.

Like many "Africanists" in the ANC Youth League, Mandela was initially wary of collaborating with whites, and he supported the expulsion of Communists from the ANC. The Communist Party was a multiracial group, but it was viewed by some in the ANC as an essentially white organization with ulterior motives.

However, Mandela later embraced the ANC's non-racialism and abandoned his earlier anti-Communism. The Africanists left the ANC in 1959 and established the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).

Mandela led the nonviolent Defiance Campaign of 1952 and helped coordinate the multiracial Congress Alliance that brought together black, white, and South Asian opponents of apartheid. The Alliance issued the "Freedom Charter" in 1955, which declared that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and … no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people." The government arrested 156 members of the Alliance, charging them with treason. The subsequent Treason Trial concluded in 1961 with the acquittal of all the defendants against whom the government had not already dropped its charges, including Mandela.

Mass protests in 1960 against the government's hated pass laws, which required non-whites to carry a passbook in order to control their movements, resulted in the massacre of 69 protestors in the town of Sharpeville. The government then banned the ANC and PAC. Both organizations went underground and decided to form military wings. Mandela and activists from the ANC and the Communist Party established Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation"), which launched a campaign of sabotage and began preparations for guerrilla warfare.

Mandela and other leading anti-apartheid activists were arrested in 1962 and 1963; many more fled into exile. In June 1964, Mandela and seven others were convicted of various charges and sentenced to life imprisonment. At the trial, Mandela declared:

> During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

Mandela would spend most of his 27 years in prison at Robben Island, a prison off Cape Town that became home—and a kind of university or think tank—for many black political prisoners. During his years in prison, Mandela became an internationally recognized symbol of defiance to apartheid. Activists in Europe, North America, and elsewhere demanded Mandela's release as well as strict sanctions on trade and investment in South Africa.

Following more years of renewed protest and labor strikes during the mid-1980s, many businesspeople and white politicians came slowly to conclude that apartheid was probably doomed. Strikes paralyzed the economy and black townships became virtually ungovernable by the white regime. Secret talks with exiled ANC officials, and eventually with Mandela, were begun, especially after F. W. de Klerk became president. De Klerk began to release ANC activists from prison. Finally, on February 11, 1990, Mandela himself was released, an event broadcast live around the world. He addressed a huge rally in Cape Town that day, concluding with his famous pledge that he was prepared to die for a free and democratic South Africa.

Over the next several years, and despite many obstacles and setbacks, Mandela helped negotiate South Africa's transition to democracy. This was no easy task. The apartheid economy had created a wealthy class of whites and a huge mass of impoverished blacks. Whites feared that democracy would empower black politicians who would expropriate their wealth. The presence of the Communist Party in the anti-apartheid coalition seemed foreboding, despite the collapse of the Soviet bloc after 1989. Mandela played a conspicuous role in allaying the fears of whites. Eventually, a deal was struck: The white minority agreed to accept democracy; in return, white wealth and property would be respected. For their efforts, Mandela and de Klerk jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.

In South Africa's first elections with universal suffrage, in April 1994, the ANC predictably swept into power, and Mandela was easily elected president. During his term in office (1994–99), racial reconciliation continued to be a major preoccupation. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established, led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to hold hearings on human rights abuses committed by both former government officials and anti-apartheid activists. Controversially, individuals who admitted to human rights abuses before the commission received amnesty from prosecution.

South Africa continues to be a land of vast inequalities and human misery. But thanks to Mandela and the anti-apartheid movement, it is much closer to the ideal of a democratic and free society to which Mandela dedicated his life.

22

Suicide Bombing

Robert J. Brym

In October 1983, Shi'a militants attacked the military barracks of American and French troops in Beirut, killing nearly 300 people. Today the number of suicide attacks worldwide has passed 1,000, with almost all the attacks concentrated in just nine countries: Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Israel, Turkey, India (Kashmir), Russia (Chechnya), Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Israel, for example, experienced a wave of suicide attacks in the mid-1990s when Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) sought to undermine peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. A far deadlier wave of attacks began in Israel in October 2000 after all hope of a negotiated settlement collapsed. Altogether, between 1993 and 2005, 158 suicide attacks took place in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, killing more than 800 people and injuring more than 4,600.

Over the past quarter century, researchers have learned much about the motivations of suicide bombers, the rationales of the organizations that support them, their modus operandi, the precipitants of suicide attacks, and the effects of counterterrorism on insurgent behavior. Much of what they have learned is at odds with conventional wisdom and the thinking of policymakers who guide counterterrorist strategy. This chapter draws on that research, but I focus mainly on the Israeli/Palestinian case to draw six lessons from the carnage wrought by suicide bombers. In brief, I argue that (1) suicide bombers are not crazy, (2) nor are they motivated principally by religious zeal. It is possible to discern (3) a strategic logic and (4) a social logic underlying their actions. Targeted states typically react by repressing organizations that mount suicide attacks, but (5) this repression often makes matters worse. (6) Only by first taking an imaginative leap and understanding the world from the assailant's point of view can we hope to develop a workable strategy for minimizing suicide attacks. Let us examine each of these lessons in turn.

Lesson 1: Suicide Bombers Are Not Crazy

Lance Corporal Eddie DiFranco was the only survivor of the 1983 suicide attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut who saw the face of the bomber.

DiFranco was on watch when he noticed the attacker speeding his truck full of explosives toward the main building on the marine base. "He looked right at me [and] smiled," DiFranco later recalled.

Was the bomber insane? Some Western observers thought so. Several psychologists characterized the Beirut bombers as "unstable individuals with a death wish." Government and media sources made similar assertions in the immediate aftermath of the suicide attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Yet these claims were purely speculative. Subsequent interviews with prospective suicide bombers and reconstructions of the biographies of successful suicide attackers revealed few psychological abnormalities. In fact, after examining many hundreds of cases for evidence of depression, psychosis, past suicide attempts, and so on, Robert Pape discovered only a single person who could be classified as having a psychological problem (a Chechen woman who may have been mentally retarded).

On reflection, it is not difficult to understand why virtually all suicide bombers are psychologically stable. The organizers of suicide attacks do not want to jeopardize their missions by recruiting unreliable people. A research report prepared for the Danish government a few years ago noted: "Recruits who display signs of pathological behaviour are automatically weeded out for reasons of organizational security." It may be that some psychologically unstable people want to become suicide bombers, but insurgent organizations strongly prefer their cannons fixed.

Lesson 2: It's Mainly about Politics, not Religion

In May 1972, three Japanese men in business suits boarded a flight from Paris to Tel Aviv. They were members of the Japanese Red Army, an affiliate of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Eager to help their Palestinian comrades liberate Israel from Jewish rule, they had packed their carry-on bags with machine guns and hand grenades. After disembarking at Lod Airport near Tel Aviv, they began an armed assault on everyone in sight. When the dust settled, 26 people lay dead, nearly half of them Puerto Rican Catholics on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

Israeli guards killed one of the attackers. A second blew himself up, thus becoming the first suicide bomber in modern Middle Eastern history. The Israelis captured the third assailant, Kozo Okamoto.

Okamoto languished in an Israeli prison until the mid-1980s, when he was handed over to Palestinian militants in Lebanon's Beka'a Valley in a prisoner exchange. Then, in 2000, something unexpected happened. Okamoto apparently abandoned or at least ignored his secular faith in the theories of Bakunin and Trotsky, and converted to Islam. For Okamoto, politics came first, then religion.

A similar evolution occurs in the lives of many people. Any political conflict makes people look for ways to explain the dispute and imagine a strategy for resolving it; they adopt or formulate an ideology. If the conflict is deep and the ideology proves inadequate, people modify the ideology or reject it for an alternative. Religious themes often tinge political ideologies, and the importance of the religious component may increase if analyses and strategies based on secular reasoning fail. When religious elements predominate, they may intensify the conflict.

For example, the Palestinians have turned to one ideology after another to explain their loss of land to Jewish settlers and military forces and to formulate a plan for regaining territorial control. Especially after 1952, when Gamal Abdel Nasser took office in Egypt, many Palestinians turned to Pan-Arabism, the belief that the Arab countries would unify and force Israel to cede territory. But wars failed to dislodge the Israelis. Particularly after the Six-Day War in 1967, many Palestinians turned to nationalism, which placed the responsibility for regaining control of lost territory on the Palestinians themselves. Others became Marxists, identifying wage-workers (and, in some cases, peasants) as the engines of national liberation. The Palestinians used plane hijackings to draw the world's attention to their cause, launched wave upon wave of guerrilla attacks against Israel, and in the 1990s entered into negotiations to create a sovereign Palestinian homeland.

Yet Islamic fundamentalism had been growing in popularity among Palestinians since the late

1980s—ironically, without opposition from the Israeli authorities, who saw it as a conservative counterweight to Palestinian nationalism. When negotiations with Israel to establish a Palestinian state broke down in 2000, many Palestinians saw the secularist approach as bankrupt and turned to Islamic fundamentalism for political answers. In January 2006, the Islamic fundamentalist party, Hamas, was democratically elected to form the Palestinian government, winning 44 percent of the popular vote and 56 percent of the parliamentary seats. In this case, as in many others, secular politics came first. When secularism failed, notions of "martyrdom" and "holy war" gained in importance.

This does not mean that most modern suicide bombers are deeply religious, either among the Palestinians or other groups. Among the 83 percent of suicide attackers worldwide between 1980 and 2003 for whom Robert Pape found data on ideological background, only a minority— 43 percent—were identifiably religious. In Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza between 1981 and 2003, fewer than half of suicide bombers had discernible religious inclinations. In its origins and at its core, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is not religiously inspired, and suicide bombing, despite its frequent religious trappings, is fundamentally the expression of a territorial dispute. In this conflict, many members of the dominant group—Jewish Israelis—use religion as a central marker of identity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many Palestinian militants also view the struggle in starkly religious terms.

The same holds for contemporary Iraq. As Mohammed Hafez has recently shown, 443 suicide missions took place in Iraq between March 2003 and February 2006. Seventy-one percent of the identifiable attackers belonged to al-Qaeda in Iraq. To be sure, they justified their actions in religious terms. Members of al-Qaeda in Iraq view the Shi'a who control the Iraqi state as apostates. They want to establish fundamentalist, Sunni-controlled states in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries. Suicide attacks against the Iraqi regime and its American and British supporters are seen as a means to that end.

But it is only within a particular political context that these ambitions first arose. After all, suicide attacks began with the American and British invasion of Iraq and the installation of a Shi'a-controlled regime. And it is only under certain political conditions that these ambitions are acted upon. Thus, Hafez's analysis shows that suicide bombings spike (1) in retaliation for big counterinsurgency operations and (2) as a strategic response to institutional developments which suggest that Shi'a-controlled Iraq is about to become more stable. So although communal identity has come to be religiously demarcated in Iraq, this does not mean that religion per se initiated suicide bombing or that it drives the outbreak of suicide bombing campaigns.

Lesson 3: Sometimes It's Strategic

Suicide bombing often has a political logic. In many cases, it is used as a tactic of last resort undertaken by the weak to help them restore control over territory they perceive as theirs. This political logic is clear in statements routinely released by leaders of organizations that launch suicide attacks. Characteristically, the first communiqué issued by Hamas in 1987 stated that martyrdom is the appropriate response to occupation, and the 1988 Hamas charter says that jihad is the duty of every Muslim whose territory is invaded by an enemy.

The political logic of suicide bombing is also evident when suicide bombings occur in clusters as part of an organized campaign, often timed to maximize strategic gains. A classic example is the campaign launched by Hamas and the PIJ in the mid-1990s. Fearing that a settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority would prevent the Palestinians from gaining control over all of Israel, Hamas and the PIJ aimed to scuttle peace negotiations by unleashing a small army of suicide bombers.

Notwithstanding the strategic basis of many suicide attacks, we cannot conclude that strategic reasoning governs them all. More often than not, suicide bombing campaigns fail to achieve their territorial aims. Campaigns may occur without apparent strategic justification, as did the campaign that erupted in Israel after negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority broke down in 2000. A social logic often overlays the political logic of suicide bombing.

Lesson 4: Sometimes It's Retaliatory

On October 4, 2003, a 29-year-old lawyer entered Maxim restaurant in Haifa and detonated her belt of plastic explosives. In addition to taking her own life, Hanadi Jaradat killed 20 people and wounded dozens of others. When her relatives were later interviewed in the Arab press, they explained her motives as follows: "She carried out the attack in revenge for the killing of her brother and her cousin [to whom she had been engaged] by the Israeli security forces, and in revenge for all the crimes Israel is perpetrating in the West Bank by killing Palestinians and expropriating their land." Strategic calculation did not inform Jaradat's attack. Research I conducted with Bader Araj shows that, like a majority of Palestinian suicide bombers between 2000 and 2005, Jaradat was motivated by the desire for revenge and retaliation.

Before people act, they sometimes weigh the costs and benefits of different courses of action and choose the one that appears to cost the least and offer the most benefits. But people are not calculating machines. Sometimes they just don't add up. Among other emotions, feelings of anger and humiliation can trump rational strategic calculation in human affairs. Economists have conducted experiments called "the ultimatum game," in which the experimenter places two people in a room, gives one of them $20, and tells the recipient that she must give some of the money—as much or as little as she wants—to the other person. If the other person refuses the offer, neither gets to keep any money. Significantly, in four out of five cases, the other person refuses to accept the money if she is offered less than $5. Although she will gain materially if she accepts any offer, she is highly likely to turn down a low offer so as to punish her partner for stinginess. This outcome suggests that emotions can easily override the rational desire for material gain. (Researchers at the University of Zürich have recently demonstrated the physiological basis of this override function by using MRI brain scans on people playing the ultimatum game.) At the political level, research I conducted with Bader Araj on the events precipitating suicide bombings, the motivations of suicide bombers, and the rationales of the organizations that support suicide bombings shows that Palestinian suicide missions are in most cases prompted less by strategic cost–benefit calculations than by such human emotions as revenge and retaliation. The existence of these deeply human emotions also helps to explain why attempts to suppress suicide bombing campaigns sometimes do not have the predicted results.

Lesson 5: Repression Is a Boomerang

Major General Doron Almog commanded the Israel Defense Forces Southern Command from 2000 to 2003. He tells the story of how, in early 2003, a wealthy Palestinian merchant in Gaza received a phone call from an Israeli agent. The caller said that the merchant's son was preparing a suicide mission, and that if he went through with it, the family home would be demolished, Israel would sever all commercial ties with the family, and its members would never be allowed to visit Israel again. The merchant prevailed upon his son to reconsider, and the attack was averted.

Exactly how many suicide bombers have been similarly deterred is unknown. We do know that of the nearly 600 suicide missions launched in Israel and its occupied territories between 2000 and 2005, fewer than 25 percent succeeded in reaching their targets. Israeli counterterrorist efforts thwarted three-quarters of them using violent means. In addition, Israel preempted an incalculable number of attacks by assassinating militants involved in planning them. More than 200 Israeli assassination attempts took place between 2000 and 2005, 80 percent of which succeeded in killing their main target, sometimes with considerable "collateral damage."

The first two rows of data in this table were calculated from a systematic analysis of newspapers (the *New York Times*, *ha-Aretz*, *al-Quds*, and *al-'Arabi*) by Robert Brym and Bader Araj. The remainder of the data is based on a survey of 45 Palestinian insurgent leaders conducted by Bader Araj in the West Bank and Gaza during the spring and summer of 2006.

Common sense suggests that repression should dampen insurgency by increasing its cost. By this logic, when state organizations eliminate the people who plan suicide bombings, destroy their bomb-making facilities, intercept their agents,

Table 22.1 Insurgency, repression, and perceptions by party

	Hamas/PIJ	Fatah/Other
Number of successful suicide attackers, 2000–5	85	48
Number of attempted state assassinations, 2000–5	124	82
Percentage of leaders never willing to recognize Israel	100%	10%
How has Israel's assassination policy affected the ability of your organization to conduct suicide bombing operations?	increased 33% not affected 42% decreased 25%	increased 9% not affected 5% decreased 86%
In comparison with other tactics used by your organization, how costly has suicide bombing been in terms of the human and material resources used, damage to your organization, etc.?	as or less costly 53% more costly 20% don't know 27%	as or less costly 11% more costly 86% don't know 4%

and punish the people who support them, they erode the insurgents' capabilities for mounting suicide attacks. But this commonsense approach to counterinsurgency overlooks two complicating factors. First, harsh repression may reinforce radical opposition and even intensify it. Second, insurgents may turn to alternative and perhaps more lethal methods to achieve their aims.

Consider the Palestinian case (see Table 22.1). Bader Araj and I were able to identify the organizational affiliation of 133 Palestinian suicide bombers between September 2000 and July 2005. Eighty-five of them (64 percent) were affiliated with the Islamic fundamentalist groups Hamas and the PIJ, while the rest were affiliated with secular Palestinian groups such as Fatah. Not surprisingly, given this distribution, Israeli repression was harshest against the Islamic fundamentalists, who were the targets of 124 Israeli assassination attempts (more than 60 percent of the total).

Yet after nearly five years of harsh Israeli repression—involving not just the assassination of leaders but also numerous arrests, raids on bomb-making facilities, the demolition of houses belonging to family members of suicide bombers, and so on—Hamas and PIJ leaders remained adamant in their resolve and much more radical than Palestinian secularist leaders. When 45 insurgent leaders representing all major Palestinian factions were interviewed in depth in the summer of 2006, 100 percent of those associated with Hamas and PIJ (compared to just 10 percent of secularist leaders) said they would never be willing to recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel. That is, the notion of Israel as a Jewish state was still

entirely unacceptable to each and every one of them. When asked how Israel's assassination policy had affected the ability of their organization to conduct suicide bombing operations, 42 percent of Hamas and PIJ respondents said that the policy had had no effect, while one-third said the policy had increased their organization's capabilities (the corresponding figures for secularist leaders were 5 percent and 9 percent, respectively).

And when asked how costly suicide bombing had been in terms of human and organizational resources, organizational damage, and so on, 53 percent of Hamas and PIJ leaders (compared to just 11 percent of secularist leaders) said that suicide bombing was less costly or at least no more costly than the alternatives. Responses to such questions probably tell us more about the persistent resolve of the Islamic fundamentalists than their actual capabilities. And that is just the point. Harsh Israeli repression over an extended period apparently reinforced the anti-Israel sentiments of Islamic fundamentalists.

Some counterterrorist experts say that motivations count for little if capabilities are destroyed. And they would be right if it were not for the substitutability of methods: increase the cost of one method of attack, and highly motivated insurgents typically substitute another. So, for example, Israel's late prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, ordered troops to "break the bones" of Palestinians who engaged in mass demonstrations, rock throwing, and other nonlethal forms of protest in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Palestinians responded with more violent attacks, including suicide missions. Similarly, after Israel began to crack down ruthlessly on suicide bombing operations in 2002,

rocket attacks against Israeli civilians sharply increased in frequency. In general, severe repression can work for a while, but a sufficiently determined mass opposition can always design new tactics to surmount new obstacles, especially if its existence as a group is visibly threatened (and unless, of course, the mass opposition is exterminated in its entirety). One kind of "success" usually breeds another kind of "failure" if the motivation of insurgents is high.

Lesson 6: Empathize with Your Enemy

In October 2003, Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon explicitly recognized this conundrum when he stated that Israel's tactics against the Palestinians had become too repressive and were stirring up potentially uncontrollable levels of hatred and terrorism. "In our tactical decisions, we are operating contrary to our strategic interests," he told reporters. Ya'alon went on to claim that the Israeli government was unwilling to make concessions that could bolster the authority of moderate Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, and he expressed the fear that by continuing its policy of harsh repression, Israel would bring about the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, the silencing of Palestinian moderates, and the popularization of more radical voices like that of Hamas. The head of the General Security Service (Shabak), the defense minister, and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon opposed Ya'alon. Consequently, his term as chief of staff was not renewed, and his military career ended in 2005. A year later, all of Ya'alon's predictions proved accurate.

Ya'alon was no dove. From the time he became chief of staff in July 2002, he had been in charge of ruthlessly putting down the Palestinian uprising. He had authorized assassinations, house demolitions, and all the rest. But 15 months into the job, Ya'alon had learned much from his experience, and it seems that what he learned above all else was to empathize with the enemy—not to have warm and fuzzy feelings about the Palestinians, but to see things from their point of view in order to improve his ability to further Israel's chief strategic interest, namely, to live in peace with its neighbors.

As odd as it may sound at first, and as difficult as it may be to apply in practice, exercising empathy with one's enemy is the key to an effective counterterrorist strategy. Seeing the enemy's point of view increases one's understanding of the minimum conditions that would allow the enemy to put down arms. An empathic understanding of the enemy discourages counterproductive actions such as excessive repression, and it encourages tactical moves that further one's strategic aims. As Ya'alon suggested, in the Israeli case such tactical moves might include (1) offering meaningful rewards—for instance, releasing hundreds of millions of Palestinian tax dollars held in escrow by Israel, freeing selected Palestinians from Israeli prisons, and shutting down remote and costly Israeli settlements in the northern West Bank—in exchange for the renunciation of suicide bombing, and (2) attributing the deal to the intercession of moderate Palestinian forces so as to buttress their popularity and authority. (From this point of view, Israel framed its unilateral 2005 withdrawal from Gaza poorly because most Palestinians saw it as a concession foisted on Israel by Hamas.) Once higher levels of trust and stability are established by such counterterrorist tactics, they can serve as the foundation for negotiations leading to a permanent settlement. Radical elements would inevitably try to jeopardize negotiations, as they have in the past, but Israel resisted the temptation to shut down peace talks during the suicide bombing campaign of the mid-1990s, and it could do so again. Empathizing with the enemy would also help prevent the breakdown of negotiations, as happened in 2000; a clear sense of the minimally acceptable conditions for peace can come only from an empathic understanding of the enemy.

Conclusion

Political conflict over territory is the main reason for suicide bombing, although religious justifications for suicide missions are likely to become more important when secular ideologies fail to bring about desired results. Suicide bombing may also occur for strategic or retaliatory reasons—to further insurgent aims or in response to repressive state actions.

Cases vary in the degree to which suicide bombers are motivated by (1) political or religious

and (2) strategic or retaliatory aims. For example, research to date suggests that suicide bombing is more retaliatory in Israel than in Iraq, and more religiously motivated in Iraq than in Israel. But in any case, repression (short of a policy approaching genocide) cannot solve the territorial disputes that lie at the root of suicide bombing campaigns. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, wrote a few years ago in the *New York Times*, "to win the war on terrorism, one must … begin a political effort that focuses on the conditions that brought about [the terrorists'] emergence." These are wise words that Israel— and the United States in its own "war on terror"— would do well to heed.

Recommended Resources

Hany Abu-Hassad. *Paradise Now*. This movie sketches the circumstances that shape the lives of two Palestinian suicide bombers, showing that they are a lot like us and that if we found ourselves in similar circumstances, we might turn out to be a lot like them. (Nominated for the 2005 Oscar for best foreign-language film.)

Robert J. Brym and Bader Araj. "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada." *Social Forces* 84 (2006): 1965–82. Explains suicide bombing as the outcome of structured interactions among conflicting and cooperating parties and organizations.

Mohammed M. Hafez. "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 591–619. The first systematic analysis of suicide bombing in Iraq demonstrates the strategic and retaliatory aims of the assailants.

Errol Morris. *The Fog of War*. Robert McNamara's extraordinarily frank assessment of his career as secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This film is a profound introduction to strategic thinking and a valuable lesson on how to learn from one's mistakes. His first lesson: empathize with your enemy. (Winner of the 2003 Oscar for best documentary.)

Robert A. Pape. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (Random House, 2005). In support of the view that suicide bombing takes place mainly for rational, strategic reasons, Pape analyzes all suicide attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2003.

Christoph Reuter. *My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing*. Trans. H. Ragg-Kirkby (Princeton University Press, 2004). A succinct overview of the past 25 years of suicide attacks.

23

Everyday Life, Routine Politics, and Protest

Javier Auyero

Contentious Snapshot

June 26, 1996. Governor Sapag and picketer Laura Padilla sign a public agreement in the city of Cutral-co, province of Neuquén, Argentina. The whole country watches the event on TV, reads about it in newspapers, or hears about the details on the radio. That agreement puts an end to a protest of thousands of residents of Cutral-co and Plaza Huincul who blocked all the access roads to the area, effectively halting the movement of people and goods for seven days and six nights. It all begins on June 20 with the news of the cancellation of a deal between the provincial government and Agrium, a Canadian company, to build a fertilizer plant in the region, a plant that will provide, at best, 50 full-time jobs. A few hours after local radio stations spread the bad news, five main barricades and dozens of smaller pickets, with varying numbers of women, men, and children in each, isolate this oil and gas region from the rest of the province and the country. During days and nights, one slogan unites the hundreds of protesters: "Nobody comes in, nobody gets out. We want Governor Sapag to come here. We want jobs."

It is below 30 degrees on the morning of June 25, when a federal judge in command of 200 soldiers of the Gendarmería Nacional *comes to Plaza Huincul with the intention of clearing the National Road 22 of demonstrators. With the help of tear gas and rubber bullets the gendarmes clear out the first barricade less than a mile from the main blockade at* Torre Uno *(the oil derrick that memorializes the discovery of petroleum in the region) but as they attempt to move forward, they notice that approximately 20,000 people (close to half of the total population of both towns) are awaiting them. From the roof of a van, her arm held by a masked picketer, the judge addresses the crowd with a megaphone, recuses herself from the case, and tells protesters that she, and the gendarmes at her command, are leaving town. The crowd cheers her, sings the national anthem, and shouts: "The people won, the people won!"*

On the morning of the protest's seventh day, Governor Sapag meets with the "Committee of Pickets' Representatives" (a recently formed organization of which Laura Padilla is now the main spokesperson) in Cutral-co. The handwritten agreement signed by the governor and the

picketer states that the protest was a "clear demonstration of the hunger suffered by the population" of both cities, and promises public works that will provide locals with jobs, delivery of food, the reconnection of gas and electricity for approximately 2500 families whose service was cut off due to lack of payment. The agreement also states that the governor will declare both communities in "occupational and social emergency," specifies some of the projects that the provincial government will begin and/or support to create jobs, promises that the provincial bank will assist local businesses with new credit lines, assures that no punitive measures will be taken against those who took active part in the protest, and, finally, guarantees that new investors will be sought to build the fertilizer plant.

Five years later, I am sitting in the living room of Laura's modest house in General Roca (in the neighboring province of Rio Negro) when she hands me the notebook she carried during the seven days of the protest that came to be nationally known as la pueblada: *"You can have it, take it with you … Part of what we, the picketers, did is in this notebook." In one of our last conversations, Laura, a 44-year-old mother of three, currently unemployed, tells me that, when she signed the agreement with the Governor, "I was signing against all the injustices, the humiliations, that I suffered throughout my life."*

In one simple statement, Laura alerted me about a key dimension of popular contention, a dimension that (I realized when back from the field) figures prominently in Charles Tilly's notion of repertoire of collective action, i.e. the intimate relationship of everyday life with protest.[1] This key, though understudied, aspect of contentious politics constitutes the object of this chapter. Based on archival research and ethno-graphic fieldwork, this article draws upon the theatrical metaphor of "repertoire" to examine the continuities between everyday life, routine politics, and contentious joint action. Focusing on a case study, the six-day road blockade in the Argentine Patagonia known as *la pueblada*, the article scrutinizes these connections through a thick description of (a) the intersection of this episode of popular protest with the life history of one of its key participants, paying particular attention to the ways in which Laura's biography (i.e. her social trajectory

not merely as a picketer but as a woman, a wife, a mother, and a worker) shapes her actions, thoughts, and feelings during the uprising, and (b) the modes in which routine politics affect the origins and shape of the protest.

Everyday Life at the Crossroads

At the time of the protest, Laura is working as a private tutor teaching language and social studies in a house she rents with her friend Jorge, who teaches math. The few students she has barely help her to make ends meet. What follows is an excerpt from Laura's diary covering the first day of the protest (the original version mixes past and present tenses):

Thursday, June 20, 1996. I woke up early. My same duties were awaiting me. No work was forthcoming, but I had to go and wait for it. Everything was as usual. I had to go to Court to check the paperwork for the child allowance I was claiming from my husband; that was tedious, tiring, humiliating … [At noon my neighbor told me to tune to Radio Victoria] I listened to the radio but I didn't understand what was going on: "they will blockade the roads, stores will close for the day." There were phone calls to the radio station in which people expressed all their anger. [When I got back to work, Jorge] told me the history of Agrium, the fertilizer plant, the different factions within the governing party (Movimiento Popular Neuquino, hereafter MPN) and all the things I had to know […] I went back home and I turned on the radio again and I listened to all the angry comments that the people were making: "Another political promise was vanishing." Unemployment, "father YPF" was gone, hunger, nothing to do […] I went to bed with the radio on my side, by then I had begun to identify with that poverty [the radio was talking about]. And I cried for the three years of solitude [since she got divorced in 1993], the three years of efforts, of struggles for my three kids … three years of fights against a humiliating court system […] That night I cried a lot … And I cried and I felt identified with the comments that people were making on the radio […] I am poor, with no possibilities, with no hope, 36 years old, alone […] I don't receive child support […] The morning of the 21st every store was closed … I never participated in something like this … What shall I do? I talked

to my neighbor and we decided to go to the road,
the radio was announcing big barbecues, and they
were saying that the cabs were free if you wanted
to go. In other words, it was like a day in the coun-
try, and with that mentality, I went to the road, [I
went] to have a barbecue with my neighbors […]
The reality: unemployment and poverty, injustice.
My reality: unemployment, poverty, injustice.
That was my life.

Laura is certainly not the sole recipient of those
radio messages. Early that June 20th, Radio
Victoria airs the cancellation of the deal between
the provincial government and Agrium, and
"opens its microphones to listen to the people's
reaction … A neighbor called saying that the peo-
ple should show its discontent … [another one]
said that we should get together in the road,"
Mario Fernández, director and owner of the radio
station, recalls. All my interviewees mention those
radio messages as central in their recollections,
not only in terms of the ways in which the radio
calls on people but also in terms of the way in
which the local radio *frames* the cancellation of
the fertilizer plant project.[2] On Radio Victoria, the
former mayor Grittini and his political ally, the
radio station owner and director Fernández,
depict the cancellation of the deal with Agrium as
a "final blow to both communities," as the "last
hope gone," as an "utterly arbitrary decision of the
provincial government." Daniel remembers that:
"there was a lot of anger … the radio said that we
should go out and demonstrate, they were saying
that it was the time to be courageous." "I learned
about the blockade on the radio … they were talk-
ing about the social situation," Zulma says. Laura,
Daniel, Zulma and the rest point towards both the
same framing articulator and its similar functions:
The radio both makes sense of the "social situa-
tion" and persuades people to go to the road.

As the radio broadcasts "the ire that we felt"—
as Daniel explains to me—and calls people to the
Torre Uno in Route 22, cabs bring people there
free of charge. Is this a sudden eruption of indig-
nation? Are radio reporters and taxi drivers
merely the first to spontaneously react? Hardly
so. The factionalism within the governing party,
the MPN, and particularly, the actions of the for-
mer mayor Grittini who is waging his own
personal fight against Mayor Martinasso and
Governor Sapag,[3] are at the root of both the

"injustice framing"[4] and the veritable mobiliza-
tion of resources.[5] In an interview that he prefers
not to tape—"because the truth cannot be told to
a tape recorder"—Daniel Martinasso tells me:
"Grittini backed the protest during the first cou-
ple of days. How? Well, in the first place buying a
couple of local radio stations so that they call peo-
ple to the route." "Is it that easy to buy a radio
station?" I innocently ask him. "I myself paid
Radio Victoria so that they broadcast nice things
about my administration. The radio's reception
area was built with the money I paid to the owner
… that's how politics work in Cutral-co." Grittini's
and his associates' efforts (Radio Victoria's owner
Fernández being a key figure at this stage) don't
stop there. Although there is not firm evidence,
many sources (journalists, politicians, and picket-
ers) indicate that he also sends the trucks that
bring hundreds of tires to the different pickets
and some of the bulldozers to block the traffic. He
is also behind the free distribution of food, gaso-
line, firewood, and cigarettes in the barricades.
Some even say that Grittini pays $50 per night to
hundreds of young picketers and that his associ-
ates provide them with wine and drugs.

Thus, while the radio airs its angry messages
(telling people that "something has to be done"
and calling them to go to the *Torre Uno*), cabs
drive people there and to the other barricades for
free, tires are brought to the pickets, food, ciga-
rettes, and other essentials are distributed free of
charge ("We even get diapers for the babies!"
Laura and other women recall). This *mobilization
of resources* and this *framing process* do not, how-
ever, operate in a vacuum but under background
conditions that are ripe for a large-scale protest.

State Dismantling

Both Plaza Huincul and Cutral-co were born of
and developed through oil activity. Since their
inception in 1918 and 1933 respectively, both
towns grew with the rhythm of (and became
highly dependent on) the benefits provided by oil
production and by the activities of the state oil
company, YPF (the first government company,
founded in 1922). With the discovery of petro-
leum in the area came its territorial occupation
and settlement carried out under the aegis of state
action. The rapid population growth of both

towns reflects the expansion of YPF's activities. From 1947 to 1990, the total population increased from 6452 to 44,711, an impressive demographic growth by all accounts. The cradle-to-grave enterprise welfare of YPF benefited its workers with higher than average salaries, modern housing serviced by the very same company personnel ("anything that was broken in the house was fixed by YPF," I was repeatedly told by former YPF workers), access to a very good hospital and health plan, and paid vacations ("once a year, we had free plane tickets and two weeks in a hotel in Buenos Aires or anywhere in the country"). YPF's welfare extended well beyond the confines of the company: It was the whole social and economic life of the region that was boosted by its presence. YPF built entire neighborhoods, provided others with sewers and lighting, erected a local high-quality hospital, a movie theater, a sports center, and provided school buses for most of the population.

In less than two years an economic system and a form of life that had lasted more than four decades was literally shattered. The privatization of YPF was passed as law by the National Congress on September 24, 1992, and soon enough the devastating effects were felt in the region. YPF not only cut back its personnel from 4,200 employees to 600 in less than a year; it also ceased to be the welfare enterprise around which the life of both towns evolved (the company even moved its headquarters out of Plaza Huincul), and became an enclave industry functioning under strict capitalist guidelines.

Headlines of the major regional newspaper captured the general mood as the first effects of the privatization began to be felt in Cutral-co and Plaza Huincul: "Uncertain future awaits Cutral-co and Plaza Huincul," "Alarming unemployment in the oil region," "The struggle against becoming a ghost town." As massive layoffs were taking place, the articles described a "general feeling of uncertainty" about the beginnings of the process that is now in its mature form: hyper-unemployment. In Cutral-co, 30 percent of the economically active population (25,340 residents) was unemployed (1997). More than half the population of both towns lives below the official poverty line.

In her diary, Laura speaks in very general terms about the widespread joblessness and misery. It would not be possible to understand the meanings that *la pueblada* has for residents and picketers without a grasp of the bigger historical picture, i.e. on the structural adjustment process and its local translation, the privatization of YPF. As relevant as the background structural conditions are to understanding the lived protest, they are not the sole source of the meanings that Laura ascribes to this massive mobilization. The emergence of the protest finds Laura at a very difficult moment in her life. Her diary describes her own deprivations since the time of her divorce and the humiliations suffered at the hands of a callous court system. It would be equally difficult to grasp her participation in the protest without delving into some aspects of her biography.

Herstory

The reconstruction of Laura's life-story took me more than 20 hours of taped interviews, and innumerable conversations and letters. Let me here mention four main themes that I deem crucial to understand both her life and her contentious experience: Laura was born and raised in a family where politics was considered a bad word and politicians seen as "dirty and corrupt fellows" ("my father never became a member of the then governing party and for that we suffered a lot … he never got a secure job in the oil company, they kept transferring him from one place to the next … politics screwed us up"). She married quite young, and sooner than later she became the victim of her husband's violence. She describes her marriage as "a jail" in which she was repeatedly beaten, abused, and (once) raped. She went through a tortuous divorce (that included having to "look for a punch" from her husband so that she could file a domestic violence complaint and not lose the custody of her children; and "tedious, tiring, and humiliating" paperwork at the courts claiming child support from her ex-husband), and last, through a painful, and at the beginning hesitant, participation in therapy groups for domestic violence victims. "In all of the separation process," she told me "going to the domestic violence groups, I learned about the cycle of violence, I learned about the honeymoon period which is when the beater repents and the woman has hope again, believes again that the story will change, that everything is going to be different, I learned how the beater goes along accumulating

tension that ends with an explosion … I also realized what happened in one of the reconciliations, the time he put the gun on the nightstand (and asked her to have sex), that was rape. I took a long time to overcome it, it gave me a shock, it was like taking on being a single mother, with all the violence that signifies, abused woman, with all the humiliations, and on top of all that a rape. It took me a long time to process that; I cooked and would cry, I went to take a bath and would cry, or I went to go to sleep and would cry. I had to go to psychologists all over again, because it was something that, after being in groups for a long time, I asked again: What happened to me in my life? How did I fall so far? How did I fail to defend myself? I wouldn't forgive myself for it. Until, little by little, through conversations in the groups … I discovered that there were others who had been through the same."

By June 1996, Laura was barely making ends meet by teaching private lessons, as she describes in her diary. She was suing her husband to obtain child support, but without a private lawyer, the lawsuit was making little, if any, progress. These were her worries on the morning of June 21, when she listened to Radio Victoria broadcasting the angry comments of the residents of Cutral-co; they were speaking in terms painfully familiar to her: poverty, unemployment, hopelessness, injustice.

A Barbecue on the Barricade

It came as a surprise to me that Laura (the symbol of *la pueblada*, the nationally known picketer) did not attend the road blockade in order to complain. Early in the morning of the 21st, she tunes to Radio Victoria to follow the news. "On local radio, they were saying that the pickets needed grill broilers. They didn't have enough of them to cook the incredible amount of meat they had. And so there I was, at home, and I told my neighbor: 'What a boring day! What if we go to the road to have a barbecue? With the grill I have, we will be able to get into one of the groups' … Life was so tedious in Cutral-co," Laura evokes, "going to the road blockade was like an excursion. Through the radio, I found out that in Añelo (northern barricade) picketers were in need of grill broilers. That was 19 kilometers away from home. I went there in a free cab to have a barbecue, to spend a day in

the countryside with my children." By now, Laura is aware of the political character of the protest. Yesterday, her friend Jorge told her that the factionalism within the MPN was behind the demonstration. "I had needs, that's true. But that was my story. My story would never become associated with anything political.[6] Politicians were in the road blockade at *Torre Uno*. I would never go there. I went to a less important barricade, with fewer people, and lots of food." More recently, in her job as a private teacher she learned more about the dark side of local political life: "Most of my students were the sons of local politicians and officials. Their families were breaking apart; parents didn't pay any attention to their kids, they were on drugs; their parents would buy them expensive stuff but not listen to them …"

"We arrive at Añelo around 10.30 am with my neighbor. There are close to 200 people," Laura explains to me. In the picket, Laura explains to me, "the motto is: 'no-body comes in, nobody goes out.'" No vehicle or person is allowed to go through Añelo (and, from the available evidence, through none of the other barricades). Around noon, the radio informs the people in Añelo and in the rest of the pickets that there will be a meeting at *Torre Uno*, delegates from each picket should attend. Since Laura is "the teacher," the one who, for the rest of the picketers, "knows how to speak," they choose her and Raúl (a 40-year-old man who has been in the picket since the night before) to be their delegates. Raúl, however, refuses to go: "He says he doesn't know how to speak in public," Laura remembers.

The meeting at the *Torre Uno* is an impressive gathering with more than 5000 people. Laura is amazed by the amount of people and astonished with the lack of attention paid to the pickets' delegates. This is how she describes what happens in the meeting:

> When we get there, surprise! Those holding the microphone are reading their speeches, they are not improvising, they are using foul language, they are asking for the resignation of the governor. The people in my picket are not like that, they are there because they are hungry … They don't want the governor to resign. Those holding the microphone never call upon us, the representatives of the pickets. They don't even say that we are there, they ignore us.

Those "holding the microphone" are, in Laura's mind, the local politicians. "I just can't stand this. It's too much, it's all politics. I ask myself: what the hell am I doing in this meeting? I better go back to Añelo." Her suspicions are shared by other picketers. Less than a month after *la pueblada*, Rubén recalls: "When I went to the *Torre*, I realized that it was like a political rally, there were as always three or four politicians making promises … "

As Laura arrives at her picket, "people from *Torre Uno* are telling the other picketers that the trucks carrying oil and gasoline have to go through our barricade, that we shouldn't be blocking the oil traffic.[7] And the people from my picket are mad, indignant, our motto is 'nobody comes in, nobody goes out', not even the trucks carrying gasoline. People go ballistic!" Here is where the trouble begins.

Disrespect

After hours of conversation with Laura I accidentally come across one incident that, minor as it seems, and unrelated to the structural roots of the uprising as it is, appears to be crucial to understanding her involvement in the protest. The following is Laura's reconstruction of the dialogue that takes place in the middle of the chaos when picketers are angrily telling the envoys from *Torre Uno* that nobody, "not even the oil trucks" will pass through Añelo:

> RAÚL (TALKING TO LAURA): Didn't you go to the meeting at *Torre Uno* and tell them that nobody will pass through the picket?
>
> LAURA: Listen to me. They didn't pay us any attention. That meeting was a farce. They didn't call us, they didn't care for our opinions … they didn't even want to know what's going on in the pickets.
>
> RAÚL (TALKING TO THE PEOPLE AROUND): See, this shit happened because we sent a woman …
>
> LAURA (ANGRY): Stop there, hang on there … You were supposed to come with me. And you convinced me to go. And now you say that a woman is good for nothing. You are the one who's useless because you didn't want to come with me …

> RAÚL (DISMISSIVE): See, she is like all women, she loudly bitches inside her home but outside …
>
> LAURA (NOW VERY ANGRY, ON THE VERGE OF TEARS): Look … we are now going to the radio. I will get all the pickets' delegates together and I will show you that I am telling the truth. After that, I hope I don't see you in my fucking life again!

Laura is now joined by Omar, another picketer who was present at the meeting at *Torre Uno*, who tries to persuade Raúl: "Laura is telling the truth," Omar says, but Raúl keeps saying that Laura is useless. And so Laura asks Omar to take her to Radio Victoria. The microphones of the radio are opened to each and every resident to express his or her point of view on the current situation. But Laura uses that outlet to call for a meeting of the picketers, in the *Aeropuerto*, "at the other end of the city, at the extreme opposite of *Torre Uno*, without politicians. On the radio, I say: 'This meeting is for the representatives of the pickets. No politicians should come.'"

Laura has no history of prior activism, and a deep distrust of anything political. When did she decide to stay in the road, with all the risks and suffering implied (it is the middle of the winter in the Patagonia and it is very cold and windy, and rumors about the imminent arrival of the gendarmes had run rampant since the very beginning) and no benefits for herself in sight? After days of talking with her, of driving her around the main pickets and listening to her stories, of watching videos and reading newspapers, I realized that the question is misleading. *Pace* rational action theorists, so fond of instances of calculation and decision-making, there is no moment in which Laura made a plain, make or break, choice to stay on the road, no occasion in which she ran the costs and benefits of possible action plans through a psychic adding machine to decide on a plan that will maximize her investment of energy, both physical and emotional. She was actually *sucked into* the role of picketer by the interactions she had on the road; interactions deeply shaped by elements of her own biography. To be blunt, she stayed on the road because she felt disrespected first by the politicians at *Torre Uno* and second, and most important at this stage, by a man. True, her last three years were years of poverty and

immiseration, years that would give her or any-body else enough reasons to protest. But she wasn't there for that, "that was my story, never to be associated with anything political." Those three years, "three years of efforts, of struggles" as she writes in her diary, were also years of "breathing the air of liberty"—as she puts it when referring to the absence of her husband. With the help of others in the groups against domestic violence, they were years of learning about the respect that women deserve from men—something that, given her history of domestic abuse and violence, was not at all clear in her mind. They were, in other words, *years of material decay but also of moral empowerment*. That day on the road, Raúl touched a nerve, giving Laura the looked-for chance to obtain the esteem and recognition she had learned about during those three years: "I was mad with Raúl … it really bothered me; he treated me badly, as if I was stupid because I was a woman. I was offended, as if we women are useless. No way." And thus she became a picketer, in part, out of a gender trouble.

And so begins Laura's six-day career as a pick-eter […] The picketer's biography informs her actions on the road in an additional way. "If I have to define what I did I'd say this: my aim was to protect people," Laura tells me when I first meet her. And she comes back to this issue of protection and of the nonviolent character of the protest oftentimes. Her remarks reflect, to some extent, part of the picketers' discussions at that time. But they also reflect her personal anxiety about safety. She tells me, "We wanted to protect people. I said that on radio: we, the picketers, are here to protect people." Her caring and protective actions were directed toward one main group in the pickets: young people (*los pibes*). Laura sheds tears every time she describes the moment when she convinced the more than 50 youngsters in her picket, who were getting violent after hours of heavy drinking, to throw the cartons of cheap wine into the burning tires. Laura comes back to this issue of wine, violence, and protection repeatedly, obsessively I would say, during the time we spend together. And there is a reason for that; a reason that has to do with how deeply her protective and caring actions are linked with the story of her own life, and particularly, with "the three years of suffering" that preceded the contentious episode:

We had to protect the people; we had to protect ourselves. How so? We had to take care of the violent people. How did we calm them down? *In the groups* (against domestic violence), *I learned* that you have to approach the violent person smoothly, put your arm around him, and touch him. When someone is irritated, you have to approach him tenderly; the first thing you have to tell him is that you understand him. People told me that in the groups. *Those were the techniques that we learned to placate the violent husband … That's what we did in the pickets* […] *The things I learned in the groups against domestic violence were very useful those days*. In order to calm down the violent kids, you have to be kind to them, touch them … *pretty much in the same way I did with my husband when he got mad* (my emphasis).

Although the way she becomes involved in the protest is highly singular, the way she begins to understand the collectivity of those protesting, the way she defines who she and her fellow picketers are, is hardly unique: it is a shared understanding that begins to take shape at that meeting in the barricade of *Aeropuerto*, where the first picketers' organization is born. This collective dimension deserves closer analytical attention.[8]

Concluding Remarks

C. Wright Mills would say that when episodes of collective contention take place, a private tutor like Laura becomes a picketer.[9] Wright Mills would then add that neither the protesters' lives nor the history of the uprisings can be under-stood without understanding them both. "Understanding them both" is the task of the sociological imagination. This chapter has exam-ined the intersection of one episode of popular protest with the life history of Laura, a woman liv-ing in a neglected region of Argentina, paying particular attention to the ways Laura's biography shapes her actions and words during the uprising.

The embeddedness of contention in local context gives protest its power and meaning. Existing scholarship insists on the rootedness of collective action in "normal" social relations, on the multifarious ways joint struggle takes

place embedded, and often hidden, in the mundane structures of everyday life and usual politics.[10] Contentious gatherings, writes Tilly, "obviously bear a coherent relationship to the social organization and routine politics of their settings. But what relationship? That is the problem."[11] In this chapter, I have examined this relationship by dissecting the ways one protester's actions, thoughts, and feelings during the uprising were deeply informed by the history of her life, her towns' history, current condition, and prevailing political routines. The way Laura lived this popular revolt was not only informed by her singular history but by the interactions she had with other fellow protesters and with authorities, and by the shared understandings forged jointly on the cold roads of Cutral-co and Plaza Huincul. Further work should examine the relationship between this collective identity and the history and current predicament of both towns. Further work should also scrutinize the manifold ways these shared self-understandings were constructed in opposition to local politicians and officials—some of whom, to end with a paradox, we can find at the origins of this contentious episode where everyday life, routine politics, and protest meet and mesh.

Notes

1 See Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain," in Mark Traugott, ed., *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

2 On framing (and its critics) as a central element in the emergence and course of mobilization, see Robert Benford and David Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–39; David Snow and Robert Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research* (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1988), 197–217; Francesca Polletta, "Contending Stories: Narrative in Social Movements," *Qualitative Sociology* 21(4) (1998a): 419–46; Mark Steinberg, *Fighting Words: Working-Class Formation, Collective Action, and Discourse in Early Nineteenth-Century England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

3 Months before, in the party primaries (*internas*) current Governor Sosbisch allied with Cutral-co former mayor Grittini against the then current Governor Sapag. Sapag won the primaries and Mayor Martinasso, who initially sided with Sosbisch-Grittini, switched factions and joined Sapag's group.

4 An "injustice frame" is a mode of interpretation—prefatory to protest—produced and adopted by those who classify the actions of an authority as unjust. See William Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

5 For the classic statement on resource mobilization theory, see John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977): 1212–41; J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 527–53.

6 Laura's personal troubles are indeed political in the sense that feminism, broadly understood, speaks of the term "political" but not in the sense that Laura herself gives it. When speaking of "politics" and "political" I am referring to indigenous categories, i.e., to the definitions that actors themselves adopt: Politics, in this sense, mean "party politics."

7 Apparently (and this has been confirmed by many local sources), some of the organizers of the protest did not want protesters to interrupt the distribution of gasoline and oil to nearby areas (former mayor Grittini, for one, was the owner of many gas stations in the area).

8 See my *Contentious Lives* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

9 C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (London: Oxford, 1959).

10 See, among others, James Rule, *Theories of Civil Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) and Beth Roy, *Some Trouble with Cows* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1994).

11 Charles Tilly, "How to Detect, Describe, and Explain Repertoires of Contention," Center for the Study of Social Change, New School for Social Research, *The Working Paper Series* 150 (1992): 6.

24

The Emotion Work of Movements

Deborah B. Gould

To grasp the sources of political action and the various forms it takes requires attending to the emotion work in which activists and others engage, as the previous chapters suggest. In this chapter I focus on the central role that emotion work plays in sustaining social movements. The fact that part of the work of social movements is *emotional* is infrequently considered by scholars of contentious politics.[1] But consider that in order to attract and retain participants and to pursue a movement's agenda, activists continually need to mobilize affective states and emotions that mesh with the movement's political objectives and tactics, and suppress those that do the opposite. Social movements provide affective pedagogies to participants and supporters, authorizing ways to feel and to emote that often go against the grain of dominant society's emotional norms. They offer, in anthropologist Clifford Geertz's phrase, "a vocabulary of sentiment," a "sentimental education" (Geertz 1973, 449). More than *manage* emotions—a term that implies a preexisting emotional state that then is amplified or dampened—the emotion work of movements frequently *generates* feelings.

ACT UP had its emotion work cut out for it in relation to the broader U.S. context and to that of the more mainstream lesbian and gay community. Like other social movements in the United States, ACT UP confronted a dominant emotional habitus that typically disparages angry people, seeing anger as chaotic, impulsive, and irrational, and thus "something which a mature person ideally can or should transcend" (Lutz 1986, 180). Anger takes on an especially negative cast when expressed by people whom mainstream society marks as "other," particularly when large numbers of them are taking to the streets and breaking the law in order to disrupt "business as usual." ACT UP also confronted an American ideology of democracy that locates legitimate political activity in the halls of legislatures and in the voting booth, and maligns street activism as unnecessary and extreme, a threat to social order. ACT UP's task was complicated even further by the recently prevailing emotional habitus in lesbian and gay communities that had suppressed anger and in other ways made a confrontational political response to AIDS largely unimaginable.

Within this context, the work of AIDS activists that illuminated, embodied, augmented, and extended the newly emerging emotional habitus and explicitly linked that set of feelings to confrontational street activism was crucial in strengthening the direct-action AIDS movement. The *Bowers v. Hardwick* decision opened an imaginative space that allowed for confrontational AIDS activism, but the new feelings and political attitudes that *Hardwick* animated were not universally accepted within lesbian and gay communities, something we might expect in most communities and certainly in one where social marginalization produces ambivalent feelings about self and society. Within this contestatory moment, ACT UP's emotion work, its affective pedagogy, played a crucial role in securing the new emotional habitus and attracting participants into the direct-action AIDS movement.

I investigate the ways direct-action AIDS activists—sometimes consciously but often less purposively—nourished and extended an emotional habitus that was both amenable to their brand of confrontational activism and responsive to the contradictory feelings that make up lesbian and gay ambivalence. I analyze, for example, how ACT UP marshaled grief, tethered it to anger, and linked both sentiments to confrontational AIDS activism; relocated the feeling of pride from a politics of respectability to a celebration of sexual difference and confrontational activism; and altered the subject and object of shame from gay shame about homosexuality to government shame about its response to the AIDS crisis.

ACT UP's emotional pedagogy offered new ways for queer folks to feel about themselves, about dominant society, and about political possibilities amid the AIDS crisis, offering a "resolution" of sorts to lesbian and gay ambivalence: it emphasized self-love and self-respect over shame and self-doubt, authorized antagonism toward society, eased fear of social rejection, and challenged the desire for acceptance on straight society's terms. The new matrix of feelings, expressed repeatedly in the movement's rhetorical and ritual practices, affected how people felt not only by legitimizing these feelings, but by naming and enacting them and thereby bringing into being and elevating those emotions while suppressing other feeling states. ACT UP also gave birth to a newly politicized *queer* sensibility that crystallized this new set of feelings and furnished a powerful response to lesbian and gay ambivalence. Foregrounding angry, confrontational activism as well as sex-radicalism, *queer* offered a compelling vision of "how to be gay" in this moment of crisis. ACT UP's emotion work—intertwined with and inseparable from its interpretive work—helped the direct-action AIDS movement to flourish into the 1990s.

Emotion work is typically less visible than the other tasks of a movement, which is one reason why scholars have tended to overlook it. But attention to the rhetoric and actions of movements illuminates the emotional dimensions of their work. The ephemera that materialize and instantiate a movement's collective action frames—its leaflets, fact sheets, T-shirts, stickers, buttons, posters, banners, speeches, chants—are particularly rich sources for exploring a movement's emotion work since framing entails mobilizing some feelings and suppressing others. Something else to consider is that although terms like *emotion work, mobilize*, and *suppress* might suggest conscious, purposive behavior, much of a movement's emotion work is nonstrategic and unpremeditated. Indeed, the generation of some feelings and the suppression of others often are crucial *effects* of a movement's many activities rather than the *intention* lying behind them. I return to this point below. A final point before turning to the case concerns the importance of studying a movement's emotion work in relation to other factors. Emotional dynamics and processes do not operate in isolation. Thus the task is to explore how a movement's emotion work articulates with other factors—for example, political opportunities and activists' interpretive practices, including framing—to affect movement sustainability.

ACT UP and a New Emotional Habitus

How did the movement respond to the emotional habitus that had until recently prevailed in lesbian and gay communities and to the one that still prevailed in larger society? How did ACT UP augment and amplify the emergent emotional habitus with its pedagogy of emotional and political practices, and how did ACT UP's preferred ways of feeling, being, and doing activism become

axiomatic to large segments of lesbians and gay men? In the following sections, I pursue such questions, first through an exploration of vying emotional and political norms in lesbian and gay communities, followed by an analysis of ACT UP's surprising success in securing—however provisionally and incompletely—the ascendance and preeminence of its own. The story of ACT UP's emergence challenges the social movement literature's political opportunity model, as does an analysis of its meteoric rise and development. The perception of constricting political opportunities helped to nourish, rather than squelch, the direct-action AIDS movement largely because that hostile environment bolstered queer anger and validated activists' claims that confrontational protests were now imperative.

Feelings in Flux

Although its emotional habitus and confrontational activism were ascendant and marked a new, more defiant moment in lesbian and gay politics, ACT UP had to vie with others in mainstream lesbian and gay communities who continued to be influenced by and reaffirm the previous emotional habitus and the more staid politics it encouraged. Even during ACT UP's heyday in the late 1980s, this struggle persisted. Most revealing are those instances when speakers or writers acknowledged the pull of the older constellation of feelings and its attendant political horizon but nevertheless encouraged lesbians and gay men to embrace the turn to angry militancy. Consider the following, excerpt from an op-ed by Achy Obejas in Chicago's *Windy City Times*, which disparaged the continuing popularity of the song "We Are a Gentle, Angry People."[2] Obejas wrote the piece in the summer of 1987, a few months after the emergence of ACT UP in New York and contemporaneous with organizing by DAGMAR for its first public demonstration about AIDS.

> When I realized Holly Near's "We Are a Gentle, Angry People" had become the unofficial anthem of the lesbian and gay movement, I was not proud. … Gentle anger, methinks, is repressed anger. … Too often in the lesbian and gay movement, we shy away from making a little noise, always fearful that we will lose more than we

gain. … Pretending we are not angry—and we can do this so well we actually believe it—is the greatest tragedy that can befall us: it will keep us from being free. … The anger, that feeling of madness at the realization of how we're denied, how we're left to die, how we're bleached out even when it's impossible to totally erase us—that should never, ever be the gentle sort. Sure, it's going to make some people a little scared, a little nervous. That's OK. (Obejas 1987)

Its tone and content indicate that Obejas wrote the piece during a period of emotional transition; she acknowledged, but challenged, one set of affects and emotions and its accompanying politics, and advocated another.

Where Obejas extolled a righteous and raucous anger to disparage what she saw as gay quiescence, the following example reveals another side in the struggle, the exaltation of gay love and gentleness, seemingly mobilized as a challenge, perhaps even a reproach, to the confrontational anger that was becoming more prominent. In describing the sorrowful, somber, and love-filled mood of a Memorial Day AIDS service and candlelight vigil in Chicago in 1988, *Windy City Times* columnist Lawrence Bommer implicitly called into question the growing anger and embrace of militancy among some lesbians and gay men. Bommer described the speeches of two men with AIDS who marveled at the love they experienced from God and from friends once they fell ill: "Given that reservoir of love, any self-pity, even anger, turned irrelevant. The fact that these young men could rise above so much pain to thank their friends—when it would be just as understandable if they raged against the dying of the light—that, too, proves we are a gentle, loving people" (Bommer 1988, 10). While anger was perhaps understandable, it verged on the disreputable, and lesbians and gay men should strive instead to prove their gentleness and lovingness. Prove to whom? we might ask. Bommer does not say, but the imagined audience might range from oneself to other lesbians and gay men and to the straight world.

A *Windy City Times* editorial in its 1988 Lesbian and Gay Pride Day issue suggested an ongoing struggle between competing emotional ways of being. The editors acknowledged lesbian and gay discomfort with activism fueled by gay

rage while indicating their own support for and pride in the new, angry activism. The editors reflected on the 1969 Stonewall Rebellion (the date commemorated by lesbian and gay pride parades) and drew connections to Chicago's upcoming Pride Parade.

[Reliable sources] record that the [Stonewall Riots] began with the last patron the police rounded up, a lesbian who was too proud to submit to the humiliation of being forced like a criminal into the waiting squad car. At the moment, no doubt, she did not feel particularly proud. … What welled up inside [felt] like anger and frustration and a rage blind to the consequences of fighting back. She had simply had enough. But the wellspring of that rage and frustration … was pride—was a sense that she was a person of equal stature to the cops … a sense that her way of expressing intimacy was fundamentally and profoundly good. … It was this same pride which erupted in her fellow patrons and inspired them to rush to her aid. … Even more than in 1969, we have had enough. But the battle no longer occurs in a moment, culminating in a street riot. The struggle now is less dramatic and more drawn-out. … When we fight back now, it is not in a moment of passion; it is calculated and planned, leaving time for a thousand rationalizations to sap our wills. … The City of Chicago still lacks legal protection for lesbians and gay men. Seven years into the most severe epidemic, of this century, the United States has authorized only one AIDS treatment drug. … We all know the statistics and we all know that we have had enough—but when the anger from the latest insult subsides and we are left in the hollow of reflection, we decide all too often that we can take some more. We *cannot* take any more. Pride week must mean more than a parade. … We have an ordinance to pass, and our aldermen need letters. We have AIDS funding to secure, and our activists need demonstrators. … So march in the parade—but when it's over, take another step. ("Our" 1988; emphasis in original)

The editorial's tone and content indicate two vying emotional habitus, with the newer one calling into question emotional norms and a concomitant political horizon that had prevailed in lesbian and gay communities since the earliest days of the epidemic.

A forum at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in early 1988 also revealed emotional and political sparring, this time among elected officials and other lesbian and gay leaders. From the podium, openly gay U.S. Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA) criticized recent gay and lesbian civil disobedience actions in his state. According to the *Windy City Times*, Frank "drew hisses from the crowd when he said that such actions often amount to nothing more than 'therapy' for the movement and may actually set back the struggle for lesbian and gay rights" ("Frank" 1988). Other lesbian and gay panelists disagreed with Frank. Virginia Apuzzo, for example, stated, "We are not angry about one precipitous act, we are angry about a lifetime, a century, two centuries' worth of deliberate oppression in its most fundamental form, saying, 'You cannot be'" ("Frank" 1988). Apuzzo joined AIDS activists in justifying and promoting lesbians' and gay men's anger, explicitly linking it to confrontational activism. […] A similar debate between Frank and Apuzzo had been publicly aired in 1985, at a point when Frank's belief in moderate politics was widely shared in lesbian and gay communities and the rare articulations of anger were typically submerged. By 1988, the relative positions of these contending emotional habitus and political horizons had been reversed.

Clearly, then, a struggle in lesbian and gay communities over the proper emotional demeanor and the acceptability of various forms of activism persisted, but opposition to angry and confrontational activism was no longer axiomatic. ACT UP's style of activism was ascendant, erupting around the country as more people joined direct-action AIDS organizations and formed new ones where they did not already exist. An *Advocate* article written less than two years after the *Hardwick* ruling, "The New Gay Activism: Adding Bite to the Movement," registered the growing militancy:

They're picketing, protesting, chanting, and rallying. They're holding sit-ins, "kiss-ins" and "die-ins." New groups have formed across the country in unexpected places like Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, and Vermont. In the South, often regarded as politically inactive, groups have sprung up in Georgia, Tennessee, and seven cities in North Carolina alone. Even places such

as Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C., which have had strong gay organizations for years, have recently seen the creation of new, more militant groups. … All across the United States, gays and lesbians—fed up with the ineffectiveness of traditional lobbying tactics—are taking their case to the streets. … Groups are staging radical demonstrations that more often than not end up on the front page of newspapers or on the local news. And in almost every case, the new organizations are dedicated either wholly or largely to direct political action. … The new era in gay activism may have reached a high point the week of April 29, [1988] when more than 30 new and established groups across the country staged a series of direct actions [about AIDS],[3] including rallies, protests, and acts of civil disobedience. (Freiberg, Harding, and Vandervelden 1988, 10–11)

In its last issue of 1988, the *Windy City Times* ran an article with the headline "ACT UP Proliferates Nationwide" that began with the statement, "They were everywhere." It continued, "All year long, they kept showing up in the news. … AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, better known by its acronym ACT UP, is the fastest-growing grass-roots political organization in the world. Chapters are everywhere, from one newly formed in Palm Springs, California, to those in all of America's major metropolises" (Schoofs 1988, 16). In an article entitled "A Decade of Rage" that commemorated ACT UP's tenth anniversary, a *Windy City Times* reporter noted that the new militancy, while controversial, was undeniably popular within lesbian and gay communities. "From [ACT UP's] beginning, the concept of direct-action activism divided the gay community"; nevertheless, "in its heyday during the late 1980s and early '90s, ACT UP was ubiquitous in the consciousness of gay America." Indeed, "the group's firebrand style of activism rallied a generation" (Weisberg 1997).

ACT UP was able to draw enormous support throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s. Increasingly calling themselves *queer*, lesbians and gay men, along with other sexual and gender outlaws who were politicizing bisexual and transgendered identities, embraced the new militancy. ACT UP drew enthusiastic praise even from more mainstream leaders, individuals, and institutions.

The emotional and political terrain for direct-action AIDS activism certainly was fertile, but that alone cannot explain ACT UP's ability to sustain itself and flourish into the 1990s. After all, the moral shock of *Hardwick* might have worn off quickly, and the confrontational activist response consequently might have lost support. Moreover, the militancy that emerged on the heels of *Hardwick* might have been extremely brief, given the emotion and political norms that prevail in mainstream American society and given the structure of lesbian and gay ambivalence and the instability of any temporary resolution to it. Additionally, from a historical perspective, anything more than a burst of militancy seemed unlikely: accounts of the lesbian and gay movement demonstrate that the allure of more routine and staid political activism has typically exerted a greater pull on the lesbian and gay movement than has confrontational politics.[4] But in this case, angry militancy won out for an extended period of time, and its predominance asks to be explained.

The Strategic Uses of Emotion

A possible explanation that takes emotion and emotion work seriously raises a question about intention and emotion work that I want to address at the outset. One might suppose that ACT UP was able to sustain itself because direct-action AIDS activists appreciated an emotional imperative: to generate support for their street activism, they had to challenge how lesbians and gay men understood and felt about the epidemic; they thus consciously set out to do so, and their strategic efforts to mobilize anger and suppress feelings not amenable to ACT UP's form of activism were successful.

I have strong reservations, which I discuss shortly, about limiting my analyses of emotion work to strategic efforts, but this explanation is worth exploring, especially because AIDS activists' emotion work sometimes was manifestly calculated and instrumental. That sort of intentionality, for example, was evident at ACT UP/NY's first meeting, where participants discussed how to shift the focus of the upcoming Gay and Lesbian Pride Parade from "Gay Pride" to "Gay Rage" (ACT UP/NY 1987). In a similar vein, the meeting minutes from a C-FAR meeting in

October 1988 record the following rationale for an outreach proposal to change C-FAR's name to ACT UP: "the name [ACT UP] gives us a sense of anger which the name 'C-FAR' … is lacking" (C-FAR 1988). Even the emotional demeanor projected in demonstrations was sometimes quite conscious. In discussing a nationally coordinated day of AIDS actions across the United States, ACT NOW leader and member of ACT UP/Los Angeles, Mark Kostopolous, stated, "We want to present a picture to the nation that we're not just sorrowful, but that we're angry and expecting change" (Wockner 1989, 40).

More generally, each exhortation to feel a given sentiment and every expression of a feeling could be read as an attempt by activists to mobilize specific feelings with the goal of garnering support for the movement. Viewed from this strategic angle, feelings might fit quite neatly into political process and political opportunity models via the framing concept. Along these lines, leading political-process theorist Sidney Tarrow has pointed to the intentional emotionality of collective action frames, writing, "The culture of collective action is built on frames and emotions oriented toward mobilizing people. … Symbols are taken selectively by movement leaders from a cultural reservoir and combined with action-oriented beliefs in order to navigate strategically. … Most important, they are given

an emotional valence aimed at converting passivity into action" (Tarrow 1998, 112). Robert Benford argues for a similar recognition of the role of feelings, writing that they are "a vital social movement resource" that movement actors "produce, orchestrate, and strategically deploy" (Benford 1997, 419).

That sort of instrumentalizing of feelings certainly occurs in movement contexts, but beginning and ending our analyses there forecloses important avenues of inquiry and leaves crucial questions about emotion work unasked and unanswered. Any exploration of the strategic deployment of feelings, for example, begs the question of what we might call *emotional resonance:* why do people sometimes respond to such deployments of emotion—feeling the anger that organizers ask them to feel, for example—and why does this purposive mobilization sometimes fail? Investigation of these questions demands an analysis of the workings of feelings—of the ways they are generated, intensified, or dampened—that necessarily takes us out of the realm of instrumentality. Even if emotions sometimes are deployed strategically, we risk neglecting much of what is rich and significant about emotion if we reduce it to another tool in the social movement entrepreneur's framing toolkit. For example, an angry chant at a demonstration might mobilize participants' and bystanders' anger toward the target of the protest, but rather than a strategic intent, the stimulus behind the chant simply might have been a felt need by demonstrators to express their own anger. A view of feelings as strategic deployments strips them of all of their bodily, noncognitive, non-instrumental attributes, thereby depleting them of some of their most interesting characteristics and diminishing much of their conceptual force. If we stick to an instrumentalist rendering, we will lose sight of the sensuous experience of feelings and thus of their power or force in stimulating and blocking activism.[5]

Grief into Anger

I return, then, to the question of how ACT UP, with its angry militancy, captured the imagination and secured the enduring participation of thousands of queer folks. Direct-action AIDS activists' responses to the grief pervading lesbian

> **Emotion Management**   Political activists typically try hard to induce emotions that they think are good for their movement or cause, and to prevent emotions or moods that they think are bad. At their planning meetings and at protest events themselves, activists often work hard at generating such emotions as outrage, excitement, joy, guilt, hope for the future, solidarity, and/or commitment to the cause. Emotion management may also involve attempts to mitigate fear, depression, hopelessness, and boredom. Activists may also try to calm down especially angry people, whose behavior may cause problems for the movement, especially if it professes nonviolent principles.

and gay communities provides a useful entry point for exploring how ACT UP buttressed and extended the emerging emotional habitus and its concomitant politics. In its rhetoric and protest actions, ACT UP harnessed grief to anger and both feelings to confrontational action. Attention to how it did so and why this emotion work was effective can help us to explain why and how ACT UP was able to develop and grow into the early 1990s.

COMPETING APPROACHES TO GRIEF. Within lesbian and gay communities, there have been two fairly distinct modes for dealing with the constant grief surrounding the epidemic. Both provide an opportunity for public, collective grieving; the difference lies in their emotional tone and political sensibility. The first approach emerged in the early 1980s: candlelight memorial vigils that lesbians and gay men held to honor those who had died from AIDS-related complications. This approach was reinvigorated in the late 1980s with the Names Project Memorial Quilt, which has afforded lesbian and gay communities a similar opportunity for public and collective grieving. Initiated and first shown in 1987, the quilt contains thousands of patches—each a unique, creative expression, made by friends, lovers, admirers, family members—that commemorate people who have died from AIDS-related complications. At each showing, the names of the dead memorialized in the quilt are read; in 1987, there were 1,920 panels, and the names were read almost continuously for more than three hours (d'Adesky and Zwickler 1987, 8). As at candlelight memorial vigils, the mood at quilt showings has tended to be solemn.[6]

Implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) criticizing what it suggested was the depoliticizing nature of those rituals, ACT UP offered an alternative route for grief: confrontational AIDS activism. Consider the following example. Direct-action AIDS activists from across the country converged in Washington, D.C., on the weekend of October 10–11, 1988, to "seize control of the FDA."[7] That same weekend, the Names Project Quilt was displayed on the National Mall. As part of its mobilization for the FDA action, ACT UP passed out a leaflet at the quilt showing. One side blared, "SHOW YOUR ANGER TO THE PEOPLE WHO HELPED MAKE THE QUILT POSSIBLE:

OUR GOVERNMENT." Text on the reverse read, "The Quilt helps us remember our lovers, relatives, and friends who have died during the past eight years. These people have died from a virus. But they have been killed by our government's neglect and inaction. … More than 40,000 people have died from AIDS. … Before this Quilt grows any larger, turn your grief into anger. Turn anger into action. TURN THE POWER OF THE QUILT INTO ACTION" (ACT UP/NY 1988, emphases theirs).

Here, ACT UP acknowledged lesbian and gay grief about the deaths of people with AIDS, and then attempted to transport them to another place, figuratively from grief to anger, literally from the quilt and the deeply felt grief manifest there to a demonstration at the FDA where that grief could be expressed in angry, confrontational political activism. The ACT UP leaflet located the source of lesbian and gay grief at the government's doorstep, and then offered a clear, logical response: if you feel grief, as we all do, then you should also feel anger toward those who have caused you to feel grief; and if you feel anger, you should join us in confrontational activism to fight those who are responsible for turning a public health issue into the AIDS crisis. Rather than regarding the quilt as a memorial to gay men and others who had died, ACT UP suggested it be viewed as a chronicle of murder that necessitated a forceful activist response. In beginning with a prevalent and more or less acceptable feeling—grief—and then linking that grief to anger—a more disreputable feeling—ACT UP authorized anger. ACT UP's emotional and political pedagogy both acknowledged and addressed lesbians' and gay men's ambivalence about political confrontation: given our grief and under these dire circumstances, where we and our loved ones are being murdered by our government, anger and defiant activism targeting state and society are not only necessary, they are legitimate, justifiable, rational, and righteous.

THE POLITICS OF GRIEVING.   Direct-action AIDS activists' criticisms of grieving rituals like vigils and quilt showings were often scathing and laid the ground for ACT UP's different approach to grief. For example, founding member and longtime administrator of ACT UP/New York,

Bradley Ball, disparaged a Memorial Day AIDS candlelight vigil that occurred in 1987:

> A handful of people clustered at Sheridan Square and sang a pretty song and lit candles. … I [handed] out leaflets for the Washington demonstration [about AIDS, to occur on June 1, 1987]. I had intended to participate [in the vigil], but I simply could not. The opening lines of the pretty song [are]: *We are a strong and gentle people. Singing, singing for our lives*. … How can we be singing for our lives? I'm so upset. … I've spent this weekend [handing out leaflets] on streetcorners and in barrooms confronting apathy and hostility, and now I find out we're singing for our lives. … Oh God, I'm tired and angry. I've been living AIDS for so long. … I want to go back to that mysterious time when I didn't have this virus inside of me that is slowly and surely and quietly destroying my system. I want out. Goddammit, I'm so fucking angry! Stonewall was supposed to bring us out of the closet and into the streets. In 1977 it was Anita Bryant. … And now there's this awful disease that is knocking us over like dominoes. … And we're lighting candles and singing songs. (Ball 1987; quoted in Goldberg 1997, 63–4; emphases his)

A year later, Ball continued his criticism: "We have spent many years mourning and bereaving, and have developed that into a high art. A lot of AIDS benefits like candlelight vigils have pretty names, but they don't express the fact that massive sectors of society are dying and that no one seems to care" (Anger 1988, 10).

Jeanne Kracher recalls having "very mixed emotions" about the candlelight vigils in Chicago:

> They were very sad, they were very solemn. It was heavy. … It was a moving experience. But on another level, I remember all of us [members of DAGMAR and C-FAR] being very critical about it. We were very tough, and felt like if you're gonna get two hundred people marching through the street with candles, have them say something. … But, I also think that I thought this is a good thing that people are paying attention to [AIDS]. [We] were trying to figure out politically what all of this meant, and sort of having contempt for people that were singing that "we are gentle, angry people," and I'm sure we were making all the jokes that we always made about [that

song]. [Our perspective was that] people should be angry. (Kracher 2000)

Kracher, in retrospect, emphasized the need for people to express grief, but in the moment itself, "I think there was this tendency [on our part] to want everything to be angry, and [we] thought] that there was something that was extremely passive about these candlelight vigils" (Kracher 2000). Ferd Eggan had a similar recollection of a candlelight vigil he attended: "I remember feeling, 'Well, this is very nice, and it's sad, and it's nice to be with these people.' … But [I remember feeling] that it was pretty tame" (Eggan 1999). ACT UP/Chicago member Darrell Gordon thought that people at the vigils "had this kind of defeatist attitude, instead of this empowerment idea of taking back, and trying to fight, the system. … It wasn't about trying to fight the Reagan-Bush administration, or fighting the pharmaceutical companies, or anything of that nature at all" (Gordon 2000).

Many were similarly skeptical about the Names Project Memorial Quilt. Carol Hayse, a member of DAGMAR and later of C-FAR and ACT UP/Chicago, saw the quilt at the 1987 March on Washington. When interviewed, she recalled the deep sadness she felt: "I just cried and cried … I mean, you just can't stop crying. I'm tearing up now. It's very sobering" (Hayse 2000). Her sadness, however, was tempered with a political critique that she described as follows:

> I generally remember being a little contemptuous of the Quilt. A little. I also cried at the Quilt. I mean, I was aware that these were people's lives being represented. … But I was a little contemptuous of the Quilt, 'cause in some ways, it seemed to divert energy from anger. It seemed to say "mourning is the valid response," and *not* say the other thing that needs to be said with that: … "turn your mourning into anger." … And so it seemed a bit reformist and diverting of energy to a lot of us. (Hayse 2000; emphasis hers)

Hayse's recollection of ACT UP's way of dealing with death provides some insight into her own, and other ACT UP members', mixed feelings about the Quilt: "There was a great great deal of collective mourning in the queer community at that time. … So, if my memory serves, we were bending the stick in the other direction. We were

saying, 'Mourning's fine. No problem. Make your space for mourning. But then, you know, get out, grab a rock and throw it through the window of the FDA'" (Hayse 2000).

In later years, some activists became even more disparaging of these more somber expressions of grief. In an article that began with the news that his entire immune system was shot, ACT UP/NY's Bob Rafsky offered a fantasy: "I'd like to find a few people who have sewn Names Project Quilt panels but now see such gestures as inadequate. Then, the next time the Quilt is unrolled—with their permission, for all our dead and our dead yet to come—I'd piss on it." Rafsky provided the following emotional and political reasoning in support of that fantasy:

> It's not grief itself we should shed; we need our grief. But if we can't leave behind all the false comforts, the easy, symbolic embodiments of our grief, most of us will never feel our anger at full force for very long. Our anger, even the knowledge some of us have of our own forthcoming deaths, gets mixed up too easily with other agendas. … I [want] to take AIDS militancy further than it's ever gone. (Rafsky 1992, 51)

Another person with AIDS angrily expressed his desire that someone "just burn that stupid blanket" (quoted in Patten 1998, 403). Even people who made quilt panels sometimes indicated ambivalence. A panel for ACT UP/San Francisco member Terry Sutton read, "Terry Sutton. He hated this quilt. And so do we! ACT UP."[8]

Returning to the leaflet that ACT UP distributed at the quilt showing in 1988, its emotion work should now be clearer. Confrontational AIDS activists initially operated in a context in which public grief among lesbians and gay men was articulated in a somber emotional register and from a political position that stopped short of oppositional activism. Many activists deemed these public grieving rituals a hindrance to the forms of activism that they thought might actually save lives. Despite sometimes being contemptuous of these rituals, they too felt the grief and knew how deeply felt and widespread it was. The ACT UP leaflet acknowledged lesbian and gay grief, but in affixing grief to anger and confrontational activism, it offered an alternative.

MARCHING WITH DEATH IN THE STREETS. ACT UP's political funerals—introduced into ACT UP's tactical repertoire in the early 1990s—offered an emotional and political sensibility that acknowledged, evoked, endorsed, and bolstered lesbians' and gay men's anger. Carrying the remains of their loved ones through the streets in a powerful joining of grief with anger, ACT UP drew on a tradition used by liberation movements from South Africa to Ireland and El Salvador that underscored the political nature of the deaths of their comrades.[9] ACT UP/New York issued an invitation/leaflet announcing the first of its political funerals, the October 1992 "Ashes" action: "BRING YOUR GRIEF AND RAGE ABOUT AIDS TO A POLITICAL FUNERAL IN WASHINGTON D.C." The image that accompanied the headline was modest, the outline of an urn, with the following text as its contents:

> You have lost someone to AIDS. For more than a decade, your government has mocked your loss. You have spoken out in anger, joined political protests, carried fake coffins and mock tombstones, and splattered red paint to represent someone's HIV-positive blood, perhaps your own. George Bush believes that the White House gates shield him, from you, your loss, and his responsibility for the AIDS crisis. Now it is time to bring AIDS home to George Bush. On October 11th, we will carry the actual ashes of people we love in funeral procession to the White House. In an act of grief and rage and love, we will deposit their ashes on the White House lawn. Join us to protest twelve years of genocidal AIDS policy. (ACT UP/New York 1992)

In using the ashes of dead people, the action was an escalation in tactics, a shift from actions that deployed representations of death (e.g., mock tombstones and fake coffins) to a funeral procession that carried the actual bodily remains of loved ones dead from AIDS-related complications. The leaflet offered the appropriate feelings and the appropriate activist response to "twelve years of genocidal AIDS policy": a love-inspired and grief-filled rage channeled into a funeral march that would force AIDS into the national consciousness.

Held in Washington, D.C., the same weekend as the annual display of the Names Project Quilt, ACT UP's "Ashes" action implicitly drew a distinction between the quilt's encouragement of

grief and its own enactment of a grief-inspired rage. ACT UP/NY member David Robinson's announcement that he planned to scatter his lover's ashes on the White House lawn inspired the "Ashes" action. Interviewed the day of the march, Robinson explicitly drew a contrast between the political implications of the quilt and of ACT UP's funeral march: "George Bush would be happy if we all made Quilt panels. We're showing people what the White House has done: they've turned our loved ones into ashes and bones" (Wentzy 1995). During the procession, participants angrily chanted that message: "Bring the dead to your door, we won't take it anymore" (Wentzy 1995). ACT UP/NY member Avram Finkelstein also contrasted the funeral march to the quilt:

> One by one, we called out the names of the dead: without a podium, a loudspeaker or celebrity spokespeople. The procession was the Quilt come to life–walking, shouting and storming the White House. … The ash bearers charged the gate, surrounded by crews [of activists] with linked arms. A fog of ashes blew through the fence and the urns were hurled. … I saw someone actually scaling the fence. … We chanted and cheered and our dead floated over the immaculate green sod. … [After the action] I walked back to the Quilt, hoping to see [my deceased lover] Don's panel before the rains came. … I wanted to snatch it up and heave it over the fence, where it really belonged. … [The "Ashes" march] has defined AIDS memorials for me. It connected me for the first time to the anger and grief of thousands of others, and reconfirmed what I have always known … action is the real Quilt. (Finkelstein 1992a, 22)

ACT UP's message was clear: the way to grieve the endless deaths is with confrontational activism that angrily forces the reality of AIDS deaths into public view.

ACT UP/NY soon escalated further, shifting from ashes to dead bodies. Two weeks after the "Ashes" action, an anonymous person with AIDS issued a statement, "Bury Me Furiously," calling on AIDS activists to hold a political funeral when he died, carrying his body in an open casket through the streets. The person, later revealed to be ACT UP/NY member Mark Fisher, wrote,

> I want to show the reality of my death, to display my body in public; I want the public to bear witness. We are not just spiraling statistics. We are people who have lives, who have purpose, who have lovers, friends and families. And we are dying of a disease maintained by a degree of criminal neglect so enormous that it amounts to genocide. … Oppressed people have a tradition of political funerals. … Everyone who sees the procession pass knows that the living, those who love the deceased, are bereaved, furious and undefeated. … I want my own funeral to be fierce and defiant. (Anonymous 1992)

Weeks later, the funeral for Fisher slowly wound through the streets of Manhattan, "urged on by a single drum" (Finkelstein 1992b), ending at George H. W. Bush's reelection campaign headquarters. Over the next few years, ACT UP chapters held a number of political funerals, carrying the bodies of their dead through the streets and attempting to deposit them at strategic sites, including the White House.

ACT UP's political funerals, perhaps the most spectacular enactment of the movement's conjoining of grief and anger in direct action, offered stark foils to the modes of grieving manifest at the quilt and candlelight vigils. In enacting the turning of grief into anger, these funerals transformed the staggering personal losses into a political as well as personal tragedy, into an injustice that should motivate lesbian and gay indignation, fury, and direct-action activism.

Notes

1   But see Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Goodwin and Pfaff 2001.
2   This song, also called "Singing for Our Lives," had become meaningful in the discourse of lesbian and gay politics. For some it signified activism and respectability; for others, it signified political

passivity, complacency, and assimilationism. What it means to those singing it, however, is often ambiguous. Some who participated in the massive civil disobedience at the Supreme Court during the 1987 March on Washington sang it along with "We Shall Overcome" and "America the Beautiful,"

changing the refrain to "we are a gentle, *loving* people," (Johnson 1987, 1). People perhaps sing that song in such circumstances in order to ameliorate the anxiety that comes from being seen as a trouble-maker, in the hope of conveying to passers-by and to oneself that one's actions are not really threatening since they are performed by gentle, loving people. Or, maybe, it's just a song to sing.

3   This article conflated gay activism with AIDS activism: the new activism was focused on AIDS.

4   See, for example, D'Emilio 1998.

5   In his insider's critique of the framing perspective, Benford initially seems to make a similar point, but his instrumentalist view of emotion quoted above undermines his own argument and simply magnifies, rather than rectifies, our existing "overly cognitive conception" of social movement participants (Benford 1997, 419).

6   For more on the quilt, see Jones 2000 and Sturken 1997.

7   Activists demanded, among other things, that the FDA shorten the time taken to approve drugs and refuse data from drug trials that used placebos and prohibited enrollees from taking concurrent prophylactic drugs to protect against opportunistic infections. See Crimp and Rolston 1990, 79, 81.

8   See the photograph in Sturken 1997, 187. Some who were not in ACT UP also criticized the quilt. Urvashi Vaid, for example, contends that the quilt "didn't do enough to politicize people" (Andriote 1999, 367).

9   There are, of course, important distinctions between these traditions as carried out by ACT UP and by liberation movements in other countries. In the latter, political funerals have been used in the context of an armed struggle and they mark the murder of comrades at the hands of the state or opposition forces. ACT UP's political funerals marked the deaths of comrades, but, despite movement rhetoric that they were killed by government neglect, they were, of course, not directly killed at the hands of the state. As with all tactics, the political funeral has a different meaning in different contexts.

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25

Tactical Repertoires: Same-Sex Weddings

Verta Taylor, Katrina Kimport, Nella Van Dyke, and Ellen Ann Andersen

In 2004, same-sex couples engaged in protests at marriage licensing counters across the United States in connection with the gay and lesbian movement's campaign to promote marriage equality. Showing up at county clerks' offices, demanding marriage licenses, and holding weddings in public places, gay couples challenged long-standing heteronormativity inscribed in laws that deny marriage to same-sex couples. The largest protest occurred in San Francisco, historically a center of gay and lesbian movement activity (Armstrong 2002), where Mayor Gavin Newsom defied California's Defense of Marriage Act by ordering the county clerk to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. During the month-long "winter of love," 4,037 couples obtained licenses and married at City Hall, creating a public spectacle that drew widespread media attention. What were the origins of these protests and their significance? And, no less important, what were their implications for the marriage equality movement more generally? We address these questions in this article by drawing from and building on broader sociological understandings of contentious cultural performances, their attributes and relational dynamics, and their varied potential impacts.

Social movement researchers increasingly view social movements not as groups or organizations but as interactive performances or protest events in which collective actors make claims against elites, authorities, or some other group. This approach, which grew out of the work of Tilly (1978, 2004, 2008) and his collaborators (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), has led to an interest in the performances and repertoires used by social movements to make collective claims (della Porta 2008; Jasper 2006; Tilly 2008; Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008). Tilly (2008) uses the metaphors of "performance" and "repertoire" to signal both the routine and limited forms of claim-making used by social movements in political contention and the tendency for claim-makers to innovate within limits set by the established repertoire and the cultural context.

While this formulation has been useful for understanding variations and changes in repertoires of contention, scholars working in the

political process and contentious politics tradition have concentrated on a small range of claim-making performances, such as strikes, demonstrations, public meetings, petitions, and violence associated with the rise of social movements in the nineteenth century (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2008). Over the past decade, scholars concerned with the role of culture and consciousness in social protest have documented an even wider range of repertoires used in modern political contention (Bernstein 1997; Blee 2002; Earl and Kimport 2008; Gamson 1989; Jasper 1997; Mansbridge and Morris 2001; Pfaff and Yang 2001; Rupp and Taylor 2003; Staggenborg 2001; Staggenborg and Lang 2007). The core insight is that social movements often adapt, create, and use culture—ritual, music, street theatre, art, the Internet, and practices of everyday life—to make collective claims.

Cultural performances certainly inspire solidarity and oppositional consciousness (Kaminski and Taylor 2008; Morris 1984; Roscigno and Danaher 2004; Taylor, Rupp, and Gamson 2004). Little attention, however, has centered on developing models that discern both the *dynamics* and the *impact* of such performances. The same-sex marriage campaign—the focus of this article—provides an ideal case for addressing this gap in the literature. State-centered contentious politics and political process approaches frequently view the gay rights movement as a subcultural movement that embraces tactics that are expressive and internally oriented, rather than instrumental and externally oriented (Cohen 1985; Jenkins 1983; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982; Tilly 1995). This distinction between expressive and instrumental action—or politics and culture—has, however, been overstated. To understand how social movements use cultural performances in political contention, it is necessary to look closely at the meaning and the relational dynamics of claim-making in particular contentious performances and to examine their potential mobilizing effects.

In this article, we use the 2004 San Francisco wedding protest to address two questions that are substantively meaningful but also theoretically important to general social movement scholarship. To what extent were the marriages used strategically and intentionally as a performance to make collective claims? And what effect did the month-long protest have on movement mobilization and subsequent actions directed at more conventional forms of political action? We begin with a theoretical discussion of tactics and repertoires, propose a model of cultural repertoires that bridges contentious politics approaches and social constructionist conceptions, and then offer brief background on the 2004 San Francisco same-sex marriage protest. Our multimethod qualitative and quantitative analysis, which includes semistructured interviews with participants and leaders and a random survey of participants in the wedding protest, (1) documents the contentious nature of the marriages as a dynamic and multifaceted repertoire and (2) highlights the consequences of the month-long wedding protest for other forms of political action after participants' marriages were invalidated by the California Supreme Court.

Conceptualizing Tactical Repertoires

We begin by building on the insights of two theoretical traditions in social movements—contentious politics and social constructionist approaches—to understand the dynamics and consequences of cultural repertoires of contention. The contentious politics approach views social movements as a series of political campaigns that link claimants, their targets, and the public through contentious performances that cluster into repertoires (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly 2004, 2008; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Repertoires of contention, according to Tilly (2008), are the recurrent, predictable, and narrow "toolkit" of specific protest tactics used by collective actors to express their interests and make claims on authorities. Like its theatrical counterpoint, the term "repertoire" implies that the interactions between a movement and its antagonists are strategic performances or "established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive claims bearing on each others' interests" (Tilly 1995:27).

Tilly (1986) initially introduced the repertoire concept to explain the rise in the nineteenth century of the social movement as a form of political contention directed at governments. The term repertoire is now used more broadly, however, to refer to "the culturally encoded ways in which people interact in contentious politics" or,

put more simply, "the forms of claim making that people use in real-life situations" (McAdam et al. 2001:16; see della Porta 2008; Walker et al. 2008).

Contentious performances and repertoires are critical to the emergence and endurance of social movements because they are occasions for collective actors to demand recognition, signal numerical strength, and promote goals (Tilly 2008). Social movements, however, are more than contentious performances. Contentious political episodes influence subsequent campaigns and repertoires by creating social movement communities, submerged networks, and collective identity among participants that become the basis for further mobilization (Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009). Protest performances do not, in other words, simply morph into repertoires. Rather, as Staggenborg and Lecomte argue (2009), the ability of people to come together to engage in collective action requires explanation.

The social constructionist tradition in social movements provides insight into how repertoires diffuse (Jasper 1997; Staggenborg and Lang 2007). Social constructionists conceptualize movements as organizations, submerged networks, and ideologically structured challenges to a variety of different institutional authorities (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Melucci 1989; Polletta 2002; Snow 2004; Staggenborg and Taylor 2005; Zald 2000). We propose an integrated formulation of tactical repertoires—a formulation that bridges these varying conceptions of social movements by linking tactical repertoires to social movement networks and communities.

Our conception combines Tilly's attention to protest repertoires or claim-making routines with social constructionists' concern with the structure, meaning, and social psychological dynamics of political contention. We identify three features of tactical repertoires (for elaboration of the model, see Rupp and Taylor 2003; Taylor et al. 2004; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). First, tactical repertoires are not spontaneous episodes, but *intentional and strategic* forms of claim-making (Gamson 1992; Jasper 2006; Klandermans 1997; McCarthy and Zald 1977; McPhail 1991; Tilly 2008). How culture is brought to bear in episodes of political contention is critical. Collective actors frequently use cultural rituals and performances intentionally and strategically to contest authorities and to pursue instrumental as well as cultural

goals (Bernstein 1997; Blee 2002; Morris 1984; Rupp and Taylor 2003).

Second, tactical repertoires involve *contestation* in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are framed and deployed to target changes in multiple institutional arenas, including cultural codes and practices (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004). The body of work on framing by Snow and colleagues (1986) suggests that movements mobilize, in part, by drawing on identities, practices, beliefs, and symbols that are already meaningful in the dominant culture and placing them in another framework so that they are, as Goffman (1974:43–4) put it, "seen by the participants to be something quite else." The same-sex wedding protest illustrates how cultural repertoires, in particular, exhibit this process of cultural borrowing—borrowing wherein rituals and practices typically used to create moral attachment to the social order are, instead, mobilized in the interest of protest (Alexander, Giesen, and Mast 2006; Durkheim 1915; Pfaff and Yang 2001).

Finally, tactical repertoires mobilize supporters through the construction of *collective identity*. To consider collective identity one of the defining features of a tactical repertoire is to acknowledge that contentious performances have both an external and an internal movement-building function (Bernstein 1997; Roscigno and Danaher 2004; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Tactical repertoires serve both functions. They create solidarity, oppositional consciousness, and collective identity among participants, while also defining the relationship and boundaries between collective actors and their opponents (Klandermans and de Weerd 2000; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Rupp and Taylor 2003). Our analysis uses this model of tactical repertoires to demonstrate that the month-long same-sex wedding protest in San Francisco was a strategic collective action intended to challenge discriminatory marriage laws and practices.

To understand how cultural repertoires contribute to more conventional forms of political action, it is important to recognize that the dilemma for collective actors when strategizing about tactics is "whether to play to inside or outside audiences" (Jasper 2006:10). This is precisely why scholars often argue that cultural tactics detract from instrumental actions, as they

privilege mobilization over tactics directed at external targets (Cohen 1985). However, the strategic choice is not mutually exclusive. Generally, movements that engage in expressive forms of action and identity deployment also aim to influence external targets (Bernstein 1997; Raeburn 2004; Staggenborg 2001; Whittier 1997). And tactical repertoires that target the state also create solidarity and collective identity (Jasper 1997; Klandermans, van Dertoorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Melucci 1989). While scholars increasingly recognize that cultural repertoires matter, very few have considered whether and how they influence subsequent mobilization.

Cultural Performances, Spillover, and Impact

The body of literature on social movement spillover, which considers the effects of social movements on each other, allows us to understand how cultural performances and repertoires serve as a conduit for subsequent collective action directed at changing power structures and politics (McAdam 1995; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Whittier 2009). Prior research points to two spillover effects capable of creating new mobilizations and altering existing movements and campaigns: *spillover across movements* (McAdam 1988; Soule 2004; Taylor 1989; Whittier 1995, 1997) and *diffusion within movements,* or the spin-off of social movement tactics, frames, identities, and networks within the same campaign (Soule 1997, 2004).

Studies of movement-to-movement influence suggest that activism around one campaign affects participation in subsequent movements (McAdam 1988, 1989; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Soule 1997; Taylor 1989; Van Dyke 1998). McAdam (1988) describes how the civil rights movement spawned the student, antiwar, and women's movements; Meyer and Whittier (1994) demonstrate that the women's movement critically influenced the frames, tactics, and organizational forms of the peace movement; and Voss and Sherman (2000) provide evidence of how inter-movement exchanges of personnel revitalized labor unions.

Movements influence each other through tactical repertoires, collective identities, frames, and shared networks. Tactics from prior movements outline possibilities for activists in other movements (Soule 2004; Tilly 1995, 2008), and tactics deployed by one campaign spread to other locales and social movement organizations through network linkages and shared frames (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Snow and Benford 1992; Soule 1997). And, of course, social movement communities in the larger social movement sector often supply the networks, master frames, and collective identities that allow new campaigns to emerge (McAdam 1988; Taylor 1989; Whittier 1995). Studies of diffusion processes within social movements suggest that the collective identity and solidarity fostered by participating in a single protest event with high symbolic impact can create activist networks with a "readiness" to participate in subsequent political actions (McPhail 1991; Soule 1997).

In the case of the 2004 same-sex marriage protest in San Francisco, there is considerable evidence that the campaign was a spin-off of earlier movements. The body of writings on tactical repertoires and social movement spillover leads us to expect that, for most participants, the mass matrimony at City Hall was not a one-shot deal. Rather, the "winter of love" fostered heightened mobilization through the formation of collective identity and networks that generated future actions aimed at challenging authorities and discriminatory legal practices that support heteronormativity.

The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, The Gay and Lesbian Movement, and the San Francisco Wedding Protest

Throughout history, same-sex couples have embraced marriage rituals as a politics of "recognition, identity, inclusion, and social support" (Hull 2006:2), even in the absence of legal recognition. Disagreement over the desirability of marriage, however, kept it off the agenda of national lesbian and gay organizations until the mid-1990s (Andersen 2006). A vocal element of the movement opposed gay marriage, arguing that marriage constitutes "a normalizing process that assimilates queers to heteronormativity" (Green

2008:10) and provides a stamp of legitimacy to the hegemony of heterosexuality by excluding other relationships (Badgett 2009; D'Emilio 2007; Hull 2006).

Few lesbian and gay organizations thus engaged in activism around the issue of same-sex marriage until 1993, when it seemed as though same-sex couples in Hawaii might win the right to marry in *Baehr v. Lewin.* The state legislature, however, reversed Hawaii's Supreme Court by amending the state constitution to define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman (Andersen 2006).

Fetner (2008) credits the religious right's opposition with catapulting same-sex marriage to the top of the lesbian and gay movement's agenda. Opponents of gay marriage launched a nationwide mobilization that resulted in passage of the 1996 federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), limiting the definition of marriage to a "legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife" and allowing states to deny recognition of same-sex marriages. California, along with 34 other states, jumped on the bandwagon and passed mini-DOMAs. National and local lesbian and gay organizations responded by orchestrating campaigns to win legal recognition for same-sex marriage in receptive states, using litigation as the primary tactic (Andersen 2006; Pinello 2006).

The first inkling that the lesbian and gay movement would embrace same-sex marriage occurred in 1987 at the third national March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights. Couples, Inc., a Los Angeles-based organization fighting for recognition of lesbian and gay couples in a movement that had its origins in a critique of traditional marriage, organized a collective wedding protest to contest the discriminatory laws and practices embedded in marriage (Ghaziani 2008). Several thousand gay and lesbian couples took part, blocking off an entire street in front of the Internal Revenue Service building. Since this first marriage protest in 1987, same-sex weddings have been deployed as street theater in connection with local gay pride demonstrations around the United States.

The campaign for same-sex marriage languished until a window of opportunity for mass mobilization opened in 2003, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled it unconstitutional to deny same-sex couples the right to marry, making Massachusetts the first state to grant legal status to same-sex marriages. When then-President George W. Bush responded with a proposal for a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage, San Francisco's Democratic mayor, Gavin Newsom, directed the assessor-recorder's office to begin issuing marriage licenses to gays and lesbians. This set off a wave of marriage protests around the country. A county clerk in Sandoval County, New Mexico, issued 26 licenses, and gay nuptials were performed on the courthouse lawn before the state attorney general stopped the marriages. In New York, the mayor of New Paltz married 19 couples, and the mayor of Ithaca began accepting marriage license applications from same-sex couples. In March 2004, a collective action comparable in scope to the San Francisco wedding protest emerged in Portland, Oregon, where 3,022 couples managed to marry before a circuit court judge ordered a halt to the marriages.

After same-sex couples began marrying legally in Massachusetts, and the marriages in San Francisco, Portland, and other locales were overturned by court action, the same-sex wedding protests receded, although isolated protests at marriage counters continued to emerge across the country. In August 2007, same-sex marriage was declared legal for less than four hours in Polk County, Iowa. Although only one couple managed to marry before the county judge declared a halt to the marriages, 27 same-sex couples filed applications for licenses. The largest instance of matrimony among lesbian and gay couples occurred in California during the summer of 2008, after the California Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. Between June 17 and November 4, an estimated 18,000 couples married, until Proposition 8, passed by 52 percent of the voters, banned same-sex marriage in California. During the course of the "summer of love," it became evident that the religious right's campaign to ban same-sex marriage was gaining ground. As a result, the marriages took on an increasing political urgency. By the time the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8, denying same-sex couples the right to marry but allowing the existing marriages to stand, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, Maine, and, shortly afterward, New

Hampshire had opened marriage to same-sex couples, making it clear that the battle had not ended.

Although California was at the forefront of legal recognition of rights for same-sex couples, public opinion in the state over same-sex marriage has been divided. In 2000, voters approved Proposition 22, a ballot measure supported by a coalition of conservative and religious-right groups, amending the Family Code to read, "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid and recognized in California." Then in 2005, the California legislature granted domestic partners the state-conferred rights of marriage.

In San Francisco, the tactic of same-sex couples showing up at City Hall to demand marriage licenses originated on February 12, 1998, when the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, a national organization of the lesbian and gay rights movement, sponsored "Freedom to Marry Day."[1] Gay rights groups held small actions in more than 40 cities that year. In San Francisco, Molly McKay and her partner Davina Kotulski went to the marriage counter at City Hall to request a marriage license. When they were denied, they decided to make it an annual protest. The spirited political contest over Proposition 22 led the two women to found Marriage Equality California (MECA), one of several fledgling grassroots organizations in California advocating for same-sex marriage. Through MECA, McKay and Kotulski ritualized the marriage-counter demonstration. Each year on Freedom to Marry Day, McKay donned a wedding dress and went to City Hall with a contingent of same-sex couples to render visible the discrimination that occurs at the marriage counter every day.

In addition to the annual marriage-counter protest, MECA coordinated rallies, marches, and other public actions to mobilize a broad base of support and educate the public about same-sex marriage. Across the country, National Freedom to Marry Day regularly featured groups of same-sex couples dressed in wedding gowns and tuxedos strolling down city streets. The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund even published a "Strolling Wedding Party Guide" touting the efficacy of street theater for stimulating discussion of same-sex marriage.

On February 12, 2004, demonstrators in San Francisco experienced a catalyzing moment.

Same-sex couples went to City Hall to apply for marriage licenses, expecting to get turned down as usual. Instead, they received marriage licenses. The same-sex weddings, which began that day, were orchestrated by Mayor Gavin Newsom's staff, working with Kate Kendell of the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), Tamara Lange of the northern California chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and Geoff Kors of Equality California (EQCA). Kendell suggested that Phyllis Lyon and Del Martin—partners for 51 years and historic figures in the gay and lesbian movement—be the first couple married, and the ACLU invited four other couples, chosen for their suitability as plaintiffs in the lawsuit anticipated when the licenses were invalidated.

Social movement organizations coordinated the initial stages of the protest by selecting the first couples to apply for licenses. The couples who went to City Hall for the annual marriage-counter protest were among the first to marry. Media attention, however, allowed the wedding protest to gain momentum. Soon throngs of gay men and lesbians arrived to take their place in a queue of couples sharing food, blankets, chairs, and friendship while waiting outside City Hall to obtain marriage licenses, and media coverage flooded the nation with images of the couples waiting in line, then emerging from City Hall waving marriage licenses. In an Internet-launched campaign of support known as "Flowers from the Heartland," people donated money to purchase flowers for the couples married at City Hall. A handful of crusading Christians opposed to gay marriage marched alongside the long line of couples. Passersby honked in support, sometimes handing out wedding bouquets and cakes. So many couples showed up that the city began scheduling appointments a month in advance. When President Bush reacted by endorsing a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage, talk-show host Rosie O'Donnell flew to San Francisco to marry her longtime girlfriend, Kelli Carpenter-O'Donnell. By the time the California Supreme Court ordered San Francisco to cease issuing and recording marriage licenses, 4,037 same-sex couples had received marriage licenses and 3,095 managed to have their marriages officially recorded.

What can we learn about the dynamics and impact of contentious cultural performances by examining the 2004 same-sex wedding protest in San Francisco? While the media portrayed the weddings as personally motivated, a social movement analysis suggests a different reading of the mass nuptials. In our analyses, we examine both the weddings as a tactical repertoire used by participants to dramatize their claims to the rights of marriage and how the San Francisco wedding protest affected subsequent mobilization on behalf of marriage equality. This two-pronged focus—on marriage as a tactical repertoire and its implications—addresses an important gap in the social movement literature surrounding the dynamics of cultural repertoires and how they may facilitate future mobilization.

Data and Measurement

Most research on cultural repertoires is based on small and unsystematic samples (Gamson 1989; Rupp and Taylor 2003; Staggenborg 2001; Staggenborg and Lang 2007). Our analyses, in an effort to address some of these prior limitations, draw on survey data as well as semi-structured interviews and combine quantitative and qualitative analysis. Initially, we conducted a random survey of all participants in the San Francisco weddings.[2] Although the individual is the unit of analysis, we sampled at the couple level, sending two surveys to a sample of 1,000 households in October 2006, approximately two-and-a-half years after the San Francisco protests. We received at least one questionnaire from 311 households (37 percent), and 525 individuals (31 percent) responded.[3]

The survey consisted mostly of closed-ended questions about respondents' demographic attributes, family structure, couples' legal status, political attitudes, and social movement participation prior to and after the protest. Our analysis draws from the survey data and the rich set of controls it affords, particularly for the quantitative analysis described below. We also draw at length from one open-ended question: "When San Francisco started issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, why did you and your spouse decide to apply for a license?"

In-depth insight into the dynamics and the mobilization effects of participating in the protest—the two core foci of our analyses—necessitated not only systematic surveying of participants and measurement of potentially important controls, but also depth that only qualitative data could provide. We therefore conducted semistructured interviews with five key informant activists from marriage equality organizations, as well as interviews with 42 gay and lesbian individuals, representing 27 couples, who participated in the weddings. On average, each interview lasted about 90 minutes. We transcribed and coded the interview data using Microsoft OneNote.

Although the sample of participants we interviewed was not obtained randomly but through snowball sampling, the respondents come close to representing the characteristics of the individuals who married in San Francisco on nearly all dimensions. According to the City of San Francisco, more than half (57 percent) of the participants were women, a trend mirrored by the same-sex marriages taking place in other locations during 2004 (Teng 2004),[4] and half (55 percent) were between the ages of 36 and 50. Our survey data reveal that these couples had been together on average 12 years, although nearly one fourth of the couples had been in their relationship for 16 years or more. The great majority (88 percent) of survey respondents identified as white, while 4 percent identified as Hispanic/Latino, 4 percent as Asian American, and less than 2 percent as African American. Most had a college degree or higher and a household income of $71,000 or higher. Although the protest drew same-sex couples from 46 states and eight foreign countries, the vast majority (91 percent) were from California (Teng 2004).

We use interview and open-ended survey data to analyze the first of our questions surrounding the dynamics of protest in general, and weddings as contentious performances in particular. We coded these data along the three analytic dimensions of the theory: contestation, intentionality, and collective identity. We then turn to the second of our questions, pertaining to impact, using the survey data along with qualitative data from the participant and key informant interviews. Here we ask whether participation in the weddings and the protest following the nullification

of the marriages influenced individuals' subsequent involvement in the campaign for marriage equality. We expect that prior participation in a variety of related movements will have a generative effect on the marriage equality movement by spinning off a new challenge through relationships within the existing social movement sector and collective identities formed in prior campaigns (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; McAdam 1995; Whittier 2001).

Dependent Variables: Subsequent Activism

While the first portion of our analyses centers on the dynamics of contention relative to contestation, intentionality, and collective identity, and draws largely on the qualitative material, the second portion draws more evenly from both quantitative and qualitative data and focuses on impact and spillover. The first outcome is whether an individual protested after the California Supreme Court invalidated the marriages.[5] Reactions to the invalidation took a number of forms (see Table 25.1). We then consider the effects of prior activism and participation in marriage protests on whether an individual is a current lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) or marriage rights activist.[6] Among our respondents, 58 percent are current activists. Table 25.2 reports descriptives for these outcomes, as well as the predictors and controls used in our modeling.

Explanatory Variables

Given that our theoretical argument predicts that participation in protest inspires subsequent activism, our quantitative modeling includes a dichotomous indicator of *prior activism*, including antiwar, civil rights, environment, women's rights, labor, pro- or anti-abortion rights, community concerns, and education. Although these movements have different goals, they are related in their challenge to the status quo and in fostering the creation of solidarity and oppositional collective identity.

We also examine how participation in contention following the California Supreme Court's invalidation of the marriages influenced participants' subsequent activism. We include a dichotomous variable coded 1 if individuals protested the invalidation of their marriage. Consistent with our

Table 25.1 Actions taken in response to invalidation of marriage licenses

Activity	Percent
I have given money to an organization dedicated to fighting for marriage rights.	74.9
I have become more "out" about my marriage.	45.6
I have given money to a political party or candidate.	40.3
I have participated in a demonstration or protest on behalf of marriage rights.	38.8
I have written letters to public officials or other people of influence.	37.3
I have joined an organization dedicated to fighting for marriage rights.	30.4
I have spoken to or gone to see a public official or other people of influence.	14.8
None of the above.	10.6

Note: N = 474. Respondents could select multiple activities so percentages do not sum to 100.

theoretical argument, we expect that individuals who engaged in collective forms of protest that brought them into contact with other activists, fostering the development of social network ties and collective identity, will be more likely to be current activists (Gamson 1992; McAdam 1986). We include a series of dummy variables measuring distinct actions.

We include *intentionality* in our modeling to capture whether individuals participating in the weddings with an explicit and intentional political motivation differ from those who married solely for personal reasons. We expect participants who intended their marriage to make a political statement to be more likely to protest the dissolution of the marriage and to be current marriage activists.

Another survey question allows us to examine intentionality indirectly. We asked whether respondents felt that civil unions were an acceptable alternative to legal marriage and included a measure ranging from 1 to 4, with a mean of 2.5, where higher values indicate less support for civil unions as a compromise measure.[7] We expect that

Table 25.2 Descriptive statistics for variables in the analysis (N = 474)

Activity	Mean	(SD)
Took action to protest dissolution	.891	(.308)
Current LGBT or marriage activist	.582	(.494)
Prior activism	.757	(.429)
Political motivation for marriage	.812	(.391)
Civil unions not viewed as acceptable alternative (4-point scale)	2.496	(1.117)
Type of action to protest dissolution		
Demonstrated	.388	(.488)
Joined an organization	.304	(.460)
Became more out about relationship	.456	(.499)
Gave money to an organization	.749	(.434)
Gave money to a politician	.406	(.491)
Met with a public official	.148	(.355)
Wrote letters	.373	(.484)
Controls		
Experienced problems	.646	(.479)
Liberal (7-point scale)	5.751	(.989)
High political efficacy	.437	(.496)
Interest in government and public affairs	.772	(.420)
Female	.487	(.500)
Race (white)	.882	(.323)
Income (10 = $74,000 to $100,000)	10.289	(1.465)
Children	.293	(.456)
Employed full-time	.709	(.455)
Age	47.200	(8.930)

respondents less willing to accept civil unions as an alternative to marriage would be more likely to protest the invalidation of their marriage licenses and to report ongoing involvement in the marriage equality movement.

Controls

Based on prior work, we include a number of arguably important controls. Social movement scholars have found that grievances provide at least a partial explanation for protest participation (Jasper 1997; Klandermans et al. 2008; Olzak 1992). Here, we include an indicator of whether individuals feel they have been disadvantaged by not having the legal protections offered to traditional families. Research also

consistently demonstrates that receiving information about a protest facilitates activism (Klandermans 1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Schussman and Soule 2005). We include a measure of how informed an individual is about government affairs. The variable is measured dichotomously.

Research on political engagement suggests that individuals with a greater sense of personal efficacy are more likely to take action in pursuit of social change (Ennis and Schreuer 1987; Klandermans et al. 2008). Our measure captures a high feeling of personal efficacy based on two survey questions: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does" and "I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most people." We coded respondents 1 if they disagreed or disagreed strongly with the first statement and agreed or agreed strongly with the second. Our final attitudinal measure captures whether survey respondents consider themselves to be liberal (Schussman and Soule 2005), based on a 7-point scale ranging from extremely conservative (1) to extremely liberal (7).

Finally, research consistently finds that young people, those without full-time jobs, and people without children are more likely to participate in social movements (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986, 1989; Schussman and Soule 2005). We thus include variables measuring age, full-time employment, and the presence of children, as well as race (1 = white), sex (1 = female), and income (in 11 categories).

Analytic Strategy and Results

Our analyses proceed in two steps, each of which employs the rich, multimethod character of these data. We begin by addressing our first empirical question. Drawing on the tactical repertoires formulation discussed earlier, we analyze the weddings as contentious cultural performances. The survey data allow us to discern the intentions of a random sample of participants, and the qualitative interview data illuminate the meaning and dynamics of the weddings as a contentious performance.

The second component of the analyses addresses the impact of the wedding protest on

subsequent political actions associated with the campaign for marriage equality. We begin with descriptive statistics regarding participation in protests after the same-sex weddings to establish spillover as a cause. To examine the impact of the same-sex wedding protest, we rely on logistic regression as the principal technique.[8] The first model [...] estimates the likelihood of protest participation following the invalidation of the marriages. The next two models [...] predict current activism in the marriage movement. Importantly, these analyses integrate qualitative data as well, allowing us to elaborate on the processes and mechanisms through which contentious cultural performance leads to further protest and more conventional forms of political action.

Same-Sex Marriage as Tactical Repertoire

Contestation

Cultural rituals typically serve to affirm dominant relations of power. When used in the pursuit of change, however, cultural tactics imbue traditional symbols, identities, and practices with oppositional meaning and are often deployed in new ways that challenge and subvert the dominant order (Taylor et al. 2004). For most participants, the weddings were not meant to embrace the institution of marriage as traditionally defined. Rather, as sites of ritualized heterosexuality (Ingraham 2003), the weddings were an opportunity for same-sex couples to deploy identity publicly and strategically (Bernstein 1997) to gain visibility for their relationships, stake a claim to civil rights, contest discriminatory marriage laws, and challenge the institutionalization of heterosexuality.

The interview and open-ended survey data are remarkably consistent on these points. The overwhelming majority of participants considered their marriages acts of protest in which they were confronting the identity categories, values, and practices of heteronormative society (Jackson 2006) by enacting marriage outside the boundaries of state sanction. When asked "why did you and your spouse decide to apply for a license?" 81 percent of survey respondents characterized the weddings as politically motivated, describing their actions as "acts of civil disobedience," "a political statement," "a public statement," "a civil rights movement," and "a protest against discrimination." One woman admitted that she married entirely to make a "political statement." She said, "I was against the institution. I didn't want to be the same as straight people." Among interview respondents, 81 percent cited political motivations for their participation, including one man who said:

> Certainly for most people, the idea of being married has no connection whatsoever with making a political statement, but for us, obviously, it's unavoidable, inescapable. It's civil disobedience.

Participants sought to challenge stereotypes of lesbians and gays. As one interviewee reported, "I saw what we were doing as a form of political protest because it was counter to all the hegemonic messages of society." Individuals who married also aimed to remake the meaning of an institution that ritualizes heterosexuality. One woman explained, "We wanted into that institution to transform it from the inside." One interviewee opposed marriage but wed so she could "participate in a movement that was trying to change society's attitudes about homosexuality, more than anything else, to say that you can't deny lesbians and gay men the rights that you grant to everyone else." Among couples who indicated they married for political reasons, many were also motivated by the desire to obtain access to the plethora of state and federal rights and responsibilities associated with marriage (Andersen 2006).

Although the majority of respondents gave political justifications for their marriages, a significant number also described the weddings as an opportunity to publicly profess their love and offered deeply personal and emotional reasons for getting married. About one third of both surveyed (36 percent) and interviewed (31 percent) respondents gave personal as well as political motives for marrying. One survey respondent emphasized the emotional significance of making a public expression of commitment to her partner of many years: "At first it was a spontaneous decision to participate in part of history, but quickly it became something much more significant for us emotionally and politically."

An interview respondent who described his marriage as "a political statement" also acknowledged that the government of the City and County of San Francisco lifted "us up from a place of second class citizenship to a place of equality. There we were, face to face, loving each other and committing to each other. It was very profound and moving." He went on to explain:

> We both grew up believing in government, believing it meant something. I just remember when the official said, "By the authority of the state of California, I pronounce you spouses for life." And there was this electric chill, physically. And it was the sense of feeling for the first time that we're actually fully equal in the eyes of the law and the government, something we had never imagined.

The 19 percent of survey respondents and interviewees who did not provide political reasons for their marriages offered mostly personal motivations that parallel those used by conventional heterosexual couples to justify marriage (Swidler 2001). Nonetheless, these motivations dispute the hegemonic constitution of love as heterosexual (Johnson 2005:15). One interviewee argued, "People say two guys or two girls getting married is breaking the notion of marriage but, no, it's a question of love, a question of being together." No matter what individuals' motivations were for marrying, the spectacle created by thousands of same-sex couples lining up outside San Francisco's City Hall was itself a form of discursive politics that contested heterosexuality's monopoly on marriage, its associated emotions, and its attendant benefits.

Intentionality

The interview data suggest that the decision to use public same-sex weddings as contentious performances was linked to activists' experiences with tactical repertoires from previous campaigns. According to one marriage equality activist, the San Francisco weddings were "our generation's Stonewall." Kate Kendell, head of the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), described her reaction when the mayor's office informed her that the city would begin issuing marriage licenses to gay couples: "Forget 'where you were when JFK was shot?' 'When did you find out about Gavin Newsom's decision to marry lesbian and gay couples?'" (Pinello 2006:76).

Molly McKay, the founder of Marriage Equality California, borrowed the idea of the marriage-counter protest from the lunch-counter sit-ins used by the civil rights movement:

> We were very inspired by the grassroots organizers in Greensboro, North Carolina, the four college students that sat in at the lunch counters, and rendered visible segregation and the ugliness of white-only lunch counters. And we thought the only way to render visible the discrimination that crosses across the marriage counter every single day is to go and request a marriage license. We'll do it with dignity. We'll do it very peacefully.

McKay emphasized the modularity of the tactic: "The great thing about it, it is a moment of civil disobedience where anyone can participate because there's a marriage license counter in every town no matter how big or small." By making their annual request for marriage licenses in mid-February, the couples were taking advantage of Valentine's Day's cultural meaning as a holiday that celebrates love to call attention to the heartbreak experienced by same-sex couples denied access to marriage.

When City Hall began issuing marriage licenses, the couples assembled for the annual protest were among the first to marry. The survey and interview data provide clear evidence that for the majority of participants, the marriages represented a strategic action with both instrumental and cultural goals. Social movement actors anticipated that the weddings would be shut down quickly, and couples who married believed the courts would eventually invalidate the marriages. The explanation provided by one respondent, when asked why he and his partner got married, illustrates this point:

> It was an historic moment that we wanted to be part of. We fully expected the courts to close it down, so we rushed over as soon as we could. We felt this was a way to participate in the activist efforts to bring marriage equality to all of us.

Participants saw the weddings, however, as more than a strategy to expand same-sex couples' access to marriage. The weddings were forms of action with a highly symbolic impact intended to win media attention, with the aim of increasing

the social status and worth of lesbians and gay men as a group. This idea is seen in one man's explanation of why he and his partner participated in the weddings: "We wanted to share our love with the world and work to end homophobia." Such responses indicate that the majority of participants viewed the weddings as a strategy to bring about legal and social recognition of same-sex relationships. This finding is consistent with previous research suggesting that even in contexts where same-sex marriage is legal, many couples marry to make a political statement about the rights of gay men and lesbians to full equality (Badgett 2009).

Collective Identity

Protest is one means by which challenging groups develop oppositional consciousness, solidarity, and collective identity. To consider collective identity as one of the defining features of a tactical repertoire acknowledges that protest tactics are not only directed to external targets, but they have an internal, movement-building function as well (Roscigno and Danaher 2001; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Taylor and Whittier 1992). The San Francisco wedding protest facilitated the creation of new forms of solidarity and community related to participants' adoption of an activist identity. Participants described their actions as part of a "civil rights movement." One interview respondent explained, "I feel responsible to my elders who fought so hard, all those people who spoke out, who pushed the issue forward, we owe it to them and then for the future generations to come so that they don't have to fight this barrier." Moreover, the collective scene at City Hall affected participants' sense of themselves as part of a larger whole. One man explained: "It was just a thrill to be sitting there where everybody's gay and everybody's there with the same purpose. And I thought, hmm, this is what straight people experience every day of their life."

The wedding protest countered the negative experiences of living in a heteronormative society by bringing so many gay men and lesbians together. One woman remembered standing in line for hours having "this emotional sharing of stories and dreams with all these strangers," and another found the "group support when you're coming in or going out to get married really amazing." A third woman put it this way: "This was the opposite of a homophobic culture. This was: we're embracing and celebrating you and excited about you and interested in you because you're gay." Indicative of the solidarity fostered by the weddings, couples borrowed each others' rings and served as witnesses for each others' marriages. The joy and camaraderie experienced by couples waiting to get married was so intense that several couples volunteered to come back to City Hall and assist with the marriages in order to remain connected to the oppositional community.

In summary, although weddings as ritual practices typically reinforce status hierarchies and symbolic codes, our data provide clear evidence that, for the overwhelming majority of the participants, the San Francisco same-sex weddings were not meant for that purpose. Rather, the weddings provided participants an opportunity to advance their claims for equal access to marriage. The individuals who married during the month-long protest considered their marriages acts of *contestation*. They used the public marriages strategically and *intentionally* to challenge discriminatory marriage laws that reinforce heteronormativity and to make demands for gay marriage rights, which also concern the right to love. Moreover, the marriage protest fostered a sense of solidarity and *collective identity* among participants that likely persisted long after the event's conclusion. The survey data demonstrate that these results hold true for a sizable segment of the couples, and the qualitative interviews provide depth and shed light on the deep emotional and symbolic character of the weddings. These findings demonstrate the utility of our theoretically-grounded conception of tactical repertoires, which attends to actors' intentions and to the deeply dynamic and relational aspects of political contention.

[…]

Conclusions

Social movement scholars have long debated the role of culture in producing social and political change. Yet researchers have largely ignored cultural tactics and repertoires, in part because political process theorists have a narrow conception of what constitutes a protest event (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2008) and in part because state-centered approaches hold

that cultural tactics have no impact on policy change (Rucht 1988; Tilly 1995). This article confronts this debate more directly than previous studies by analyzing the attributes, dynamics, and impact of the 2004 same-sex wedding protest in San Francisco.

Drawing from a rich data set that integrates qualitative and quantitative analyses, we offer compelling evidence that cultural tactics do, indeed, matter in political contention. Our analyses demonstrate that the San Francisco weddings constituted a contentious public performance used by actors intentionally and strategically to make collective claims. We also find that the month-long wedding protest sparked other forms of political action and mobilization on behalf of marriage rights, igniting a statewide campaign for marriage equality in California. Together, these findings offer powerful evidence for moving beyond the rigid distinction between culture and politics that characterizes mainstream theorizing in social movements in order to consider the influence of cultural repertoires in political contention.

Our three-dimensional model of cultural repertoires has broad utility above and beyond our particular case in point and, we hope, offers other scholars a theoretical blueprint that more fully incorporates cultural repertoires into the study of social movements. This model combines the insights of contentious politics approaches (that define social movements as a series of public campaigns involving contentious performances or repertoires enacted between claimants and their targets) with social constructionist conceptions (that view movements as communities that create submerged networks and collective identity). We identify three features of cultural repertoires—contestation, intentionality, and collective identity—all of which interact and vary. This formulation adds a qualitative component to protest event research, which has been concerned mainly with documenting the diffusion of and variations in a relatively limited set of repertoires of contention. As our analyses reveal, the tactical repertoires model allows us to look inside cultural performances to discern their meaning and to examine the relational dynamics involved in political contention. The collective identity dimension of tactical repertoires captures both the internal movement-building function of cultural repertoires and the external targets of contentious performances, providing insight into how social movement tactics diffuse within and between movements.

Participation in one movement, even simply one high profile demonstration, clearly can affect subsequent protest participation through the generation of networks, solidarity, and collective identity (Meyer and Whittier 1994). The couples who took part in the weddings in San Francisco had links to a variety of social movements, including the civil rights, AIDS, lesbian and gay, women's, and pro-choice movements. Movement-to-movement spillover helps explain marriage equality activists' initial adoption of marriage-counter protests as a strategy to make visible the civil rights denied to same-sex couples by virtue of the state's prohibition on same-sex marriage. These activists borrowed the repertoire from the direct action tactics pioneered by the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, adapting it to the political street theater used by the AIDS and women's movements in the 1980s and 1990s.

Our results also provide evidence pertaining to other unresolved questions about the role of culture in political contention. These data challenge the position of scholars who argue that expressive tactics that foster collective identity are not also directed at influencing external targets (Kriesi et al. 1995). The qualitative analysis provides clear evidence that couples intentionally participated in the wedding protest not only to make identity claims, but also to communicate their numerical strength and disruptive potential and to challenge the state. Scholars of social movements have, at times, faulted the gay and lesbian movement for its preference for tactics that rely on culture, performance, and identity deployment, arguing that these methods detract from the movement's broader political agenda (D'Emilio 2007; Gamson 1995). As our findings show, wedding protests used the trappings of the traditional white wedding—bridal gowns, tuxedos, bouquets, and wedding cakes—to dramatize and challenge the heteronormativity of traditional marriage. Such cultural performance was effective in mobilizing more traditional forms of political action.

One of our goals has been to demonstrate that the eruption of mass matrimony among lesbian and gay couples in 2004, when 13,000 same-sex couples received licenses to marry in

San Francisco, Oregon, Massachusetts, and other locations around the country, was a tactical innovation that increased the pace of mobilization around the issue of gay marriage. During the month-long protest in San Francisco, images of gay and lesbian couples standing in line for marriage licenses, then marrying in civic buildings and other public locations, appeared on the evening news, front pages of newspapers, and covers of weekly news magazines, challenging the hegemonic interpretation of marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman. Politics is as much a discursive struggle as it is a contest over resources (Alexander et al. 2006). As our findings show, cultural repertoires not only play an important role in the internal life of social movements, but cultural symbols, rituals, and practices can be used to convey powerful political messages to the multiple targets of social movements and to mobilize actors to engage in other forms of political contention.

Although the lesbian and gay movement historically has been more likely than other social movements to deploy cultural performances and repertoires to assert identity claims and to promote particular goals, the use of cultural performances in political contention is not limited to this particular movement. Social movements on both the left and the right typically use a variety of cultural forms of political expression, including music, art, literature, and theater. Our findings raise questions about how contentious cultural performances in less public venues might be connected to larger campaigns. Prior research suggests, for example, that same-sex couples who elect to engage in public or private ceremonies to express their commitment frequently offer political reasons for their marriages (Badgett 2009; Lewin 1998). Similarly, Rupp and Taylor (2003) argue that drag performances in gay commercial establishments are tactical repertoires that have a long history in the gay and lesbian movement as forms of claim-making that create collective identity and contest heteronormative structures, identities, and practices. One of our central interests in this study is to extend the concept of tactical repertoires to embrace these understudied cultural forms of political expression. To understand how movements remain vital, how they connect to previous and future campaigns, and what types of impact they have, it is fundamental that scholars recognize the significant impact of cultural performances and repertoires in political contention.

Notes

1 Gay rights groups in 40 cities marked the day by demanding marriage licenses at city clerks' offices.

2 The data are part of a larger study of same-sex couples who married in 2004, including the 3,027 couples in Multnomah County, Oregon, and the 6,095 couples in Massachusetts.

3 Sixteen percent of the packets were returned with no forwarding address. We attempted to increase the response rate, but follow-up with nonrespondents revealed many were suffering survey fatigue. The City of San Francisco made the names of those who married available to the public for a nominal fee, and they were inundated with mail from researchers and businesses.

4 At 43 percent, men made up a greater proportion of couples who married in San Francisco than in Multnomah County, Oregon (29 percent) or Massachusetts (36 percent).

5 The survey sampled individuals who participated in the marriage protest. As a result, we are unable to run models predicting participation in the initial San Francisco weddings. A sample of nonparticipant gays and lesbians would be virtually impossible to obtain.

6 We obtained comparable results when we restricted our analysis to individuals currently active in the marriage equality movement only.

7 The question wording was as follows: "Some people seeking to find a 'middle ground' in the debate over marriage equality have argued that same-sex couples should be given all the legal rights and responsibilities associated with legal marriage, but that their relationship should be called by another name, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships. If the government were to create civil unions, identical to marriage in everything but name, would that be acceptable to you?" The four possible answers ranged from very unacceptable to very acceptable. We reversed the order of responses for the analysis, so that a higher value indicates less support.

8 Diagnostics suggest no problems with multicollinearity, with all v.i.f.'s below 1.3.

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Part VII

How Do Movements Interact with Other Players?

Introduction

Any social movement must deal with a range of powerful groups and institutions. Among them, the state or government is usually the most important. Many movements make demands directly of politicians, primarily through demands for changes in policies or laws. Sometimes it is government actions or policies that are the focus of the grievance. If nothing else, the state lays down the rules of the game within which protestors maneuver and, if they choose to break those rules, they are likely to encounter punitive action from the police or armed forces. Another major institution with which social movements usually come into contact is the news media, which can be used to purvey a movement's message, portray opponents in an unfavorable light, and influence state decisions. In this section we examine these major players in a social movement's environment.

In the political process school, the state is the major influence on social movements, even to the extent of very often causing movements to arise in the first place. In Part II we saw that, according to this theory, it is changes in the state ("political opportunities" such as the lessening of repression, divisions among elites, etc.) that often allow movements to form.

There are different ways of understanding the term "opportunity." One is in a more structural fashion, in which large changes occur without much or even any intervention by movements themselves. Sociologists Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow represent this point of view in the excerpts in Chapter 26, from a 1977 article that helped define the process approach. For one thing, they argue that the same factors explain both the rise of farmworker insurgency and its outcomes. Those factors center squarely on political and economic elites. When they are divided, such that some of them provide resources and political support to a social movement, then that movement has a much better chance of both establishing itself and attaining its goals (we'll see in Part IX that these are both seen as forms of "success" in the process model). In another argument typical of the process approach, Jenkins and Perrow dismiss the explanatory importance of discontent, which they say "is ever-present for deprived groups." Jenkins and Perrow also exemplify the process school's focus on those social movements composed of people with little or no political and economic power, groups that normally face severe repression when they try to organize and make demands on the system.

Celebrities Most social movements try to publicize their cause by attracting media coverage. They seek to stage protest events that will be considered newsworthy, perhaps because they are flamboyant or represent a new twist on old tactics. But certain people are also newsworthy, attracting attention simply because they are celebrities. When they call a news conference, reporters come. Social movement groups often try to get well-known actors, musicians, singers, and athletes to support their causes, knowing they will get more publicity this way. This strategy can backfire, however, when a celebrity has her own view of a social issue which may be at odds with that of the protest group.

Moral Panics Students of deviance, social problems, and politics have used the concept of a moral panic to describe sudden concern over a group or activity, accompanied by calls for control and suppression. Out of an infinite range of potential perceived threats, one— which may be neither new nor on the rise— suddenly receives considerable attention. Marijuana use, motorbikes, and rock and roll music are common examples. The news media, public officials, religious leaders, and private "moral entrepreneurs" are key in focusing public attention on the issue, typically by identifying some recognizable group as "folk devils"—usually young people, racial and ethnic minorities, or other relatively powerless groups—responsible for the menace. New political or legal policies are sometimes the result, as are new symbols and sensibilities (available as the raw materials for future panics). Some moral panics inspire grassroots protest groups, but others are manipulated by interested elites to undo the work of social movements. For instance, a series of moral panics over the "black underclass" in American cities—having to do with crime, teenage pregnancy, drugs, and so on—were used to scale back affirmative action programs in the 1980s and after.

Another way to understand opportunities is shorter term. During any conflict, there will be moments when quick action can have a big effect. The media suddenly notice your cause, perhaps because of a crisis or accident, or maybe because of an event you have organized. You must move quickly to use them to get your message across. Or there may be a crisis in government that gives your social movement room to maneuver and makes the government concede to your demands just to keep the peace. Social movements are constantly looking for these openings in the state, as well as for sympathetic politicians. But many of these windows of opportunity can hurt as well as help, reshaping, curtailing, or channeling movement demands in the very process of recognizing them. "Opportunities" may also be "constraints."

A third way to envision opportunities (or a third kind of opportunity) is as the relatively permanent features of a country's political landscape. Administrative structures, legal systems, electoral rules, and constitutions all constrain what social movements can achieve. We might call these "horizons" of opportunity, since they define what is possible within that system, in contrast to "windows" of opportunity that open and shut quickly.

The mass media are, of course, another important institution that shapes and constrains movements and which movements seek to shape and constrain as well. Modern social movements can hardly be imagined without the media to amplify their messages. The cheap newspapers that appeared in the nineteenth century, for instance, helped larger, more national movements form for the first time in the industrialized countries. Today, hardly any movement can afford to ignore the media, which can reach much larger numbers than the movement itself can through personal networks or its own publications. These anonymous audiences can be especially important in contributing funds and in affecting state policies.

Movement activists devote considerable time to figuring out events that will attract news coverage—in other words, events which editors and reporters will consider "news-worthy" (Gans 1979). Especially flamboyant marches and rallies, new twists on old themes, and clever incantations can all help events to get on the evening news. Abbie Hoffman was a genius at attracting this kind of attention, with events such as the "levitation" of the Pentagon. But social movements challenging

the status quo often face media that are not entirely sympathetic, and that are sometimes hostile to the movement's message. The mass media, after all, are owned and monitored by wealthy elites with distinct interests. What is more, movements' elite opponents usually have better access to the news media. Movements have little control over how they are ultimately portrayed.

Which movements have received the most media attention, historically, and why? Looking across the entire twentieth century in the United States, Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Sheera Joy Olasky, and James E. Stobaugh find that the labor, civil rights, and veterans movements garnered the most attention, although attention to the labor and veterans movements declined significantly after the mid-century (Chapter 27). Not surprisingly, the civil rights movement received extensive media coverage in the 1960s, and the women's and environmental movements attracted considerable coverage from the 1970s through the 1990s. These authors find that a movement became the focus of very extensive media coverage when four factors combined: the movement engaged in disruptive activities; the movement grew to include a large number of organizations; politicians favorable to the movement were in office; and politicians were enforcing policies in favor of the movement. These findings show the importance of size, disruption, and a favorable political context when it comes to attracting media attention.

As they try to attract media attention, movements themselves may change. One of the first (and best) analyses of the complex interaction between a movement and the media was Todd Gitlin's book about the New Left of the 1960s, *The Whole World Is Watching* (1980). Gitlin demonstrated some of the ways that the media "framed" the protest at its height (in other words, when it was most threatening to mainstream institutions) by concentrating on its more extreme ideas and actions and at the same time trivializing the threat it posed. At the same time, this loosely organized movement began thinking about itself in the terms laid out by the media! Gitlin showed that one hazard of media coverage is the creation of media "stars" from among movement leaders. These are not always the actual organizational or intellectual leaders, but usually people who are flamboyant and photogenic—in other words, those with a talent for attracting media attention. This creation of spokespersons whose power comes from their ability to attract media coverage further distorts a movement's message. Many potential leaders simply abdicate this role in the face of media dynamics.

It is clear from Gitlin's account that the media can give undue prominence to radical or illegal wings of movements, or to segments that are further outside mainstream culture: the "kooks" in a movement.

Governments, too, often radicalize a movement by indiscriminately repressing moderates and radicals (in which case there is little incentive to be a moderate), or simply by repressing a movement too heavy-handedly. In the end, these interactions with media and the state deeply affect a movement's ability to change society.

The media have had a significant influence on the human rights movement in the West, as detailed by James Ron, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers in Chapter 28. The media are generally uninterested in (and often incapable of) reporting human rights abuses in poor and "obscure" countries, even when those abuses are extensive. So human rights organizations, which generally prize media visibility, tend to focus on abuses in wealthier and more accessible countries, even if the abuses there are less severe. Media visibility also makes it easier for rights organizations to raise funds, an important incentive for focusing their efforts on wealthier and better-known countries. The media's priorities, in

Choice Points Protestors and their opponents make numerous choices in the course of their varied engagements. In doing so they face many strategic dilemmas, in which each course of action has potential benefits but also costs and risks. The creativity of movements is evident when a choice is made to do something differently from what is expected or what has been done in the past. Not all choices are consciously faced, as many people—following routines—do what other protest groups usually do because they think that "is just the way it is done." Even when they are not encountered explicitly, the strategic dilemmas still exist as tradeoffs, shaping the outcomes of conflict. Scholarly analysts can often see alternatives that activists themselves do not.

short, encourage the human rights movement to pay less attention to abuses in poorer countries than would be merited in a fairer world.

The opposite side of this coin, as Clifford Bob shows in Chapter 29, is a tendency for movements in poorer countries to adjust their own goals and strategies to match the concerns of potential allies in richer countries. Bob notes how the Ogoni ethnic group in Nigeria, led by Ken Saro-Wiwa (see the short biography at the end of Chapter 29), reframed its conflict with multinational oil companies from one of ethnic domination to "environmental warfare." This strategic shift was instrumental in winning the support of Western environmental organizations. But worthy movements that lack savvy or those without charismatic leaders attuned to Western audiences (including highly participatory movements) are likely to suffer in isolation. Movements that seem complex, unfashionable, or hopeless are unlikely to attract international support.

Corporations are another important institution with which movements contend. The changing character of corporations and the capitalist economy has altered the playing field on which movements—especially labor and environmental movements—have mobilized in recent years. Corporations have become increasingly powerful and global in scale. As Stephen Lerner points out in Chapter 30, most of the 100 largest economies in the world today are not countries but global corporations. Accordingly, Lerner suggests, labor unions need to focus their organizing efforts on corporations, not countries, which in turn means organizing on the same global scale as corporations. (Lerner is an official of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), the fastest-growing union in the United States.) Multinational corporations may be increasingly powerful, but they are also dependent on service workers whose jobs cannot be relocated or "off-shored." (A janitor in Manila cannot clean an office in Los Angeles; a maid in Calcutta cannot make a bed in Miami.) So, even low-wage workers have some potential leverage in the global economy. Global capitalism has certainly created daunting challenges for labor movements, but it has not changed the need for or the possibility of them. As we have seen, in fact, it has even spurred a transnational movement for democratic globalization.

Discussion Questions

1   What kinds of opportunities affect the efficacy of social movements?

2   What are the benefits and risks of having allies among prominent politicians or other celebrities?

3   To what extent was the farmworkers' movement successful because of a shifting political environment? To what extent was its success a product of specific strategies?

4   Why do the media cover some movements more than others? As a political activist, how would you go about getting media attention for your cause? What are some of the risks of that attention?

5   What factors shape how the media will portray a social movement and its ideas?

6   Corporations are increasingly global in their operations. In what ways does this make them more or less vulnerable to pressure from workers and their allies?

26

Farmworkers' Movements in Changing Political Contexts

J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow

From about 1964 until 1972, American society witnessed an unprecedented number of groups acting in insurgent fashion. By insurgency we mean organized attempts to bring about structural change by thrusting new interests into decision-making processes. Some of this insurgency, notably the civil rights and peace movements, had begun somewhat earlier, but after 1963 there were organized attempts to bring about structural changes from virtually all sides: ethnic minorities (Indians, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans), welfare mothers, women, sexual liberation groups, teachers and even some blue-collar workers. The present study isolates and analyzes in detail one of these insurgent challenges—that of farmworkers—in an effort to throw light on the dynamics that made the 1960s a period of dramatic and stormy politics.

Our thesis is that the rise and dramatic success of farmworker insurgents in the late 1960s best can be explained by changes in the political environment the movement confronted, rather than by the internal characteristics of the movement organization and the social base upon which it drew. The salient environment consisted of the government, especially the federal government, and a coalition of liberal support organizations. We shall contrast the unsuccessful attempt to organize farmworkers by the National Farm Labor Union from 1946 to 1952 with the strikingly successful one of the United Farmworkers from 1965 to 1972.

The immediate goals of both movements were the same—to secure union contracts. They both used the same tactics, namely, mass agricultural strikes, boycotts aided by organized labor, and political demands supported by the liberal community of the day. Both groups encountered identical and virtually insurmountable obstacles, namely, a weak bargaining position, farmworker poverty and a culture of resignation, high rates of migrancy and weak social cohesion, and a perpetual oversupply of farm labor, insuring that growers could break any strike.

The difference between the two challenges was the societal response that insurgent demands received. During the first challenge, government policies strongly favored agri-business; support from liberal organizations and organized labor

was weak and vacillating. By the time the second challenge was mounted, the political environment had changed dramatically. Government now was divided over policies pertaining to farmworkers; liberals and organized labor had formed a reform coalition, attacking agri-business privileges in public policy. The reform coalition then furnished the resources to launch the challenge. Once underway, the coalition continued to fend for the insurgents, providing additional resources and applying leverage to movement targets. The key changes, then, were in support organization and governmental actions. To demonstrate this, we will analyze macro-level changes in the activities of these groups as reported in the *New York Times Annual Index* between 1946 and 1972.

Repression Armies and police are almost always better armed than social movements. If political leaders retain control over the military and police, accordingly, then they can suppress almost any social movement that they choose. Such repression will be constrained primarily by public opinion or by disagreements among elites. While repression generally works to dampen protest, however, it sometimes "backfires," provoking greater levels of protest, including armed resistance, by people who are angry and outraged by the repression, in addition to whatever grievances prompted them to protest in the first place. Even armed revolutionaries, however, rarely succeed against a unified state. But the likelihood that (or at least the speed with which) a state will move to suppress a social movement varies enormously. Movements aimed at seizing state power receive the fastest attention. Those that are disruptive or that challenge economic elites can also expect a powerful repressive response. But many moderate movements, which seek reforms within the existing political and economic order, may escape repression. In fact, this is usually a prerequisite for their survival, given the enormous imbalance in power between the state and most social movements.

The Classical Model

In taking this position, we are arguing that the standard literature on social movements fails to deal adequately with either of two central issues—the formation of insurgent organizations and the outcome of insurgent challenges. Drawing on Gusfield's (1968) summary statement, the classical literature holds in common the following line of argument.

Social movements arise because of deep and widespread discontent. First, there is a social change which makes prevailing social relations inappropriate, producing a strain between the new and the old. Strain then generates discontent within some social grouping. When discontent increases rapidly and is widely shared, collective efforts to alleviate discontent will occur. Though there is disagreement about how to formulate the link between strain and discontent, e.g., subjective gaps between expectations and satisfactions versus emotional anxiety induced by anomie, the central thrust is consistent. Fluctuations in the level of discontent account for the rise of movements and major changes in movement participation.

Recent research, though, has cast doubt on the classic "discontent" formulations. Disorders do not arise from disorganized anomic masses, but from groups organizationally able to defend and advance their interests (Oberschall, 1973; Tilly et al., 1975). As for relative deprivation, Snyder and Tilly (1972) and Hibbs (1973) have failed to find it useful in accounting for a wide variety of collective disruptions. Nor is it clear that we can use the concept without falling into post hoc interpretations (cf. Wilson, 1973:73–9).[1]

In this study, we do not propose to test each of the various "discontent" formulations currently available. *A priori*, it is rather hard to believe that farmworkers' discontent was, for example, suddenly greater in 1965, when the Delano grape strike began, than throughout much of the 1950s when there was no movement or strike activity. Indeed, it seems more plausible to assume that farmworker discontent is relatively constant, a product of established economic relations rather than some social dislocation or dysfunction. We do not deny the existence of discontent but we question the usefulness of discontent formulations in accounting for either the emergence of

insurgent organization or the level of participation by the social base. What increases, giving rise to insurgency, is the amount of social resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups, making it possible to launch an organized demand for change.

As for the outcome of challenges, the importance of resources is obvious. Though the classical literature has rarely dealt with the issue directly, there has been an implicit position. The resources mobilized by movement organizations are assumed to derive from the aggrieved social base. The outcome of the challenge, then, whether or not one adopts a "natural history" model of movement development, should depend primarily upon internal considerations, e.g., leadership changes and communication dynamics among the membership.

However, are deprived groups like farmworkers able to sustain challenges, especially effective ones, on their own? We think not. Both of the movements studied were, from the outset, dependent upon external groups for critical organizational resources. Nor, as the history of agricultural strikes amply attests, have farmworker movements proven able to mobilize numbers sufficient to wring concessions from employers. For a successful outcome, movements by the "powerless" require strong and sustained outside support.

If this line of argument is correct, we need to contest a second thesis frequently found in the classical literature—the assertion that the American polity operates in a pluralistic fashion (Kornhauser, 1959; Smelser, 1962). A pluralistic polity is structurally open to demands for change. As Gamson (1968; 1975) has put it, the political system should be structurally "permeable," readily incorporating new groups and their interests into the decision-making process. Once organized, groups redressing widely-shared grievances should be able to secure at least some part of their program through bargaining and compromise. Yet our evidence shows that farmworker challenges have failed, in part, because of the opposition of public officials, and that a successful challenge depended upon the intervention of established liberal organizations and the neutrality of political elites.

We can then summarize the classical model as follows. (1) Discontent, traced to structural dislocations, accounts for collective attempts to bring about change. (2) The resources required to mount collective action and carry it through are broadly distributed—shared by all sizeable social groupings. (3) The political system is pluralistic and, therefore, responsive to all organized groups with grievances. (4) If insurgents succeed, it is due to efforts on the part of the social base; if they do not, presumably they lacked competent leaders, were unwilling to compromise, or behaved irrationally (e.g., used violence or broke laws).

In contrast, we will argue that (1) discontent is ever-present for deprived groups, but (2) collective action is rarely a viable option because of lack of resources and the threat of repression. (3) When deprived groups do mobilize, it is due to the interjection of external resources. (4) Challenges frequently fail because of the lack of resources. Success comes when there is a combination of sustained outside support and disunity and/or tolerance on the part of political elites. The important variables separating movement success from failure, then, pertain to the way the polity responds to insurgent demands.

Structural Powerlessness of Farmworkers

The major impediment to farmworker unionization has been the oversupply of farm labor, undercutting all attempted harvest strikes. There are few barriers of habit or skill that restrict the entry of any applicant to work in the fields. The result is an "unstructured" labor market, offering little job stability and open to all comers. The fields of California and Texas are close enough to the poverty-stricken provinces of Mexico to insure a steady influx of workers, many of whom arrive by illegal routes. Continuous immigration not only underwrites the oversupply of labor, but complicates mobilization by insuring the existence of cultural cleavages among workers.

Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that a significant number of workers have only a limited economic interest in the gains promised by unionization. The majority of farmworkers, both domestic and alien, are short-term seasonal workers. During the early 1960s, farm employment in California averaged less than three months of the year. This means that a majority of

workers are interested primarily in the "quick dollar." Imposition of union restrictions on easy access to jobs would conflict with that interest. And for the vast majority of farmworkers, regardless of job commitment or citizenship status, income is so low as to leave little economic reserve for risk-taking. Since a major portion of the year's income comes during the brief harvest period, workers are reluctant to risk their livelihood on a strike at that time.

In addition to these structural restraints on collective action, there were the very direct restraints of the growers and their political allies. The California Department of Employment and the U.S. Department of Labor have long operated farm placement services that furnish workers for strike-bound employers. Insurgent actions that directly threaten growers, like picket lines and mass rallies, consistently have been the target of official harassment. Though never returning to the scale of the "local fascism" of the 1930s grower vigilante actions are not uncommon.

Bringing these considerations to bear on the comparison of farmworker challenges, there is reason to believe that circumstances were slightly more conducive to the mobilization efforts of the UFW. Between 1946 and 1965 farm wage rates rose slightly and a few public welfare benefits were extended, at least within California. Presumably, farm-workers were slightly more secure economically by the mid-1960s. More significant, though, were changes in the social composition of the farm labor force. During the late 1940s farmworkers in California were either "dustbowlers" or Mexican *braceros* (government-imported contract workers); by the mid-1960s the California farm labor force was predominantly Mexican-descent, short-term workers, most of whom only recently had migrated across the border. Not only were linguistic-cultural cleavages somewhat less pronounced, but these new immigrants were more likely to settle and develop stable community ties than their "Okie" predecessors.

Also, the United Farmworkers pursued a mobilization strategy better designed than that of the NFLU to sustain the participation of farmworkers. From its inception, the UFW was an Alinsky-styled community organization. The primary advantage was that it offered a program of services and social activities that did not depend upon first securing a union contract.

Members developed an attachment to the organization independent of the immediate gains that might derive from any strike. Though the National Farm Labor Union had taken limited steps in a similar direction, its program remained primarily that of the conventional "business" union, promising wage gains and better working conditions rather than social solidarity and community benefits.

But the critical issue is whether differences in either the structural position of farm-workers or the mobilization strategy adopted by the movements affected either dependent variable. As we shall see, the impetus for both of the challenges came from the interjection, into an otherwise placid situation, of a professionally-trained cadre backed by outside sponsors. Farmworker discontent remained unexpressed in any organized way until outside organizers arrived on the scene.

As for the question of challenge outcome, despite the UFW's advantages, it experienced no more success in strike efforts than did the NFLU. Where the NFLU had to contend with the semi-official use of *braceros* as strikebreakers, the UFW had to deal with vastly increased numbers of illegal aliens and short-term workers crossing the picket lines. The combination of structural constraints and direct controls insured that neither union was able to mobilize a sufficiently massive social base to be effective.

What separated the UFW success from the NFLU failure was the societal response to the challenges. The NFLU received weak and vacillating sponsorship; the UFW's backing was strong and sustained. Under the pressure of court injunctions and police harassment, the NFLU boycott collapsed when organized labor refused to cooperate. By contrast, the UFW boycotts became national "causes," receiving widespread support from organized labor and liberal organizations; though official harassment remained, the UFW did not deal with the same systematic repression confronted by the NFLU. The success of a "powerless" challenge depended upon sustained and widespread outside support coupled with the neutrality and/or tolerance from the national political elite.

[…]

Our analysis centers on the comparison of three time periods. The first, 1946–1955, spans

the challenge of the National Farm Labor Union. Chartered to organize farm-workers at the 1946 American Federation of Labor convention, the NFLU launched a strike wave in the Central Valley of California that ended with the abortive Los Baños strike of 1952. The selection of 1955 as the end point of the period was somewhat arbitrary.

By comparison, the third period, 1965–1972, covers the sustained and successful challenge of the United Farmworkers. The 1965 Coachella and Delano strikes announced the UFW challenge; in 1970, after two years of nation-wide boycott efforts, the UFW brought table-grape growers to the bargaining table and began institutionalizing changes in the position of farmworkers. (The Teamster entry in 1973 is not dealt with in this paper.)

During the period intervening between the two challenges, 1956–1964, important changes took place in the political system that set the stage for a successful challenge. In the absence of a major "push" from insurgents, issues pertaining to farm labor received a different treatment in the hands of established liberal organizations and government officials. We will argue that these years constituted a period of germination and elite reform that made possible the success of the late 1960s.

[…]

Period I: The NFLU Conflict (1946–1955)

The first period illustrates in classical terms the obstacles to a sustained and successful farmworker challenge. In addition to the structural constraints restricting farmworker activity, the political environment confronting the insurgents was unfavorable. Government officials at all levels and branches came into the conflict predominantly on the side of the growers, despite the mandate of agencies such as the Department of Labor or the Education and Labor Committees in Congress to protect the interests of deprived groups like farmworkers. Though external support was decisive in launching the challenge, it was weak and frequently ill-focused, dealing with the consequences rather than the causes of farmworker grievances. When support was withdrawn, the challenge soon collapsed.

Chartered at the 1946 convention of the American Federation of Labor, the National Farm Labor Union set out to accomplish what predecessors had been unable to do—successfully organize the farmworkers of California's "industrialized" agriculture. The leadership cadre was experienced and resourceful. H. L. Mitchell, President of the NFLU, was former head of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union; the Director of Organizations, Henry Hasiwar, had been an effective organizer in several industrial union drives during the 1930s; Ernesto Galarza, who assumed prime responsibility for publicity efforts, had served as political liaison for Latin American unions and had a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University.

Initially, the strategy was quite conventional: enlist as many workers as possible from a single employer, call a strike, demand wage increases and union recognition, and picket to keep "scabs" out of the fields. American Federation of Labor affiliates would then provide strike relief and political support to keep the picket line going. An occasional church or student group would furnish money and boost morale.

But the government-sponsored alien labor or *braceros* program provided growers with an effective strike-breaking weapon. According to provisions of the law, *braceros* were not to be employed except in instances of domestic labor shortage and *never* to be employed in fields where domestic workers had walked out on strike. Yet in the two major tests of union power, the DiGiorgio strike of 1948 and the Imperial Valley strike of 1951, the flood of *braceros* undermined the strike effort of domestic workers. In the Imperial strike, the NFLU used citizen's arrests to enforce statutes prohibiting employment of *braceros* in labor disputed areas. However, local courts ruled against the tactic and the Immigration Service refused to remove alien "scabs" from the fields. Nor were affairs changed when the *bracero* administration was transferred to the U.S. Department of Labor in 1951. Domestic workers were pushed out of crops by *braceros,* and *braceros* reappeared in the Los Baños strike of 1952 to break the challenge.

In response, the NFLU launched a two-pronged political challenge—a demand for termination of the *bracero* program and, to get

around the problem of ineffective strikes, requests for organized labor's support of boycotts. Neither demand found a favorable audience. Lacking strong labor or liberal support, the demand for an end to the *bracero* traffic ended in minor reforms in the *bracero* administration. As for the boycott, despite initial success, it collapsed when a court injunction was issued (improperly) on the grounds that the NFLU was covered by the "hot cargo" provisions of the Taft–Hartley Act. The National Labor Relations Board initially concurred and reversed its position over a year later. By then the Union's resources were exhausted and organized-labor support had long since collapsed.

Figure 26.1 charts the level of favorable actions by selected groups, allowing us to gauge the societal response to insurgency. The curves delineating government, liberal, and farmworker activities move roughly in concert. (Organized labor, though, played little public role in this or the next period.) […]

The main issue for the period was labor supply. […] The union attempted, through court actions, lobby efforts and public protest, to pressure government to end the *bracero* program since it was so central to the control of the labor supply. The official response, however, was largely symbolic. Though government tended to respond to concrete insurgency with favorable concrete actions, the majority of favorable governmental actions were actually symbolic (58%). Nor did many of these concrete moves decisively aid the farmworker cause. Key actions, such as pulling strikebreaking *braceros* out of the fields, did not occur.

What, then, are we to make of the fact that 50% of reported governmental actions were coded as favorable to the interest of farmworkers? Was government responding to the conflict between insurgents and growers in some even-handed "pluralist" way? Here it is necessary to recall that we are using news media reportage on a social problem and efforts to redress that problem. The news media will be more sensitive to efforts attempting to define or solve that problem than to efforts to maintain the *status quo*. Consequently, unfavorable actions by government and growers are underrepresented in our data. If only 50% of news-reported government actions can be coded

as favorable, then the full universe of governmental activities should, in the balance, be more favorable to growers.

The strength of this assertion is borne out by information on actions favorable to growers. Figure 26.2 charts these actions for government and growers. […] In quantitative terms, government was more responsive to agribusiness interests. Clearly, in critical instances, e.g., leaving *braceros* in struck fields, government policies favored growers over workers.

In addition to the predominantly unfavorable response of government, the NFLU failed to receive sustained, solid support from the liberal community. The major problem was the type of activities in which liberals engaged. When they acted, liberals consistently supported farmworkers over growers but they rarely moved beyond symbolic proclamations. Only 24% of liberal actions during the period were concrete. By contrast, 38% during the UFW challenge were so. […] Where the UFW experienced consistent and concrete support, the NFLU found itself relatively isolated.

Though liberals did not rush to the side of the NFLU, they did play a role in the pressure campaign. […] Insofar as liberals did act alongside insurgents, apparently it was in the presence of public officials. But there were problems even with this limited-scale liberal support. Liberals focused almost exclusively on the working and living conditions of farmworkers. Following the lead of Progressive Party candidate Henry Wallace in 1948, several religious and "public interest" associations sponsored conferences and issued study reports publicizing deplorable camp conditions and child labor. In what might be considered a typical pattern of liberalism of the time, they were concerned with the plight of the workers rather than the fact of their powerlessness or the role of the *bracero* program in underwriting that powerlessness. It was a humanitarian, non-political posture, easily dissipated by "red baiting" in Congressional investigations and "red scare" charges by growers and their political allies throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s. The two issues, poverty and the question of labor supply, were not to be linked by the liberal organizations until well into Period II.

Figure 26.1   Actions favorable to insurgents

Period II: Elite Reform and Realignment (1956–1964)

The late 1950s and the early 1960s, the second Eisenhower administration and the brief Kennedy period emerge from this and other studies in the larger project as a period of germination. Contrary to some interpretations, the remarkable insurgencies of the late 1960s did not originate with the Kennedy administration, but with developments that initially began to appear during Eisenhower's second term. Nor did the Kennedy years witness a dramatic escalation of insurgent activity. Indeed, in the case of farmworkers, insurgency showed a decline (Figure 26.1). For our purposes, the two presidential administrations

Figure 26.2 Actions favorable to growers

can be treated as a single period, one that witnessed important realignments and shifts in political resources in the national polity, culminating in a supportive environment for insurgent activity.

Farmworker insurgency during the reform period was at a low ebb. Actions by farm-worker insurgents dropped from 16% to 11% of all proworker activity. In 1956–1957 the NFLU, now renamed the National Agricultural Workers Union (NAWU), secured a small grant from the United Auto Workers, enabling it to hang on as a paper organization. Galarza, by then the only full-time cadre member, launched a publicity campaign to reveal maladministration and corruption within the *bracero* administration. Aside from a brief and ineffective organizing drive launched in 1959 by the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), generating only one reported strike (in 1961), this was the sum of insurgent activity for the nine-year Period II (Figure 26.1). Growers remained publicly inactive and seemingly secure in their position, aroused only at renewal time for the *bracero* program to lobby bills through Congress. Until the insurgency of Period III began, growers retained a low profile in the *Times* (Figure 26.2).

With the direct adversaries largely retired from the public arena, affairs shifted into the hands of

government and the liberals. Despite the absence of significant insurgency, the balance of forces in the national polity had begun to shift. Actions favorable to the interests of farmworkers increased from 50% to 73%, remaining on the same plane (75%) throughout the following UFW period. Beginning during the last years of the Eisenhower administration, three interrelated developments brought about this new supportive environment: (1) policy conflicts within the political elite that resulted in a more "balanced," neutral stance toward farmworkers; (2) the formation of a reform coalition composed of liberal pressure groups and organized labor that, in the midst of elite divisions, was able to exercise greater political influence; (3) the erosion of the Congressional power-base of conservative rural interests, stemming immediately from reapportionment.

The concern of liberal pressure groups initially was focused on the need to improve housing and educational conditions of migrant workers. In 1956, the Democratic National Convention included a plank for increased welfare aid to migrants. The next year, the National Council of Churches, already involved in the early civil rights movement in the South, began a study of migrant camp conditions and child labor. In early 1958, the Council brought public pressure to bear on Secretary of Labor James Mitchell to enforce

existing laws regarding migrant camps throughout the nation. In late 1958, several liberal pressure groups were joined by the AFL-CIO in attacking the *bracero* program, scoring administrative laxity, and arguing that federal labor policies were the origin of social problems. The two as yet unrelated issues—poverty and labor policies—were now firmly linked in the public debate.

The fusion of these two issues was significant. Of course, economic conditions already had been linked with social deprivations in public parlance, but the concern of liberal groups in the past had been with inspection of housing, assurances of educational opportunity, and public health measures. To argue now that a public program of importing foreign labor perpetuated the list of conditions deplored by liberals was a substantial change. As later happened more generally with the New Left, the advocates of reform had begun to look at the source of problems in terms of a system.

About the same time, organized labor took a new interest in farmworkers. In 1959, the AFL-CIO Executive Council abolished the NAWU and created the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), headed by Norman Smith, a former UAW organizer. Despite strong financial backing, the AWOC produced little results. Concentrating on 4 a.m. "shake-ups" of day laborers, the AWOC managed to sponsor a number of "job actions" but only one major strike and little solid organization. Like the NFLU, the AWOC had to confront the problem of *braceros*. In the one reported strike, the Imperial Valley strike of February, 1961, the AWOC used violence to intimidate strikebreaking *braceros* and create an international incident over their presence. Officials quickly arrested the cadre, and the AWOC ceased to exist except on paper. Though the AWOC drive consumed over one million dollars of AFL-CIO funds, it produced neither contracts nor stable membership. Yet, and this indicates the shift, this type of financial support had never before been offered by organized labor.

The final element in the formation of a supportive environment was a shift in governmental actions. Actions favorable to farmworkers increased from the unfavorable 50% prevailing during Period I to a more "balanced" 68% of all governmental actions. Of these, the portion coded "concrete," and therefore more likely to have impact, increased from 40% in Period I to

65%. Indicative of the change taking place in official views, the focus of governmental attentions shifted from the labor supply issue (56% of favorable actions during Period I) to the question of farmworkers' living and working conditions (73% during Period II).

The change in official actions stemmed, in part, from internal conflicts within the national political elite. Secretary of Labor James Mitchell was a surprise Eisenhower appointee from the Eastern wing of the Republican Party, a former labor consultant for New York department stores and a future protege of Nelson Rockefeller. Mitchell took the Department of Labor in a more pro-union direction than was thought possible, at the time becoming a "strong man" in the cabinet because of his success in mollifying unions. In 1958, an open fight between the Taft and Eastern wings of the Republican Party developed, with the conservatives favoring a national "right-to-work" law. Mitchell, as an advocate of unionism and apparently jockeying for position for the Republican Vice-Presidential nomination, became a figure of elite reform within Republican circles.

A second factor contributing to the shift in official actions was the pressure campaign launched by the reform coalition. […]

Tangible effects of the pressure campaign appeared almost immediately. In 1957, under pressure from the liberal reform coalition, the Department of Labor under Mitchell's guidance carried out an internal review of farm labor policies. The upshot was a series of executive orders to tighten up enforcement of regulations covering migrant camps. When the economic recession of 1958–1959 arrived, sensitivity within the Administration to rising unemployment levels increased. In response, Mitchell vowed to enforce more fully the 1951 statutes requiring farm employment to be offered to domestic workers prior to importation of *braceros*. Growers, long accustomed to having their *bracero* requests met automatically, rebelled when asked to provide more justification. In February, 1959, Mitchell took an even stronger step, joining the liberal reformers in support of legislation to extend minimum-wage laws to agriculture and to impose new restrictions on the use of *braceros*.

The following year, the division within the Eisenhower Administration opened up into a full-scale, cabinet-level battle over renewal of the

bracero program. The Farm Bureau and the state grower associations engaged that other administration "strong man," Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, to defend the program. In testimony before the House Committee on Agriculture, the White House took a neutral stance; Benson defended the program, while Mitchell argued that the program exerted demonstrable adverse effects upon domestic workers and should be abolished. Into this breach in the political elite stepped the liberal-labor support coalition. At the same time, the House Committee on Public Welfare opened hearings on health and camp conditions, giving the Cotton Council and the Meatcutters Union a chance to air opposing views.

Initially, the reform effort failed. In March, 1960, Secretary Mitchell withdrew his program, resolving the dispute on the cabinet level. The next month, agribusiness pushed a two-year renewal of the *bracero* program through Congress. But, for the first time, the issue had been debated seriously and a loose coalition of liberal pressure groups (e.g., National Council of Churches, National Advisory Committee of Farm Labor, NAACP) and organized labor had formed. Though the eventual termination of the *bracero* program did not undermine growers' ability to break strikes (there were other substitutes, e.g., "green card" commuters, illegal aliens), the fight against the program did refocus the concern of liberals and organized labor on the structural problem of farmworker powerlessness.

The reform coalition sustained the campaign over the next three years. In 1960, the Democratic platform condemned the *bracero* program. Once in office, the New Frontiersmen, though demanding no important statutory changes, did vow to enforce fully the laws restricting *bracero* use. By renewal time in 1963, the Kennedy Administration was in the pursuit of a public issue ("poverty") and courting minority-group votes. For the first time, the White House went formally on record against the program. Only at the last minute was a pressure campaign, mounted by Governor Pat Brown of California and the Department of State, responding to Mexican diplomatic pressure, able to save the program temporarily. Amid promises from Congressional farm bloc leaders that this was the last time the program would be renewed, a one-year extension was granted.

In addition to the efforts of the reform coalition, which played a critical role in other reforms of the same period, and the new elite-level neutrality, the fall of the *bracero* program stemmed from the narrowing power base of the Congressional farm bloc. Congressional reapportionment had visibly shaken the conservative farm bloc leaders. Searching for items in the farm program that could be scuttled without damaging the main planks, the farm bloc leaders fixed on the *bracero* program. The mechanization of the Texas cotton harvest had left California growers of specialty crops the main *bracero* users. When the test came, *bracero* users, as a narrow, special interest, could be sacrificed to keep the main planks of the farm program intact.

Period II, then, emerges from this analysis as a period of reform and political realignment that dramatically altered the prospective fortunes of insurgents. Reforms, stemming from elite-level conflicts and a pressure campaign conducted by liberal public-interest organizations and organized labor, came about in the virtual absence of activity by farmworker insurgents. The activism of several key liberal organizations depended, in turn, upon broad economic trends, especially the growth of middle-class disposable income that might be invested in worthy causes (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Insurgents did not stimulate these changes in the national polity. Rather, they were to prove the beneficiaries and, if anything, were stimulated by them.

Period III: The UFW Success (1965–1972)

During the NFLU period, the number of insurgent actions reported totaled 44. Most of these were symbolic in character, only 27% being concrete. Insurgency was brief, concentrated in a four-year period (1948–1951). However, in the third period, insurgency became sustained. Insurgent actions reached a new peak and remained at a high level throughout the period. A total of 143 actions conducted by farmworker insurgents were recorded. Significantly, 71% of these were concrete in character. By the end of the period, the success of the United Farmworkers was unmistakable. Over a hundred contracts had been signed; wages had been raised by almost a third; union hiring halls

were in operation in every major agricultural area in California; farmworkers, acting through ranch committees set up under each contract, were exercising a new set of powers.

The key to this dramatic success was the altered political environment within which the challenge operated. Though the potential for mobilizing a social base was slightly more favorable than before, the UFW never was able to launch effective strikes. Though the UFW cadre was experienced and talented, there is little reason to believe that they were markedly more so than the NFLU leadership; neither did the tactics of the challenge differ. The boycotts that secured success for the UFW also had been tried by the NFLU, but with quite different results. What had changed was the political environment—the liberal community now was willing to provide sustained, massive support for insurgency; the political elite had adopted a neutral stance toward farmworkers.

As before, external support played a critical role in launching the challenge. The initial base for the United Farmworkers was César Chávez's National Farmworkers Association (NFWA) and remnants of the AWOC still receiving some support from the AFL-CIO. During the 1950s, Chávez had been director of the Community Service Organization, an Alinsky-styled urban community-organization with strong ties to civil rights groups, liberal churches and foundations. Frustrated by the refusal of the CSO Board of Directors to move beyond issues salient to upwardly-mobile urban Mexican-Americans, Chávez resigned his post in the winter of 1961 and set out to organize a community organization among farmworkers in the Central Valley of California. Drawing on his liberal contacts, Chávez was able to secure the backing of several liberal organizations which had developed a new concern with poverty and the problems of minority groups. The main sponsor was the California Migrant Ministry, a domestic mission of the National Council of Churches servicing migrant farmworkers. During the late 1950s, the Migrant Ministry followed the prevailing policy change within the National Council, substituting community organization and social action programs for traditional evangelical ones. By 1964, the Migrant Ministry had teamed up with Chávez, merging its own community organization (the FWO) with the NFWA and sponsoring the Chávez-directed effort.

By summer, 1965, NFWA had over 500 active members and began shifting directions, expanding beyond economic benefit programs (e.g., a credit union, cooperative buying, etc.) to unionization. Several small "job actions" were sponsored. Operating nearby, the remaining active group of the AWOC, several Filipino work-crews, hoped to take advantage of grower uncertainty generated by termination of the *bracero* program. The AWOC launched a series of wage strikes, first in the Coachella Valley and then in the Delano-Arvin area of the San Joaquin Valley. With the AWOC out on strike, Chávez pressed the NFWA for a strike vote. On Mexican Independence Day, September 16th, the NFWA joined the picket lines.

Though dramatic, the strike soon collapsed. Growers refused to meet with union representatives; a sufficient number of workers crossed the picket lines to prevent a major harvest loss. Over the next six years, the same pattern recurred—a dramatic strike holding for a week, grower intransigence, police intimidation, gradual replacement

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Political Opportunities   Some groups are eager and sufficiently organized to protest, yet are fearful that they will be ignored or even repressed if they do. These groups may not engage in protest, accordingly, until (1) they have at least some access to authorities, or they see signs that (2) repression is declining, (3) elites are divided, or (4) elites or other influential groups are willing to support them. Such shifts in the political environment diminish the risks associated with protest and amplify the political influence of protesters. The appearance or "expansion" of these types of "political opportunities" may be a necessary precondition for—and may explain the precise timing of—the emergence of a protest movement. The same political opportunities, whether or not their participants are even aware of them, may also help movements to change laws and public policies. Of course, when they are willing to take sufficient risks, movements sometimes create opportunities for themselves, rather than simply waiting for changes among elites.

of the work force by playing upon ethnic rivalries and recruiting illegal aliens. What proved different from the NFLU experience was the ability of the insurgents, acting in the new political environment, to secure outside support.

Political protest was the mechanism through which much of this support was garnered. By dramatic actions designed to capture the attention of a sympathetic public and highlight the "justice" of their cause, insurgents were able to sustain the movement organization and exercise sufficient indirect leverage against growers to secure contracts. The UFW's use of protest tactics departed from that of rent strikers analyzed by Lipsky (1968; 1970). Though the basic mechanism was the same (namely, securing the sympathy of third parties to the conflict so that they would use their superior resources to intervene in support of the powerless), the commitments of supporting organizations and the uses to which outside support was put differed. Lipsky found that protest provided unreliable resources, that the news media and sympathetic public might ignore protestors' demands and that, even when attentive they often were easily satisfied with symbolic palliatives. Though the UFW experienced these problems, the presence of sustained sponsorship on the part of the Migrant Ministry and organized labor guaranteed a stable resource base.

Nor were the uses of protest-acquired resources the same. Lipsky's rent-strikers sought liberal pressure on public officials. For the UFW, protest actions were used to secure contributions and, in the form of a boycott, to exercise power against growers. Marches, symbolic arrests of clergy, and public speeches captured public attention; contributions from labor unions, theater showings and "radical chic" cocktail parties with proceeds to "*La Causa*" supplemented the budget provided by sponsors and membership dues.

Given the failure of strike actions, a successful outcome required indirect means of exercising power against growers. Sympathetic liberal organizations (e.g., churches, universities, etc.) refused to purchase "scab" grapes. More important, though, major grocery chains were pressured into refusing to handle "scab" products. To exercise that pressure, a combination of external resources had to be mobilized. Students had to contribute time to picketing grocery stores and shipping terminals; Catholic churches and labor

unions had to donate office space for boycott houses; Railway Union members had to identify "scab" shipments for boycott pickets; Teamsters had to refuse to handle "hot cargo"; Butchers' union members had to call sympathy strikes when grocery managers continued to stock "scab" products; political candidates and elected officials had to endorse the boycott. The effectiveness of the boycott depended little upon the resources of mobilized farm-workers; instead, they became a political symbol. It was the massive outpouring of support, especially from liberals and organized labor, that made the boycott effective and, thereby, forced growers to the bargaining table.

The strength of liberal-labor support for the UFW is indicated by the high level of concomitant activity between insurgents and their supporters. […] Given the fact that liberal activities rarely occurred jointly with pro-worker government activities, it is clear that liberals directed their efforts toward supporting insurgents rather than pressuring government.

The more "balanced," neutral posture of government that was the product of the reform period continued. Sixty-nine percent of all official actions were favorable to farm-workers (as against 50% and 68% in Periods I and II). Concretely, this meant that court rulings no longer routinely went against insurgents; federal poverty programs helped to "loosen" small town politics; hearings by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and Congressional committees publicized "injustices" against farmworkers; welfare legislation gave farmworkers more economic security and afforded insurgents a legal basis to contest grower employment practices. National politicians, such as Senators Kennedy and McGovern, lent their resources to the cause.

The most striking changes in official actions took place on the federal level. Actions favorable to farmworkers rose from 46% of federal level activity in the first period, to 63% in the second and 74% in the third. State and local government, more under the control of growers, followed a different pattern. In Period I, when growers had opposition only from insurgents, only 26% of official actions were judged favorable to workers. In Period II, when farmworkers were acquiescent but the liberal-labor coalition was experiencing growing influence in national politics, 67% were favorable, slightly more than on the federal level. But when insurgency reappeared in Period III,

the percent favorable dropped to 45%, far lower than the federal level. Government divided on the question, federal actions tending to be neutral, if not supportive, of insurgents while state actions, still under grower dominance, continued to oppose insurgents.

Significantly little of the pro-worker trend in governmental actions during the UFW period is associated with either insurgent or liberal activities. […] Only organized labor appeared to be performing a pressure function. […] Official positions had already undergone important changes during the reform period. The termination of the *bracero* program had left government in a neutralized position. No longer a key player in the conflict, but still under the influence of the reform policies, government preserved its neutral stance despite less visible pressure from any of the partisans.

There was, of course, opposition on the part of growers and allied governmental actors. There were numerous instances of police harassment, large-scale purchases of boycotted products by the Department of Defense, and outspoken opposition from Governor Reagan and President Nixon.

However, growers had lost their entrenched political position. Public officials no longer acted so consistently to enhance grower interests and to contain the challenge. […] By the time the United Farm-workers struck in 1965, agricultural employers were no longer able to rely upon government, especially at the federal level, to be fully responsive to their interest in blocking unionization.

Conclusion

The critical factor separating the National Farm Labor Union failure from the United Farmworker success was the societal response to insurgent demands. In most respects, the challenges were strikingly similar. In both instances, the leadership cadre came from outside the farmworker community; external sponsorship played a critical role in launching both insurgent organizations; both movements confronted similar obstacles to mobilizing a social base and mounting effective strikes; both resorted to political protest and boycotts. What produced the sharp difference in outcome was the difference in political environment encountered. The NFLU received token contributions, vacillating support for its boycott and confronted major acts of resistance by public authorities. In contrast, the UFW received massive contributions, sustained support for its boycotts and encountered a more "balanced," neutral official response.

The dramatic turnabout in the political environment originated in economic trends and political realignments that took place quite independent of any "push" from insurgents. During the reform period, conflicts erupted within the political elite over policies pertaining to farmworkers. Elite divisions provided the opening for reform measures then being pressed by a newly active coalition of established liberal and labor organizations. Though the reforms did not directly effect success, the process entailed by reform did result in a new political environment, one which made a successful challenge possible.

If this analysis is correct, then several assumptions found in the classic literature are misleading. Rather than focusing on fluctuations in discontent to account for the emergence of insurgency, it seems more fruitful to assume that grievances are relatively constant and pervasive. Especially for deprived groups, lack of collective resources and controls exercised by superiors—not the absence of discontent—account for the relative infrequency of organized demands for change. For several of the movements of the 1960s, it was the interjection of resources from outside, not sharp increases in discontent, that led to insurgent efforts.

Nor does the political process centered around insurgency conform to the rules of a pluralist game. The American polity had not been uniformly permeable to all groups with significant grievances (Gamson, 1975). Government does not act as a neutral agent, serving as umpire over the group contest. Public agencies and officials have interests of their own to protect, interests that often bring them into close alignment with well-organized private-interest groups. When insurgency arises threatening these private interests, public officials react by helping to contain insurgency and preserve the *status quo*. But if an opposing coalition of established organizations decides to sponsor an insurgent challenge, the normal bias in public policy can be checked. Sponsors then serve as protectors, insuring that the political elite remains neutral to the challenge.

The implications for other challenges are rather striking. If the support of the liberal community is necessary for the success of a challenge by a deprived group, then the liberal community is, in effect, able to determine the cutting edge for viable changes that conform to the interests of those groups still excluded from American politics. Moreover, there is the possibility of abandonment.

Since liberal support can fade and political elites shift their stance, as has happened to the UFW since 1972, even the gains of the past may be endangered. The prospects for future insurgency, by this account, are dim. Until another major realignment takes place in American politics, we should not expect to see successful attempts to extend political citizenship to the excluded.

Notes

1   Shifts in perceptions, treated as central by relative deprivation theorists, in our view would be secondary to the main process—changes in social resources.

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César Chávez and the UFW

César Estrada Chávez, born in Yuma, Arizona, in 1927, led the most successful union of farmworkers in U.S. history. Chávez himself worked as a migrant farmworker from the age of 10, after his family lost their land during the Great Depression. César, who was forced to attend dozens of elementary schools as his family moved about, quit school after the eighth grade to help support his family. After serving in the navy during World War II, Chávez married and settled in the San Jose, California, barrio called *Sal Si Puedes* ("Get out if you can").

While working in the orchards outside San Jose, Chávez met Fred Ross, an Anglo organizer for the Community Service Organization (CSO), which was sponsored by the Chicago-based Industrial Areas Foundation led by the famous community organizer, Saul Alinsky. Chávez was soon working full time for the CSO, registering farmworkers to vote and organizing chapters of the CSO across California and Arizona. He once registered more than 2,000 voters in just two months.

Chávez's wife, Helen, worked in the fields to support her husband and family during these years. (During his lifetime, Chávez never earned more than $5,000 a year.) In 1962 Chávez decided to leave the CSO to

organize a union of farmworkers, the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), later renamed the United Farm Workers of America (UFW). Farmworkers had tried to organize unions before, but none had been successful, even though most farmworkers earned little more than a dollar an hour during this time.

Chávez roamed from one migrant camp to the next during the mid-1960s, tirelessly organizing a few followers in each. By 1964 the NFWA had about 1,000 members in 50 locales. Chávez once said that "A movement with some lasting organization is a lot less dramatic than a movement with a lot of demonstrations and a lot of marching and so forth. The more dramatic organization does catch attention quicker. Over the long haul, however, it's a lot more difficult to keep together because you're not building solid…. A lasting organization is one in which people will continue to build, develop, and move when you are not there."

In 1965, the NFWA joined in a strike against California grape growers, who brought in scabs and thugs who beat up the strikers. The strikers took a pledge of nonviolence, and Chávez himself conducted a 25-day fast in 1968 (a tactic he utilized often, like his hero Mahatma Gandhi) which attracted national media attention. Senator Robert Kennedy was at his side when he broke his fast, calling Chávez "one of the heroic figures of our time." Chávez also organized a nationwide boycott of grapes, forging a broad support coalition that included other unions, churches, and student and civil rights groups. Most of the major growers finally signed contracts with the union by 1970, and in 1975 the Agricultural Labor Relations Act was passed in California, which provided for secret ballot elections, guaranteed the right to boycott, and oversaw collective bargaining between growers and farmworkers. Tens of thousands of farmworkers covered by UFW contracts enjoyed better wages, health insurance, and pension benefits.

The UFW lost much of its momentum during the early 1980s, confronting a new conservative state government in California. Chávez announced a new grape boycott in 1984, emphasizing how pesticides were harming both farmworkers and consumers. In 1988 Chávez conducted a 36-day "Fast for Life" to protest growers' use of harmful pesticides.

Chávez was president of the UFW when he died on April 23, 1993. Tens of thousands of mourners attended his funeral. The following year, President Bill Clinton posthumously awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor.

27

Movements in the Media

Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Sheera Joy Olasky, and James E. Stobaugh

Gaining the mass news media's attention is critical to the struggles of political advocacy and social movement organizations (SMOs);[1] gaining coverage is a measure of an SMO's cultural influence (Berry 1999; Ferree et al. 2002; Gamson 2004; Gamson et al. 1992; Gitlin 1978, 1980; Koopmans 2004; Lipsky 1968; Vliegenthart, Oegema, and Klandermans 2005; review in Earl 2004). In this study, we address why some SMO families receive extensive newspaper coverage by developing new data on *New York Times* articles that mentioned U.S. SMOs across the twentieth century. We first identify which U.S. SMOs and SMO families have received the greatest newspaper coverage; we then use this information to systematically address why some movement families receive extensive coverage, appraising well-known theories of social movements and movement consequences.

Explaining newspapers' SMO coverage is important for several reasons. SMOs seek to promote many sorts of social change, from creating interests and identities to spurring political participation and civic engagement to winning political goals (Amenta 2006; Andrews 2004; Clemens 1997; Gamson 1990; Ganz 2000; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Polletta 2002; Sampson et al. 2005; Skocpol 2003), and media coverage is important to these efforts. Coverage also constitutes key data in mapping political interests and identities among the politically disadvantaged; it provides a measure of discursive presence or influence in the production of culture akin to Gamson's (1990, 1998) "acceptance" (Earl 2004). Using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analyses (fsQCA) across 2,153 movement family years, we explore why some movement families received extensive coverage, employing arguments from the disruption perspective and the resource mobilization and political contextual theories. We also develop a relatively new political contextual argument: enforced policies for a movement's constituency will spur movements and their coverage.

Motivation, Previous Work, and Models of Movement Influence

Coverage as a Cultural Consequence of Movements

SMOs have been central to movement research since the early 1970s (Gamson 1990; McCarthy and Zald 1977), but few studies go beyond examining one movement (cf. Gamson 1990; Skocpol 2003). Moreover, the mass news media have the widest gallery of all forums in the policy-making process (Gamson 2004), so the attention SMOs receive in the mass media bolsters their positions as representatives for the interests and constituencies they claim (Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans 2004). The mass media help legitimize SMOs in a democratic political system in which most organized groups can gain some access to political institutions; media coverage itself is a demonstration of SMOs' impact, or acceptance (cf. Gamson 1990). Many also see mass media coverage as necessary for movements to be influential (Lipsky 1968). SMOs seek to showcase and transmit their causes to relevant third parties and bystanders (Gamson 2004) by offering alternative framings of issues (Cress and Snow 2000; Ferree et al. 2002; Ryan 1991) or discrediting opponents and their framings (Gamson 2004). SMOs can gain coverage and influence policy debates in multiple ways aside from protest (Amenta 2006; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Andrews 2004), and those that receive coverage also tend to gain support (Vliegenthart et al. 2005). In short, media coverage of SMOs across movements and over time is an important, if limited, consequence of movements.

SMOs appear in newspapers in different ways, but always as a function of the practices of news-gathering organizations, which are concerned with generating "stories" and "news" (see Schudson 2002). Unlike with protest events (see review in Earl et al. 2004), there is no way to compare coverage of SMOs with all their relevant activity or all dimensions of their size. It is possible, however, to compare SMO coverage with important measures of movement size, such as membership and organizational density, and with protest events and other disruptive activities. Most important, by comparing across all SMO families over a century, we can test theories about social movements and movement consequences to explore why some SMO families achieved high coverage.

Four Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Movements and Outcomes

Prominent ideas in the literature on the consequences of social movements suggest, first, that disruption brings influence for movements. In the classic view (Piven and Cloward 1977), mass turmoil is expected to influence political leaders by creating a threat to the social order. This point of view dovetails with the literature on newspaper coverage. Newspapers are more likely to report on large and violent events (Earl et al. 2004; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Oliver and Myers 1999), so organizations linked to disruptive action will likely receive more extensive coverage (see also Corbett 1998; Rohlinger 2002).

The resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Zald and McCarthy 2002) expects movements with many organizations and capacities to be the best mobilized and to exert influence of many different sorts, including media related. SMOs and SMO families with the most extensive resources would thus be expected to receive extensive coverage (see also Corbett 1998). Newspapers tend to view their reporting as reflecting main tendencies in social trends (Gans 1979), so coverage may be determined in part by the size of SMOs and SMO families. Studies of newspaper coverage of collective action events indicate that coverage focuses on events that draw the participation of large organizations (Earl et al. 2004). Research identifies many different aspects of movements as resources to appraise this approach, including membership in SMOs and SMO families (Zald and McCarthy 2002), particularly the number of SMOs in the family available to be covered (Minkoff 2002). From this perspective, the expectation is that the more members and the greater the number of organizations available for coverage in an SMO family, the greater the coverage.

Along with these two theories, our research here also addresses two political contextual models that seek to explain movements and their consequences. The most prominent argument in the

literature on political contexts, or "opportunities," expects movements to expand and gain influence with a sympathetic regime in power (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). This is typically understood and modeled in the U.S. context as a Democratic regime for movements of the left and a Republican regime for movements of the right. In this view, ideologically similar regimes should both stimulate movements and promote consequences favorable to them.

An additional, although less prominent, argument from the political context perspective is that movements will advance in the wake of major policy changes favoring the movement's constituency (Amenta and Young 1999; Berry 1999; see also Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Halfmann, Rude, and Ebert 2005). In this view, movements are sustained politically through policies related to their constituencies. Movements are shaped by the rhythms of state building (Skocpol 2003; Tilly 2005) and policy making (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), which alter politics and often work in a self-reinforcing way (Pierson 2000). These policies should bolster movements and help promote further outcomes favorable to them.

Conceptualizations, Data, and Methods

We examined the coverage of all national U.S. SMOs in articles in the *New York Times*, following a longstanding practice in newspaper studies of movements (see Earl et al. 2004), to determine which SMOs and SMO families have been most publicly prominent in every year of the twentieth century. Many prominent longitudinal studies of movements are based on newspaper data on protest events and use the *New York Times*, with its national focus, as a source (Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Kerbo and Shaffer 1992; McAdam and Su 2002; Soule and Earl 2005).

Working from definitions of SMOs by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Gamson (1990), our first step was to identify the population of national, political SMOs contending in the twentieth century—no easy task, as until now no one has done so (cf. Brulle et al. [2007] on environmental organizations). We then searched the *New York Times* using ProQuest Historical Newspapers for mentions of these SMOs in articles. Next, we arrayed the data, listing organizations according to their overall mentions. We checked the results with data from the *Washington Post.* We then categorized the organizations into different groupings based on movement type. From there, we compared measures of SMO coverage in the *Times* with other measures of movement size and activity to see how closely they corresponded to and correlated with coverage figures. Finally, we used fsQCA analyses to ascertain why some movement families received extensive coverage, employing four theories of movement outcomes.

To conceptualize SMOs, we rely on definitions by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Gamson (1990), who refer, respectively, to "social movement organizations" and "challenging groups." For McCarthy and Zald, SMOs are formal organizations whose goals are allied with those of a social movement. For Gamson (see also Berry 1999), a challenging group is a formal organization that seeks to mobilize an unmobilized constituency and has an antagonist in authority outside its constituency. These largely similar definitions include only politically inflected organizations; like Gamson, we rely on organizations with national goals. These definitions also include most of what today are called political advocacy organizations. For instance, Gamson's large sample netted such institutional-tactic-reliant organizations as the American Association of University Professors, the Proportional Representation League, and the League of American Wheelmen. Andrews and Edwards's (2004) "advocacy organizations" are similar to the McCarthy and Zald/Gamson version of SMOs, but they also include "interest groups" (Granados and Knoke 2005). We also include what McCarthy and Zald refer to as "established" SMOs, or mobilized challenging groups. That is, we do not stop including organizations, such as the AFL-CIO, the NAACP, NOW, and the Sierra Club, once they have mobilized a new constituency.

Needless to say, this definition excludes many organizations. The McCarthy and Zald/Gamson definition of SMOs we employ does not include all voluntary mass organizations, as do studies of civic engagement (Putnam 2000; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Skocpol 2003). We do not include standard interest groups, such as Chambers of Commerce, think tanks, and

professional associations. SMOs that engage in or threaten non-institutional or transgressive action (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) form a distinct subset; our results do not generalize to this subset. We also exclude the main political parties. Unlike in Europe, U.S. SMOs in the twentieth century have not "graduated" to become significant national political parties, and they are not mainly concerned with nominating and electing candidates to political offices. There are many other ways to conceptualize movements and organizations (see Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004), but we chose this definition because of its widespread currency and because these organizations are the most directly influential in institutional politics and elite debates.

We started with previous large lists of SMOs (Fountain 2006; Tilly N.d.), work that compares large numbers of organizations (e.g., Gamson 1990; Minkoff 1997; Skocpol 2003; Snow et al. 2004; Wilson 1973), many articles and more than 100 monographs on movements, advice from colleagues, and the Encyclopedia of Associations. We also inspected newspaper articles with the words "groups" and "organizations" in the headline to identify further candidates for inclusion. We then searched for all articles mentioning the SMOs through ProQuest, using the official name of the organization and its acronyms. We examined some of the articles indicated and expanded or restricted the search terms for the most accurate count. We cross-checked the *Times*' coverage against coverage in the *Washington Post* for each of the top 30 SMOs in the *Times*' coverage overall, as well as the top 25 SMOs in the *Times*' coverage for a given year (see below). All four authors coded, led by the senior scholars of the team, and pairwise reliability scores were always above 90 percent.[2]

We identified 1,247 qualifying SMOs in the twentieth century, although only 947 had coverage in the *Times*. Altogether, we identified 298,359 article mentions of SMOs. It may not ever be possible to identify all qualifying SMOs, but our search methods make us confident that we located almost all qualifying SMOs that received significant national newspaper coverage. We are also confident that the potential future identification of SMOs as yet uncovered

will not greatly change the results below. We employ individual mentions (cf. Vliegenthart et al. 2005) for simplicity's sake, and also because there was little variation among the most covered SMOs in the degree to which they appeared in front-page articles.

Which SMOs and Movements Received the Most Coverage?

Which SMOs and movements received the greatest coverage? The SMO with the most coverage overall is, unsurprisingly, the AFL-CIO (including coverage of the AFL and CIO individually before they merged in 1953). The extent of its dominance is surprising, however, as it receives more than three times as many mentions as the next SMO, the American Legion (see Table 27.1). The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is a close third, and the American Civil Liberties Union and the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) round out the top five, each appearing in more than 8,000 articles. The top-30 list also includes seven other labor-union organizations. Other well-known social movements are well represented in the top 30, including four additional SMOs relating to African American civil rights: the National Council of Churches, the National Urban League, the Black Panther Party, and the Congress of Racial Equality. Two additional veterans organizations—the Grand Army of the Republic and the Veterans of Foreign Wars—rank in the top 30 as well. Other movement families are represented by longstanding organizations, including the feminist (League of Women Voters), anti-alcohol (the Anti-Saloon League), animal protection/rights (American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals), environmental (Sierra Club), and reproductive rights movements (Planned Parenthood).

We also examine the coverage of the top SMOs in the *Washington Post*. Aside from mentions of SMOs in the *Post* being lower overall, there are a few important differences. A few New York-based organizations are far better covered in the *Times*, including the American Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee; the Actors Equity Association, with its connections to Broadway, receives a lot of attention in the *Times*, but little in the *Post*. All

Table 27.1 Top 30 SMOs with the most *New York Times* coverage in the twentieth century, with coverage from the *Washington Post*

Rank	Organization (year of founding)	Times	Front page	Post
1	American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (1886, 1937, 1955)	41,718	6,848	33,690
2	American Legion (1919)	12,650	1,441	9,262
3	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (1909)	12,616	1,707	12,247
4	American Civil Liberties Union (1920)	8,911	1,022	7,431
5	Ku Klux Klan (1867)	8,067	1,119	5,879
6	United Mine Workers (1890)	7,044	1,397	6,560
7	League of Women Voters (1920)	6,869	461	7,647
8	International Ladies Garment Workers (1900)	5,875	675	601
9	International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1903)	5,216	1,848	8,864
10	Veterans of Foreign Wars (1936)	4,829	480	6,419
11	National Education Association (1857)	4,725	462	4,616
12	Anti-Saloon League (1893)	4,581	851	2,533
13	United Steelworkers (1942)	4,019	392	1,777
14	American Jewish Congress (1918)	3,849	297	876
15	Grand Army of the Republic (1866)	3,492	149	2,853
16	Black Panther Party (1966)	3,460	394	2,333
17	American Jewish Committee (1906)	3,317	263	1,074
18	Actors' Equity Association (1913)	3,229	157	216
19	American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (1866)	3,016	51	213
20	United Auto Workers (1935)	2,872	195	5,257
21	National Council of Churches (1950)	2,649	256	1,919
22	Anti-Defamation League (1913)	2,618	247	1,424
23	Planned Parenthood (1923)	2,610	204	2,199
24	International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (1891)	2,541	337	781
25	Sierra Club (1892)	2,497	218	2,822
26	National Urban League (1910)	2,495	300	1,203
27	Congress of Racial Equality (1942)	2,349	519	540
28	American Federation of Teachers (1916)	2,267	325	1,063
29	International Typographical Union (1852)	2,130	165	1,180
30	Americans for Democratic Action (1947)	2,052	298	2,076

the same, the correlation between the top-30 lists is .96, with most of the slippage due to the New York-based organizations. Among the top 30, moreover, the correlation between overall coverage and appearing in front-page articles in the *Times* is extremely high (.97).

From here, we analyze coverage according to broad categories, families, or industries of social movements to ascertain which received the most coverage across the century. Lacking scholarly consensus in both the categories of social movements and allocating SMOs to them, we employ frequently used, if somewhat broad, movement families—including labor; African American civil rights; environmental, conservation, and ecology; veterans; and feminist/women's rights—for a total of 34 mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Due to the lack of consensus and the small numbers of article counts for some possible movement families, three of these categories have a residual quality. We categorized SMOs that were largely left- or right-wing in orientation, but that did not fit neatly into a more coherent movement family, as "progressive, other" and "conservative, other"; SMOs seeking civil rights for specific groups, but that did not receive enough coverage

to warrant an entire category, are categorized as "civil rights, other." We also focus on issues, rather than movements' demographic makeups; organizations largely or exclusively consisting of women might find themselves as part of the feminist, anti-alcohol, or children's rights movements, for instance, and organizations of students might be part of antiwar, civil rights, conservative, or progressive SMO families.

Table 27.2 lists each movement family or industry according to the mentions received by the organizations constituting the category. Labor received by far the most mentions, accounting for 36.3 percent of articles in which SMOs were mentioned, more than three times as much as its closest competitor, the African American civil rights movement, which had 9.8 percent. Labor remains first easily even when individual unions are not counted, with about 18.9 percent of the coverage. (We also list the movements without individual unions because these organizations so dominate coverage.) Behind these two are four SMO families; the veterans, feminist/women's rights, nativist/supremacist, and environmental, conservation, and ecology SMOs each had between 4.0 and 7.6 percent of the coverage. Jewish civil rights, civil liberties, anti-war, and residual conservative SMOs round out the top 10. Although the veterans and nativist movement families place in the top five, and the Jewish civil rights and civil liberties families place in the top 10, none have received extensive scholarly attention.

Next, we examine the overall trajectory of the top movement families or industries. Figure 27.1 shows the coverage for the labor, African American civil rights, and veterans SMO families (in three-year moving averages to smooth out arbitrary year-to-year variations). For reasons of scale, we include the labor movement without individual unions, although the pattern is similar (results not shown). Labor has a strong newspaper presence throughout the century, taking off in the 1930s and 1940s and declining in the 1950s and beyond, although remaining at a significantly high level of coverage. Coverage of the African American civil rights movement takes off in the 1960s, after making gains in the late 1950s, and does not decline until the mid-1970s. If social movements have moved in waves (Tarrow 1994), labor was at the center of the

wave in the 1930s and 1940s, and the civil rights movement was at the center of the wave in the 1960s. Veterans organizations made great leaps forward during the 1930s and after World War II, persisting throughout the century but declining during the last half.

The families next in coverage include SMOs from the feminist, nativist, and environmental movements (see Figure 27.2). The coverage of feminist movement SMOs, which in Figure 27.2 also includes abortion/reproductive rights SMOs, shows the expected two waves, with the second wave beginning largely in the 1970s. The waves are fairly gentle, however, and there is a "middle" wave of coverage in the 1930s. The coverage of environmental SMOs fits the pattern of a new social movement based on quality-of-life concerns, taking off in the 1970s and 1980s, peaking in the 1990s, and sustaining high coverage. By contrast, nativist organizations, led mainly by two incarnations of the KKK, had a peak in coverage in the 1920s, with a secondary peak in the 1960s.

Across the twentieth century, national newspaper coverage of SMOs focused on the labor and civil rights movements, and scholarship has followed (e.g., Andrews 2004; Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 2004; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). The labor movement has dominated coverage; it remains the most covered movement family, despite the precipitous decline in union membership in the last half of the twentieth century. Similarly, the African American civil rights, feminist, and environmental families of SMOs rank expectedly high in coverage. In a recent handbook (Snow et al. 2004), a section on "major" social movements included reviews of the labor, environmental, and feminist movements, and ethnic mobilization, encompassing African American civil rights, and anti-war movements, but veterans and nativist movements were not covered. Generally speaking, SMOs that peaked in media attention before the 1960s, and movements with a conservative slant, have not received scholarly attention commensurate with their media attention. While the top movement families also show waves of coverage, as would be expected, the coverage appears somewhat later than expected and is sustained longer than the imagery of cycles suggests.

Table 27.2 *Times* coverage of SMOs by movement families

Rank	Family title	Percent	Without unions	No. of SMOs	Most highly covered SMO
1	Labor	36.3	18.9	141	American Federation of Labor
2	Civil rights, African American	9.8	12.4	62	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
3	Veterans	7.6	9.7	17	American Legion
4	Feminist/women's rights	5.5	7.0	124	League of Women Voters
5	Nativist/supremacist	4.2	5.4	63	Ku Klux Klan
6	Environment/conservation/ ecology	4.0	5.1	132	Sierra Club
7	Civil rights, Jewish	3.7	4.7	7	American Jewish Congress
8	Civil liberties	3.1	4.0	6	American Civil Liberties Union
9	Anti-war	2.8	3.6	79	American Friends Service Committee
10	Conservative, other	2.6	3.3	98	John Birch Society
11	Progressive, other	2.5	3.2	92	National Council of Jewish Women
12	Anti-alcohol	2.4	3.0	21	Anti-Saloon League
13	Farmers	2.1	2.6	18	American Farm Bureau Federation
14	Communist	1.7	2.1	20	Communist Party USA
15	Animal protection/rights	1.4	1.8	26	American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
16	Abortion/reproductive rights	1.3	1.6	27	Planned Parenthood
17	Civic	1.1	1.5	16	National Civic Federation
18	Consumer	1.1	1.4	8	National Consumers' League
19	Old age/senior rights	.9	1.2	26	American Association of Retired People
20	Christian right	.9	1.2	36	Moral Majority
21	Civil rights, other	.9	1.1	34	Nation of Islam
22	Children's rights/protection	.9	1.1	13	Child Welfare League
23	Liberal, general	.7	.9	5	Americans for Democratic Action
24	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender	.5	.6	47	Gay Men's Health Crisis
25	Anti-smoking	.4	.5	13	American Public Health Association
26	Anti-abortion	.4	.5	33	National Right to Life Committee
27	Gun owners' rights	.3	.4	11	National Rifle Association
28	Civil rights, Native American	.2	.3	3	American Indian Movement
29	Welfare rights	.2	.2	12	National Welfare Rights Organization
30	Civil rights, Hispanic	.2	.2	12	League of United Latin American Citizens
31	Disability rights	.1	.1	16	National Association for Retarded Children
32	AIDS	.1	.1	5	AIDS Action
33	Prison reform/prisoners' rights	.1	.1	10	National Committee on Prisons
34	Gun control	.1	.1	14	Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence

Figure 27.1 *Times* coverage of labor movement, African American civil rights movement, and veterans SMOs, 1900 to 1999

Figure 27.2 *Times* coverage of the nativist/supremacist, feminist and abortion rights, and environmental/conservation/ecology SMOs, 1900 to 1999

Size, Disruptive Activity, and Coverage: Preliminary Results

The descriptive results lead to the following question: Why are some SMOs and SMO families better covered than others? As noted earlier, two approaches to the question are related to the scale of the movement and its activity. One view is that newspapers disproportionately cover events that are disruptive or violent (McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999; see review in Earl et al. 2004), and presumably SMOs connected to such events. This view is connected to the classic argument that disruption leads to influence for social movements (Piven and Cloward 1977). One might also expect newspapers simply to report on SMOs according to their size. To some extent, this is what reporters claim to be doing (Gans 1979) and is consistent with the resource mobilization view of the impact of social movements (Zald and McCarthy 2002). Movements are expected to have influence in relation to available resources, including the members and organizations in the movement family or industry. These two aspects of the scale of movements, their size and dramatic activity, are frequently used to summarize or operationalize the presence of movements and SMOs in quantitative research on movements. To provide a preliminary assessment of these models, we compare newspaper coverage with measures employed in high-profile research on some of the more prominent SMOs and SMO families.

To address the degree to which coverage reflects the main aspects of SMO size, we start with two prominent SMOs. The Townsend Plan was one of the most publicized SMOs of the 1930s; it demanded generous and universal old-age pensions and organized 2 million older Americans into Townsend clubs (Amenta et al. 2005). It quickly reached membership levels that few voluntary associations achieve (Skocpol 2003), but it lost most of its following by the 1950s. The correlation between its membership (data from Amenta et al. 2005) and coverage from 1934 to 1953 is .62. The NAACP, a key organization in the most prominent movement of the second half of the twentieth century, is, by contrast, an evergreen in coverage. In examining data from 1947 through 1981 (courtesy of J. Craig Jenkins), we find the relationship between its membership

and *Times* coverage is fairly strong, too, with a correlation of .69. Membership and coverage both peak in the mid-1960s.

We next address the connection between coverage and size for two of the most prominent SMO families, beginning with organizational density in the women's rights/abortion rights movements from 1955 through 1986 (with data courtesy of Debra C. Minkoff). A plot of SMO coverage, in a three-year moving average, against the organizational density of total organizations and the subset of "protest and advocacy" organizations in the women's rights movement shows that they are very strongly and similarly correlated (.97) (see Figure 27.3). Coverage and organizational density both rise dramatically in the mid-1960s and peak around 1980. Despite the large correlation between coverage and organizational density, however, only a few SMOs received the bulk of the coverage. As for the most prominent family, a comparison of the *Times* coverage of the labor movement from 1930 to 1999 with unionization shows a correlation of .59; after 1954, however, when unionization declines, the correlation increases to .80 (see Figure 27.4).

Next, we turn to bivariate assessments of whether coverage is closely connected to disruptive activity. We begin with labor strikes, the standard disruptive activity of the labor movement (see Figure 27.4). The pattern for coverage and strikes works in the opposite direction from unionization. Although the correlation between the work stoppage measures and coverage is .58 overall, between 1930 and 1947, during the rise of the labor movement, the correlation is .81.[3] In short, correlations are high for strike activity in the early years of the labor movement and high for unionization in later years. Coverage may generally result from disruptive action in the early years of a largely successful movement, and from aspects of its size in later years.

Next, we assess the connection between coverage and protest events in the African American civil rights movement, the second most covered movement family. Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone (2003: 286), extending McAdam's (1982) data for 1950 through 1997, define protest events as "non-violent protest by African Americans, including public demonstrations and marches, sit-ins, rallies, freedom rides, boycotts, and other protest actions." We compare this measure with coverage

Figure 27.3 The density of feminist and abortion rights organizations, by overall and protest/advocacy organizations, and *Times* coverage, 1955 to 1986

Figure 27.4 Union membership, work stoppages, and *Times* labor movement SMO coverage, 1930 to 1999

of the so-called Big Four civil rights organizations, the NAACP, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). [...] The two have the same general pattern, with small increases in the late 1950s, followed by larger increases in the 1960s, and a relatively constant and low level of activity starting in the 1980s; they are correlated at .66. Although both coverage and protest events level out after the early 1970s, coverage has remained at a fairly high level, despite far fewer protests.

All in all, these preliminary bivariate results show that coverage tracks to some degree SMO and SMO family size, as well as disruption and dramatic activity. The medium high correlations between coverage and individual membership for two prominent SMOs, in conjunction with higher correlations with union density and a very high correlation with feminist SMOs, suggest that coverage is connected most closely to the size of entire, influential movement families. Approximately 43 percent of the national SMOs we located, typically small organizations, gain little or no coverage. This suggests that size matters; coverage generally concentrates on the better-known SMOs in movement families. These findings are consistent with the resource mobilization view of movements' impact. Coverage is also related to protest and similar activity, especially in the early days of a movement organization or family. For SMOs and SMO families that do not gain organizational footholds after early years of disruptive or dramatic activities, the early days are all they have. In short, the preliminary results indicate some support for both disruption and resource mobilization explanations of movement outcomes. These two views, however, are not inconsistent with each other [...].

Conclusions

Social movement organizations are crucial to political life, and media coverage of SMOs is key to both substantiating their claims to represent groups and developing important cultural outcomes. This article documents the national newspaper coverage received by national U.S. SMOs

and families in the twentieth century as a prelude to explaining why some families were extensively covered. Our analyses provide the first test of the main social movement theories, including those regarding disruption, resource mobilization, and political contexts, across all movements on a measure of the cultural influence of movements.

Our [...] analyses of daily or greater coverage by social movement families or industries show some support for the main macro-social theories of social movements and their consequences. The results indicate that extremely high coverage, at the level of twice a day, is best explained by each of the four determinants—disruptive activity, a large number of organizations, a favorable political regime, and an enforced policy in favor of the SMO family's constituency—occurring at the same time. In their heydays, the labor and African American civil rights movements had this sort of saturation coverage. To produce daily coverage, we find that short-term partisan contexts are not important; the main solution includes only disruption, large numbers of organizations, and an enforced policy. This combination is also a main part of the solution for every-other-day coverage. Most solutions include disruption and a large number of organizations in existence. In combination with the bivariate analyses, these set-theoretic results provide strong support for the resource mobilization and disruption arguments, which seem to work in tandem to influence coverage.

The results also suggest, though, that scholars need to rethink their ideas regarding what constitutes a favorable political context for movements. Enforced policies seem to matter more, for coverage at least, than do favorable partisan circumstances. It is possible, however, that these causes work sequentially, and that highly partisan contexts are critical for the development of new policies in favor of movements' constituencies. The Democrats' partisan dominance in the mid-1930s and 1960s was closely connected to new policy developments. For the labor movement, these policies centered on the Wagner Act of 1935 and the creation of the National Labor Relations Board; the African American civil rights movement saw the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Similarly, dramatic action may have been important in spurring these sorts of policies, which provided SMOs with both

political and cultural leverage. Policy-related controversies may help keep SMO families in the news and in public discourse long after their disruptive peaks.

Like the initial analyses of the political consequences of social movements, however, our analyses and results, which examine the broadest macro perspectives about the causes and consequences of social movements, are only the first steps in theorizing and analyzing the process of gaining coverage. Analyses of political outcomes have moved beyond movement-centered models and theorized more extensively interactions between movements and political structures and processes (see Amenta 2006; Andrews 2004). Similarly, more complete theorizing of interactions between movements and media structures and processes will likely provide more compelling theoretical claims and more accurate analyses of SMO coverage. Moreover, coverage is a limited measure of influence for SMOs and SMO families. Raw coverage does not identify whether an SMO achieved "standing," nor whether articles included frames favorable to a movement or if the tone or valence of coverage was favorable. Also, winning discursive battles in newspapers does not necessarily translate into favorable policy outcomes for social movements (Ferree et al. 2002). Examining coverage in a more refined way, and connecting it with thinking and analyses of policy outcomes, is needed to establish the nature of these links.

Our descriptive and bivariate findings also have implications for further inquiry. Coverage of movements corresponds, in part, with previous scholarly attention to movements. Labor movement organizations and similarly well-studied African American civil rights SMOs are best covered. Yet veterans, nativist, and civil liberties SMOs received coverage that far outstrips corresponding scholarship, and, generally speaking, SMOs from before the 1960s and non-left SMOs (see McVeigh 2009) are not as well researched as they are covered. Possibly different theoretical claims will apply to them. In bivariate analyses, we find that newspaper coverage closely reflects movement size at the SMO family level for the prominent labor and feminist movements, and larger SMOs receive far more coverage. The results also show that coverage tracked strikes and protest events during the rise of the labor and African American civil rights movements. Coverage thus seems to track conspicuous collective action in the early years of an SMO or SMO family, followed by coverage according to size for older organizations, at least for some highly influential SMO families. This pattern corresponds to ideas about the institutionalization of movements (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), but it may apply only to SMO families that achieve permanent leverage in politics.

These results suggest a few additional new directions in research. It would be revealing to compare the newspaper coverage of well-studied SMOs with a wide range of their actions, analogous to work on protest and its coverage, to ascertain which activities and characteristics of SMOs tend to lead to coverage and which do not. In regressing measures of size and activity on coverage with various control measures, moreover, it may be possible to devise ways to adjust coverage figures so that they more closely tap these less easily measured aspects of SMOs and SMO families. These adjusted measures could be valuable in addressing many questions about social movements, and this line of research may hasten the day when analyses across movements and over time will no longer seem exceptional.

Notes

1 Our conceptualization of SMOs includes national advocacy organizations that make claims on or on behalf of mass constituencies, similar to definitions used by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Gamson (1990) and scholars following their work. We use the term "social movement organization" for simplicity's sake, although we are cognizant of the fact that other scholars (notably McAdam 1982) reserve the term for organizations that threaten or engage in disruptive collective action, a set of organizations subsumed by our definition.

2 Some scholars use the IRS's list of tax-exempt organizations (notably, Brulle et al. 2007), which, in December 2006, numbered 677,043. We took a

random sampling of 100 organizations from this list and searched for them online, locating 80. Of these, only the Bowhunting Preservation Alliance was found, barely, to meet our criteria for an SMO, but appeared in no articles. To ensure we captured the coverage of federated organizations, we often searched for shortened versions of official names, such as "woman's suffrage association" for the National American Woman's Suffrage Association. We also searched for alternatives such as "woman

suffrage association" and "women's suffrage association." We counted any mention of a lower-level organization as part of the coverage of the national organization (cf. Brulle et al. 2007).

3   In the Bureau of Labor Statistics' data, for the years 1947 to 1999 "work stoppage" includes only those involving at least 1,000 workers, whereas earlier data include work stoppages of any number of workers. In the 15 years in which the two measures overlap, they have a correlation of .96.

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Abbie Hoffman: "Marx with Flowers in His Hair"

Born in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1936, Abbie Hoffman became one of the most famous revolutionaries of the 1960s, embodying the playful side of the period better than anyone else. He graduated from Brandeis in 1959 with a B.A. in psychology, but soon embarked on a lifetime of political and cultural activism. He became a civil rights organizer, then moved to Manhattan's Lower East Side to market the products of Mississippi cooperatives. When black nationalism came to dominate the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the mid-1960s, he turned to the antiwar movement. He later said that he had tried "to bring the hippie movement into a broader protest," in other words to combine cultural expression with political protest. The Yippies, which he founded with Jerry Rubin, were an effort to do just that.

Media events were Hoffman's specialty, based on his belief that "a modern revolutionary heads for the television station, not for the factory." In April 1967 Hoffman and a handful of companions threw dollar bills from the visitors' gallery of the New York Stock Exchange, causing a pause in trading while brokers scrambled for the money. That fall he organized an "exorcism" of the Pentagon, using incantations to try to levitate the building. (It did not work.) He and his friends planted a soot bomb at Con Edison headquarters, and mailed joints to 3,000 people selected randomly from the phone book. In 1968 he traveled around with a pig, which he tried to nominate for president. Abbie later explained his approach: "Recognizing the limited time span of someone staring at a lighted square in their living room, I trained for the one-liner, the retort jab, or sudden knockout put-ons."

Hoffman's fame peaked in the aftermath of the Chicago Democratic Convention in 1968, when he and seven other defendants went on trial for conspiracy in organizing the protests. (The Chicago Eight became the Chicago Seven when Black Panther Bobby Seale was bound, gagged, and imprisoned for contempt of court.) Hoffman, in particular, turned the trial into a form of guerrilla theater to express the ideas of the left. He even claimed, at one point, to be the illegitimate son of the judge presiding over the trial.

Hoffman had his critics. He had begun by using the media to get his message across, but the media in turn made him a star. This came at a cost, as he and a handful of other celebrity protestors came more and more to define the whole movement. Egalitarian efforts to avoid formal leaders had led to a vacuum in which the media could place their own favorite spokespersons, inevitably those who were the most flamboyant.

Many protestors of the 1960s continued their political activity alongside later jobs, but Hoffman devoted his adult life to full-time activism. He went underground in 1973 after being arrested for the sale of cocaine to undercover police, for which he faced a mandatory 15-year sentence. Using the name Barry Freed, he was active in environmental protest even while in hiding. In 1980 he turned himself in to authorities and served one year in prison. After that, he was a popular campus speaker and returned to writing. *Steal This Book* (1971), was his most memorable title. He continued his political activities until 1989, when he committed suicide. In pain from an automobile accident the previous year, and on drugs for manic depression, he took a large dose of alcohol and phenobarbital on April 12. "Marx with flowers in his hair," one of Hoffman's phrases, described him well.

What Shapes the West's Human Rights Focus?

James Ron, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers

In spring 2005, Amnesty International published a hard-hitting report on human rights violations by a host of abusive governments. The media, however, focused on the group's stinging critique of the United States and its Guantanamo prison. These accounts infuriated American officials, who claimed they were excessive and misplaced.

The Bush administration's response was disingenuous, but may still have contained a grain of truth. Human rights abuses by some countries get more media attention than others, and even the most fair-minded activist devotes more resources to some areas than others. Why does this happen? Are nefarious biases at work, or are structural forces at play? The question is crucial, since respect for human rights has become a leading indicator of state legitimacy.

Look closely, and human rights terminology is everywhere. From asylum laws to development policies, "human rights" promotion, vaguely defined, has assumed pride of place alongside such standard policy phrases as "structural adjustment," "good governance," and "democratization." Western countries increasingly insert human rights conditions into their trade and aid agreements, and even their military interventions. For example, the campaigns in Kosovo, East Timor, and Iraq all cited human rights justifications.

Human rights rhetoric enjoys strong public support. In 2003, a Gallup poll of U.S. respondents found 86 percent support for policies friendly to human rights, while a survey of Western opinion leaders found more confidence in Amnesty International's "brand" than in that of many major corporations. Today, Western publics, journalists, and governments regard Amnesty and Human Rights Watch as trustworthy information sources.

The long-term effect of all this is unclear, since much of the rhetoric is empty verbiage. In fact, one recent study argues that abusive governments are more likely than others to sign international human rights treaties.

Still, human rights pressures can and do make a difference, especially when governments are ripe for change, including those with competent bureaucracies, democratic leanings, and strong Western ties. Western influence per se does not help, but it often facilitates alliances between local human rights groups, journalists, international activists, and sympathetic Western officials.

Figure 28.1   Human rights training programs, 1980–2005
*Data obtained from the Center for the study of Human Rights at Columbia University's catalog of university-
and non-university-based human rights training programs*

Policy efficacy aside, the rhetoric of human rights is likely to be with us for some time, if only because a number of newly created training programs are educating an emerging group of officials, journalists, and activists. In 1981, there were only six such programs globally, but by 2005, there were at least 56 (Figure 28.1).

Shaping the Human Rights Agenda

Yet, like economic globalization, the wave of rights talk has not spread evenly around the world. Some countries attract intense attention, while others languish in obscurity. The result is an imbalanced portfolio of Western human rights concern.

Consider ethnic cleansing and massacres, two acute human rights violations that spurred much reporting and institution-building over the last decade, including the creation of a standing international criminal court. During 1991–93, Serbian abuses in Croatia and then Bosnia attracted Western compassion and policy interest, including thousands of media stories, Security Council resolutions, NGO fact-finding missions, and a special, UN-backed war crimes tribunal.

By 1998, this human rights machinery was large, effective, and focused on Serbian security-force violations. When Serbian agents began abusing civilians again in Kosovo, the human rights wheels began furiously turning. NGOs and UN monitors reported on Serbian abuses in intimate detail, Western journalists diligently covered the events, and in the spring of 1999, NATO mounted a massive air assault. Although the war initially exacerbated Serbian ethnic cleansing and indirectly killed thousands, Serbian troops were ultimately forced to withdraw, and many refugees returned home. Ever since, an international force has ruled the region, with mixed results for all.

Compare this to the West's relative indifference to events in Congo-Brazzaville, a small country bordering on the larger Congo-Kinshasa. Civil war raged there throughout the 1990s, claiming thousands of lives and rape victims, and displacing one-third of the country's 2.1 million residents. These figures rivaled Kosovo's, but the Balkans attracted far more human rights scrutiny. Bosnia and Kosovo are run by international peacekeepers and receive substantial assistance, while Congo-Brazzaville has neither.

The legal ramifications can also be profound. Serbian paramilitaries and nationalists still hide their wartime experiences, fearing international war crime indictments from the Hague. In Congo-Brazzaville, by contrast, former fighters speak freely of their misdeeds, even while queuing for post-conflict aid in UN-supported camps. Abuses in the two regions were similar, but no one issued international arrest warrants for Brazzaville's warlords.

Is it Racism?

Some argue that an anti-African racism underlies these disparities, prompting the Western-dominated international community to focus more on European victims. These claims gained credence

in 1994 and again in 2005, when the Rwandan and Darfur massacres unfolded without Kosovo-style interventions. But there are problems with this argument. True, Western militaries rarely intervene to stop African wars, but Western journalists, NGOs, and policy-makers devote substantial attention to some African crises.

Consider Zimbabwe, a favorite site for contemporary human rights scrutiny. Western disgust with President Robert Mugabe's authoritarianism has skyrocketed in recent years, heaping opprobrium on the former guerrilla leader's increasingly brutal regime. In summer 2005, Western criticism peaked over the government's violent squatter evictions. Yet forced slum clearances are discouragingly common in the developing world, and similar abuses have occurred in Delhi, Jakarta, Beijing, and Lagos. Still, Western human rights attention has focused more on Mugabe's misdeeds, prompting the *Guardian*'s John Vidal to note that Zimbabwe's strongman, like Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein before him, is the "international monster of the moment."

Politics and Human Rights

These and other disparities crop up regularly across the globe, infuriating governments over alleged distortions of their records. Conspiracy theories and backlash politics abound, and many argue that the Western human rights agenda is neocolonial and self-interested.

In Israel, nationalists find anti-Semitism lurking behind critiques of their policies regarding Palestine; in Pakistan, traditionalists detect racist paternalism in Western concern for women's rights; in Turkey, critics see human rights reporting as covert support for Kurdish separatism. These complaints are largely misguided since abusive governments rarely acknowledge evil deeds. Still, the severity of human suffering alone rarely explains levels of Western scrutiny, and profound imbalances exist in the deployment of human rights criticisms.

In Turkey, Western European concern with violations against Kurdish civilians is linked, in part, to Turkey's bid for European Union membership, a controversial move that many oppose. European officials say Turkey's membership depends on its human rights record, giving

interested parties incentives to probe allegations of abuse. Large Turkish and Kurdish diasporas highlight the issue, as does advocacy by Armenian activists exasperated by Turkey's refusal to acknowledge their own genocide.

Other political factors are also at play. As the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid from 1981 to 2000, Turkey forms an integral part of NATO's southern flank, using American weapons to fight Kurdish rebels. Given U.S. laws against aiding abusive regimes, American journalists, NGOs, and lobbyists are keen to probe Turkey's record. Everyone wants to be "policy-relevant" and effective, and Turkey's behavior, combined with existing U.S. laws, creates the potential for impact. Thus, Turkey's Western ties have transformed its human rights record into a topical issue for Western journalists, activists, and lawmakers.

Uzbekistan is another recent example. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, an increasingly abusive regime has repressed extremists and non-violent protesters. In spring 2005, a demonstration in the city of Andijan was brutally put down by Uzbek security forces, who killed some 500 civilians. Although some protestors did use violence, the army's response was massively disproportionate.

The Andijan events triggered a wave of reporting by Western media and NGOs, fueled largely by the presence of a U.S. military base supporting America's Afghan operations. Embarrassed by the massacre and the resulting media furor, the United States vigorously condemned the crackdown; Uzbekistan is a staunch ally in the "war on terror," but the massacre was a public relations liability. Shortly thereafter, Uzbekistan angrily instructed America to close its base within six months.

Human Rights and the United States

The "Washington connection" to violations in the developing world has provoked debate ever since the 1970s, when Jimmy Carter committed America to human rights-friendly policies. During the Cold War, the political left argued that abuses by Western allies attracted less attention than those of their enemies. As Noam Chomsky

claimed, Western governments and media focused intensely on abuses by the likes of Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, but ignored violations by anticommunist allies.

These claims have merit, but they do not hold up over time. After all, U.S. Cold War allies such as EI Salvador and Israel were heavily criticized by journalists and others during the 1980s. Indeed, the more U.S. officials defended these allies, the more the debate over their records intensified. U.S. government representatives were often slow to condemn allies, but the Western media and many NGOs were not.

A more plausible theory is that any connection to the United States or other powerful Western governments creates incentives for greater human rights scrutiny. Western officials are keen to protect their allies' reputations, but overt ties to the West facilitate unofficial investigations and lobbying. Activists, journalists, and interest groups of all kinds want to be heard and to shape policy, and they do this best when speaking out on countries that are relevant to Western foreign policy.

Interestingly, this claim should hold true for major Western adversaries such as Russia, Cuba, or China, whose policy relevance comes from their challenger status. The more Western allies are criticized, the more Western officials address their enemies' misdeeds. These duels feed on each another, pushing for greater scrutiny of friend and foe alike. In the process, abuses in countries deemed irrelevant to the Western policy agenda are often ignored.

A Systematic Study

To investigate these and other theories, we studied the coverage of human rights criticism by two elite Western media sources, the U.K.-based *Economist*, and the U.S. magazine *Newsweek*. We assumed that these two magazines would reflect and help shape government and activist agendas. More important, we believed they would lend insight into the type of human rights reports consumed by the West's internationally oriented reading public.

As English-language weeklies covering domestic and foreign affairs, the two magazines share some important qualities, but they differ in crucial ways. While the *Economist*'s readers are financially better off and better educated, *Newsweek*'s readers are far more numerous. Together, the two provide a useful indicator of Western reporting.

Our team read all articles appearing in either publication that included the phrase "human rights," and then selected all stories with specific mention of an abuse in a particular country. Although this omits reports of abuse without the keywords "human rights," it does provide a consistent measure of the way in which the human rights discourse is used. We coded articles from 1981 to 2000, but due to other data limitations, confined our statistical models to 148 countries from 1986 to 2000. Our study focused on 1027 articles published in the *Economist*, and 810 in *Newsweek*.

Our first observation was the dramatic growth in the number of articles containing any use of the phrase "human rights." In 1986, the *Economist* and *Newsweek* published 63 and 88 articles, respectively, with this keyword phrase. But in 2000, these figures had risen to 251 and 172 (see Figure 28.2). The number of countries described as "human rights" abusers also grew. In 1986, the two sources jointly cited 24 countries for specific violations, while also mentioning "human rights"; by 2000, that pool had expanded to 61. As we suspected, journalists used the term more frequently, and applied it more broadly.

We then developed a "top ten" list of abusers appearing in stories with the human rights keywords (Figure 28.3). Two American adversaries, China and Russia (and the former Soviet Union), headed the list, lending credence to the left's suspicion that concern for human rights was a weapon used against Western enemies. Yet we could draw the opposite conclusion from the countries tied for third place: U.S. anti-communist ally Indonesia, and the United States itself. Of the remaining countries on the list, some, such as Turkey, Colombia, Chile, and the United Kingdom, were Western countries or their allies, while others, such as Serbia and Cuba, were adversaries. The only apparent outlier is Nigeria. Although it was not a major political ally of the West, it is an important economic ally, since its massive oil reserves are heavily exploited by Western petroleum companies.

Figure 28.2   Articles on human rights in the *Economist* and *Newsweek*, 1986–2000
Based on a Lexis-Nexis search of the term "human rights"

1	China	244
2	Russia/USSR	127
3	Indonesia & East Timor	89
3	USA	89
4	Chile	60
5	Turkey	53
6	Serbia and Montenegro	51
7	Colombia	50
8	UK	48
9	Cuba	45
10	Nigeria	43

Figure 28.3   Top recipients of *Economist* and *Newsweek* human rights coverage, 1986–2000

The "most cited" list, in other words, lends support to the notion that Western policy relevance boosts media interest in the human rights records of both friends and enemies. Yet the list is also intriguing because of the countries that are absent. Missing are North Korea and Iraq, for example, two countries ranked during the 1986–2000 period as "very repressive" by Steven Poe's Political Terror Scale, a widely used indicator of government violations of civil and political rights. Similarly, the two countries with the most war-related deaths during 1986–2000—Sudan and Rwanda—received only marginal "human rights" attention. While the sheer magnitude of a country's suffering may matter, other factors are clearly at work.

Statistical Findings

Our list suggests that Western policy relevance matters, but our statistical analysis helps probe for other possibilities. Violations of civil and political rights do affect media coverage. A high Political Terror Score raised a country's media coverage, as did the intensity of armed conflict, measured by the percentage of the population directly killed in war. Moreover, the more closed a government's political rules and institutions were, the more likely the media were to report on its abuses.

Yet other factors also mattered, and it is here that the statistical story becomes interesting. Poverty, for example, has negative effects on media coverage. The poorer a country, the less likely are *Newsweek* and the *Economist* to report on its abuses while citing "human rights." Controlling for actual levels of abuse, wealth seems to attract critical scrutiny.

This finding is counterintuitive, since poverty increases the likelihood of government abuse and civil war. Many feel that poverty itself is a human rights abuse because it violates essential economic and social rights. Why, then, were *Newsweek* and the *Economist* reluctant to mention abuses in poor countries?

We are not certain, but we have some plausible theories. Rich countries have better communications facilities and higher levels of education, both of which generate more information about government misdeeds. Wealthy countries also wield more influence internationally and may therefore be of greater interest to journalists.

Historically, moreover, the West (and especially the United States) has downplayed respect for economic and social rights, seeing them as linked to a discredited communist agenda. This, too, may limit the media's willingness to define poverty-related problems as "human rights" violations.

A second intriguing finding was that human rights coverage increased with the number of NGOs formally registered in a given country. Like our finding on wealth, this was surprising, as countries bedeviled by civil war, government terror, or political extremism tend to have smaller NGO communities. Like wealth, however, such groups increase political participation, advocacy, and information about government behavior, and these may translate into greater media coverage.

Our findings on wealth and civil society highlight the information paradox noted by scholars of transnational activism. Countries with lower levels of actual abuse often produce more information about violations within their borders, since press freedoms, democratic norms, and vigorous activism all promote debate and exposure. Thus, politically open and wealthy countries attract more human rights attention, even though their abuses are comparatively less severe.

The Activists' Impact

Statistically, the advocacy of Amnesty International also makes a difference. When we included that group's press advocacy in our models, we discovered that Amnesty press releases boosted media coverage in general. This is good news for the organization, since its work depends on the ability to publicly name and shame abusers.

Without doubt, international human rights activism has come a long way since the 1970s, when a handful of small groups used part-time volunteers to protest abuses in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Today, Amnesty International's London staff numbers 400, and its $46 million budget is only one-quarter of the group's overall resources. New York's Human Rights Watch is equally influential, although its staff and budget are only half as large. Amnesty's activists engage with grassroots members as well as elites, but Human Rights Watch's media-savvy team focuses more heavily on the media and top policymakers.

Together, the two have achieved remarkable results. When governments shoot Uzbek protesters or bomb Afghan villagers, Amnesty and Human Rights Watch researchers appear soon after, using satellite links, media-savvy methods, and powerful legal arguments to broadcast their concerns. Abusive governments control bureaucracies and security forces, but their credibility is often shaky, and their information often stale. Global activists regularly use their information to discredit authoritarian rulers in weak countries. On occasion, they even make the most powerful Western official eat humble pie.

The Activists' Dilemma

Yet the activists' growing media influence has been a mixed blessing. The more they hone their message for the Western media, the more they must cater to Western journalistic tastes. Journalists increasingly call on activists for information and comment, but they ask more questions about some countries than others.

This places Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and others in a painful bind. Although they are committed to exposing abuses wherever they occur, reports on "obscure" countries evoke little response. As one senior Amnesty manager noted, "You can work all you like on Mauritania, but the press couldn't give a rat's ass." As a result, activists are forced to adjust the flow of reporting to match media concerns. Consider again Kosovo and Congo-Brazzaville, two small regions with similar levels of violence during the 1990s. Amnesty issued 69 press releases on Kosovo during the relevant decade, compared to only two for Congo-Brazzaville. The media worried far more about the Balkans, and Amnesty's press officers were obliged to respond in kind.

Overall, the four countries most cited for their abuses in Amnesty press releases during 1986–2000 were the United States and three of its allies, Israel, Indonesia, and Turkey. Cumulatively, these countries earned a total of 502 press releases. Compare this to the 148 press releases issued about violations in the four countries considered "most repressive" by the Political Terror Scale (North Korea, Colombia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka), or to 126 press releases about abuses in the four countries with the worst

armed conflicts (Sudan, Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Mozambique).

A similar picture emerges for Amnesty's background papers, which are aimed at more specialized, practitioner audiences. Here, the four countries most targeted were Turkey, Russia and the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, which cumulatively earned 1474 reports. This compares poorly to the 441 papers Amnesty wrote about violations in the four countries with the worst Political Terror Scores, or the 259 papers on abuses in the four most war-torn societies.

We must interpret these figures cautiously, since Amnesty engages in other types of advocacy efforts. For example, its representatives participate in UN meetings and briefing sessions, which promote human rights concerns in less visible ways. Indeed, these methods are often used with countries with low media profiles. And as Amnesty officials note, many politically repressive countries refuse to grant research visas, making it difficult to report on their abuses. Statistically, moreover, we found that Amnesty's papers are less sensitive to media reports, suggesting that the group has a somewhat diversified portfolio of written products.

Still, the trends are clear, and they are not unique to Amnesty International. Human Rights Watch's record-keeping is not as detailed, but a survey of their catalogued reports during the 1990s shows that the United States, Turkey, Indonesia, and China topped their list. Indeed, Human Rights Watch is probably even more media-savvy than Amnesty, enmeshed as it is in the fast-paced environment of elite New York and Washington politics. The group is intensely strategic, and its written reports are always part of a broader lobbying strategy in which press visibility plays a key role. As the group's director noted,

Human Rights Watch's job is to influence public debates, and this often requires "seizing moments of public attention—usually whatever is in the news—to make human rights points." In many ways, this is an excellent strategy. Still, the relevant "public attention" is often Western, shaped by parochial policies and interests.

NGO fundraising is also at stake, since media visibility boosts charitable giving. According to one Amnesty manager, the group raises funds through work on high-profile venues, but then spends some revenue on less visible countries. Still, countries that attract little Western policy or media interest pose a huge challenge for activists. With many abuses occurring in high-profile countries, it is tempting to let "obscure" locales drift to the back burner.

These challenges have not escaped NGO attention. At Amnesty, some say they are concerned that the group is becoming too concerned with media impact; as one staffer noted, "Perhaps … we are not conscious enough of swimming with the tide." At Human Rights Watch, employees criticize the attention given high-profile emergencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, arguing that other, equally deserving countries get fewer resources. In both groups, senior managers readily acknowledge the risks of a media-savvy strategy, but remain sensitive to the need for policy relevance and visibility.

These dilemmas are not easy to resolve. To grow and make a difference, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and others must work with elite Western journalists. Yet even as activists struggle to boost public engagement with little-noticed countries and conflicts, Western media tastes and the potential for policy influence exert strong, countervailing pressures. In the years to come, NGOs may yet conclude that their media-savvy strategy was a Faustian bargain.

Recommended Resources

Clifford Bob. 2005. *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (Cambridge University Press). Argues that the Western media and non-governmental organizations bestow attention on an isolated number of deserving cases.

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox

of Empty Promises," *American Journal of Sociology* 110:1372–1411. Uses statistical methods to argue that while global human rights treaties do not have an independent effect on abusive governments, mobilization by global civil society activists can make a difference.

Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century (Oxford University Press, 2005), available

online at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/human-security-report.aspx. Review of the methods used to measure the human cost of violence, including a discussion of the Political Terror Scale.

James Ron, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers. 2005. "Transnational Information Politics: Human Rights NGO Reporting, 1986– 2000," *International Studies Quarterly* 49: 557–587. Argues that the volume of Amnesty International country reporting is shaped by actual human rights conditions as well as other factors, including previous reporting efforts, state power, U.S. military aid, and a country's media profile.

The websites of the world's two largest human rights organizations, Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) and Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org), contain a wealth of information on human rights conditions in dozens of countries.

29

The Quest for International Allies

Clifford Bob

For decades, Tibet's quest for self-determination has roused people around the world. Inspired by appeals to human rights, cultural preservation, and spiritual awakening, tens of thousands of individuals and organizations lend moral, material, and financial support to the Tibetan cause. As a result, greater autonomy for Tibet's 5.2 million inhabitants remains a popular international campaign despite the Chinese government's 50-year effort to suppress it.

However, while Tibet's light shines brightly abroad, few outsiders know that China's borders hold other restive minorities: Mongols, Zhuang, Yi, and Hui, to name only a few. Notable are the Uighurs, a group of more than 7 million located northwest of Tibet. Like the Tibetans, the Uighurs have fought Chinese domination for centuries. Like the Tibetans, the Uighurs face threats from Han Chinese in-migration, communist development policies, and newly strengthened antiterror measures. And like the Tibetans, the Uighurs resist Chinese domination with domestic and international protest that, in Beijing's eyes, makes them dangerous separatists. Yet the Uighurs have failed to inspire the broad-based foreign networks that generously support and bankroll the Tibetans. International celebrities—including actors Richard Gere and Goldie Hawn, as well as British rock star Annie Lennox—speak out on Tibet's behalf. But no one is planning an Uighur Freedom Concert in Washington, D.C. Why?

Optimistic observers posit a global meritocracy of suffering in which all deserving causes attract international support. Howard H. Frederick, founder of the online activist network Peacenet, has argued that new communications technologies help create global movements in which individuals "rise above personal, even national self-interest and aspire to common good solutions to problems that plague the entire planet." And Allen L. Hammond of the World Resources Institute recently wrote that the combination of global media, new technologies, and altruistic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may soon empower the have-nots of the world, bringing them "simple justice" by creating a "radical transparency" in which "no contentious action would go unnoticed and unpublicized."

But even while a handful of groups such as the Tibetans have capitalized on the globalization of NGOs and media to promote their causes, thousands of equally deserving challengers,

such as the Uighurs, have not found their place in the sun. While the world now knows about East Timor, similar insurrections in Indonesian Aceh and Irian Jaya remain largely off the international radar screen. Among environmental conflicts, a small number of cases such as the Brazilian rubber tappers' struggle to "save" the Amazon, the conflict over China's Three Gorges Dam, and the recent fight over the Chad–Cameroon pipeline have gained global acclaim. But many similar environmental battles, like the construction of India's Tehri Dam, the destruction of the Guyanese rain forests, and the construction of the Trans Thai–Malaysia gas pipeline are waged in anonymity. Whole categories of other conflicts—such as landlessness in Latin America and caste discrimination in South Asia—go likewise little noticed. To groups challenging powerful opponents in these conflicts, global civil society is not an open forum marked by altruism, but a harsh, Darwinian marketplace where legions of desperate groups vie for scarce attention, sympathy, and money.

In a context where marketing trumps justice, local challengers—whether environmental groups, labor rights activists, or independence-minded separatists—face long odds. Not only do they jostle for attention among dozens of equally worthy competitors, but they also confront the pervasive indifference of international audiences. In addition, they contend against well-heeled opponents (including repressive governments, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions) backed by the world's top public relations machines. Under pressure to sell their causes to the rest of the world, local leaders may end up undermining their original goals or alienating the domestic constituencies they ostensibly represent. Moreover, the most democratic and participatory local movements may garner the least assistance, since Western NGOs are less likely to support groups showing internal strife and more inclined to help a group led by a strong, charismatic leader. Perhaps most troubling of all, the perpetuation of the myth of an equitable and beneficent global civil society breeds apathy and self-satisfaction among the industrialized nations, resulting in the neglect of worthy causes around the globe.

Pitching the Product

The ubiquity of conflict worldwide creates fierce competition for international support. In a 2001 survey, researchers at Leiden University in the Netherlands and the Institute for International Mediation and Conflict Resolution in Washington, D.C., identified 126 high-intensity conflicts worldwide (defined as large-scale armed conflicts causing more than 1000 deaths from mid-1999 to mid-2000), 78 low-intensity conflicts (100 to 1000 deaths from mid-1999 to mid-2000), and 178 violent political conflicts (less than 100 deaths from mid-1999 to mid-2000). In these and many other simmering disputes, weak challengers hope to improve their prospects by attracting international assistance.

Local movements usually follow two broad marketing strategies: First, they pitch their causes internationally to raise awareness about their conflicts, their opponents, and sometimes their very existence. Second, challengers universalize their narrow demands and particularistic identities to enhance their appeal to global audiences.

Critical to the success of local challengers is access to major Western NGOs. Many groups from low-profile countries are ignored in the developed world's key media centers and therefore have difficulty gaining visibility among even the most transnational of NGOs. Moreover, despite the Internet and the much-ballyhooed "CNN effect," repressive regimes can still obstruct international media coverage of local conflicts. In the 1990s, for example, the government of Papua New Guinea did just that on Bougainville island, site of a bloody separatist struggle that cost 15,000 lives, or roughly 10 percent of the island's population. During an eight-year blockade (1989–97), foreign journalists could enter the island only under government guard, while the rebels could dispatch emissaries abroad only at great risk. India has used similar tactics in Kashmir, prohibiting independent human rights monitors from entering the territory and seizing passports of activists seeking to plead the Kashmiri case before the UN General Assembly and other bodies. Less effectively, Sudan has tried to keep foreigners from entering the country's vast southern region to report on the country's 19-year civil war.

Even for causes from "important" countries, media access—and therefore global attention—remains highly uneven. Money makes a major difference, allowing wealthier movements to pay for media events, foreign lobbying trips, and overseas offices, while others can barely afford places to meet. For example, long-term support from Portugal helped the East Timorese eventually catch the world's attention; other Indonesian separatist movements have not had such steady friends. And international prizes such as the Goldman Environmental Prize, the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award, and the Nobel Peace Prize have become important vehicles of internationalization. In addition to augmenting a leader's resources, these awards raise a cause's visibility, facilitate invaluable contacts with key transnational NGOs and media, and result in wider support. For instance, Mexican "farmer ecologist" Rodolfo Montiel Flores's receipt of the $125,000 Goldman Prize in 2000 boosted the campaign to release him from prison on false charges stemming from his opposition to local logging practices. Not surprisingly, such prizes have become the object of intense salesmanship by local groups and their international champions.

Local challengers who have knowledge of global NGOs also have clear advantages. Today's transnational NGO community displays clear hierarchies of influence and reputation. Large and powerful organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth have the resources and expertise to investigate claims of local groups from distant places and grant them legitimacy. Knowledge of these key "gatekeeper" NGOs—their identities, goals, evidentiary standards, and openness to particular pitches—is crucial for a local movement struggling to gain support. If homegrown knowledge is scarce, local movements may try to link themselves to a sympathetic and savvy outsider, such as a visiting journalist, missionary, or academic. Some Latin American indigenous groups, including Ecuador's Huaoroni and Cofán, Brazil's Kayapó, and others, have benefited from the kindness of such strangers, who open doors and guide their way among international networks.

Small local groups with few connections or resources have more limited options for raising international awareness and thus may turn to protest. Yet domestic demonstrations often go unseen abroad. Only spectacular episodes—usually violent ones—draw international media coverage. And since violence is anathema to powerful international NGOs, local groups who use force as an attention-grabbing tactic must carefully limit, justify, and frame it. For example, the poverty and oppression that underlay the 1994 uprising by Mexico's Zapatista National Liberation Army went largely unnoticed at home and abroad for decades. In the face of such indifference, the previously unknown Zapatistas resorted to arms and briefly seized the city of San Cristóbal on January 1, 1994. Immediately tarred by the Mexican government as "terrorists," the Zapatistas in fact carefully calibrated their use of force, avoiding civilian casualties and courting the press. Other tactics also contributed to the Zapatistas' international support, but without these initial dramatic attacks, few people beyond Mexico's borders would now know or care about the struggles of Mexico's indigenous populations.

The NGO Is Always Right

To improve their chances of gaining support, local movements also conform themselves to the needs and expectations of potential backers in Western nations. They simplify and universalize their claims, making them relevant to the broader missions and interests of key global players. In particular, local groups try to match themselves to the substantive concerns and organizational imperatives of large transnational NGOs.

Consider Nigeria's Ogoni ethnic group, numbering perhaps 300,000 to 500,000 people. Like other minorities in the country's southeastern Niger delta, the Ogoni have long been at odds with colonial authorities and national governments over political representation. In the late 1950s, as Royal Dutch/Shell and other multinationals began producing petroleum in the region, the Ogoni claimed that the Nigerian federal government was siphoning off vast oil revenues yet returning little to the minorities who bore the brunt of the drilling's impact. In the early 1990s, an Ogoni movement previously unknown outside Nigeria sought support from Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and other major international NGOs. Initially, these appeals were rejected as unsubstantiated, overly complex, and too political.

Ogoni leaders responded by downplaying their contentious claims about minority rights in a poor, multiethnic developing state and instead highlighting their environmental grievances, particularly Shell's "ecological warfare" against the indigenous Ogoni. Critical to this new emphasis was Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa's recognition of "what could be done by an environment group [in the developed world] to press demands on government and companies."

The Ogoni's strategic shift quickly led to support from Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club. These and other organizations provided funds and equipment, confirmed and legitimated Ogoni claims, denounced the Nigerian dictatorship, boycotted Shell, and eased Ogoni access to governments and media in Europe and North America. In the summer of 1993, as the Ogoni's domestic mobilizations brought harsh government repression, human rights NGOs also took notice. The 1994 arrest and 1995 execution of Saro-Wiwa ultimately made the Ogoni an international symbol of multinational depredation in the developing world, but it was their initial repositioning as an environmental movement that first put them on the global radar screen. (For its part, Shell countered with its own spin, attacking Saro-Wiwa's credibility as a spokesman for his people and denying his allegations against the company.)

Similar transformations have helped other local causes make global headway. In drumming up worldwide support for Guatemala's Marxist insurgency in the 1980s, activist Rigoberta Menchú projected an indigenous identity that resonated strongly with left-leaning audiences in Western Europe and North America. Her book *I, Rigoberta Menchú* made her an international symbol of indigenous oppression, helping her win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992, year of the Columbus quincentenary, despite her association with a violent rebel movement. As anthropologist David Stoll later showed, however, Menchú and the guerrillas may have enjoyed more backing among international solidarity organizations than among their country's poor and indigenous peoples. According to Stoll, external support may have actually delayed the guerrillas' entry into domestic negotiations by several years, prolonging the war and costing lives.

Mexico's Zapatistas have also benefited abroad from their indigenous identity. At the beginning of their 1994 rebellion, the Zapatistas issued a hodgepodge of demands. Their initial call for socialism was quickly jettisoned when it failed to catch on with domestic or international audiences, and their ongoing demands for Mexican democratization had mainly domestic rather than international appeal. But it was the Zapatistas' "Indianness" and their attacks first on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and then on globalization that found pay dirt in the international arena. (Little coincidence that the day they chose to launch the movement—January 1, 1994—was also the day NAFTA went into effect.) Once the appeal of these issues had become clear, they took center stage in the Zapatistas' contacts with external supporters. Indeed, the Zapatistas and their masked (non-Indian) leader Subcomandante Marcos became potent symbols for antiglobalization activists worldwide. In February and March 2001, when a Zapatista bus caravan traversed southern Mexico and culminated in a triumphant reception in the capital's central square, dozens of Italian *tute bianche* ("White Overalls"), activists prominent in antiglobalization protests in Europe, accompanied the Zapatistas as bodyguards. Even the French farmer and anti-McDonald's campaigner José Bové was present to greet Marcos.

Focusing on an internationally known and notorious enemy (such as globalization or NAFTA) is a particularly effective way of garnering support. In recent years, multinational corporations and international financial institutions have repeatedly served as stand-ins for obscure or recalcitrant local enemies. Even when a movement itself is little known, it can project an effective (if sometimes misleading) snapshot of its claims by identifying itself as the anti-McDonald's movement, the anti-Nike movement, or the anti-Unocal movement. Blaming a villain accessible in the developed world also forges strong links between distant social movements and the "service station on the block," thus inspiring international solidarity.

Such strategies are not aimed only at potential supporters on the political left. The recent growth of a well-funded Christian human rights movement in the United States and Europe has helped many local groups around the world. One major beneficiary is John Garang's Sudan People's

Liberation Army, made up mostly of Christians from southern Sudan fighting against the country's Muslim-dominated north. Rooted in ethnic, cultural, and religious differences, the conflict has been aggravated by disputes over control of natural resources. Since fighting broke out in 1983, the war has attracted little attention, despite the deaths of an estimated 2 million people. As late as September 1999, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright reportedly stated that "the human rights situation in Sudan is not marketable to the American people." However, in the mid-1990s, "slave redemptions" (in which organizations like Christian Solidarity International buy back Christians from their Muslim captors) as well as international activism by Christian human rights organizations began to raise the conflict's profile. The start of oil extraction by multinationals provided another hook to attract concern from mainstream human rights and environmental organizations. Joined by powerful African-American politicians in the United States angered over the slave trade, conservative NGOs have thrown their support behind Garang's group, thereby feeding perceptions of the conflict as a simple Christian-versus-Muslim clash. These NGOs also found a receptive audience in the administration of US President George W. Bush, thus boosting Garang's chances of reaching a favorable settlement.

By contrast, failure to reframe obscure local issues (or reframing them around an issue whose time has passed) can produce international isolation for a struggling insurgent group. Two years after the Zapatista attacks, another movement sprang from the poverty and oppression of southern Mexico, this time in the state of Guerrero. The Popular Revolutionary Army attacked several Mexican cities and demanded an old-style communist revolution. But these rebels drew little support or attention, particularly in contrast to the Zapatistas and their fashionable antiglobalization rhetoric. Meanwhile, Brazil's Landless Peasants Movement and smaller movements of the rural poor in Paraguay and Venezuela have suffered similar fates both because their goals seem out of step with the times and because their key tactic—land invasions—is too controversial for many mainstream international NGOs. In the Niger delta, radical movements that have resorted to threats, sabotage, and kidnappings have also scared

off international support despite the similarity of their grievances to those of the Ogoni.

Leaders for Sale

If marketing is central to a local movement's gaining international support, a gifted salesman, one who identifies himself completely with his "product," is especially valuable. Many individual leaders have come to embody their movements: Myanmar's (Burma) Aung San Suu Kyi, South Africa's Nelson Mandela, as well as the Dalai Lama, Menchú, and Marcos. Even when known abroad only through media images, such leaders can make a host of abstract issues seem personal and concrete, thus multiplying a movement's potential support. For this reason, international tours have long been a central strategy for domestic activists. In the late-19th and early-20th centuries, for example, Sun Yat-sen crisscrossed the world seeking support for a nationalist revolution in China. Attracting international notice when he was briefly kidnapped by the Manchus in London, Sun found himself in Denver, Colorado, on another lobbying trip when the revolution finally came in 1911. Today, for well-supported insurgents, such roadshows are highly choreographed, with hard-charging promoters; tight schedules in government, media, and NGO offices; and a string of appearances in churches, college lecture halls, and community centers. In November 2001, for example, Oronto Douglas, a leader of Nigeria's Ijaw minority, embarked on a six-city, seven-day tour throughout Canada, where he promoted the Ijaw cause along with his new Sierra Club book *Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta*.

What transforms insurgent leaders into international icons? Eloquence, energy, courage, and single-mindedness can undeniably create a charismatic mystique. But transnational charisma also hinges on a host of pedestrian factors that are nonetheless unusual among oppressed groups. Fluency in a key foreign language, especially English; an understanding of Western protest traditions; familiarity with the international political vogue; and expertise in media and NGO relations—all these factors are essential to giving leaders the chance to display their more ineffable qualities. Would the Dalai Lama appear as

charismatic through a translator? For his part, Subcomandante Marcos has long insisted that he is but an ordinary man, whose way with words just happened to strike a responsive chord at an opportune moment.

Most of these prosaic characteristics are learned, not innate. Indeed, many NGOs now offer training programs to build advocacy capacity, establish contacts, and develop media smarts. The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization in The Hague regularly holds intensive, week-long media and diplomacy training sessions for its member "nations," replete with role plays and mock interviews, helping them put their best foot forward in crucial venues. (Among others, Ken Saro-Wiwa praised the program for teaching him nonviolent direct action skills.) One of the most elaborate programs is the Washington, D.C.-based International Human Rights Law Group's two-year Advocacy Bridge Program, which aims to "increase the skills of local activists to amplify their issues of concern globally" and to "facilitate their access to international agenda-setting venues." Under the program, dozens of participants from around the world, chosen to ensure equal participation by women, travel to Washington for one week of initial training and then to Geneva for three weeks of on-site work at the UN Human Rights Commission. In their second year, "graduates" help train a new crop of participants.

Successful insurgent leaders therefore often look surprisingly like the audiences they seek to capture, and quite different from their downtrodden domestic constituencies. Major international NGOs often look for a figure who neatly embodies their own ideals, meets the pragmatic requirements of a "test case," or fulfills romantic Western notions of rebellion—in short, a leader who seems to mirror their own central values. Other leaders, deaf to the international zeitgeist or simply unwilling to adapt, remain friendless and underfunded.

The High Price of Success

Many observers have trumpeted global civil society as the great last hope of the world's have-nots. Yet from the standpoint of local challengers seeking international support, the reality is bleak. The international media is often myopic: Conflicts attract meager reporting unless they have clear relevance, major importance, or huge death tolls. Technology's promise also remains unfulfilled. Video cameras, Web access, and cellular phones are still beyond the reach of impoverished local challengers. Even if the vision of "radical transparency" were realized—and if contenders involved in messy political wrangles in fact desired complete openness—international audiences, flooded with images and appeals, would have to make painful choices. Which groups deserve support? Which causes are more "worthy" than others?

Powerful transnational NGOs, emblematic of global civil society, also display serious limitations. While altruism plays some role in their decision making, NGOs are strategic actors who seek first and foremost their own organizational survival. At times this priority jibes nicely with the interests of local clients in far-flung locations, but often it does not. When selecting clients from a multitude of deserving applicants, NGOs must be hard-nosed, avoiding commitments that will harm their reputations or absorb excessive resources. Their own goals, tactics, constituencies, and bottom lines constantly shape their approaches. Inevitably, many deserving causes go unsupported.

Unfortunately, the least participatory local movements may experience the greatest ease in winning foreign backing. Charismatic leadership is not necessarily democratic, for instance, yet external support will often strengthen a local leader's position, reshaping the movement's internal dynamics as well as its relations with opponents. Among some Tibetan communities today, there are rumblings of discontent over the Dalai Lama's religiously legitimated leadership, but his stature has been so bolstered by international support that dissident elements are effectively powerless. Indeed, any internal dissent—if visible to outsiders—will often reduce international interest. NGOs want their scarce resources to be used effectively. If they see discord instead of unity, they may take their money and clout elsewhere rather than risk wasting them on internal disputes.

The Internet sometimes exacerbates this problem: Internecine feuds played out on public listservs and chat rooms may alienate foreign

supporters, as has happened with some members of the pro-Ogoni networks. And although much has been made about how deftly the Zapatistas used the Internet to get their message out, dozens of other insurgents, from Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front to the Western Sahara's Polisario Front have Web sites and use e-mail. Yet they have failed to spark widespread international enthusiasm. As the Web site for Indonesia's Papua Freedom Organization laments, "We have struggled for more than 30 years, and the world has ignored our cause." Crucial in the Zapatistas' case was the appeal of their message (and masked messenger) to international solidarity activists, who used new technologies to promote the cause to broader audiences. In fact, for most of their conflict with the Mexican government, the Zapatistas have not had direct access to the Internet. Instead, they have sent communiqués by hand to sympathetic journalists and activists who then publish them and put them on the Web. Thus the Zapatistas' seemingly sophisticated use of the Internet has been more a result of their appeal to a core group of supporters than a cause of their international backing.

Perhaps most worrisome, the pressure to conform to the needs of international NGOs can undermine the original goals of local movements. By the time the Ogoni had gained worldwide exposure, some of their backers in the indigenous rights community were shaking their heads at how the movement's original demands for political autonomy had gone understated abroad compared to environmental and human rights issues. The need for local groups to click with trendy international issues fosters a homogeneity of humanitarianism: Unfashionable, complex, or intractable conflicts fester in isolation, while those that match or—thanks to savvy marketing—appear to match international issues of the moment attract disproportionate support. Moreover, the effort to please international patrons can estrange a movement's jet-setting elite from its mass base or leave it unprepared for domestic responsibilities. As one East Timorese leader stated after international pressure moved the territory close to independence, "We have been so focused on raising public awareness about our cause that we didn't seriously think about the structure of a government."

The quest for international support may also be dangerous domestically. To gain attention may require risky confrontations with opponents. Yet few international NGOs can guarantee a local movement's security, leaving it vulnerable to the attacks of enraged authorities. If a movement's opponent is receptive to rhetorical pressure, the group may be saved, as the Zapatistas were. If not, it will likely face its enemies alone. The NATO intervention in Kosovo provides a rare exception. But few challengers have opponents as notorious and strategically inconvenient as Slobodan Milosevic. Even in that case, Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova's nonviolent strategies met years of international inaction and neglect; only when the Kosovo Liberation Army brought the wrath of Yugoslavia down on Kosovo and after Milosevic thumbed his nose at NATO did the intervention begin.

Historically, desperate local groups have often sought support from allies abroad. Given geographical distance as well as political and cultural divides, they have been forced to market themselves. This was true not only in the Chinese Revolution but also in the Spanish Civil War, the Indian nationalist movement, and countless Cold War struggles. But the much-vaunted emergence of a global civil society was supposed to change all that, as the power of technologies meshed seamlessly with the good intentions of NGOs to offset the callous self-interest of states and the blithe indifference of faraway publics.

But for all the progress in this direction, an open and democratic global civil society remains a myth, and a potentially deadly one. Lost in a self-congratulatory haze, international audiences in the developed world all too readily believe in this myth and in the power and infallibility of their own good intentions. Meanwhile, the grim realities of the global morality market leave many local aspirants helpless and neglected, painfully aware of international opportunities but lacking the resources, connections, or know-how needed to tap them.

Recommended Resources

The leaders of local movements around the world have authored numerous first-person chronicles of their battles and causes. For a fascinating account of the Ogoni struggle, see Ken Saro-Wiwa's *A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary* (New York: Penguin, 1995).

José Ramos-Horta describes the early years of East Timor's struggle for international support in *Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor* (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1987). Aung San Suu Kyi explains her experiences in Burma in *Freedom from Fear* (New York: Penguin, 1991). Many of Subcomandante Marcos's communiqués are available in Spanish and English on the website of the nonprofit group *¡Ya Basta!*

For a critical account of Rigoberta Menchú's projection of the Guatemalan revolution, see David Stoll's *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). Donald S. Lopez's *Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) explores the price Tibet has paid for going international. Alison Brysk explains how Latin American indigenous groups deal with the global community in *From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). See Clifford Bob's *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) for a discussion of how the Ogoni and Zapatista movements fit into the academic literature on civil society and nonstate actors.

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink examine global nongovernmental organization (NGO) networks in *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). P.J. Simmons describes the growing role of activist groups in world affairs in "Learning to Live with NGOs" (*Foreign Policy*, Fall 1998). For recent comprehensive surveys of the global influence of nongovernmental activism, see Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor, eds., *Global Civil Society 2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, eds., *Civil Society: History and Possibilities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

A special issue of *Peace Review: A Transnational Quarterly* (Vol. 13, No. 3, September 2001) examines the Internet's impact on social justice movements. For the role of media in global politics, see Royce J. Ammon's *Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics: CNN, Telediplomacy, and Foreign Policy* (London: McFarland & Company, 2001).

Ken Saro-Wiwa: Cultural Broker

Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa was born in 1941 to a chief of the Ogoni, an ethnic minority in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Saro-Wiwa, always known as Ken, built on this promising foundation by studying English at Government College Umuahia, the University of Ibadan, and then the University of Lagos. By the time the bloody Nigerian civil war broke out in 1967, he had a government post and supported the federal side against the insurgent Biafrans.

Ken Saro-Wiwa was a gifted and prolific writer. Through novels, memoirs, and a newspaper column he reached a wide audience in Africa and—significantly—beyond. *Sozaboy: A Novel in Rotten English* (1994) dealt with the civil war and the corruption of the regime, providing a moral shock for Western readers in the seductive form of a good read. Saro-Wiwa also produced a popular television series, *Basi & Co*., which satirized the local customs and corruption of the emerging urban classes. His ability to understand and reach out to Western, English-speaking audiences would become a huge political advantage.

Increasingly active on behalf of Ogoni rights, Saro-Wiwa was dismissed from government service in 1973. He now devoted his time not only to television and writing, but also to business ventures, especially real estate, that provided him resources for his political work. In 1987 he again briefly joined the government when a new dictator promised a return to democracy. Saro-Wiwa, quickly realizing the promise was deceitful, resigned.

Saro-Wiwa helped Ogoni activists develop a strategy of reaching out to international groups. They founded the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), tapping into the idea of indigenous peoples at risk. This attracted the attention of the UNPO (the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization), which in turn gave MOSOP legitimacy with other international organizations. Through a process of trial and error, documented by Clifford Bob in *The Marketing of Rebellion* (2005) (see chapter 32 in that volume for Bob's general argument), movement leaders settled on two additional ways of framing their struggle in a way that would garner international attention. Their success was remarkable.

One frame was human rights, a discourse often seen as originating in and especially appealing to citizens of the developed world. (On these dynamics, see Chapter 28 by James Ron, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers.) To gain new support, MOSOP had to move away from presenting itself as an indigenous culture under threat from development, linking the threat instead to the dictatorial government of Nigeria. Basic human rights rather than cultural specificity sold well. A number of international human-rights groups, Amnesty International among them, eventually came to the aid of MOSOP and Saro-Wiwa.

Ogoni activists also framed their struggle as environmental. Their region contains oil, although virtually all the revenues from its exploitation are siphoned off by the federal government. Yet the local population suffers from the spills, blowouts, fires, and other accidents, from the resulting air and water pollution, and from the disruption from boom-town migrants. Shell Oil dominates production, providing MOSOP with a visible player to demonize, a player interested in its international reputation and subject to pressure from Western publics (especially in its home country, the Netherlands). Shell denied many of the Ogoni charges, but photos and videos often caught the company in lies—devastating blunders that opened opportunities for protestors (Jasper and Poulsen 1993). With their environmental frame, the Ogoni attracted support from environmental giants such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club.

Saro-Wiwa's adept English allowed him to speak directly to non-Nigerians, especially wealthy protest organizations in the United States and elsewhere. Able to finance his own travel, he visited numerous international organizations in the early 1990s, pitching his case in vivid language. He almost single-handedly catapulted his tiny group into prominence in the world of international activism. Out of the hundreds of causes around the world, the Ogoni managed to gain enormous publicity and sympathy (and resources) in the West.

Framing is not everything, of course: mobilization is also crucial (see Chapter 13 by Charlotte Ryan and William A. Gamson). In January 1993, MOSOP managed to put 300,000 Ogoni onto the streets for "Ogoni Day," representing more than half the group's total population—an astounding turnout. In 1993 there were also riots when government troops fired on peaceful crowds and when police arrested MOSOP leaders. Such events were "newsworthy," as was the involvement of a prominent multinational like Shell.

The Nigerian government reacted with characteristic brutality. It jailed Saro-Wiwa, without a trial, for several months in 1992 and a month in the spring of 1993. This repression further increased international sympathy for Saro-Wiwa and his cause, as he was now a kind of celebrity capable of attracting media attention. A group like Amnesty International, which according to its mission cannot intervene unless someone has been killed, attacked, or jailed, now began to monitor and support the MOSOP cause.

The Nigerian regime responded by increasing its pressure. In May 1994, Saro-Wiwa and nine others were arrested on patently false charges of murdering four Ogoni elders. Many of the prosecution witnesses later admitted to having been bribed for their testimony. International indignation resulted in a Right Livelihood Award and a Goldman Environmental Prize for Saro-Wiwa, but these could not prevent a guilty verdict from the tribunal. The Ogoni Nine were hanged in a secret military procedure on November 10,

Brokers Individuals who bring together previously unconnected groups and organizations are known as brokers. Brokerage is often very important for the development of movements, which cannot grow rapidly if they rely upon recruiting new members one at a time. Brokerage is closely connected to movement leadership. Individuals who are effective brokers often become leaders, and leaders are often in the best position to become effective brokers. Some influential brokers, however, may not become well known to the public. Belinda Robnett (1997) has shown that African-American women were important "bridge leaders" in the civil rights movement, helping to connect ordinary people in local communities with the formal organizations of the movement. These women did not become as famous as Martin Luther King, Jr., or Ralph Abernathy, but they were essential to the movement's growth and success.

1995. The main cost to the government was Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth, but there were no economic sanctions (although the United States and other governments considered these).

After the death of Saro-Wiwa and many others, the movement declined. But its international campaign had some victories. Shell Oil devoted resources to local community development, cleaned up its environmental record, and began to hire more employees from the local population. The Nigerian government created more states, a reform which, at least on paper, might have entailed more autonomy to the many regions and tribes of the country. But the continuing instability of the regimes has nullified most of these changes.

Saro-Wiwa's son, in a book about his father published in 2000, reveals some of the tradeoffs involved in a life devoted primarily to political activity. *In the Shadow of a Saint: A Son's Journey to Understanding his Father's Legacy* is a powerful memoir about a family that was always second (or lower) in the patriarch's priorities. Ken Wiwa, now a journalist in Canada, resented his father's absences and infidelities, but also recognized that what made him a bad father also made him a great protest leader.

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Global Corporations, Global Unions

Stephen Lerner

In November 2006 a group of Latino immigrant janitors won a historic strike in Houston, Texas—doubling their income, gaining health benefits, and securing a union contract for 5300 workers with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). At a critical moment in the strike, 1000 janitors marched on the police station to protest the illegal arrests of two strikers. The next day, when the charges were dropped and the workers released, a local newspaper reported the crowd's chant as "*Arriba Revolución!*" The article got it wrong—workers were actually chanting "*Arriba La Unión!*" But it got the mood right. It looked and felt like a revolution in Houston. Thousands of immigrant workers and their supporters had successfully challenged the corporate power structure and its allies. They stood up to the police, blocked streets, garnered widespread support, and prevailed against enormous odds.

To many observers, a union fight in the heart of Texas seemed like a shot in the dark. But to workers toiling in poverty for the wealthiest corporations on earth, Houston was a shot heard around the world.

The SEIU janitors' month-long strike exposed a global economy addicted to cheap labor. Immigrant workers challenged a system that paid them $20 a night to clean toilets and vacuum the offices of global giants like Chevron and Shell Oil. They stood up to the global real estate interests that own and manage the office buildings where they work and the national cleaning companies that stay competitive by paying workers next to nothing.

Supported by activists from religious, civil rights, and community movements, janitors marched through Houston's most exclusive neighborhoods and shopping districts, into the lives of the rich and powerful. These disruptions forced Houston's elite, normally insulated from the workers who keep the city functioning, to face up to the human downside of the low-wage economy. Invoking the legacy of the civil rights movement, more than 80 union janitors and activists from around the country flew to Houston on "freedom flights" to support the strikers. They chained themselves to buildings, blocked streets, and were arrested for non-violent acts of civil disobedience.

The city's corporate and political establishment tried to thwart the strikers. Twenty years ago they had successfully resisted an SEIU-led organizing drive among the city's janitors. So when workers took to the streets, the gloves came off again. Police

helicopters circled, mounted police moved in, and protesters nursed broken bones in jail, while the district attorney demanded $40 million in combined bond, nearly $900,000 for each person arrested.

If the strike had been only a local affair, the civic elite would probably have won. But the campaign went global, arising in front of properties controlled by the same firms in cities around the world. As the strike spread, janitors in Chicago, New York, Washington, Mexico City, London, Berlin, and other cities honored picket lines or sponsored demonstrations. These protests and the negative publicity they drew put the struggle of 5000 workers in Texas in the international spotlight. Houston's business leaders intervened to end the dispute, and the workers secured their historic victory. The strike, the tension and passion it generated, and the reaction of the power structure explain why a reporter hearing "*Arriba La Unión*" thought he heard "*Revolución*."

Such a victory in anti-union Texas is worth attention. During the past four decades, union membership has steadily shrunk, first in the United States and now increasingly around the world. As unions have declined, we have seen greater inequality, cuts in social welfare benefits, and a redistribution of wealth to giant multinational corporations around the globe. Trade unions, laws, and social policies that benefited workers have been gutted in country after country. Corporations and newly minted private-equity billionaires boast of their ability to operate anywhere in the world without challenges from workers, unions, or governments to their increasing dominance of the global economy.

Given these trends, many observers have written the labor movement's obituary. But the Houston victory and successes by janitors elsewhere around the world signal a new upsurge of labor activism in America and beyond. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the spread of multinational corporations and the increasing concentration of capital have created the conditions that can turn globalization on its head and lift people out of poverty.

A Turning Point

SEIU's Building Services Division, like many U.S. unions, declined dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. It lost a quarter of its members, work was part-timed, and benefits were cut. Through its Justice for Janitors campaign in the 1980s and 1990s, the SEIU grappled with how to respond to outsourcing within the United States; as large-contract cleaning companies consolidated on a national basis, so too co-workers in far-flung cities consolidated their efforts to win campaigns and contracts. By 2006, the SEIU had figured out how to use this national scope for growth and power, and members around the country used their sway with national employers and building owners to help the Houston janitors win their strike. Cleaners across the globe bore witness to the struggle and put Houston's real estate leaders under an international microscope.

But the conditions that allowed for success in Houston are already changing. Again the ground is shifting under our feet as the service industry and its clients continue to globalize. Just as the SEIU moved from organizing in single buildings to organizing whole cities and extending that strength to new regions like the South, it must respond to these new changes by developing a deeper global strategy. The largest property owners and service contractors are becoming global companies that operate in dozens of countries and employ or control the employment conditions of hundreds of thousands of workers. Simple solidarity will no longer suffice. Without a global union that unites U.S. workers with their counterparts across the world, workers' power to influence these corporations will continue to wane. Such corporations may threaten workers' way of life, but they also present an opportunity.

It is ironic that a great opportunity to organize global unions comes among the poorest, least skilled workers in one of the least organized and wealthiest sectors of the world economy. Contract janitors, security officers, and others who clean, protect, and maintain commercial property (most of them immigrants) perform site-specific work that is local by nature; their jobs cannot be moved from country to country. Workers who follow global capital from country to country in search of jobs have the power to demand and win better working and living standards. It is among the most invisible and seemingly powerless workers— whose labor is nonetheless essential to the economic success of the most powerful corporations—that we can build a global movement to reinvigorate trade unions, stop the race to the

bottom, and lift workers out of poverty. Far from an isolated event, the Houston strike demonstrates how the extraordinary reorganization and realignment of the world's economy has opened up the opportunity to unite workers around the globe in a movement to improve their lives by redistributing wealth and power.

Understanding Globalization

The world is tilting away from workers and unions and the traditional ways they have fought for and won justice—away from the power of national governments, national unions, and national solutions developed to facilitate and regulate globalization. It is tilting toward global trade, giant global corporations, global solutions, and toward Asia—especially China and India. We cannot depend on influencing bureaucratic global institutions, like the International Labor Organization, or fighting entities that are ultimately under the control of global corporations, like the World Trade Organization. Workers and their unions need to use their still-formidable power to counter the power of global corporations before the world tilts so far that unions are washed away, impoverishing workers who currently have unions and trapping those who lack them in ever deeper poverty. The power equation needs to be balanced before democratic institutions are destroyed.

As multinationals have grown, wealth and capital have become increasingly concentrated. Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 52 are not nations—they are global corporations. The top five companies, Wal-Mart, General Motors, Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, and BP, are each financially larger than all but 24 of the world's nations. The problem is not that corporations operate in more than one country—it is that multinational corporations are so powerful they increasingly dominate what happens in whole countries, hemispheres, and the entire globe.

As global corporations grow and state power declines, national unions are shrinking in membership and power. Union density is down across the globe. Though many countries experienced an increase in unionization during the 1970s and 1980s, density declined in the 1990s. From 1970 to 2000, 17 out of 20 wealthy countries surveyed

by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development had a net decline in union density. While the specifics and timing are different in each country, what is remarkable over the last 30 years is the similarity of the results.

No country, no matter how strong its labor movement or progressive its history, is immune to these global trends. Density is starting to decline in Scandinavia, South Africa, Brazil, and South Korea, countries that until recently had stable or growing labor movements. In France, general strikes and mass worker and student mobilizations have slowed the rollback of workers' rights, but these are defensive strikes by workers desperately trying to maintain standards that those in surrounding countries are losing.

The Antidote: Global Unions

For 150 years the argument for global unions was abstract, theoretical, and ideological: in brief, capitalism is global, therefore worker organizations should be too. However, even though capitalism was global, most employers were not. Theoretically, workers were stronger if united worldwide, but the day-to-day reality of unionized workers enabled them to win through the power of national governments. Unionized workers saw workers in other countries as potential competition for their jobs rather than allies. There was no immediate, compelling reason to act beyond national boundaries.

Now, globalization itself is creating the conditions to organize global unions in the service economy. The infrastructure of the FIRE sector (finance, insurance, and real estate) and the millions of service jobs needed to support it are concentrated in some 40 global cities, while manufacturing and mobile jobs—aided by new technology—are being shifted and dispersed around the globe. Global unions could certainly be formed in manufacturing or other sectors characterized by mobile jobs, but right now the opportunity is greatest in service jobs concentrated in the cities that drive the world economy.

Global cities—like New York, Hong Kong, London, and São Paulo—are economic hubs that rely on service jobs to function. Multinational corporations and their executives increasingly depend on these cities because they physically

work, live, and play in them. Deeply embedded in each of these cities are hundreds of thousands of janitors, security guards, maintenance, hotel, air-port, and other service workers whose labor is essential and cannot be offshored. And, unlike the jobs in manufacturing and the garment indus-try, there is no threat of relocation.

The coexistence of immense wealth and low-wage service jobs concentrated in these global economic "engine rooms" dramatically increases the potential power of service workers to build a global movement.

The Houston Victory

Houston's janitors won because the five cleaning contractors that employ them clean more than 70 percent of the office space in the city and operate throughout the United States. Real estate compa-nies like Hines and major tenants like Chevron and Shell operate around the world, allowing union allies to organize actions in places like Mexico City, Moscow, London, and Berlin. The unquenchable thirst of real estate companies for capital to finance their global expansion allowed pension funds like the California Public Employment Retirement fund to intervene, saying that conditions for janitors were both unaccepta-ble and bad for their investment. If Houston's janitors had confronted a local oligarchy of cleaning contractors, building owners, and corporations, they would likely have stood alone and again been crushed.

The union worked among janitors in down-town commercial office buildings in the major northern cities of the United States. But even as the SEIU expanded to organize service workers in other sectors, the gains among janitors were severely threatened by the wave of outsourcing in the 1970s and 1980s.

The union's own structure—dozens of local unions, often competing and undercutting each other in the same city—constrained its ability to fight back, and it needed to build strong local unions that could bargain across a geographic jurisdiction. The SEIU learned the hard way that it could not make gains by organizing building by building; even if a contractor allowed its workers to unionize, the union was likely to be undercut when the contract next went out to bid.

So the SEIU scaled its strategy upwards, reckoning that the resources needed to wage a fight in a single building could be more efficiently deployed in winning a contractor's entire portfolio across a city, and by doing this with multiple con-tractors in a citywide campaign, it could unionize the entire commercial office-cleaning industry. Crucial to this was developing the "trigger": after a contractor agreed to go union, SEIU would not raise wages until a majority of its competitors also went union, ensuring that no contractor was put at a competitive disadvantage. It began to untangle the complicated relationships between the janitors' direct employers—the contractors—and their secondary employers, the building owners. It also worked to understand the latter's financial, regu-latory, political, and operational situation and their key relationships, especially with investors.

The union also learned that the janitors had hidden power: their critical—though invisible—position in the FIRE industry meant they could not be off-shored. As a result, powerful constitu-encies in these cities rallied to demand justice for janitors in their communities who earned poverty wages while cleaning the offices of multibillion-dollar companies.

These formed the core elements of an integrated strategy that allowed the Justice for Janitors cam-paign to reestablish or win master agreements for janitors in commercial office markets in the largest U.S. cities, bringing 100,000 new members into the union. In turn that strength allowed the campaign to spread to cities such as Houston, where the same owners operated. Master agreements that included the right to honor picket lines meant that a con-tractor's unfair labor practices in one city could trigger strike action by SEIU locals in other cities.

There is no geographic limit to this strategy—as the key owners and contractors globalize, so do workers. Their victories demonstrate that in many ways multinationals are becoming more—not less—vulnerable as they spread across the globe.

Global Movement

In the face of the ascendancy of neoliberal poli-cies, it may sound preposterous to argue that we are entering a moment of incredible opportunity for workers and their unions. But sometimes an

unplanned combination of events may unleash social forces and contradictions that create the possibility—not the guarantee, the possibility—of creating a movement that lets us accomplish things we had never imagined possible. We are now in such a time.

How do we mount a campaign to organize workers into trade unions strong enough to raise wages and unite communities into organizations powerful enough to win decent housing, schools, and medical care? How do we build on the critical lessons and challenges of Houston, where janitors were far stronger than they would have been if they had focused their efforts on one building, company, or group of workers?

1. Organize Globally

Most trade unions still focus their resources and activity in one country. Despite one hundred years of rhetoric about the need for workers to unite across borders, most global work is symbolic solidarity action and not part of a broader strategy. As the economy has become interrelated and global, organizing work must do the same.

2. Corporations not Countries

A campaign to change the world needs to focus on the corporations that increasingly dominate the global economy. To raise wages and living standards, we must force the largest corporations in the world to negotiate a new social compact that addresses human rights and labor rights in enforceable agreements that could lift tens of millions out of poverty. This campaign must be grounded in the work sites of the corporations that drive the economy and the cities in which they are located and from which they get much of their capital.

Unions as well as community, religious, and political leaders need to lead a campaign calling on the 300 largest pension funds in the world to adopt responsible investment policies covering their 6.9 trillion Euros (US$9 trillion) in capital. If corporations want access to the capital in workers' pension funds, they ought to develop responsible policies that govern how workers' money is to be invested and used.

3. Global Workers, Global Unions, Global Cities

We must create truly global unions, whose mission and focus is on the new global economy, spread across six continents. But they do not need to be in every country or major city in order to have the breadth and reach to tackle the largest global corporations. The challenge of building global unions is not to be everywhere in the world; rather, we need to determine the minimum number of countries and cities in which we must operate in order to exercise maximum power to persuade corporations to adopt a new social compact. This means organizing janitors, security, hotel, airport, and other service workers in some of the 40 or so global cities that are central to the operations of these corporations. Such organization must take place not only in individual work sites, but across cities, corporate groups, and industry sectors to improve immediate conditions and to build a union that organizes not only where workers labor but also in their neighborhoods and communities.

4. A Moral and Economic Message

It is not enough to organize workers and their workplaces. The campaign needs a powerful message about the immorality of forcing workers to live in poverty amidst incredible wealth. Religious, community, and political leaders need to embrace and help lead the campaign because it highlights the moral issues of poverty, calls the corporations responsible for it to task, and offers solutions that are good for workers and the community as a whole.

There are signs that elements of this campaign are becoming politically fashionable. Public-opinion polls suggest there is significant concern about the growing inequality between rich and poor. In a national *Los Angeles Times*/Bloomberg poll in December 2006, nearly three-quarters of respondents said they considered the income gap in America to be a serious problem.

To organize successfully at the work site and in communities, immigrants and migrant workers need to be brought out of the shadows of second-class status in the countries where they work. This campaign needs to take the lead in each country, and globally, to defend the rights of

immigrant and migrant workers. It must promote laws that give immigrant and migrant workers full legal rights so that they can organize, unite with native-born workers, and help lead this fight.

5. Disrupting—and Galvanizing—the Global City

It would be naive to imagine that traditional union activity, moral persuasion, and responsible investment policies are enough to change corporate behavior or the world. These are starting points—small steps that allow workers and their allies to win victories, solidify organization, and increase the capacity to challenge corporate power. As activity and tension increase, the global business elite will go back and forth between making minor concessions to placate workers and attacking them at the workplace, in the media, and in political circles. But in the end, we only get real change by executing a two-part strategy: (1) galvanizing workers, community leaders, and the public to lift up our communities and (2) creating a crisis that threatens the existing order.

This is why this moment is so exciting and ripe with opportunity. In the last century industrial workers learned that increasingly coordinated industrial action could cripple national economies, topple governments, and win more just and humane societies. This strategy worked for more than 50 years. But production has been redesigned and shifted across the globe to disperse the power of workers and their unions. The rapid convergence of global corporations and workers in key cities around the world—where corporations are concentrating, not dispersing—has created the conditions and contradictions that allow us to envision how organized service workers can capture the imagination of people in their communities who are disturbed by poverty and income inequality while simultaneously learning how to disrupt the "engine rooms" in cities across the globe and so gain the leverage needed to start to tip the balance of economic power in the world.

Global capitalism operates smoothly in these cities because business leaders from around the world can fly in and out of their airports, stay in their hotels, and travel their streets to offices, banks, finance houses, and stock exchanges. Global cities and the multinational corporations that have centered the economic life of the world in them cannot operate without the global workers, who literally feed, protect, and serve the richest and most powerful corporations and people in the world.

By learning how to disrupt these airports, offices, and hotels, service workers can exert their newly available and previously unimagined power—not for a day, but for weeks and months in an escalating campaign that demands decent wages and living conditions for workers and a stronger, more prosperous future for entire communities and cities. In using this power, they can take the lead in creating a new world where the incredible technological progress, wealth, and economic advances of the global economy lift up the poor, empower the powerless, and inspire all of us to fight for justice.

Recommended Resources

For more information on global union organizing, see http://www.union-network.org/unipropertyn.nsf. To learn about SEIU, go to www.seiu.org; and to find out more about the corporate accountability campaign on Group 4 Securicor, go to www.focusongroup4securicor.org and www.eyeonwackenhut.com.

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Part VIII

Why Do Movements Decline?

Introduction

Not surprisingly, scholars have had much more to say about why social movements arise than why they decline, enter a period of "abeyance," or disappear altogether. Nonetheless, several hypotheses about movement decline have attained some notoriety. Most explanations for decline focus on the surrounding political environment, which may of course constrain as well as facilitate movements. Of course, the very success of a movement in changing laws or government policies may undermine the motivations that many people had for participating in that movement. Movement organizations may also be legally recognized by the government, leading to their "institutionalization" and declining reliance on disruptive protest. Government concessions of this type, even if they do not redress all the grievances and concerns of all of a movement's participants, may nevertheless be sufficient to satisfy or placate many people, who will then drift away from the movement or from protest tactics. Social movements, in short, may become victims of their own success.

Movements may also decline as a result of their own internal dynamics and evolution. In her account in Chapter 31 of the decline of the women's movement in America, Barbara Epstein stresses how the movement gradually lost its radical élan and vision. This was a result in part of intense ideological conflicts between radical feminists within the movement, who had provided much of the movement's activist core and ideological inspiration. Gradually, and partly because of its own success in opening up new professional careers for women, the women's movement as a whole took on a middle-class outlook. It became more concerned with the career opportunities and material success of individual women than with the group solidarity of women or the concerns of poor and working-class women. A remarkably wide range of women's organizations have now been successfully institutionalized, Epstein points out, but they have not been able, and most have not been concerned, to bring about gender equality within the larger society.

Movements in Abeyance Some political causes go through long periods of relative inactivity, disappearing from the public eye before springing back to life. While in abeyance, they are kept alive by small groups or networks of people who remember previous mobilizations and remain committed to ideals that are generally out of favor among the broader public. Such "abeyance structures" also include formal organizations that continue to work for social change even when there is no evidence of a surrounding movement. For instance, the small and largely obscure National Woman's Party (NWP) led by Alice Paul agitated for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) during the 1940s and 1950s, until that cause was picked up again by the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The persistence of such networks and organizations helps to explain why certain movements, ideas, and tactics can sometimes reappear quickly after decades of dormancy. See Taylor (1989).

The excerpt by Joshua Gamson in Chapter 32 emphasizes yet another way in which a movement's internal dynamics may lead to schism, if not decline. Movements typically require—or themselves attempt to create—clear and stable collective identities. How can we make claims and demands on others, after all, if we do not know who "we" and "they" are? Many recent movements have been centrally concerned with establishing, recasting, and/or defending collective identities, including previously stigmatized identities. But collective identities, sociologists argue, are not "natural" or given once and for all; they are culturally constructed and continually reconstructed. Some identities, moreover, may obscure or devalue others. As a result, people have often attempted to blur, reconfigure, or deconstruct certain identities. Hence, Gamson's question: must identity movements self-destruct?

Gamson shows how the gay and lesbian movement has been shaken in recent years by "queer" theorists and activists who have challenged fixed sexual identities like "gay," "lesbian," and "straight." Queer activists have also challenged the "assimilationist" goals of mainstream (and generally older) gay and lesbian activists, some of whom object to the very use of a stigmatized label like "queer." To some extent, Gamson points out, queer activism developed out of the growing organization of bisexual and transgendered people, whose very existence challenges the notion of fixed sexual and gender identities.

In the end, then, the gay and lesbian movement and indeed all identity movements face a dilemma: to be politically effective they may feel a need to emphasize exclusive and secure collective identities, but this may paper over and effectively ignore important differences between movement participants—differences that may later erupt in a way that weakens the movement. How movements handle this dilemma in order to avoid self-destruction—how they weigh and balance competing and potentially disruptive identity claims—is an important question for future research.

Movements may also decline because the political opportunities that may have helped give rise to them begin to contract or disappear. Elite divisions may be resolved or (perhaps because of elite unity) elites may decide to harshly repress a movement. Both of these factors are usually invoked to explain the violent demise of the democracy movement in China in 1989. In *The War on Labor and the Left* (1991), Patricia Cayo Sexton also emphasizes repression as a key factor in the decline of the U.S. labor movement since the 1950s. More specifically, she argues that union decline in America is largely explained by aggressive employer opposition to unions, which is in turn facilitated by laws and policies that favor employers over workers (see also Goldfield 1987). One does not see the same type of employer resistance in Canada, Sexton points out, mainly because laws discourage it. As a result, unions have remained strong in Canada. American unions have also been hurt by factory closings in recent years; many businesses have transferred their operations to parts of the country (mainly the South) or other countries where unions are weak and wages relatively low. (Of course, as Stephen Lerner points out in Chapter 30, multinational corporations remain vulnerable to organized labor.)

A primary reason for the existence of a legal framework in the United States which encourages business opposition to unions is the historic *political* weakness of the American labor movement. Unlike all other developed capitalist countries, the United States has never had a strong labor or leftist political

party (although some scholars have suggested that the Democratic Party briefly functioned like one during the 1930s). Scholars refer to the historical weakness of labor and socialist parties in the United States as "American exceptionalism." The precise reasons for this exceptionalism continue to be debated, with factors such as the two-party system, racial and ethnic antagonisms among workers, and the American creed of individualism receiving considerable emphasis.

Charles Brockett and Ian Roxborough remind us that repression sometimes works and sometimes fails. State violence sometimes demobilizes protestors and crushes insurgents, but it sometimes backfires, spurring more people to take to the streets or to take up arms. What explains this?

Looking at Central America during the 1970s and 1980s, Brockett notes (in Chapter 33) that ruthless repression was most effective when authorities used it before movements had become strong—before a *cycle of protest* had begun. However, after such a cycle of protest was underway—when people were already active and organized—repression tended to backfire. Organized activists redoubled their efforts, went underground, and often turned to violence, joined by others seeking protection, justice, and sometimes revenge.

Roxborough suggests that U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq failed because they were based on a misunderstanding of insurgent social movements. U.S. officials assume that popular attitudes toward insurgents and the government are based on short-term cost–benefit calculations, failing to see how insurgencies may be deeply rooted in intractable class, ethnic, or religious conflicts. Accordingly, attempts to win over the hearts and minds of the population by providing material benefits are insufficient. Insurgent movements are less interested in popularity or legitimacy per se than in monopolizing political control at the grassroots; such movements constitute an alternative government. Counterinsurgency, then, is about establishing local political control; it is a project that requires a great deal of time and troops—something which outside powers may be unwilling to commit.

Discussion Questions

1 How might a social movement become a victim of its own success? Could this be said of the women's movement?

2 Why has the women's movement declined in recent years? Do you think that this decline is permanent, or that the movement is simply in "abeyance," with the possibility of springing back to life under the right conditions?

3 How have "queer" activists challenged the gay and lesbian movement? Is this challenge simply destructive or could it be potentially beneficial to the movement?

4 Why did government repression sometimes "work" in Central America and sometimes backfire?

5 How do insurgent or revolutionary movements differ from other movements? When are such movements most likely to succeed? When and how is counterinsurgency most likely to succeed?

31

The Decline of the Women's Movement

Barbara Epstein

From the late sixties into the eighties there was a vibrant women's movement in the United States. Culturally influential and politically powerful, on its liberal side this movement included national organizations and campaigns for reproductive rights, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), and other reforms. On its radical side it included women's liberation and consciousness-raising groups, as well as cultural and grassroots projects. The women's movement was also made up of innumerable caucuses and organizing projects in the professions, unions, government bureaucracies, and other institutions. The movement brought about major changes in the lives of many women, and also in everyday life in the United States. It opened to women professions and blue-collar jobs that previously had been reserved for men. It transformed the portrayal of women by the media. It introduced the demand for women's equality into politics, organized religion, sports, and innumerable other arenas and institutions, and as a result the gender balance of participation and leadership began to change. By framing inequality and oppression in family and personal relations as a political question, the women's movement opened up public discussion of issues previously seen as private, and therefore beyond public scrutiny. The women's movement changed the way we talk, and the way we think. As a result, arguably most young women now believe that their options are or at least should be as open as men's.

Despite the dramatic accomplishments of the women's movement, and the acceptance of women's equality as a goal in most sectors of U.S. society, gender equality has not yet been achieved. Many more women work outside the home but most continue to be concentrated in low-paying jobs; women earn, on the average, considerably less than men; women are much more likely than men to be poor. Violence against women is still widespread. Responsibility for childcare remains largely the responsibility of women; despite the fact that most women work outside the home, nowhere is it seen as a societal rather than a familial responsibility. In the sixties and seventies feminists protested the imbalance in power between men and women in family and personal relations. But these continue to exist.

Worst of all, there is no longer a mass women's movement. There are many organizations working for women's equality in the public arena and in private institutions; these include specifically women's organizations such as the National Organization for Women, and in environmental, health care, social justice and other areas that address women's issues. But where there were once women's organizations with large participatory memberships there are now bureaucratic structures run by paid staff. Feminist theory, once provocative and freewheeling, has lost concern with the conditions of women's lives and has become pretentious and tired. This raises two questions. Why is there so little discussion of the near-disappearance of a movement that not so long ago was strong enough to bring about major changes in the social and cultural landscape? What are the causes of the movement's decline?

Why the Silence?

[…] It is my impression that the real reason for avoiding or suppressing criticisms within the movement is fear that discussing the movement's problems will hasten a process of unraveling that is already well underway. Movements are fragile; the glue that holds them together consists not only in belief in the causes that they represent, but also confidence in their own growing strength. Especially when a movement is in decline it is tempting to silence criticism and turn to whistling in the dark, in the hope that no one will notice that something has gone wrong. But problems that are not acknowledged or discussed are not likely to go away; it is more likely that they will worsen. Understanding why a movement has declined may not lead to the revival of that movement as it was in the past, but it may help in finding new directions.

Reluctance to look at the weaknesses of the current women's movement may also have to do with the fear that second wave, or contemporary, feminism could disappear, sharing the fate of first wave feminism. The first women's movement in the United States, which took place in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, was almost wiped from historical memory during the four-decade interlude between the two waves of feminist activism. It was the

weaknesses of first wave feminism, most of which have not been shared by feminism's second wave, that made this possible. First wave feminism was largely confined to white, middle and upper middle class women. First wave feminism also moved, over the course of its history, toward a narrowness of vision that isolated it from other progressive movements. The first feminist movement in the United States originated in the abolitionist movement. In its early years feminism's alliance with the antislavery movement, and its association with other protest movements of the pre-Civil War decades, gave it a radical cast. But when the Civil War ended and suffrage was extended to former slaves but not to women, much of the women's movement abandoned its alliance with blacks. In the decades between the Civil War and the turn of the twentieth century, racist and anti-immigrant sentiment spread within the middle class. In the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth the women's movement narrowed its focus to winning woman's suffrage, and leading feminists turned to racist and anti-immigrant arguments on behalf of that goal. Other currents in the women's movement, such as the women's trade union movement, avoided racism and continued to link feminism with a radical perspective. But by the late nineteenth century the mainstream woman's suffrage organizations dominated the women's movement. By the time woman's suffrage was won, first wave feminism had abandoned any broader agenda and had distanced itself from other progressive movements. Feminism was easily pushed aside by the conservative forces that became dominant in the twenties.

The impact of second wave feminism has been broader and deeper than that of the first wave. Whatever direction U.S. politics may take it is hard to imagine feminism being wiped off the slate as it was in the thirties, forties, and fifties. In the last three decades feminism has changed women's lives and thinking in ways that are not likely to be reversed. Where first wave feminism collapsed into a single-issue focus, second wave feminism has in many respects broadened. Second wave feminism had its limitations in its early years. Though participants included women of color and of working class backgrounds, their route into the movement was through the same student and professional circles through which

white middle class women found feminism. The presence of women of color and working class women did not mean that feminism was being adopted within these communities. Second wave feminists, especially in the intoxicating early years of the movement, tended to believe that they could speak for all women. Such claims contained a small grain of truth, but ignored the composition of the movement, which was overwhelmingly young, white, college educated, heterosexual, and drawn from the post-Second World War middle class.

Unlike first wave feminism, the second wave broadened over time, in its composition and, in important respects, in its perspective. In the seventies and eighties, lesbian feminism emerged as a current within the movement. Women of color began to articulate their own versions of feminism, and working class women, who had not been part of the movement's early constituency of students and professionals, began to organize around demands for equal treatment at the workplace and in unions, for childcare, and for reproductive rights. Where first wave feminism pulled back, over time, from its early alliances with the black movement and other radical currents, second wave feminism increasingly allied itself with progressive movements, especially with movements of people of color and with the gay and lesbian movement. Second wave feminists also developed increasing sensitivity to racial differences, and differences of sexual orientation, within the women's movement.

From a Movement to an Idea

The heyday of the women's movement was in the late sixties and early seventies. During the eighties and nineties a feminist perspective, or identity, spread widely and a diffuse feminist consciousness is now found nearly everywhere. There are now countless activist groups and social and cultural projects whose goals and approaches are informed by feminism. There are women's organizations with diverse, grassroots constituencies focusing on issues of concern to working class women and women of color. There is the National Congress of Neighborhood Women, dealing with the problems of working class women and women of color. There are many local groups with similar

concerns; an example from California is the Mothers of East Los Angeles, which has played an important role in environmental justice struggles. There is Women's Action for New Directions (previously Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament), bringing women of color and white women together around issues of health and the environment. There are many others. Nevertheless, grassroots activism is not the dominant, or most visible, sector of the women's movement. Public perception of feminism is shaped by the staff-run organizations whose concerns are those of their upper middle class constituencies and by the publications of feminists in the academy. The mass diffusion of feminist consciousness, the bureaucratization of leading women's organizations, and the high visibility of academic feminism are all consequences of the acceptance of feminism by major sectors of society. But these changes have not necessarily been good for the movement. Feminism has simultaneously become institutionalized and marginalized. It has been rhetorically accepted, but the wind has gone out of its sails.

Feminist activism has not ceased, nor have the numbers of women engaged in feminist activity or discussion declined. Millions of U.S. women talk to each other about women's concerns, using the vocabulary of feminism. There are countless organized feminist projects, focusing on domestic violence, reproductive rights and women's health. There are international networks of women continuing efforts begun at the international meeting of women at Beijing in 1995. Young feminist writers are publishing books addressed to, or speaking for, their generation.

The proliferation of feminist activism is part of a broader pattern. The numbers of people involved in community, social justice, and progressive activism generally appear to have increased since the seventies (though there is no way of counting the numbers of people involved). Feminist activism is not an exception to this trend, especially if one includes in this category women's involvement in the environmental and public health movements, addressing women's issues among others. The fact that feminist perspectives have been adopted by movements outside the women's movement, by organizations that also include men, is itself an achievement. Women play a role in leadership of the environmental and

anti-corporate movements that is at least equal to men's; feminism is understood by most of these groups to be a major element in their outlook. But these activist projects do not shape the public image of feminism. The organizations and academic networks that shape public perceptions of feminism have become distant from the constituencies that once invigorated them, and have lost focus and dynamism.

Feminism has become more an idea than a movement, and one that often lacks the visionary quality that it once had. The same could be said about progressive movements, or the left, generally: we now have a fairly large and respectable arena in which feminist and progressive ideas are taken for granted. And yet we seem to have little influence on the direction of politics in the United States as a whole, and a kind of "low-grade depression" seems to have settled over the feminist/progressive arena. This is both result and cause of the weakness of the left in recent decades, a response to the widespread acceptance of the view that there is no alternative to capitalism. The women's movement has been weakened along with other progressive movements by this loss in confidence in the possibility that collective action can bring about social change.

Why the Decline of the Women's Movement?

In the sixties and early seventies the dominant tendency in the women's movement was radical feminism. At that time the women's movement included two more or less distinct tendencies. One of these called itself Socialist Feminism (or, at times, Marxist Feminism) and understood the oppression of women as intertwined with other forms of oppression, especially race and class, and tried to develop a politics that would challenge all of these simultaneously. The other tendency called itself Radical Feminism. Large-R Radical Feminists argued that the oppression of women was primary, that all other forms of oppression flowed from gender inequality.

Feminist radicals of both stripes insisted that the inequality of the sexes in the public sphere was inseparable from that in private life; radical feminism demanded equality for women in both

spheres. And despite disagreements among themselves about the relationship between the oppression of women and other forms of oppression, radical feminists agreed that equality between women and men could not exist by itself, in a society otherwise divided by inequalities of wealth and power. The goal of radical feminism was an egalitarian society, and new kinds of community, based on equality.

During the sixties and seventies the radical current within the women's movement propelled the whole movement forward, but it was the demand for women's entry into the workplace, on equal terms with men, that gained most ground. The more radical feminist demands for an egalitarian society and new kinds of community could not be won so easily. Though the liberal and radical wings of the women's movement differed in their priorities, their demands were not sharply divided. Radical feminists wanted gender equality in the workplace, and most liberal feminists wanted a more egalitarian society. Affirmative action was not only a tool of privileged women. In an article in the Spring 1999 issue of *Feminist Studies*, Nancy McLean points out that working women used this policy to struggle for equality at the workplace, both opening up traditionally male jobs for women and creating a working class component of the women's movement. As long as the women's movement was growing and was gaining influence, demands for equal access to the workplace and for broad social equality complemented one another.

But a movement's demands, once won, can have different consequences than intended. Affirmative action campaigns were on the whole more effective in the professions than elsewhere, and it was educated, overwhelmingly white, women who were poised to take advantage of these opportunities. This was in large part due to the failure of the labor movement to organize women and people of color. The class and racial tilt of affirmative action was also a result of the accelerating stratification of U.S. society in the seventies, eighties, and nineties, the growing gap between the lower and higher rungs of the economy. The gains made by working women for access to higher-paid jobs could not offset the effects of widening class divisions. From the early seventies on, the standard of living of workers generally declined. Women, who were poorer to begin with, suffered the worst consequences.

The radical feminist vision became stalled, torn apart by factionalism and by intense sectarian ideological conflicts. By the latter part of the seventies, a cultural feminism, aimed more at creating a feminist subculture than at changing social relations generally, had taken the place formerly occupied by radical feminism. Alice Echols' book *Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967–1975* describes these developments accurately and empathetically. Ruth Rosen's recent survey of the women's movement, *The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement Changed America*, includes a clear-eyed account of the impact of these developments on the women's movement generally. Ordinarily, such sectarianism occurs in movements that are failing, but the women's movement, at the time, was strong and growing. The problem was the very large gap between the social transformation that radical feminists wanted and the possibility of bringing it about, at least in the short run. The movement itself became the terrain for the construction of, if not a new society, at least a new woman. The degree of purity that feminists demanded of one another was bound to lead to disappointment and recriminations.

I think that radical feminism became somewhat crazed for the same reasons that much of the radical movement did during the same period. In the late sixties and early seventies many radicals not only adopted revolution as their aim but also thought that revolution was within reach in the United States. Different groups had different visions of revolution. There were feminist, black, anarchist, Marxist-Leninist, and other versions of revolutionary politics, but the belief that revolution of one sort or another was around the corner cut across these divisions. The turn toward revolution was not in itself a bad thing; it showed an understanding of the depth of the problems that the movement confronted. But the idea that revolution was within reach in the United States in these years was unrealistic. The war in Vietnam had produced a major crisis in U.S. society. Protest against the war, combined with protest against racism and sexism, led some to think that it had become possible to create a new society. In fact, the constituency for revolution, however conceived, was limited mostly to students and other young people, and this was not enough for a revolution. When the war ended the broad constituency of the protest movement evaporated, isolating its radical core. Radical feminism lasted longer than other insurgencies due to the continuing strength of the women's movement as a whole, and the ongoing receptivity of many feminists to radical ideas. But by the eighties radical feminism, at least as an activist movement with a coherent agenda, also became marginal to politics in the United States.

Affirmative action for women constituted an effort toward gender equality in the workplace, a goal not yet achieved. But the success of the women's movement in opening up the professions to women, ironically, has had the effect of narrowing the movement's perspective and goals. When it was mostly made up of young people, and infused with radical ideas, feminism was able to develop a perspective that was in many ways independent of, and critical of, the class from which most feminists were drawn. Now, although there are important new, younger feminist voices, the largest part of the organized women's movement consists of women of my generation, the generation that initiated second wave feminism. I am not suggesting that people necessarily become less radical as they get older. I think that what happens to people's politics depends as much on the times, and the political activity that they engage in, as it does on their age. In a period when radicalism has been made to seem irrelevant even for the young, it is easy for a movement whose leadership is mostly made up of middle aged, middle class professionals to drift into something like complacency.

This of course does not describe the whole women's movement. What we now have is a women's movement composed on the one hand of relatively cautious organizations such as the National Organization for Women, the National Women's Political Caucus, and others, as well as more daring but also less visible organizations concerned with specific issue grassroots organizing. What we do not have is a sector of the women's movement that does what radical feminism once did, that addresses the issue of women's subordination generally, and places it within a critique of society as a whole. Liberal feminism lost the ERA, but it did accomplish many things. Largely due to liberal feminist organizing efforts, young women and girls now have opportunities that did not exist a few decades ago, and

expectations that would have seemed wildly unrealistic to earlier generations.

Radical versions of feminism still exist, but more in the academy and among intellectuals than among organizers. Some feminists have continued to work at bridging this gap, both in their intellectual work and in engagement with grassroots movements. The growing numbers of women, including feminists, in the academy, has meant that many students have been introduced to feminist and progressive ideas, and feminist and progressive writings have influenced the thinking of a wide audience. But on the whole, feminists in the academy, along with the progressive wing of academics generally, lack a clear political agenda, and have often become caught up in the logic and values of the university. In the arena of high theory, and to some extent cultural studies, both of which are closely associated with feminism, the pursuit of status, prestige, and stardom has turned feminist and progressive values on their head. Instead of the sixties' radical feminist critique of hierarchy, we have a kind of reveling in hierarchy and in the benefits that come with rising to the top of it.

Though the contemporary women's movement has avoided the racial and ethnic biases, and the single-issue focus, that plagued the early feminist movement, it resembles first-wave feminism in having gradually lost its critical distance from its own middle and upper middle class position. First wave feminism narrowed, over the course of its history, not only in relation to the issue of race but also in relation to the issues of capital and class. In the pre-Civil War years, first wave feminism was part of a loose coalition of movements within which radical ideas circulated, including critical views of industrial capitalism. In the late nineteenth century, as the structures of industrial capitalism hardened and class conflict intensified, feminists played important roles in the reform movements that championed poor and working class people, and some sections of the women's movement criticized capitalism and reached out to labor. The Women's Christian Temperance Union, for instance, criticized the exploitation of labor by capital and entertained support for "gospel socialism" as "Christianity in action." In the early years of the twentieth century the alliance between feminism

and socialism continued within the Socialist Party. But after the turn of the century mainstream feminists moved away from any critique of capitalism, instead identifying women's interests and values with those of the upper middle class. By the time first wave feminism disappeared it had lost any critical perspective on capitalism or on its own class origins.

Feminism Has Absorbed the Perspective of the Middle Class

Like first wave feminism, contemporary feminism has over time tended to absorb the perspective of the middle class from which it is largely drawn. Meanwhile the perspective of that class has changed. Over the last several decades, under the impact of increasing economic insecurity and widening inequalities, the pursuit of individual advancement has become an increasingly important focus within the middle class. Community engagement has weakened for many, perhaps most, middle class people. For many people, especially professionals, work has become something of a religion; work is the only remaining source of identity that seems valid. Meanwhile the workplace has become, for many, more competitive and more stressful. This is not just a problem of the workplace, but of the culture as a whole. This country has become increasingly individualistic, cold, and selfish. And feminism has not noticeably challenged this. The feminist demand for equal workplace access was and remains important; for most women this demand has not been achieved. But the most visible sector of the women's movement appears to have substituted aspirations toward material success for the demand for social equality and community. This evolution, from the radical and transforming values of its early years, has been so gradual that it has been easy for those involved not to notice it. But it is a reflection of the shifting perspectives of women who were once part of a radical movement and now find themselves in settings governed by a different set of values.

In the seventies and eighties, many feminists thought that if only we could get more women into the universities, the universities would be transformed and would become less elitist, less competitive, more humane, and more concerned

with addressing social problems. We now have a lot of women in the universities, and it is not clear that the universities have changed for the better. Indeed, in many respects the universities are worse, especially in regard to the growing pursuit of corporate funds and the resultant spread of the market ethos. But so far neither women in general nor feminists in particular have been especially prominent in challenging these trends and demanding a more humane, less competitive, or less hierarchical university. Feminist academics have not in recent years been particularly notable for their adherence to such values. There are some areas of academic feminism where there is open discussion, where people treat each other with respect, and where everyone involved is treated as an equal participant working toward a common purpose. But in too much of feminist academia this is not the case. In the arena of high theory, the most prestigious sector of academic feminism, competition and the pursuit of status are all too often uppermost.

The shift in values that has taken place in the women's movement has been part of a broader trend. In a period of sharpening economic and social divisions, characterized by corporate demand for greater and greater profits and the canonizing of greed, a whole generation has been seized by the desire to rise to the top. Feminists are no exception to this. The image of the feminist as careerist is not merely a fantasy promulgated by hostile media. Put differently, feminists, at least those in academia and in the professions, have been no more overtaken by these values than other members of the middle class. But to say this is to admit that feminists have lost their grip on a vision of a better world.

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The Dilemmas of Identity Politics

Joshua Gamson

Focused passion and vitriol erupt periodically in the letters columns of San Francisco's lesbian and gay newspapers. When the *San Francisco Bay Times* announced to "the community" that the 1993 Freedom Day Parade would be called "The Year of the Queer," missives fired for weeks. The parade was what it always is: a huge empowerment party. But the letters continue to be telling. "Queer" elicits familiar arguments: over assimilation, over generational differences, over who is considered "us" and who gets to decide.

On this level, it resembles similar arguments in ethnic communities in which "boundaries, identities, and cultures, are negotiated, defined, and produced" (Nagel 1994:152). Dig deeper into debates over queerness, however, and something more interesting and significant emerges. Queerness in its most distinctive forms shakes the ground on which gay and lesbian politics has been built, taking apart the ideas of a "sexual minority" and a "gay community," indeed of "gay" and "lesbian" and even "man" and "woman." It builds on central difficulties of identity-based organizing: the instability of identities both individual and collective, their made-up yet necessary character. It exaggerates and explodes these troubles, haphazardly attempting to build a politics from the rubble of deconstructed collective categories. This debate, and other related debates in lesbian and gay politics, is not only over the *content* of collective identity (whose definition of "gay" counts?), but over the everyday *viability* and political *usefulness* of sexual identities (is there and should there be such a thing as "gay," "lesbian," "man," "woman"?).

This paper, using internal debates from lesbian and gay politics as illustration, brings to the fore a key dilemma in contemporary identity politics and traces out its implications for social movement theory and research. As I will show in greater detail, in these sorts of debates—which crop up in other communities as well—two different political impulses, and two different forms of organizing, can be seen facing off. The logic and political utility of deconstructing collective categories vie with that of shoring them up; each logic is true, and neither is fully tenable.

New Social Movements Since the 1960s, a cluster of social movements have swept through Europe and the United States which are not pursuing the economic or class interests of their members. Instead, they are pursuing issues such as the quality of life or democratic procedures. The antinuclear movement, ecology, the animal rights and peace movements, and the women's and student movements are examples. Many theorists argued that these movements were to "postindustrial" society what the labor movement—the quintessential "old" social movement—had been to "industrial" society: the central social conflict whose outcome would determine the direction of social change. These new movements were thought to be resisting corporate and government "technocrats" who make a range of decisions that, without being publicly debated, profoundly shape everyone's lives. Other scholars have argued that these movements are not so new, especially in the United States, which had non-class movements such as temperance or "anti-vice" in the nineteenth century. While these "post-class" movements use many of the same tactics as more traditional movements, they may also pay more attention to the manipulation of images on television and in other media.

On the one hand, lesbians and gay men have made themselves an effective force in this country over the past several decades largely by giving themselves what civil rights movements had: a public collective identity. Gay and lesbian social movements have built a quasiethnicity, complete with its own political and cultural institutions, festivals, neighborhoods, even its own flag. Underlying that ethnicity is typically the notion that what gays and lesbians share— the anchor of minority status and minority rights claims—is the same fixed, natural essence, a self with same-sex desires. The shared oppression, these movements have forcefully claimed, is the denial of the freedoms and opportunities to actualize this self. In this *ethnic/essentialist* politic, clear categories of

collective identity are necessary for successful resistance and political gain.

Yet this impulse to build a collective identity with distinct group boundaries has been met by a directly opposing logic, often contained in queer activism (and in the newly anointed "queer theory"): to take apart the identity categories and blur group boundaries. This alternative angle, influenced by academic "constructionist" thinking, holds that sexual identities are historical and social products, not natural or intrapsychic ones. It is socially-produced binaries (gay/straight, man/woman) that are the basis of oppression; fluid, unstable experiences of self become fixed primarily in the service of social control. Disrupting those categories, refusing rather than embracing ethnic minority status, is the key to liberation. In this *deconstructionist* politic, clear collective categories are an obstacle to resistance and change.

The challenge for analysts, I argue, is not to determine which position is accurate, but to cope with the fact that both logics make sense. Queerness spotlights a dilemma shared by other identity movements (racial, ethnic, and gender movements, for example): Fixed identity categories are both the basis for oppression and the basis for political power. This raises questions for political strategizing and, more importantly for the purposes here, for social movement analysis. If identities are indeed much more unstable, fluid, and constructed than movements have tended to assume—if one takes the queer challenge seriously, that is—what happens to identity-based social movements such as gay and lesbian rights? Must socio-political struggles articulated through identity eventually undermine themselves?

Social movement theory, a logical place to turn for help in working through the impasse between deconstructive cultural strategies and category-supportive political strategies, is hard pressed in its current state to cope with these questions. The case of queerness, I will argue, calls for a more developed theory of collective identity formation and its relationship to both institutions and meanings, an understanding that *includes the impulse to take apart that identity from within*.

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Social Movements and Collective Identity

Social movements researchers have only recently begun treating collective identity construction as an important and problematic movement activity and a significant subject of study. Before the late 1980s, when rational-actor models came under increased critical scrutiny, "not much direct thought [had] been given to the general sociological problem of what collective identity is and how it is constituted" (Schlesinger 1987:236). As Alberto Melucci (1989:73) has argued, social movement models focusing on instrumental action tend to treat collective identity as the nonrational expressive residue of the individual, rational pursuit of political gain. And "even in more sophisticated rational actor models that postulate a *collective* actor making strategic judgments of cost and benefit about collective action," William Gamson points out, "the existence of an *established* collective identity is assumed" (1992:58, emphasis in original). Identities, in such models, are typically conceived as existing before movements, which then make them visible through organizing and deploy them politically; feminism wields, but does not create, the collective identity of "women."

Melucci and other theorists of "new social movements" argue more strongly that collective identity is not only necessary for successful collective action, but that it is often an end in itself, as the self-conscious reflexivity of many contemporary movements seems to demonstrate. Collective identity, in this model, is conceptualized as "a continual process of recomposition rather than a given," and "as a dynamic, *emergent* aspect of collective action" (Schlesinger 1987:237). Research on ethnicity has developed along similar lines, emphasizing, for example, the degree to which "people's conceptions of themselves along ethnic lines, especially their ethnic identity, [are] situational and changeable" (Nagel 1994:154). "An American Indian might be 'mixed-blood' on the reservation," as Joane Nagel describes one example, "'Pine Ridge' when speaking to someone from another reservation, a 'Sioux' or 'Lakota' when responding to the U.S. census, and 'Native American' when interacting with non-Indians" (1994:155).

How exactly collective identities emerge and change has been the subject of a growing body of work in the study of social movements. For example, Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, analyzing lesbian-feminist communities, point to the creation of politicized identity communities through boundary-construction (establishing "differences between a challenging group and dominant groups"), the development of consciousness (or "interpretive frameworks") and negotiation ("symbols and everyday actions subordinate groups use to resist and restructure existing systems of domination") (1992:100–111). Other researchers, working from the similar notion that "the location and meaning of particular ethnic boundaries are continuously negotiated, revised, and revitalized," demonstrate the ways in which collective identity is constructed not only from within, but is also shaped and limited by "political policies and institutions, immigration policies, by ethnically linked resource policies, and by political access structured along ethnic lines" (Nagel 1994:152, 157).

When we turn to the disputes over queerness, it is useful to see them in light of this recent work. We are certainly witnessing a process of boundary-construction and identity negotiation: As contests over membership and over naming, these debates are part of an ongoing project of delineating the "we" whose rights and freedoms are at stake in the movements. Yet as I track through the queer debates, I will demonstrate a movement propensity that current work on collective identity fails to take into account: the drive to blur and deconstruct group categories, and to keep them forever unstable. It is that tendency that poses a significant new push to social movement analysis.

Queer Politics and Queer Theory

Since the late 1980s, "queer" has served to mark first a loose but distinguishable set of political movements and mobilizations, and second a somewhat parallel set of academy bound intellectual endeavors (now calling itself "queer theory"). Queer politics, although given organized body in the activist group Queer Nation, operates largely through the decentralized, local, and often anti-organizational cultural activism of street postering,

parodic and non-conformist self-presentation, and underground alternative magazines ("zines") (Berlant and Freeman 1993; Duggan 1992; Williams 1993); it has defined itself largely against conventional lesbian and gay politics. The emergence of queer politics, although it cannot be treated here in detail, can be traced to the early 1980s backlash against gay and lesbian movement gains, which "punctured illusions of a coming era of tolerance and sexual pluralism"; to the AIDS crisis, which "underscored the limits of a politics of minority rights and inclusion"; and to the eruption of "long-simmering internal differences" around race and sex, and criticism of political organizing as "reflecting a white, middle-class experience or standpoint" (Seidman 1994:172).

Queer theory, with roots in constructionist history and sociology, feminist theory, and post-structuralist philosophy, took shape through several late 1980s academic conferences and continues to operate primarily in elite academic institutions through highly abstract language; it has defined itself largely against conventional lesbian and gay studies (Stein and Plummer 1994). Stein and Plummer have recently delineated the major theoretical departures of queer theory: a conceptualization of sexual power as embodied "in different levels of social life, expressed discursively and enforced through boundaries and binary divides"; a problematization of sexual and gender categories, and identities in general; a rejection of civil rights strategies "in favor of a politics of carnival, transgression, and parody, which leads to deconstruction, decentering, revisionist readings, and an anti-assimilationist politics"; and a "willingness to interrogate areas which would not normally be seen as the terrain of sexuality, and conduct queer 'readings' of ostensibly heterosexual or nonsexualized texts" (1994:181–182).

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My discussion of this and the two debates that follow is based on an analysis of 75 letters in the weekly *San Francisco Bay Times*, supplemented by related editorials from national lesbian and gay publications. The letters were clustered: The debates on the word "queer" ran in the *San Francisco Bay Times* from December 1992 through April 1993; the disputes over bisexuality ran from April 1991 through May 1991; clashes over transsexual inclusion ran from October 1992 through December 1992. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that these disputes are widespread, it should be noted that I use them here not to provide conclusive data, but to provide a grounded means for conceptualizing the queer challenge.

The Controversy over Queerness: Continuities with Existing Lesbian and Gay Activism

In the discussion of the "Year of the Queer" theme for the 1993 lesbian and gay pride celebration, the venom hits first. "All those dumb closeted people who don't like the Q-word," the *Bay Times* quotes Peggy Sue suggesting, "[they] can go fuck themselves and go to somebody else's parade." A man named Patrick argues along the same lines, asserting that the men opposing the theme are "not particularly thrilled with their attraction to other men," are "cranky and upset," yet willing to benefit "from the stuff queer activists do." A few weeks later, a letter writer shoots back that "this new generation assumes we were too busy in the '70s lining up at Macy's to purchase sweaters to find time for the revolution—as if their piercings and tattoos were any cheaper." Another sarcastically asks, "How did you ever miss out on 'Faggot' or 'Cocksucker'?" On this level, the dispute reads like a sibling sandbox spat.

Although the curses fly sometimes within generations, many letter writers frame the differences as generational. The queer linguistic tactic, the attempt to defang, embrace, and resignify a stigma term, is loudly rejected by many older gay men and lesbians. "I am sure he isn't old enough to have experienced that feeling of cringing when the word 'queer' was said," says Roy of an earlier letter writer. Another writer asserts that 35 is the age that marks off those accepting the queer label from those rejecting it. Younger people, many point out, can "reclaim" the word only because they have not felt as strongly the sting, ostracism, police batons, and baseball bats that accompanied it one generation earlier. For older people, its oppressive meaning can never be lifted, can never be turned from overpowering to empowering.

Consider "old" as code for "conservative," and the dispute takes on another familiar, overlapping frame: the debate between assimilationists and separatists, with a long history in American homophile, homosexual, lesbian, and gay politics. Internal political struggle over agendas of

assimilation (emphasizing sameness) and separation (emphasizing difference) has been present since the inception of these movements, as it has in other movements. The "homophile" movement of the 1950s, for example, began with a Marxist-influenced agenda of sex-class struggle, and was quickly overtaken by accommodationist tactics: gaining expert support; men demonstrating in suits, women in dresses. Queer marks a contemporary anti-assimilationist stance, in opposition to the mainstream inclusionary goals of the dominant gay rights movement.

"They want to work from within," says Peggy Sue elsewhere (Berube and Escoffier 1991), "and I just want to crash in from the outside and say, 'Hey! Hello, I'm queer. I can make out with my girlfriend. Ha ha. Live with it. Deal with it.' That kind of stuff." In a zine called *Rant & Rave*, coeditor Miss Rant argues that:

> I don't want to be gay, which means assimilationist, normal, homosexual .… I don't want my personality, behavior, beliefs, and desires to be cut up like a pie into neat little categories from which I'm not supposed to stray (1993:15).

Queer politics, as Michael Warner puts it, "opposes society itself," protesting "not just the normal behavior of the social but the *idea* of normal behavior" (1993:xxvii). It embraces the label of perversity, using it to call attention to the "norm" in "normal," be it hetero or homo.

Queer thus asserts in-your-face difference, with an edge of defiant separatism: "We're here, we're queer, get used to it," goes the chant. We are different, that is, free from convention, odd and out there and proud of it, and your response is either your problem or your wake-up call. Queer does not so much rebel against outsider status as revel in it. Queer confrontational difference, moreover, is scary, writes Alex Chee (1991), and thus politically useful:

> Now that I call myself queer, know myself as a queer, nothing will keep [queer-haters] safe. If I tell them I am queer, they give me room. Politically, I can think of little better. I do not want to be one of them. They only need to give me room.

This goes against the grain of civil rights strategists, of course, for whom at least the appearance of normality is central to gaining political "room." Rights are gained, according to this logic, by demonstrating similarity (to heterosexual people, to other minority groups) in a nonthreatening manner. "We are everywhere," goes the refrain from this camp. We are your sons and daughters and co-workers and soldiers, and once you see that lesbians and gays are just like you, you will recognize the injustices to which we are subject. "I am not queer," writes a letter writer named Tony. "I am normal, and if tomorrow I choose to run down the middle of Market Street in a big floppy hat and skirt I will still be normal." In the national gay weekly *10 Percent*—for which *Rant & Rave* can be seen as a proud evil twin—Eric Marcus (1993:14) writes that "I'd rather emphasize what I have in common with other people than focus on the differences," and "the last thing I want to do is institutionalize that difference by defining myself with a word and a political philosophy that set me outside the mainstream." The point is to be not-different, not-odd, not-scary. "We have a lot going for us," Phyllis Lyon says simply in the *Bay Times*. "Let's not blow it"—blow it, that is, by alienating each other and our straight allies with words like "queer."

Debates over assimilation are hardly new, however; but neither do they exhaust the letters column disputes. The metaphors in queerness are striking. Queer is a "psychic tattoo," says writer Alex Chee, shared by outsiders; those similarly tattooed make up the Queer Nation. "It's the land of lost boys and lost girls," says historian Gerard Koskovich (in Berube and Escoffier 1991:23), "who woke up one day and realized that not to have heterosexual privilege was in fact the highest privilege." A mark on the skin, a land, a nation: These are the metaphors of tribe and family. Queer is being used not just to connote and glorify differentness, but to revise the criteria of membership in the family, "to affirm sameness by defining a common identity on the fringes" (Berube and Escoffier 1991:12; see also Duggan 1992).

In the hands of many letter writers, in fact, queer becomes simply a shorthand for "gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender," much like "people of color" becomes an inclusive and difference-erasing shorthand for a long list of ethnic, national, and racial groups. And as some letter writers point out, as a quasi-national shorthand

"queer" is just a slight shift in the boundaries of tribal membership with no attendant shifts in power; as some lesbian writers point out, it is as likely to become synonymous with "white gay male" (perhaps now with a nose ring and tattoos) as it is to describe a new community formation. Even in its less nationalist versions, queer can easily be difference without change, can subsume and hide the internal differences it attempts to incorporate. The queer tribe attempts to be a multicultural, multigendered, multi-sexual, hodge-podge of outsiders; as Steven Seidman points out, it ironically ends up Queer as an identity category often restates tensions between sameness and difference in a different language.

> denying differences by either submerging them in an undifferentiated oppositional mass or by blocking the development of individual and social differences through the disciplining compulsory imperative to remain undifferentiated (1993:133).

Debates over Bisexuality and Transgender: Queer Deconstructionist Politics

Despite the aura of newness, then, not much appears new in recent queerness debate; the fault lines on which they are built are old ones in lesbian and gay (and other identity-based) movements. Yet letter writers agree on one puzzling point: Right now, it matters what we are called and what we call ourselves. That a word takes so prominent a place is a clue that this is more than another in an ongoing series of tired assimilationist liberationist debates. The controversy of queerness is not just strategic (what works), nor only a power-struggle (who gets to call the shots); it is those, but not only those. At their most basic, queer controversies are battles over identity and naming (who I am, who we are). Which words capture us and when do words fail us? Words, and the "us" they name, seem to be in critical flux.

But even identity battles are not especially new. In fact, within lesbian-feminist and gay male organizing, the meanings of "lesbian" and "gay" were contested almost as soon as they began to have political currency as quasi-ethnic statuses. Women of color and sex radicals loudly challenged lesbian feminism of the late 1970s, for example,

pointing out that the "womansculture" being advocated (and actively created) was based in white, middle-class experience and promoted a bland, desexualized lesbianism. Working-class lesbians and gay men of color have consistently challenged "gay" as a term reflecting the middle-class, white homosexual men who established its usage (Stein 1992; Phelan 1993; Seidman 1993, 1994). They have challenged, that is, the definitions.

The ultimate challenge of queerness, however, is not just the questioning of the content of collective identities, but the *questioning of the unity, stability, viability, and political utility of sexual identities*—even as they are used and assumed. The radical provocation from queer politics, one which many pushing queerness seem only remotely aware of, is not to resolve that difficulty, but to exaggerate and build on it. It is an odd endeavor, much like pulling the rug out from under one's own feet, not knowing how and where one will land.

To zero in on the distinctive deconstructionist politics of queerness, turn again to the letters columns. It is no coincidence that two other major *Bay Times* letters column controversies of the early 1990s concerned bisexual and transgender people, the two groups included in the revised queer category. Indeed, in his anti-queer polemic in the magazine *10 Percent* (a title firmly ethnic/essentialist in its reference to a fixed homosexual population), it is precisely these sorts of people, along with some "queer straights," from whom Eric Marcus seeks to distinguish himself:

> Queer is not my word because it does not define who I am or represent what I believe in.… I'm a man who feels sexually attracted to people of the same gender. I don't feel attracted to both genders. I'm not a woman trapped in a man's body, nor a man trapped in a woman's body. I'm not someone who enjoys or feels compelled to dress up in clothing of the opposite gender. And I'm not a "queer straight," a heterosexual who feels confined by the conventions of straight sexual expression.… I don't want to be grouped under the all-encompassing umbrella of queer … because we have different lives, face different challenges, and don't necessarily share the same aspirations (1993:14).

The letters columns, written usually from a different political angle (by lesbian separatists, for

example), cover similar terrain. "It is not empowering to go to a Queer Nation meeting and see men and women slamming their tongues down each other's throats," says one letter arguing over bisexuals. "Men expect access to women," asserts one from the transgender debate. "Some men decide that they want access to lesbians any way they can and decide they will become lesbians."

Strikingly, nearly all the letters are written by, to, and about women—a point to which I will later return. "A woman's willingness to sleep with men allows her access to jobs, money, power, status," writes one group of women. "This access does not disappear just because a woman sleeps with women 'too' … That's not bisexuality, that's compulsory heterosexuality." You are not invited; you will leave and betray us. We are already here, other women respond, and it is you who betray us with your back-stabbing and your silencing. "Why have so many bisexual women felt compelled to call themselves lesbians for so long? Do you think biphobic attitudes like yours might have something to do with it?" asks a woman named Kristen. "It is our community, too; we've worked in it, we've suffered for it, we belong in it. We will not accept the role of the poor relation." Kristen ends her letter tellingly, deploying a familiar phrase: "We're here. We're queer. Get used to it."

The letters run back and forth similarly over transgender issues, in particular over transsexual lesbians who want to participate in lesbian organizing. "'Transsexuals' don't want to just be lesbians," Bev Jo writes, triggering a massive round of letters, "but insist, with all the arrogance and presumption of power that men have, on going where they are not wanted and trying to destroy lesbian gatherings." There are surely easier ways to oppress a woman, other women shoot back, than to risk physical pain and social isolation. You are doing exactly what anti-female and anti-gay oppressors do to us, others add. "Must we all bring our birth certificates and two witnesses to women's events in the future?" asks a woman named Karen. "If you feel threatened by the mere existence of a type of person, and wish to exclude them for your comfort, you are a bigot, by every definition of the term."

These "border skirmishes" over membership conditions and group boundaries have histories preceding the letters (Stein 1992; see also Taylor

and Whittier 1992), and also reflect the growing power of transgender and bisexual organizing. Although they are partly battles of position, more fundamentally the debates make concrete the anxiety queerness can provoke. They spotlight the possibility that sexual and gender identities are not the solid political ground they have been thought to be—which perhaps accounts for the particularly frantic tone of the letters.

Many arguing for exclusion write like a besieged border patrol. "Live your lives the way you want and spread your hatred of women while you're at it, if you must," writes a participant in the transgender letter spree, "but the fact is we're here, we're dykes and you're not. Deal with it." The Revolting Lesbians argue similarly in their contribution to the *Bay Times* bisexuality debate: "Bisexuals are not lesbians—they are bisexuals. Why isn't that obvious to everyone? Sleeping with women 'too' does not make you a lesbian. We must hang onto the identity and visibility we've struggled so hard to obtain." A letter from a woman named Caryatis sums up the perceived danger of queerness:

> This whole transsexual/bisexual assault on lesbian identity has only one end, to render lesbians completely invisible and obsolete. If a woman who sleeps with both females and males is a lesbian; and if a man who submits to surgical procedure to bring his body in line with his acceptance of sex role stereotypes is a lesbian; and if a straight woman whose spiritual bonds are with other females is a lesbian, then what is a female-born female who loves only other females? Soon there will be no logical answer to that question.

Exactly: In lesbian (and gay) politics, as in other identity movements, a logical answer is crucial. An inclusive queerness threatens to turn identity to nonsense, messing with the idea that identities (man, woman, gay, straight) are fixed, natural, core phenomena, and therefore solid political ground. Many arguments in the letters columns, in fact, echo the critiques of identity politics found in queer theory. "There is a growing consciousness that a person's sexual identity (and gender identity) need not be etched in stone," write Andy and Selena in the bisexuality debate, "that it can be fluid rather than static, that one has the right to PLAY with whomever one

wishes to play with (as long as it is consensual), that the either/or dichotomy ('you're either gay or straight' is only one example of this) is oppressive no matter who's pushing it." Identities are fluid and changing; binary categories (man/woman, gay/straight) are distortions. "Humans are not organized by nature into distinct groups," Cris writes. "We are placed in any number of continuums. Few people are 100 percent gay or straight, or totally masculine or feminine." Differences are not distinct, categories are social and historical rather than natural phenomena, selves are ambiguous. "Perhaps it is time the lesbian community re-examined its criteria of what constitutes a woman (or man)," writes Francis. "And does it really matter?" Transsexual performer and writer Kate Bornstein, in a *Bay Times* column triggered by the letters, voices the same basic challenge. Are a woman and a man distinguished by anatomy? "I know several women in San Francisco who have penises," she says. "Many wonderful men in my life have vaginas" (1992:4). Gender chromosomes, she continues, are known to come in more than two sets ("could this mean there are more than two genders?"); testosterone and estrogen don't answer it ("you could buy your gender over the counter"); neither child-bearing nor sperm capacities nails down the difference ("does a necessary hysterectomy equal a sex change?"). Gender is socially assigned; binary categories (man/woman, gay/straight) are inaccurate and oppressive; nature provides no rock-bottom definitions. The opposite sex, Bornstein proposes, is neither.

Indeed, it is no coincidence that bisexuality, transsexualism, and gender crossing are exactly the kind of boundary-disrupting phenomena embraced by much post-structuralist sexual theory. Sandy Stone, for example, argues that "the transsexual currently occupies a position which is nowhere, which is outside the binary oppositions of gendered discourse" (1991:295). Steven Seidman suggests that bisexual critiques challenge "sexual object-choice as a master category of sexual and social identity" (1993:123).

[…]

The point, often buried in over-abstracted jargon, is well taken: The presence of visibly transgendered people, people who do not quite fit, potentially subverts the notion of two naturally fixed genders; the presence of people with ambiguous sexual desires potentially subverts the notion of naturally fixed sexual orientations. (I say "potentially" because the more common route has continued to be in the other direction: the reification of bisexuality into a third orientation, or the retention of male–female boundaries through the notion of transgendered people as "trapped in the wrong body," which is then fixed.) Genuine inclusion of transgender and bisexual people can require not simply an expansion of an identity, but a subversion of it. This is the deepest difficulty queerness raises, and the heat behind the letters: If gay (and man) and lesbian (and woman) are unstable categories, "simultaneously possible and impossible" (Fuss 1989:102), what happens to sexuality-based politics?

The question is easily answered by those securely on either side of these debates. On the one side, activists and theorists suggest that collective identities with exclusive and secure boundaries are politically effective. Even those agreeing that identities are mainly fictions may take this position, advocating what Gayatri Spivak has called an "operational essentialism" (cited in Butler 1990; see also Vance 1988). On the other side, activists and theorists suggest that identity production "is purchased at the price of hierarchy, normalization, and exclusion" and therefore advocate "the deconstruction of a hetero/homo code that structures the 'social text' of daily life" (Seidman 1993:130).

The Queer Dilemma

The problem, of course, is that both the boundary-strippers and the boundary-defenders are right. The gay and lesbian civil rights strategy, for all its gains, does little to attack the political culture that itself makes the denial of and struggle for civil rights necessary and possible. Marches on Washington, equal protection pursuits, media-image monitoring, and so on, are guided by the attempt to build and prove quasi-national and quasi-ethnic claims. By constructing gays and lesbians as a single community (united by fixed erotic fates), they simplify complex internal differences and complex sexual identities. They also avoid challenging the system of meanings that underlies the political oppression: the division of the world into man/

woman and gay/straight. On the contrary, they ratify and reinforce these categories. They therefore build distorted and incomplete political challenges, neglecting the political impact of cultural meanings, and do not do justice to the subversive and liberating aspects of loosened collective boundaries.

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The Repression/Protest Paradox in Central America

Charles D. Brockett

The specific focus of this chapter is the often-noted paradox that regime violence smothers popular mobilization under some circumstances, but at other times similar (or even greater) levels of violence will provoke mass collective action rather than pacify the target population. This paradox remains even when the usual explanatory variables, such as the level of socioeconomic grievances or political regime type, are held constant.

The consequences of governmental repression for mass protest and rebellion have been the subject of much scholarly attention. Theories have been advanced for linear relationships, but in both negative and positive directions. Curvilinear relationships have also been proposed, again with the curves running in both directions. Each of these four models has found some empirical support—but also contradiction—from a variety of cross-national aggregate data studies.

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The most significant argument of this essay is that the repression/protest relationship is mediated by its temporal location in what Sidney Tarrow has conceptualized as "the cycle of protest." I will demonstrate that the key to the resolution of the repression/protest paradox is its location within the protest cycle.

The case material for this chapter comes from Central America, especially the recent histories of El Salvador and Guatemala through the first third of the 1980s, which is when their protest cycles were brought to an end. The subject matter of this article has not been an abstract question for the people of these countries: a repressive response to popular mobilization has been probable throughout their histories. Indeed, tens of thousands of people innocent of any crime have been slain in recent years by the agents of state terrorism in both countries. This tragic story will be utilized to demonstrate that a protest-cycle model resolves the paradoxical relationship between repression and mobilization.

[…]

The Central American Reality

It is generally agreed that in the 1970s popular challenges to elite rule reached unparalleled levels in Central America. Tragically, this mass

mobilization was matched by extraordinary levels of state terrorism. This contradiction was most intense in El Salvador and Guatemala. Both countries will be examined here (with limited comparisons to Nicaragua in the following section). […]

Salvadoran society in the early 1970s was aptly characterized as a "culture of repression" by one scholar with substantial experience in the country (Huizer 1972: 52–61). The lack of popular opposition to the regime was not because of the lack of grievances nor because of support for the government. Instead, the paramount factor was the high level of coercion built into the system and the intermittent use of violence by public and private elites to maintain quiescence. This description applied to Guatemala as well. Although there are important differences in the histories of the two countries, these repressive structures had evolved in both across the centuries to ensure elite control of the land and labor necessary for the enrichment of the elite.

Socioeconomic grievances intensified during the 1960s and 1970s in both countries as the economic security of many people deteriorated, especially in rural areas. At the same time, new opportunities for acting on their discontent opened for nonelites, beginning in El Salvador in the late 1960s and then in Guatemala in the mid-1970s when a more moderate government came to power. Mass political activity was facilitated by the sustained efforts of outside "catalysts for change" (Pearce 1986: 108), such as church workers, some of whom brought a new biblical message of liberation here on earth. As the 1970s progressed, new forms of popular political activity appeared and new levels of popular opposition to the regimes were reached. Most important were the popular organizations with their large mass memberships and their use of nonviolent but confrontational actions, such as demonstrations, strikes, occupations of buildings, and land seizures. In response to this growing popular challenge, violence from the entrenched security forces escalated. […] From a strategy of targeted and intermittent killings in the mid-1970s, by early 1980 the violence became widespread and indiscriminate in its scope.

[…]

In Guatemala, indiscriminate and widespread political violence crushed a popular mobilization involving many different interests, organizations, and strategies that drew on substantial support across many sectors of society. Some of these groups were mainly seeking progress toward political democracy and respect for civil liberties. The last fairly elected president had been the leftist Jacobo Arbenz, who was covertly overthrown by the United States in 1954. Since then, the military had tightened its control of the country, with military candidates winning the presidency in each election since 1970. Other groups stressed the need to reform Guatemala's grossly unequal socioeconomic structures and exploitative labor practices. Most significantly, for the first time there were groups representing the interests and needs of the country's Mayan population, still about one-half of the entire population and concentrated primarily in the rugged highlands of the west.

In its early stages the indiscriminate violence of the late 1970s and into the early 1980s did bolster active support for the opposition and especially the armed revolutionary movements operating among Indian communities, particularly in the isolated back reaches of the western highlands. But as the military violence intensified and continued virtually without restraint in the Mayan countryside, where even the young and the elderly were murdered in large numbers, and as it continued relentlessly month after month and year after year, the guerrillas were thrown on the defensive and then isolated. The military destroyed some 440 villages with the "scorched earth" tactics of 1980–84 and left up to one million Guatemalans displaced from their homes (Black 1985: 16). In the face of this unrelenting brutality, it became clear that the revolutionaries would not win and then that they could not protect their supporters. Exile to Mexico or the United States was often the only rational choice. The military's recourse to massive indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians not only won the war against the people but also created structures of control that penetrated the Indian highlands of western Guatemala far beyond that which had existed previously.

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The military had directly ruled El Salvador since 1932. When civilian centrist forces looked like they might win in the elections of both 1972 and 1977, the military relied on fraud and

intimidation to maintain its power. As the 1970s progressed, Salvadoran society became increasingly mobilized through a multitude of organizations representing peasants and workers, students and professionals. With the electoral path blocked, regime opponents turned to strikes, demonstrations, and occupations. In the face of this growing popular challenge, the Salvadoran regime increasingly turned to violence. A coup by junior military officers brought a reformist government to office in October 1979 and the hope of a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The new government, however, was divided, was distrusted by the militant left, and most importantly, had no control over the security forces. As confrontational activities of the left (especially occupations of buildings and mass demonstrations) increased, regime violence escalated even further. Civilian deaths at the hands of the regime averaged over 300 a month for the remainder of the year, more than double the rate of the preceding period (Morales Velado et al. 1988: 190). In March 1980, following two virtually complete changes in the new government, an agrarian reform was promulgated. It is at this point that informed observers identify the beginning of the civil war (for example, Baloyra 1982: 137; Dunkerley 1982: 162). Regime violence accelerated again, with civilian deaths doubling to 584 during March and then more than doubling in May to 1424 (Morales Velado et al. 1988: 195). By the end of the year virtually all political space for nonviolent opposition to the regime had been eliminated (Morales Velado et al. 1988: 73), the key symbol being the November kidnapping and execution of six leaders of the nonviolent left. The remaining leadership then either went into exile or underground. Over 10,000 civilians were murdered by the security forces and their allied death squads in El Salvador in both 1980 and 1981, with 6000 more killed in 1982 (Brown 1985: 122).

The relationship between popular opposition and regime violence during these years in El Salvador was multifaceted. Generally, as regime violence grew through the late 1970s into 1980, collective actions against the regime increased in number, intensity, and militancy. During this period, the guerrilla forces remained relatively small and comparatively limited in their activities. Instead, the major vehicles for popular opposition were the popular organizations (which had semi-covert ties to the guerrilla movements) and

their (largely) nonviolent confrontational tactics. As the regime violence became increasingly widespread in early 1980, many of the leaders and the rank and file of the popular organizations were killed, and the space for their forms of collective action disappeared. It was at this point that the guerrilla forces rapidly grew in size, popular support, and ability to oppose the regime. This growth in the size and actions of what became later in the year the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), however, coincided with a *decline* in the total number of people who were actively engaged in all forms of oppositional activities. The civil war intensified until about early 1984. Although the war continued through 1991, the FMLN never was able to reachieve the level of threat to the regime that it represented at that time. Vital to the ability of the Salvadoran military to contain the threat from the FMLN, of course, was the tremendous financial support it received from the United States, which totaled $6 billion (Gugliotta and Farah 1993: 6), peaking in 1985 at $115 per resident of El Salvador (Congressional Research Service 1989: 25–27).

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Did popular opposition to the regime decline because regime violence declined first? Or did regime violence eventually decline because it had successfully eliminated most overt popular opposition, with the exception of the guerrilla armies, and even with the armed opposition had stemmed the growth of its support? If the latter, then the indiscriminate violence was successful, not counterproductive, from the viewpoint of the regime, just as it was in Guatemala.

In reality, nonelites have another alternative besides supporting either the regime or the guerrillas as regime violence escalates. They can also flee: about one-quarter of the entire population of El Salvador were refugees by mid-1984. Close to 750,000 people had fled the country in the preceding five years (Brown 1985: 135). If nonelites believe that the opposition has a chance of winning, then active support might be rational in the face of indiscriminate violence that might strike them. If they find the program and/or the tactics of that opposition also objectionable, however, then exile might be the more rational alternative. Furthermore, when regime violence continues and intensifies to the point where victory by the opposition is doubtful, then exile might be the

more likely response, regardless of agreement with the program of the guerrillas.

When calculating the probable consequences of a recourse to systematic state terrorism in response to escalating popular opposition, elites in El Salvador and Guatemala only needed to contemplate their own histories. Elites in El Salvador could look back to *la mantanza* of 1932, when 10,000 to 30,000 peasants were massacred, as "a model response to the threat of rebellion," as well as to the four decades of "peace" that the massacre brought (McClintock 1985a: 99–100; Anderson 1971). Guatemalan elites considering violence only needed to refer to 1966–72 when over 10,000 innocents were murdered or to the 22-year reign of terror of Manuel Estrada Cabrera early in the century. Going further back in time, elites in both countries evaluating violence as an instrument of control could recall the coercion employed in converting peasant food-crop land to elite-owned coffee land beginning in the latter third of the nineteenth century, or they could go all the way back to the massive violence of the Conquest itself and the consequent coercion utilized to maintain colonial society. The fundamental point has been aptly stated by Gurr (1986: 66): "Historical traditions of state terror … probably encourage elites to use terror irrespective of … structural factors." Although morally abhorrent, the historic reliance on violence by Guatemalan and Salvadoran elites has not been counterproductive to their interests. Violence-as-necessary has allowed a small group to maintain its privileged position to the severe disadvantage of the vast majority. From the viewpoint of those in charge, state terrorism has been a success.

Summarizing this section, I argue in partial agreement with Mason and Krane (1989) that in its early stages indiscriminate violence targeted against neutral nonelites can increase mass involvement in and support for oppositional collective action, including revolutionary activities. However, state terrorism when sustained has often had the opposite effect in Central America, smashing overt popular opposition to the terrorist regime. In the following section a superior model will be proposed for differentiating which effect regime violence will have, regardless of whether it be violence from an indiscriminate targeting strategy or from the two more limited strategies.

The Political Cycle Explanation

[…] Socioeconomic grievances did escalate throughout Central America in the 1970s. Equally critical to the development of the mass movements of the decade, though, was the development of a more favorable opportunity structure. Mass mobilization was catalyzed and sustained by assistance from support groups and allies, such as religious groups, revolutionary organizers, political party activists, and international development workers. Also crucial was the opening of political space for oppositional activities in El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as in Nicaragua and Honduras. Repression lightened, lowering the risks of organization and action. With the possibilities for winning beneficial changes improving, mass organizations and oppositional activities proliferated.

Tarrow has demonstrated in a number of his works (for example, 1983) that such mass collective action sometimes occurs in the larger context of a protest cycle, a temporal location with significant implications for challengers. Protest cycles begin when the structure of political opportunity turns more favorable, encouraging groups to act on long-standing grievances and/or newly created ones. The activities of these early

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Free Spaces Most efforts at change face resistance or repression, so it is often helpful to have a safe setting in which to meet, exchange ideas, and make plans—a space sheltered from the prying eyes of opponents and authorities. Churches played this important role in the U.S. civil rights movement, although schools, recreational facilities, and other organizations can also function as free spaces. The most influential free space of the twentieth century was, ironically, a prison. On Robben Island, in the bay off Cape Town, hundreds of South African political prisoners were put together, isolated from outside networks but permitted to converse freely with one another. As Nelson Mandela's biographer Anthony Sampson puts it, "It was like a protracted course in a remote left-wing university."

mobilizers then encourage other groups and movements to activate as well. As a result, conflict diffuses throughout society at higher than normal levels of frequency and intensity. This activity builds, peaks, and then declines to more normal levels (Tarrow 1983: 38–39). […]

A challenger asserting claims on the upswing of the protest cycle generally will fare better than challengers late in the cycle or outside its duration. During the upswing of a cycle, many groups and movements will be asserting claims, placing greater pressure on the system than could any group individually. Systems and their elites, though, adapt only so far; short of revolutionary transformations, responsiveness eventually declines and repressive measures become more likely. Challenges made late in the cycle or afterward face a less favorable opportunity structure.

When the concept of the protest cycle is wedded to government violence, the essential argument is this: indiscriminate repression is likely to provoke further popular mobilization only during the ascendant phase of the protest cycle. In contrast, indiscriminate repression deters popular collective action before the initiation of a cycle, and it can (and does) bring protest cycles to an abrupt end. For example, the widespread and arbitrary murders of thousands of noncombatant peasants in Guatemala in the mid-1960s and in Nicaragua in the mid-1970s did not provoke mass mobilization among the survivors (see Brockett 1990). The revolutionary guerrilla organizations in their midst (which were the "justifications" for the campaigns of terror) were small and isolated from other political forces. Indeed, society itself was largely demobilized, as certainly the peasantry was even prior to the counterinsurgency campaigns. Under these circumstances, survivors in the targeted regions, no matter how sharp their pain nor how strong their rage, had no opportunities for collective action. The structure of political opportunity offered no hope for justice, no possibility for revenge.

Later, though, the political context changed. Political space for organizing and action opened for a variety of reasons in each country: in urban El Salvador in the late 1960s, slowly spreading to its rural areas; in Guatemala in the mid-1970s;

and to a lesser extent in Nicaragua in the last third of the 1970s. Collective action was greatly assisted by the appearance of numerous support groups. In this more supportive context, intermittent regime violence provoked anger, determination, and resistance in each country. Popular organizations grew in number, in size, and in assertiveness. Vigorous protest cycles were initiated in El Salvador and Guatemala and to a lesser extent in Nicaragua.

Faced with this sustained threat from below, the regimes of each country turned to even more violence. Although this violence became increasingly widespread, brutal, and arbitrary, initially it did not deter popular mobilization but provoked even greater mass opposition. Opponents who were already active redoubled their efforts, and some turned to violence. Increasing numbers of nonelites gave their support to the growing revolutionary armies, many becoming participants themselves. Previously passive regime opponents were activated, and new opponents were created as the indiscriminate violence delegitimized regimes, on the one hand, and created incentives for opposition, such as protection, revenge, and justice, on the other.

The desires for justice and for revenge can find an outlet through collective action in this ascendant phase of the protest cycle (and violence as self-protection can appear rational) for at least two reasons. First, there is hope of winning. Despite the brutality of the regime's indiscriminate violence, the active opposition of large numbers of people and of many organizations from many different sectors of society sustains the belief that the regime will be defeated. This belief was widespread among the popular forces in Nicaragua during the insurrections of 1978–79 and, shortly thereafter, in El Salvador and Guatemala for a brief time at the peak of their popular mobilizations.

The second reason goes beyond rational calculation of the probability of victory to include both emotional response and location in the protest cycle. Assume two sets of regime opponents where the first set is already engaged in collective action against the regime but the second set is not. When indiscriminate repression is directed against the population, the people who are already mobilized are more likely to

continue their opposition than the people who are unmobilized are likely to act on their rage by initiating oppositional activities. For the first set, although the indiscriminate violence increases the dangers of further collective action (and might even diminish the probability of success), the rage engendered by that violence provides additional motivation for action, perhaps more than enough to offset the increased danger. Since these opponents are already active, the momentum of that activity can carry them into clandestine and violent forms of resistance and retaliation as the regime closes nonviolent channels of protest. For the second set, however, the configuration of grievances and risks will be different. They had not been active before the violence, which now increases the dangers of opposition while further restricting the opportunities for action.

Furthermore, the active individuals are not isolated. The fact that they have already been involved in oppositional activities means that they are integrated, at least to some extent, into groups and organizations. These social networks provide the leadership and opportunities for continuing activity, as well as the solidarity bonds and obligations and the examples that encourage action.

As with individuals, we can posit two different situations concerning the social movement sector: organizations making demands on the political system are either numerous or few. The ascendant phase of the protest cycle is marked by the proliferation of organizations and their activities and by unusually large numbers of individuals involved in collective action. Under these circumstances (for example, Guatemala in the early 1980s), indiscriminate regime violence is likely to accelerate antiregime action, for the reasons identified above. However, prior to the initiation of a protest cycle (for example, Guatemala in the late 1960s) there are far fewer people in the active category and far fewer organizations to give direction to their grievances. Therefore, indiscriminate regime violence outside the protest cycle deters popular collective action.

The popular mobilizations in El Salvador and Guatemala during the 1970s and early 1980s, however, were met by ever more vicious repression, abruptly ending their protest cycles. The tens of thousands of murders in each country in the early 1980s were sufficient to destroy most popular organizations or drive them underground, to restore fear and passivity to much of the countryside, and to contain the revolutionary forces. The fact is, successful rebellions and revolutions are rare. Although indiscriminate violence might escalate regime opposition under some circumstances, there are limitations to a people's ability to withstand ferocious regime violence. The difference in the outcomes between these two countries and Nicaragua, where the popular forces succeeded in overthrowing the murderous Somoza regime in 1979, was the result of more than the fact that the opposition to Somoza was more widespread across classes. In addition, Somoza did not have nearly the same capacity for state terrorism as his neighbors, and the Guatemalan and Salvadoran regimes had the willingness to use their greater capacity to the extent necessary to ensure their survival.

Conclusion

The central issue dealt with in this chapter is the paradoxical relationship between regime violence and popular protest. In attempting to explain why sometimes regime violence deters mass oppositional activities but at other times it provokes further opposition, I claim here that the most important determinant is the temporal location in the protest cycle. The targeting strategy pursued by the regime is, of course, a critical variable. However, the evidence from Central America indicates that during "normal conditions," that is, prior to the onset of a protest cycle, escalating repression will deter popular mobilization against the regime.

In contrast, in the ascendant phase of the protest cycle the same repression is likely to provoke increased mass oppositional activities. Nonetheless, if elites are willing and are capable of instituting widespread indiscriminate killing on a sustained basis, then they have often been successful in ending the protest cycle and terrorizing the population back into political passivity. […]

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34

Counterinsurgency

Ian Roxborough

The most powerful military in the world has lost control of Iraq, unable to put an end to the violence or to sustain a democratic Iraqi government. A civil war simmers on the edge of catastrophe. Has the U.S. military learned nothing since Vietnam?

In military parlance, the task of suppressing revolution (insurgency) and civil war is called *counterinsurgency*. Looking at the nationalist and revolutionary guerrilla wars of the 20th century, military thinkers sought to develop ways to defeat insurgents. Counterinsurgency theory is a practitioner's guide to the sociology of revolution, only with the aim of defeating it. Forty years ago, during the Vietnam era, debate within the military produced a slew of books, articles, and official manuals on counterinsurgency. After the United States withdrew from Vietnam, these books gathered dust. The military vowed never again to get caught up in a messy war of counterinsurgency.

The current imbroglio in Iraq has forced the U.S. military to look again at theories of counterinsurgency. In this chapter I explain why the sociological dynamics of these conflicts baffle military thinkers and why a workable "solution" is so elusive.

The Shadow of Vietnam

When we think about counterinsurgency, we think first of Vietnam. American thinking about counterinsurgency began with the Maoist notion of "people's war"; all insurgencies and counterinsurgencies were then forced into this framework. Insurgencies were seen as the response of peasants to the dislocations produced by modernization; they were easily swayed by Communist promises of a better life, and Moscow could orchestrate these social movements in its global Cold War struggle against the United States.

This is too simple. While there are similarities between Iraq (or Afghanistan) and Vietnam, there are just as many differences. It is not useful to treat all insurgencies as fundamentally the same. Revolutionary romanticism on the left is as much a mistake as military technicism. Everyone has learned too well from Vietnam: Rural Maoist guerrilla war with foreign sanctuaries is not the only type of insurgency. We are like a doctor who believes that all patients suffer from the same disease and require the same course of treatment.

Because of the Vietnam model, old formulas are recirculated and old lessons reaffirmed. One thing the U.S. military learned in Vietnam—reinforced by its success in defeating a Marxist insurgency in El Salvador in the 1980s—was that counterinsurgency is essentially a struggle for the "hearts and minds" of the population. This implies that an army cannot use the same kind of overwhelming firepower it would in a traditional offensive. Both the population and insurgents who surrender need to be treated well.

Since conventional U.S. military forces are trained for high-intensity combat, the Vietnam formula suggests it is better to deploy small numbers of Special Forces soldiers who can use violence in a more discriminating manner. Rather than treat the insurgents as a military force to be destroyed in combat via "search-and-destroy" operations, it would be more effective to pacify a small region and then work outward, like a spreading ink-spot, to protect and control the population. Improvements in material standards of living would then win over the population and establish the legitimacy of the government.

But the foremost lesson of Vietnam was "never again." Never again would the U.S. military be drawn into what was essentially a civil war. After Vietnam, with the exception of a handful of Special Forces experts, the U.S. military as a whole lapsed into a bout of collective amnesia about counterinsurgency. When the Army and Marine Corps found themselves mired in a difficult conflict in Iraq, they had to relearn rapidly the lessons of counterinsurgency, dusting off and reprinting those 40-year-old books. The problem is, these lessons were based on false assumptions.

The World Is Complicated

The standard way of thinking about counterinsurgency employs a "triangular" model: the government and the insurgents compete with each other for the allegiance of the population. While this is superior to the military notion of dyadic conflict between two armies, the assumption of a triangular contest misapprehends the dynamics of most counterinsurgencies. For a start, the triangular model is based on a misleading notion of the causes of support for

government and insurgents. Most people passively accept the government (or the insurgent countergovernment) if they view its rule as permanent—as a de facto monopoly of violence. Active minorities have clear goals, and these vary from situation to situation. Also, the "population" is seldom an undifferentiated object. Different ethnic, political, or religious groups all seek their own goals. The conflict may resemble a many-sided "civil war" more than it does a triangular insurgency.

Moreover, both the government and the insurgents are almost always divided into hardliners and those willing to consider accommodation with the adversary. This generates a series of dilemmas for each actor, as each seeks the most effective way to pursue its goals, while often being undercut by some of its own supporters who adopt different tactics.

No conflict can be reduced to a single, simple model. In Afghanistan, the Karzai government faces the classic problem of attempting to impose central power over regional warlords. This is the context for military operations aimed at Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. The insurgents, moreover, have a sanctuary in Pakistan, where the terrain is forbidding, the local peoples are sympathetic to the guerrillas, and the military government worries about offending a massive Islamist population.

Iraq, on the other hand, is not—at least not yet—run by warlords. Nor, despite much wild talk, do the insurgents benefit from a nearby sanctuary. There, the American invasion produced an instant failed government. The lines of political contention are largely ethnic and religious. Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia struggle to define the post-Saddam polity and maximize their position within it. Neither Iraq nor Afghanistan resembles Vietnam, where there was a largely agrarian struggle between absentee landlords and the government on the one hand and the peasantry on the other.

Political scientist Stephen Biddle argues that U.S. policymakers have made a category mistake in Iraq. The conflict in that country is not an ideological, class-based, people's war (as in Vietnam), but a sectarian communal conflict, more akin to the wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The dynamics of the conflicts differ and require different policies.

The problem is deeper still. While a distinction between two types of conflict (Maoist peoples' war versus communal conflict) is better than the notion that all insurgencies are basically the same, it does not go far enough. In some ways it simply reproduces the central lesson drawn from Vietnam and El Salvador: "We don't do civil wars." Sociologists and practitioners who think about counterinsurgency are prisoners of their concepts. We assume too easily that insurgency–counterinsurgency is one thing, "civil war" another.

In fact, the borderlines between insurgency, terrorism, civil war, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of conflict are fuzzy. Social scientists and policymakers are apt to believe that these terms denote clear and distinct phenomena. Reality is different. Many internal wars, and certainly those in which the United States is likely to be involved, are complex, shifting, hybrid affairs that mix elements of insurgency, civil war, and regular warfare in ways that are often difficult to untangle. This makes the design of appropriate policies incredibly difficult: Counterinsurgency is a difficult business requiring a deep sociological understanding of the dynamics of conflict.

Because the U.S. Army had forgotten what little it knew of counterinsurgency except the injunction not to get embroiled in another country's internal war, the conflict in Iraq came as a rude shock. American soldiers and marines were intellectually unprepared for the challenges they faced.

Soldiers are trained to fight other soldiers; they are uncomfortable with "politics." They treat an insurgency as a purely military affair: a simple matter of killing or capturing insurgents more quickly than they can be replaced. They try to bring the insurgents to battle and/or to disrupt their organization. Early U.S. Army efforts in both Vietnam and Iraq involved large "sweep and cordon" or "area assault" operations designed to bring "the enemy" to battle and destroy him. Only later did American military thinkers scramble to relearn the techniques of fighting insurgents. They turned initially to the writings of military officers, especially the French, with experience of counterinsurgency in the 1950s and 1960s.

Once a military organization convinces itself—or is convinced by others—that standard military practice is inappropriate, the way is open to a coherent counterinsurgency strategy. But by then it is often too late to stop the fighting quickly; a long—and possibly unwinnable—war is usually necessary.

Legitimacy and Consent

In many ways, an insurgency is like other social movements. Insurgents must articulate grievances, mobilize resources, and develop a strategy. They must struggle with competitors (those willing to work peacefully within the political system) to establish authoritative claims to speak on behalf of their constituency.

But there is an important difference between insurgencies and the kinds of social movements sociologists usually study. Insurgent organizations, like governments, typically seek to monopolize the representation of their social base. Indeed, they claim to constitute an alternative government. They may therefore manage to displace their competitors not through competition but more directly by assassinating their leaders and terrorizing and coercing their supporters. Other revolutionary and reformist organizations usually contest these efforts, and the struggles within the ranks of the antigovernment forces can be intense and bloody. As a would-be government, an insurgency seeks a monopoly of political control.

Political control is not the same thing as legitimacy. When insurgents and counterinsurgents are seen as involved in a struggle for the "hearts and minds" of the population, it is not always clear what this entails and whether it is necessary. Whose hearts and minds are to be won over, how do you win them, and why will this stop the insurgency? Wars are not elections or popularity polls; individual preferences are less important than behavior. Whether individuals support the government (or the insurgents) willingly or grudgingly, because of intimidation, or because they see no realistic alternative, matters little compared to the fact of their acceptance and acquiescence in government control. Governments do not need the active support of the entire population, or even a majority; acquiescence will suffice. Although the phrase "hearts and minds" implies active support for the government, a sort of positive legitimacy, this may not always be necessary.

American counterinsurgency thinking not only stresses the importance of legitimacy; it believes that this will come about through the provision of material goods and services. American policy in Iraq (as in Vietnam) has been to restore local services, get the economy moving, and improve living conditions. Such material improvements will win hearts and minds, and legitimacy will follow. This misdiagnoses the microdynamics of internal war.

In a study of the province of Long An in Vietnam, Jeffrey Race contrasts the kinds of rewards offered to the peasantry by the government and by the insurgents. Government forces provided wells, roads, and other kinds of improvements for the peasants. But these benefits would accrue to the peasants no matter which side won the war. On the other hand, the benefits brought by the insurgents—driving out the landlords and reducing rents—would cease if government forces won the war. This was one of several practical reasons for peasants to support the insurgents. The government—until it belatedly got into the business of land reform—could not compete.

American counterinsurgency continues to operate on the incorrect assumption that improvements in material conditions are the key to winning hearts and minds and thereby gaining the legitimacy needed for victory. Throughout the conflict in Iraq, American policymakers have worried about the delivery of services to the Iraqi population: electricity, security, jobs, construction, and so on. The catastrophic failure to deliver the goods in Iraq is often seen as a major factor behind the continuing unrest. This notion that grievances can be ameliorated by improving government services or by increasing the standard of living of the population derives from a commonsense (and very Western) notion of the origins of grievances. Antigovernment behavior is seen as a response to poverty rather than to inequality and injustice. U.S. counterinsurgency thinking refuses to confront the hard reality of intractable, zero-sum conflict between classes, sects, or ethnic groups.

Competition in Coercion

Some military strategists criticize this "amelioration program" in two ways. First, they argue that security, rather than other public services such as schools, clean water, electricity, and so forth, is the most important thing a government can offer. Until the personal safety of the population is assured, no other inducements will be effective. The proponents of this approach retain the notion of winning hearts and minds by providing government services; they simply prioritize the delivery of these services, with law and order at the top of the list.

Second, they argue that the problem is not about buying the support of the population, but about winning a competition in coercion between government and insurgents. In this view, the population is asked only to comply with, not believe in, its government. What matters is a calculation on the part of the population that the government will prevail. Combining both arguments, the French counterinsurgency thinker David Galula wrote, back in 1964, "The population's attitude… is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand."

An extension of this school of thought sees massive violence as highly effective. Authoritarian regimes and their armies often decide that their best strategy is extreme violence to defeat the insurgency. This seems to have worked in El Salvador in the 1930s and perhaps also in Guatemala in the 1980s. Peasants may have been sympathetic to the insurgents, but when the army unleashed a wave of terror against whole communities suspected of favoring the insurgents, peasants turned against the insurgents, whom they saw as responsible for bringing this violence down on their heads.

Which of these schools of thought is right? Current social-science thinking suggests that neither "hearts and minds" nor "competition in coercion" accurately captures the dynamics of contention for power. What matters is control: persistent and predictable political control at the local level. Violence is necessary, and targeted, discriminate violence is more effective than indiscriminate violence. Local political control requires a massive commitment of manpower. It requires detailed local knowledge of the local population. This is something that police do well and military organizations do badly.

Counterinsurgency as Reform

The reality that material improvements will not by themselves end an insurgency has an obvious corollary. Counterinsurgents can take the wind out of insurgents' sails by reforming the government and its army, as well as by attending to the legitimate grievances of the people, usually through land reform, to address the "root causes" of the insurgency. The official 1990 Army manual on low-intensity conflict states that

> mobilization grows out of intense popular dissatisfaction with existing political and social conditions.… Insurgency arises when the government is unable or unwilling to redress the demands of important social groups.… The government must recognize conditions that contribute to insurgency and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem of insurgency.

In this view, all problems can be solved. There are no intractable, zero-sum social conflicts. The keys are the willingness and ability of the government to implement the needed reforms. Depending on the nature of the grievances, free elections, land reform, or ethnic partition will solve the problem. Many insurgent supporters can then be coopted and incorporated. As for the guerrillas themselves, a policy of restraint and correct treatment will lead all but a few hardliners to give up. Military measures are secondary. Effective local policing and intelligence, rather than big military sweeps, are the keys to success.

In El Salvador, the insurgency ended only when the army began to reduce its abuses, and the government held elections and implemented a very modest land reform. Even relatively minor efforts to address grievances may be sufficient to undercut an insurgency. The Huk rebellion in the Philippines ended when Ramon Magsaysay promised to reduce abuses by the army, to hold meaningful elections, and to introduce agrarian reform. The amount of land actually redistributed was tiny. It was the reduction in army-induced violence, an amnesty for guerrillas, and the prospect of democratic elections that took the wind out of the insurgency.

But ruling oligarchies and praetorian armies are seldom inclined toward reform, seeing it as more of a threat than a solution. Reforms often undercut the social basis of the government itself. Alternatively, some nations may be willing to undertake reforms but be too weak to implement them. The reformist version of counterinsurgency usually needs the backing of a powerful foreign government.

Nation-Building

Effective counterinsurgency is one component of a larger project of nation-building. Because American policymakers learned from the bitter experiences of the Cold War that "nation-building" is a dauntingly complex task, they generally shrink from detailed contemplation of its intricacies. Yet, if regime change does not go smoothly, or if there is a decision to intervene in a failed nation, U.S. policymakers must engage in a task whose complexities they only dimly grasp.

As sociologists have argued, nation-building is a long-term project that takes generations, if not centuries. It entails contention. Success is far from certain. Local power holders need to be subordinated to the central government. At the same time, the organizational grip of the central government on the society must be extended. All sorts of local-level representations of the government must be created and sustained.

Moreover, policymakers need to control their nominal subordinates to ensure that their policies are actually executed. Military forces in an insurgency or civil war are seldom accountable to or under the effective control of the political leadership. They act with considerable impunity, and lower-level leadership effectively operates without restraint. It is common to talk about a "national" army, but in practice the armed forces of an embattled Third World country are neither unified nor accountable to political leaders.

It is tricky to build an army and police force composed of distinct ethnic or sectarian groups. In insurgencies and civil wars, our "normal" assumptions about military forces no longer apply. Armed force is fragmented and uncertain.

It has been decentralized or dispersed in some manner so that the "state" no longer has a monopoly. This occurs in two ways: by the development of a range of militias and armed forces not under government control (and often in opposition to it); and by the fragmentation of the "national" army. The social composition of the national army is a key issue. Simply labeling it as a national army does not make it so. Counterinsurgency doctrine tiptoes around this sensitive issue.

A central part of nation-building is to establish a monopoly on organized violence. Power at a local level is often in the hands of warlords who control their own armies. There may be local "self-defense" militias and paramilitaries with variable relations to the official government forces. Bringing all these forces under the control of the central government is a delicate and risky business, full of conflict and the potential for failure.

The central government may not control enough economic resources to suppress local power centers. Where local strong men control easily tradable resources—minerals and drugs, for example—they may be able to operate independently. Where this happens, guerrilla forces often settle into permanent opposition. Their ideological aspirations become subordinated to the mechanics of daily existence and economic parasitism. They may devolve into banditry and racketeering. Even if the guerrillas lose interest in overthrowing the government, they still pose a serious problem.

Since counterinsurgency is part of nation-building, it must create the micro-foundations of political order. Counterinsurgents often do this unintentionally following a purely military logic. Various population control measures recommended by counterinsurgency thinkers—relocating people, issuing identity cards, controlling travel, and so on—together with the organization of self-defense forces build the local foundations of the government.

Counterinsurgencies often generate a variety of "self-defense" militias and "warlord" armies. Such forces are formed by local groups that oppose the insurgents. They may wish to protect themselves and their property, to wreak vengeance on the insurgents, to dispossess them, or to establish the political domination of their class, ethnic group, or religious sect. Self-defense militias provide the government with a vast pool of manpower that it can use to free up regular forces. Familiar with local conditions, militias are often effective in identifying and suppressing the insurgents.

The risk is that the conflict increasingly takes on the features of a "civil war" between armed bands of the population. Both the brutal treatment of the population that this entails and the difficulty of asserting political control over such militias pose serious problems for the government as it eventually seeks a peace agreement. Achieving peace often means controlling or disbanding pro-government militias in order to reintegrate the insurgents into the political process.

The role of self-defense organizations in defeating insurgency has often been understood in narrowly military terms. Counterinsurgents have come to appreciate that organizing the rural population to defend itself is very efficient. Local self-defense forces (together with some population reconcentration) enable villages to stave off insurgent attacks. But the political aspects of local self-defense organizations are just as important.

In places where self-defense forces are closely linked to the defense of fortified villages and where they are under the control of government agencies (often the military), a form of near-totalitarian political control over the adult male population is achieved. This may not always be intended, but it works to crowd out any space for independent organization among the villagers, subjecting them all to surveillance by the military. The local self-defense forces organized during the long war in Guatemala, along with those organized in Peru to defend against Sendero Luminoso, the Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces, and the Kikuyu Home Guard during the Mau-Mau insurgency in Kenya in the 1950s all seem to have monopolized political activity and suppressed dissent.

Population control serves several purposes. Standard military doctrine emphasizes the goal of separating the insurgents from the people. If the insurgents are like fish that swim in the sea of the people, then the sea can be drained or dykes built to keep the population away from the insurgents. Of course, this tactic presumes that insurgents are, in a physical sense, "outside" the

communities under government control. If this is not the case, then population control measures are unlikely to work.

Civilians may be relocated into protected hamlets or even refugee camps. They may be required to carry identification papers. Travel may be restricted. There will be roadblocks and neighborhood searches. Food may be tightly controlled to prevent it from being passed to the insurgents. From the point of view of micro-politics, population control serves the same purpose as establishing a local self-defense militia. It imposes a totalitarian control system over the population. This is most effective when there is a dominant political party tightly linked, possibly through a militia, with the armed forces.

French counterinsurgency thinker Roger Trinquier argued in 1961 that "control of the masses through a tight organization … is the master weapon of modern warfare." To counter the organization of the insurgent, Trinquier advocated organizing the entire population into a structured organization under government control. "We may always assure ourselves of their loyalty by placing them within an organization it will be difficult to leave." The strategy was not an amorphous appeal to hearts and minds, but total-itarian control of the population.

Despite frequent citations of Galula and Trinquier, modern American counterinsurgent thinkers seem unable to grasp the implications of their insistence on political control at the micro level. Winning a counterinsurgency means building the government at the grass-roots, from the bottom up. It means creating organizational means for the political control of the population. Military strategists think of this as "politics": something to be done by someone else. Creating the micro-foundations of the government is, in fact, the key task of counterinsurgency.

At the macro level of nation-building, an effective, stable government is the goal of American counterinsurgent operations. Often, they will also at least pay lip-service to creating democracy. Social scientists disagree about the role of elections in promoting stability and reducing an insurgency. Some argue that elections reduce insurgencies by offering an alternative to antigovernment violence. Others believe that, at least in the short run, new democracies may be politically destabilizing and prone to exacer-bate, rather than reduce, conflict. Where conflict is likely to be organized along ethnic or sectarian lines, holding early elections may bring commu-nal extremists to power. But postponing elec-tions also has grave risks, delaying the institutionalization of political conflict. Since democracy has many advantages in the long run, one of the inescapable difficulties in nation-building is to get over "the hump" of early, unsta-ble democracy.

A Final Dilemma

Counterinsurgency involves two ticking clocks, two different sets of priorities and constraints. One is the time frame for military and police operations in the insurgent country or region. The general assumption is that counterinsur-gency is a slow process that may take a decade or more. The processes of nation-building, development, and reform, possibly including democratization, do not happen overnight. The other is the political time frame in the country sending troops to the fight. Here publics are often impatient and want their troops home quickly. Democracies are also constrained by a public unwilling to tolerate atrocity and wide-spread killing. These distinct time frames pose a dilemma for policymakers, forming the Achilles' heel of a counterinsurgency.

Political leaders need to end the insurgency quickly, while their military commanders tell them that it will be a lengthy process. This dilemma has a tendency to produce wishful thinking on the part of policymakers; it is not surprising that they are frequently disappointed. The United States can resolve the dilemma if it commits only a handful of troops to the counter-insurgency and if they do not suffer appreciable casualties. El Salvador and Colombia are the models in this regard. The Vietnamization of the war in Southeast Asia (namely, training Vietnamese troops to do the fighting so the Americans could withdraw) was intended to produce this effect. And now Iraqification is intended to do something similar.

Iraqification, like Vietnamization before it, will not in itself defeat the insurgency. It will merely transfer the task from American to Iraqi shoulders. If and when the U.S. military leaves, the Iraqi army must still design a strategy to suppress the fighting. This will not be easy. It will require political accommodation between the rival ethnic and sectarian groups at the highest level. So long as official military thinking about counterinsurgency fails to grasp these central issues and the underlying dynamics of popular mobilization and nation-building, it will be doomed to recycle the dubious "lessons" of Vietnam.

The U.S. Army prides itself on being a "learning organization." It claims that it has, after an initial period of muddling through, learned anew the fundamentals of counterinsurgency. This may be so, but it is not the point. The central sociological assumptions upon which U.S. counterinsurgency policy is built—the notion of a struggle for "hearts and minds"; the denial of intractable class, sectarian, or ethnic conflict; the idea that nation-building is about government "legitimacy," and so on—are deeply flawed. There is something about the ideological mind-set of policymakers and the authors of military doctrine that prevents them from seeing the real dynamics of conflict.

The failure in Iraq, as in Vietnam, stems in part from the intellectual poverty of official American thinking about counterinsurgency and nation-building. In 2006 the Army and Marine Corps wrote new counterinsurgency doctrine. However, it showed little sign of breaking through the conceptual impasse. It simply refurbished the lessons of the most recent positive case, El Salvador, for a conflict involving large numbers of American troops.

There are advances in thinking, to be sure. American soldiers and marines are enjoined to do a careful analysis of the society and culture, and to treat the locals with great cultural sensitivity. There is a whole section of the new manual that reads like a sociology textbook—a rather good one, at that. But admonitions to study the local society and to behave with cultural sensitivity will not work if the fundamental sociological assumptions underlying counterinsurgency doctrine are flawed. The misguided notion that providing material benefits will increase government legitimacy and thereby erode support for the insurgency remains at the heart of current thinking.

Counterinsurgency continues to be seen as a popularity contest rather than as a competition for control between two (or more) forces that claim to be the effective government. The inherent complexity of armed conflict is reduced to a simple dichotomy of "insurgency" versus "civil war." The notion of deeply rooted group antagonisms remains a taboo area. The micro-foundations of nation-building are poorly understood. The upshot of this accumulation of conceptual errors and blind spots is that the contemporary American military is like a blind boxer, swinging wildly, hoping to land a lucky punch. Counterinsurgency is hard; it is made still harder by the inability of the military to transcend an analysis that is as mistaken now as when it was first written 40 years ago. Dusting off old books is not the same as learning.

Recommended Resources

David Galula. 1964. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Praeger). Written by a French officer with considerable experience in combating insurgency, this book has been widely read by American military officers in recent years.

Jeff Goodwin. 2001. *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge University Press). The best sociological survey of modern insurgencies.

Stathis Kalyvas. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge University Press). Exhaustive survey of violence and political control in civil wars and insurgencies, with a tightly argued theory and a case study of Greece.

Jeffrey Race. 1972. *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Village* (University of California Press). A detailed study of insurgency and counterinsurgency in a Vietnamese province near Saigon.

D. Michael Shafer. 1988. *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton University Press). A clear exposition of American

military thinking about counterinsurgency, focusing on Greece, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

Roger Trinquier. 1964. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Pall Mall Press). Another French book newly popular with U.S. military officers.

Part IX

What Changes Do Movements Bring About?

Introduction

Social movements have a number of effects on their societies, some of them intended and others not. A few movements attain many or most of their goals, others at least manage to gain recognition or longevity in the form of protest organizations, and many if not most are suppressed or ignored. But, whereas scholars used to talk about the success or failure of movements, today they are more likely to talk about movement "outcomes," in recognition of the unintended consequences. Some movements affect the broader culture and public attitudes, perhaps paving the way for future efforts. Others leave behind experienced activists, social networks, tactical innovations, and organizational forms that other movements can use. At the extreme, some movements may arouse such a backlash against them that they lose ground. (The far right mobilization against the U.S. government which led to the Oklahoma City bombing probably inspired closer surveillance and repression of their groups than had previously existed.)

Even if we concentrate on movement goals and success for a moment, we see that most movements have a range of large and small goals. They may try at the same time to change corporate or state policy, transform public attitudes and sensibilities, and bring about personal transformations in protestors themselves. What is more, within a given movement different participants may have different goals, or at least a different ranking of priorities. And these goals may shift during the course of a conflict. Goals may expand in response to initial successes, or contract in the face of failures. When a movement faces severe repression, mere survival (of the group or the literal survival of members) may begin to take precedence over other goals. We have seen that movements have different audiences for their words and actions, and we can now add that there are different goals they hope to achieve with each of these different audiences. A group may launch a campaign designed to prove its effectiveness to its financial backers, its disruptive capacity to state officials, and its willingness to compromise to members of the general public. It may not be possible to succeed on all these fronts at once; there may be tradeoffs between goals.

Even a movement's goals with regard to the state and its many agencies can conflict with one another. Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander (1995) contrast six types or stages of policy effects alone: access to legislators and policymakers, agenda setting for legislators, official policies, implementation and

Radical Flank Effects   Many social movements consist of diverse organizations and networks that disagree on strategy and ideology. Often, a more radical wing emerges that is more likely to use disruptive or illegal tactics, including possibly violence, and which develops a more pure (and less compromising) distillation of the movement's guiding ideas. The existence of a radical flank—more threatening to authorities—can have diverse effects on a movement. In some cases, it undermines public tolerance for the movement as a whole, making it easier for its enemies to portray it as undesirable. Authorities may decide to repress the entire movement, not just its radical wing. In other cases, the radical flank is threatening enough that the forces of order take the movement more seriously, often making concessions. The moderate flank can present itself as a reasonable compromise partner, so that authorities grant it some concessions or give it more power in order to undercut the radicals (although the moderates must distance themselves from the radicals to garner these benefits). If nothing else, radical flanks, by creating a perception of crisis, often focus public attention on a new set of issues and a new movement. In many cases, radical flanks have a combination of negative and positive effects on the broader movement. See Haines (1988).

enforcement of those policies, achievement of the policies' intended impact, and finally deeper structural changes to the political system. And this does not even include effects on repression—in other words, a movement's relationship with the police or armed forces.

Success in the short and the long term may not coincide. In some cases, these even conflict with each other, as when a movement's initial successes inspire strong countermobilization on the part of those under attack. This happened to both the antinuclear and the animal protection movements (Jasper and Poulsen 1993). Efforts that are quite unsuccessful in the short run may have big effects in the long, as in the case of martyrs who inspire outrage and additional mobilization.

Overall, researchers have managed to demonstrate relatively few effects of social movements on their societies. In part this is due to their concentration on direct policy effects or benefits for constituencies. A large number of movements have met with considerable repression. Others have attained some acceptance for their own organizations without obtaining tangible benefits for those they represent. Still others have found government ready to establish a new agency or regulator in response to their demands, only to conclude later that this agency was ineffectual or unduly influenced—even "captured"—by the movement's opponents. Scholars of social movements would like to believe that the mobilizations they study affect the course of history, but usually they have had to assert this without much good evidence.

A brief excerpt from William Gamson's classic, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, in Chapter 35 is an important statement of the meaning of success, reflecting a combination of mobilization and process perspectives. The stability and institutionalization of the protest group is as important as the benefits it achieves for its constituency. The assumption behind this approach seems to be that there is a predefined group ready to benefit, a group whose spokespersons have been excluded in some way from full participation in politics. In a later part of the same chapter, not included here, Gamson lists *consultation*, *negotiation*, *formal recognition*, and *inclusion* as signs of the protest group's acceptance. Of the 53 groups he studied, 20 received a full response and 22 collapsed, while only five were subject to cooptation and only six preemption (Gamson 1990: 37).

The piece by David S. Meyer in Chapter 36 reviews how movements have mattered for public policy, political institutions, and activists themselves. The activist identity is itself an important effect of social movements, just one of many cultural effects of movements. These cultural effects are perhaps the hardest movement impacts to study, yet they may be some of the most profound and longest-lasting outcomes. Many movements help articulate new ways of thinking and feeling about the world. Thus animal protectionists developed widespread sympathy for nonhuman species into an explicit ideology of outrage. Other movements raise issues for public debate, forcing informed citizens to think about a topic and decide how they feel about it. A majority may reject the movement's perspective, but it can

still cause them to think more deeply about their own values and attitudes. Even those who disagree with anti-abortionists have had to decide *why* they disagreed. Still other social movements, like the environmental movement, have inspired scientific research or technological change. In short, movements have played an important *pedagogical* role.

Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison have addressed some of the cultural effects of movements in their book *Music and Social Movements* (1998). They generally view culture as the arts. Art affects a society's collective memory and traditions, its "common sense" of how the world works. Culture is thus a bearer of truth, as they put it. They are keen to insist on the independent effects of culture in political life, on how our beliefs about the world affect our sense of what is possible and desirable.

One of the effects that Eyerman and Jamison mention is that movements create the raw materials for future movements. In their case, these are songs that movements may share with one another; the civil rights movement, for instance, generated a number of songs now associated generally with protest. Movements also create new tactics and other political know-how that future protestors can use. They also leave behind social ties that can be used to ignite new efforts in the future. The women's movement of the early twentieth century, for example, left a legacy of personal networks and organizations (as well as values and ideas) that the new women's movement of the 1960s could draw upon (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989).

There may be even broader cultural effects of social movements. On the one hand, they give people a moral voice, helping them to articulate values and intuitions that they do not have time to think about in their daily lives (Jasper 1997). This is extremely satisfying for most participants. On the other hand, social movements can also generate very technical, scientific, and practical knowledge. They engage people in politics in an exciting way—rare enough in modern society. Unfortunately, some movements may go too far and, instead of trying to be artists, they try to be engineers, telling rather than trying to persuade others what is good for them.

The excerpt by David Naguib Pellow and Robert J. Brulle in Chapter 37 discusses the achievements of the movement for environmental justice (EJ). They end by expressing their hope and concern for the future. The EJ movement has had many successes, but current and future challenges seem more daunting than ever. Indeed, given the extreme threats to humanity created by today's climate change, a strong environmental movement seems especially necessary today. But, because the most daunting problems associated with climate change have not yet beset us, it may be difficult to mobilize enough people to change our present course before it is too late. (It may not be an exaggeration to say that our very survival as a species depends on a social movement.)

Some movements—revolutionary movements—set themselves very broad goals indeed. They seek to overthrow governments and, sometimes, to take power for themselves. They try to build new political orders and institutions and, sometimes, to remake much of society in the process—to redistribute property, power, and opportunities, and to create and diffuse new cultural symbols and meanings.

Like other movements, revolutionary movements often come in cycles or waves that spread across multiple countries, as in Europe in 1848 and central Europe in 1989. The most recent revolutionary wave began in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011. Yet not all governments were overthrown by movements in this region. In his contribution in Chapter 38, Jack Goldstone argues that it was a particular kind of dictatorship—the "sultanistic" dictatorship (the term comes from the sociologist Max Weber)—which broke down in the Arab world in 2011. This kind of dictatorship may endure for decades, but (partly because of that) it can also alienate both elites and the broader population, antagonize military officers and soldiers, and lose foreign support. After sultanistic dictators fall, however, the broad opposition to them may begin to fracture, and there is no guarantee that reformists, let alone radical revolutionaries, will triumph. An alliance of conservative elites and military officers is often able to reconsolidate power. Dictators may be overthrown, but the immediate outcome may be neither democracy nor social justice.

The movements which brought down dictators in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 were largely nonviolent. Nonviolent movements have also toppled—or helped to topple—authoritarian regimes in Iran, the Philippines, Chile, Eastern Europe, South Africa, Indonesia, Serbia, and Ukraine in recent decades.

Yet not all nonviolent movements succeed. A conspicuous example is the failure of the student-led democracy movement in China in 1989. In Chapter 39 Sharon Erickson Nepstad seeks to discover why this movement failed, which is not only important for understanding today's China, but also helpful in understanding better why some nonviolent movements actually succeed.

Nepstad argues that the students who initiated the democracy movement in China alienated certain groups—above all, workers—who might have employed powerful tactics against the regime, such as strikes. In other words, the movement was not nearly as broad as it might have been, nor were its tactics. The students also failed to win over soldiers to their side, in part because the regime mobilized soldiers from outside the region, including some, allegedly, who did not understand the kind of Chinese spoken in Beijing, where the movement was concentrated (perhaps *too* concentrated). Eventually, a few students taunted and even threw bricks and Molotov cocktails at soldiers, decreasing the chances that soldiers would defect and increasing the likelihood of the violence that eventually destroyed the movement. Student activists, moreover, were divided and unable to provide consistent leadership or to maintain nonviolent discipline within the movement.

This is a sad but perhaps an appropriate note on which to end this volume. The world we live in is undoubtedly a better place thanks to past social movements (even if some have certainly made us worse off). Yet current and emergent social problems—including dictatorship and authoritarianism, extreme inequality, and climate change—suggest that we need movements more than ever. Clearly, social movements will not disappear soon. We hope this volume has helped the reader understand them better.

Discussion Questions

1   What kinds of effects do social movements have on their societies?

2   What are the main institutional arenas in which protestors hope to have an impact?

3   Under what circumstances, or in what kind of movements, should we consider it a form of success for movement organizations to gain recognition, simply to survive?

4   How can movements contribute to a society's culture or knowledge, including its self-knowledge?

5   What kinds of unintended effects can a movement have?

6   What seem to be the main personal consequences of political protest?

7   What have been the main successes and failures of the environmental justice movement? What challenges will this movement face in the years ahead?

8   Why and how were "sultanistic" dictators, but not monarchs, overthrown in the Middle East?

9   Why did the democracy movement in China fail? What does its failure tell us about why some nonviolent movements succeed?

35

Defining Movement "Success"

William A. Gamson

Success is an elusive idea. What of the group whose leaders are honored or rewarded while their supposed beneficiaries linger in the same cheerless state as before? Is such a group more or less successful than another challenger whose leaders are vilified and imprisoned even as their program is eagerly implemented by their oppressor? Is a group a failure if it collapses with no legacy save inspiration to a generation that will soon take up the same cause with more tangible results? And what do we conclude about a group that accomplishes exactly what it set out to achieve and then finds its victory empty of real meaning for its presumed beneficiaries? Finally, we must add to these questions the further complications of groups with multiple antagonists and multiple areas of concern. They may achieve some results with some targets and little or nothing with others.

It is useful to think of success as a set of outcomes, recognizing that a given challenging group may receive different scores on equally valid, different measures of outcome. These outcomes fall into two basic clusters: one concerned with the fate of the challenging group as an organization and one with the distribution of new advantages to the group's beneficiary. The central issue in the first cluster focuses on the *acceptance* of a challenging group by its antagonists as a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests. The central issue in the second cluster focuses on whether the group's beneficiary gains *new advantages* during the challenge and its aftermath.

Both of these outcome clusters require elaboration, but, for the moment, consider each as if it were a single, dichotomous variable. Assume a group that has a single antagonist and a single act which they wish this antagonist to perform—for example, a reform group which desires a particular piece of national legislation. We ask of such a group, did its antagonist accept it as a valid spokesman for the constituency that it was attempting to mobilize or did it deny such acceptance? Secondly, did the group gain the advantages it sought—for example, the passage of the legislation that it desired?

By combining these two questions, as in Table 35.1, we acquire four possible outcomes: full response, co-optation, preemption, and collapse. The full response and collapse categories are relatively unambiguous successes and failures—in the one case the achievement of both

Table 35.1 Outcome of resolved challenges

		Acceptance	
		Full	None
New advantages	Many	Full response	Preemption
	None	Co-optation	Collapse

acceptance and new advantages, in the other, the achievement of neither. The remainder are mixed categories: co-optation is the term used for acceptance without new advantages and preemption for new advantages without acceptance.

Table 35.1 is the paradigm for handling outcomes of challenging groups, but it requires additional complexity before it can be used to handle as diverse a set of groups as the 53 [examined in my own research]. Acceptance must be given a special meaning for revolutionary groups, for example, which seek not a nod of recognition from an antagonist but its destruction and replacement. Similarly, new "advantages" are not always easy to define. We must deal with cases in which a group seeks, for example, relatively intangible value changes, shifts in the scope of authority, or a change in procedures as well as the simpler case of material benefits for a well-defined group.

The Endpoint of a Challenge

The outcome measures used refer to "ultimate" outcome, to the state of the group at the end of its challenge. A given group might achieve significant new advantages at one point without receiving acceptance, but we would not consider that preemption had occurred as long as it continued to press an active challenge. Only when it eventually collapsed or ceased activity would we classify its outcome as preemption. Or, if it eventually won acceptance, its outcome would be full response instead. Similarly, the new advantages might be withdrawn and the group brutally crushed, making "collapse" the appropriate outcome. Thus, during its period of challenge, a group might appear to be in one or another cell of Table 35.1 at different times, but the outcome measures only consider its location at the end.

A challenge period is considered over when one of the following occurs:

1. *The challenging group ceases to exist as a formal entity*. It may officially dissolve, declaring itself no longer in existence. Or, it may merge with another group, ceasing to maintain a separate identity. Note, however, that a group does not cease to exist by merely changing its name to refurbish its public image. Operationally, we consider that two names represent the same challenging group if and only if:
   a. The major goals, purposes, and functions of the two groups are the same.
   b. The constituency remains the same.
   c. The average challenging group member and potential member would agree that the new-name group is essentially the old group relabeled.

2. *The challenging group, while not formally dissolving, ceases mobilization and influence activity*. A five-year period of inactivity is considered sufficient to specify the end of the challenge. If, after such a dormant period, the group becomes active again, it is considered a new challenging group in spite of its organizational continuity with the old challenger. This occurred, in fact, with two of the 53 challengers in the sample. In each case the period of dormancy was quite a bit longer than the required five years, and, in one case, the geographical location of activity was different as well.

Marking the end of a challenge is more difficult with groups that continue to exist and be active. The line between being a challenging group and an established interest group is not always sharp. The essential difference lies in how institutionalized a conflict relationship exists between the group and its antagonists. When this conflict becomes regulated and waged under some standard operating

procedures, the challenge period is over. Operationally, this can be dated from the point at which the group is accepted. Hence, for continuing groups, the challenge period is over when:

3. *The challenging group's major antagonists accept the group as a valid spokesman for its constituency and deal with it as such.* In the case of unions, this is indicated by formal recognition of the union as a bargaining agent for the employees. In other cases, the act of acceptance is less clear, and, even in the case of unions, different companies extend recognition at different times.

With continuing groups, then, there is some inevitable arbitrariness in dating the end of a challenge. The compiler was instructed to err, in ambiguous cases, on the side of a later date. Thus, where acute conflict continues to exist between the group and important antagonists, the challenge is not considered over even when some other antagonists may have begun to deal with the challenger in a routinized way. Furthermore, by extending the challenge period, we include new benefits that might be excluded by using a premature termination date.

36

How Social Movements Matter

David S. Meyer

In January 2003, tens if not hundreds of thousands of people assembled in Washington, D.C. to try to stop the impending invasion of Iraq. It did not look good for the demonstrators. Months earlier, Congress authorized President Bush to use force to disarm Iraq, and Bush repeatedly said that he would not let the lack of international support influence his decision about when—or whether—to use military force. Opposition to military action grew in the intervening months; the Washington demonstration coincided with sister events in San Francisco, Portland, Tampa, Tokyo, Paris, Cairo, and Moscow. Protests, albeit smaller and less frequent, continued after the war began. Did any of them change anything? Could they have? How? And how would we know if they did?

Such questions are not specific to this latest peace mobilization, but are endemic to protest movements more generally. Social movements are organized challenges to authorities that use a broad range of tactics, both inside and outside of conventional politics, in an effort to promote social and political change. Opponents of the Iraq war wrote letters to elected officials and editors of newspapers, called talk radio shows, and contributed money to antiwar groups. Many also invited arrest by civil disobedience; some protesters, for example, blocked entrances to government offices and military bases. A group of 50 "Unreasonable Women of West Marin" lay naked on a northern California beach, spelling out "Peace" with their bodies for a photographer flying overhead. Besides using diverse methods of protest, opponents of the war also held diverse political views. Some opposed all war, some opposed all U.S. military intervention, while others were skeptical only about this particular military intervention. This is a familiar social movement story: broad coalitions stage social movements, and differences within a movement coalition are often nearly as broad as those between the movement and the authorities it challenges.

Political activists and their targets act as if social movements matter, and sociologists have been trying, for the better part of at least four decades, to figure out why, when, and how. It is too easy—and not very helpful—to paint activists as heroes or, alternatively, as cranks. It is similarly too easy to credit them for social change or,

alternatively, to dismiss their efforts by saying that changes, such as advances in civil rights or environmental protections, would have happened anyway. What we have learned is that social movements are less a departure from conventional institutional politics than an extension of them—a "politics by other means." In the end, we find that movements crest and wane, often failing to attain their immediate goals, but they can lastingly change political debates, governmental institutions, and the wider culture.

It is often difficult to tell whether activism makes a difference because the forces that propel people to mobilize are often the same forces responsible for social change. For example, it is difficult to decide whether the feminist movement opened new opportunities to women or whether economic changes fostered both the jobs and feminism. Also, authorities challenged by movements deny that activism influenced their decisions. What politicians want to admit that their judgments can be affected by "mobs"? Why risk encouraging protesters in the future? Finally, movements virtually never achieve all that their partisans demand, and so activists are quick to question their own influence. As a result, proving that movements influence politics and policy involves difficult detective work.

But research shows that social movements can affect government policy, as well as how it is made. And movement influence extends further. Activism often profoundly changes the activists, and through them, the organizations in which they participate, as well as the broader culture. The ways that movements make a difference are complex, veiled, and take far longer to manifest themselves than the news cycle that covers a single demonstration, or even a whole protest campaign.

When Movements Emerge

Activists protest when they think it might help them achieve their goals—goals they might not accomplish otherwise. Organizers successfully mobilize movements when they convince people that the issue at hand is urgent, that positive outcomes are possible and that their efforts could make a difference. In the case of the war on Iraq, for example, President Bush set the agenda for a broad range of activists by explicitly committing the country to military intervention. More-conventional politics—elections, campaign contributions, and letter-writing—had already played out and it became clear that none of these activities were sufficient, in and of themselves, to stop the war. In addition, the President's failure to build broad international or domestic support led activists to believe that direct pressure might prevent war. The rapid worldwide growth of the movement itself encouraged activism, assuring participants that they were part of something larger than themselves, something that might matter. In effect, President Bush's actions encouraged antiwar activism to spread beyond a small group of perpetual peace activists to a broader public.

With peace movements, it is clear that threat of war helps organizers mobilize people. Threats generally help political opposition grow beyond conventional politics. Movements against nuclear armaments, for example, emerge strongly when governments announce they are building more weapons. Similarly, environmental movements expand when government policies toward forests, pesticides, or toxic wastes become visibly negligent. In the case of abortion politics, each side has kept the other mobilized for more than 30 years by periodically threatening to take control of the issue. In each of these cases, those who lose in traditional political contests such as elections or lobbying campaigns often take to the streets.

Other sorts of movements grow when the promise of success arises. American civil rights activists, for example, were able to mobilize most broadly when they saw signals that substantial change was possible. Rosa Parks knew about Jackie Robinson and *Brown v. Board of Education*—as well as Gandhian civil disobedience—before deciding not to move to the back of the bus in Montgomery, Alabama. Government responsiveness to earlier activism—such as President Truman's desegregation of the armed forces and calling for an anti-lynching law—though limited, fitful, and often strategic, for a time encouraged others in their efforts. And the success of African-American activists encouraged other ethnic groups, as well as women, to pursue social change through movement politics.

As social movements grow, they incorporate more groups with a broader range of goals and

more diverse tactics. Absent a focus like an imminent war, activists inside and political figures outside compete with one another to define movement goals and objectives. Political authorities often respond with policy concessions designed to diminish the breadth and depth of a movement. While such tactics can divide a movement, they are also one way of measuring a movement's success.

How Movements Matter: Public Policy

By uniting, however loosely, a broad range of groups and individuals, and taking action, social movements can influence public policy, at least by bringing attention to their issues. Newspaper stories about a demonstration pique political, journalistic, and public interest in the demonstrators' concerns. By bringing scrutiny to a contested policy, activists can promote alternative thinking. By displaying a large and engaged constituency, social movements provide political support for leaders sympathetic to their concerns. Large demonstrations show that there are passionate citizens who might also donate money, work in campaigns, and vote for candidates who will speak for them. Citizen mobilization against abortion, taxes, and immigration, for example, has encouraged ambitious politicians to cater to those constituencies. In these ways, social movement activism spurs and supports more conventional political action.

Activism outside of government can also strengthen advocates of minority positions within government. Social movements—just like presidential administrations and Congressional majorities—are coalitions. Anti-war activists in the streets may have strengthened the bargaining position of the more internationalist factions in the Bush administration, most notably Colin Powell, and led, at least temporarily, to diplomatic action in the United Nations. Mobilized opposition also, for a time, seemed to embolden Congressional critics, and encouraged lesser-known candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination to vocally oppose the war.

Social movements, by the popularity of their arguments, or more frequently, the strength of their support, can convince authorities to re-examine and possibly change their policy preferences. Movements can demand a litmus test for their support. Thus, George H. W. Bush, seeking the Republican nomination for president in 1980, revised his prior support for abortion rights. A few years later, Jesse Jackson likewise reconsidered his opposition to abortion. Movements raised the profile of the issue, forcing politicians not only to address their concerns, but to accede to their demands.

Although movement activists promote specific policies—a nuclear freeze, an equal rights amendment, an end to legal abortion, or, more recently, a cap on malpractice awards—their demands are usually so absolute that they do not translate well into policy. (Placards and bumper stickers offer little space for nuanced debate.) Indeed, the clearest message that activists can generally send is absolute rejection: no to nuclear weapons, abortion, pesticides, or taxes. These admonitions rarely become policy, but by promoting their programs in stark moral terms, activists place the onus on others to offer alternative policies that are, depending on one's perspective, more moderate or complex. At the same time, politicians often use such alternatives to capture, or at least defuse, social movements. The anti-nuclear weapons movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s did not end the arms race or all nuclear testing. It did, however, lead to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which ended atmospheric testing. First Eisenhower, then Kennedy, offered arms control proposals and talks with the Soviet Union, at least in part as a response to the movement. This peace movement established the framework for arms control in superpower relations, which subsequently spread to the entire international community.

In these ways, activists shape events—even if they do not necessarily get credit for their efforts or achieve everything they want. The movement against the Vietnam War, for instance, generated a great deal of attention which, in turn, changed the conduct of that war and much else in domestic politics. President Johnson chose bombing targets with attention to minimizing political opposition; President Nixon, elected at least partly as a result of the backlash against the antiwar movement, nonetheless tailored his military strategy to respond to some of its concerns. In later years, he suggested that the antiwar movement made it

unthinkable for him to threaten nuclear escalation in Vietnam—even as a bluff. In addition, the movement helped end the draft, institutionalizing all-volunteer armed forces. And, according to Colin Powell, the Vietnam dissenters provoked a new military approach for the United States, one that emphasized the use of overwhelming force to minimize American casualties. Thus, the military execution of the 1991 Persian Gulf war was influenced by an antiwar movement that peaked more than three decades earlier. This is significant, if not the effect most antiwar activists envisioned.

Political Institutions

Social movements can alter not only the substance of policy, but also how policy is made. It is not uncommon for governments to create new institutions, such as departments and agencies, in response to activists' demands. For example, President Kennedy responded to the nuclear freeze movement by establishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which became a permanent voice and venue in the federal bureaucracy for arms control. A glance at any organizational chart of federal offices turns up numerous departments, boards, and commissions that trace their origins to popular mobilization. These include the Department of Labor, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the National Labor Relations Board, the Environment Protection Agency, the National Council on Disability, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Although these offices do not always support activist goals, their very existence represents a permanent institutional concern and a venue for making demands. If, as environmentalists argue, the current Environmental Protection Agency is often more interested in facilitating exploitation of the environment than in preventing it, this does not negate the fact that the environmental movement established a set of procedures through which environmental concerns can be addressed.

Government responses to movement demands also include ensuring that diverse voices are heard in decision-making. In local zoning decisions, for example, environmental impact statements are now a routine part of getting a permit for construction. Congress passed legislation establishing this requirement in 1970 in response to the growing environmental movement. Indeed, movement groups, including Greenpeace and the Sierra Club, negotiated directly with congressional sponsors. Similarly, juries and judges now routinely hear victim impact statements before pronouncing sentences in criminal cases, the product of the victims' rights movement. Both public and private organizations have created new departments to manage and, perhaps more importantly, document personnel practices, such as hiring and firing, to avoid being sued for discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or disability. Workshops on diversity, tolerance, and sexual harassment are commonplace in American universities and corporations, a change over just two decades that would have been impossible to imagine without the activism of the 1960s and 1970s. In such now well-established bureaucratic routines, we can see how social movements change practices, and through them, beliefs.

Social movements also spawn dedicated organizations that generally survive long after a movement's moment has passed. The environmental movement, for example, firmly established a "big ten" group of national organizations, such as the Wildlife Defense Fund, which survives primarily by raising money from self-defined environmentalists. It cultivates donors by monitoring and publicizing government actions and environmental conditions, lobbying elected officials and administrators, and occasionally mobilizing supporters to do something more than mail in their annual membership renewals. Here, too, the seemingly permanent establishment of "movement organizations" in Washington, D.C. and in state capitals across the United States has—even if these groups often lose—fundamentally changed policymaking. Salaried officers of the organizations routinely screen high-level appointees to the judiciary and government bureaucracy and testify before legislatures. Mindful of this process, policymakers seek to preempt their arguments by modifying policy—or at least their rhetoric.

Political Activists

Social movements also change the people who participate in them, educating as well as mobilizing activists, and thereby promoting ongoing

awareness and action that extends beyond the boundaries of one movement or campaign. Those who turn out at antiwar demonstrations today have often cut their activist teeth mobilizing against globalization, on behalf of labor, for animal rights, or against welfare reform. By politicizing communities, connecting people, and promoting personal loyalties, social movements build the infrastructure not only of subsequent movements but of a democratic society more generally.

Importantly, these consequences are often indirect and difficult to document. When hundreds of thousands of activists march to the Supreme Court to demonstrate their support for legal abortion, their efforts might persuade a justice. More likely, the march signals commitment and passion to other activists and inspires participants to return home and advocate for abortion rights in their communities across the country, thereby affecting the shape of politics and culture more broadly.

The 2003 anti-Iraq War movement mobilized faster, with better organizational ties in the United States and transnationally than, for example, the movement against the 1991 Persian Gulf War. But how are we to assess its influence? Many activists no doubt see their efforts as having been wasted, or at least as unsuccessful. Moreover, supporters of the war point to the rapid seizure of Baghdad and ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime as evidence of the peace movement's naïveté. But a movement's legacy extends through a range of outcomes beyond a government's decision of the moment. It includes consequences for process, institutional practices, organizations, and individuals. This antiwar movement changed the rhetoric and international politics of the United States' preparation for war, leading to a detour through the United Nations that delayed the start of war. The activists who marched in Washington, San Francisco, and Los Angeles may retreat for a while, but they are likely to be engaged in politics more intensively in the future. This may not be much consolation to people who marched to stop a war, but it is true. To paraphrase a famous scholar: activists make history, but they do not make it just as they please. In fighting one political battle, they shape the conditions of the next one.

Recommended Resources

Arkin, William M. 2003. "The Dividends of Delay." *Los Angeles Times*, February 23. Arkin details the influence of the peace movement on U.S. military strategy in the Iraq war.

Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly. 1990. *How Social Movements Matter* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). This collection employs diverse approaches in examining the outcomes of social movements across a range of cases.

Klatch, Rebecca. 1999. *A Generation Divided: The New Left, The New Right, and the 1960s* (Berkeley: University of California Press). Klatch traces individual life stories of activists on both ends of the political spectrum during a turbulent period and beyond.

Meyer, David S. 1993. "Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age." *Political Research Quarterly* 46: 451–79. This article details how government responses to peace movements affect policy and subsequent political mobilization.

Meyer, David S., Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett, eds. 2002. *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press). A collection that addresses the link between protesters and context across different settings and times.

McAdam, Doug, and Yang Su. 2002. "The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973." *American Sociological Review* 67: 696–721. Antiwar protests set an agenda for Congress, forcing resolutions about the war, but could not influence the outcomes of those votes.

Rochon, Thomas. 1998. *Culture Moves: Ideas, Activism, and Changing Values* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Rochon looks at social movements as a primary way to promote new ideas and alter culture.

Tarrow, Sidney. [1994] 1998. *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press). A broad and comprehensive review of scholarship on movements, synthesized in a useful framework.

Environmental Justice

David Naguib Pellow and Robert J. Brulle

One morning in 1987 several African-American activists on Chicago's southeast side gathered to oppose a waste incinerator in their community and, in just a few hours, stopped 57 trucks from entering the area. Eventually arrested, they made a public statement about the problem of pollution in poor communities of color in the United States—a problem known as environmental racism. Hazel Johnson, executive director of the environmental justice group People for Community Recovery (PCR), told this story on several occasions, proud that she and her organization had led the demonstration. Indeed, this was a remarkable mobilization and an impressive act of resistance from a small, economically depressed, and chemically inundated community. This community of 10,000 people, mostly African-American, is surrounded by more than 50 polluting facilities, including landfills, oil refineries, waste lagoons, a sewage treatment plant, cement plants, steel mills, and waste incinerators. Hazel's daughter, Cheryl, who has worked with the organization since its founding, often says, "We call this area the 'Toxic Doughnut' because everywhere you look, 360 degrees around us, we're completely surrounded by toxics on all sides."

The Environmental Justice Movement

People for Community Recovery was at the vanguard of a number of local citizens' groups that formed the movement for environmental justice (EJ). This movement, rooted in community-based politics, has emerged as a significant player at the local, state, national, and, increasingly, global levels. The movement's origins lie in local activism during the late 1970s and early 1980s aimed at combating environmental racism and environmental inequality—the unequal distribution of pollution across the social landscape that unfairly burdens poor neighborhoods and communities of color.

The original aim of the EJ movement was to challenge the disproportionate location of toxic facilities (such as landfills, incinerators, polluting factories, and mines) in or near the borders of economically or politically marginalized communities. Groups like PCR have expanded the movement and, in the process, extended its goals beyond removing existing hazards to include preventing new environmental risks and promoting safe, sustainable, and equitable forms of development. In

most cases, these groups contest governmental or industrial practices that threaten human health. The EJ movement has developed a vision for social change centered around the following points:

- All people have the right to protection from environmental harm.
- Environmental threats should be eliminated before there are adverse human health consequences.
- The burden of proof should be shifted from communities, which now need to prove adverse impacts, to corporations, which should prove that a given industrial procedure is safe to humans and the environment.
- Grassroots organizations should challenge environmental inequality through political action.

The movement, which now includes African-American, European-American, Latino, Asian-American/Pacific-Islander, and Native-American communities, is more culturally diverse than both the civil rights and the traditional environmental movements, and combines insights from both causes.

Researchers have documented environmental inequalities in the United States since the 1970s, originally emphasizing the connection between income and air pollution. Research in the 1980s extended these early findings, revealing that communities of color were especially likely to be near hazardous waste sites. In 1987, the United Church of Christ Commission on Racial Justice released a groundbreaking national study entitled *Toxic Waste and Race in the United States*, which revealed the intensely unequal distribution of toxic waste sites across the United States. The study boldly concluded that race was the strongest predictor of where such sites were found.

In 1990, sociologist Robert Bullard published *Dumping in Dixie*, the first major study of environmental racism that linked the siting of hazardous facilities to the decades-old practices of spatial segregation in the South. Bullard found that African-American communities were being deliberately selected as sites for the disposal of municipal and hazardous chemical wastes. This was also one of the first studies to examine the social and psychological impacts of environmental pollution in a community of color. For example, across five

communities in Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia, Bullard found that the majority of people felt that their community had been singled out for the location of a toxic facility (55 percent); experienced anger at hosting this facility in their community (74 percent); and yet accepted the idea that the facility would remain in the community (77 percent).

Since 1990, social scientists have documented that exposure to environmental risks is strongly associated with race and socioeconomic status. Like Bullard's *Dumping in Dixie*, many studies have concluded that the link between polluting facilities and communities of color results from the deliberate placement of such facilities in these communities rather than from population-migration patterns. Such communities are systematically targeted for the location of polluting industries and other locally unwanted land uses (LULUs), but residents are fighting back to secure a safe, healthy, and sustainable quality of life. What have they accomplished?

Local Struggles

The EJ movement began in 1982, when hundreds of activists and residents came together to oppose the expansion of a chemical landfill in Warren County, North Carolina. Even though that action failed, it spawned a movement that effectively mobilized people in neighborhoods and small towns facing other LULUs. The EJ movement has had its most profound impact at the local level. Its successes include shutting down large waste incinerators and landfills in Los Angeles and Chicago; preventing polluting operations from being built or expanded, like the chemical plant proposed by the Shintech Corporation near a poor African-American community in Louisiana; securing relocations and home buyouts for residents in polluted communities like Love Canal, New York; Times Beach, Missouri; and Norco, Louisiana; and successfully demanding environmental cleanups of LULUs such as the North River Sewage Treatment plant in Harlem.

The EJ movement helped stop plans to construct more than 300 garbage incinerators in the United States between 1985 and 1998. The steady expansion of municipal waste incinerators was abruptly reversed after 1990. While the cost of

Table 37.1 Municipal waste incinerators in the United States

Year	Number of incinerators
1965	18
1970	25
1975	45
1980	77
1985	119
1990	186
1995	142
2000	116
2002	112

Source: Tangri 2003

Table 37.2 Medical waste incinerators in the United States

Year	Number of incinerators
1988	6,200
1994	5,000
1997	2,373
2003	115

Source: Tangri 2003

building and maintaining incinerators was certainly on the rise, the political price of incineration was the main factor that reversed this tide. The decline of medical-waste incinerators is even more dramatic (Tables 37.1 and 37.2).

Sociologist Andrew Szasz has documented the influence of the EJ movement in several hundred communities throughout the United States, showing that organizations such as Hazel Johnson's People for Community Recovery were instrumental in highlighting the dangers associated with chemical waste incinerators in their neighborhoods. EJ organizations, working in local coalitions, have had a number of successes, including shutting down an incinerator that was once the largest municipal waste burner in the western hemisphere. The movement has made it extremely difficult for firms to locate incinerators, landfills, and related LULUs anywhere in the nation, and almost any effort to expand existing polluting facilities now faces controversy.

Building Institutions

The EJ movement has built up local organizations and regional networks and forged partnerships with existing institutions such as churches, schools, and neighborhood groups. Given the close association between many EJ activists and environmental sociologists, it is not surprising that the movement has notably influenced the university. Research and training centers run by sociologists at several universities and colleges

focus on EJ studies, and numerous institutions of higher education offer EJ courses. Bunyan Bryant and Elaine Hockman, searching the World Wide Web in 2002, got 281,000 hits for the phrase "environmental justice course," and they found such courses at more than 60 of the nation's colleges and universities.

EJ activists have built lasting partnerships with university scholars, especially sociologists. For example, Hazel Johnson's organization has worked with scholars at Northwestern University, the University of Wisconsin, and Clark Atlanta University to conduct health surveys of local residents, study local environmental conditions, serve on policy task forces, and testify at public hearings. Working with activists has provided valuable experience and training to future social and physical scientists.

The EJ movement's greatest challenge is to balance its expertise at mobilizing to oppose hazardous technologies and unsustainable development with a coherent vision and policy program that will move communities toward sustainability and better health. Several EJ groups have taken steps in this direction. Some now own and manage housing units, agricultural firms, job-training facilities, farmers' markets, urban gardens, and restaurants. On Chicago's southeast side, PCR partnered with a local university to win a federal grant, with which they taught lead-abatement techniques to community residents who then found employment in environmental industries. These successes should be acknowledged and praised, although they are limited in their socio-ecological impacts and longevity. Even so, EJ activists, scholars, and practitioners would do well to document these projects' trajectories and seek to replicate and adapt their best practices in other locales.

Legal Gains and Losses

The movement has a mixed record in litigation. Early on, EJ activists and attorneys decided to apply civil rights law (Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) to the environmental arena. Title VI prohibits all government and industry programs and activities that receive federal funds from discriminating against persons based on race, color, or national origin. Unfortunately, the courts have uniformly refused to prohibit government actions on the basis of Title VI without direct evidence of discriminatory intent. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been of little assistance. Since 1994, when the EPA began accepting Title VI claims, more than 135 have been filed, but none has been formally resolved. Only one federal agency has cited environmental justice concerns to protect a community in a significant legal case: In May 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission denied a permit for a uranium enrichment plant in Louisiana because environmental justice concerns had not been taken into account.

With regard to legal strategies, EJ activist Hazel Johnson learned early on that, while she could trust committed EJ attorneys like Keith Harley of the Chicago Legal Clinic, the courts were often hostile and unforgiving places to make the case for environmental justice. Like other EJ activists disappointed by the legal system, Johnson and PCR have diversified their tactics. For example, they worked with a coalition of activists, scholars, and scientists to present evidence of toxicity in their community to elected officials and policymakers, while also engaging in disruptive protest that targeted government agencies and corporations.

National Environmental Policy

The EJ movement has been more successful at lobbying high-level elected officials. Most prominently, in February 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898 requiring all federal agencies to ensure environmental justice in their practices. Appropriately, Hazel Johnson was at Clinton's side as he signed the order. And the Congressional Black Caucus, among its other accomplishments, has maintained one of the strongest environmental voting records of any group in the U.S. Congress.

But under President Bush, the EPA and the White House have not demonstrated a commitment to environmental justice. Even Clinton's much-vaunted Executive Order on Environmental Justice has had a limited effect. In March 2004 and September 2006, the inspector general of the EPA concluded that the agency was not doing an effective job of enforcing environmental justice policy. Specifically, he noted that the agency had no plans, benchmarks, or instruments to evaluate progress toward achieving the goals of Clinton's Order. While President Clinton deserves some of the blame for this, it should be no surprise that things have not improved under the Bush administration. In response, many activists, including those at PCR, have shifted their focus from the national level back to the neighborhood, where their work has a more tangible influence and where polluters are more easily monitored. But in an era of increasing economic and political globalization, this strategy may be limited.

A Chronology of the U.S. Environmental Movement

1845: Henry David Thoreau moves to Walden Pond, where he stays for two years, and writes one of a series of careful observations of the New England environment which he made throughout his life
1872: U.S. Congress creates the first national park, Yellowstone, but also passes legislation (still in effect today) allowing private individuals and companies to stake mining claims in public lands for a nominal fee

1891: Forest Reserve Act allows the president to set aside public lands with only restricted uses
1892: The Sierra Club is founded by outdoorsmen to conserve California's wilderness, with John Muir as its first president
1913: After long controversy, Congress passes a law to allow the damming of California's Hetch Hetchy, a dramatic and beautiful valley much like Yosemite; the conflict pitted pragmatic

conservationists like Gifford Pinchot, who favored the dam for the electric power it would produce, against more radical preservationists like John Muir

1949: Aldo Leopold publishes *The Sand Country Almanac*, which argues that all life (human and nonhuman) is connected through its presence in balanced habitats: we all benefit, he said, from the biological diversity of ecosystems

1962: Marine biologist Rachel Carson publishes *Silent Spring* in serial form in the *New Yorker*, on the unintended effects of DDT and other chemical pesticides

1964: President Johnson signs the Wilderness Act, which allows large tracts of land to be protected from development

1966: Victor Yannacone and others sue to stop the spraying of DDT on Long Island; a year later they form the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF); the Ford Foundation provides startup grants to several legally oriented environmental groups, including EDF, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund

1968: Paul Ehrlich publishes *The Population Bomb*, warning of the many risks of rapid population growth around the world

1969: David Brower, dynamic head of the Sierra Club who has radicalized that organization, is forced out and founds the Friends of the Earth; when he is later ousted from that group, he forms the Earth Island Institute

1970: On January 1, President Nixon signs the National Environmental Policy Act; within a decade two dozen other environmental acts will be passed, creating among other things the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

1970: Twenty million Americans participate in the first Earth Day on April 22, aiming to spread awareness of environmental problems and solutions: this is probably the largest single show of support for any cause in U.S. history

Mid-1970s: Within several years, a number of direct-action ecology groups are founded, including Greenpeace, the Environmental Policy Institute, and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society

Late 1970s: Ecology movement helps inspire antinuclear movement against civilian nuclear reactors

1978: Love Canal makes headlines and places toxic waste at the top of environmental agenda; thousands of local environmental groups (sometimes called NIMBYs—for "Not in My Back Yard") are formed

1980: Led by Dave Foreman, former lobbyist for the Wilderness Society, Earth First! is founded on the principle of sabotage against logging, mining, and other incursions into wilderness areas

1981: President Reagan appoints James Watt of Wyoming as Secretary of the Interior as part of the "sagebrush rebellion" of Western businesses and politicians against federal intervention to protect the environment or slow down commercial exploitation; millions join the major environmental groups in response

1990: A conference in Michigan and a book, *Dumping in Dixie* by Robert Bullard, help create the environmental justice movement, which emphasizes that poor communities are the biggest victims of pollution and hazards

Globalization

As economic globalization—defined as the reduction of economic borders to allow the free passage of goods and money anywhere in the world—proceeds largely unchecked by governments, as the United States and other industrialized nations produce larger volumes of hazardous waste, and as the degree of global social inequality also rises,

the frequency and intensity of EJ conflicts can only increase. Nations of the global north continue to export toxic waste to both domestic and global "pollution havens" where the price of doing business is much lower, where environmental laws are comparatively lax, and where citizens hold little formal political power.

Movement leaders are well aware of the effects of economic globalization and the international

movement of pollution and wastes along the path of least resistance (namely, southward). Collaboration, resource exchange, networking, and joint action have already emerged between EJ groups in the global north and south. In the last decade EJ activists and delegates have traveled to meet and build alliances with colleagues in places like Beijing, Budapest, Cairo, Durban, The Hague, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Mumbai, and Rio de Janeiro. Activist colleagues outside the United States are often doing battle with the same transnational corporations that U.S. activists may be fighting at home. However, it is unclear if these efforts are well financed or if they are leading to enduring action programs across borders. What is certain is that if the EJ movement fails inside the United States, it is likely to fail against transnational firms on foreign territory in the global south (see Chapter 33).

Although EJ movements exist in other nations, the U.S. movement has been slow to link up with them. If the U.S. EJ movement is to survive, it must go global. The origins and drivers of environmental inequality are global in their reach and effects. Residents and activists in the global north feel a moral obligation to the nations and peoples of the south, as consumers, firms, state agencies, and military actions within northern nations produce social and ecological havoc in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. Going global does not necessarily require activists to leave the United States and travel abroad, because many of the major sources of global economic decision-making power are located in the north (corporate headquarters, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the White House). The movement must focus on these critical (and nearby) institutions. And while the movement has much more to do in order to build coalitions across various social and geographic boundaries, there are tactics, strategies, and campaigns that have succeeded in doing just that for many years. From transnational activist campaigns to solidarity networks and letter-writing, the profile of environmental justice is becoming more global each year.

After Hazel Johnson's visit to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, PCR became part of a global network of activists and scholars researching and combating environmental inequality in North America, South America, Africa, Europe, and Asia. Today, PCR confronts a daunting task. The area of Chicago in which the organization works still suffers from the highest density of landfills per square mile of any place in the nation, and from the industrial chemicals believed to be partly responsible for the elevated rates of asthma and other respiratory ailments in the surrounding neighborhoods. PCR has managed to train local residents in lead-abatement techniques; it has begun negotiations with one of the Big Three auto makers to make its nearby manufacturing plant more ecologically sustainable and amenable to hiring locals, and it is setting up an environmental science laboratory and education facility in the community through a partnership with a major research university.

What can we conclude about the state of the movement for environmental justice? Our diagnosis gives us both hope and concern. While the movement has accomplished a great deal, the political and social realities facing activists (and all of us, for that matter) are brutal. Industrial production of hazardous wastes continues to increase exponentially; the rate of cancers, reproductive illnesses, and respiratory disorders is increasing in communities of color and poor communities; environmental inequalities in urban and rural areas in the United States have remained steady or increased during the 1990s and 2000s; the income gap between the upper classes and the working classes is greater than it has been in decades; the traditional, middle-class, and mainly white environmental movement has grown weaker; and the union-led labor movement is embroiled in internecine battles as it loses membership and influence over politics, making it likely that ordinary citizens will be more concerned about declining wages than environmental protection. How well EJ leaders analyze and respond to these adverse trends will determine the future health of this movement. Indeed, as denizens of this fragile planet, we all need to be concerned with how the EJ movement fares against the institutions that routinely poison the earth and its people.

Recommended Resources

Robert Bullard. 2000. *Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality* (Westview Press). The foundation of environmental justice studies, this book is a landmark work by the leading scholar in the field who is also the movement's most prominent advocate.

David Naguib Pellow and Robert J. Brulle, eds. 2005. *Power, Justice, and the Environment: A Critical Appraisal of the Environmental Justice Movement* (MIT Press). A hopeful but hard-hitting analysis of how far this young social movement has come and where it might be headed.

Andrew Szasz. 1994. *Ecopopulism: Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environmental Justice* (University of Minnesota Press). A ground-breaking study of the contemporary origins of environmental inequality in the United States and the story of how ordinary activists spear-headed a grassroots revolution to challenge this epidemic.

Neil Tangri. 2003. *Waste Incineration: A Dying Technology* (GAIA). A study commissioned by the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives provides critical details concerning the rise and fall of the global waste-incineration industry.

United Church of Christ. 1987. *Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States* (UCC). The first national study to uncover the relationship between a community's racial composition and the location of waste sites.

Understanding Revolutions
The Arab Uprisings

Jack A. Goldstone

The wave of revolutions [that swept] the Middle East in 2011 bears a striking resemblance to previous political earthquakes. As in Europe in 1848, rising food prices and high unemployment […] fueled popular protests from Morocco to Oman. As in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989, frustration with closed, corrupt, and unresponsive political systems […] led to defections among elites and the fall of once powerful regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and […] Libya. Yet 1848 and 1989 are not the right analogies […]. The revolutions of 1848 sought to overturn traditional monarchies, and those in 1989 were aimed at toppling communist governments. The revolutions of 2011 [fought] something quite different: "sultanistic" dictatorships. Although such regimes often appear unshakable, they are actually highly vulnerable, because the very strategies they use to stay in power make them brittle, not resilient. It is no coincidence that although popular protests have shaken much of the Middle East, the only revolutions to succeed so far […] have been against modern sultans.

For a revolution to succeed, a number of factors have to come together. The government must appear so irremediably unjust or inept that it is widely viewed as a threat to the country's future; elites (especially in the military) must be alienated from the state and no longer willing to defend it; a broad-based section of the population, spanning ethnic and religious groups and socioeconomic classes, must mobilize; and international powers must either refuse to step in to defend the government or constrain it from using maximum force to defend itself.

Revolutions rarely triumph because these conditions rarely coincide. This is especially the case in traditional monarchies and one-party states, whose leaders often manage to maintain popular support by making appeals to respect for royal tradition or nationalism. Elites, who are often enriched by such governments, will only forsake them if their circumstances or the ideology of the rulers changes drastically. And in almost all cases, broad-based popular mobilization is difficult to achieve because it requires bridging the disparate interests of the urban and rural poor, the middle class, students, professionals, and different ethnic or religious groups. History is replete with student movements, workers' strikes, and peasant

uprisings that were readily put down because they remained a revolt of one group, rather than of broad coalitions. Finally, other countries have often intervened to prop up embattled rulers in order to stabilize the international system.

Yet there is another kind of dictatorship that often proves much more vulnerable, rarely retaining power for more than a generation: the sultanistic regime. Such governments arise when a national leader expands his personal power at the expense of formal institutions. Sultanistic dictators appeal to no ideology and have no purpose other than maintaining their personal authority. They may preserve some of the formal aspects of democracy—elections, political parties, a national assembly, or a constitution—but they rule above them by installing compliant supporters in key positions and sometimes by declaring states of emergency, which they justify by appealing to fears of external (or internal) enemies.

Behind the scenes, such dictators generally amass great wealth, which they use to buy the loyalty of supporters and punish opponents. Because they need resources to fuel their patronage machine, they typically promote economic development, through industrialization, commodity exports, and education. They also seek relationships with foreign countries, promising stability in exchange for aid and investment. However wealth comes into the country, most of it is funneled to the sultan and his cronies.

The new sultans control their countries' military elites by keeping them divided. Typically, the security forces are separated into several commands (army, air force, police, intelligence)—each of which reports directly to the leader. The leader monopolizes contact between the commands, between the military and civilians, and with foreign governments, a practice that makes sultans essential for both coordinating the security forces and channeling foreign aid and investment. To reinforce fears that foreign aid and political coordination would disappear in their absence, sultans typically avoid appointing possible successors.

To keep the masses depoliticized and unorganized, sultans control elections and political parties and pay their populations off with subsidies for key goods, such as electricity, gasoline, and foodstuffs. When combined with surveillance, media control, and intimidation, these efforts generally ensure that citizens stay disconnected and passive.

By following this pattern, politically adept sultans around the world have managed to accumulate vast wealth and high concentrations of power. Among the most famous in recent history were Mexico's Porfirio Díaz, Iran's Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Nicaragua's Somoza dynasty, Haiti's Duvalier dynasty, the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, and Indonesia's Suharto.

But as those sultans all learned, and as the new generation of sultans in the Middle East—including Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen—[...] discovered, power that is too concentrated can be difficult to hold on to.

Paper Tigers

For all their attempts to prop themselves up, sultanistic dictatorships have inherent vulnerabilities that only increase over time. Sultans must strike a careful balance between self-enrichment and rewarding the elite: if the ruler rewards himself and neglects the elite, a key incentive for the elite to support the regime is removed. But as sultans come to feel more entrenched and indispensable, their corruption frequently becomes more brazen and concentrated among a small inner circle. As the sultan monopolizes foreign aid and investment or gets too close to unpopular foreign governments, he may alienate elite and popular groups even further.

Meanwhile, as the economy grows and education expands under a sultanistic dictator, the number of people with higher aspirations and a keener sensitivity to the intrusions of police surveillance and abuse increases. And if the entire population grows rapidly while the lion's share of economic gains is hoarded by the elite, inequality and unemployment surge as well. As the costs of subsidies and other programs the regime uses to appease citizens rise, keeping the masses depoliticized places even more stress on the regime. If protests start, sultans may offer reforms or expand patronage benefits—as Marcos did in the Philippines in 1984 to head off escalating public anger. Yet as Marcos learned in 1986, these sops

are generally ineffective once people have begun to clamor for ending the sultan's rule.

The weaknesses of sultanistic regimes are magnified as the leader ages and the question of succession becomes more acute. Sultanistic rulers have sometimes been able to hand over leadership to younger family members. This is only possible when the government has been operating effectively and has maintained elite support (as in Syria in 2000, when President Hafez al-Assad handed power to his son Bashar) or if another country backs the regime (as in Iran in 1941, when Western governments promoted the succession from Reza Shah to his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi). If the regime's corruption has already alienated the country's elites, they may turn on it and try to block a dynastic succession, seeking to regain control of the state (which is what happened in Indonesia in the late 1990s, when the Asian financial crisis dealt a blow to Suharto's patronage machine).

The very indispensability of the sultan also works against a smooth transfer of power. Most of the ministers and other high officials are too deeply identified with the chief executive to survive his fall from power. For example, the shah's 1978 attempt to avoid revolution by substituting his prime minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar, for himself as head of government did not work; the entire regime fell the next year. Ultimately, such moves satisfy neither the demands of the mobilized masses seeking major economic and political change nor the aspirations of the urban and professional class that has taken to the streets to demand inclusion in the control of the state.

Then there are the security forces. By dividing their command structure, the sultan may reduce the threat they pose. But this strategy also makes the security forces more prone to defections in the event of mass protests. Lack of unity leads to splits within the security services; meanwhile, the fact that the regime is not backed by any appealing ideology or by independent institutions ensures that the military has less motivation to put down protests. Much of the military may decide that the country's interests are better served by regime change. If part of the armed forces defects—as happened under Díaz, the shah of Iran, Marcos, and Suharto—the government can unravel with astonishing rapidity. In the end, the befuddled ruler, still convinced of his indispensability and invulnerability, suddenly finds himself isolated and powerless.

The degree of a sultan's weakness is often visible only in retrospect. Although it is easy to identify states with high levels of corruption, unemployment, and personalist rule, the extent to which elites oppose the regime and the likelihood that the military will defect often become apparent only once large-scale protests have begun. After all, the elite and military officers have every reason to hide their true feelings until a crucial moment arises, and it is impossible to know which provocation will lead to mass, rather than local, mobilization. The rapid unraveling of sultanistic regimes thus often comes as a shock.

In some cases, of course, the military does not immediately defect in the face of rebellion. In Nicaragua in the early 1970s, for example, Anastasio Somoza Debayle was able to use loyal troops in Nicaragua's National Guard to put down the rebellion against him. But even when the regime can draw on loyal sectors of the military, it rarely manages to survive. It simply breaks down at a slower pace, with significant bloodshed or even civil war resulting along the way. Somoza's success in 1975 was short-lived; his increasing brutality and corruption brought about an even larger rebellion in the years that followed. After some pitched battles, even formerly loyal troops began to desert, and Somoza fled the country in 1979.

International pressure can also turn the tide. The final blow to Marcos' rule was the complete withdrawal of U.S. support after Marcos dubiously claimed victory in the presidential election held in 1986. When the United States turned away from the regime, his remaining supporters folded, and the nonviolent People Power Revolution forced him into exile.

Rock the Casbah

The revolutions unfolding across the Middle East represent the breakdown of increasingly corrupt sultanistic regimes. Although economies across the region have grown in recent years, the gains have bypassed the majority of the population, being amassed instead by a wealthy few. Mubarak and his family reportedly built up a fortune of between $40 billion and $70 billion, and 39 officials and businessmen close to Mubarak's son

Gamal are alleged to have made fortunes averaging more than \$1 billion each. In Tunisia, a 2008 U.S. diplomatic cable released by the whistleblower Web site WikiLeaks noted a spike in corruption, warning that Ben Ali's family was becoming so predatory that new investment and job creation were being stifled and that his family's ostentation was provoking widespread outrage.

Fast-growing and urbanizing populations in the Middle East have been hurt by low wages and by food prices that rose by 32 percent in the last year alone, according to the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization. But it is not simply such rising prices, or a lack of growth, that fuels revolutions; it is the persistence of widespread and unrelieved poverty amid increasingly extravagant wealth.

Discontent has also been stoked by high unemployment, which has stemmed in part from the surge in the Arab world's young population. The percentage of young adults—those aged 15–29 as a fraction of all those over 15—ranges from 38 percent in Bahrain and Tunisia to over 50 percent in Yemen (compared to 26 percent in the United States). Not only is the proportion of young people in the Middle East extraordinarily high, but their numbers have grown quickly over a short period of time. Since 1990, youth population aged 15–29 has grown by 50 percent in Libya and Tunisia, 65 percent in Egypt, and 125 percent in Yemen.

Thanks to the modernization policies of their sultanistic governments, many of these young people have been able to go to university, especially in recent years. Indeed, college enrollment has soared across the region in recent decades, more than tripling in Tunisia, quadrupling in Egypt, and expanding tenfold in Libya.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, for any government to create enough jobs to keep pace. For the sultanistic regimes, the problem has been especially difficult to manage. As part of their patronage strategies, Ben Ali and Mubarak had long provided state subsidies to workers and families through such programs as Tunisia's National Employment Fund—which trained workers, created jobs, and issued loans—and Egypt's policy of guaranteeing job placement for college graduates. But these safety nets were phased out in the last

decade to reduce expenditures. Vocational training, moreover, was weak, and access to public and many private jobs was tightly controlled by those connected to the regime. This led to incredibly high youth unemployment across the Middle East: the figure for the region hit 23 percent, or twice the global average, in 2009. Unemployment among the educated, moreover, has been even worse: in Egypt, college graduates are ten times as likely to have no job as those with only an elementary school education.

In many developing economies, the informal sector provides an outlet for the unemployed. Yet the sultans in the Middle East made even those activities difficult. After all, the protests were sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old Tunisian man who was unable to find formal work and whose fruit cart was confiscated by the police. Educated youth and workers in Tunisia and Egypt have been carrying out local protests and strikes for years to call attention to high unemployment, low wages, police harassment, and state corruption. This time, their protests combined and spread to other demographics.

These regimes' concentration of wealth and brazen corruption increasingly offended their militaries. Ben Ali and Mubarak both came from the professional military; indeed, Egypt had been ruled by former officers since 1952. Yet in both countries, the military had seen its status eclipsed. Egypt's military leaders controlled some local businesses, but they fiercely resented Gamal Mubarak, who was Hosni Mubarak's heir apparent. As a banker, he preferred to build his influence through business and political cronies rather than through the military, and those connected to him gained huge profits from government monopolies and deals with foreign investors. In Tunisia, Ben Ali kept the military at arm's length to ensure that it would not harbor political ambitions. Yet he let his wife and her relatives shake down Tunisian businessmen and build seaside mansions. In both countries, military resentments made the military less likely to crack down on mass protests; officers and soldiers would not kill their countrymen just to keep the Ben Ali and Mubarak families and their favorites in power.

[…]

The Revolutions' Limits

As of this writing [early 2011], Sudan and Syria, the other sultanistic regions in the region, have not [been overthrown]. Yet Bashir's corruption and the concentration of wealth in Khartoum have become brazen. One of the historic rationales for his regime—keeping the whole of Sudan under northern control—recently disappeared with southern Sudan's January 2011 vote in favor of independence. In Syria, Assad has so far retained nationalist support because of his hardline policies toward Israel and Lebanon. He still maintains the massive state employment programs that have kept Syrians passive for decades, but he has no mass base of support and is dependent on a tiny elite, whose corruption is increasingly notorious. Although it is hard to say how staunch the elite and military support for Bashir and Assad is, both regimes are probably even weaker than they appear and could quickly crumble in the face of broad-based protests.

The region's monarchies are more likely to retain power. This is not because they face no calls for change. In fact, Morocco, Jordan, Oman, and the Persian Gulf kingdoms face the same demographic, educational, and economic challenges that the sultanistic regimes do, and they must reform to meet them. But the monarchies have one big advantage: their political structures are flexible. Modern monarchies can retain considerable executive power while ceding legislative power to elected parliaments. In times of unrest, crowds are more likely to protest for legislative change than for abandonment of the monarchy. This gives monarchs more room to maneuver to pacify the people. Facing protests in 1848, the monarchies in Germany and Italy, for example, extended their constitutions, reduced the absolute power of the king, and accepted elected legislatures as the price of avoiding further efforts at revolution.

In monarchies, moreover, succession can result in change and reform, rather than the destruction of the entire system. A dynastic succession is legitimate and may thus be welcomed rather than feared, as in a typical sultanistic state. For example, in Morocco in 1999, the public greeted King Mohammed VI's ascension to the throne with great hopes for change. And in fact, Mohammed VI has investigated some of the regime's previous legal abuses and worked to somewhat strengthen women's rights. He has calmed recent protests in Morocco by promising major constitutional reforms. In Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, rulers will likely to be able to stay in office if they are willing to share their power with elected officials or hand the reins to a younger family member who heralds significant reforms.

The regime most likely to avoid significant change in the near term is Iran. Although Iran has been called a sultanistic regime, it is different in several respects: unlike any other regime in the region, the ayatollahs espouse an ideology of anti-Western Shiism and Persian nationalism that draws considerable support from ordinary people. This makes it more like a party-state with a mass base of support. Iran is also led by a combination of several strong leaders, not just one: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Parliamentary Chair Ali Larijani. So there is no one corrupt or inefficient sultan on which to focus dissent. Finally, the Iranian regime enjoys the support of the Basij, an ideologically committed militia, and the Revolutionary Guards, which are deeply intertwined with the government. There is little chance that these forces will defect in the face of mass protests.

After the Revolutions

Those hoping for Tunisia and Egypt to make the transition to stable democracy quickly will likely be disappointed. Revolutions are just the beginning of a long process. Even after a peaceful revolution, it generally takes half a decade for any type of stable regime to consolidate. If a civil war or a counterrevolution arises (as appears to be happening in Libya), the reconstruction of the state takes still longer.

In general, after the post-revolutionary honeymoon period ends, divisions within the opposition start to surface. Although holding new elections is a straightforward step, election campaigns and then decisions taken by new legislatures will open debates over taxation and state spending, corruption, foreign policy, the role of the military, the powers of the president, official policy on religious law and practice, minority

rights, and so on. As conservatives, populists, Islamists, and modernizing reformers fiercely vie for power in Tunisia, Egypt, and perhaps Libya, those countries will likely face lengthy periods of abrupt government turnovers and policy reversals—similar to what occurred in the Philippines and many Eastern European countries after their revolutions.

Some Western governments, having long supported Ben Ali and Mubarak as bulwarks against a rising tide of radical Islam, now fear that Islamist groups are poised to take over. […] Yet the historical record of revolutions in sultanistic regimes should somewhat alleviate such concerns. Not a single sultan overthrown in the last 30 years—including in Haiti, the Philippines, Romania, Zaire, Indonesia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan—has been succeeded by an ideologically driven or radical government. Rather, in every case, the end product has been a flawed democracy—often corrupt and prone to authoritarian tendencies, but not aggressive or extremist.

This marks a significant shift in world history. Between 1949 and 1979, every revolution against a sultanistic regime—in China, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran, and Nicaragua—resulted in a communist or an Islamist government. At the time, most intellectuals in the developing world favored the communist model of revolution against capitalist states. And in Iran, the desire to avoid both capitalism and communism and the increasing popularity of traditional Shiite clerical authority resulted in a push for an Islamist government. Yet since the 1980s, neither the communist nor the Islamist model has had much appeal. Both are widely perceived as failures at producing economic growth and popular accountability—the two chief goals of all recent anti-sultanistic revolutions.

Noting that high unemployment spurred regime change, some in the United States have called for a Marshall Plan for the Middle East to stabilize the region. But in 1945, Europe had a history of prior democratic regimes and a devastated physical infrastructure that needed rebuilding. Tunisia and Egypt have intact economies with excellent recent growth records, but they need to build new democratic institutions. Pouring money into these countries before they have created accountable governments would only fuel corruption and undermine their progress toward democracy.

What is more, the United States and other Western nations have little credibility in the Middle East given their long support for sultanistic dictators. Any efforts to use aid to back certain groups or influence electoral outcomes are likely to arouse suspicion. What the revolutionaries need from outsiders is vocal support for the process of democracy, a willingness to accept all groups that play by democratic rules, and a positive response to any requests for technical assistance in institution building.

The greatest risk that Tunisia and Egypt now face is an attempt at counter-revolution by military conservatives, a group that has often sought to claim power after a sultan has been removed. This occurred in Mexico after Díaz was overthrown, in Haiti after Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure, and in the Philippines after Marcos' fall. And after Suharto was forced from power in Indonesia, the military exerted its strength by cracking down on independence movements in East Timor, which Indonesia had occupied since 1975.

In the last few decades, attempted counterrevolutions (such as those in the Philippines in 1987–8 and Haiti in 2004) have largely fizzled out. They have not reversed democratic gains or driven post-sultanistic regimes into the arms of extremists—religious or otherwise.

However, such attempts weaken new democracies and distract them from undertaking much-needed reforms. They can also provoke a radical reaction. If Tunisia's or Egypt's military attempts to claim power or block Islamists from participating in the new regime, or the region's monarchies seek to keep their regimes closed through repression rather than open them up via reforms, radical forces will only be strengthened. As one example, the opposition in Bahrain, which had been seeking constitutional reforms, has reacted to Saudi action to repress its protests by calling for the overthrow of Bahrain's monarchy instead of its reform. Inclusiveness should be the order of the day.

The other main threat to democracies in the Middle East is war. Historically, revolutionary regimes have hardened and become more radical in response to international conflict. It was not the fall of the Bastille but war with Austria that gave the radical Jacobins power during the French Revolution. Similarly, it was Iran's war with Iraq

that gave Ayotallah Ruhollah Khomeini the opportunity to drive out Iran's secular moderates. In fact, the one event that may cause radicals to hijack the Middle Eastern revolutions is if Israeli anxiety or Palestinian provocations escalate hostility between Egypt and Israel, leading to renewed war.

That said, there is still reason for optimism. Prior to 2011, the Middle East stood out on the map as the sole remaining region in the world virtually devoid of democracy. The Jasmine and Nile Revolutions look set to change all that. Whatever the final outcome, this much can be said: the rule of the sultans is coming to an end.

Why Nonviolence Sometimes Fails
China in 1989

Sharon Erickson Nepstad

In June 1989, troops encircled Tiananmen Square in Beijing, where several thousand workers and student protesters were huddled at the foot of the Monument to the People's Heroes. For weeks, students had nonviolently struggled to transform the Chinese communist regime. They had boycotted university classes, mobilized mass demonstrations, staged hunger strikes, and occupied the square. Hundreds of thousands joined the students' call for political change. While they succeeded in capturing the world's attention, they did not usher in a new era of democracy. Instead, a brutal military crackdown caused the students to retreat and brought the movement to an abrupt halt.

Why did the students and their supporters fail? Was it a matter of poor timing, faulty strategy, or a weak organizational base? Was the state's repressive capacity simply overwhelming, eliminating any chance that David could overcome Goliath in this case? What role did structural factors play in the outcome of their struggle? To answer these questions, I begin with a brief overview of the movement's history.

Democratic Stirrings

In the spring of 1988, Beijing University was celebrating its 90th anniversary. Administrators invited alumni to return for the event, and some departed from the official program by sponsoring a discussion on academic freedom and democracy. The conversation, held on a grassy spot near the university entrance, was so engaging that a group continued to hold these "lawn salons" on a weekly basis. By the following winter, "democracy salons" had spread to several other universities.

Students had plenty to discuss at these meetings. Many were concerned about the economy, which was deteriorating because of flawed policies implemented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, the CCP had tried to stimulate economic development by permitting limited private enterprise and introducing modern technology. While this led to initial improvements, a financial crisis erupted in the late 1980s due to some critical mistakes. One mistake was that the government created a twofold structure that included (1) state-owned enterprises,

equipped with skilled personnel and more advanced technology, and (2) private enterprises, mostly owned by rural residents with minimal education and limited technology. Government policies put state-owned industries at a disadvantage by taxing them at higher rates and rigidly controlling workers' wages. Thus state-owned enterprises declined, even though they had superior technology and intellectual capacity. This painted a grim picture for university students since crumbling state businesses did not offer enticing job prospects.

This two-tiered enterprise system also generated rampant inflation and flourishing corruption. The government set quotas and fixed the price of state-manufactured products but allowed private companies to sell surplus goods on the free market for whatever price they could get. This caused inflation rates to rise to double-digit levels. It also enabled officials in the trading business to profit by accepting bribes to increase the quotas to state distributors. Those distributors could then sell the excess goods on the free market at exorbitant prices. The general public was indignant. The government had promised that the reforms would improve people's financial lives; instead, most saw their purchasing power decline precipitously while food and other basic necessities were in seriously short supply. People were even more outraged by the stark contrast they observed between their own suffering and the huge profits that corrupt officials were reaping.

In addition to the financial crisis, Chinese students were also growing frustrated that Deng's economic reforms were not accompanied by political reforms. Freedom of expression was extremely limited, and those who challenged the Chinese Communist Party's practices were often persecuted. In the spring of 1988, one repressive episode was particularly on students' minds: the crackdown that had occurred nearly a decade earlier against "Democracy Wall" activists. The Democracy Wall movement started in 1978 when Deng released hundreds of political prisoners and, for the first time in decades, permitted popular action that was independent of state control. Taking advantage of this new freedom, citizens gathered for discussions along a brick wall near the Beijing bus depot. They covered the wall with hand-written posters addressing various social and political issues. After a while, those posters were transformed into magazines that were sold on location.

Initially, Deng was not concerned about the Democracy Wall movement since it mostly engaged in magazine production of a limited scope. But everything changed in the spring of 1979, when some activists aimed their criticisms directly at party leadership. Activist Wei Jingsheng called on Deng to expand his goal of modernizing four areas—agriculture, industry, science, and technology—to include a fifth arena: politics. […] Not surprisingly, this outraged Deng, who subsequently imposed formal restrictions on Democracy Wall activities. In response, Wei denounced Deng as a "new dictator." Wei was quickly charged with the crime of producing counterrevolutionary propaganda and releasing state secrets. He was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

In 1988, there were new calls for Wei's release, which prompted discussions in the democracy salons. In February 1989, salon participants formed a working group to investigate the conditions of political detainees such as Wei. As a result of their investigation, students drafted a petition calling for democratization, freedom of speech, and the release of all political prisoners. They also developed plans to commemorate two events: the 10th anniversary of Wei's arrest and the 70th anniversary of the "May Fourth movement"—a movement of Chinese intellectuals and students who demanded democracy in the spring of 1929. Thus groups convened inside and outside the university, congregating in coffeehouses, restaurants, bookstores, and research centers. A culture of opposition was growing in these free spaces, and organizers recognized that the anniversary commemorations provided an opportunity to launch resistance activities.[1]

Action Begins

As it turned out, students did not have to wait for the anniversary events since protest erupted earlier than anticipated. It began with the unexpected death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989. Hu had served as the Chinese Communist Party's secretary general until January 1987, when he was

dismissed for failing to crack down on student protests. This turned him into a hero for student activists, even though Hu had not advocated democratic rights. But more importantly, Hu's death provided the pretext for students to mobilize. As one activist, Fang Lizhi, recalled, "Hu Yaobang himself wasn't that important. … But in China, a leader's death serves as an excuse for people to assemble. The party can't very well tell the people not to mourn a Party leader! Since a funeral is the only situation when people can assemble, you take advantage of the opportunity."[2]

Over the next days, thousands of student mourners marched to Tiananmen Square, where they placed a huge painted portrait of Hu at the Monument to the People's Heroes. By April 18, several hundred students staged a sit-in at the Great Hall of the People, located on the west side of Tiananmen Square, which houses the government's legislative and executive branches. The goal of their sit-in was to present a petition to Premier Li Peng. The petition called for an end to corruption and officials' privileges, increased funds for education, freedom of speech, and the right to dialogue with party officials, among other things. But Li Peng never came out to accept the petition; it was only after hours of waiting and kneeling that three members of the National People's Congress (NPC) finally received it. The next day, April 19, more than 100,000 gathered at the square in protest.

Forming Movement Organizations

The sit-in and marches transformed student democracy salons into formal organizations. By April 24, Bejing students from 21 campuses came together to establish the Beijing Provisional Federation of Autonomous Students Association, which became the primary coordinating body for the movement. After electing Wang Dan and Wuer Kaixi as leaders, the federation's inaugural act was a boycott of classes. By the end of April, every university in Beijing was involved in the boycott except the People's University for Police Officers, the School for Diplomats, and the Public Security University.

The government quickly condemned the students' activities in an editorial published on April 26 in the *People's Daily*. Aiming to discredit the students and tarnish their image, the editorial read:

During the period of mourning … an extremely small number of people used the opportunity to fabricate rumors and attack leaders of the Party and state by name, and to deceive the masses.… Taking into consideration the broad masses' grief, the Party and government took a tolerant, restrained attitude to uncertain inappropriate words and actions of emotionally excited young students.… But after the memorial was over, an extremely small number of people with ulterior motives continued to take advantage of the young students' mourning for Comrade Hu Yaobang.… In some universities and colleges, illegal organizations were established and tried to grab power from the student unions by force. Some even took over the schools' public address facilities by force. In some universities, students and teachers were encouraged to boycott classes; students were forcibly prevented from going to classes. …

If we take a lenient, permissive attitude toward this turmoil and just let it go, a situation of real chaos will emerge. … A China with a great hope and a great future would become a China wracked with turmoil, a China with no future. … Illegal demonstrations are forbidden. Going to factories, to the countryside, and to schools to link up with others is forbidden. Those who smash, loot, and burn must be punished according to the law. The normal right of students to attend classes must be guaranteed.[3]

Shortly thereafter, additional rumors spread, indicating that Deng was willing to use violence to stop the protests. "What do we have to fear?" he purportedly claimed. "They are only some 100,000 people; we have three million soldiers."[4]

Militarization

Indeed, Deng was in the process of militarizing the situation. During the first days of student protests, thousands of public security officers and members of the People's Armed Police were deployed. By the time Hu's official funeral ceremony was held, the People's Liberation Army was on full alert. Army commands within the Beijing Military Regime had been moved into "positions of readiness" around the city. And when class boycotts began, 20,000 troops from the 38th Group Army had moved into the Beijing area.

But students had great hopes that they could win the troops' sympathy—especially since some soldiers had friends and family members in the movement. After one university group did research on the armed forces, they concluded that "new recruits were mainly peasants who benefited greatly from reforms. Having a personal investment in the new economy, they were unlikely to be brainwashed easily or to obey orders blindly. Another part of the Army was composed of young officers who had recently graduated from military schools. They were well educated and likely to be sympathetic to the Democracy Movement. … We felt that if we did not go too far, the Army would not present a real danger."[5]

Those feelings intensified when 150,000 students marched on April 27 to protest the *People's Daily* editorial. The line of police stationed outside Beijing University did not stop the march. But when the students arrived at Tiananmen Square, they discovered hundreds of additional security officers, so they quickly changed their plans and marched past the square. As they continued on, the students encountered more police lines. But the police were unarmed, attempting to hold the crowd back merely by linking arms. The students were able to break through police lines with relative ease, evoking cheers from the crowd. After that incident, the troops more or less stayed on the sidelines during the May 4 demonstrations. This reinforced student beliefs that security forces would not engage in a crackdown.

Tactical Innovation

After sponsoring numerous marches that mobilized hundreds of thousands, students saw little in terms of concrete gains. Thus a few suggested embarking on a more radical form of action: hunger strikes. The action began on May 13 as students gathered at the Martyrs' Monument at Tiananmen Square. Within a few days, thousands of students were fasting. Since they refused both food and drink, it did not take long for them to collapse. Between May 14 and May 24, 32 hospitals in Beijing treated 9,158 cases of collapse; more than 8,200 of these individuals were hospitalized.

The hunger strikes were remarkably effective at eliciting solidarity from the broader population,

as more than a million people came to the square to show their support. But the tactic also revealed a division within the movement. A militant faction was emerging, centered around Chai Ling, the leader of the hunger strikes. Other student leaders, who emphasized dialogue and negotiation, called for an end to the hunger strikes so that the movement could prepare for an upcoming meeting with the State Council spokesman. When the meeting took place on May 14, it was disastrous. Craig Calhoun explains why:

> Ultimate blame for the breakdown of negotiations probably must rest with the government's failure to broadcast the dialogue [as it had earlier promised]—its refusal, in effect, to make it public—but the students' internal discord was also a problem. Some of the discord resulted from simple lack of organization and discipline—too many people tried to ask questions at once. More deeply, just as the government was split between those trying to find a way out of confrontation and those prepared to see it escalate (if only to justify repressing it), the students were split between those looking for a basis to withdraw from Tiananmen and build a long-term movement and those seeking to intensify the current confrontation.[6]

Since the negotiations failed, students chose to continue the hunger strikes and remain in Tiananmen Square during Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev's highly anticipated visit, which was scheduled to begin the following day. Gorbachev's visit was significant in that it marked the end of the Chinese-Soviet rift that developed in 1960 between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev. Western journalists were present to cover the event, but protesters stole media attention away from formal diplomatic events. During Gorbachev's stay, Deng's hands were tied. He could not forcefully remove the students without tarnishing China's international image.

Relations with Security Forces

As the movement gained global media coverage, students grew bolder. Their confidence was also related to their belief that the police and the military were increasingly sympathetic to their cause. Several police officials had marched to Tiananmen Square carrying a banner proclaiming, "The

People's Police Love the People." Staff members from the People's Liberation Army's General Logistics Department appeared during a march shouting, "We demand democracy!" A soldier released an open letter to the students, proclaiming, "As soldiers, obeying orders, we cannot support you openly. But we are sons and brothers of the people, Chinese like yourselves. … You have suffered greatly, and we will not remain silent. Let this document support you. … I salute you with the greatest respect!"[7] And a bulletin was disseminated throughout the city that alleged: "The 38th Army has refused to enter Tiananmen Square and carry out clearing operations. … A young Beijing policeman in a letter to the students says, no matter what bureaucrat orders us to suppress you, we will not act."[8]

The troops' camaraderie was not completely surprising because students had made numerous appeals to security officers. To undermine troops' loyalty to the state, students repeatedly reminded them that their duty was to protect the people, not the Chinese Communist Party. Similarly, open letters to soldiers were published, highlighting the discrepancy between corrupt officials' growing wealth and the declining purchasing power of soldiers' salaries. The point was to show that soldiers and protesters shared similar economic hardships and frustrations. The following letter from student activists underscores these points:

> Greetings to all soldiers in the People's Liberation Army! Before everything else, please remember that you are the army of the people and the country, responsible for the protection of their welfare. However, the people here believe in you, and ask you to look at the real nature of things.
>
> You will see that people are suffering, that the future of our nation lies in your support for the university students, some of whom have been on hunger strike for seven days. … We speak with the voice of the people, and want to replace economic manipulation and corruption by the bureaucracy with democracy and legality. What is wrong with that?… Soldiers! We love you, and your hands must not be stained with the people's blood. Facing you there are starving students supported by millions of people. … Soldiers and brothers, please think again, and do not violate the hopes of the people. Think carefully about your own families![9]

Finally, students emphasized the long-term moral consequences of repression: "If you dare to raise your hands against the people … history will forsake you. … You will all remain condemned through the ages."[10]

Divisions within the Movement

By the middle of May, students were riding an emotional high from their successes: the restraint of security forces, an outpouring of support for hunger strikers, and successful international media coverage during Gorbachev's visit. But even during these elated moments, the movement's internal divisions and organizational challenges grew. The hunger strikers, led by Chai Ling, were fighting against student federation leaders Wang Dan and Wuer Kaixi for control of Tiananmen Square. Moreover, there was a huge influx of students from outside Beijing who were demanding a voice in decision-making processes. Frustrated that they were not fully included, they eventually formed their own associations. These divisions—between militant and dialogue-oriented Beijing students and between students from Beijing and those outside the city—led to escalating suspicion, distrust, and rumors. Such rumors were undoubtedly exacerbated by the fact that students in Tiananmen Square had little access to television or newspapers. While they were effective at getting their message out to the wider world, they were not very effective at communicating with one another.

There were also escalating tensions between student protesters and workers who had come to the square to join the movement. Although workers had expressed support for the students early on and had raised funds for the hunger strikers, the students remained hostile and distant. In one report, a group of students linked arms to prevent workers from joining their ranks. They also denied them access to loudspeakers and other equipment. And when the workers' leader, Han Dongfang, stood up to speak at the Monument to the People's Heroes, the students shouted him down, yelling: "Who is this guy? We are the vanguard! Get down, leave!" Consequently, workers formed their own organization, the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation, which drew in roughly 5,500 members.[11]

Divisions within the Government

As conflicts intensified among civil resisters, divisions were also growing among Chinese Communist Party elites, especially between Secretary General Zhao Ziyang and Premier Li Ping. Zhao and Li had been locking horns over policy issues for years. Zhao had pushed for increased reform and modernization in the military and economic sectors. In contrast, Li was a hard-liner who advocated slow and modest change. Zhao was losing stature as the nation's economic troubles grew, but the democracy movement drove an even deeper wedge between the two men. Zhao advocated leniency with the protesters while Li argued that the government should exercise its power to bring the situation under control.

Martial Law

Deng, who served as chair of the Communist Party's Military Commission, sided with Li. This marked the end of Zhao's career and the party's turn toward a hard-line position. This hard-line approach became immediately evident as the party prepared to impose martial law. The news was leaked to the students on May 19; they decided to end the hunger strike so they could prepare for this next stage of confrontation. The following day, May 20, Premier Li officially announced that martial law was in effect.

Students in Tiananmen Square prepared for a bloody confrontation that day. But it did not happen. As the People's Liberation Army headed for the city, tens of thousands of citizens built barricades to stop the tanks and trucks. Citizens offered soldiers food and drink and began pleading with them to not harm the protesters. Student organizers had encouraged this, distributing leaflets that stated, "You must believe in the basic quality of the people's soldiers. Do careful ideological work with them. Don't just tell them to not come into the city: tell them to turn their guns and stand on the side of the people."[12] To nearly everyone's amazement, the soldiers did not push through the barricades or use the weapons they carried—from tear gas to handguns and missiles. Hence the troops remained at a standstill, unable to clear a path

and unwilling to smash through the wall of people.

Within 45 hours, the troops were ordered to withdraw. But retreating proved to be nearly as difficult as advancing, since the masses did not allow them to move. Eventually, after being stuck in their trucks for five days, they were able to disengage. But the soldiers did not vacate the vicinity. They were stationed roughly one to two hours outside the city, where they set up logistics centers, implying that the confrontation was not over.

Although the students had temporarily won the battle to remain in the square, they were still divided over goals, strategies, and leadership. By this point, students from outside Beijing outnumbered local students. The tensions between these groups boiled over on May 27, when Wang Dan of the Beijing Student Association announced the movement's 10-point program. In addition to the aims they had articulated earlier, the new program included a call to remove Premier Li Ping from office and to withdraw from Tiananmen Square after a mass rally on May 30. But students from outside provinces were determined to keep the occupation going until June 20, when the National People's Congress was scheduled to convene. Moreover, they wanted more direct confrontation with the government. Disillusioned with the lack of unity in the movement, several Beijing leaders, including Wang Dan, resigned.

The conflicts took a toll on student resisters, who were quickly growing tired and discouraged. But the movement gained new momentum when the students heard that Shanghai demonstrators had carried a Statue of Liberty replica to City Hall. Students quickly contacted Beijing's Central Academy of Fine Arts, which agreed to make a similar statue dubbed the Goddess of Democracy. When the 37-foot-tall statue was unveiled at Tiananmen Square on May 30, the Goddess gave the movement a new confrontational edge. She was positioned to directly face the official portrait of Mao Zedong—a potentially defiant gesture. Moreover, the sculptors had intentionally made her as large as possible so that it would be difficult to remove her. One sculptor stated, "If they decide to do this, they'll have to smash her into pieces, thereby exposing their antidemocratic faces."[13]

But the enthusiasm generated by the Goddess was short-lived, and the movement rapidly unraveled in the first days of June. Several factors

contributed to this situation. First, the government began to stage its own counterdemonstrations; while those who attended readily admitted that they were paid by the government to participate, it still indicated that the support for the students was not universal. Second, on June 1, soldiers took control of the Beijing television and radio stations, along with telegraph and postal services. They used these media sources to warn residents to stay at home, emphasizing that soldiers and police officers had "the right to use all means to forcefully dispose of those who defy martial law regulations."[14] Third, the movement's internal tensions had escalated to the point that some provincial students attempted to kidnap Chai Ling, the hunger strike leader. The kidnappers were angry over allegations that Chai Ling had misappropriated movement funds. Obviously, movement leaders were not widely trusted or perceived as legitimate. Finally, a growing number of unemployed men had joined the protesters in Tiananmen Square. Some of these men had formed "dare to die" squads that roamed through the area, occasionally vandalizing government property. Their presence made the atmosphere in the square more aggressive and provocative.

The Military Crackdown

On June 3, the army made its fateful move into the city, entering from all directions. Once again, citizens surrounded the trucks, erected barricades, and obstructed the troops' movement. But the tone was different than it had been two weeks earlier, when the people forced the troops to retreat. With emotions running strong, protesters began to vent their anger at the security officers. When police at the Zhongnanhai compound used tear gas, the crowd began throwing rocks. In other areas, local residents spat on soldiers and kicked them. Protesters also captured military vehicles and then climbed onto tanks and trucks to display the helmets, clothing, and weapons confiscated from the soldiers. Behind the Great Hall of the People, demonstrators used tree branches to pound on the buses that carried the soldiers to the square. Near the Princess's Tomb, several miles west of downtown, protesters tried to jam iron rods into the tracks of armored

personnel carriers and tossed Molotov cocktails to ignite the vehicles. And groups of men—mostly young and unemployed—roamed the streets, armed with hammers and wooden clubs, shouting at soldiers. In response, student leaders appealed for nonviolence, but others clearly did not share their commitment to peaceful means.

Shortly thereafter, the troops start shooting. One young man described what he witnessed:

> Without warning, the troops fired on us. People cursed, screamed, and ran. In no time, seventy or eighty people had collapsed around me. Blood spattered all over, staining my clothes. … We saw bodies scattered all along the road. I must have seen several hundred bodies, mostly young people, and including some children. As the army reached Liubukou, an angry crowd of over ten thousand surged forward to surround the troops. This time the soldiers turned on the people with even greater brutality. The fusillades from machine guns were loud and clear. Because some of the bullets used were the kind that explode within the body when they struck, the victims' intestines and brains spilled out. I saw four or five such bodies. They looked like disemboweled animal carcasses. I recall one scene clearly. A man with a Chinese journalist's identity badge on his shirt, waving a journalist's identity card covered with blood rushed toward the troops screaming, "Kill me! Kill me! You've already killed three of my colleagues!" Then I saw them shoot him and when he fell, several soldiers rushed over to kick him and to slash at him with their bayonets.[15]

All over the city, troops resorted to violence to clear the path to Tiananmen Square, killing thousands in the process.

When word of the massacre reached students and workers at Tiananmen Square, there were mixed reactions. Some found it hard to believe that the People's Army would turn against the people. Others prepared to fight. […] Others appealed for consistent nonviolence. […] Some turned in guns and Molotov cocktails while others gathered whatever they could find to defend themselves against the troops.

The troops finally arrived at Tiananman Square around 1:30 A.M., armed with AK-47 automatic rifles. They broadcast a warning over loudspeakers, stating that the People's Liberation Army had shown restraint long enough and was

now prepared to crack down on all those who were defying martial law. Students and workers were ordered to leave the Square or face the consequences. When soldiers fired warning shots, protesters huddled together at the foot of the Monument to the People's Heroes. Once again, students and workers were divided about their next move. Should they evacuate or defend the occupation at all costs? […]

As the protesters debated, a couple of individuals—a rock singer and an intellectual who had just embarked on a new hunger strike—negotiated with the army. […] When the two returned to report on their conversation with the officers, they told the crowd that they must evacuate since they had no remaining bargaining chips and too many lives had already been lost. Student leader Li Lu proposed a vote. Since it was still dark, they conducted a voice vote of either "Evacuate" or "Stand Firm." Although it was close, those wishing to evacuate won out. Within 25 minutes, all the students had left the square. The occupation was over and so, too, was the movement.

Over the next few days, reports of casualties ranged wildly—from government claims of 300 killed to the Chinese Red Cross's estimate of 3,000 deaths.[16] One thing was clear: a massacre had happened. While some citizens spoke of revenge, many were simply trying to get news about current developments. This was difficult since rumors were rampant. These included stories that a young man shot Li Peng in retaliation for the death of his girlfriend. Another rumor was that the 38th Army, which had refused to repress citizens, was battling for power against the 27th Army that had been responsible for much of the slaughter. Still other stories spread that universities were under military occupation.

By June 7, it was evident that no serious political or military battling was taking place and the country would not sink into civil war. The political hard-liners, led by Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, had defeated the uprising, and protesters were no longer on the streets. To ensure that such insubordination did not occur again, the government arrested hundreds of people and court-martialed soldiers who refused orders to arrest. While the movement had been brought to an end, the memory of the uprising would live on.

Factors Contributing to the Uprising's Failure

Why did the movement fail? In the beginning, student protesters appeared to have several factors in their favor. First, the weak economy made the government vulnerable since escalating inflation and corruption angered a significant portion of the population. Second, there was a division within the Chinese Communist Party between those, such as Zhao Ziyang, who sought more wide-ranging reforms and party hard-liners, represented by Li Peng. Third, an easing of political repression in the mid-1980s enabled free spaces to emerge in the form of democracy salons. This fostered a culture of opposition and provided the basis for initial mobilization. Finally, the historic visit of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in the spring of 1989 provided an important political opportunity as a large number of foreign journalists traveled to Beijing. This increased students' chances of broadcasting their struggle to the wider world and potentially winning the support of international community members.

Students acted on these advantageous conditions, quickly forming movement organizations and mobilizing resistance. Protesters used multiple methods over the movement's seven-week life span, including sit-ins, boycott of classes, mass demonstrations, hunger strikes, negotiation, and nonviolent obstruction of troops. Thus the movement's downfall was not due to a lack of tactical diversity, as some nonviolent theorists suggest. Rather, it was partly due to students' failure to withdraw key forms of support from the Chinese Communist Party.

Protesters were able to persuade a large number of Beijing residents to question the authority of the regime. This was evident as hundreds of thousands came out during demonstrations to denounce the government's failed policies and to call for the removal of Premier Li Peng. It was also apparent in the widespread disgust at the state's claim that only 300 individuals (100 troops and 200 civilians and students) had died during the June 4 crackdown. By June 9, an army general revised that estimate, claiming that no students had died. From firsthand experience, many Beijing residents knew that this was a blatant lie, deepening their conviction

that Chinese Communist Party leaders lacked legitimacy.

Civil resisters also withdrew cooperation from the regime by refusing to comply with certain laws. Despite official prohibitions against demonstrating and congregating during the martial law period, people defied orders and remained in Tiananmen Square. Furthermore, this defiance indicates that protesters no longer held mentalities of obedience toward the Chinese Communist Party.

But […] three civil resistance techniques—withholding skills, withdrawing material resources, and undermining the state's sanctioning power—were not successfully used in the uprising. At one point, activists did propose a general strike, which could have weakened the government. But it never materialized. This was partly because student activists alienated workers, pushing them to the margins of the movement. Despite the fact that tens of thousands of workers joined the demonstrations and one trade union donated $27,000 for medical aid to the hunger strikers, students still considered themselves the rightful vanguard of the uprising. One sympathetic worker stated:

> The workers could see that participation was being strictly restricted by the students themselves, as if the workers were not qualified to participate. … The issues that the students raised had nothing to do with the workers. For example, Wuer Kaixi in his speeches only talked about the students. If he had mentioned the workers as well, appealed to the workers … in a sincere manner, the workers might really have come out in a major way.[17]

If the workers had been welcomed and fully incorporated into the movement, the situation might have played out differently. When workers fail to show up at factories, industrial productivity drops, and the economy suffers. When employees refuse to pick up garbage or run transportation systems, the government finds it imperative to act. But when students do not attend classes, the regime does not become more vulnerable.

Another reason a general strike never happened was that managers of state enterprises threatened to fire anyone who participated. But independent entrepreneurs could have gone on strike without fear of such sanctions since they operated autonomously. And many of them were highly sympathetic to the student movement. In fact, a group of entrepreneurs staged a sit-in in solidarity with the students, and many donated funds that enabled the student protesters to buy equipment such as megaphones and fax machines. Another group formed the "Flying Tiger Brigade" that navigated the city on motorbikes to deliver news of troop movements to protesters. Despite their support and assistance, the students held disparaging attitudes toward the commercial entrepreneurs, viewing them as amoral and untrustworthy. When they refused to build a working coalition with them, they lost an opportunity to weaken the regime through the withdrawal of skills and material resources.

Student activists also failed to undermine the state's repressive capacity. This can be done in two ways: (1) by undermining the loyalty of troops and encouraging mutiny and (2) by refusing to be deterred by punishments, persisting through repression. The students did initially win sympathy from police officers and soldiers. When citizens blocked troops from advancing after martial law was declared on May 20, the soldiers did not resort to violence because of the connection they felt to the people. Several high-ranking military officers—including Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, former Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, former Higher Military Academy Director Xiao Ke, former Naval Chief Ye Fie—and 100 others publicly stated that they were sympathetic to the movement.[18]

Why, then, did soldiers shoot on June 3 and 4? There are several answers. One reason is that Chinese Communist Party leaders were aware of the troops' reluctance to take action against the people. So they mobilized vast numbers of additional soldiers—estimated between 150,000 and 350,000—mostly from units outside the area. These newcomers had not been subjected to protesters' appeals over the previous weeks, and thus they were not as hesitant to follow orders. There were even reports that some troops were brought from Inner Mongolia and thus did not understand the Mandarin Chinese spoken in Beijing, making them relatively immune to protesters' pleas.[19] Furthermore, some of the new troops had little knowledge of what had transpired; state

control of the media meant that news of Tiananmen Square activities did not reach every region. Thus, they had little reason to doubt the validity of the orders they received.

Another reason troops obeyed orders to use violence that night was that they faced hostile crowds. Unlike earlier events, when protesters generally had peaceful interactions with soldiers, the evening of June 3 was different. Nonviolent discipline was not maintained. People threw bricks and Molotov cocktails, damaged army vehicles, berated and cursed soldiers. Although such instances were not widespread, they were sufficient to heighten emotions of anger and frustration while changing the atmosphere to an aggressive one, which probably put the soldiers on the defensive. Moreover, while peaceful protests had made it difficult for troops to justify the use of force, this was no longer the case. Some soldiers truly felt that the situation was now out of control and only a heavy hand could save the nation from complete chaos—a line that senior party officials repeatedly iterated.

The aggressive turn among protesters was undoubtedly linked to fatigue from nearly two months of opposition, combined with the infiltration of government *agents provocateurs*. But it additionally reflected weak movement leadership that had not sufficiently prepared people to remain peaceful. In fact, student leaders varied considerably in their commitment to nonviolence, and some argued that resisters had the right to use force against attacking troops. Thus all the divisions within the movement—between workers and students, between Beijing students and those from outside provinces, and between militant and dialogue-oriented protesters—meant that leaders were not able to develop an effective plan to deal with the outbursts of hostility and the looming repression. While the Chinese Communist Party overcame its divisions, with hard-liners gaining ascendancy over reformists, the students did not overcome theirs. This gave the government the upper hand. Soldiers no longer saw confusion from the top; they had clear orders to proceed. Protesters, on the other hand, did not have clear guidance, and subsequently people responded independently and, in some cases, aggressively.

In addition, leaders were unable to minimize the impact the repression had on the movement's future. To generate the backfire dynamic—whereby people are so outraged by a regime's brutality that they fight harder—movement leaders need to frame the situation in a manner that channels outrage into action. In other words, student leaders needed to interpret the crackdown as a temporary setback or even a sign of movement success since regimes typically resort to these measures when they fear their power is slipping away. Moreover, they needed to have provisions in place to enable survivors to persist. But none of the leaders offered these things, in part because the repression was so swift and comprehensive that the movement's leadership was decimated and incapable of responding. As a result, the repression did lead to the movement's demise.

Undoubtedly, other factors played a role as well. For example, protesters' geographical confinement in Tiananmen Square made it easier to physically control and repress the movement. Moreover, since the Chinese government was not highly dependent on other sources for financial support and military reinforcement—as many Eastern European countries were on the Soviet Union—they were less susceptible to any pressures from the international community.

But the CCP's countermoves were one of the most important factors that shaped the struggle's outcome. Initially, the Chinese government tried to undermine movement support by publishing an editorial that denounced student activists as disloyal malcontents driven by ulterior motives. The CCP also tried to amplify its own legitimacy by sponsoring counterdemonstrations. These moves had little effect, and support for the Tiananmen Square resisters continued to grow. But party leaders did find an effective way to reverse the waning commitment of security force members, thereby ensuring that they could carry out a crackdown. The government accomplished this through a twofold method. First, they brought in tens of thousands of outside troops who had not been subject to appeals over the previous weeks of protests. Second, the CCP allegedly promoted hostile actions among citizen supporters. This, coupled with the movement's lack of ability to maintain nonviolent discipline, meant that it was easier for troops to justify the use of repression. Furthermore, the crowd's hostility decreased the likelihood of defections. In fact, when one soldier did defect, angry citizens

beat him to death. As other soldiers witnessed this assault, any thoughts of defection were probably eliminated.

The outcome of this movement, therefore, reflects a combination of factors. The movement was unable to overcome internal divisions, facilitate troop defections, and maintain nonviolent discipline. But the Chinese Communist Party also contributed to this outcome by strategically shoring up its sanctioning powers.

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