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Editors

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CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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PREFACE

This volume of *Comparative Social Research* is devoted to comparative approaches to civil society. Our main focus in editing this volume has been to present comparative studies that allow a deeper understanding of the composition, structure, role, and transformation of civil society around two main themes:

- Civil society regimes
- The democratic role of civil society in activating citizens' participation

THE COMPARISON OF CIVIL SOCIETY REGIMES

Salamon and Anheier have developed a theory about civil society regimes to explain differences between groups of countries based on data from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector project (Anheier & Salamon, 2006; Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon, Sokolowski, & List, 2003). The purpose of the theory is to classify the countries into different groups in which different causal mechanisms are in operation. This echoes by and large Barrington Moore Jr.'s classification of countries according to their "routes to the modern world" (Moore, 1966) and Esping-Andersen's three welfare "regimes" (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1999). The assumption is that there is no single factor that can explain the size and composition of the nonprofit sector in different countries, in contrast to the economic theories of nonprofit organizations. Instead, complex relations exist between, on the one hand, social forces such as the working class, the landed and urban elites, the peasantry, and external powers, and on the other hand, social institutions like the state and the church. As a consequence, countries cluster into four types, social democratic, corporatist, statist, and liberal models, according to size of public welfare spending and scale of the nonprofit sector. The theory is used to explain current patterns in nonprofit sector size and composition when it comes to

employment, revenue, expenditures, and volunteering. That means comparing only a few variables for a large number of countries.

There is an increasing body of research on civil society, governance, citizen participation, and the transnational role of civil society organizations (CSOs). Many countries now have detailed studies of the composition and role of civil society on a national level. There are also a number of comparative studies in this field, mainly based on statistical data. However, we still lack in-depth studies of civil society in smaller number of countries, combining statistical analysis with thick descriptions of the role civil society plays in different social fields. To what extent is it feasible to talk about civil society regimes in relation to different constructions of citizenship and welfare states? To what extent are relations and borders to the business sector changing the CSOs? How are activities on a national level linked to participation in policymaking on a transnational level, in terms of political equality, representation, accountability, and legitimacy?

THE DEMOCRATIC ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMPARATIVE REGIMES

The concept of civil society emphasizes the political role of civil associations that do not belong to the state's sphere or the market's one. Civil society is a polysemous concept, which has been given different contents by authors such as Ferguson (1995), Kant (1991), Hegel (1967), Tocqueville (1955), Arendt (1958), or Habermas (1996). It is however possible to identify three dimensions of civil society more or less emphasized by these authors. Civil society is conceived as *sphere of morality*, as constitutive element of the public sphere, and as basis for the civic community. As a matter of fact, for Ferguson, following the tradition opened by Hobbes and Locke, civil society is the society without the state. The question is to determine how conflicting interests between individuals as well as the exercise of arbitrary power can be limited and regulated. Ferguson's answer is morality, the moral sentiments. Kant and Hegel affirm against Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, the preeminent place of morality in opposition to interest as a foundation of the common life and of civil society. The second dimension, that of *public sphere*, put forward by Kant, Arendt, and Habermas, is based on the distinction made by the ancient Greeks between the private sphere (family, household), which is also the sphere of necessity, and the public sphere (the polis), which is the sphere of freedom and where the public opinion is made. The last dimension, that of *civic community*, emphasized by

Tocqueville and Putnam (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2000), considers civil society as a sphere of mediation between the individual and the state allowing the union between individual interests and the common good. Civic associations are the locus where public spirit, civicness, trust, cooperation, and social capital are constituted, making possible the emergence of a common good, a civic community beyond particular interests. The civil society paradigm consequently insists upon CSOs' role in democracy's functioning (public spaces, intermediation, and school of democracy) as well as their role as agent and spaces of morality allowing the transcendence of particular interests and the constitution of a common good.

From this viewpoint, civil society is considered crucial for the good functioning of democracy and for the plain exercise of citizenship. Indeed, democratic citizenship requires, in addition to a set of formal rights and obligations, a public sphere within which citizens can actively participate within and beyond the state. In addition, new forms of governance, both at the national and at the supra-national level, entail partnership between civil society, public sector, and business enterprises. With the globalization of markets, new kinds of war, increased migration, technological changes, changes in communication, and cultural production, new transnational public spaces are seen to develop at the supra-national and global levels. CSOs and citizens can actively participate outside the mechanisms of representative government.

Several contributions of this volume offer a comparative perspective on civil society as arena for participation and help to better identify the institutional constellations in which civil society may play an active role. They also cast light on the interaction processes and networks of actors operating at different levels.

Social origins theory is used as a point of departure by several of the comparative articles. Some of them compare only two or three countries in depth, in contrast to Salamon and Anheier's research. Other articles by Archambault, Boje, and Sivesind compare civil society in several countries but broaden the number of aspects compared and describe features of each country more in depth. This results in findings that in some cases differ from and in other cases fill in social origins theory.

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PART I
CIVIL SOCIETY REGIMES AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

THE THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE: DOES IT EXHIBIT A CONVERGING MOVEMENT?

Edith Archambault

European Union is widening step by step, passing from the six member states of the origin in 1957, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and Netherlands, to 27 member states in 2007, including recently, the bulk of post-communist countries. In this integration movement, European Union is often compared with the United States owing to its population or its gross domestic product (GDP): a larger population in European Union, 490 million inhabitants, than in the United States, 300 million, while the European and the American GDP are of the same order of magnitude, 10 917 billion € and 10 037 billion €, respectively, in 2006.

Beyond this economic point of view, the resemblance between both regions stops. In opposition to the United States, the European member states do not share a common historical background, a common language, a common foreign policy, or an income redistribution system among the richer and the poorer member states decided democratically. These features are at the roots of the concept of citizenship, and as we remarked a few years ago (Archambault, 2000), there is not yet any kind of European citizenship.

What are the main differences between European and US nonprofit sectors? Firstly, in Europe, there is everywhere a kind of partnership between the third sector and central or local governments and social security as well, while in the United States, its competition with public agencies and

private for-profit corporations is more visible. This difference reflects in the structure of the resources of the third sector in both sides of the Atlantic: the main source of income in Europe is public funding whether grants or contracts,[1] whereas, the American nonprofit organizations rely mainly on fees, charges and other private-resources. Secondly, we find in Europe, a strong ideological competition inside the third sector rooted in a long history tracing back to the Middle Ages for charitable organizations run initially by the Church and to the 19th-century workers movement for organizations more or less linked with the labor unions. By contrast, the US nonprofit organizations seem to be less dependent on the workers movement and more marked by the self-help principle of the pioneers, as Tocqueville pointed out.[2] It reflects also by the Puritan ideology according to which you have to ''give back to the community'' and consider volunteering as the best use of spare time. Thirdly, in Europe, the nonprofit sector is embedded in a larger set of organizations called social economy, including cooperatives and mutual societies, supported by the Brussels institutions and viewed by some authors as an alternative to shareholder-driven capitalism. By contrast, in the United States, the concept of social economy does not exist: cooperatives and mutual societies are considered as standard businesses after the 1980s demutualization trend.

However, the European Union's third sector is not uniform; it shows five clusters of civil society organizations with complex bonds and ties with the surrounding societies and national identities. We will analyze in Section 1 these five clusters, Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Mediterranean, and Eastern, according to their political, social, and economic background,[3] and their main features and use the data issued from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project[4] (Salamon et al., 2004). Section 2 is devoted to the question of a likely convergent evolution of these five clusters in the past decade, according to a mimetic movement that we can observe in the European Commission's policy to disseminate the ''best practices'' but also as a bottom–up trend of civil society organizations working cross-country.

1. FIVE CLUSTERS INSIDE THE EUROPEAN PATTERN OF THIRD SECTOR

The theoretical approach of the five clusters relies on the distinction of the three welfare state regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) (Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, & Myles, 2003). Indeed, Europe as a

whole provides the highest level of social protection and the widest "decommodification" of this social protection. Therefore, the bulk of nonprofit organizations – not only those providing education, health, and social services – cannot be understood without a reference to the kind of welfare state that shaped the whole modern society. The change or crisis of the welfare state over time gives indeed new opportunities to the third sector. We refer also to the social origins theory (Salamon et al., 2004), more global and complex, and try to make this theory more specific in the European Union. Empirical data are numerous because 16 countries over 27 were included in the second phase of the Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Comparative project (CNP2; Salamon et al., 2004). Exchanges among European researchers complete more qualitatively these figures (Salamon et al., 1997).

These theories inspire the first part of the table in annex (Table A1) that shows the framework of the clusters according to the following features:

- The relationship to the government (central/local, high/low level of taxation).
- The main religions and their links with parts of the third sector.
- The labor market situation (unemployment, flexibility, and security) with a special attention devoted to women employment, full-time or part-time, in relation with volunteering.
- The ratio of social protection to GDP, the share of public social expenditure, and the dominant type of social security regime.
- The composition of social economy.[5]

The second part of the table gives the data of CNP2 for the five clusters (human resources inside the third sector, origin of the resources) to compare them to the political, religious, social, and economic background included in the first part.

The five clusters isolated are the following in the mid-1990:

- The Continental or corporatist cluster
- The Anglo-Saxon or liberal cluster
- The Nordic or socio-democrat cluster
- The Mediterranean or emerging cluster
- The Eastern or post-communist cluster

1.1. The Continental or Corporatist Cluster

This ideal type includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Except Austria, these countries were members at the time of

the establishment of European Union in 1957. Switzerland also belongs to this pattern, though not inside European Union.

In these countries, the nonprofit sector is large and embedded by a long-lasting partnership in a political system tending to a bipartisan and a decentralized administrative system. In this federalist context, the subsidiarity principle implies that the government does not provide a service if the family, the local government, or a nonprofit organization has coped with the concerned social issue. The social protection is rather high, with a high level of public social spending and a ''Bismarckian'' form of social security, that is social insurance on a professional and corporatist basis funded by social contributions. This high social protection combines with a labor market with low flexibility, and the unemployment rate is rather high in the countries of this cluster, except Austria and the Netherlands. Many nonprofit organizations were therefore created to help the unemployed to find or resume work and join the mainstream. According to the Bismarckian social security scheme, married women are protected by the health insurance of their husband; in consequence, they are not incited to work. Despite this fact, during the past decades, women participation to labor market increased dramatically in all countries, opening new fields for the nonprofit sector such as child and dependent elderly care. Part-time female employment increased as a partial answer to child care and a way of reducing unemployment.

Catholic mainly or mixing Catholicism and Protestantism, the countries of this cluster have nonprofit organizations marked by religious or political affiliation. This is the pillarization system, culminating in the Netherlands: in this country, people used to stay in their Catholic or Protestant segment from the cradle to the grave, each pillar having its own newspapers, economic interest organizations, labor unions, political parties, radio and TV broadcasting associations, and, of course, schools. Competition between both religions is an encouragement to developing nonprofit organizations. In most countries, except France, the religions have a quasi-public status. In Germany, for instance, the church tax finances religious activities and a part of the health or social activities linked to the Catholic or Protestant pillars, while Catholic schools predominate in Belgium or Netherlands.

In these countries, the nonprofit sector is large and its paid and volunteer work force is eight per cent of total employment in average. It is composed mainly of large organizations, some of them dating back to the Middle Ages. These organizations are federated according to religious or political lines as said earlier: Catholic, socialist, and liberal pillars in Belgium; Catholic and secular in France and Italy; and socialist, Protestant, and Catholic in Germany. Most nonprofit organizations are very professional

(with an average paid/volunteer work ratio of 1.9) and rely less on volunteering in Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Italy than in France or the Netherlands. Conversely, there are also many recent citizen initiatives creating small voluntary associations on advocacy, cultural, or recreation purposes. Large nonprofits are mainly funded by governments or social security, according to the subsidiarity principle; therefore, it is in the Continental cluster that public funding is the highest in Europe, 58 per cent on average. Fees and charges are relatively low as well as individual and corporate giving. Grant-making foundations are growing in all countries, and they become financial intermediaries (Schlueter, Then, & Walkenhorst, 2002). Large-scale cooperatives of all kind exist in all countries of the Continental cluster: mutual societies provide health and insurance services, everywhere except Italy and more than elsewhere in France where cooperative banks are indeed a main financial partner of the third sector. In the Continental cluster, there is an official reference to social economy, and in some countries, the government encourages networking among social economy organizations.

The partnership with public powers is ancient: labor unions, professional organizations, as well as the welfare associations are partners in drafting, testing, and implementing the public policies concerning their fields. The government specifies the quantity and quality of services to be produced and controls the output; different kinds of agreements and regulations precise the partnership with the state, local government, or social security, often with a public funding valid for a number of years. Nonprofit organizations have the state (federal or federated) as their main partner in education and research, the local governments in culture and sports, and social services and local development and social security in the health fields. The Socio-Economic Council that gathers representatives of the so-called organized civil society[6] is the top of this corporatist framework (Archambault, 1997, 2001).

1.2. The Anglo-Saxon or Liberal Cluster

United Kingdom and Ireland follow the European version of the Anglo-Saxon countries liberal ideal type, more represented in North America (United States and Canada) and in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). The voluntary organizations in United Kingdom are in a closer relationship with government than their counterparts in overseas countries, the former British Empire.

In United Kingdom and Ireland, the political background is centralized, but local governments are strong and their power is growing. The tax level is lower than in the Continental pattern. Contrasting with the preceding cluster, the labor market is flexible, with a low security and a low unemployment rate, meaning a high job turnover. The level of women employment is high, but as most of them work part-time, this leaves them time to care their children or volunteer. Volunteerism indeed is high, rooted in history, and included in school curriculum, and it is considered as a way of socialization.

The welfare state was initially Beveridgian, that is, universalistic, based on citizenship and funded by tax. However, since the Thatcher's era, the social protection was declining in United Kingdom. More and more means tested benefits appear transforming partly the Beveridgian social security system into assistance to the poorest. In Ireland, social protection was initially low and remains under such conditions for competitive reasons.

In United Kingdom, the hegemonic religion is Protestantism and Catholicism in Ireland. The competition through nonprofit organizations among religious denominations or congregations inside the main religion, as well as among ethnic communities in countries with high immigration, provoked the growth of the nonprofit sector. Another cause of this growth is the contracting-out behavior of central and local governments in the field of social services, health, and education, which is a way of privatization of the Welfare state.

The Anglo-Saxon cluster relies on voluntary organizations of all sizes. This term insists on the symbolic function of volunteering, relying on a long-lasting tradition of private initiative, individualism and Puritanism (or Catholic charity in Ireland). In the United States, philanthropic initiative is traditionally opposed to central government bureaucracy, while it works in close partnership with town councils and other municipal powers in the European islands (Kendall & Knapp, 1997; Donoghue, 1998).

Inside nonprofit organizations, volunteer and paid work mix rather well. The core of the nonprofit sector is composed of charities.[7] Paid employment goes first to education, the main sector in both countries, private universities mainly in United Kingdom and catholic schools in Ireland; then, it is directed toward health in Ireland and social services in United Kingdom. Volunteering is mainly oriented as everywhere in Europe toward culture, sports, and recreation, then social services and local development. Wage earners are skilled and the top staff graduated in nonprofit management or other focused curricula. Umbrellas gather voluntary

organizations according to either ideological lines or activities. These umbrellas provide regular statistical data on charities, and they create self-controlled ethical rules.

These independent and private organizations have a greater variety of resources than in the other patterns. Public resources are shifting from grants to contracts, often in competition with other nonprofits or standard businesses. Donations are higher than elsewhere and private earnings are diversified: lotteries, charitable shops, ethical investments, deductions on the wage bill, and giving checks are British innovations that spread on the Continental countries. Finally, foundations and trusts are decisive financial intermediaries (Dogan & Prewitt, 2007).

1.3. The Nordic or Socio-Democrat Cluster

In the countries belonging to the Nordic cluster, maybe the most specific, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, socio-democrat governments ruled with few alternations throughout the 20th century. These countries are small and centralized, and local governments have less power than in the preceding clusters. Owing to a high tax level, accepted by the population, the socio-democrat welfare state provides directly education, health, and social services. Only one per cent of students, for instance, attended a private school in Sweden in the early 1990s (Lundstrom & Wijkstrom, 1997). The social security scheme is Beveridgian, that is unique, universal, uniform, and funded by tax.

In these countries, the third sector is smaller than in the preceding clusters (6.4 per cent of total employment comparing to 8 per cent in the Continental and 9.4 per cent in the Anglo-Saxon clusters). It is called voluntary as in Anglo-Saxon countries, but the term of charity has a negative connotation as in the Continental cluster. Though some parts of this voluntary sector trace back to the popular movements of the end of the 19th century, its main part is more recent than in the preceding clusters. It is composed of small organizations grouping into umbrellas according to their main activity. In the welfare state fields, education, health, and social services, nonprofit organizations fill the few gaps of the welfare state, following a reverse subsidiarity principle. For instance, associations for sick and disabled provide information and support supplementing the public system and also alternative expertise and advocacy.

Most voluntary organizations are member-serving, as the state fulfills general interest purposes. The field of culture, sports, and recreation is the

first one, from far, followed by social and professional organizations, consumer defense, and child care. Many nonprofits act as lobbies putting pressure upon central and local governments. But it is also in the Nordic countries that the organizations advocating for peace, conflict resolution, or Human Rights are many, as well as NGOs channeling a public aid to developing countries higher than 0.7 per cent of GDP, a target that few countries reach.

The labor market is characterized by "flexisecurity," a combination of high flexibility and high security of work. Nordic women are working nearly at the same level as men, but they work mainly in the public sector and often part-time. Despite this fact, volunteering is the highest of all European clusters, and the paid/voluntary employment ratio is 0.6. Therefore, the Nordic third sector is the only one in Europe to rely more on volunteer work than on paid employment. More than half of volunteer time is devoted to sports, culture, and recreation associations, but the society-oriented organizations attract new volunteers. The main religion is Lutheran Protestantism, a quasi-public institution entitled to a church tax in Nordic countries, despite the recent separation between church and state in Sweden. However, the influence of religion on the voluntary sector is low and declining.

The resource structure of the sector in the socio-democrat pattern is diversified, relying on volunteering and dues or fees as main resources. Conversely, public funding is lower than in the two preceding patterns, one-third of total resources, while the level of giving is higher than in the corporatist pattern. Many grant-making foundations afford new resources to nonprofit organizations, the most famous is obviously the Nobel foundation for scientific research.

Some parts of the voluntary sector are in a loose relationship with agricultural, housing, and consumer cooperatives, and many of them are in a tighter partnership with the mighty labor unions in a crossed relationship. If the membership of the Nordic labor unions is so high, it is partly due to the advocacy, cultural, and social services offered by their voluntary subsidiaries. Conversely, labor unions support them.

1.4. The Mediterranean or Emerging Cluster

The Mediterranean countries that illustrate this pattern – Spain, Portugal, and Greece – have a recent nonprofit sector because of the restriction or

even prohibition of the freedom of association during the authoritarian or dictatorial regimes that these countries went through during the 20th century. Because of its recent origin, the nonprofit sector in this emerging pattern is less developed than the preceding ones: half of the Continental or Anglo-Saxon patterns and even less than the Nordic one.

Narrower, the nonprofit sector is also in a situation of conflict between the state and the main religion, Catholicism (or Orthodoxy in Greece). This conflict calmed down with the secularization of many previous religious organizations such as schools, hospitals, or social services. However, a part of the nonprofit sector is linked with the left-wing political parties, labor unions, or large cooperative networks, whereas another part is still run by catholic congregations. For most countries, the disestablishment of the Church is still at the agenda; therefore, nonprofit organizations are viewed as assets in the competition between the clerical and the secular camps and few of them have a foot in both camps.

The socio-political background is characterized by a weak central government and mighty regional and local governments. Social protection of these countries is rising since the entry in European Union, with a mix between Bismarckian (old age and disability) and Beveridgian (health) social security schemes. Southern European countries are yet more rural than the Northern ones, and spatial inequalities are deeper. The labor market is characterized by a low flexibility and a low security of work and a mean to high unemployment. Women are working less than in the other clusters. Volunteering is scarce because self-help, mainly by women, still exists inside the extensive family, the parish, or the village. But this informal volunteering was recently challenged by the increased participation of women to paid employment, mainly full-time. That is why the paid/volunteer ratio is the same as in the Continental cluster: 1.9.

As in the Continental pattern again, the social service field is the largest part of the nonprofit sector, with the recent dissemination of social cooperatives in Mediterranean countries, after Italy; education comes second, with catholic schools that are less supported by government than in Belgium, France, or the Netherlands and that charge more fees and giving. Then comes local development to reduce spatial inequalities and stress the mighty local power.

The nonprofit sector of Mediterranean countries relies mainly on private commercial resources; public funding have less importance, one-third of total resources, as in the Nordic countries. Private individual or corporate contributions are rather high, and foundations are scarce but large.

1.5. The Eastern or Post-Communist Cluster

This cluster may include all post-communist countries, including those of the former Yugoslavia. However, data come from the five countries included in CNP2, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, all new comers in European Union. Of course, these countries and their nonprofit organizations are deeply shaped by their recent historical background. Before the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, there was no freedom of association and the existing ones were mainly in the field of culture, sports, and recreation, some of them hiding more political organizations. The most famous of these semi-clandestine organizations is of course Solidarnoc. As these organizations play a major role in the collapse of the communist regimes through the organization of civil society, the term of civil society organizations is the most common in the post-communist countries.

Since 1989, the third sector grew rapidly in all countries, but as it started nearly from scratch, it is much smaller than in the other European clusters: 1.2 per cent of total employment. It is as professional as in the other clusters (except the Nordic one) with a paid/volunteer ratio of 2.0. During the transition period, the growth of civil society organizations was fueled by private (Soros Foundation) and public international support. Foreign public assistance was a competition field between U.S. Democracy Network intended to develop civic advocacy, human rights, civic education, and environment protection organizations and European Union's more institutional approach promoting the former communist countries to the dominant standards in Europe, nearer to the Continental pattern (Saulean & Epure, 1998). During the communist regime, the State provided all health, education, and social services as well as in the Nordic countries, but not with the same quality standards. Therefore, the partial privatization of these welfare services is a field of competition among civil society organizations and forprofit businesses. New social cooperatives or mutual societies also enter in competition, despite the bad reputation of cooperatives considered as aftermath of the communist period.

Except Poland, the Eastern countries are small and centralized. Religion has no or little influence on the civil society organizations, with the exception of Poland where the Catholic Church resumed its previous status and retrieved its seized property. Before 1989, indeed, the Polish Catholic parishes and congregations were independent of government resources and became the main distributor of the relief aid from western countries; they sheltered civic initiatives, including Solidarnoc (Les, Nalecz, & Wygnanski,

2000). The labor market of Eastern countries combines high flexibility, low security, and high unemployment. The female employment is high and full-time. The social protection is the lowest in Europe; the social security scheme is a mix of the Beveridgian regime inherited from the communist period and a means tested assistance, nearer to the Anglo-Saxon pattern, but lower.

In this context, associations and foundations mushroom, the later are now more regulated because in some countries they were run by former communist officials who transferred resources from the state by this channel. They are still mainly oriented toward culture and recreation, but health and social services are rapidly growing. Their income come first from fees and dues (54 per cent), and public funding is lower than elsewhere in Europe, 28 per cent of total resources. Private giving is higher than in the other clusters: this paradoxical fact in low-income countries can be explained first by foreign assistance, the bulk of giving in Romania, but also by very favorable tax exemptions to donors and the dissemination to other countries of the "one per cent"[8] initiated by Hungary to foster philanthropy.

To conclude this part, we have to outline that these clusters are ideal types, in the sense of Max Weber, more than a description of a moving reality. Many countries do not fit with the ideal type and could be placed elsewhere. We have chosen to follow approximately in Table A1 the enlargement of European Union, from left to right,[9] but Italy of course is between the Mediterranean and the Continental clusters, Ireland between the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon ones, the Netherlands between the Nordic and the Continental ones, and Slovenia between the Eastern and the Continental ones. In addition, the clusters we have depicted are changing as the years go by. Are these changes exhibiting a converging movement toward a more common European pattern?

2. IS A CONVERGING MOVEMENT OF THE FIVE CLUSTERS A LIKELY FORECAST?

We firstly observe that a converging movement may be observed in the background of the third sector organizations that is often the necessary condition if not the sufficient one. However the top–down movement coming from European institutions encouraging the nonprofit organizations and disseminating the best practices is ambiguous, and a bottom–up convergence toward a European civil society seems more likely.

2.1. A Convergence is Observed in the Political, Social and Economic Background of the Third Sector of the Member States

Most European member states are facing common trends in their political and socio-economic backgrounds:

- From the political point of view, the convergence toward a decentralized government and administration in the large member states is the main point. The Decentralization Acts in France (1983, 2003) and the 1999 Devolution in United Kingdom are examples of this movement to join the mainstream pattern. Conversely, the less populated member states keep their centralized government. Another trend toward a bipartisan system is less clear. These changes of course have consequences on the partnership with the third sector at the local level. *Ceteris paribus*, decentralization is favorable to the development of civil society organizations (Salamon et al., 2004; Enjolras, 2008).
- The tertiarization of the economy of all member states, the increased pressure of the global economy on their social security systems and public expenses, the direct comparability of the prices of goods and services inside the Eurozone, the development of European multinational corporations, and intra-Europe migration and tourism are shared economic trends that shape deeply the third sector. Its organizations are indeed quasi-exclusively tertiary everywhere in Europe. They can supplement or replace social security benefits or public goods in case of retrenchment of public expenses. Intra-European migration and tourism incite to cross-country cooperation and exchange between nonprofit organizations: for instance, nursing homes and residential facilities for the elderly and the disabled developed in borderline zones of the country with lower wages and attract clients from other countries.
- The European countries share also deep sociodemographic trends, such as an ageing society, due to a higher life expectancy and a lower fertility rate, which put pressure on elderly pensions and imply immigration flows from the rest of the world. Another trend is the increasing participation of women to the labor force everywhere, with a difficult conciliation between family and work lives. Religion is growing from scratch in post-communist countries, while the other European countries are more and more secular. An educated middle-class exists also everywhere, even in the less-developed new member states, giving opportunities for new social entrepreneurs. All these trends are in favor of the development of new

nonprofit organizations, and these new organizations are more similar than the older ones because of a mimetic attitude.
- Finally, the cultural backgrounds of the European countries mix as well. Recent Eurobarometers show that the values are more and more similar, especially among the youth. European universities are brought nearer by the Bologna process,[10] and Erasmus programs make a European course of studies more frequent. Cultural exchanges have often a nonprofit organization as vehicle, whether in the linguistic exchanges of students or the twining of cities (Flash Eurobarometer, 2006).

In this changing background, the convergence of the European countries is consistent with the higher growth rates of GDP in the new than in the ancient member states, in a catch-up movement.[11] It is also consistent with the reconciliation of the ideal types of social security schemes, Bismarckian, Beverdgian, and assistance in new forms of welfare mix where third sector organizations, including mutual societies, take an increasing part and the state a decreasing part (Ascoli & Ranci, 2002). When the level of public social expenditure increases in Mediterranean and in some Eastern countries, it is decreasing in the Nordic countries, including Sweden, where social cooperatives or other nonprofit organizations are new actors in the field of new social services in partnership with the government and with a large participation of citizens to the co-production of the services (Pestoff, 2009).

What are the consequences of these movements on the five clusters? Of course, the first one is that nowadays, the Mediterranean cluster, and maybe the Eastern one later, tends to disappear in a mix of the Continental and Anglo-Saxon pattern.

Secondly, the Continental cluster becomes less corporatist, with a decreasing influence of the social partners and consultative bodies and a more neo-liberal spirit in Germany and Austria. In these countries, an opening of the subsidiarity principle to commercial businesses challenges the quasi-monopolistic position of the free welfare organizations. A new volunteerism, less official and honorary than the traditional one, took place recently. The Netherlands met a depillarization movement in the late 20th century, when the Catholic and socialist labor unions unified and the Catholic and the Protestant parties merged in a single Christian-democrat Party (Burger & Dekker, 2001). In France, the decentralization was a great opportunity for the third sector with a contracting-out of the local powers toward nonprofit organizations, sometimes with quasi-markets relying on tenders, and since 2006, the competition increased in the proximity social services.

Thirdly, the Anglo-Saxon voluntary organizations became more involved in a partnership with the central government. In United Kingdom, the level of social protection rose during the second Blair government up to the mean level of the Continental cluster, reversing the declining trend since the Thatcher government. Moreover, the Third Way (Giddens, 1998) inspiring the Labour Party governments prefers the partnership between the voluntary organizations and the government to the contract and insists on combating social exclusion. Therefore, in 1998, Compacts were signed in England, Wales, and Scotland, which give a larger public support, acknowledgment, and independence to the voluntary sector. Expert groups reinforce the Compacts that are introducing some kind of subsidiarity in the Anglo-Saxon cluster. At the same time, new forms of social enterprises appear in United Kingdom and Ireland (companies limited by guarantee, industrial, and provident societies) beside charities, trusts, or friendly societies.

Finally, even the very specific Nordic cluster imports some of the features of the other patterns under the pressure a smaller proportion of the GDP going to public social expenditure and a growing part of nonprofit organizations and cooperatives in the provision of welfare services. Private schools mushroom, whether nonprofit or for-profit. The relationship between labor unions and voluntary organizations becomes looser. Other popular movements such as laymen protestant mission, alcohol temperance, women health organizations, farmers, and fishermen movements revived or developed recently. Conversely, other clusters copy the lobbying methods and the advocacy force of the Nordic countries.

In this converging movement, the hybrid countries, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and so on, play a strategic role of go-between.

2.2. The Ambiguity of the Top–Down Movement Coming from European Institutions

Through the ups and downs of its history, the European Union tries to bring together the various clusters and stresses that a vibrant nonprofit sector, included in a larger social economy, is an important part of its identity. However, European institutions have an ambiguous relationship with the third sector or the social economy organizations (Kendall & Anheier, 1999).

On the one hand, the nonprofit and social economy umbrellas have representatives in Brussels, they work more and more together to advocate for their field. The European Commission encourages the creation of platforms of nonprofit organizations working on the same field in the

various member states. The Commission asks these platforms advice on the policy concerning their fields and facilitates the benchmarking among the countries to adopt the best practices. This kind of partnership can be interpreted as a corporatist experience due to the identity of the six founding member states; the European Social and Economic Council could be viewed as the crown of this corporatist pattern. The Commission and the European Parliament published as well many reports enhancing the role of the third sector or social economy in Europe and launched research tenders on those under-researched topics.

On the other hand, the European treatises consider two categories of economic actors, businesses and public agencies, leaving no place for the specificity of third sector organizations. The European courts usually condemn the public support to organizations in competition on the same market with standard businesses as unfair competition, with a shift from grants to contracts in the public support as a result. This "fair competition" rule may extend soon to the social services of general interest provided by third sector organizations and transform them into purely commercial businesses. Finally, the Barroso Commission abandoned the project of a European legal status of association, the first draft of which was written 20 years ago. This draft status of European association was aimed to facilitate the cross-border action of the large civil society organizations.

Of course, European institutions have been in standby after the crisis provoked by the negative answer of the French and the Dutch to the referendum on Constitutional Treaty in 2005. But the 2007 Lisbon Treatise gives a new start to a more political European Union. However, this treatise maintains the subsidiarity principle and the fair competition on the market as two pillars of the European institutions.

2.3. A Bottom–Up European Civil Society is Emerging

Facing this ambiguous position of European authorities, a bottom–up movement coming from third sector organizations helps to build the organizational infrastructure of a coming European civil society, next to the existing common market and the future new political institutions that will result due to the implementation of the Lisbon Treatise (Anheier, 2002). In fact, European authorities pay attention to civil society organizations to fill the gap of democracy and fight bureaucracy, their two Achilles' heels. In this sense, the European third sector could help the Lisbon treatise to be implemented.

Firstly, many ancient or more recent organizations work already cross borders: the Red Cross, Scouts, Caritas, Greenpeace, Medecins sans Frontières, Amnesty International, and so on, to quote some of them. Most of them lobby at Brussels, especially on poverty and social exclusion issues, and they create social ties among the member states. European or International networks are created by the organizations themselves, such as ICFO, created in 1978, to disseminate the best practices in the independent monitoring or self-regulation of fundraising organizations. A more recent example is EUCLID, the European network of third sector leaders, launched in 2007 in Paris on a British initiative of ACEVO.[12]

Secondly, membership organizations are by tradition schools of democracy, fostering civic spirit and responsibility. The largest organizations experimented in the past decades a multi-stakeholder governance, near the future political scheme of the Lisbon Treatise. In a market-oriented economic union, institutional mechanisms to balance self-interest are a necessary but not a sufficient condition, and some level of public spirit is needed that the third sector can afford in addition to the political institutions. At a local level, the organizations created to enhance the friendship between two countries, to foster linguistic, cultural, or sports exchanges or to twin European cities that are of course building the European civil society. The periodic widening of the European Union opens new fields to this civil society and prevents it to be closed on its privileged position.

Thirdly, some associations, and many among the more recent ones, are primarily advocating for another form of economic mainstream arrangement than the shareholder-driven form of capitalism. They fight also for a more egalitarian world and more ecological production and consumption. They give a voice to the underprivileged and they try to invent other forms of exchange, money, artistic expression, and so on. These anti-establishment nonprofit organizations or NGOs could play a major role in the future European policy, as they already did in many World forums or World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings. A role of critical analysis of course, but they could also propose new projects or agenda by using the right of petition included in the Lisbon Treatise as well; the third sector networks could get hundreds of thousands of signatures through the Internet more easily than the political parties or labor unions. This utopian function in building a more vibrant European Union could propose alternative projects, experiment new ways of living together, and create new ideologies and new forms of values affirmation. In a sense, the utopian role of civil society organizations is a way to refer to the age of Enlightment, one of the most innovative periods in Europe.

3. CONCLUSION

The European third sector is one and diverse. In every of the five clusters isolated, the actors of the nonprofit and the public sector have understood that cooperation is better than competition: the third sector can detect new issues, innovate to cope them, and experiment alternative answers to the new questions as well, while the public sector has the right to raise taxes and the duty to secure an equal access of citizens to the public goods. That is why all the clusters, not only the Continental one, have built more or less recently a partnership between the third sector and the government at all levels, local, national, or European. Some of the values of the third sector are nowadays disseminated in the corporate sector as well, under the themes of corporate responsibility and governance. Despite some mismatches and crisis, European Union and the third sector have to work together to a more civilized globalization.

NOTES

1. Nordic countries are an exception to this ideal type that fits with the bulk of European population.
2. de Tocqueville (1835): "Partout où, à la tête d'une entreprise nouvelle, vous voyez en France le gouvernement et en Angleterre un grand seigneur, comptez que vous apercevrez aux Etats-Unis une association." "In any new endeavour's leadership, you can see in France the government and in England a landlord, but in the USA you find an association."
3. Neglecting, because of the limited dimension of this chapter, the most important and complex one: the historical background (Salamon et al., 2004; Archambault, 2001).
4. Hereafter designed as CNP2.
5. Social economy, a concept of French origin, includes cooperatives, mutual societies, associations and foundations. This concept is now used by European Union institutions. For an analytical point of view, see Archambault and Kaminski (2004).
6. The Socio-Economic Council gathers representatives of agriculture, manufacturing, and service industries; of crafts and commerce; and of cooperatives, mutual societies, and associations. That is, any organization, for profit or nonprofit, but the public sector. This large scope contrasts with the common acceptation of civil society.
7. The Charity Commission, a public agency inside the Home Office with independent board members, holds the list of charities. To be registered as a charity, a nonprofit organization has to fulfill several cumulative conditions. The charity has to send annual reports and accounts to the Charity Commission.

8. According to this Hungarian tax arrangement, the taxpayers are authorized to allocate one per cent of their tax to the nonprofit organization of their choice. Italy has recently adopted the same income tax arrangement, at the level of 0.5 per cent.

9. The dates of the creation and enlargement of European Union are the following: 1957 – Treatise of Rome among the founding member states, Belgium, France, Germany(West), Italy, Luxemburg, and Netherlands; 1973 – Denmark, Ireland, and UK; 1981 – Greece; 1986 – Portugal and Spain; 1995 – Austria, Finland, and Sweden; 2004 – Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; 2007 – Bulgaria and Romania.

10. The Bologna process is a standardization of the courses of study in the European universities, on the American pattern: licence (bachelor's degree), master (graduate), and doctor (PHD).

11. This chapter was written before the financial crisis that widens now the gap between the ancient and the new member states.

12. Association of Chief Executives in the voluntary organizations.

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ANNEX

Table A1. The Five Clusters of the European Pattern: the Political, Social, and Economic Background[a].

Clusters	Continental (or Corporatist)	Anglo-Saxon (or Liberal)	Nordic (or Socio-Democrat)	Mediterranean (or Emerging)	Eastern (or Post-Communist)
	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and [Switzerland]	United Kingdom and Ireland	(Denmark), Finland, [Norway], and Sweden	(Greece), Portugal, and Spain	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia
Background					
Central government	Decentralized; subsidiarity mighty (féderalism)	Centralized	Centralized	Decentralized	Centralized
Local governments		Rather mighty	Weak	Mighty	Weak
Tax level	Mean to high	Low	High	Low and unclear	Mean to high
Main religion(s)	Catholic or Catholic/ Protestant	Protestant UK Catholic (Ireland)	Protestant	Catholic Orthodox (Greece)	Catholic or no religion
Labor market:					
Flexibility	Mean to low	High	Mean to high	Low	Mean to high
Sécurity	Mean to high	Low	High	Low	Low
Unemployment	High (except Austria and Netherlands)	Low	Mean to low	Mean to high	High
Women employment	Variable, Part-time +	High, Part-time +	High, Part-time +	Low, full-time	High, Full-time
Social protection expenses/GDP	Mean to high 26-31%	UK: mean: 28% Ireland: low 16%	Mean to high 26-33%	Weak to mean 20-25%	Weak 14-20%
Type of social protection scheme	Bismarckian	Beveridgian/assistantial	Beveridgian	Bismarckian/Beveridgian	Beveridgian/ assistantial

Social economy					
Cooperatives	All kind, large-scale coops	Consumers coops	Agricultural and consumers coops	All kind, large-scale coops	Ancient, mainly agriculture
Mutual societies	Health and insurance, except Italy	Housing mutuals, recent demutualization	Few mutuals	Few and weak	Very weak or non-existent
Associations	Many large associations Growing citizen initiatives	Many, all size voluntary organizations	Culture and recreation voluntary organizations, mainly,	Recent, growing nonprofit organizations including social coops	Very recent civil society organizations, culture, and recreation mainly
Foundations	Recent and growing	Many in UK, few in Ireland	Many, grant-making	Recent and growing	Many, recent (1% of tax)
Characteristics					
Human resources in the TS as % of total employ	**8.0%**	**9.4%**	**6.4%**	**4.3%**	**1.2%**
Paid employment (FTE)	5.2%	6.5%	2.3%	2.8%	0.8%
Volunteering (FTE)	2.7%	2.9%	4.1%	1.5%	0.4%
Paid/voluntary	1.9: professional	2.2: professional	0.6: voluntary	1.9: professional	2.0: professional
Paid employment mainly directed toward	Social services+, Santé, Education	Education+, culture, Health (Ireland), social (UK)	Culture and recreation, social, professional organization	Social+, education, Local development	Culture and recreation +, education, social
Volunteering mainly directed toward	Culture and recreation, social, advocacy	Culture, social, Local development	Culture and recreation +, advocacy	Social, culture, and recreation	Culture and recreation, social
Partnership with: central government	Education	Compacts	Beginning in social services	Partnership with regions	Beginning partnership in social services
Social security	Health, social services	Partnership with local municipalities	Partnership with local municipalities		
Local governments	Culture, social, local development				

Table A1. (*Continued*).

Clusters	Continental (or Corporatist)	Anglo-Saxon (or Liberal)	Nordic (or Socio-Democrat)	Mediterranean (or Emerging)	Eastern (or Post-Communist)
	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and [Switzerland]	United Kingdom and Ireland	(Denmark), Finland, [Norway], and Sweden	(Greece), Portugal, and Spain	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia
Origin of the resources of the third sector					
Public sector	**58%**	**47%**[b]	33%	32%[c]	28%
Private commercial	37%	45%	**59%**	**49%**	**54%**
Private giving	5%	9%	7%	19%	18%

Abbreviations: TS, third sector; FTE, full-time equivalent.

Source: Abramovici (2005), Archambault (2002), Salamon et al. (2004) and author's calculations.

[a]Roughly, the enlargement of the European Union goes from left to right. [Inside hooks]: countries outside the EU. (Inside brackets): countries not included in the JH CNP2.

[b]We give there the composition of the resources of United Kingdom. The resource structure of Ireland is similar to the continental cluster's one (more precisely, exactly the same as Belgium).

[c]Data for Spain only.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND NEW FORMS OF GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF CHILDCARE SERVICES IN A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Francesca Petrella

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, the subject of governance has come to the fore in many public discussions, notably with regard to reforms of the social protection system. Without entering into various debates the concept has generated, we shall use it in its positive sense (Gilly, Leroux, & Wallet, 2004), to designate all of the interactions between various public and private actors in the elaboration and implementation of public policies to attain shared objectives of general interest (Enjolras, 2008; Le Galès, 1998). Governance thus reflects a change in the forms of collective action – which certainly would qualify as modernisation – and the growing importance granted to management strategies in this change. It also brings out the complexity of the interrelationships between the different levels of decision-making (horizontal and vertical), which might be characterised as 'poly-governance' (Eme, 2005). And governance also permits a simultaneous approach to the new territorial, productive and partnership arrangements emerging in response to the different levels of constraints

and socio-demographic changes. These issues lie at the heart of the transformations of the welfare state and related policies for rationalising public intervention and stabilising public finances. Studies dealing with welfare mix and welfare pluralism (Evers & Svetlik, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Ascoli & Ranci, 2002; Pestoff, 2006; Richez-Battesti, 2008) bring out different ways of combining sources of risk protection or other forms of solidarity. Such research reinforces analyses of co-ordination, as well as those of management and decision-making.

Among social policies, childcare services are particularly indicative of the reforms of the welfare state and the new modes of governance which have been introduced into it. Childcare services involve issues at the heart of the Lisbon Strategy, such as the reconciliation of work and family life, the parents' participation in the labour market, the linking of formal and informal care and gender equality. The Barcelona Council in 2002 defined clear objectives in terms of childcare service provision to be met in 2010. The importance of public policies supporting families is also stressed in the recent Communication of the Commission on 'Promoting Solidarity between the generations' adopted in May 2007 (Commission of the European Communities, 2007).

In this context, these services have had to deal with the increase and diversification of demands stemming from demographic trends and changing family structures, as well as growing requirements of flexibility on the labour market. More specifically, childcare services are part of the 'core' of family policies, which include cash benefits or in-kind support measures aimed at supporting parenthood and protecting the family and children. Inside family policies, strong differences are observed across Europe as far as childcare services are concerned, in terms of the type of services provided, of the proportion of social spending for these services and of their quality regulation.

These services are offered by collective structures such as *crèches* or by individuals in the context of mutual agreement (child minders, persons employed by private individuals in their homes). Collective structures can be managed by public, nonprofit or, more recently, by for-profit organisations. Childcare services involve interpersonal relationships in the sense that the quality of the relationship between provider and user (and often those around the latter) is determinant for the quality of the service (Gadrey, 1996). This relational dimension is a central issue in terms of governance as far as quality control and guarantee are concerned.

We have adopted the Enjolras's approach with regard to the governance regime, characterised in function of 'the participants involved and their

features, the public-policy instruments used to serve the public interest, the institutional forms of co-ordination and the interaction between actors within a public-policy network' (Enjolras, 2008). Our objective is to analyse the hybrid nature of the governance regimes at work in the field of childcare services in Europe by focusing on the forms of local or territorial governance, and thus, the heterogeneity of ways local orders and participative dynamics are structured. Indeed, with the decentralisation of authority, we find highly territorialised modes of governance, in the sense that the system of governance can vary from one territory to another within the same country. This approach is similar to that of Itçaina, Palard and Ségas (2007) with regard to the analysis of territorial regimes. Their approach allows us to bring out 'the relations between the system of production of goods and services and the system of governance on a given territory' (p. 13), where that system characterises above all the new relationships between different categories of actors. It stresses the fact that the actors' strategies, whether institutional or not, shape the territory. Speaking of territorial governance thus amounts to highlighting the construction of local compromises between the different stakeholder logics coexisting on a territory. The territory to be analysed may therefore be the community level, the municipal level, the departmental or the regional one.

We have drawn on the findings of two studies carried out in several European countries on childcare. The first one was conducted within the European TSFEPS project (Changing Family Structures and Social Policies: the case of childcare) in eight European countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (Eme & Fraisse, 2005)[1]. The second research concerned the study of local governance modes for childcare in three French territories (Fraisse, Lhuillier, & Petrella, 2007)[2]. These two studies are based on field research, mainly through local case studies and information gathering combining qualitative interviews and in-depth investigation of the contexts and institutional changes. The TSFEPS project included 22 case studies (at the level of a city) and 250 in-depth interviews of three types of actors: institutional actors, directors of service structures and parents on the basis of common methodological grids. For the second study, 40 in-depth interviews were conducted with institutional actors and directors of service structures in three French departments (Bouches-du-Rhône, Meurthe-et-Moselle and Seine-Saint-Denis). These case studies are not representative of the dynamics observed in each country but they illustrate the existing diversity of local governance modes.

From this perspective, the aim of this chapter is to discuss the interactions between public authorities and civil society in the governance process of

childcare service provision and public policy, within a European comparative approach. Following Salamon, Sokolowski, and List (2003, p. 4), we shall use the terms *civil society* to refer to 'a broad array of organisations that are essentially private, i.e. outside the institutional structures of government; that are not primarily commercial and do not exist primarily to distribute profits to their 'owners'; that are self-governing and that people are free to join or support voluntary (…). Informal as well formally registered organisations are included within this definition'. We therefore consider self-organised groups of parents or inhabitants as part of civil society.

We shall focus here on the decentralisation of authority and the growing diversification of actors, whether institutional or not, who participate in the conception and/or implementation of care policies, as well as the changes in the forms of public intervention and their impact at territorial level.

In the first section, we shall introduce a typology of governance regimes with emphasis on the ways civil society is included (or not) in different governance regimes. In the second section, we shall present childcare policies inside the large spectrum of family policy measures and their heterogeneity observed between European countries. We shall then propose an analysis of the growing diversification of the players and policies involved in developing childcare services, with particular emphasis placed on the role of civil society in this diversification process and the limits of participative dynamics. We shall conclude with a consideration of the challenges posed by the new forms of territorial governance of childcare services, and in particular, with regard to the participation of civil society.

PART 1: CIVIL SOCIETY IN GOVERNANCE REGIMES

Building on the analytical grid for governance regimes developed by Enjolras (2008), which cross-tabulates actors, public-policy instruments and methods of co-ordination, we introduce a fifth, *civic* type of governance (Fraisse et al., 2008), which covers innovative dynamics launched by civil society organisations in the field of childcare services.

In Enjolras' typology, *public governance* involves only public actors. Social services are directly provided by public organisations or delegated to third-sector organisations with direct public financing and within a tutelary and hierarchical regulatory framework. The policy-making process is technocratic. *Corporatist governance* is based on a monopoly representation and implementation given by public government to a third-sector umbrella organisation within a specific field of services. Regulation and financing are

mainly public and coercive. *Competitive governance* describes a regime in which a market is developed through incentive measures and regulated by public authorities. *Partnership or multi-actor governance* involves varying actors, institutional and non-institutional ones, in the policy-making process. Services are provided by a mix of actors and financed by varying types of public and private resources. Negotiation, deliberation and compromises qualify the way public policy is designed and implemented (Enjolras, 2008).

Since partnership is often initiated by public bodies and, therefore, somehow institutionalised in the *partnership governance* type, we propose to add a fifth type, the *civic governance* regime to characterise the involvement of multiple actors, mainly from the civil society (users, third-sector organisations, such as associations or co-operatives, etc.), which have in common the fact of bringing out emerging social demands which are not or only partially recognised by public authorities (Fraisse et al., 2008). Civil society actors here initiate partnership. Public funding is limited, granted project by project, and aimed at financing risk-taking and experimentation. When specific rules are applied to these services, they are the result of negotiation between the associations and public actors. Local non-institutional actors create coordination bodies, and although these are open to a range of participants, they integrate few institutional partners. This fifth regime, seemingly the most unstable, is useful to characterise a horizontal or bottom-up approach of governance, in which citizen or civil society organisations organise themselves to influence the decision-making process. Within a *civic governance* regime, actors co-operate, contrasting with a *competitive governance* regime, where coordination is also horizontal but interactions are based on competition. Adopting a dynamic perspective, civic governance forms can lead to more institutionalised partnership governance, or it can prefigure the definition of a public tutelary governance, as it was the case of most social policies during the development of welfare-state policies. By adding this fifth type of governance regime, we emphasise the capacity of civil society organisations to organise themselves into a policy network in order to influence public policy (Rhodes, 1997). This process would fit a horizontal conception of governance, the self-governance mode, as described by Rhodes (1997) or Kooiman (2003).

We also emphasise the levels where decisions are made, taking into account the tensions between the dynamics (horizontal or vertical) of the different local and global levels. In this way, we are attempting to show how the varying degrees of complexity of the local childcare services configurations are harmonised within the framework of an *embedded governance*,

which can take original forms in each of the territories observed (Table 1).

   The aim of this typology is to present ideal types of governance regimes. In practice, governance processes are often a combination, a mix between two or more regime types. This typology is nevertheless useful to understand the current evolutions that characterise childcare services today and their consequences in terms of governance regimes. The second part of this chapter shall focus on these issues.

PART 2: CHILDCARE SERVICES IN EUROPE – DECENTRALISATION, PARTICIPATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE MIXES

Childcare Services Inside Family Policies: The Persistence of the Welfare State Regimes in Europe?

Despite the common objectives defined at the European level, family support policies vary from country to country. A broad set of policy measures are adopted to support families and children and to reconcile work and family life, as listed by Math and Thévenon (2009, p. 39): cash support to families, through social benefits and/or tax relief; support in-kind or services such as childcare services, through direct provision of public services or through the subsidisation of services provided by private organisations or paid family-related leaves such as maternity, paternity or parental leaves. Although our objective here is not to propose a complete and comparable survey of family policies in Europe, we shall, in this section, briefly present the importance of childcare services within the set of family instruments across the countries studied.

   The diversity in the set of public measures adopted may first highlight various objectives pursued by each country through the development of childcare services such as supporting fertility, promoting children's well-being and development, increasing female employment rates or reducing poverty (Letablier, Lucy, Math, & Thévenon, 2009, p. 9).

   The diversity of family and children's policies also lies in the differences in the importance of family and children's social protection benefits in each country. Among the eight countries included in the TSFEPS project we are building upon, Germany, Sweden and France are spending the higher part of social protection for children and their families as a percentage of the

Table 1. Governance Regime Types.

	Public Governance	Corporatist Governance	Institutionalised Partnership or Multi-Actor Governance	Competitive or Quasi-Market Governance	Civic Governance
Actors' institutional form	Public	Public third sector	Public for-profit third sector	Public for-profit Third sector	Plurality of actors, mainly non-institutional
Policy implementation	Public administration; public property	Tutelary regulation; third party	Regulation of prices, products, quality	Contracts incentive regulation	Regulation by projects
Policy development	Technocracy	Corporatism	Institutionalised partnership	Market-based, incentive measures	Negotiation public-policy networks

Sources: Enjolras (2008) and Fraisse, Lhuillier, and Petrella (2008), reprinted with permission.

total social protection expenditure (respectively 10.8%, 9.5% and 8%); the average for the European Union being 7.7% in 2005. At the opposite, Italy and Spain are the countries that dedicate the smaller part of their social expenditures in terms of family and children's benefits (respectively 4.2% and 5.5%; source ESSPROS, 2008, in Math & Thévenon, 2009).

As far as childcare services are concerned, differences are observed too. The total spending per child on childcare services for children under 3 varies greatly between European countries. For instance, spending on childcare services corresponds to 1.9% of GDP in Sweden, 1.6% in France, 0.77% in Germany and 0.8% in the United Kingdom (Math & Thévenon, 2009, based on the OECD family database, 2007).

As a result, very contrasted patterns are observed in OECD countries (Math & Thévenon, 2009, pp. 64–66). Focusing on Europe, Math and Thévenon show that Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark) provide the most comprehensive support for working parents with children under age 3, including well paid maternity and parental leaves and a relatively high provision of childcare services from age 1. By contrast, Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece) are characterised by a limited assistance to families, whichever dimension is considered. The Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland, United Kingdom) also offer a lower support for families with children aged under three that the Nordic countries. Public investment targeted at preschool education and low-income families is however higher. The other countries, in Eastern and Central Europe, located in an intermediate position between the above groups, are characterised by a diversity of situations. The French case is interesting since the investment in childcare services is relatively higher and the parental leave longer than the other countries of this group.

This classification seems to fit the typology of Esping-Andersen (1999), completed by Ebbinghaus (1999), that characterises the welfare-state regimes in Europe and their different ways of combining the state, the market and the family spheres in order to provide insurance, redistribution and provision of social services. In general, four dominant ideal-types of the welfare state are usually distinguished: the liberal model (UK), the social-democrat model (Scandinavian countries), the conservative corporatist continental model (Germany, France) and the familial Latin or Mediterranean model (Italy), which seems today the most unstable.

This typology appears indeed to be useful to characterise both the relative heterogeneity of family and children's policies and the path dependency which constrains and orients the reconfigurations underway (Erhel & Palier, 2003). Some countries have indeed a long tradition of public investment in

childcare services like Sweden or France, whereas in other countries, childcare has always been under the responsibility of families, such as in Italy or in Spain. Under this hypothesis of path dependency, although childcare is becoming a major issue on the public agenda in most countries, we may assume that the development of childcare services shall follows different paths in Europe.

Multiple Actors with Shared Responsibilities: Towards a New Welfare Mix

Despite divergent responses in the different European countries, common trends may be observed: the increased responsibility of territorial authorities for childcare and the broader range of stakeholders (public, private, for-profit and not-for-profit) in the conception and implementation of public policies. The local governance of childcare policies is a mixed system, which involves and federates the action of different public authorities at several levels of the hierarchy of institutions (Evers & Riedel, 2003). Multi-level governance reflects a recasting of relations between central and local governments, which varies in its intensity from one country to another and gives rise to territorial issues, notably concerning equity between territories in the access to care services. In countries that have a long tradition of centralisation like France, these evolutions may be the sign of a deep transformation, in contrast to countries, such as Germany and Italy, that are characterised by a long experience of subsidiarity.

Decentralisation of Authority: The Role of Territorial Governments

A trend towards the decentralisation of authority may be observed in most of the European countries (Richez-Battesti, Petrella, & Priou, 2006). In the countries with centralised tutelary regulation, a growing role is attributed to territorial authorities. Thus, in France, childcare, in contrast to nursery schools, entails a complicated division of responsibilities between different levels of power (central, departmental, municipal), owing to the non-mandatory nature of the involvement at municipal level and the absence of a universal right of access to the different childcare structures (Fraisse et al., 2007). This division of responsibilities between different institutional levels requires co-ordination mechanisms that take different forms, including contracts, local development schemes, authorisation procedures and steering committees. The Childhood contract (Contrat Enfance et Jeunesse, 2007, ex-Contrat Enfance) and the Departmental Early Childhood Commission (Commission départementale de la petite enfance, 2002) are

illustrations of this (see later). The call for local cooperation is still initiated by the central government, however. This multi-level institutional structure complicates the early childhood scene and leads to considerable territorial and social disparities in the access to childcare structures.

Several examples of multi-level governance are described in Daune-Richard & Letablier (2009). For instance, in the United Kingdom, since the *Childcare Act 2006*, municipalities are responsible for the well-being of children, ensuring that the childcare services supply is sufficient and controlling for the service quality. The *National Childcare Strategy*, adopted in 1998, fixes national objectives and guidelines while municipalities implement these programmes. The *National Childcare Strategy* has generalised a partnership dynamic between public, private for-profit and non-profit actors to develop childcare policies within the *Early Years Development Childcare Partnership* (EYDCP) framework (see later). The municipalities have the responsibility to implement the EYDCP programme. Regulation is still defined at the central level as well as the invitation to co-operate between local actors. Note that since the *Childcare Act of 2006*, quality control and regulation are now ensured by a central agency that delivers the licence and the quality certifications.

In Germany, since 1991, the Federal Law (*Kinder- und Jugendhilfegesetz –* KJHG) recommends to formally involve the main local actors in the policy-making process. More precisely, this law makes it compulsory for municipalities to create childhood municipal committees, composed by local institutional and non-institutional actors. The federal level thus defines the legal framework and public policy objectives while each Land can complete the federal laws with particular rules or objectives. The municipal level is responsible for the implementation of public policies and finances their childcare programmes with municipal and Land's financing.

In Italy, since 2000, the law 328/2000 defines the general framework for social policies. Multi-level governance interactions may also be observed. This national law defines the objectives to be achieved, regions define their own policies to reach these objectives and municipalities implement the provision of childcare services on their own territory. The national law also allows for the creation of municipal committees to develop their 'local social plans' (*Piani Sociali di Zona*). These committees involve, in varying degrees, civil society representatives, notably social co-operatives whose emergence was encouraged by a previous law, the law 285/97.

It is interesting to note that in these countries (France, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy), national legislations design the frame for coordination and cooperation among actors at the local level. The incentive towards

cooperation between local actors comes from the national level, with varying degrees of constraints (Eme & Fraisse, 2005). One of the results of the local management of services concerns the growing territorial disparities in childcare provision in several European countries (Yonnet, Farvaque, & Messaoudi, 2006; Centre d'analyse stratégique, 2007). These disparities may be aggravated in the absence of adjustments between the purposes, objectives and means of local institutions and those of central ones, leaving considerable room to manoeuvre at local level relative to the national framework (Fraisse et al., 2008).

Note that 'delegations' of public service through invitations to tender which set up market competition for provision of services at the local level also represent a relatively new form of contractual arrangement between territorial authorities and private providers as far as childcare services are concerned. By 'delegation' (as it is known in France), we mean that municipal authorities invite to tender for the provision of childcare services initially managed by the municipality. Delegation differs from a quasi-market since the public authorities do not purchase the services as in the United Kingdom. In France, the delegation process implies that the providers support the financial risks. Although these processes are still limited in France, they are increasingly used. For instance, the city of Aix-en-Provence has recently 'delegated' the management of all the childcare services of the municipality to a private commercial enterprise. This 'delegation process' may also deepen the inequalities towards territories and raises important issues in terms of quality criteria and regulation.

A Growing, Innovative Role for the Third Sector: Provider or Partner?

Childcare services are now the prerogative of a multiplicity of actors. In certain countries this diversity of providers is not new, but its visibility has increased with the spread of a formalised service provision encouraged by public policies in response to the growing numbers and various demands (Fraisse et al., 2007).

In most European countries, notably those where public intervention was dominant, the diversification of service providers has been accompanied by a growing role for third-sector organisations and, more recently, private enterprises. This is especially the case in France, Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom in relation to the development of the contracting out or 'delegation' of a public service, as described earlier.

Historically, the associative sector played a pioneering role in the provision of social-care services in the European countries. This process of outsourcing the domestic sphere is in keeping with the gradual

recognition of women's work in the home, which was socially invisible but accorded greater value by associative dynamics. The same dynamics have subsequently promoted the integration of social-care services into welfare-state programmes (Laville & Nyssens, 2001, p. 234). Childcare has followed a similar pattern in Germany, Belgium and, to a lesser degree, France. For the first two countries, many traditional services (day-care centres, kindergartens) developed historically through third-sector initiatives supported by religious associations. Today, these traditional associative childcare centres are subsidised by public funds, within a logic of delegation or complementarity. In fact, from the standpoint of their objectives, means of funding and operations, they are hardly different from the municipal centres.

Recent associative or co-operative initiatives also play an innovative role in the increase and renewal of local childcare provision. This is the case in Germany, Sweden, Belgium, France and Italy, where the associative sector's share in the number of places provided is on the rise (Fraisse et al., 2008).

The associative sector is thus part of a dual process of diversifying supply: on the one hand, by default or 'delegation of public service', to make up for the lack of places in public structures and, on the other, by project, to meet emerging social demands. In this second process, the services offered by the associations are innovative in terms of the kinds of centres (with extended hours, in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, children–parent centres providing support in parenting, day nurseries buses in remote rural areas, day care for disabled children, home care for sick children, etc.), as well as in the kind of management, such as parent-run day nurseries (Fraisse et al., 2007). Where the municipal services attempt (not without encountering frictions with the professionals) to integrate these new functions into their modes of selection and organisation, the third-sector initiatives offer services more oriented towards specific problems and publics: centres in rural areas, parental initiatives, structures and support for immigrant families, childcare for parents entering the labour market, flexible or intermittent childcare, out-of-school childcare, professionalisation of at-home childcare, non-standard hours, reorganisation of social time, open centres.

Uneven Dynamics in the Private for-Profit Sector
In almost all the forms of local care systems, public and non-profit organisations play an important role in the provisioning of these services. At the same time, however, a division may be observed between systems where for-profit providers play a marginal role and those where private (for-profit) provision represents a significant, growing share of the services.

With regard to childcare, the dynamics of for-profit initiatives are, in quite different contexts, the most significant in the United Kingdom and Spain, and to a lesser extent in Italy. The TSFEPS research on the Spanish and Italian cases indicates that private day nurseries, created on the initiative of groups of specialised teachers or educators, provide more places than the public day nurseries. Above all, the spread of private forms of childcare has come about without support from local public authorities. Operating with financial contributions from the parents, these initiatives are only slightly integrated into the local governance of childcare. Conversely, the example of Birmingham illustrates the integration of private-sector structures into local regulation of childcare. Private day nurseries offer the largest number of places and the private sector participates in the local EYDCPs in the same way as the public and third sectors, with access to the different funds provided by the central government for the creation of new services. By contrast, in Stockholm, the for-profit sector represents only 5% of non-municipal childcare provision, although since 1991 Swedish law has authorised the access of commercial providers to public funding, probably because of the number and quality of municipal and co-operative childcare structures.

Incentive schemes have also been adopted in France and Belgium to encourage private companies to participate in the creation and financing of childcare facilities. In France, since the National Family Conference in 2003, the involvement of the for-profit sector in childcare has been encouraged to increase the number of places and diversify supply. Although the number of projects run by commercial enterprises is still limited, the number of places run by commercial enterprises increases rapidly, and this trend may reveal the emergence of a new mode of governance. Another path worth considering concerns individual childcare, mainly provided by a child minder in her own home or a 'nanny' in the parental home. A specific childcare benefit package (*prestation accueil jeunes enfants*, PAJE) offers tax incentives for employing a child minder.

In Germany, private enterprises appear today as a major partner of the new family policy (Daune-Richard & Letablier, 2009). Although private enterprises provided childcare services for long, new public financing is now accessible for them to create and manage childcare services. Public policy towards the involvement of private enterprises is not limited to financial support or tax deductions but coordination tools are also adopted. Note in particular the 'Alliance for the family', created in 2003 under the responsibility of the president of the employers' unions, aimed at helping small and medium enterprises to develop practices that help to reconcile work and family life.

A common trend towards the diversification of providers may thus be observed in most European countries, even if the respective roles and weights of the different sectors vary from one country to another. Nonetheless, significant divergences appear over the way this diversification is regulated, organised and funded by public authorities at the different levels of power.

We propose therefore to reconsider the classification of welfare-state regimes with an analysis in terms of governance. In recent decades, the corporatist countries and, to a lesser degree, the Scandinavian countries, have witnessed a shift from an essentially public, centralised governance to a mixed one which predominantly tutelary, but with increasing recourse to competitive mechanisms, as well as the emergence of local dynamics of multilateral governance on certain territories. In the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, Spain), meanwhile, where the family plays an important role and state intervention in social services is limited, we find greater participation of public authorities at local level, in a context of market competition between providers. In the liberal model, and notably in the United Kingdom, partnership between a large diversity of local stakeholders is strongly encouraged as far as childcare services are concerned but public participation remains primarily focused on the most disadvantaged groups.

Within these evolutions, it is interesting to have a closer look at the role played by civil society organisations in local governance structures and at their capacity to influence the public-policy design process.

Civil Society Participation in Local Governance

Participative dynamics vary across countries but also across territories. Case studies show that they vary, at the local level, on their origin (who initiated the participation), their size and scope and on their capacity to influence the policy-making process.

Moreover, our empirical results suggest that the type of governance regime may, on the one hand, foster or limit civil society participation and, on the other, influence the nature of the relationship between all the stakeholders involved by encouraging cooperation or competition.

An Institutionalised Multi-Actor Partnership Process

The first participative dynamic observed is a top-down process, encouraged by central authorities that propose new coordination tools between a broad

array of actors at the local level. The call for cooperation is initiated by central authorities. For instance, in France, the Childhood Contract is presented as an instrument of contractual policy allowing municipal authorities to negotiate and co-finance their early childhood actions with the Family Allowance Fund (CAF) on the basis of a joint diagnosis. Non-institutional actors can officially be part of the contract, but it remains a tool of bilateral negotiation between funding sources. In practice, few civil society actors, and even fewer private enterprises, are associated as decision-makers alongside the institutional players to this contract. Similarly, the Departmental Early Childhood Commissions institutionalised by decree in 2002 are aimed at coordinating all the actors concerned by childcare services, public or private, users or professionals. These Commissions provide an institutionalised framework for cooperation between varying local actors and institutions on different issues such as the territorial diagnosis of the needs, the information of parents and professionals or the improvement of access to services and of quality. In fact, these commissions have neither real decision-making nor funding power to develop new forms of childcare. The fact that, at the time of the study, they had only been set up in two-thirds of the *départements* illustrates the difficulty of developing co-operative efforts between stakeholders on a given territory.

In the United Kingdom, a dynamics of joint local governance has been encouraged through the establishment of local Early Years Development and Childcare Partnerships (EYDCP, as described above). These bodies serve as intermediaries between the national government and representatives of the different forms of local childcare structures in the public, private and voluntary sectors. By law, the EYDCP deals with all the elements necessary for achieving the national objectives: funding, registration, accreditation, quality, access, creation and management of new childcare places, etc. In principle, the EYDCP would seem to be a successful form of multilateral local governance; in practice, however, the levels of commitment and participation are insufficient. Beyond the non-representation of users and private companies, the EYDCD does not constitute an arena for the elaboration of a local early childhood policy based on a comparison of the viewpoints of the different parties but rather, a body for achieving the objectives of the central government. That said, this institutional framework is relatively recent, and the participants are thus still at the learning stage.

In Germany, the Ministry of the Family also developed in 2004 local pacts for the families. These structures are aimed at coordinating various public actors (the municipalities), economic actors (social partners) and social actors (including third sector organisations, parent associations and

religious associations) and at structuring local networks to develop childcare initiatives. Today, there are 360 municipalities that have created such a pact, including more than 2000 enterprises (Daune-Richard & Letablier, 2009).

The case of Monza (Italy) is another example of a public-dominated governance that integrates only partially private actors of childcare. There is an attempt to define a local policy towards childcare but it is still strongly associated to a municipal dynamic. Local councillors and professionals from the public sector do not plan to collaborate with commercial private actors and do not buy places in private services, as it is done in the nearby city of Milan. The municipality however developed a partnership with third-sector organisations to create a multi-ethnic *crèche*. Such a cooperation on a specific project does not reflect the emergence of a larger cooperation between all local actors to define a global policy of childcare for the municipality. There is no formal coordination structure where various actors could just meet and discuss. Civil society, through family or neighbourhood associations, does not take part in governance structures.

Our observations highlight that the participation of civil society is limited in such institutionalised and mainly top-down partnership governance type. The general frame of partnership and the related public policies, instruments or financing measures are, in most cases, designed by public authorities at the central level. Civil society is not really involved in the decision process concerning public policies but in the consultation and negotiation process. In practice, they have little power to influence public policies.

An important room to manoeuvre is however given to local authorities in the implementation of this general policy frame, generating important differences at the local level. For instance in France, the comparative analysis of three departments showed that in one of the three, civil society organisations were involved into the partnership governance process and contributed to the design of new public policies. By contrast, in the two other departments, the partnership with civil society representatives was less developed or ineffective.

Civil Society Networks at the Local Level: Tools of Governance?
In other cities studied in the context of the TSFEPS project, the forms of partnership or cooperation involving a range of stakeholders are more the fruit of a historical process where the mobilisation of non-municipal actors and organisations, in particular the third-sector ones, has played a determinant role in the construction of a local early childhood policy. Whether the initiatives have come from parents, co-operatives or

associations, they have directly or indirectly influenced the present forms of local governance.

In Frankfort, for example, municipal childcare policy is marked by the history of the parental initiative movement (*Kinderladenbewegung*) that, since the early 1970s, has constituted pressure groups to obtain recognition of the specific pedagogical and organisational features of their childcare structures. This movement has come to be supported by and integrated into municipal policy, which makes the diversification of the offer a priority. There is thus a close cooperation between local authorities and representatives of the different forms of childcare. In this way, questions concerning the management of places, the creation of new services, the integration of children from immigrant families, pedagogy and quality have been able to be discussed and negotiated through networks, work groups and regular meetings involving the heads of the main private childcare services. This culture of partnership, more than the formal presence of the representatives of parental initiatives within the municipal Child and Youth Welfare Board (KJHA), is what distinguishes local governance in Frankfort. But its multilateral aspect is restricted by the fact that family associations and parents are excluded.

At a smaller scale, let us mention the Childcare Committee (*Collectif Petite Enfance*) created in two neighbourhoods of Marseille (*15e et 16e arrondissements*), which brings together inhabitants, social workers, third-sector organisations and institutional actors to organise themselves for the development of childcare services in the area. They constituted a committee to foster the creation of a social centre in the neighbourhood. This group serves as a 'watch committee' for childhood and youth projects and local policy.

On the basis of these examples, we can conclude that governance structures initiated by civil society actors that cooperate to solve public policy problems, exist at a small scale but do not spread through all the territories studied. They may organise themselves to, eventually, influence public policy, as a policy network. The case of Frankfort may illustrate such a process. By referring to policy networks, we stress the interactive nature of policy-making process, in which a wide variety of actors is involved (Rhodes, 1997). From this perspective, civil society networks represent an important innovative force to design public policy since they are intrinsically embedded in social networks and have the capacity to reveal and meet emerging social demands at the local level.

However, the limited number of these experiences also illustrate the difficulty of civil society to be considered as a real partner in the decision

process of public policies. It may also reflect the challenge for civil society networks to institutionalise to become a tool of governance, in particular in countries with a long tradition of public intervention in childcare, as France or Sweden, and/or of centralisation of public policy such as in the United Kingdom, by contrast with Germany, characterised by a limited public intervention of childcare in the past and an important role played by parental initiatives, in coherence with the subsidiarity principle that Germany applies. Another argument to explain the difficulty of civil society participation in governance structures may come from the difficulty of these actors to cooperate given that they compete between themselves for the provision of services.

Cooperation or Competition?

In several European countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain and also France, we see the emergence of elements of quasi-market governance in the provision of social services that foster competition more than cooperation between local actors.

A first trend concerns the growing adoption, at the national level, of policy measures that support demand instead of directly financing service providers. These instruments encourage competition among service providers as they leave the choice of the provider to the users.

Since the end of the 1980s, to improve the effectiveness of public funding in a context of budgetary constraints, but without hindering market mechanisms, public authorities have privileged 'demand' subsidies that are paid directly to beneficiaries within the framework of social policies (for the service provided) or employment policies (for the public to be integrated) (Laville & Nyssens, 2001). The objective is to create employment for low-skilled persons while putting a series of previously 'off-the-books' activities 'on the books'. These services are part of the 'new job pools' or 'local development and employment initiatives' already advanced by Jacques Delors (then-president of the European Commission) in his 1993 White Paper.

The consumption of services is encouraged by financial assistance mainly in the form of cash benefits or tax deductions for the expenses incurred (in France, Belgium and the UK, tax deductions for childcare expenses or those related to the use of home care services, although the three voucher systems are quite different). The UK voucher is a sort of in-kind benefit given to workers by their employers for their expenses related to childcare services with tax deductions for both workers and employers. The French voucher entitles the user to tax deductions for the consumption of a wide range of home care services while in Belgium, the voucher includes a public subsidy

(the price paid by the user is below the market price) and a tax deduction for the expenses incurred and is limited to housekeeping services. In both countries, the vouchers are highly successful.

This demand support has attracted less interest in the Scandinavian countries (e.g., Norway has eliminated the housekeeping allowance for consumers) as well as Mediterranean countries like Spain, where experiments with service vouchers have remained quite limited.

Although demand support promotes the growth of housekeeping and wellness services for working couples, risks in terms of quality emerge since the choice of the provider is left to the user in the case of relational and trust services (i.e., where the quality of the relationship between provider and user is determinant for the quality of the service). This risk is reinforced when care services are aimed at vulnerable populations such as dependent elderly persons or young children. Tax deductions for care-related expenses are a form of subsidy independent of quality, in the sense that there are no quality requirements apart from minimal conditions such as recourse to registered providers. Empirical studies show, however, that in the case of childcare, when the average price decreases, households tend to demand a greater quantity of services rather than an improvement of quality (Blau & Hagy, 1998). In addition, asymmetries between user and provider information about the quality of the services limits users' abilities to judge this quality and argues for a direct 'supply' subsidy (Enjolras, 1995). Given the fact that families do not have the same ability to choose between various providers, moreover, the granting of demand subsidies reinforces this inequality (Mocan, 2001). Therefore, in the absence of licensing and quality control measures, letting users choose the kind of provider in order not to hinder competition mechanisms poses a problem. Although the effects of an instrument depend greatly on its specific features, a 'supply' subsidy ensures greater quality for services, which are difficult for users to evaluate. Unlike individual childcare services, subsidised collective services are in fact subject to many rules concerning authorisation, quality and fixing of rates. A direct 'supply' subsidy also permits the public intervention to target specific services, such as quality group childcare for children from disadvantaged backgrounds.

In the case of experience and trust goods, a public regulation of quality is in general necessary since quality labels and certifications delivered by third parties, such as private agencies or the firms themselves, are not sufficient to secure service quality to users (Coestier & Marette, 2004).

A second trend is characterised by the growing number of invitations to tender, as mentioned earlier, in the context of a delegation of public service which creates market competition between different providers, both for- and

not-for-profit, comes within this logic. Although delegation processes can take different forms, they have in common to increase competition among providers. The governance regime here fosters competition more than cooperation among all the stakeholders. Moreover, it does not consider civil society organisations as partners of public policy but as one potential provider of childcare services, among others.

These results suggest that participative dynamics of civil society in governance regimes differ from the way governance structure is initiated, designed and implemented (horizontal or vertical) and from the nature of the interactions between the actors encouraged by the governance regime to regulate the diversification of the supply (cooperation or competition).

Their combination leads to identify three types of civil society participative dynamics, which correspond to different governance regimes as developed in Table 2. The first dynamic is characterised by a large participation of civil society with an important role in terms of social innovation and experimentation in the public-policy process. The second dynamic is characterised by a limited participation of civil society actors that are consulted and negotiate with institutional actors. The third one is characterised by competitive interactions between all types of providers. In this last type, civil society actors are considered as service providers such as private enterprises.

Note that this second table highlights that civil society organisations, at the local level, have to deal with various types of relationships. In most European countries, they are encouraged to participate in institutionalised partnerships while in the meantime, they have to compete in tendering

Table 2. Civil Society Participation Dynamics in Governance Regimes.

	Horizontal	Vertical
Cooperation	*Civic governance*	*Institutionalised partnerships*
	High participation of civil society: innovative capacity, experimentation and public policy networks	Limited civil society participation: consultation and negotiation with local institutional actors
	e.g.: Germany	e.g.: UK, Italy, France
Competition	*Competitive governance or quasi-market governance*	
	(e.g.: market-based incentive measures; invitations to tender)	
	Civil society as providers in competition	
	e.g.: UK, France	

processes. Our analysis may suggest that countries with a long tradition of centralisation will turn towards vertically implemented structures but the current evolutions are more complex given the autonomy left at the local level and the territorial disparities that are generated. The cases of Frankfort (Germany) and Monza (Italy) show the existence of horizontal partnership structures, but in the German case, it has been historically initiated by civil society organisations, whereas in the Italian case, the municipality plays a central role in the development of the partnership.

Civil society participation in childcare services governance structures seems therefore to be dominated by vertical coordination tools and by the growing use of market-oriented measures to implement public policy.

CONCLUSIONS

Participation of civil society is a central issue in the design of new welfare mixes in the provision of childcare services across Europe. Differences emerge between European countries in the way the transformations in terms of governance are encouraged and regulated by public authorities, reflecting, in part at least, the heterogeneity of the welfare state regimes. Although the public governance regimes remains predominant in the Scandinavian countries, leaving little room for civil society organisations in governance structures, public interventions increases in Mediterranean countries, in particular at the local level, that are implementing partnership governance structures. The United Kingdom, characterised by a quasi-market governance, also develops partnership programmes at the local level while focusing public spending towards children and families in need. The corporatist continental countries seem to move to a partnership governance in different ways, rather vertically in the case of France and horizontally in the case of Germany.

Beyond these different institutional configurations, most of countries have to handle a 'mixed' governance that, not without tension, links up different levels of power and authority, different actors, and different modes of governance. We have stressed the emergence of forms of quasi-market governance in a number of European countries, as well as the presence of forms of multilateral governance over certain territories. Our analysis also argues for a territorial approach of governance modes since a large room to manoeuvre has been observed at the local level, leading to the emergence of local governance mixes.

As a whole, the role of the third sector in childcare provision is real in terms of both innovative capacity and complementary supply to public services, but its participation in local governance structures remains, in general, limited. When these are initiated and supervised by the public authorities, they suffer from low participation of non-institutional actors or the latter's non-integration in public financing beyond that for specific projects. Within institutionalised partnerships, civil society actors are consulted but public authorities still centrally design the frame of public policy.

When they are introduced by civil society organisations, they remain embryonic and scattered over the territories. *Civic governance* initiatives, yet limited in our empirical study, illustrate that there is room for civil society to organise itself into policy networks and try to influence public policy at the territorial level. It is thus important not to confine the third-sector organisations to a role of service providers but rather, to encourage their involvement in local government bodies to bolster their capacity for innovation and experimentation in face of changing social demands.

But the growing forms of market competition between organisations threaten to limit these innovative capacities and their contribution to the reduction of inequalities in access to services (Fraisse et al., 2007). In terms of quality, competitive or quasi-market governance may also be questioned since childcare services are relational services characterised by strong asymmetric information situations that lead to market failures, as developed earlier. More fundamentally, the question of quality in social services will be at the heart of further research and debate at the European level, in the context of the liberalisation of services and notably of the development of social services of general interest.

NOTES

1. Research coordinated by Bernard Eme et Laurent Fraisse (CRIDA, France; 2001–2004). Results can be downloaded on http://www.emes.net
2. Research coordinated by Philippe Mossé (LEST, France; 2005–2008).

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PUBLIC GOVERNANCE ROLES OF THIRD SECTOR ORGANISATIONS IN IRELAND: A COMPARISON WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Freda Donoghue

INTRODUCTION

In the shift from government to governance the possibility of an increased role or roles for third sector actors becomes greater. In addition, the potential for different roles also increases. In public governance, for example, third sector civil society actors[1] can adopt an advocacy and campaigning role or a partnership role. This chapter seeks to understand public governance roles of Irish third sector organisations compared to those in South Africa inspired by the work of Habib (2008, 2007a, 2007b) which draws attention to the concept of substantive uncertainty. Substantive uncertainty, Habib says, is a necessary condition for democratic functioning and refers to uncertainty of outcomes in political processes. In other words, the ability to challenge elites and facilitate the dispersal of power, so that space for opposition is engendered, is the essence of democracy. Because substantive uncertainty involves this uncertainty of outcomes it challenges hegemony therefore, Habib says. Yet, he notes, the political literature has not paid a lot of attention to this concept.

Inspired by his work, this chapter seeks to empirically explore the third sector's role potential to create substantive uncertainty using Irish data, and to draw some comparisons between the situation in South Africa, as outlined by Habib, and that which pertains in Ireland. Both countries present interesting cases for comparison. South Africa has quite recently come through a major struggle for national identity and democracy, whereas the Republic of Ireland gained independence from Britain in 1922, and has been a nation-state since that time. Both countries, therefore, demonstrate histories of struggles for national identity, albeit from different oppressors and at different historical junctures. The roles played by the respective third sectors in public governance have changed en route and there is also a diversity of public governance roles played by various third sector actors. We now spend some time on those roles looking first at South Africa and then at Ireland.

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE ROLES AND THE THIRD SECTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA

In post-Apartheid South Africa, Habib (2008) argues that there are three main kinds of civil society actor, each of which, he says, has different relationships with the state for different ends. He identifies these three kinds of third sector actors as, formal nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), informal survivalist community organisations and social movements. The formal NGOs, he says, are engaged in service delivery and policy development and they have a largely collegial and collaborative relationship with the state. The other two kinds of organisations differ from formal NGOs in that both have emerged in response to the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies by the post-Apartheid state. One of these, the survivalist organisations, is informal community-based organisations concerned with helping the communities in which they exist to survive. The other kind, which he refers to as social movements – although he acknowledges that this is a loose application of that definition – are more formal community-based structures and are explicitly political in their aims and actions. They are concerned, he says 'with the explicit political aim of organising and mobilising the poor and marginalised and contesting and/or engaging the state and other social actors around the implementation of neo-liberal social policies' (Habib, 2007a, p. 7). Although the survivalist organisations have no relationship with the state, concerned as they are with service delivery to

the poor and marginalised, the other two kinds of formal organisations – the NGOs and social movements – have explicit and engaged relationships, he says, the former more collegiate and the latter more adversarial.

He argues that all kinds of civil society organisations have diverse roles and collectively they create both adversarial and collaborative relationships which together assist and compel the state to be responsive to and responsible for their citizens. They all, therefore, contribute to democracy in South Africa, albeit in different ways. He places most emphasis on the role of social movements, however, because he says they represent the most hope for keeping alive the concept of 'substantive uncertainty'. In the political science literature, substantive uncertainty has been referred to as a vital ingredient in political uncertainty, which itself is the essence of democracy (Schedler, 2001; Dahl, 1966). Substantive uncertainty refers to uncertainty of substance, or outcomes. In other words, the ability to generate uncertainty or instability in the outcomes of politics is important for democratic functioning because it allows for space for opposition and challenge, and thus the opportunity for change through the dispersal of power.

Habib says there are five routes to the achievement of substantive uncertainty. These are electoral reform, the establishing of a viable competitive political system, the erosion of corporatist institutions and processes which tend to maintain the status quo, strategic foreign policy and the emergence of an independent robust, plural civil society. It is this final element on which he pins most hope for South Africa because, he says, there is not only the empirical evidence to demonstrate the political efficacy which such organisations have had for democracy in South Africa, but also the other variables are more difficult to achieve. From the perspective of public governance, therefore, if third sector actors can play a role in creating substantive uncertainty, then they are contributing effectively to a functioning democracy. In asserting this, he is specifically concerned with the hegemony that the ANC enjoys, he says, and the lack of serious challenge to it in the polls. He states that social movements have 'had the effect of promoting the political accountability of elites to their citizens' (Habib, 2008, p. 59).

If we take Habib's premise that substantive uncertainty is essential for democratic functioning, then, how do the public governance roles performed by third sector organisations in Ireland compare to South Africa? Can we identify the potential among third sector organisations in Ireland to create substantive uncertainty, or at the very least, their willingness to see this as one of their functions? To do so, we need to

unpack this concept and put some empirical flesh on its bones. We will first look at the public governance roles played by third sector organisations in Ireland, since its becoming a nation-state in 1922, before moving onto a discussion of social partnership, a neo-corporatist structure for negotiated governance in which third sector organisations have an influence, and then onto an exploration of the potential for substantive uncertainty among Irish third sector organisations.

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE ROLES PLAYED BY THIRD SECTOR IN IRELAND

Three public governance roles can be identified for third sector organisations in Ireland: First, they were instrumental in the shift from a colonised nation to an independent nation-state. Second, they have been involved in the provision of social services, including health and education, for many decades; a relationship that gets formal recognition through a variety of funding channels from the state. Finally, from the mid-1990s the third sector has been represented in the process of negotiated governance (Larragy, 2006) called social partnership. All of these roles have involved different institutional arrangements with the state and tension and negotiation in the management of such relationships, as discussed in the next section.

Shift from a Colonised Nation to an Independent Nation-State

No history of the coming into being of what is now the Republic of Ireland is complete without paying some kind of due to the third sector and the importance of social movements. The revival of the language through Conradh na Gaeilge, or the Gaelic League, the burgeoning of Gaelic sports clubs around the country at parish level through An Cumann Luthcleas Gael, or the Gaelic Athletics Association, the rising national identity movement – fought through the various ranks of 'volunteers', in the shape of Sinn Féin and Cumann na mBan – as well as the workers' movements, played instrumental parts, to varying degrees, in Ireland's transition from a British colony to an independent nation-state. Actors in those different movements, themselves, became active in the newly formed Saorstát na h-Éireann (Irish Free State) and several individuals went on to become prominent in its political and administrative apparatus. The governance and administrative infrastructure was, itself, inherited intact from the British

(Chubb, 1992) and the new elements of public administration, including many former members of national and cultural identity movements, took up the mantle and adjusted to their new formal roles.

Involvement in Provision of Social Services

The newly formed Irish state in its first Constitution of 1922 attempted to combine the liberal-democratic tradition inherited from Britain with Catholic social teaching (Chubb, 1992). In the field of social service provision, therefore, this translated into the state adopting a hands-off stance under the principle of subsidiarity and 'allowing' such provision to occur at the basic social unit, the state only stepping in as a last resort. Before independence, there had been a strong religious voluntary presence in the provision of health care, education and social services, and this continued in the newly emerging state. Statutory funding for such welfare services increased substantially as the 20th century progressed and the state eventually also developed its own welfare services in tandem with those provided by third sector organisations. Ireland, however, never developed a state-run welfare system along the lines found in other countries, including our former coloniser Britain. The mixed welfare model that currently exists can be traced back to the early days of the state and comprises third sector, state, for profit and community providers. There is, too, a prominent discourse of service delivery that can be seen in various policies covering aspects of state–third sector relations, which serves to emphasise this service role of third sector organisations (Donoghue & Larragy, 2009).

Social Partnership

Since the mid-1990s, third sector representation has become prominent in social partnership. This process, which has been called negotiated governance (Larragy, 2006), has its roots in the so-called wage rounds which commenced in the 1940s and lasted until 1981 and involved various interests in negotiating and setting wages. From 1987 and the revival of a form of this process henceforth called social partnership, however, a more sophisticated and complex process has developed. At first, the state entered into partnership with representatives of employers, farmers and the trade unions to address the economic crisis and deep stagnation of the 1980s. Third sector actors, therefore, were present from the beginnings of the

present-day social partnership. In the mid-1990s a fourth pillar was established, the Community and Voluntary Pillar[2] (CVP), which had a broad concern with poverty and disadvantage, and in recent years the third sector itself. The social partnership process has resulted in seven national agreements since its establishment in 1987; it shaped the socio-economic environment in Ireland and contributing to its economic turnaround and, consequent enormous socio-economic changes and development. The CVP, while it has less of a solid bargaining position than that of the other social partners, has achieved several notable policy outcomes in fighting poverty and rebuilding communities (Donoghue & Larragy, 2009), as discussed later.

   In Ireland, therefore, as in South Africa, third sector actors play different roles in public governance and have different relationships with the state depending on these roles. The distinction, identified by Habib between different kinds of organisations in South Africa, is not as clear cut in Ireland, however, and multiple governance roles can be performed by a single organisation. If, as Habib argues however, it is the creation of substantive uncertainty that is most important to a healthy functioning democracy, we now want to consider those third sector actors who either contribute to substantive uncertainty or who have the potential to do so.

SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP AND SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY

In Habib's analysis, an important element of substantive uncertainty is the presence of an independent robust plural civil society. He draws a distinction between the roles played by two formal types of civil society organisation, as seen earlier, that of NGOs and that of social movements. Formal NGOs have a consensual relationship with the state, he says, sub-contracted to provide services and engage in policy development for such ends. Social movements, by contrast, have a relationship with the state based on advocacy, campaigning and social change, and because they are mass based and have resources they contest elites' hold on power. Social movements create substantive uncertainty, he says, through the mobilisation of citizens and the contestation of elites. Social movements, as well as being in a position to mobilise resources, including citizens and the masses, have also succeeded in policy and political change on a number of fronts in South Africa. He states, furthermore, that they demonstrate great political hope

because they result in the dispersal of power in society through challenging the ANC's hegemony.

To apply his analysis to Ireland, there are a number of leads that we can follow. First of all, Habib points to institutional and extra-institutional action. Secondly, he identifies the two processes of civic enablement and elite contestation as of significance.

Let us look first at institutional action and the example of social partnership. As already noted earlier, third sector actors have represented various constituency interests since the inception of social partnership but specific third sector-wide representation became more prominent upon the establishment of the CVP in 1996. Can we ask, then, whether or not the CVP has made a difference to public governance in Ireland and whether it has contributed to substantive uncertainty?

Before formally joining the social partnership process, individual organisations, now included on the CVP, were active on the policy front for many years. Broadly sharing a concern with poverty and inequality, the organisations which would go on to become part of the CVP, lobbied on measures for unemployment, the empowerment of marginalised communities, income maintenance and social welfare. Since 1996, within social partnership, the CVP has had an impact on various national agreements. Taxation, social welfare, childcare, local development, migration, housing policy and even views on the future shape of the Irish welfare state have found their way onto the agenda at national social partnership talks. Becoming a part of the centralised process of negotiated governance (Larragy, 2006) gave organisations in the CVP a new degree of influence, bringing them into contact with the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and with other important players in government and civil society. The CVP, therefore, has helped to contribute to the broadening of the political agenda and the politicisation of 'disadvantage' (Donoghue, 1999).

All is not rosy in the social partnership garden, however, and observers have noted that the CVP has less room for manoeuvre than other pillars, such as the trades unions, the employers and the farmers. The CVP lacks the power to veto the process, which the other social partners have, and can only voice concern or leave the process in protest (Donoghue & Larragy, 2010). There have been observations that the CVP's effect has been residual (Peillon, 1997/1998) and while its presence has led to a broader social focus in some of the agreements that have been produced, its potential for negotiation is more limited than the other partners (Powell & Geoghegan, 2004) and has sometimes been curtailed by the prevailing

economic environment when 'harder' economic issues have been given precedence.

Among the conditions necessary for the flourishing of substantive uncertainty, argued by Habib, is the erosion of corporatist institutions and processes because he says they maintain the status quo. Social partnership is a neo-corporatist structure enabling consensus in the political system. Observers on the left in Ireland, for example, have argued that it is a neo-liberal construct serving to maintain the status quo (Allen, 2000) thereby taking the teeth out of political action. We must turn to extra-institutional action, therefore, as Habib does in the South African context, to explore substantive uncertainty more fully.

THIRD SECTOR VIEWS ON SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY

If substantive uncertainty involves elite contestation and civic enablement, there are a number of roles that may be important in contesting those elites and facilitating civic enablement, and there are also a number of different values that will underpin such actions. A recent large-scale survey on third sector organisations in Ireland (Donoghue, Prizeman, O'Regan & Noël, 2006) collected quantitative data on the roles and values which respondents said were important for their organisations. Several of these may be taken as proxies for elite contestation and civic enablement. These roles included 'influencing or involvement in national policy development', 'providing a way through which individuals can interact with their community to produce a better society for all', 'identifying and/or addressing present or new social needs' and 'maintaining and/or changing values in society' and were included in the survey to explore empirically in an Irish context the importance of role performance by third sector organisations informed by international work in the area (Kramer, 1981; Salamon, Hems, & Chinnock, 2000; Frumkin, 2002; Donoghue, 2003). The survey also included questions on values (Frumkin, 2002), and of relevance for our exploration of substantive uncertainty, are values associated with the distribution of political and economic power in society.

Looking at roles first, 'influencing or involvement in national policy development' would seem to be most directly relevant for examining substantive uncertainty in that it encompasses direct intervention in the policy-making process. If, however, political uncertainty is the essence of

democracy because it forces political elites to become responsive to the needs and wishes of citizens and allows for the dispersal of power (Habib, 2007b), there are other roles played by civil society actors that may also be important to consider. In the survey, these included 'providing a way through which individuals can interact with their community to produce a better society for all', because in and of itself it implies the building of community to fight for greater social benefits. As such, it encompasses the dispersal of power, its potential to influence and a concern with social mobilisation. Of interest, too, is the role 'identifying and/or addressing present or new social needs' for this implies civic enablement and the potential for social mobilisation. Finally, 'maintaining and/or changing values in society' is also an important role to include in our analysis here because it implies an advocacy or campaigning role. It could be argued, therefore, that these four roles might be taken as proxies for examining substantive uncertainty because they encompass social mobilisation, civic enablement, calling into question the state's accountability to its citizens, and, at the very least, providing a countervailing voice to the status quo.

Habib also notes the importance of the dispersal of power and to our proxy roles we can add two values, therefore, on which we collected data: political values 'where actions are motivated by a view on the distribution of political power in society' and economic values 'where actions are motivated by a view on the distribution of economic power in society' (Donoghue et al., 2006).

Responding organisations were asked to rate the importance of each role and value on a scale of 0–6, where '0' corresponded to 'not applicable' and '6' corresponded to 'most important'. Combining all the aforementioned roles and values, it was possible to compute an average (mean) score for 'substantive uncertainty'. Table 1 presents the average scores by the field of activity of the organisation (using the International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations; Salamon & Anheier, 1996).

As can be seen, those organisations scoring above average were in the fields of advocacy and campaigning, community development, international development, social services, trade unions and education. All of these kinds of organisations, apart from education, would be actively engaged in policy lobbying or would have representatives in social partnership. Examining these organisations in a little more detail to see if there are any organisational characteristics that can be identified, Table 2 sets out those findings.

Those characteristics emerging as significant for an above-average scoring on the importance of roles and values associated with substantive

Table 1.   Types of Organisations (ICNPO) and Mean Scores
for 'Substantive Uncertainty' (Scale of 0–6).

Field of Activity of Organisations	Mean Score
Advocacy, law and politics	4.46
Community, economic and social development and housing	3.78
International development	3.74
Social services	3.72
Trade unions, business and professional associations	3.71
Education and research	3.51
Health	3.39
Religious and faith-promoting organisations	3.38
Environment	3.24
Philanthropic intermediaries and promotion of voluntarism	3.05
Arts, culture and heritage	2.82
Sports and recreation	2.81
Overall	3.44

uncertainty were: having been established since 1986, having an income greater than €40,000 per annum, having both paid staff and volunteers, in receipt of state funding but not private donations, and having urban beneficiaries and a national or international remit. The characteristics also included a preference for being called an NGO, community or nonprofit organisation.

Comparing these findings to South Africa (Habib, 2007a), a certain level of resources is required for organisations creating substantive uncertainty, as Habib has also argued. In the case of Ireland certain levels of both financial and human resources resulted in a higher than average score on substantive uncertainty variables. When the above variables were tested further in regression analysis, the most significant (at $p \geqslant .050$, or significant at the 95% confidence level) were being established since 1986 (.000), having an income greater than €40,000 per annum (.029), receiving state funding (.004), not receiving private donations (.000), having both paid staff (.000) and volunteers (.000), having an international remit (.005), being called a community organisation (.000), or being called an NGO (.005). Organisations active in the fields of education (.000), community development (.000), social services (.000), advocacy (.000), trade unions (.000) and international development (.003) were all statistically significant.

To tease out the analysis a little further, factor analysis was used to identify the underlying relationships that respondents were making between

Table 2. Organisational Characteristics and Mean Scores
for 'Substantive Uncertainty'.

Organisational Characteristics	Mean Score
Prefer to be called 'nongovernmental organisation/NGO'	4.29
Income over €40,000 p.a.[a]	3.70
Paid staff	3.68
Established after 1986[b]	3.63
Urban beneficiaries	3.62
State income	3.61
International remit	3.60
Prefer to be called 'community organisation'	3.60
Prefer to be called 'nonprofit organisation'	3.56
National remit	3.55
Volunteers	3.51
No private donations	3.51
Rural beneficiaries	3.45
Overall mean	3.44
Local remit	3.41
No volunteers	3.38
Private donations	3.34
Prefer to be called 'voluntary organisation'	3.31
Established before 1986[b]	3.29
Income less than €40,000 p.a.[a]	3.25
No income from state	3.25
No paid staff	3.06
Prefer to be called 'charity'	n.s.

Notes: There were fewer responses to the income than the age question. Almost 100% answered the question on age, whereas 76% responded to the question on income (see Donoghue, Prizeman, O'Regan, & Noël, 2006, p. 46). Median age and income were taken for averages, rather than means, because of the distribution of responses. n.s., not significant.
[a]This was the average (median) income of responding organisations to this question (*N* = 3,215).
[b]This was the average (median) age of all responding organisations (*N* = 4,214).

different variables. Factor analysis identifies underlying statistical relationships made by respondents between different variables. As a result, if these relationships can be identified, variables fall into a number of different groupings, called factors. As can be seen, two main factors, or sets of variables were obtained in this analysis (Table 3).

The first factor contains the roles 'maintaining and/or changing values in society', 'identifying and/or addressing present or new social needs' and 'providing a way through which individuals can interact with community to

Table 3.   Factor Analysis of Roles and Values Contributing
to 'Substantive Uncertainty'.

Factors	Varimax Score	Direct Oblimin Score
Civic enablement		
Maintaining and/or changing values in society	.711	.705
Identifying and/or addressing present or new social needs	.704	.691
Providing a way through which individuals can interact with their community to produce a better society for all	.733	.759
Elite contestation		
Influencing or involvement in national policy development	.595	.578
Political values – where actions are motivated by a view on the distribution of political power in society	.784	.805
Economic values – where actions are motivated by a view on the distribution of economic power in society	.713	.717

Notes: Two methods of rotation were used to check for robustness of the data – Varimax and Direct Oblimin. As can be seen, similar factor 'scores' were obtained, serving to underline the strength of the underlying relationships between the variables comprising the two factors. Furthermore, high scores were obtained for the variables in the two factors, again another sign of robustness.

produce a better social for all'. The second factor consists of the role 'influencing or involvement in national policy development' and political and economic values. We might suggest that both of these factors can be taken to represent the different sides of the substantive uncertainty coin; the first has a concern with civic enablement whereas the second has a concern with the direct contestation of elites.

Given the linkages that respondents were making between the different variables, it is possible to explore how different types of organisations score the two factors. Taking the analyses in Tables 1 and 2 as a guide, various organisational characteristics, including field of activity, were compared to see what their average (mean) scores were. Overall, civic enablement scored higher on average than the contestation of elites, being accorded an average of 4.33 on a scale of 0–6, whereas the latter was given an overall average of 2.43 on a scale of 0–6. Regression analysis was run then to discover what variables emerged as most statistically significant for each factor. Table 4 outlines the findings from regression analysis for each factor.

First looking at civic enablement, the most significant variables (when run in regression analysis, at $p \geqslant .005$, or 99% confidence level) were: having been established since 1986 (.002), being in receipt of state funding (.002), having both paid staff (.000) and volunteers (.000) and identifying as a

Table 4. Support for Civic Enablement and Contestation of Elites (Regression Analysis Showing Statistically Significant Variables).

	Civic Enablement	Elite Contestation
Education and research	.000	.000
Social services	.000	.000
Community, economic and social development and housing	.000	.000
Advocacy, law and politics	.000	.000
International development	n.s.	.001
Trade unions, business and professional associations	n.s.	.000
Established after 1986	.002	.000
Income over €40,000 p.a.	n.s.	.000
Paid staff	.000	.000
Volunteers	.000	.004
State income	.002	.001
No private donations	.038	.000
Urban beneficiaries	.049	n.s.
National remit	n.s.	.000
International remit	n.s.	.002
Prefer to be called 'community organisation'	.000	n.s.
Prefer to be called 'nongovernmental organisation/NGO'	n.s.	.000

Note: n.s., not significant.

community organisation (.000). Organisations operating in education, community development, social services and advocacy were all significant at .000.

The significant variables (at $p \geqslant .005$, or 99% confidence level) for the contestation of elites were: having been established since 1986 (.000), having an income greater than €40,000 per annum (.000), state funding (.001) but not private donations (.001), paid staff (.000), volunteers (.004), a national remit (.000), an international remit (.002) and identifying as an NGO (.000). Organisations in the fields of education, community development, social services, advocacy, trade unions and international development were all significant at .000.

The two sides of substantive uncertainty, therefore, revealed some differences in support. Resources such as paid staff and volunteers were important for civic enablement as was being in receipt of state funding. These organisations were more likely to identify themselves as community organisations and were involved in advocacy, community development, social services and education. Organisations for which the contestation of elites were important also had a certain level of resources – both financial

and human; they had a national or international remit, preferred to call themselves NGOs and identified themselves as trade unions, or involved in international development as well as in the same fields of activity as those organisations supporting civic enablement.

DISCUSSION

Although these roles and value data are being taken as proxies for substantive uncertainty, we can indicate certain findings that are worthy of note emerging from the analysis. First of all, as Habib (2007a) has pointed out in the South African situation, a certain level of organisational resources is required to create substantive uncertainty. He argues that social movements have both financial and human resources that facilitate their engagement with the state, which the survivalist community-based organisations, for example, do not have at their disposal. Similarly, as the Irish data indicated above, organisations giving above-average support to those roles and values encompassing substantive uncertainty, whereas younger than the average (median) age, have above-average (median) incomes, receive funding from the state and have both paid staff and volunteers. Furthermore, and as Habib noted in the case of South Africa, these organisations have either a national or international remit (particularly in the case of organisations supporting the contestation of elites variables).

Habib (2007a) also says that the type of organisation is important for creating substantive uncertainty. In the South African context, social movements, through their campaigning and advocacy, engage in an adversarial relationship with the state, but also mobilise the masses through their structures and networks, unlike NGOs whose relationship with the state is consensual and is based on service delivery. In Ireland, the field of activity was found to be important and certain kinds of organisations were more likely to give higher support to roles and values associated with substantive uncertainty than others. So, the organisations involved in advocacy, community development, international development and trade unions gave above-average support. Habib further points to several functions involved in substantive uncertainty, two of which, he says, are most important for social movements in South Africa viz. civic enablement and the contestation of elites. When factor analysis was conducted on the Irish data, it was possible to identify two sets of variables which approximated those two functions. Again, a certain level of both human

and financial resources was found to be significant for both factors. Differences between support for these two functions of substantive uncertainty could be seen in both the remit and field of activity of the organisation. Organisations involved in the contestation of elites tended to have a national or international remit, which was not statistically significant for organisations supporting civic enablement. Furthermore, trade unions and international development organisations were more likely to be involved in the contestation of elites rather than in civic enablement.

Another finding emerging from the Irish data was the identification of the organisation, which could also be seen, albeit implicitly, in the South African situation. According to Habib, social movements are most likely to create substantive uncertainty in South Africa which he attributes to resource levels and their focus of campaigns at national, rather than local, level. NGOs, by comparison, are service delivery organisations primarily and survivalist organisations are community-based and local.

In Ireland, different labels are used by third sector organisations from the ones found in South Africa. As noted earlier, over the past three decades 'community' has become a more important moniker for third sector organisations in Ireland and these organisations have been associated with political activity or the politicisation of certain issues (Donoghue, 1999) as well as with active citizenship and the effective functioning of democracy (Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs, 2000). What the analysis here shows, however, is that 'community' as its name implies has stronger associations with the civic enablement function of substantive uncertainty. Community organisations in Ireland are different from those in South Africa, as described by Habib. Having a community development ethos does not preclude state funding (in fact, there has been a long-standing state programme, called the Community Development Programme, to support community development), nor are such organisations necessarily small. Although community organisations can have a place-based or geographical identification, there are many community organisations with a national remit because they are based on communities of interest (e.g. lesbian, gay, women, disabilities, ethnic minorities, poverty and disadvantage). Organisations representing communities of interest are included on the CVP.

Different from the case in South Africa, NGO in Ireland is a term with more direct political connotations, as can be seen in its association with the contestation of elite factor in our analysis. NGOs adopt quite an explicit political role and campaigning organisations are quite likely to identify themselves, as a result, as NGOs.

The Irish data also point to the importance of state funding and, interestingly, the relative unimportance of private donations. Taking the issue of state funding first, it seems that its significance can be related to the stage of development of the organisation (Donnelly-Cox & O'Regan, 1999). The state is a significant funder of third sector activity in Ireland (Donoghue et al., 2006), so its importance in the context of our analysis of substantive uncertainty relates to the stage of the organisation's development and to its ability to forge relationships in the external environment to attract resources. At the same time, the state apparatus has an uneasy relationship with advocacy (Keenan, 2008), and it is excluded from the definition of charitable activities (Charities Bill, 2009). An organisation may, however, receive funding for service provision or community building, whereas still engaging in advocacy. Furthermore, state funding can give an organisation legitimacy, enabling it to seek funding from other sources (Donoghue, 2002).

Private philanthropy is relatively underdeveloped in Ireland (Donoghue, 2004), which would explain why its absence emerged as statistically significant in the analysis earlier. It should not be construed that private philanthropy does not support substantive uncertainty but that organisations involved in creating substantive uncertainty have reached a certain level of development, even if they are relatively young (established since 1986) and they have a certain level of both financial and human resources, from different sources, enabling them to engage.

Although the state has an uneasy relationship with advocacy, it is also noteworthy that civic enablement, rather than the contestation of elites, received higher support among Irish third sector organisations. There may be a somewhat ambivalent approach to advocacy among third sector organisations in general (Keenan, 2008), which is why some types of third sector organisation emerged more strongly in favour than others for the contestation of elites factor. Support for both sides of the substantive uncertainty coin, by third sector organisations and the state alike, might be worth considering at a more sophisticated level for future policy development and negotiation.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The third sector's involvement in public governance in Ireland can take a variety of shapes involving different institutional arrangements and potential tensions in their management. For example, third sector actors

were instrumental in the shift from a colonised nation to an independent nation-state; they are involved in the provision of social services and since 1987 have been involved in social partnership. Taking our cue from the concept of substantive uncertainty proposed by Habib (2008, 2007a, 2007b), it has been suggested in this chapter that third sector involvement in social partnership has contributed to substantive uncertainty. This involvement has taken the form of the more traditional social partners, such as the employers' representative groups, the trade unions and the farmers' representatives groups but has also, since the mid-1990s, been broadened to include other community and voluntary actors representing the interests of the socio-economically marginalised as well as of civil society organisations. Though the CVP has less room for manoeuvre than the other, more traditional, social partners, it has still contributed in broadening the scope of partnership agreements to include the voice of disadvantaged constituencies in Irish society.

As well as third sector involvement in social partnership, however, this chapter also explored the potential for substantive uncertainty and whether or not that is regarded as important among third sector actors in Ireland. Using data from a large-scale survey, a number of roles and values were taken as proxies for substantive uncertainty and analysed for their significance. Third sector organisations were shown to play a number of different roles and the two different sides of substantive uncertainty, that is the contestation of elites and civic enablement, were found to be of relevance for different kinds of third sector organisations. This chapter has not only highlighted these two sides of the substantive uncertainty 'coin', but also the tendency in Ireland for community organisations to support civic enablement and NGOs to support the contestation of elites.

Although a distinction between different kinds of third sector organizations, as described by Habib, was not found in the Irish data, as in South Africa a certain level of financial and human resources are required by Irish organisations to contribute to the creation of substantive uncertainty. While the organisations were found to be relatively young, having been established within the past 20 years, they had sufficient incomes as well as paid staff and volunteers. In addition, they had either a national or international remit and their field of activity was also found to be important. Advocacy, international development, community development, social services and education all emerged as significant fields of activity.

The focus on a national or international remit in the findings is interesting but points to the system of government in Ireland rather than a lack of concern with local issues. Other Irish research has suggested the importance

of identification with place by third sector organisations, particularly in attracting resources (Donoghue, O'Regan, & Hughes, 2007). Ireland, however, is a highly centralised country (as well as being very small) and the ability to take action at the national level, even on issues of local concern, is important in seeking to effect social change.

The data also indicate the importance of state funding, which could be interpreted as another anomaly. In Ireland 68% of third sector organisations receive funding from the state and such funding represents 60% of third sector income, in total (Donoghue et al., 2006, p. 46). Such funding differs by the field of activity and education, health care and social services receive the majority of funding. At the same time, the state does not provide funding for advocacy activities, which indicates the multiple roles played by third sector organisations. In other words, an organisation can be receiving state funding for service provision but also be engaged in advocacy. Organisations, therefore, can be involved in a number of different roles, all having public governance functions.

The Irish data have also indicated elsewhere that despite the association of some third sector organisations with service delivery (found in both theory and policy), that role is not regarded as important as other roles such as community building, value expression and civic enablement. Service delivery, therefore, may be a means to an end, rather than an end in itself and wider recognition of not only the multiplicity of roles but also their complexity is required. For individual organisations there can be tension between the service provision role and advocacy and being a 'handmaiden' of the state is an ongoing argument within third sector circles. At the same time, organisations themselves argue for the importance of advocacy, in some fields of activity more than others (as our data indicate), and there has been a recent advocacy initiative to develop this activity further across different third sector organisations (www.cnm.tcd.ie; Keenan, 2008).

Habib has also argued for the recognition of this plurality of roles as well as of their effect on diverse state–civil society relations. Such recognition is needed too in the Irish context for not only can relationships be consensual or conflictual, but different roles played at particular historic or political junctures will also influence the nature of those relationships. Policy on the third sector has not tended to recognise fully the multiplicity of these roles nor the importance of advocacy and campaigning in contributing to democracy. The role that the third sector plays in public governance, and its importance as a watchdog and as a vehicle for the expression of values and community difference, require policy recognition so that the sector's democratic contribution can be more effective. In this way, the multiplicity

of roles and relationships, which Habib points to in the South African situation, and which we can indicate empirically in Ireland, can be given their full space.

NOTES

1. Like Habib (2007a) the definition of civil society being adopted in this chapter is 'the organized expression of various interests and values operating in the triangular space between the family, state and the market' (Habib & Kotze, 2003, p. 3). Most times the term third sector will be used, but at other times the terms civil society and voluntary and community sector will be used. Although these terms are used interchangeably, and, possibly open to argument among those with a definitional interest, they are all taken for organisational forms in that 'triangular space'. See footnote 2 for a further discussion on terminology.

2. It is probably necessary at this point to make a note on terminology. First of all, Habib's analysis of South Africa makes a distinction between informal community-based organisations, formal NGOs and social movements. In Ireland, organisations bearing the first two of these monikers, are different kinds of animals from the ones described by Habib. In general, the preferred terms covering most third sector actors in Ireland are community (39%) and voluntary (31%) (Donoghue et al., 2006, p. 33), which led to the adoption of the term 'community and voluntary sector' during the 1990s, also reflected policy (Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs, 2000). Voluntary organisations tend to be a little older, whereas community organisations are of recent origin, having their base in the various rights movements since the late 1960s (Donoghue et al., 2006, p. 34). To further complicate matters, legislation refers to charities (Charities Act, 2009) but this is a term best preferred by only 6% of organisations in a recent survey; meanwhile 5% of organisations best preferred the term NGO. Nonprofit was preferred by almost 19% of organisations, which is interesting because it is not a widely used term; presumably it was chosen for its perceived neutrality (Donoghue et al., 2006).

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TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF CIVIL SOCIETY: UNDERSTANDING NON-GOVERNMENT PUBLIC ACTION

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INTRODUCTION

In the United Kingdom and elsewhere, the move from government to governance has been well documented (Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1996, 1997). In the global North, governance is understood as a response to complexity and a recognition that many problems cannot be solved by government alone, whereas in democracies across the North and South, there is a concern to address the democratic deficit and [re]legitimize the state. In both contexts, new governance spaces and opportunities have emerged for non-governmental actors to engage in the process. Interest in community or "third sector" participation has spread around the globe, albeit with very different expressions in different contexts, and in many cases at the insistence of international financial institutions. Deacon (2007, p. 15) describes such global trends as "the contested terrain of emerging global governance" in which he includes both international non-governmental organizations and transnational social movements. Although this shift

represents new opportunities, the extent to which the spaces for participation offer a new vision of the public domain is contested (Fung & Wright, 2003; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007).

This chapter argues that the degree to which contemporary governance arrangements offer opportunities for non-governmental actors or is the means for ever greater state control will depend to some extent on the nature of civil society prevailing at any time. It aims to make a theoretical contribution to our understanding of civil society and sets out a typology of civil society, with a focus on state–civil society relations, constructed on the basis of our empirical work but one that undoubtedly requires further research and analysis.

THE RESEARCH

The chapter draws on research[1] that explored the opportunities and experience of governance from the perspective of non-governmental organizations in four countries: Bulgaria, Nicaragua, England, and Wales and across three regions (Central Latin America, Europe, and the "Accession Countries" of the former East European Soviet bloc).[2] The research sought to explore how non-governmental actors in these spaces perceive the tensions and opportunities they find and to understand theoretically and empirically whether and how they become "active subjects".

Although each of the selected nation states was experiencing a period of transition they were chosen specifically for their differences and in particular the historical development of collective welfare provision and state-civil society relationships. The shared experience of "transition" was also significant. Nicaragua was still in transition from a dictatorship and revolutionary upheaval, Bulgarian was emerging from state socialism and a centralized bureaucratic control, whereas the United Kingdom was in transition from its post-war social democratic welfare state and a period of radical neo-liberal reform and Wales was experiencing something of a re-birth of nation identity, a degree of devolved power and an opportunity to shape policy and practice in quite distinctive ways. In all four cases, the role of civil society, the Third Sector, citizenship and identity are all critical and in Nicaragua and Bulgaria there was considerable external interest in the evolution of such developments.

Within each nation state, we selected sites that would best reflect national trends but provide some basis for comparison. In Nicaragua and Bulgaria, we chose the capital cities of Managua and Sofia, as they provided a range of governance spaces in comparison with other areas of the country. In the

United Kingdom selecting London could distort the data and so Birmingham, England's second city, was chosen. A focus on Wales provided the opportunity to consider the impact of "national" devolution and again, Swansea, its second largest second city was selected. We explored local governance within a single constituency in Birmingham and a District of Managua while drawing upon the whole of both Swansea and Sofia.

Interviews were conducted with between 15 and 20 national stakeholders in each of the three nation states followed by stakeholder interviews in each of the four cities. Following a mapping of governance spaces within each city, between 4 and 6 NGOs engaged in grass-roots work were selected from the three fields of economic, social and community development, primary health care, and education. Organizations were selected with a view to provide a range in terms of size, number of employees, maturity, membership and public oriented, and involvement in policy-making and service delivery. Within each organization at least two semi-structured interviews were conducted with up to six actors each with different relationships to the organization (e.g., Board member, CEO, frontline employee, volunteer). The interviews covered: participant profile, organizational profile, non-governmental sector, engagement with and experience of governance spaces, organizational consequences of participation, individual experiences of membership and evaluating governance spaces. Interviews were tape recorded and professionally transcribed. Data were coded using the interview schedule agreed with our Bulgarian and Nicaraguan partners and analyzed using Nvivo9. Our approach assumed that a sufficient number of clearly defined organizations of sufficient size and capacity, working in our policy fields and involved in governance could be found in each research site. In some cases, particularly Bulgaria, this was not the case and the number of interviewees available from each organization was less than anticipated.

Considerable time was spent in the selection of research sites and the probability of finding sufficient units of research was central to this process. Paying attention to the geographical site allowed us to explore the significance of place, political cultures and a more nuanced set of historical relationships between state and civil society. Between two and three Inquiry Groups were held at different stages of the interview process involving up to six participants from the selected organizations. These were used to share, discuss, and further develop emergent findings and gather intelligence about current local developments. An access-restricted web site was designed for participants to post comments, raise questions, or enter a dialogue and was used by the research team to post emergent papers and outputs.

A videoconference was held toward the end of the study, with participants from each site, in which discussions confirmed both that participants shared many similar experiences albeit for quite different reasons and the influence of the political contexts of each setting on their strategic responses.[3]

FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE

Although new forms of governance are influenced by common global trends, Deacon (2007) and others have argued that they are shaped more by the historical socio-political and cultural context in which they emerge. Although governance theorists welcome these opportunities as the "ultimate in hands-off government" (Rhodes, 1997, p. 110), governmentality theorists describe how the compliance of willing subjects is secured, arguing that the NGO sector is constructed as a "governable terrain" (Carmel & Harlock, 2008) and community transformed from a language of resistance into an expert discourse and professional vocation (Rose, 1996). Governmentality theory argues that what we are witnessing is in fact a process whereby the state expands its reach and extends its power by governing through non-state institutions. Thus, Miller and Rose (2008) argue that "each of these emergent political rationalities…seeks a way of governing, not through the politically directed, nationally territorialized, bureaucratically staffed and programmatically rationalized projects of a centrally concentrated state, but through instrumentalizing the self-governing properties of the subjects of government themselves in a whole variety of locales and localities – enterprises, associations, neighbourhoods, interest groups and, of course, communities" (p. 111).

In the global "North," governance is understood as a response to complexity and "wicked" problems that cannot be solved by government or market alone (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998). There is also a challenge to address the "democratic deficit" in both old and newer democracies across the North and South, understood as a loss of citizen faith in political parties and the political systems as evidenced by a decline in party membership, public opinion polls and electoral turnout. Governmentality theory suggest that by bringing non-governmental actors into governance spaces, as well as the private sector, government can channel such resources (skills, knowledge, and networks), and extend further its control to address problems such as social exclusion and unsafe neighborhoods (Jessop, 2002). Governance theory offers an alternative perspective suggesting that it "opens up new

ways in which citizens can engage in the politics of localities and regions and participate in 'project politics' on specific issues" (Newman, 2005, p. 4).

Governments are motivated for a number of different reasons to create "new governance spaces" and invite non-governmental and private sector actors to participate. In the South, the requirements of international institutions create significant pressures. Structural adjustment rolled back the state and left a vacuum in basic needs provision that has been filled in part by the activities of NGOs. Civil society strengthening has become a central plank of World Bank strategy, and civil society participation is a requirement of their poverty reduction strategies. United Nations frameworks for human rights, international donor priorities, and solidarity networks also support greater democratic inclusion. The influence of global institutions is undoubtedly powerful but not hegemonic or static (Deacon, 2007).

Such internal and external pressures are driving changes in legislation, including constitutional rights that re-frame the citizen–state relationship, and as such can be understood as creating political opportunity structures and new channels of access to public decision-making. Social movement theory attempts to explain "contentious politics." Tarrow (1998, p. 71) argues, "when institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available, and state capacity for repression declines, challengers find opportunities to advance their claims". However, the meaning of "contentious" is not always clear and recently in the context of post-state socialist countries Tarrow appears to equate contentious with the mere presence of civil society groups (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007). Furthermore, new governance arrangements offer opportunities for "collaborative activity" in what are deemed, "invited" spaces (Cornwall, 2004) that non-governmental actors may enter without contention. Yet the capacity of non-governmental organizations and citizens to participate effectively as "active subjects" (Morrison, 2000) will vary according to the context, the nature of the organization, personal capacities and dispositions, and the linkages with other actors. Elsewhere (Howard et al., 2008), we have explored the factors that contribute to making non-governmental "subjects" more or less active participants in new governance spaces. Here we turn our attention to the relationship between civil society formations and the nature of non-governmental action.

In this chapter, we suggest that despite the inherent problems in all attempts at typologizing dynamic systems, it remains a useful heuristic devise for considering different formations of contemporary civil society that have arisen from the historical relationships between state, economy,

and society as a way of explaining the orientation and behavior of public actors in relation to new governance arrangements. The concept of civil society formation is preferred to that of "regime" as the latter conveys a structure that is too orderly, fixed, or organized to reflect the rather messy, chaotic, contested, and contradictory nature of any civil society. The chapter will argue for the importance of any specific civil society located within the boundaries of a nation state in shaping public action. It also recognizes the emergence of a global civil society and that engagement at a global level will in turn impact upon actions and orientations within each national context. Although it is expected that the influence of a global civil society will grow at present a global consciousness amongst civil society actors and global organizations remains underdeveloped (Mayo, 2005; Wainwright, 2005).

UNDERSTANDING CIVIL SOCIETY

Since the 1989 collapse of the Soviet East European bloc, there has been a revival of interest in the concept of civil society. No doubt this is in part due to what Hilder, Caulier-Grice, and Lalor (2007, p. 10) suggest are the current levels of civil society campaigning as, "more widely-used and legitimate than ever before as a channel for voice and change." Following the Marxist theorists Gramsci (1971), writing from his prison cell in the 1930s, and later the exiled Hungarian Polanyi (1944),[4] most contemporary scholars define civil society today as that public space between the state, market place, and the informal personalized life of the family. This contrasts with earlier interpretations that first included the state and then the market but not the state. Thus, civil society today would be differentiated from the "public sphere" that would also include the government, state, and other public bodies. Yet such boundaries are permeable, fluid, and disputed. Each sphere has a relationship to the others, and each is able to influence all. Such inter-relationships between civil society, state, and market are perhaps as important as what is happening within any particular sphere (Turner, 1992).

Both the overall shape of civil society and that of any of its constituent elements are determined by such relationships. Indeed Polanyi (1944, p. 201) argued that a market economy needs a vibrant society. In another sense too civil society is a conceptual and political territory destined to generate boundary disputes in what Deakin (2001) describes as the "borderlands" over what should be included within the definition and in particular whether

the intimate sphere of immediate and extended family and friendships are included or whether political parties and trade unions qualify as civil society organizations (CSOs). Similarly, although it is argued that a civil society should continue to be defined in relation to the nation state in which it is located others such as Kaldor (2003, p. 1) argue that a global civil society has emerged "no longer confined to the borders of the territorial state" and in which local identities and affiliations are being transformed by broader and more powerful concerns and a new basis of solidarity (Kossler & Melber, 2007).

Gramsci argued that civil society, a product of late 19th-century western capitalism, had a contradictory connection with the state, being both a space, "the outer earthworks" penetrated by the state, in which capitalist hegemony or domination is maintained *and* a key site in which hegemony is also resisted through a process of building consent (Burawoy, 2003; Birchfield, 1999). Civil society is both public and political or as Birchfield (1999, p. 43) notes, "an open-ended, continuously transformative process through which thought and action become unified." Polanyi too placed "active society" (to borrow Burawoy's (2003, p. 198) term) in relationship to the market and like Gramsci saw it as both threatened by and resisting the dehumanizing and commodifying aspects of the market, what he described as a "double movement." Here the state becomes the vehicle through which society manifests itself or as Jessop (2001, p. 15) puts it, "society, in and through the agency of a wide range of social forces, seeks to constrain the destructive anarchy of the free market by subjecting it to various forms of extra-economic regulation that nonetheless support and sustain capitalist accumulation."

Gramsci saw civil society as "a new terrain of struggle that connected the state to the rhythms of everyday life" (Burawoy, 2003, p. 206). He viewed the state as, "the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 80). In his later writing, Gramsci expressed less optimism about the capacity for resistance, led by organic intellectuals in a "War of Position," to generate a counter-hegemonic force, and saw the reach of an expansive state as a major break on socialist advancement. Polanyi retained his more optimistic view that society, in the form of cross-class alliances, would turn against capitalism noting, "Socialism is essentially the tendency inherent in an industrial civilisation to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to democratic society" (Polanyi, 1944, p. 234).

Contemporary writers of different political persuasions value and pro-
mote civil society – its institutions, relations and the values it represents – for
various conflicting reasons. Civil society is variously associated with: its
democratic function in developing appropriate practices and dispositions of
cooperation and other-oriented behavior; as a bulwark against excessive
state power; as a vital element of "good governance" and improved public
services in complex and diverse societies; as a way of strengthening the
voices and transformative capacities of marginalized and disadvantaged
peoples or a way of managing or containing dissent; and as a substitute to
State provision of public goods and services. In the global south, it is
additionally thought of as a vehicle to circumvent or challenge those
governments perceived – often by those in the global north – to be
ineffective, unaccountable, or corrupt. Perhaps significantly, the revival of
this seemingly benign concept, especially in the work of the various social
capital theorists notably Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1995) but also the
communitarianism of Etzioni, coincided with the perceived fragmentation
and individualization of contemporary western neo-liberal capitalism, the
loss of social ties and the decline of trust. According to Kossler and Melber
(2007), the popularity of civil society matched the decline of the more
conflictual idea of "solidarity."

This revival of interest in civil society has produced, "one of the
essentially contested concepts of political modernity" (Lofgren & Thorn,
2007, p. 5) that has only intensified in debates about the emergence of a
"global civil society" (Kaldor, 2003; Glasius, Kaldor, & Anheier, 2003) or
even "global neighbourhood" (Larson & Allen, 2006). Scholte (2007)
identifies four interpretations of civil society: the quality of civility; a
deliberative citizen-based political space; the sum total of associational life
and, more specifically, a collective description for an organizational type of
"civil society organisation" Indeed some writers have questioned whether it
is any longer possible to theorize a concept that has become a "catch-all
category" and used in "vague, unhelpful ways" (Swift, 1999, p. 22). The
adoption and promotion of both structural and normative definitions has
further only added to the confusion (Edwards, 2004; Wild, 2006; Mitlin,
Hickey, & Bebbington, 2007).

There are those writers who adopt a purely normative definition using
"civil" as an aspirational adjective to describe a society still-to-be secured.
In this approach CSOs become "civilising" organizations, *for* rather than *of*
civil society. Thus, Knight, Chigudu, and Tandon (2002, pp. 60–61)
conclude that, "It is impossible to separate civil society from aspirations and
values…civil society has its usefulness only if it attempts to achieve a better

world…something for which we must continue to strive…to achieve the common public good.'' Similarly, Kaldor (2003, p. 11) having identified five meanings of global civil society locates herself with the "activist" version that links the concept to the struggle for human equality in an unjust world. For these writers the key debate is what is meant by the "public good" or "civility," leading them to exclude those beyond civility who preach, "a philosophy of separation, supremacy and sectarianism" (Knight et al., 2002, p. 61).

Anheier (2007, p. 46) too argues that any definition should include only those committed to "civility." By this he means, following Billante and Saunders (2002), a respect for others, civility in public behavior toward strangers and empathy. The importance accorded to civility lies in its commitment to a process, a means to multiple ends. This approach would exclude "terrorist networks, violent activists, hate groups and criminal organisations" (Anheier, 2007, p. 46), but it generates two further problems. The first is that it invests a "civilising" mission to civil society (Sen, 2007), and second, it invalidates a number of "uncivil" strategies frequently adopted by CSOs. Sen suggests these be described as "incivil" to distinguish them from the "uncivil" activities of those pursuing more limited motives (p. 60). However, although this approach may be attractive it remains largely aspirational in highly unequal societies where a commitment to civility appears more as an appeal to a consensual way of being and ultimately is rooted in particular social relations that privilege particular social groups. Furthermore, normative approaches beg the question as to where, how and by whom the "public good" would be defined and that such definitions are closely connected to both place and time. Rather it would be better to acknowledge as does Kaldor's (2003, p. 10) "postmodern" version that civil society contains very contradictory forces with a dark side co-existing alongside what might be considered more appealing organizations.

Although normative judgments are unavoidable, an alternative approach is to adopt a structural definition that more closely reflects that there is "not a single civil society viewpoint but rather multiple views, often profoundly contradictory ones" (Wild, 2006, p. 5). Thus, Scholte (2007, pp. 16–17) opts for a view of civil society as a "*political space* where associations of citizens seek…to shape the rules that govern one or another area of social life…an enactment of citizenship." Thus, Lummis (1996, p. 22) sees the function of civil society as an area that "provides space for public discourse, for the development of public values and public language, for the formation of the public self…." However, from a range of political perspectives, violence is not excluded from the repertoires available to shape the rules and is often

the tactic of last resort to defend civil society. For Mayo (2005), Walzer's (1995, p. 7) definition as ''the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks…that fill this space'' represents the commonly accepted viewpoint. Similarly, Kaldor (2003, p. 7) argues that most definitions are predicated on the existence of the state, the rule of law and the ''relative absence of coercion in human affairs.'' In other words, there is a boundary between the civil and uncivil with the latter characterized more by violence or coercion with the result that it is no longer possible to speak about an enactment of citizenship but more about the disintegration or failure of civil society.

From this viewpoint, civil society is but a heterogeneous space occupied by many conflicting associations divided on the basis of values, orientation, behavior, sense of purpose and identity (Wild, 2006). Typically, from this viewpoint civil society embraces social movements, faith-based organizations, NGOs, and formal and informal community organizations, whether constructed on the basis of territory, identity, or interest. The darker side of civil society includes various underworld and criminal organizations as well as those organized to inflict violence or hatred on others. Hilder et al. (2007) in a report focused on social campaigning identify the range of activities commonly undertaken as a consequence of such associational activities. These include, in addition to social campaigning ''mutual aid, service delivery, media strategies, electoral politics, unruliness, even political violence and revolution'' (p. 7). They argue that ''Campaigning has always been messy, rough and argumentative. It is the grit that keeps the smoother world of electoral democracy fair, and it is the currency through which societies talk to themselves honestly about their virtues and their vices'' (p. 8).

Within such a framework, debates between civil and uncivil notions of society or the nature of the ''public good'' becomes a defining feature. Civil society is the arena in which such debates are played out. In other words civil society, whether contained within a nation state or an emergent global sphere will reflect the social, economic and political relations of the wider society, including global north-south relations, and a place for the struggle for ideas (Mayo, 2005). Normative definitions appear to recoil from the ugly realities of contested civil societies for whom many experience as anything but civil. Structural definitions that locate civil society as a sphere in relation to other dominant spheres of state and market better reflect its shifting dynamic and complex nature in which competing interest are contested through not only dialogue but also physical violence and intimidation. However, without a sense of the values and practices, we aspire to achieve

structural definitions become mere sociological categories. In other words, it is not for nothing that we speak of "civil society," and it is not insignificant that such spaces are largely absent in totalitarian societies.

TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF CIVIL SOCIETIES

Various attempts have already been made from within different disciplinary frameworks to categories types of civil society. One approach developed within social or welfare policy has been to focus on the issue of how societies organize themselves to meet collective needs and ensure citizen well-being. This led to attempts to categorize and account for different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Siarrof, 1994; Goodin, Heady, Muffels, & Dirven, 1999; Holliday, 2000; Gough & Woods, 2004). These have largely focused on the relationship between paid work, state welfare provision and the role of organized labor in advancing welfare claims. As Lewis (2000) points out this tendency has ignored or under-valued the role of unpaid work and the mixed economy of welfare. Deacon (2007, p. 175) argues that all such approaches ignore the shifting nature of policy as global, complex "multi-sited, multi-layered, multi-actored" preferring Clarke's (2005) formulation of emergent welfare regimes as "policy assemblegies," the still unpredictable outcome of multi-layered transactions between multiple actors. Although such approaches to collective arrangements in response to shared needs are critical to state–civil society relations, they do not tell us enough about the flavor of the latter.

From a political perspective Linz (2000) connects civil societies with broadly defined types of society and distinguishes between democratic and non-democratic regimes. These were subsequently modified by Howard (2002) to three regime types: "democratic," "authoritarian," and "communist" and between "older democracies," "post-authoritarian," and "post-communist" regimes. Similarly, Wild (2006, p. 6) argues that while civil society now exists in all regions of the world, "it tends to be stronger in more democratic and liberal states than in authoritarian and illiberal ones." Although this typology recognizes the legacy of previous regime-type, it fails to sufficiently capture the differences between countries within any category. It also has some interesting classifications. Australia, for example, is included as an "old democracy" yet the Commonwealth of Australia was formed only in 1901, and it saw its population grow threefold from 7 million in 1945 to 21 million in 2008 thereby transforming the country and ensuring that it is still very much concerned with nation-building.

Salamon and Anheier's (1998) stress the need to locate non-governmental action in the context of the wider political economy. They highlight four critical indicators to distinguish between different civil societies: the degree of political centralization, government policies toward the non-governmental sector, the existence of a facilitative legal framework and the degree of nation-state development. However, despite this approach, the civil society literature has rather assumed that the isomorphic tendencies amongst NGOs apply equally to the civil societies in which they are located.

Both Gramsci and Polyani suggest that we can expect quite distinctive nation state civil society formations and they highlight three important points. The first is that civil societies emerge at particular moments and from particular socio-economic configurations. The second is that it is the relationships to state and market that are critical in defining them. The third is that as a contested terrain civil society will express various degrees of compliance and resistance to dominant ideologies and practices. Thus the development of a typology may help to better understand the behaviors, flavor, and tendencies within any civil society and especially in a context where claims are made for the emergence of a global civil society.

The identification of such types or formations of civil society raises a number of questions not least of which are the limitations of constructing what is a map of containment when systemic dynamism is a fundamental feature. Perhaps any civil society is too turbulent, too complex, too contradictory, too opaque, the data too partial, and the moment too fleeting to be "captured" in a typology? (Back, 2004, p. 213). Although any civil society may come to represent an ideal formation these can never be considered a fixed or final position or a staging post on a linear journey toward some particular end point. Labels can become over-deterministic that having named it so we know it when what we should pay attention to are the variants within the broad direction. At best we can capture in each formation a dominant orientation within a complex, diverse, contradictory, sometimes inaccessible, and turbulent sphere of human activity. In doing so it may convey the appearance of a settlement just at the moment when civil society enters a turbulent phase and shifts toward another formation. Quite profound shifts can occur in moments of crisis transforming civil society where it may only rest briefly before shifting again through a series of gradual re-adjustments, perhaps returning closer to where it was pre-turbulence. Such formations are also not sealed units in which no trace of other varieties can be found. Rather it is likely, as in our research, that each will contain traces or tendencies, often powerful forces, from other formations, residues from previous periods or as emergent features that

challenge or disrupt dominant patterns. There is a tendency too for typologies to airbrush out those difficult or awkward features that undermine the certainty of the description. Typologies do not remove the necessity for interpretative analysis especially those policies and events that contain the potential to challenge the descriptor. One should never underestimate either the power of agency and its capacity for surprise or equally the failure to take up opportunities that present themselves. Nevertheless a civil society may become stuck or fixed in a particular mode for a sufficiently lengthy period so as to consider it representative of a particular formation.

Despite, or indeed because of the dynamism inherent to any set of relationships models can act as a useful heuristic device for freezing and analyzing the key factors within them, offering insights into understanding why particular civil societies reflect certain tendencies and provide explanations as to why significant shifts in orientation have happened or might be about to do so. To work well however such models must be able to tell us what kinds of behaviors and predispositions we might expect to find within each formation. They should also be able to offer a sufficiently convincing explanatory narrative as to how each might have emerged. In other words, we ought to be able to recognize the internal workings of each model and through an examination of the external relationships with the state and the market recognize how each formation took root. Further the boundaries between each model should be sufficiently solid, with enough that is distinctive and significant, yet also permeable, in recognition that each contains elements of the other and each type can evolve into another.

Our research suggests that it is possible to identify different civil society formations and the likely behaviors that derive from them. It suggests that the overall nature and direction of non-governmental public action can be understood by taking account of the inter-relationships between first actors, organizations and political culture(s) and second civil society, market and the state. However, profound changes in civil society can be ushered in due to a crisis internal to itself or in its relationships with either the market or state and increasingly in changes in global patterns and relationships, such as global migration, conflict, or recession.

As others have already suggested, the "strength" of any civil society, often measured by the level of associational activity, is no doubt related to the depth of the democratic system and cultures that welcome difference, acknowledge historical legacies from previous political regimes, and have an enabling legal and policy framework. Other critical factors from our

research that throw some light on the nature of civil society and the relationships between it and the state or market include:

- A level of economic development sufficient to produce surpluses from which basic collective needs can be met and ensure freedom from aid-dependent relationships.
- A political culture that places a high value on public goods and recognizes collective inter-dependencies.
- A state with sufficient capacity to fulfill its coordination function while finding an acceptable balance between centralized and de-decentralized political systems.
- Multiple political parties with strong and competing value positions and a capacity to value divergent viewpoints.
- A clear distinction between formal political party organizations and other CSOs.
- An educated urbanized cosmopolitan and autonomous middle class comfortable in its relationships with authority and whose value is recognized by the state.
- Strong relationships between the different segments of civil society in which proactive labor and social movements can nourish and support non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, and networks.

Athough the nature of civil society is in part determined by the autonomous action of citizens, it is more crucially shaped by the ways in which the state and economy have evolved and the strategies adopted by these actors in their efforts to manage a nation state. An associational life presupposes a degree of freedom from economic insecurity, political stability, and enabling legal frameworks.

Modern European civil society began to evolve in the late 18th century at a time when the rule of law had already been established, a market economy was beginning to develop, a settlement had been reached between state and monarchy and political institutions were in the process of consolidation. Continued economic growth and technological development alongside the further embedding of political institutions and practices, extensions to the rule of law as well as an on-going but relatively peaceful social and political reform process are all considered important and stabilizing features in the concomitant growth of civil society. However, if the European context suggests a relatively evolutionary process in which civil society develops largely in relation to the internal dynamics of each self-contained nation state, the picture is further complicated for those nations who have the

imprint of colonial subordination, continuous economic backwardness, or extensive autocratic rule. In the context of globalization such nations must establish new forms of self-identity while negotiating models of civil society thrust upon them by external, sometimes former colonial powers but also the more benign offerings of international NGOs, while remaining economically dependent. For others the "problem" is rather to preserve elite rule and contain a frustrated civil society perhaps over-eager to embrace a version of the European model.

The typology presented here emerged both inductively and deductively. Three civil society formations were identified from the research data: *disciplined* (United Kingdom), *manipulated* (Bulgaria), and *contentious* (Nicaragua). Two other formations *competitive* and *repressed* can be deduced from the analysis although further empirical research would be required to confirm both the depiction and where particular civil societies might be located. Any investigation into the detailed nature of a "repressed" civil society does of course pose fundamental research problems not least of which being that certain levels of repression might appear to eradicate any features that can be described as examples of a civil society in existence.

In addition, we suggest a sixth formation. We call this normative formation, a "civil society in the mind", borrowing a concept from psychodynamics, as it provides the values and assumptions against which research data might be evaluated. Such a normative model could be described as *reflexive, inclusive, critical, authoritative, and engaged*, although equally it could have other contrasting features, and is something to which civil society actors aspire. A well-governed regime could be someone's idea of repressive tolerance just as much as it could be a vision of progressive development. As previously noted it is impossible to separate the analytical from the normative when discussing civil society. Deakin (2001) points to what he describes as a "utopian" strand in the literature but here we suggest that all civil society actors carry a strong normative vision that underpins their engagement. We retain this dualism by acknowledging that civil society actors hold continuously a "civil society in the mind" moving constantly between what we find and what we seek.

We suggest that these six formations (outlined in Table 1) represent the dominant and existing patterns of civil society that might be found. However, in this article, we will focus primarily on the three types – disciplined, manipulated, and contentious – as found in our research based on three nation states, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, and Nicaragua, respectively. These "ideal types" will be internally uneven and contra-dictory, some elements will be prevalent in more than one formation and

Table 1. A Typology of Civil Society.

1	Contentious
2	Manipulated
3	Disciplined
4	Competitive and interest oriented
5	Repressed
6	Civil society in-the-mind (normative)

formations can dissolve and be reconstituted into another. In locating civil society as a ''space'' between state and market, we recognize that the boundaries between all spheres are blurred and permeable. While aware of the rich diversity of associational life, we have in drawing up a typology focused on that organized element concerned with public issues. However, we would suggest that the observable patterns in these relationships would also be evident in other areas of civil society.

A CONTENTIOUS CIVIL SOCIETY

A contentious civil society is likely to be found in fragile democratic states with a history of colonialism and authoritarianism and still subject to frequent, sometimes violent, regime change, in which the military continue to play a prominent role, matched by weak often corrupt political parties sometimes propped-up by foreign governments, high levels of poverty and inequality, with weak economies dependent on external loans and international agencies. It is one in which civil society actors and organizations are in almost permanent conflict with the state, irrespective of the values and objectives of civil society actors or who occupies formal political power. Political parties are likely to be equally hostile to civil society actors viewing them as a source of competition and undermining their legitimacy. ''Clientelism'' is an endemic feature as a way of arriving at a ''false'' collaborative relationship with CSOs often a proxy for political parties. Within such societies, there is no single recognized coordinating agency. Civil society actors find themselves pulled in conflicting directions, with little faith in any formal institution, as they struggle to secure livelihoods and meet basic needs on the one hand and establish democratic rights on the other. Furthermore, the struggle must be conducted without the support of reliable and embedded state structures. Social movement and CSOs both

provide direct services to meet basic needs and challenge the state but are repeatedly frustrated by the state's lack of capacity to respond. In other words, there is very little that can be described as stable or predictable except the necessity for struggle.

A MANIPULATED CIVIL SOCIETY

A manipulated civil society is most likely to be found in those ''transitional'' states that have previously functioned under centralized state bureaucratic rule but are currently taking steps to join the ''global community'' of democracies and are expected to demonstrate an active commitment to developing civil society. It is one that has been constructed in the image of others. It has not emerged organically but rather has been created and shaped by the state and other external actors. Political parties will be weak, unstable, and unreliable. The previously state and continuing to exert centralized control is likely to be ill-equipped to respond to the contemporary challenges of social, economic, and political life. Rather, in its embrace of ''democracy,'' it must create the appearance of devolving power. It is a defended state that resists the postmodern world seeking to preserve outmoded mechanisms of governing. Every concession to the politics of the postmodern is experienced as a humiliating defeat yet it recognizes the need to give the appearance of desiring all that is new. Citizens lack confidence for self-organization and the creation of a sustainable politics. It lacks authenticity in political action or a secure inner-self but rather possesses a distorted relationship to authority, the ''knowing other.'' This absence of authenticity produces a vulnerability to the agendas of others. While previously the state was the coordinating agency, it is now the economy that has acquired this function with the appearance of an irresistible force for citizens long denied access to consumer goods. Yet the market economy remains weak and under-developed unable to deliver the promised prosperity by acting as entrepreneurs or consumers. Although the state remains trapped in outmoded forms of politics it is unable to respond to such expectations or adopt a political model more appropriate to a market economy.

CSOs may proliferate to give the appearance of independence and autonomy but are more likely to be either covert state bodies or dependent on external bodies, dependent on them for funding and direction and thus largely ignored by the state. The apparent opening up of autonomous spaces creates the impression that it is indeed there to be peopled by self-organizing

groups and that opportunities are available for them to emerge. The state as it were must make way for civil society to emerge for without its visible presence it faces the prospect of external criticism or even sanctions. However, the subsequent emergence of new organizations is closely monitored and various strategies are deployed to ensure that their behavior is compliant and they are as influential as they are allowed to be.

A DISCIPLINED CIVIL SOCIETY

A disciplined civil society is a self-governing one and comes closest to the expectations of governmentality theorists. Here we might expect to find a strong state and market economy with longstanding broad-based political parties representing competing political perspectives working within deeply embedded political, social and cultural rules and institutions. It is to be found in "old" social democracies with established citizen, political, and social rights, a mature technologically advanced economy with high participation rates, well-established machinery for industrial relations and producing enough surplus to provide a range of universal socialized goods and services to meet basic needs. The state is the primary agency of coordination. It will have established, over a lengthy period, democratic ways of managing change that involves a mix of both representative and participative democracy. The market is dominant and pervasive able to sustain high levels of mass consumerism, a culture of individualism, self-absorption, immediate gratification and a cult of celebrity with its associated fantasies and thus undermining previously held collective ethos or a sense of the public good.

  Citizens will be well versed in self-organizing. Dissent is a feature of society and is valued as such but it is a dissent that is expressed "responsibly." In previous periods dissent may have been critical in the formation of an articulate civil society and in shaping political, social, and economic change but while still present dissent is now contained within consensual frameworks for resolving conflict. In such a society, state, market, and civil society relationships would be a constant source of debate and adjustment yet underpinned by a shared belief in common goals and interests. The state will be critical in the survival and well-being of CSOs. Economic and social divisions are recognized but it is the degree of acceptable difference and the ways by which this can be achieved that is to be negotiated not the source of such differences. Continuous progressive

change, however minimal, is the guiding principal of all participants, and there is little appetite for more radical social upheaval.

A COMPETITIVE AND INTEREST-ORIENTED CIVIL SOCIETY

A competitive and interest-oriented civil society is one in which there is an abundant associational life but few shared goals and only a weak sense of common identity. This "affiliative drive" is merely an extension of the pursuit of individualism in a more organized way. The market is the key agency of coordination and provider of the means to need satisfaction in which citizens compete as best they can. Although the expression of group interests and particularities is actively encouraged, they are expected to pursue these in a competitive environment. It is these competing and multiple voices that ensure their continuing separation in the struggle for resources and sectional orientation. Such behavior mirrors economic and political life that will be strongly anti-collectivist in which trade unionism is weak and reflects classical liberalism. Political parties are likely to be large mass parties with few significant ideological class-based differences. Where dissent is expressed through larger social movements or identity politics they are inevitably prone to fragmentation as particularisms and individualism reassert themselves over collective goals. Concepts such as the "common good" or "mutual interdependence" as embodied by the state are weak by comparison having never taken a strong hold in the nation's consciousness but are overridden by notions of the right to "individual freedom" and the "pursuit of happiness." In domestic politics, the state will be structurally politically weak too as an aggressive individualism leads to both a rigorous system of checks and balances and decentralized structures. In contrast the state will be stronger in foreign affairs and able to call upon citizens to "defend the land of the free."

A REPRESSIVE CIVIL SOCIETY

A repressive civil society is by most definitions one that has yet to emerge. It is a feature of powerful centralized states that continue to exercise a pervasive grip on economic, social, and political life ensuring that only those loyal to the regime occupy key strategic positions of command and control

at every level and throughout each area of activity, including CSOs, where they are permitted. Regime opposition, however minimal, is met with repressive force underpinned by extensive systems of surveillance and security. There remains a strong and visible military presence loyal to the regime. Citizens have few rights and live under constant fear. Attempts to establish citizen-based organizations function at the clandestine level, often as informal networks rather than traditional organizations. At critical moments or trigger points such covert activity spills out into the public domain and if sustained the state may be forced to negotiate a new settlement even if it is a temporary one until it can re-group. Such states remain self-contained and powerful enough to ignore international pressure or flout international legislation and are prepared to implement extreme measures to deal with any emerging opposition. International access is something that is agreed on terms set by the state.

THREE EXAMPLES: NICARAGUA, BULGARIA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Nicaragua: A Contentious Civil Society

The case of Nicaragua represents what we have described as a contentious civil society. It is not alone in the Latin American context. Pearce (2004) drawing upon three reports from different global institutions (Mark Payne, 2002; World Bank, 2003; UNDP/PNUD, 2004) captures the situation well in her description of the dilemmas confronting many such countries.

> Latin Americans have organised, mobilised, suffered and died in their thousands over the decades in struggles against elitist, militaristic and authoritarian rule…[but]…Many social activists…remain to be convinced that the form of democracy on offer…is worth fighting for rather than against…Can social activists…be persuaded to invest more of their energies in the field of formal, institutionalised politics? (Pearce, 2004, pp. 485–486)

Pearce notes that "the realm of contentious collective action politics has not evolved…within a society that is already firm in its liberal values" (p. 487) but rather that for many, "liberalism…masks the abuse of power by elites" (p. 487) while "civil society is associated with *oppositionism*" (p. 488, italics original). She also refers to the alarming numbers reported by UNDP as favoring authoritarianism if that leads to improved economic circumstances and shares the World Bank view that change is sustainable only when "embedded in formal institutions, especially those that create the capacity of lower and middle groups to articulate their goals and

interests and organize…'' (World Bank, 2003, p. 33 quoted in Pearce, p. 486, footnote). Ironically, as Deacon (2007, p. 169) reminds us it was World Bank policies during the 1980s and 1990s that drove the urban middle classes into private service providers and, ''as a consequence abandoning their historic role as state builders.'' Pearce notes too the failure to establish ''an autonomous, distinct and legitimated public political sphere'' (Pearce, 2004, p. 492) and the persistence of state oppression, incorporation and clientelism. Civil society activists have come to value their oppositional but peripheral position equating this to civil society (pp. 498–499), whereas external stakeholders seek to transform activists into an American or European version of a non-profit organization (Salamon & Anheier, 1997).

Pearce's regional analysis is confirmed by our research in Nicaragua. There the state's capacity to meet basic needs is chronically inadequate, and it is the family, often via remittances that do so (BCN Banco Central de Nicaragua, 2008). International donors also have a huge impact where international aid represents 21% of GNP (Gosparini, Carter, Hubbard, Nickson, & Nunez, 2006) and will typically represent 90% of a CSO budget, mainly for service provision, giving rise to the NGO-ization of civil society (Borchgrevink, 2006, p. 11) and undermining the capacity for representation and accountability. Although democratization has progressed there remains a significant gap between laws upholding political institutions and how individuals act within them. The state remains highly centralized while debates on decentralization, local governance and development have revolved around the two poles of a neo-liberalism, that sees citizen participation as a free labor resource for the implementation of state projects, and a civil society network proposal for a decentralized democracy based on full citizen participation (Serra, 2007).

Nicaragua's political culture is marked by the *caudillismo* of its political leaders. Political parties are institutionally weak vertical organizations under charismatic *caudillos* or populist leaders oscillating between confrontation and cross-party pacts, resulting in weak institutions. CSOs express widespread political cynicism but nevertheless continue to accept the benefits of patronage and rarely engage in partnership building. Despite its recognition in the Constitution direct participatory democracy sits uncomfortably with representative mechanisms and has declined (Serra, López, & Seligson, 2004). The FSLN government, re-elected in 2007, introduced a new hierarchy of citizens' committees but organized along party lines to substitute (or in a few places to complement) existing citizen grassroots, municipal and national structures.

Although the collective action of the 1960s challenged the state, it was inherently ambiguous about democracy while the evolution of the public sphere has been inhibited by entrenched traditions of patronage (Pearce, 2004; see also Cunill, 1997). Since the 1970s political power has swung between right and left, with different parts of civil society allied to successive and opposing governments. Somoza's regime repressed autonomous civil organizations and promoted clientelist mechanisms, a tradition revisited and expanded during the 1980s by those who ousted the dictatorship. The FSLN lost power in 1989, and there followed a series of right wing governments, IMF intervention, reduced state provision, and civil conflict. Macro-economic structural adjustment was accompanied by a rapid increase in NGOs to deal with growing poverty and unemployment, and to channel the surge in foreign aid.

Power struggles also take place between protagonists within civil society, where "NGOs" are viewed as competing with political parties, and social movements struggle to gain or maintain autonomy (Baynard de Volo, 2006). Many NGOs emerged from complex relations between social movements, political parties and religious institutions and reflect a commitment to advocacy, influence and democratic participation, but have strong clientelist tendencies (Mitlin et al., 2007, Bebbington, 2004). Many are chronically dependent on the State, a political party, the Church, or an international NGO, and CSO leaders are often compromised by such relationships. Social movements remain in a state of almost permanent mobilization, as basic needs and human rights are constantly in jeopardy. Yet Nicaragua's civil society is strong, well networked and capable of proposal as well as protest.

Bulgaria: A Manipulated Civil Society

Bulgaria is a relatively new independent state, emerging as such as late as 1878 following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, precipitated by Russian military pressure approved by the then European Great Powers – Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Throughout its entire history Bulgaria has either been a province within a relatively strong but technologically underdeveloped empire – Byzantine or Ottoman – or profoundly influenced by them. Bulgarian capitalism (1878–1944) remained underdeveloped, captured by small property owners and possessing a collectivistic ("communal") mentality among the emergent bourgeoisie. Politically, this is reflected in the centralist organization of public affairs under the dominance of the State. Large-scale private property ownership

was never sufficiently significant so as to initiate the decentralization of political power. Bulgaria is an orthodox country and the Orthodox Church, an inheritance of the Byzantine Empire, is characterized by its submissive and dependent role in relation to the secular authorities.

Bulgaria's post-empire and pre-totalitarian history is marked by numerous local wars offering further opportunities for authoritarian governments and preparing the ground for totalitarianism by enervating any democratic and liberal tendencies. With the arrival of Soviet troops in 1944 Bulgaria was ready to accede to totalitarianism as an opportunity for some "meaningful," centrally planned, late and ultimately inhuman modernization. After a brief but intensive terror, a process of rapid industrialization followed, based on Soviet imported raw materials. After several waves of gradual and cautious liberalization, the technological and economic reforms proved untenable rendering the regime bankrupt. The bloodlessness of the 1989 transition and the absence of any pre-totalitarian cultural accumulation enabled the old elite able to secure it own position – physically and politically. Consequently many of the current economic, political leaders and state officials are direct heirs of the Communist era. The economic crisis of the post-transition reached its deepest point in the mid-1990s. After 1997 there was something of an economic revival within the major cities and while unemployment declined significantly emigration remains high and in the most rapidly developing areas Bulgaria imports workers to meet the demand.

In Bulgaria political parties have been numerous and short-lasting. The emergent middle class remains far removed from its historical role as the purveyor of liberal values, whereas the interest of small private property finds its political representation in nationalist, authoritarian-populist formations. Of all the transition countries, Bulgaria recorded the lowest rejection levels to welcoming authoritarian alternatives to the current democratic system (Howard, 2002). The human rights of large numbers of vulnerable groups are disregarded systematically. Public debate tends to be apathetic and restricted to a small circle of urban in intellectuals who, due to their relatively privileged positions at the European Union, have secured some public prestige. The trade union movement, a section of which was active in mobilizing against the Socialist government until the mid-1990s, is no longer influential reflecting other conservative tendencies and leading to chronically poor productivity and a low skilled workforce.

The administration of the European Union is seen as a form of meta-governance that should control and manage national governance, and also as a financial donor for development. The State remains very powerful but it

is also deeply mistrusted. Howard (2002, p. 288) using the 1998 New Europe Barometer Survey notes that Bulgaria comes highest of all the "transition" countries in its level of distrust in both civil and political institutions. Yet alternative models are few and emerge only after lengthy bargaining with the EU and until recently – with US diplomacy. Local self-governance is practically non-existent, with severe legal measures imposed on local authorities restricting their independence and denying them any tax raising capacity. Policy making is characterized by inconsistency and a lack of planning. Disappointment with the outcome and the absence of comprehensive policies is accepted as the norm.

The NGO sector is itself regarded even by its own representatives as something "imported," an untypical phenomenon in the Bulgarian context and is reflected in low membership figures (Howard, 2002, p. 289). Its existence is marked with feelings of novelty or experiment as something that is happening, "not because citizens are extremely active but rather the reverse is true: certain leaders knowing the so-called 'Anglo-American system' import [it] into Bulgaria…civil society is a project…." The sector's "umbilical cord" is connected rather to the donors while it relates to the objects of its attention as if it was independent and separate from those communities. Many national stakeholders remain closely connected with the former totalitarian regime, a "NGO nomenklatura grouping" emerging from the circles of the communist establishment. Each of four subsequent governments created their own NGO "circles" functioning either as secondary points for the allocation of NGO funds from external sponsors or recipients of large-scale projects a subject of constant criticism and public attacks from many of the "new" NGOs. State corruption of NGO activities has been apparent since 1989. Under a 1989 law NGOs received various financial benefits that allowed a number of people to take advantage generating a widespread attitude that made "foundation" synonymous with "unfair, capitalist/democratic fortune-making." Yet such cynicism has not undermined an extensive system of private informal networks that operate in part as a vehicle through which needs are met (Howard, 2002; Petrova & Tarrow, 2007).

Attitudes toward the third sector are closely connected with the state's capacity to address particular problems, and it tends to be focused on the more marginal areas of state activity. In the fields of healthcare, social care, and education, there are two major NGO "types" recognized by central and local governments and who benefit from media coverage. First there are the "old," government-supported NGOs, a heritage from the totalitarian past, such as the national unions of the disabled, the blind and the deaf that

flourished during the socialist era, with mandatory membership for individuals so categorized. Second are the "new" NGOs funded mainly by the "West," the "importers" of new, liberal practices in human relationships (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007). Public awareness associates "new" NGOs with the notion of the "third sector" – a form of liberal thinking based on the protection of the rights of disadvantaged groups. Dependent on external (Western) donors, their existence is bound up with the policy of an externally assisted "renaissance" of civil society. For neither group is there sufficient public accountability. As partners of the state governance has always existed for the "official" NGOs. From the perspective of the "new" NGOs, *governance* is a façade concealing state control, poor services, stigmatization, and exclusionary practices. Furthermore, NGO management remains underdeveloped, often dependent on a single charismatic person, who symbolizes the mission, vision, and organizational goals. Boards tend not to act as independent public bodies mediating between the community and the organization, but rather as a group of friends supporting an idea. There is little room for authentic *governance*, a public partnership between state/local authorities and civil organizations that is responsible for the values it professes and subjects these to evaluation.

The United Kingdom: A Disciplined Civil Society

The United Kingdom was the first industrializing nation and represents an old social democratic state – universal suffrage was achieved in 1928 – with long-established class based political parties – the Labor Party is the youngest of the major parties yet still over 100 years old. The Liberal Democratic Party is however a merger of the old Liberal Party (which first took office in 1868 and was originally an amalgamation of different factions) and the Social Democratic Party, a rump break-away group from the Labor Party. The rekindling of nationalism has seen the emergence in Scotland and Wales of nationalist parties while the last 10 years have seen a decline in class-based politics and a striving for the "middle ground." Since the settlement between state and monarchy at the end of the 17th century, the United Kingdom has slowly and sometimes painstaking developed its political institutions including the establishment of civil, political, and social rights. Although without a written constitution, its principles of governance and regulatory frameworks are deeply embedded, ritualized, and interwoven into the institutional framework. The British state is a mature state that has as it were "seen it all" having negotiated two world wars plus multiple

foreign interventions, the building and relative peaceful dismantling of an Empire that left most of its former colonies both economically and perhaps more significantly politically dependent for long periods, coped with insurrection in its own back yard of Northern Ireland and transferred its learning there to the management of domestic protest. Over the years, the United Kingdom state has, if nothing else, demonstrated its continuing capacity for diplomacy, negotiation, absorption, and turning defeats into its long-term advantage. Where necessary it equally demonstrated its ruthlessness in the suppression of dissent.

What is particularly striking about the UK context is the long history of formal or institutionalized relationships between the State and the ''Third Sector.'' Indeed, ''social welfare,'' whether focused on the ''deserving'' poor or in other more universal areas such as education, health, and housing, was initially the responsibility of charities and philanthropic employers. The State accepted only limited responsibilities for managing social problems except in the case of the ''undeserving'' where the primary task was to impose sanctions and deterrents. Although voluntary and community sector (VCS) activity during this period was overwhelmingly concerned with tendering to the needs of particular disadvantaged groups there were also some significant examples, such as in the anti-slavery movement, Glasgow rent strikes of 1912 and the franchise movement, of self-organized groups protesting about conditions or advocating for change. It was not until the turn of the 20th century that the State began to expand significantly its role in relation to welfare services and benefits from that of regulation to financing and finally provider. It was not until the 1945 election of the first Labor Government that an organized state system of welfare was created and the role of the VCS marginalized both in practice and politically.

Its four post-1945 settlements – organizational, political, social, and economic (Clarke & Newman, 1997) – are an example of the state's capacity to ''manage'' modernity. These secured the market economy, albeit a slightly more regulated one, at its core. Critically they produced a ''kind of framing consensus…a temporary period of stability or equilibrium, even while they remain complex, contested and fragile'' (Hughes, 1998, p. 4). These legitimated the function of the state as the primary coordinating agency. A planned, coordinated, systematic, properly resourced programme, backed by a determined political will was assumed to be the only option for the future organization of society and the state the only body capable of providing it (Chamberlayne, 1992). The expectation was that ''state management and control would ensure that the pre-war vagaries of the market…would be avoided and that chance, fate or predilection would

no longer determine individual life chances. Further, the arbitrary, uneven, moralising and bitterly resented activities of those charities engaged in the management of the poor would also become a thing of the past'' (Miller, 2004, p. 14).

Although the creation of a ''welfare state'' and the dominant and growing cross-party perception that only the State could properly identify, coordinate and deliver services for the ''public good,'' voluntary sector provision did not completely disappear. Nevertheless for more than 30 years its role was largely restricted to that of a supplement to the State, providing additional ''extras,'' filling in small gaps, complementing the State by offering services felt to be beyond what it could reasonably be expected to provide or marginal to current priorities, advising actual and potential service users about provision and how to navigate successfully the state system, and as advocates for those whose needs had yet to be recognized or campaigning for increased provision. Such activities were underpinned by an understanding that citizen well-being was a responsibility of the state although the exact balance between State and non-governmental organizations in the provision of well-being has long been a matter of contestation across the political spectrum. Both those on the neo-liberal right and those on the libertarian left have viewed State intervention negatively and supported voluntary self-help while paternalistic conservatism and various shades of socialists have favored a strong interventionist state.

This over-riding consensus remained in place until the mid-1970s before being dismantled by Thatcherite neo-liberal governments (1979–1997). Since 1979 under both Conservative and Labor governments there has been a tendency toward the centralization of powers, policy direction, and regulation, even ironically in policies associated with decentralization or the revitalization of the democratic function of local government. Labor's return to government (1997) has been characterized as an attempt to secure a new settlement based on more collaborative relationships and the creation of new governance spaces. A key relationship within new governance arrangements is that between local state agencies, led by the local authority, and civil society, most specifically voluntary and community sector organizations as well as active citizens acting on their own agency but who can claim legitimacy to speak to particular interests or concerns. Although the emphasis is more on the state as enabler rather than direct service provider, its coordination function remains powerful. For the non-governmental sector, this meant much greater recognition and explicit reference in policy recommendations and reflected in a comprehensive policy for the sector, a ''Compact'' between it and government and a series

of sector reviews that culminated *inter alia* in a new Charity Law, a Local Government White Paper that repeatedly emphasized the importance of engaging "communities and citizens," a major Treasury Third-Sector Review and the reorganization of Whitehall departments with a new Office of the Third Sector in the Cabinet Office, with its own Minister.

CSOs and NGOs now figure at the heart of reform programmes across the political spectrum, in policy making, implementation, service delivery through contractual relationships, the reinvigoration of democracy, strengthening citizenship and social capital and advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged or marginalized groups. The sector is openly valued by government and the state for its avowed creativity, imagination and new ideas, autonomy and ability to challenge and take risks, its capacity to reach those that the statutory sector cannot because they are assumed to be closer to the ground, flexible and can command greater reserves of trust, the additional resources civil society actors bring to partnerships and a commitment and "getting on with things." Nevertheless the state remains responsible for key decisions and finding the balance between competing considerations.

Although the nature and extent of VCS activity and its perceived value has varied over time, it has always been defined primarily in relation to the State, especially at critical junctures. In other words, as a sector, it has rarely acted independently. Rather the sector's image and role has always been defined largely in relation to how the State has been perceived and its capacity for intervention. This does not prevent individual organizations and informal networks acting without reference to the state but it is not these initiatives that have influenced the discourse on the role of what might be thought of as "organized" civil society. Only for brief periods during the past 150 years have segments within British civil society broken from their institutional moorings to adopt a more challenging or radically alternative vision. Civil society dissent has always been present and has at times acted as a powerful force but even within such periods the dissenters have found themselves in conflict with other more traditional, conservative, and numerically superior elements.

The interdependent nature of the relationship between the State and non-governmental organizations has left the latter with an ambiguous relationship to wider progressive social and political movements. This is not to say that such movements have not influenced NGOs or that organizational members and employees do not belong simultaneously to social or political movements. Indeed at times organizations have modeled themselves on the politics and ideology of specific movements while others saw themselves as

part of an explicitly wider movement. Yet regardless of whether they are against the very idea of a State, opposed to it for the interests it allegedly serves or disappointed with it for its short comings the majority of NGOs have continued to secure State financial support, recognition, and legitimacy while adopting a position of compliance and negotiation. At times a stronger and visible civil society working with social movements, as well as a confident labor movement, has enabled NGOs to be more dynamic, assertive, even confrontational, and to have a better sense of its own collective identity. The decline and fragmentation of social and labor movements has left NGOs weaker but also but also with fewer State-alternative points of reference. Overall UK CSOs have shied away from what undoubtedly would be a challenging task of being independent of State both financially and orientation.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has argued that non-governmental action can be better understood within a context of civil society at the national level, although acknowledging the growing influence of global dynamics. It does not claim that understanding the dynamics of civil society will provide a full account of non-governmental action. To achieve this consideration would also need to be given to the disposition of individual actors, organizational resources, institutional opportunities, and choices taken. Despite its limitations, the construction of a typology helps to define and differentiate some critical demarcation lines between civil societies and their organizational actors. Through a typological lens the experiences and responses of non-governmental actors can be contextualized and tensions both within and between civil societies considered. From comparative research in Bulgaria, Nicaragua, and the United Kingdom plus some deductive logic five civil society formations have been identified and it has been suggested that all actors carry a normative model of civil society ''in the mid'' which acts as a guide to practice and analysis. Despite its limitations, especially the aspects shared across formations and capacity of typologies to conceal as much as they reveal they can nevertheless help counter the tendency toward civil society isomorphism and to remind us that despite globalizing influences national civil societies continue to be strongly influenced by history, culture and state and market relationships. The inherent dynamism of civil society combined with these various influences on its formation suggest that whether the theorists of governmentality, governance or social movements

have a grasp must remain an open question although what is clear that the core relationship between the organizations of civil society and the state and the capacity of the former for agency remains at the heart of any formation.

NOTES

1. The UK Economic and Social Research Council as part of its Non-Governmental Public Actors Programme funded the research. RES-155-25-0058.

2. Although both England and Wales are part of the United Kingdom, the newly devolved arrangements in the United Kingdom gave the opportunity for further comparison.

3. For more detailed discussion of comparative research methods, see Miller and Taylor (2009).

4. There is some dispute as to whether Polanyi is sufficiently Marxist to be described as such. For a review of his work, see Block (2003).

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DOES PUBLIC SPENDING "CROWD OUT" NONPROFIT WELFARE?

Karl Henrik Sivesind and Per Selle

ABSTRACT

Social origins theory proposes that countries cluster around different models according to how public welfare spending affects nonprofit sector scale (Anheier & Salamon, 2006; Salamon & Anheier, 1998). This article confronts these assumptions about a liberal, corporatist, and social democratic model with results from a comparative analysis of highly industrialized countries with extensive welfare arrangements. We focus on nonprofit sector employment in relation to total employment in the welfare field, including education and research, health, and social services. Explanatory factors are public welfare spending, share of income from donations, and religious homogeneity. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 2000) is applied to sort countries in types. The results show that the consequences of public sector welfare spending on nonprofit welfare employment vary depending on other social conditions. In liberal countries, low public sector welfare spending results in a small nonprofit share of employment. The preconditions are low religious homogeneity and large shares of nonprofit income from donations. In other Western European countries, the size of public sector welfare spending is inversely proportional with the size of the nonprofit share of employment, depending on religious homogeneity. The Nordic countries have the highest religious homogeneity, and largest public welfare costs, and

accordingly, the smallest share of nonprofit welfare services. However, a similar ''crowding out'' pattern can be found in the presumably corporatist countries such as France, Austria, and also to some extent in Germany and Italy. In the other end of the line, we find the Netherlands, which is the clearest example of the presumed corporatist pattern in this sample. Religious homogeneity comes into play in both the liberal and the Western European causal constellation in accordance with Weisbrod's theory of government failure/market failure (Weisbrod, 1977), which indicates that this factor is more important for nonprofit welfare regimes than previously thought.

INTRODUCTION

Why is there a nonprofit sector? When it comes to why there is a market and a public sector, theories seem to converge around some simple answers: The market exists to balance demands and needs for scarce goods through the price mechanism. The public sector exists to provide public goods for which there is no individual incentive for paying. In addition, by satisfying the needs of the median voters for security, social insurance, and welfare services, politicians increase their chances to be re-elected. Hence, the price mechanism is central for coordination within markets, and the voting mechanism is central for coordination within the public sector. At least this is how it works in some theoretical models. When it comes to why there is a nonprofit sector, there are several more complicated answers, and it seems difficult to identify one central coordination mechanism. Instead, there exist several non-exclusive theories about why we have a nonprofit sector, in addition to markets and a public sector.

A nonprofit organization can be defined as *not* being subject to the public sector's structures of governance and also precluded from distributing financial surplus to those in control, that is, owners, executives, members, or others (Hansmann, 1987). This form of organization is chosen for many types of activity, such as delivering services; grant-making; advocacy; interest representation; and cultural, physical, and religious expression. Some nonprofit organizations are providing welfare services for clients, some are mainly oriented toward their members, and others are spreading certain messages to the general public, media, or decision-makers in the politics, public administration, or businesses. By not distributing profit, the organizations have some kind of public purpose, but the goals, target

groups, and stakeholders vary and are in many cases mixed (Enjolras, 2000). Hence, it is difficult to come up with a single coordinating mechanism to build a general theory of why there is a nonprofit sector. This may be the reason for the many alternative theories.

The most cited economic theories of nonprofit organizations focus on the welfare field and why provision of services by nonprofit organizations under certain circumstances may be an alternative to the public sector and the market. This includes government failure/market failure theory (Weisbrod, 1977), supply-side theory (James, 1987), and trust theories (Hansmann, 1987). Other theories underline the potential for interdependence and partnerships between the nonprofit and the public sectors (Salamon, 1987; Grønbjerg, 1987), or how voluntary organizations may promote public involvement in welfare services rather than represent a competing alternative (Kuhnle & Selle, 1992). These theories may be reasonable on their own terms, but seem to have a limited area of validity. Hence, it may be more feasible to look for varieties of nonprofit sectors where certain theories apply, rather than for a general theory. The nonprofit sector may exist as an alternative to the market and the public sector for different reasons from one country to another or from the welfare field to culture and recreation, advocacy, and interest organizations. This has led some researchers to look for different nonprofit models or regimes in different countries.

One important initiative to identify nonprofit regimes comes from Lester Salamon and his co-writers associated with the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP). In a number of publications, they argue that economic nonprofit theories fail to account for characteristics of the nonprofit sectors in different countries due to their single-factor explanations (Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2001; Anheier & Salamon, 2006). Mechanisms of one type of theory do a better job of explaining features of some countries, whereas other types of theories fit better with other countries. Instead, they want to divide countries into four different types in accordance with how the nonprofit sector relations to other sectors and social forces originated. The most important distinction for the following analysis is between the *social democratic countries*, where an ambitious welfare state "crowds out" the nonprofit sector, and the *corporatist countries*, where high public welfare expenditures in large parts are used to pay for nonprofit services and hence "crowds in" the nonprofit sector. These models will be contrasted with the *liberal countries* that despite low public welfare spending are expected to have large nonprofit sectors funded by households and private charity and foundations. In this article, we will confront assumptions from Salamon and co-writers about the

characteristics of nonprofit sector regimes with results from a comparative analysis that uses a method called Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987, 2000, 2008) to identify constellations of causes and outcomes that may vary between clusters of countries.

In the next section, we will further explore the idea of civil society regimes and their methodological consequences. Thereafter, we will outline Salamon and co-writer's social origins theory and draw out some hypotheses about nonprofit regimes with particular relevance for the difference between the corporatist and the social democratic countries. Then, in the following section, these assumptions will be compared with findings from a comparative "fuzzy-set" QCA of causes for civil society welfare employment. In the concluding section, empirical and theoretical implications of the findings are drawn.

THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY REGIMES

The concept of "regimes" has been of great significance in the field of welfare research. A regime is an ideal-typical pattern of causes and effects. When compared with data, some traits may be present in some countries, less so in other countries. For instance, in his analysis of how welfare systems structure labor markets and stratification, Esping-Andersen constructed regimes from three general characteristics of welfare states: protections against loss of income, equality of benefits, and the prevalence of public over private welfare providers (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Based on scores on these dimensions, it is possible to distinguish between a social democratic regime, that is, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland) and the Netherlands,[1] a traditional or corporatist regime, that is, Central and South European countries, and the liberal regime of countries such as United States, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Thomas Janoski has expanded the regime concept to also include the nonprofit sector by presuming that citizenship, welfare, and civil society depend on each other in different ways in different societies (Janoski, 1998). For instance, some societies emphasize universal social rights, others individual, insurance-based arrangements. It is commonly assumed that the size and composition of public welfare services largely determines the share of voluntary welfare services. However, in civil society, interest and pressure groups often attempt to secure and expand the legal, political, and social rights and duties of the citizens. At the same time, such institutions and

initiatives attempt to bolster these citizenship rights from domination by the market and the public sectors (Habermas, 1992; Ehrenberg, 1999; Cohen & Arato, 1992). In consequence, civil society will vary in size, composition, and role in different countries, and regimes are models or heuristic devices that may make this variation more comprehensible (Janoski, 1998).

The idea of a regime means that the pattern of causality may vary between clusters of countries. However, the contention that a combination of factors can explain certain common characteristics of countries with resemblance to a certain regime, but not the characteristics of other countries, creates serious challenges to our use of methods. It means that the same cause may have one effect in combination with certain causes in one regime, and another effect in other combinations of causes in other regimes, also called "conjunctural" or "heterogeneous" causality. This means that conventional methods that are used to find the most *general* causes or combination of causes in a sample, such as analysis of correlations or regressions, are rendered useless. We need methods that can differentiate between regimes or types of countries and find which constellations of causes can be associated with certain outcomes in each regime. We therefore apply here a method called QCA (Ragin, 1987, 2000, 2008) that can be used to group countries in types or regimes. It does so by formalizing the logic that is commonly applied in comparative case studies by applying a set-theoretic approach and Boolean algebra. This makes it easier to get the overview over more than a few cases and factors. By also applying fuzzy-set scores, it is possible to construct formal expressions for a case's degree of membership in different constellations of causes and outcomes. This is a method that is designed to differentiate between types of cases or regimes, rather than look for general, uniform patterns.

SOCIAL ORIGINS THEORY

In the chapter "The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective" published in a research handbook for the nonprofit sector, Helmut Anheier and Lester Salamon give detailed descriptions of four nonprofit sector models (Anheier & Salamon, 2006). The analysis was originally based on the countries that took part in an early phase of the Johns Hopkins CNP (Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2001). The researchers present a "social origins theory" that views the nonprofit sector "as an integral part of a social system whose role and scale are a by-product of a complex set of historical forces" (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, p. 245).

The purpose of the theory is to classify the countries into different groups in which different causal mechanisms are in operation. They claim to have been inspired by Barrington Moore Jr.'s classification of countries according to their ''routes to the modern world'' (Moore, 1966) and by Esping-Andersen's three welfare ''regimes'' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). The assumption is that there is no single factor that can explain the size and composition of the nonprofit sector in different countries, in contrast to the economic theories of nonprofit organizations. Instead, complex relations exist between, on the one hand, social forces such as the working class, the landed and urban elites, the peasantry, and external powers, and, on the other hand, social institutions such as the state, parties, and the church. As a consequence, countries cluster into four types, the social democratic, corporatist, statist, and liberal models, according to the size of public welfare spending and scale of the nonprofit sector (Table 1). This theory is supposed to explain current patterns in nonprofit sector size and composition when it comes to employment, revenue, expenditures, and volunteering. At least these four ideal-typical models should be useful heuristic devices for sorting data in comprehensible ways.

Table 1 indicates that the statist and the liberal countries are expected to have low public welfare spending, but the liberal countries still have large nonprofit sectors, to a large part funded by households and private charity and foundations. In statist countries, the nonprofit organizations are viewed as potential challenges to the state's hegemony and hence remain limited. The difference between the social democratic and the corporatist models is central to this analysis. Both models have large public welfare expenditures. However, according to the theory, in the corporatist countries, increased public welfare spending implies that the nonprofit organizations share of employment increases, because large shares of public welfare expenditures go to the nonprofit sector. In the social democratic countries, in contrast, increased public welfare spending goes to public sector service providers.

Table 1.   Social Origins Model of the Nonprofit Sector.

Nonprofit Sector Scale	Public Welfare Spending	
	Low	High
Small	Statist	Social democratic
Large	Liberal	Corporatist

Source: Salamon and Anheier (1998, p. 240).

This results in smaller voluntary sectors. Here, the state "crowds out" the voluntary providers according to social origins theory (Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2001; Salamon, Sokolowski, & List, 2003; Anheier & Salamon, 2006).

The historical explanation for the social democratic pattern, according to Salamon and Anheier, is that early in the phase of industrialization, the working class was able to exert effective political power, often in allegiance with farmers or other groups. Urban and/or landed elites had no blocking majority (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, p. 229, 242). In this situation, it was in the interest of the social democratic rulers to secure the rights of their supporters to essential health, educational, and social services. Furthermore, the church authorities in many social democratic countries had been domesticated as a result of the reformation. During the social democratic rule, according to these authors, church-related welfare was gradually absorbed by the public sector in the process of extending social rights. The public and third sectors were seen as alternative providers of welfare services, the former preferred by the social democrats because it offered the only way, it was thought, to ensure unitary standards and equal access for all.

This may not be entirely correct, but we will not discuss the historical explanations here (Sivesind, Lorentzen, Selle, & Wollebaek, 2002) but focus on implications for the present situation. In the social democratic regime, the nonprofit sector is replaced by the state, whereas in the corporative regime, the nonprofit sector, which performs welfare services that are paid for by the public sector, becomes heavier involved when welfare ambitions rise. Thus, in the social democratic regime, the size of the nonprofit sector varies inversely with the size of the public social welfare costs, whereas in the corporative regime, the nonprofit sector grows when the public welfare spending increases (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, pp. 229–230).

Based on the social origins theory, Salamon and co-writers assume that in the social democratic regime, the public sector has main responsibility for the welfare services, and this leaves little room for nonprofit organizations on this field. Furthermore, public funding and private gifts are considered alternative sources of funding in the social democratic model. Since the nonprofit sector was rejected as a mechanism for meeting public needs in the welfare field and the public sector both pays for and performs service "the voluntary sector would be financed more heavily by private charitable contributions" (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, p. 230). In the following analysis, we will compare such assumptions from social origins theory with results from a comparative analysis.

We find it necessary to focus on the welfare field to put these hypotheses to a test. Social origins theory deals primarily with the relationship between public welfare spending and nonprofit employment, but Salamon and colleagues analyze data for the *whole* nonprofit sector, not just nonprofit organizations (NPOs) on the welfare field. They focus on if an ambitious welfare state crowds out or crowds in nonprofit organizations, and what consequences this has for paid employment, volunteering, and funding? Does this mean that they presume that the consequences of public welfare costs are the same for paid employment in all categories of nonprofit organizations? For instance, in the social democratic regime, would paid employment in sports, trade unions, employer associations, religious assemblies, and so on increase if public welfare costs' share of gross national product (GNP) decreases? Salamon and Anheier never point out any causal mechanisms that could have this effect. It seems improbable that there should be any direct link between public welfare spending and employment in all kinds of nonprofit organizations outside the welfare field. The effect is at best indirect. Increased public welfare spending could result in increased demand in the economy, which in turn increases employment in many areas including NPOs. If so, this would be contrary to Salamon and Anheier's assumptions about the public expenditures crowding out NPOs in the social democratic regime. However, this is not something they discuss. It seems more reasonable that they are concerned with the effects of public welfare costs for employment in nonprofit organizations *on the welfare field*, whether it decreases or increases depending on the nonprofit sector regime. This is where the increased public welfare spending can reasonably be expected to crowd out NPO paid employment as share of total paid employment in the social democratic model, since increased public funding would expand the public sector service delivery, or so they assume.

By including other categories of NPOs than the welfare field, such as culture and recreation, professional organizations, environment, civic, and advocacy in the analysis, it would seem that Salamon and co-writers add complexity to the data that is irrelevant to how public welfare spending primarily affects paid nonprofit employment. First, these other categories vary in size of paid employment, volunteering, operating expenditures, and level of funding from different sources from country to country. In the Nordic countries, including all NPOs is especially problematic: Paid employment in NPOs on the welfare field has a small share of total NPO employment, whereas culture and recreation employment is relatively large, in particular in Sweden. Second, NPOs outside the welfare field may respond differently to changes in public welfare spending. One important characteristic

of the welfare field is that service providers from market, public, and non-profit sectors in principle may replace each other. This may not be the case in other fields. For example, reduced funding for choirs, football clubs, or environmental organizations would not necessarily be compensated by increased employment in the public sector or the market. This means that social origins theory's assumptions about whether high public welfare spending results in crowding in or crowding out of NPO employment would be more or less irrelevant for large parts of NPOs outside of the welfare field. The social origins model does not explicitly assume that culture and recreation organizations react in the same way as NPOs on the welfare field to changes in public welfare spending. Hence, by including these other categories outside the welfare field, the observed effect of public welfare spending on NPO paid employment is a net result of several diverging causal mechanisms, many of which are irrelevant to the social origins model.

For the welfare field, Salamon and colleagues have made interesting assumptions about how public spending affects NPOs in different clusters of countries. By focussing exclusively on this field, we believe social origins theory can be put to a more relevant test than Salamon and co-writers have presented in their own publications (Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2001; Salamon et al., 2003; Anheier & Salamon, 2006).

In a comment to Salamon and Anheier's article about social origins, Charles Ragin suggests, first, that a social origins theory should not be applied to the nonprofit sector as a whole but to sub-sectors and further that more dimensions should be included, that is, proportion of private funding (fees, donations of money, and time) (Ragin, 1998). We will follow these intentions in this article, but by using other additional variables than what Ragin suggested.

In the next section, the concepts necessary for testing Salamon and colleagues' assumptions about the social democratic regime will be defined and operationalized, and the structure of the QCA (Ragin, 2000) will be outlined. The focus is on nonprofit sector employment in relation to total employment on the welfare field only.

COMPARATIVE "FUZZY-SET" ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY WELFARE EMPLOYMENT

In any comparative analysis, it is important to select cases that contain variation that is relevant for the theoretical assumptions to be tested.

We have therefore chosen countries that in previous studies have been classified as social democratic, corporatist, and liberal. They are all advanced industrial countries with extensive and institutionalized welfare arrangements. Other countries, such as post-communist countries in transition or developing countries, have a very different point of departure. The same applies to the very diverse set of countries that social origins theory links to the statist regime, that is, Japan, Brazil, and many developing countries (Anheier & Salamon, 2006, p. 108). In a path dependency perspective, this would mean that the consequences of public welfare spending for NPO employment probably have more to do with the particular history and context of these countries than with the core causal mechanisms social origins theory is built on. This could affect the clustering of countries in ways that are irrelevant for social origins theory. Such countries are therefore left out of the analysis. Furthermore, we have selected countries that have taken part in the Johns Hopkins CNP. Through collaboration with associated researchers, this project has developed definitions and categories of NPOs that ensure comparable data as far as practically possible.

The object of the study is to explain variation in share of NPO employment on the welfare field. To measure this, we use the most recent CNP data on size of NPO paid employment in the ICNPO categories[2] Education and Research, Health, and Social Services. This is seen in relation to total employment on the welfare field, including civil, public, and market sector providers. The source for these data is the International Labor Organization (ILO) Labor Statistics Database and includes employment in the categories "education" and "health and social work" (ILO, 2008). The data are from the same year as the CNP data from each country.[3]

Table 2 summarizes first full-time equivalent paid employment in NPOs in the categories education and research, health and social services for each country from the CNP. The next column shows ILO data on full-time employment on the welfare field in all sectors. In the final column, the percentage of NPO employment of total employment is calculated. In line with expectations, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark have the smallest civil society sector employment shares from 4 to 13 percent. According to the social origins theory, liberal and corporatist countries should all have large NPO shares of welfare employment. However, there is a large gap from typical corporatist European countries such as France, Austria, and Germany, with 20, 24, and 25 percent, respectively, and up to United States, the Netherlands, and Ireland with 32, 45, and 56 percent. In other words, some of the countries expected from social origins theory to

Table 2. Nonprofit Sector and Total Paid Employment on the Welfare Field (Full-Time Equivalents), and Nonprofit Sector's Share (Percent).

Country	NPO Employment			Total Employment	Nonprofit Share (%)
	Education and research	Health	Social service	Education, health and Social work	
Sweden (2002)[a]	19,269	3,424	20,962	1,122,000	4
Norway (2004)	15,942	6,253	16,027	6,44,000	6
Finland (1996)	15,718	14,463	11,161	4,27,000	10
Denmark (2004)	50,909	2,616	39,748	6,93,600	13
Italy (1999)	1,16,022	121,823	1,56,629	2,502,000	16
Portugal (2002)	14,396	4,799	79,975	5,80,700	17
United Kingdom (1995)	5,86,430	60,411	1,85,654	4,494,000	19
France (1995)	1,98,873	148,180	3,81,173	3,687,000	20
Austria (1995 total 2001)	12,786	16,697	91,910	5,03,700	24
Australia (1995)	95,600	74,817	78,974	1,009,400	25
Germany (1995)	1,67,336	441,293	5,59,761	4,644,000	25
Spain (1995)	1,19,270	57,972	1,51,107	1,275,100	26
United States (1995)	1,840,209	3,959,821	1,156,152	21,660,700	32
Netherlands (2002)	2,03,965	3,32,955	2,10,633	1,679,000	45
Ireland (1995)	63,671	32,777	5,400	1,82,800	56

Sources: Salamon et al. (1999), CNP (2008), and ILO (2008). Boje data for Denmark, Sivesind data for Norway, and Dekker and Kuhry data for the Netherlands.
[a]Number of persons employed in the NPO sector (Wijkström & Einarsson, 2006), ratio of full-time employment/paid employees (Lundström & Wijkström, 1997).

have large shares of welfare employment are in fact in the middle and low range, whereas only a few of them are in the top range. The biggest surprise is that only United States with 32 percent among the liberal countries has a relatively large nonprofit share of welfare employment, compared to Australia with 25 and the United Kingdom with just 19 percent. Second from the top are the Netherlands with 45 percent. Because of religious and ideological divides in the population (Protestant, Catholic, and social democratic), it has been difficult for the state to deliver welfare services that are acceptable for all. Instead, different groups have built up their own welfare institutions, to a large extent supported by public funding, resulting in a pillarization of the welfare system. The highest level of nonprofit share of welfare employment can be found in Ireland with 56 percent, a result of

the Catholic Church's major role as welfare provider. This shows that there are very different processes that result in the most extreme cases of the presumed corporatist pattern: Religious homogeneity in Ireland and low homogeneity in the Netherlands. Adding to the complexity, homogeneity is also found in the Nordic countries with the lowest welfare employment and largest public welfare. To find differences between groups of countries that correspond to regimes, we must see the shares of civil society sector employment in relation to constellations of relevant factors, and religious homogeneity seems to be of importance.

To include more factors in the comparison and to sort countries in different regimes, we will use the QCA method. We use the fuzzy-set theoretic version of the method. Instead of classifying countries as belonging or not belonging to a group, they get fuzzy scores between 0 and 1 according to their degree of membership in each group. We start by scoring the countries according to size of NPO employment on the welfare field. Table 3 indicates the share of nonprofit welfare employment from the previous table. The next column shows fuzzy scores for belonging to the group of countries with a *small share of welfare employment*. The values are assigned by considering what may be the highest value that seems logically and

Table 3. Percentage and Fuzzy Scores for Share of Nonprofit Sector Welfare Employment.

	Percentage of Nonprofit Sector Welfare Employment	Fuzzy Scores: *Small Share* of Nonprofit Sector Welfare Employment
Sweden	4	1.00
Norway	6	0.96
Finland	10	0.89
Denmark	13	0.82
Italy	16	0.77
Portugal	17	0.75
United Kingdom	19	0.72
France	20	0.69
Austria	24	0.61
Australia	25	0.60
Germany	25	0.59
Spain	26	0.58
United States	32	0.46
The Netherlands	45	0.22
Ireland	56	0.10

practically possible for the category of cases that is selected. That means for industrialized countries with well-established and sophisticated welfare arrangements. We find it highly unlikely that the share of nonprofit welfare employment could go considerably below 4 percent. Sweden was down to 2 percent in 1992, but like most western welfare countries, the share of employment in market and nonprofit sector has increased since then, as a result of "new public management" ideology and increased emphasis on a network style of governance. For this reason, Sweden is assigned the maximum value 1.00 for belonging to the group of countries with small share of nonprofit welfare employment. In the other end, we find Ireland, which has a nonprofit share of 56 percent. We consider this as a relatively high value within the selected group of countries, since the public sector has a certain minimum of welfare provision in this type of countries. Ireland is therefore assigned the value 0.10, which is close to minimum value for belonging to the group of countries with small share of nonprofit welfare employment.

Next, we have to take into consideration where the border goes between high and low share of nonprofit welfare employment. Several countries have shares in the range of 24–26 percent. However, there is a gap up to United States with 32 percent. We therefore find it reasonable to draw the line between United States and the rest below. United States is assigned the value 0.46, which means that it does not belong to the group of countries with small share of nonprofit welfare employment. The same goes for the Netherlands, which is assigned the fuzzy score 0.22, a value between United States and Ireland. The remaining countries are assigned fuzzy scores from 0.58 to 1.00 in proportion to their share of nonprofit welfare employment. This means that they to varying degrees belong to the group of countries with small share of nonprofit welfare employment. What is considered logical maximum and minimum and where the limit for belonging to a group goes cannot be extracted directly from the data by using means or other statistical techniques. It has to be based on theoretical and practical considerations concerning the selected cases and what scope of variation that is relevant for the research question. The arguments for scoring in a particular way should be made explicit and be part of the scientific dialog (Ragin, 2008, 2000).

We have now scored the countries according to their belonging to the group with *low nonprofit share of welfare employment*. This is the output factor in the QCA. We now have to go through the same procedure for factors that may be relevant for explaining *low nonprofit share of welfare employment*. We have chosen factors in accordance with the expectations from social origins theory. As we saw in Table 1, public welfare spending is

considered to be an essential cause. The main difference between the different models is if an ambitious welfare state "crowds out" the civil sector in the welfare field or if there is a symbiotic partnership. As a measure for public welfare spending, we use social expenditures and direct expenditures on education at current prices and current purchasing power parities (PPPs), in US dollars for 2001,[4] which adds up to *total public welfare spending*. However, we look at public welfare costs per inhabitant and not as share of GNP, as Salamon and Anheier do. The reason is that the relationship between GNP and welfare costs can be affected by a country's composition of industries and economic cycles. In Norway, for instance, the oil economy would make GNP larger and hence the share of public welfare costs smaller, even if they still are high and increasing in absolute terms. Comparative studies of health and social service costs as share of GNP ranks the Scandinavian countries high, but the difference to other Western European countries has decreased over time. The growth in welfare costs has been lower than growth in GNP, whereas it has increased in some other countries (Rostgaard & Lehto, 2001). Such different trends complicate comparisons of welfare costs as share of GNP between countries. To avoid this problem, we compare size of public welfare costs per person.

Table 4 summarizes public welfare spending per person and fuzzy scores. We have given Norway full score (1.00) for membership in the group of countries with *large public welfare spending*. In absolute figures, the welfare spending for each country will probably increase over time, but in terms of rank, it seems unlikely that any country in the group of industrialized countries with well-established and sophisticated welfare arrangements would go above Norway in the foreseeable future, with an oil economy and a social democratic type of welfare state. Next follows the other Nordic countries, Austria and Germany. The Netherlands has been put on the breakpoint with a 0.5 score, which means that it is neither belonging to the group with large or small public welfare spending. Next, we find countries that do not belong to the group with *large public welfare spending*: Italy; the liberal countries United States, United Kingdom, and Australia; before Ireland and Spain. Finally, there is Portugal with close to minimum value (0.05) for belonging to the group of countries with *large public welfare spending*.[5]

In line with social origins theory, we find Norway, Denmark, and Sweden are on top, followed by the supposedly corporatist European countries: France and Austria. Next comes another Nordic country, Finland, followed by more continental European countries: Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. The latter countries have surprisingly low welfare costs, around the breaking point on the fuzzy score scale. Anheier and Salamon (2006, p. 107)

Table 4. Public Welfare Expenditures Per Person in 2001. US$ and
Fuzzy Scores.

Country	Public Welfare Expenditures[a]	Fuzzy Scores: Large Public Welfare Spending
Norway	11,306	1.00
Denmark	11,021	0.96
Sweden	9,746	0.78
France	9,064	0.69
Austria	9,003	0.68
Finland	8,181	0.57
Germany	8,139	0.56
The Netherlands	7,675	0.50
Italy	7,467	0.48
United States	7,135	0.46
United Kingdom	7,120	0.45
Australia	6,261	0.30
Ireland	5,396	0.15
Spain	5,120	0.10
Portugal	4,836	0.05

[a]"Total public social expenditures" (OECD, 2006a) and "Government expenditures on education" (OECD, 2006b) at current prices and current purchasing power parities (PPP) in US dollars.

claim that Italy belongs to the social democratic model with high public welfare spending, although to a lesser extent than the Nordic countries.[6] That would not seem to be the case here. However, in line with expectations from social origins theory, we then find the liberal countries United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, not belonging to the group of large public welfare spending countries. However, the countries with weakest membership to this group of countries are Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, which used to be among the poorer EU countries, but recently have had a rapid development of their public and private welfare arrangements. From social origins theory, one would expect Spain and Portugal, with historically strong landed elites and a Catholic Church as a central welfare provider, to be closer to the corporatist than the liberal model, whereas Ireland is a mixed case in many ways. These anomalies suggest that further inquiry is needed to sort the countries in regimes in a consistent way.

The third factor we bring in to the comparative analysis has to do with sources of income. Outgoing from social origins theory, a high share of income from donations is expected in liberal and social democratic countries (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, pp. 230–231, 243). We measure this by the

percentage of donations relative to total income, and we only look at nonprofit organizations on the welfare field, since the outcome factor is NPO welfare employment. Funding of other NPOs is irrelevant for the analysis. Salamon and Anheier presume that in a social democratic regime, a large share of income from donations is associated with a small nonprofit sector on the welfare field, because the sector is rejected as an alternative mechanism for meeting public needs. Since NPOs do not get much funding from public contracts, they will have to rely on other sources.

Other theories also point out that the share of donations may be important for the choice between public and nonprofit welfare provision. According to Steinberg, the extent to which government spending crowds out the nonprofit sector may depend on charitable donations and preferences for self-reliance (Steinberg & Young, 1998; Steinberg, 1991). Thomas Janoski also thematizes what kind of exchange relationship people have to the state. Do they expect the public sector to take care of their welfare needs because they pay taxes or do they feel they ought to make direct donations? Janoski (1998) claims that people in different regimes develop varying conceptions of the exchange relationship with the state or different citizenship-selves. The share of income from donations has to do with the willingness of the population to contribute directly to the nonprofit sector welfare services and not just indirectly through taxes.

Table 5 indicates that the share of income from private gifts for nonprofit organizations on the welfare field varies from 2 to 12 percent. The lowest shares we find in the Netherlands and Germany, countries with large, professionalized, and mainly state-funded nonprofit sectors on the welfare field. The highest shares we find in liberal countries, such as Australia, United States, and United Kingdom, but with Spain on top. From social origins theory, one would expect that countries belonging to the social democratic regime and the liberal countries should get a large share of income from gifts since public funding is scarce (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, p. 231). However, the Nordic countries have smaller shares than the liberal countries and also smaller than some of the corporatist countries such as France and Austria. This is not in line with expectations. Again, there are anomalies in the social origins model that suggest further investigations.

Spain with 12 percent income from gifts has been assigned maximum fuzzy score (1.00) for belonging to the group of countries with *large share of income from gifts*, since no other western advanced welfare countries are close to this share. In the other end, we find the Netherlands with just 2 percent income from gifts, which has got almost minimum score (0.05),

Table 5. Percentage and Fuzzy Scores for Share of Income from Private Gifts for Nonprofit Organizations on the Welfare Field.

	Percentage of Income from Gifts	Fuzzy scores: *Large Share of Income from Gifts*
Netherlands (2002)	2.0	0.05
Germany (1995)	2.1	0.05
Norway (2004)	3.0	0.14
Italy (1999)	3.2	0.16
Denmark (2004)	3.2	0.16
Portugal (2002)	4.3	0.26
Ireland (1995)	5.1	0.33
Austria (1995)	5.6	0.38
Sweden (2002)	5.6	0.38
Finland (1996)	5.6	0.38
Australia (1995)	6.5	0.47
France (1995)	7.2	0.53
United States (1995)	9.0	0.70
United Kingdom (1995)	9.2	0.72
Spain (1995)	12.2	1.00

since the share was even lower in 1995. The breaking point goes between Australia with 6.5 and France with 7.2 percent income from gifts.

Religious homogeneity is the third factor we consider as potentially relevant for explaining size of nonprofit share of welfare employment. As we saw in the discussion of share of nonprofit welfare employment, religion seems to be important for size and composition of the nonprofit sector in many countries, but not in a straightforward manner. The largest shares of nonprofit welfare employment can be combined with *low* religious homogeneity in the Netherlands because of pillarization and *high* homogeneity in Ireland because of traditional reliance on the Catholic Church for welfare provision. In contrast, in the Nordic countries, where the church was domesticated during the reformation, we find *high* religious homogeneity in combination with small nonprofit welfare and a large universalist public welfare system. Such diverse effects call for further empirical examination.

Religious homogeneity is not at the core of social origins theory, although concerned with historic relations between the Church, State, peasantry, working class, and elites. Religious and ideological divides are pointed out as a reason for pillarization and hence a large share of nonprofit welfare services in the case of the Netherlands. Salamon and Anheier (1998, p. 241)

also point out that racial and ethnic diversity kept the working class highly splintered in the United States and that this weakened support for a state-centered welfare system. However, the point they make is that because the United States is more racially and ethnically divided, the United Kingdom is a more mixed case than the United States. Hence, such diversity explains differences in welfare systems within the liberal model.

In contrast to social origins theory, we want to consider religion as a causal factor in the analysis of size of nonprofit welfare in line with Weisbrod's demand heterogeneity theory. This is among the single-factor approaches that Salamon and Anheier reject because of inconsistencies with the empirical findings, without testing its potential in multi-factor comparisons (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, pp. 232–237).

According to Weisbrod, in situations with low homogeneity, there will be demands that are not met by the public sector services designed to satisfy the median voter. Since many welfare services represent collective goods that the market fails to produce, people turn to the nonprofit sector. The result is a willingness to support nonprofit providers by private donations (Weisbrod, 1977) and a large share of nonprofit welfare employment. This could come as a result of many types of heterogeneity, that is, in income, age, education, language, ethnicity, or religion. However, we have chosen to focus on religion, as it seems to be a historically relevant precondition for size of NPO welfare employment. Since religious groups in many cases partly overlap with ethnic, linguistic, and social divides, religion could also be seen as a common denominator for many types of diversity.

In line with demand heterogeneity theory, a universalist welfare state, and hence a small civil sector in the welfare field, which is associated with a social democratic regime, would be easier to sustain if religious homogeneity is high. Under other circumstances, there will be demands that are not satisfied by the public sector services, resulting in a willingness to donate to nonprofit providers and a large nonprofit share of welfare provision.

In our comparisons, religious homogeneity of the population is measured by religious fractionalization, which means the probability that two randomly selected persons belong to different religious groups. 0 means that all people belong to the same group, whereas 1 means that they fall into many different groups. The data for the year 2001 are from Encyclopedia Britannica. The calculations of religious fractionalization are documented by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003).

Table 6 summarizes the fractionalization scores from Alesina et al. (2003) and the fuzzy scores for *religious homogeneity*. Portugal and Ireland are the countries with lowest religious fractionalization score among the highly

Table 6. Religious Homogeneity, 2001.

Country	Religious Fractionalization[a]	Fuzzy Scores: Religious Homogeneity
Portugal	0.1438	1.00
Ireland	0.1550	0.98
Norway	0.2048	0.91
Denmark	0.2333	0.87
Sweden	0.2342	0.87
Finland	0.2531	0.84
Italy	0.3027	0.77
France	0.4029	0.62
Austria	0.4146	0.60
Spain	0.4514	0.55
Germany	0.6571	0.25
United Kingdom	0.6944	0.19
Netherlands	0.7222	0.15
Australia	0.8211	0.00
United States	0.8241	0.00

[a] *Source:* Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003).

industrialized countries with extensive welfare arrangements we have selected for this study. They are assigned full and almost full membership score (1.00 and 0.98) in the *religious homogeneity* group, since lower fractionalization scores can only be found among third world and Muslim countries. Next follow the Nordic countries and then Italy, France, and Austria. After that there is a large gap in fractionalization score between Spain (0.4514) and Germany (0.6571), so the line between religious homogeneity and heterogeneity is drawn between them. The countries that do not belong to the homogeneity group are Germany (0.25), the Netherlands (0.15), and the liberal countries United Kingdom (0.19), Australia, and United States (0.00). The two latter have the highest fractionalization scores among the selected countries. They are therefore assigned minimum fuzzy scores, which indicate that they do not belong to the countries with *religious homogeneity*. The only country in the world with higher fractionalization score is South Africa with 0.8603 (Alesina et al., 2003).

Table 7 summarizes fuzzy scores for the outcome variable *small share of nonprofit sector welfare employment*, and all three causal factors we consider in the comparative analysis: *large public welfare spending*, *large share of income from gifts*, and *religious homogeneity*. With three causal factors, there are eight possible causal constellations or corners in the property space. Each corner can be viewed as a possible regime. We have given high score on each variable in line with expectations about the social democratic model

Table 7. Fuzzy Scores for Analysis of Small Share of Civil Society Sector Welfare Employment.

Country	Small Share of Nonprofit Sector Welfare Employment	Large Public Welfare Spending	Religious Homogeneity	Large Share of Income from Gifts
Norway	0.96	1.00	0.91	0.14
Denmark	0.82	0.96	0.87	0.16
Sweden	1.00	0.78	0.87	0.38
France	0.69	0.69	0.62	0.53
Austria	0.61	0.68	0.60	0.38
Finland	0.89	0.57	0.84	0.38
Germany	0.59	0.56	0.25	0.05
The Netherlands	0.22	0.50	0.15	0.05
Italy	0.77	0.48	0.77	0.16
United States	0.46	0.46	0.00	0.70
United Kingdom	0.72	0.45	0.19	0.72
Australia	0.60	0.30	0.00	0.47
Ireland	0.10	0.15	0.98	0.33
Spain	0.58	0.10	0.55	1.00
Portugal	0.75	0.05	1.00	0.26

Sources: CNP, ILO, and OECD.

from social origins theory and from demand heterogeneity theory about what would result in a small share of nonprofit welfare employment. However, this is just one of the corners in the multi-dimensional property space we have created. We now need to find out which causal constellations or corners in the property space are associated with the outcome *small nonprofit welfare employment*.

By using Charles Ragin's "fuzzy-set" comparative method based on Boolean algebra (Ragin, 1987, 2000), this table can be reduced to the following two expressions:[7]

Small nonprofit sector welfare employment = Small public welfare spending AND Large share of income from donations AND Low religious homogeneity
   OR
Large public welfare spending AND High religious homogeneity

The main finding is that these two constellations are *sufficient causal conditions* for a small share of nonprofit sector welfare employment. "Sufficient conditions" mean they are subsets of the outcome in set theoretic

terms (Ragin, 2000, pp. 203–229). In other words, they represent different ways of reaching the same outcome. Together, these two constellations account quite well for variation of the factors compared. The coverage of the model is 0.725,[8] which is pretty good considering the simplicity of the causal expressions.

We do not find any *necessary conditions*, that is, causal conditions present in every case (Ragin, 2000, pp. 230–260). This is not surprising since based on previous research we expect to find different regimes. We must also find out if the causal constellations overlap with corners in the property space that lack empirical instances, because then we would have to make *simplifying assumptions* about their outcome should they exist (Ragin, 2000, pp. 300–303). However, there are no such lacking empirical instances, so there is no need to make any simplifying assumptions.

In the first causal constellation, the outcome small nonprofit sector welfare employment is associated with small public welfare spending, a large share of income from donations, and low religious homogeneity. In the other constellation, small nonprofit sector welfare employment is associated with large public welfare spending and high religious homogeneity. This means that the same outcome is associated with small public welfare spending in the first causal constellation, and with large public welfare spending in the second causal constellation, depending on other factors. The same goes for religion. The same outcome is associated with low homogeneity in the first causal constellation, and with high homogeneity in the second causal constellation, depending on other factors.

This means we find two different regimes that both result in small share of nonprofit sector welfare employment. Such a discovery would not be possible using a statistical method that looks for the most general explanations and assumes that one cause only can be associated with one outcome. However, it is quite common to assume that conjunctural causality is possible when comparing few cases (Ragin, 2000, p. 33). The QCA method makes it possible to apply similar assumptions to a larger number of cases and factors than we can easily sort out.

In set-theoretical terms, the cases displaying sufficient causal conditions form a subset of the cases displaying the outcome (Ragin, 2000, p. 233). This means that the highest score on any of the sufficient sets of conditions should be close to, but lower than, the score on the outcome variable. This can be seen in Table 8, which indicates the score for each country on the outcome variable and on each of the causal constellations. A country's maximum score on the causal constellations is marked with bold print. This shows which of the sufficient causal constellations a country has strongest

Table 8. Fuzzy Scores in Expressions that are Sufficient Conditions for a Small Share of Nonprofit Sector Welfare Employment (Maximum Score in Bold).

Country	Outcome	Causal Conditions		
		pubwelfspend∗ relighom∗ GIVING	PUBWELFSPEND∗ RELIGHOM	PUBWELFSPEND∗ GIVING
Sweden	1.00	0.13	**0.78**	0.38
Norway	0.96	0.00	**0.91**	0.14
Finland	0.89	0.16	**0.57**	0.38
Denmark	0.82	0.04	**0.87**	0.16
Italy	0.77	0.16	**0.48**	0.16
Portugal	0.75	0.00	**0.05**	**0.05**
United Kingdom	0.72	**0.55**	0.19	0.45
France	0.69	0.31	**0.62**	0.53
Austria	0.61	0.32	**0.60**	0.38
Australia	0.60	**0.47**	0.00	0.30
Germany	0.59	0.05	**0.25**	0.05
Spain	0.58	**0.45**	0.10	0.10
United States	0.46	**0.54**	0.00	0.46
The Netherlands	0.22	0.05	**0.15**	0.05
Ireland	0.10	0.02	**0.15**	**0.15**

Notes: Bold shows the causal expression with maximum score $\leq$ outcome score for each country, with an adjustment factor of 0.10 fuzzy points. The causal conditions are in uppercase letters to show membership to a group, lowercase means non-membership, while asterisk (∗) means Boolean "and."

association with. The difference between the outcome score and the causal condition's score shows how strong that association is.

The level of association for each country and the combined coverage of the causal constellations are illustrated in Fig. 1. It shows the outcome score on the *Y*-axis and the maximum value on the causal conditions on the *X*-axis, which is marked with bold print in Table 8. To pass the test for sufficiency, or to be subsets of the outcome, countries should be close to, but above, the diagonal in Fig. 1. We use an adjustment factor of 0.10 fuzzy points, which increases the number of causal conditions that are likely to pass the sufficiency test. This is done to reduce problems of measurement of the raw data, despite deriving from the best available statistics, or with imprecisions in translating them to fuzzy scores. There may also be random variation in the data. There are too few cases to incorporate probabilistic criteria to handle these kinds of problems, as is frequently done in statistical analysis. The adjustment factor means that if no case has a score on a causal condition

Fig. 1. Nonprofit Employment in the Welfare Field.

which is more than 0.10 fuzzy-membership units higher than the outcome variable, the pattern is considered consistent with causal sufficiency.

This adjustment factor is only relevant for Ireland, United States, and Denmark with a slightly *higher* score on one of the causal conditions than on the outcome variable. Countries with considerably *lower* scores on any of the two sufficient sets of conditions than on the outcome variable, such as Portugal, and to a less extent Germany, Finland, and Italy, show that there is still some variation that is not accounted for by these constellations. In remaining countries, the score on the causal conditions with maximum score is less than 0.22 fuzzy points lower than on the outcome variable for all other countries (difference between scores in bold and column 2 in Table 8). This shows that the two causal constellations do a good job in accounting for most of the cases. Fifteen countries are too few to do a probabilistic testing of the model. However, Fig. 1 and Table 8 indicate that the two sufficient sets of conditions combined produce a very good fit with the outcome in general.

The results from the comparative analysis are in line with the assumption that the selected advanced industrial countries with extensive welfare

arrangements belong to different regimes when nonprofit sector welfare employment is considered. The United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, and United States have maximum scores closest to but below their scores on the outcome variable for the combination of small public welfare spending, a large share of income from donations, and low religious homogeneity (Table 8, column 3). This is in line with the *liberal regime* in social origins theory, except that religion is a part of the constellation and that Spain also belongs to this regime (Anheier & Salamon, 2006; Salamon & Anheier, 1998). These four countries have membership scores on this causal constellation from 0.45 to 0.55 fuzzy points. The gap between outcome score and the causal condition is just – 0.17 or less, except for United States, which has 0.05 points higher score on the causal condition (difference between column 3 and 2 in Table 8). However, this is within the adjustment factor of 0.10 points for the sufficiency test. All in all, these countries are well accounted for by our reformulated liberal regime.

The other Western European countries have maximum scores closest to but below their score on the outcome variable for the combination of large public welfare spending and religious homogeneity (Table 8, column 4). This includes all selected countries on the Western European continent, except Spain which belongs to the liberal model. We therefore just call it the *Western European regime*. Most of these countries have medium to high fuzzy scores for this constellation, from Italy with 0.48 to Norway with 0.91 fuzzy points, whereas Germany and Netherlands have lower scores with 0.25 and 0.15 fuzzy points. For Denmark, Norway, France, Austria, and the Netherlands, the gap between outcome score and the causal condition is just ± 0.07 fuzzy points or less. For Sweden, it is – 0.22, Italy – 0.29, Finland – 0.32, and Germany – 0.34 (difference between column 4 and 2 in Table 8). The latter countries have gaps that indicate some variation weakly accounted for by the causal expression, but they do not fail the sufficiency test, which requires higher score on the causal constellation than the outcome factor.

Ireland and Portugal stand out as special cases. As we have seen, they have maximum score close to the outcome variable on two combinations of factors: *High public welfare spending and high share of income from private giving* (Table 8, column 4) and *High public welfare spending and high share of income from private* giving (Table 8, column 5). The maximum scores are exactly the same on both of these causal conditions for Ireland (0.15) as well as for Portugal (0.05). This means that they are accounted equally well for by both constellations. Since no country is accounted for *better* by this third causal constellation (Table 8, column 5) than any of the other constellations,

it is redundant.[9] Ireland has scores on these two latter combinations that are close to, but slightly *higher*, than the outcome score (0.05), but the adjustment factor saves the causal combinations in the sufficiency test. In addition, Ireland has very high religious homogeneity combined with large nonprofit welfare employment, in contrast to all other countries. This indicates that Ireland belongs to a group with no other members in this sample. Portugal, on the contrary, has very much *lower* score on both of these two combinations than on the outcome, the difference is -0.70 fuzzy points. This indicates a lot of variation weakly accounted for by any of the causal expressions. Ireland and Portugal can be considered singular cases in this analysis. They are not contradicting the conditions for sufficiency, but do not clearly belong to neither the Western European nor the Liberal regime. To really understand these cases, they need to be targeted by in-depth case studies.

NONPROFIT WELFARE REGIMES AND HOMOGENEITY

All in all, this analysis shows that there are two causal constellations that result in small shares of nonprofit sector employment in the welfare field: (1) *Small* public welfare spending, a large share of income from donations, and low religious homogeneity, and (2) *Large* public welfare spending and high religious homogeneity. Our selected sample of advanced industrial countries with extensive and institutionalized welfare arrangements belong to one of these two regimes, with the exception of Portugal and Ireland. These two causal constellations are related to, but different from, the social origins models presented by Salamon and Anheier (Anheier & Salamon, 2006; Salamon & Anheier, 1998).

The first constellation we call *the liberal regime*, in which small public sector welfare spending results in a small nonprofit share of employment in the field (Table 8, column 3). The preconditions for this mechanism are low religious homogeneity and large shares of income from donations for nonprofit organizations on the welfare field. The countries that have strongest belonging to this model are United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, and United States. They all have relatively low public welfare spending, but in contrast to expectations from social origins theory, this does not necessarily result in large nonprofit employment. United Kingdom, Spain, and Australia have small nonprofit welfare employment, whereas United States comes closer to expectations from social origins theory. However, with just

36 percent nonprofit employment on the welfare field, there is still a long way up to the Netherlands and Ireland with 45 and 56 percent, respectively.

The reason why small public welfare spending not necessarily results in a large nonprofit sector can be understood with reference to Weisbrod's (1977) theory. It builds on the presumption that the public sector's supply of welfare services, reflecting the median voter's preferences, will leave an unsatisfied demand in a country with great heterogeneity. To meet this demand, people are willing to pay for welfare services through donations. The results from our QCA confirm that there is a liberal regime with low religious homogeneity and a large share of income from donations, in line with Weisbrod's theory. There is a higher willingness to support nonprofit welfare by gifts than in other countries, but the shares of income from donations range only from 6.5 to 12.2 percent. This is not sufficient to compensate for the low public welfare spending that is characteristic for the liberal countries, since public funding in most countries is the main source of income for nonprofit welfare. The exception to this pattern within the liberal regime is the United States, which has nonprofit welfare employment in the middle range as a result of large nonprofit institutions such as hospitals and universities that have been built up over very many years. The households have contributed to this expansion by fees, charges, health insurance payments, and donations stimulated by tax exemptions.

The second regime called *the Western European regime* is not clearly linked to any model in social origins theory. It operates when public sector welfare spending is *inversely* proportional to nonprofit share of welfare employment (Table 8, column 4), depending on religious homogeneity. This can also be understood with reference to Weisbrod's (1977) theory. In countries with high religious homogeneity, it is possible for the public sector to provide services that satisfy the needs of the median voter. An ambitious welfare state may then "crowd out" nonprofit organizations, as our data show in the Scandinavian countries, France, and Austria, and to some extent in Italy, Finland, and Germany. In contrast to expectations from social origins theory, these countries do not cluster around separate social democratic and corporative models. The only outlier is the Netherlands with low homogeneity and a large share of nonprofit employment in welfare services, that is, pillarization. This is the clearest example of a corporatist pattern in our sample. However, it can also be accounted for by the Western European regime, which then seems to be a more versatile explanation.

It is important to note that a relatively large share of income from gifts for nonprofit organizations on the welfare field is a precondition for the liberal

regime, but this factor is not part of the Western European regime. This is in contrast to expectations from Anheier and Salmon's (2006, p. 108) theory that a large share of income from donations characterizes the social democratic countries since the nonprofit sector to a large extent is rejected as a mechanism for meeting public welfare needs. In fact, nonprofit organizations on the welfare field in the Nordic countries have a relatively low share of income from gifts and lower shares than many supposedly corporatist countries that according to social origins theory should have a low share of income from giving (Table 5). Salamon and Anheier admit the socialdemocratic regime is a "deviation", but argue, "However, once the value of volunteer time is considered, the prediction holds for social democratic countries as well" (Anheier & Salamon, 2006, p. 108). The problem is that there is not very much volunteer time on the welfare field in the Nordic countries, and what there is takes place in member-based organizations and to a little extent in performance of services or generating income for nonprofit welfare providers (Sivesind, 2008). It is therefore not the case that donations or volunteering are important alternatives to public funding for the nonprofit welfare sector in the presumably social democratic Nordic countries.

Religious homogeneity is a factor in both the liberal and the Western European regime but with different consequences. Low homogeneity explains small nonprofit welfare employment in the liberal regime, whereas, in contrast, high homogeneity is a precondition for the same outcome in the Western European regime. However, both regimes are in accordance with Weisbrod's theory (Weisbrod, 1977) as we have seen. In a historic perspective, religious homogeneity seem to be a factor involved in what kind of compromises that have been possible to achieve between different sectors and social forces. This means that homogeneity probably could have been added to the historical explanations underpinning social origins theory. It would therefore seem Salamon and Anheier (1998, pp. 232–237) dismissed demand heterogeneity theory too soon.

All in all, we are not opposed to social origins theory's underlying path dependency perspective, implying that historic relations between forces and institutions result in different nonprofit welfare regimes at later stages. However, we have chosen a different comparative approach by exclusively focusing on the welfare field, by adding causal factors as *share of income from donations* and *religious homogeneity*, and by using the QCA method to find causal constellations to which the observed cases can have varying degrees of belonging. Our findings show two nonprofit welfare regimes that are different from social origins theory, but that we believe has a stronger empirical foundation.

NOTES

1. The inclusion of the Netherlands here illustrates the point that the ''social democratic regime'' as an idealtypical concept must be detached from ''social democracy'' as a political ideology. The latter has had a much weaker impact in the Netherlands than in the Scandinavian countries, but still there are some resemblances in the size of the welfare states.

2. International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations, see Salamon et al. (2004).

3. The exception is Austria, where the CNP data are from 1995, but the ILO data do not go further back than 2001.

4. Total public welfare spending per head, at current prices and current PPPs, in US dollars. Sources: ''Total public social expenditures'' (OECD, 2006a) and ''Government expenditures on education'' (OECD, 2006b).

5. Among the Western EU countries with low level of public welfare costs, we also find Greece, which was slightly lower than Portugal in 2001 (4,807 US$). However, Greece is not included here because of lack of Hopkins data.

6. Italy is very far from the having a social democratic type of welfare state. As Ragin has pointed out, it is really unfortunate to force fit a country to a model while disregarding origin factors that in line with Rokkan's conceptual map of different European historical paths (Rokkan, 1987; Flora, Urwin, Kuhnle, & Rokkan, 1999) would be potentially important, such as the fact that Italy developed a state relatively late (Ragin, 1998, p. 269).

7. These expressions were generated by using the inclusion algorithm of the computer program Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0 (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 2003).

8. ''Coverage'' concerns the relative importance of combinations of sufficient conditions in the effort to explain or ''cover'' instances of the outcome (Ragin 2003).

9. This constellation incorporates a simplifying assumption, which is a logically possible combination of causal conditions that lacks observed cases: PUB-LWELFSP*relighom*GIVING (see note in Table 8). Since we already have concluded that it is redundant, we need not consider the implications of this any further.

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PART II
CIVIL SOCIETY, CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND ADVOCACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES

Gabriela de Brelàz and Mário Aquino Alves

ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to compare the advocacy role of civil society organizations in the United States and Brazil. We conducted an exploratory case study of three peak organizations that engage in public policy advocacy as part of their strategies. We analyze how they advocate and the role this form of action plays within different democratic contexts that assume public discussion and deliberation, by citizens, about matters relevant to them, such as the formulation, execution, and monitoring of public policy. The study concludes that the policy advocacy role of civil society organizations strengthens internal and external democratic processes by bringing for the deliberation process in the public sphere organizations that represent different groups in society. However, this process also poses some risks and challenges that shall be taken into consideration.

INTRODUCTION

Civil society organization (CSO), nonprofit organization, and non-governmental organization (NGO) are different terms used to designate CSOs active in the public sphere; they are also referred as third sector, a term coined in the 1970s that was revamped in the 1990s – which has been influencing academy, especially in Iberoamerican countries (Alves, 2002). The common factor shared by the various organizations that make up this sector is their private nature and their non-economic orientation that is, the lack of profit as core purpose and the intent of providing benefits to all the community or specific groups.

These organizations perform several roles in society like service provision through hospitals, schools, social care institutions, environmental organizations. They are also important as a way of expressing the pluralism of society, the diversity of cultural, religious, ethnical groups, for building the concept of community and for helping to stimulate individual initiative for the public good (Salamon, 2002). Beside these roles, another important activity is advocacy (Andrews & Edwards, 2004; Boris, 2006; Boris & Krehely, 2002; Salamon, 2002; Van Tuijl, 1999). Advocacy is a vital role for CSOs and is considered a traditional function in the United States, where citizens have always gathered in CSOs and contributed to shaping the country's political, economic and social characteristics (Boris & Krehely, 2002). In the case of Brazil, CSO's advocacy is still seldom discussed and few studies exist on this form of action.

Advocacy is a broad concept that allows different interpretations. Mostly scientific studies in this area have been developed in the United States, where CSOs have a long tradition in advocating and lobbying (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). Advocacy and lobbying are often used synonymously although there are significant differences between them. Advocacy is understood as the act of identifying, adopting, and promoting a cause. It is an effort to shape public perception or achieve a change, whether or not by reforming the law. Lobbying is a specific form of advocacy that focuses on influencing lawmaking activity (Avner, 2002). Lobbying always involve advocacy, though advocacy does not always involve lobbying. Hence, the meaning of advocacy and how this conception is systematized is the theme of this comparative study that seeks to compare the policy advocacy role of two CSOs in Brazil (Group of Institutes, Foundations and Companies – GIFE and Brazilian Association of Non Governmental Organizations – ABONG) and one in the United States (Independent Sector – IS).

These organizations are characterized for being associations that represent other CSOs and that accomplish policy advocacy as part of their strategy. This study analyzes how these organizations advocate, what does advocacy means in each country and the significance of this role through the scope of deliberative democracy that presumes the discussion and deliberation of citizens in the public sphere of matters of their interest, as for example, the elaboration, the put into practice and monitoring of public policies. We observe that although performing public policy advocacy is the core of their strategy, there are differences on how this is done according to the intrinsic features of the development of CSOs in each country and according to differences in the ideologies that support their actions, especially in the Brazilian cases.

The main normative principle supporting this research is that representative democracy has some limitations as a democratic ideal, and it is necessary a higher degree of civil society participation in the deliberation of several issues in the public sphere (Lavalle, Houtzager, & Castello, 2006). Additionally, the concept of established democracies as the elections of political representatives has some limitations when we talk of transnational decision making arenas and spaces where different groups and interests demand recognition and voice: "These developments have produced a more complex discourse of representation, for which simple egalitarian and universalistic standards embedded in the standard model no longer seem adequate" (Castiglione & Warren, 2006, p. 2). In modern societies, the emergence of new forms of representation through associations such as advocacy groups is legitimate and expands the concept of democratic representation, but it is necessary to analyze deeply the risks involved in this process and how the intrinsic features of the organizations shape how policy advocacy is developed.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

This study provides the main findings of an exploratory comparative research developed between 2006 and 2007 based on literature review, case studies, and in-depth interviews combined with an historical approach, which main objective was to analyze the advocacy role played by organizations that represent and defend the rights of CSOs in Brazil, a country where interesting deliberative experiences are being developed in the

public realm (e.g., public policy councils, participatory budgeting) and in the United States, country where most of the literature on advocacy comes from.

For Arthur and Nazroo (2003) an exploratory study aims to understand the often non-explicit values, concepts, and standards that drive a certain topic. To understand the phenomenon of advocacy of CSOs, we utilize a multi-disciplinary approach, combining elements from political science, sociology and organizational theory. Organization theory supports that any analysis of organizations assumes an explicit or implicit comparison (Blau, 1965). However, through a narrower scope, we understand the comparative method as a systematic comparison of a number of organizations to establish relationships between their characteristics. Considering that the advocacy role of CSOs is a recent research topic and that there are not many studies in Brazil, it was preferable to choose three cases and explore them in depth than to adopt more cases and sacrifice detailed information. In the case studies the interrelations of each organization with government, members, corporations, others associations that develop advocacy activities, international agencies and governmental NGOs were analyzed.

Comparative studies of CSOs have grown with multiple definitions of what the field encompasses and with different theoretical perspectives, emerging mainly from Western Market economies. In this context, the first large-scale comparative study developed was undertaken by the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project in 40 countries. Lately, Salamon and Sokolowski (2004) willing to develop a complex matrix that compares the sector in different countries constructed a composite index of Civil Society Development based on the capacity, sustainability, and impact dimensions of the sector. By capacity dimensions, the authors refer to the sectors employment level, diversification of employments, and volunteers mobilization. Sustainability dimension measures the financial base of the sector, popular support (memberships and population volunteering) and the legal environment they operate. And by impact dimension, the share of the sectors' activities in different areas (e.g., health, education) and its involvement in expressive functions. According to updated data, in 2007, the United States had the third higher Civil Society Development Index (after Holland and Norway) and Brazil ranked in the 25th position.

It is important when doing comparative studies to understand the different features of the sector that are intrinsically linked to the sector path dependence, which means, to the distinct history, culture, and political tradition of the country. This will be developed in the section ''Comparative Analysis at the Societal Level: Peculiarities of North American and

Brazilian CSOs Contexts.'' The move of CSOs to the center of policy concern and consequently the increase of scope and scale of the sector is increasing and calling up researchers attention that have been able to make significant improvements to the basic data available about this sector, however the understanding of the role of these organizations is still limited (Anheier & Salamon, 2006).

The literature review in this study attempted to understand the meaning of advocacy and lobbying in Brazil and in the United States and within deliberative democracy. As the terms are strongly developed in Anglo-Saxon tradition, they served as reference to conceptualize the meaning in Brazil, where theoretical references were few, even though the term advocacy shows increasing usage. Through the case studies, we attempted to provide a qualitative analysis of the act of advocating in both countries. Case studies are an appropriate research tool to study new topics (Eisenhardt, 1989), as is the case of the action of CSOs in Brazil and, more specifically, their advocacy role. Thus, we conduct our research in three umbrella organizations – IS, GIFE, and ABONG that represent and advocate for CSOs interests in an explicit or not explicit manner (even if members do not recognize these activities as an advocacy activity). Twenty in person and by telephone interviews were done with representatives of the case studies organizations, with other CSOs and researchers. This process was important to obtain information for the case studies and to understand the concepts of advocacy and lobbying. In terms of comparison, the following levels were taken in consideration: historical perspective in the constitution of CSOs (differences and similarities among the two countries) and comparative analysis at the organizational level between the three case studies.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Hereafter, we introduce the theoretical framework that sustains the comparative study we carried on. In the first part, we discuss the concepts of civil society and third sector to understand the main political aspects that involve the question of advocacy. Next, we present literature review concerning the potential roles of CSOs, specially the advocacy role developed by peak organizations. Finally, we compare the development of CSOs in Brazil and in the United States and how advocacy and lobbying evolved in both American and Brazilian contexts, to connect them to the concepts of civil society, public policy advocacy and deliberative democracy.

Civil Society and Third Sector

According to Habermas (1996) civil society is part of the public sphere and plays an important role in the construction of a deliberative democracy. In a legitimate democratic process, members of civil society can propose arguments, listen to and dialogue with government, therefore exerting influence on lawmaking. It is important to point out, however, that are not citizens that make decisions; these are made by the formal political process. However, citizens take part in the discussion process that leads to decision-making.

> The constitution of this (public) sphere through basic rights provides some indicators for its social structure. Freedom of assembly and freedom of association, when linked with freedom of speech, define the scope for various types of associations and societies: for voluntary associations that intervene in the formation of public opinion, push topics of general interest and act as advocates for neglected issues and under-represented groups; for groups that are difficult to organize or that pursue cultural, religious or humanitarian aims […]. Basic constitutional guarantees alone, of course, cannot preserve the public sphere and civil society from deformations. The communication structures of the public sphere must rather be kept intact by an energetic civil society. (Habermas, 1996, pp. 368–369)

Cohen and Arato (1992) observed the issue of public space and the participation of civil society associations as the marking trait of the new movements. The classic views of social movements, based on the theories of mass action and collective behavior that focus on the irrational aspects of human behavior, are no longer appropriate to explaining today's social movements. New collective actions involve specific forms of association and strategies, in a modern context of pluralistic civil society. This context includes "public spaces, social institutions (press, mass media), rights (association, speech, gathering), representative political institutions and an autonomous legal system, all of which are the targets of social movements attempting to influence policy or set change into motion" (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. IX).

The concept of civil society used for the purposes of this study is not the same as third sector. Alves (2004) criticizes that the concept of civil society is often associated with the third sector, and even used as synonyms. Therefore, third sector organizations are understood to be only one part of civil society, institutionalizing discourses on the solution of problems and issues relevant to the population in the public sphere. The confusion between the two concepts portrays a depoliticized form of representation of the component by the entirety (Alves, 2004).

Cohen and Arato define civil society as "the sphere of social interaction between economy and State, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements and forms of public communication." (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. IX).

According to Fung (2003), associations can contribute to democracy in several manners: by simply bringing the value of associative life, by stimulating civic virtues and teaching political abilities, by controlling government, by improving representation quality and equality, and by stimulating participation and deliberation. For this contribution to occur, the design of institutions is an important task to face. To an empowered deliberative democracy (EDD) occur based on participation of ordinary people through reason based decision making and tying action to discussion, Fung and Wright (2001) sustain that some background conditions are necessary: 1) focus on specific and tangible problems, 2) involvement of ordinary people affected by these problems and with the officials close to them, and 3) solution development through deliberative practices. After analyzing different EDD practices around the world, the authors conclude that three institutional design characteristics deepen these principles: 1) devolution of power and decision making authority to local action units, 2) centralized supervision and coordination, and 3) use of new state institutions to support these practices and not leaving it only to voluntaristic initiatives. Considering different experiences, Fung (2004) analysis on different institutional environments of participation in the public sphere emphasizes that Porto Alegre's Participatory Budgeting experience in Brazil as one of the most prominent. For him, these experiences go beyond simple legitimacy to become important mechanisms of public accountability, social justice, effective governance, and popular mobilization.

In a deliberative context, Elster (1998) emphasizes that the process of deliberative conversation is not simply the process of discussing and arguing to convince the other party of a certain view but that it also involves bargaining: the exchange of threats and promises. Gambeta (1998) draws attention to the negative aspects of the deliberative process, such as the cooptation of weaker parties and information manipulation by lobbies, but believes that the deliberative process is more positive than negative to the quality and legitimacy of decisions by: offering new and better solutions for different problems; providing more just results by protecting weaker groups; creating public discussions leading to the dilution of individual interests and to a greater consensus in any decision; and by being able to generate more legitimate decisions, specially for minorities. How democratic are advocacy

activities? Some argue that deliberation is an ill-structured and chaotic mechanism, exclusive and limited to the kinds of voices and people it can hear, causing difficulties to those with trouble to communicate effectively and cannot take part in a deliberative forum (Dryzek, 2000; Fung & Wright, 2001). Another criticism offered is that by participating and deliberating, individuals undergo an educational and disciplinary process that ends up restricting the participation of individuals whose opinions are inhibited or obliged to be more disciplined and behave responsibly, discouraging radicalism and militancy. Therefore, democracy acts as a disciplining force, making the participation of individuals to end up harming their opportunities (Hindess, 2000; Fung & Wright, 2001). Moreover, other risks inherent to deliberative procedures involve elite tendency to participate more frequently and effectively, the use of more and better tools such as material resources, information asymmetries, and rhetorical capacities and agenda setting affected by unfair representation (Fung & Wright, 2001).

Along these lines, Gambeta (1998) argues, influenced by Hirschman (1986), that cultures where people usually have strong opinions about everything (e.g., Latin-American countries) are negative for the genuine exchange of opinions. Strong opinions inhibit others from taking part and offering their own arguments. In cultures such as these, also known as "Claro!" cultures, there are risks of particular interests and collective losses being created by the culture itself in the process of building democratic institutions. In more analytically oriented societies, where people are not afraid of admitting lack of knowledge of a certain topic, deliberation can more easily take place.

We realize that recent studies call up the attention to the risks that associations can pose to democracy as some of them may threaten democratic values rather than stabilizing them (Fung, 2003; Urbinati & Warren, 2008; Houtzager & Lavalle, 2009). The basic assumption rests on the idea that association represents different constituencies and interests, however some questions are not seldom addressed, as for example: how are the associations authorized by those in whose name they act and how are they held accountable to those they represent raising questions about their legitimacy and their real contribution to democracy (Urbinati & Warren, 2008; Houtzager & Lavalle, 2009).

Roles of Civil Society Organizations

Normative definitions of roles, where some are considered more legitimate than others, are part of a complex ideological dispute based on the definition

of form, function and intent of the sector (Anheier & Salamon, 2006). Mostly, these definitions assume a functional perspective.

Korten (1990) takes an evolutionary perspective and finds four generational roles in terms of orientation. The first one involves a focus on the provision of services to meet an immediate need, such as the supply of food, water, shelter. Many organizations still act in this manner, but many changed this immediate relief orientation to a local development one, being regarded as the second generation of strategies. This generation focuses on local community development so that individuals can meet their own needs. The third generation comprehends organizations developing sustainable systems, focused on developing communities and changing specific policies and institutions at the local, domestic and global levels. This kind of strategy usually arises from the failure of the second generation of strategies, which are too focused on the local environment and require constant CSOs presence. Because these CSOs cannot provide benefits to many communities with this kind of action, the second strategy generation ends up inefficient. As a result, the third generation is a far more comprehensive strategy of action, focusing on public policy and attaining results with greater influence on local sustainable development. The fourth-generation strategy orientation focuses on social movements, driven by ideology and a vision of a better world, trying to mobilize a critical mass of initiatives supporting a similar world-view. CSOs active in public policy advocacy analyzed here can be considered as part of the third and forth generation of strategies.

CSOs forms of action may also be seen as constitutive. Salamon (2002) offers a definition of these roles based on: service provision, advocacy, expressive role, community development, and guardian of values. This categorization goes beyond the economic view, which simply analyzes the resources these organizations use and the jobs they generate. Van Tuijl (1999) writes that CSOs can be defined as operational or advocacy organizations. Operational CSOs are service providers (e.g., education, health, social services) and advocacy organizations are those that lobby in the government halls and also the international organizations. Mintzberg et al. (2005) analyze these organizations from the perspective of forms of association, suggesting the presence of four kinds of associative organizations (Table 1). They can be categorized according to whom they benefit (their own members or other individuals) and to their purpose (providing services or advocacy for or against a cause).

Some CSOs exert a special role of acting on behalf of all members when lobbying government or promoting the interests of the members. They are called *peak associations or organizations*. Peak organizations usually refers

Table 1. Association Matrix.

		Beneficiaries	
		Others	Selves
Purpose	Advocacy	Activist associations Advocacy for others (such as environmental organizations, nature preservation organizations)	Protection associations Advocacy for selves (such as lobbying organizations, anti-defamation leagues)
	Service	Benefit associations Service for others (direct or indirect) (such as art festivals, "private" universities, food banks)	Mutual associations Service for selves (for pleasure or gain) (such as cooperatives, student newspapers, literature clubs)

Source: Mintzberg et al. (2005, p. 39).

to corporatist political systems, where some organizations defend business sectors as pressure groups (Staber, 1987). In our study, we use the term peak organizations in the same sense as Anheier (1990, 1991) and Anheier, Priller, and Zimmer (2000), that is, as federations of nonprofit organizations that intend to foster their member-organizations visibility and interests.

Comparing Contexts

The increasing involvement of CSOs in the policy environment according to Anheier and Salamon (2006) is related to three aspects. First, to the emergence of a new public management embedded in neoliberal public policies that impulse the diminishing of Government and picture CSOs as essential partners of service provision. Second, to the popularity of the concept of social capital and the importance of CSOs functioning to integrate civil society and make it more engaged, contributing to the ideal of community building. Studies indicate that regions with high level of civic engagement and trust have also high governmental effectiveness, political stability and economic growth; and third, to globalization that engages a global network of CSOs operating in transnational level interacting with governments and private corporations.

The common feature shared by the studied organizations is that they are nonprofit associations that defend the rights of other CSO and adopt public policy advocacy as part of their strategies. These organizations maintain relationships with governmental bodies through direct influence on public policy making, oversight of governmental activities, involvement in committees, public hearings, meetings with congress leaderships and meetings with municipal bureaus. A brief description of the organizations:

Independent Sector (United States): founded in 1980, counts with 575 members (foundations, associations, corporate foundations, and corporate grant programs). Is seen as a benchmark in the defense of the sector advocacy rights, attempting to "strengthen and mobilize the society's independent sector to create a more just and inclusive society, with active citizens and communities, independent institutions and a healthy democracy" (IS, 2007). The organization emerged in a context where CSOs were experiencing increasing control and regulation by government and was established as an umbrella organization intended to strengthen the sector through the merger of two organizations: a coalition of grantseekers and a coalition of grantmakers. The organization was established to advocate in the broader sense of the term, by promoting a cause and attempting to change public opinion through education, communication and influence on public policy.

Group of Institutes, Foundations and Companies (Brazil): established in 1995 by organizations that make private social investments. By the time of this research, the association had 101 members, mostly corporate foundations, and although public policy advocacy role was not prominent at first, this activity is now central to the organization strategy to improve CSOs Legal Framework.

Brazilian Association of Non Governmental Organizations (Brazil): created in 1991 by a group of NGOs whose purpose was to fight for social justice and expand democracy (the roots of ABONG coincide with the NGOs of the 1960s and 1970s characterized by the fight for democracy alongside social movements). It arises to articulate NGOs and represent them before the State and other actors in civil society. It involves around 270 member organizations working on human rights, land rights, regional development and, racial equality promotion, among other areas and is acknowledged as an actor of political intervention and a governmental interlocutor, upholding the idea that NGOs are crucial to the formulation and monitoring of public policy and should exert social control over it.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AT THE SOCIETAL LEVEL: PECULIARITIES OF NORTH AMERICAN AND BRAZILIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS CONTEXTS

This comparative study has led to a series of findings to be summarized for the purposes of this article. First, we must emphasize the historic differences and, above all, the evolution of CSOs and their policy advocacy role in the analyzed countries.

Historical Perspective of Civil Society Organizations in the United States

Civil Society Organizations exist in the United States since colonial times (e.g., Harvard University, 1636), but the concept of nonprofit organizations as a united and coherent sector emerged around 1970. In the United States as in Brazil, CSOs vary in scale and form of action. Some examples are grassroots organizations, membership organizations, foundations, universities, and religious organizations (Hall, 2005). Legal and governmental institutions as well as civil society of British North America developed very differently from those of Latin American countries, mainly Spanish and Portuguese colonies.

In the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville (2003) observed the habits, costumes and values related to the United States social and political institutions and exposed the great associative power and drive of North-American citizens and their contribution to the development of a liberal and democratic society.

Between the Civil War and 1920, there was a steep growth in the number of CSOs due to an increase of funding coming from corporations, wealthy families, and religious groups (Hall, 2006). In many cases of corporate and family donations, these were encouraged by tax exemption, in a period named The Golden Age of Philanthropy (Grobman, 2004). According to Hall (2005), 90% of U.S. Nonprofit organizations were established after 1950 and gained impulse in the 1960s when poverty spread across the country and urban rebellions forced the government to increase investments in social policies. CSOs were used as service providers for government, expanding the welfare state network.

The following decades saw a more stringent government control over CSOs due to the anticommunist movement led by Senator Joseph

McCarthy and to new control measures imposed on the tax exemptions given to the organizations and to donators. Those are relevant questions tackled in the case study of IS, which is active in the United States since 1980 and had a notable role in advocating for CSOs.

Constitutionally, CSOs can be classified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as 501c(3) – charitable organization and private foundations – which should be institutions working for the public welfare and are tax and fee exempted and also allow donators to deduct taxes; or as 501c(4), civic organizations, which may take part in political campaigns. In this case, only the organization can deduct taxes, not the donator (Hall, 2005). Tax exemption is a benefit established by the English Parliament in colonial times (1601) (Grobman, 2004) and is still a strong incentive in the country as society understands CSOs as institutions helping in the improvement of public welfare and, therefore, government should support them through tax exemption. This is a particularly different characteristic between the analyzed countries.

In 2005, there were approximately 1.5 million CSOs in the United States, being 1.4 million registered as 501c(3) and 140.000 as 501c(4). Those organizations were subdivided in categories, similar to Brazilian classification: 1) arts, culture, and humanities; 2) education and research; 3) environment and animals; 4) healthcare; 5) social assistance services; 6) international issues; 7) public welfare; 8) religion. Between 1987 and 2005, the increase of CSOs registered at the IRS was two times higher than of the for-profit organizations registered in the same period. Churches and other religious organizations are not required to incorporate or apply for tax exempt status. In 2004, 501c(3) organizations employed 9.4 million people, 7.2% of the total economy, demonstrating the importance of the sector. When voluntaries are included, the number of people working in CSOs reaches 14.1 million (IS, 2007). In financial terms, the sector represents 5.2% (Pollack & Blackwood, 2006) of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and in 2005, donations for CSOs amounted US$260 billion (The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2006), and expenditures summed US$1 trillion, according to the IRS.

Many authors are now concerned with the size of the sector in the country, criticizing how some organizations are operating very similar to corporations and raising questions about their real mission and purpose (Hall, 2006; Grobman, 2004; Salamon, 2006), and Salamon (2006) affirms that during the past 20 years CSOs have gone through various challenges that involve financial sustainability, transparency, competition, legitimacy, erosion of public trust, among others.

Historical Perspective of Civil Society Organizations in Brazil

It is a challenge to fully understand CSOs historical background in Brazil, given the few data available for the sector. The emergence of CSOs in Brazil differs significantly from the North-American process, as both societies have uneven backgrounds relating to government formation and civil society development. Brazilian society developed under state centralization, high level of influence of corporations' interests in public policies and a fragile civil society.

Landim (1993) affirms that the colonization period in Brazil was not favorable to the emergence of CSOs that could offer public services. This scenario was very different from the North-American where people frequently served their own community's or groups interests and needs. In the colonial period, Catholic Church and its philanthropic role provided social services as education and health care facilities with State support. When Brazil proclaimed to be a Republic and the industrial period started, the symbiosis between the Catholic Church and the State ended. By this time evangelic churches started to arrive in the country with immigrants from the United States and Europe, establishing their own social assistance and educational activities. Beside religious organizations, other CSOs participation is hard to notice.

By the end of the 19th century, a period of rapid industrialization in Brazil, there was a proliferation of CSOs with the emergence of the first trade unions and charity funds, mainly established by European immigrants. This led to a great change in the membership associations' scene, with associations becoming real interest groups and bringing to the center of the movement political orientations and class interests. Trade unions became very important CSOs controlled by the State during the 1930s when the country was going through its first populist government, focused on national development. After, Getulio Vargas dictatorship (1937–1945) started to restrict and control the associations that had flourished until then when independent CSOs (politically inclined to the left or to the right) were suppressed. From 1950 on, more politically oriented associations started to appear again but with the military coup in 1964, there was a new wave of repression and censorship (Landim, 1993).

During military government, organizations linked to the Catholic Church gained new strength, steering the social assistance scene and spreading the ideas of the Liberation Theology, a movement that emphasized fighting for equality and for the improvement of human living conditions. New

organizations aiming at discussing democratization also started to pop up, regaining ground for political CSOs.

In the 1990s, CSOs role in facing socioeconomic challenges in an innovative way was recognized by the State, becoming partners in governmental policies. Moreover, companies started Corporate Social Responsibility actions, mainly community investment programs, based on alliances with CSOs. The concept of Third Sector became wider to accommodate a growing variety of organizations such as CSOs, nonprofit organizations, corporate foundations, associations.

In Brazil, recent information of this very heterogeneous sector was published in a research called "Private Foundations and Nonprofit Associations in Brazil" carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics and the Applied Economic Research Institute aiming at presenting a more comprising picture of the Brazilian CSOs sector. This research mapped, measured, and characterized CSOs according to their mission following the System of National Accounts of the United Nations: institutionalized; separated from government; self-governing; non-profit distributing; non compulsory (involving some meaningful degree of voluntary participation) (IBGE, 2008).

According to the study in 2005, there were approximately 338.000 organizations registered as private foundations or nonprofit organizations: a growth of 215% compared to 1996. These organizations represented around 5.6% of the total registered public and private (for-profit and nonprofit) organizations.

The study classified the CSOs taking into consideration their purpose: 1) housing (0.1%); 2) health (1.3%); 3) culture and entertaining (13.9%); 4) education and research (5.9%); 5) social assistance (11.8%); 6) religion (24.8%); 7) professional and/or employers' associations (17.4%); 8) environmental and animal protection (0.8%); 9) development and defense of rights (17.8%); 10) Others (6.4%).

Around 68% of the organizations were established after 1990 and in 2005 employed 1.7 million people, however, 79% of these nonprofit organizations did not have any employee, which reflects the importance of voluntary work at those institutions.

Of the total number of organizations, 60.259 (17.8%) were grouped as development and defense of rights and 58.796 (17.4%) as professional and employers' associations, which will be considered for the purpose of this study as advocacy activities (35.2%). Analyzing the organizations registered as development and defense of rights this group has grown 437.4% from 1996 to 2005 and the group of professional and employers associations has

Table 2. Classification of the Organizations.

Category	Category Composition
Development and defense of rights	
Housing-related associations	Association of residents, tenants, and inhabitants in general of the neighborhoods and owners of popular houses
Communitarian centers and associations	Communitarian centers and associations, community development associations; water supply organizations
Rural development	Rural settlements and irrigation districts; associations for rural and agricultural development and support
Employment and training	Junior enterprises and professional insertion and integration entities
Minority and rights defense	Associations for the defense of specific groups or minorities, women children indigenous, disabled people, African-Brazilian, homosexual; students associations, retired workers, householders, veterans and others rights
Other forms	Other forms of development and defense of rights not stipulated above
Professional and employers associations	
Employers and corporate associations	Representation among the public administration and communication
Professional associations	Associations of different professions to distribute information, settle and control professional norms and to represent among the public administration
Rural producers associations	Associations of rural producers, animal breeders and fishermen

Source: "Private Foundations and Nonprofit Associations in Brazil", IBGE (2008, pp. 155–157).

grown 364.4% in the same period. In Table 2 it is possible to observe a description of the activities developed by these CSOs.

It is important to note, however, that advocacy activities may be sub dimensioned because this activity may be present in organizations defined in the groups of housing, health, education, environment, culture, and others. Mostly advocacy organizations were established after 1990, democratization period after the military dictatorship (1964–1985), and since then CSOs became more professionalized. Even though these organizations do not represent the whole universe of advocacy activities carried out by CSOs, their expressive growth represents a significant change in advocacy activities in Brazil and demonstrates that the growth is a tendency and not an isolated occurrence.

Advocacy and Lobbying in a Comparative Perspective

Andrews and Edwards (2004) write that, although the topic has deserved much attention from North American academy (more than in other countries), there is no single defined concept of what advocacy organizations are. For Avner (2002) advocacy involves identifying, adopting, and promoting a cause, willing to shape public perception or achieve a change, be it through legislation or not. According to Jenkins (2001, 2006), political advocacy is a specific form of advocacy that aims to influence the decisions of an institutional elite in favor of a collective interest. Advocacy can be on behalf of individuals, specific populations or causes, the interests of an organization or sector, or broad public interests (Boris & Krehely, 2002). Lobbying is a specific form of advocacy intended to influence public policy (Avner, 2002; Berry, 1977; Boris & Krehely, 2002).

A review of the Brazilian literature tells little about the term advocacy and the term lacks an accurate translation into Portuguese. More frequent are the references on the participation of civil society, which can be found in relation to topics such as participation and deliberation, civil society and public spaces, participative democracy, and others that are close to the role of public policy advocacy (also defined as lobbying in the United States), but that not completely replace it.

So, advocacy is not part of the Brazilian lexicon, and lobby, according to the Houaiss Portuguese Dictionary (2007), means: ''an organized (interest, propaganda) group's actions to exert pressure on politicians and public powers, intended to exert any influence possible over them, but without seeking formal control of the government; campaigning, lobbying.'' The discussion of lobbying in Brazil is complex because the activity is mostly unknown and stigmatized by shady connotations that, added to the lack of information, discourage researchers and contribute to keeping the study of lobbying in a sort of theoretical limbo (Oliveira, 2004). Lobbying is often used as a synonym for exerting pressure, influence peddling, or corruption, and is generally regarded as the exclusive domain of major corporations that wield their economic power to achieve certain objectives. However, lobbying does take place in Brazil without breaking any laws (Oliveira, 2004; Rodrigues, 2000; Mancuso, 2004). In fact, no lobbying activity can be more legitimate than that done by civil society, as this is a bottom-up form of pressure, from citizens to rulers, on behalf of a common cause or public good (Rodrigues, 2000).

When comparing advocacy in Brazil and in the United States, it is important to highlight that in Brazil lobbying is not a regulated activity,

different from the United States where it is regulated on the federal and state level as lobbyists have to register, separately, in each government level and need to comply all the requirements of the *Lobbying Disclosure Act*, approved by the Congress in 1946 and reviewed in 1995 (Grobman, 2004).

In Brazil, a bill (PL 6.132/1990) based on the North-American Lobbying Disclosure Act was proposed in 1990 willing to increase the transparency of group and individual activities directed to influence government's decision making and deliberation processes and to restrain possible abuses of influence and power; however, it was never approved (Mancuso, 2004). Rodrigues (1996) concludes that Brazilian democracy is mature enough to have a comprehensive and efficient lobbying law guaranteeing a legitimate and transparent participation process to all organized groups. Nonetheless, the bill 6.132/1990 does not consider some particularities of the country and, therefore, there is a consensus that it should be reviewed.

In-depth interviews allowed identifying differences in how advocacy and lobbying are understood in both countries, although they do not permit major generalizations. The interviewed North Americans responded similar definitions, which can be understood as an illustration of awareness of these activities in a country where they are legitimate, regulated, and long-standing. When trying to define those concepts in Brazil, there is not the same level of assimilation and understanding.

Two types of answer prevail: 1) those that see advocacy and lobbying in a manner similar to the North American definition, with lobbying as a legitimate activity that is part of advocacy, and 2) those that see lobbying as something negative, involving private for profit oriented interests. These groups use the term advocacy to define activities intended to influence public policy (they do not understand advocacy as a broader concept) and, in some cases, make adaptation; for example, they refer to CSOs lobbying as lobbying for the good. The group 2, which rejects lobbying, concentrates a larger number of responses, out of a total of 11 responses on the definition of advocacy and lobbying, 7 belong to that group.

Subsequently, there is a possible evidence that the concept of advocacy in Brazil loses its broader sense of identifying, adopting and promoting a cause, which may or may not involve lobbying, and ends up with a reduced scope that serves the purpose of lending a more legitimate and legal aspect to the act of influencing public policy, that is, CSOs with public interests advocate, while corporations lobby.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL: CONSTITUTION, STRUCTURES AND RESOURCES

The advocacy role of the analyzed organizations is an important part of their action strategy, and it is possible to observe that historical, social, and cultural characteristics of each country has meaningful influence on how the organizations structure and develop these activities. The previous analysis of the historical perspective of CSOs in the United States and in Brazil allows us to better understand the influence of the countries path dependence on the constitution, structure and resource strategy of each organization.

IS, GIFE, and ABONG

In terms of foundation, IS was created as a public policy advocacy organization since the beginning in line with the development of the democratic features of North American CSOs; so was ABONG, but with not as much emphasis due partly to Brazilian recent democratic experience and greater openness to civil society participation only after the Federal Constitution of 1988. From its inception, ABONG projected a close interface with government, under the reasoning that public matters should not be managed only by the State. As such, we may affirm that, in the cases of IS and ABONG, policy advocacy strategy is constitutive, the "reason why" the organizations were established. In GIFE, policy advocacy was not part of its strategy when it was founded, this form of action is evolutional, part of its learning process and maturity.

IS springs from the merger of two other organizations, one of grantmakers and another of grantseekers. GIFE is regarded as an association of grantmakers, while ABONG as an association of grantseekers. However, a merger of GIFE and ABONG, organizations with different ideologies and perspectives, is difficult to conceive in a short or medium term. GIFE and ABONG clearly take different positions, one being more business-oriented, with ties to the corporate social responsibility movement and private social investment, and the other being more closely connected with social movements and the fight for civil rights, with a left winged profile. But within the context of a broader coalition that seeks to exert a greater impact on the rights of CSO, closer ties between the two organizations would lead to significant gains for the sector.

The three organizations represent a range of organizations, which adds certain legitimacy to their activities; however, this also poses some risks of representation when some members have stronger voices. In addition, it is worth noting that these organizations employ professionals specialized in policy advocacy, as they understand that this activity requires a knowledge of the legislative and executive process. In terms of funding, all have chosen not to accept government grants, and IS is the one that mostly emphasizes the risks governmental funding creates for the sector's autonomy.

These organizations have similar internal deliberation process: thematic groups or committees where various topics are discussed with members. The main difference lies in how these groups are organized. At IS, groups are divided according to the IS form of action; at GIFE according chiefly to members' areas of operations; and at ABONG, according to members' location. In the case of IS, organizations must be invited to attend committees, while attendance is free at ABONG and GIFE, evincing a more participative process. Other common forms of deliberation are general meetings, e-mail and e-bulletins as means to communicate with members. IS was the only one to mention teleconferencing with members and uses this tool often. The *Nonprofit Panel* organized by IS is an important coalition and relevant process of deliberating not only with members, but with other organizations and scholars. IS, GIFE, or ABONG do not regularly use consultation procedures such as surveys, polls and votes with associates. Decisions are made by each organization's board of directors.

It is worth pointing out the risks Gambeta (1998) identified in the deliberative process, such as, for example, the manipulation of weaker parties and the presence of "Claro!" cultures. The process of "education and discipline" that inhibits individuals from expressing their opinions, pointed by Hindess (2000) and the fact that when certain people argue better than others, they have a better chance of being heard (Sanders, 1997).

In such a context of deficiency, it is important to determine whether these facts occur within the environment of the analyzed organizations. We were unable to conduct an in-depth investigation of their deliberation processes, as the research project did not contemplate on-site observation of the organization's daily activities or of their general meetings. But the authors' presence at an important meeting to discuss the Legal Framework of CSOs at GIFE allows drawing attention to the fact that a minority of members participating deliberated. Attendance at a Seminar about the Relations of NGOs and Corporations promoted by ABONG draw attention to the lack of proper debate and deliberation, as a consequence of the homogeneous positions of the participants (seven of eight speakers were connected to

social movements and NGOs, only one had a link with corporations). Still, more in-depth study is required.

GIFE and ABONG

One important difference lies in who they represent: GIFE stands for a group that makes private social investments, whose members are mostly companies, whereas ABONG represents NGOs, with a more politicized and militant profile, all of which are constitutive of their positioning within the context of the public sphere and related to CSOs Legal Framework that is under debate and construction. These organizations represent a section of the so-called third sector, that is, they do not speak for the entire third sector, as it also includes charities, religious organizations and others.

Another difference lies in that ABONG maintains an office and a professional dedicated full-time to public policy advocacy in the capital Brasilia, in line with the organizational goal of strengthening deliberative and participatory public spaces. GIFE, on the contrary, out sources the role to an advocacy organization, given the fact that the latter has accumulated experience in public/social causes advocacy and also due to cost concerns, as this choice makes more economic sense for the organization. However, by the time of this research GIFE was considering to establish in Brasilia.

It is important to point out that in policy advocacy, where an organization acts on behalf of a cause, the act of defending, claiming, and arguing is important to the deliberation process and to the organization's positioning. This begs the question: does direct action adds legitimacy? Considering that the advocacy role at GIFE arises from an evolutional process within the organization, delegating this role can also be legitimate before the necessary skills are acquired, that is, the organization attempts to incorporate learning to gain legitimacy before performing these activities on its own.

Concerning the relationship with State, both organizations affirm that it is marked by partnership and conflict, and criticize the absence of State policies for CSOs. Several negotiations have occurred with different governments, but there is no single State policy that is resistant to political terms and political interests, affecting the sectors development and effectiveness.

Considering the analysis of the bills/propositions each organization track at the Senate and House of Representatives we observe that their documents patterns are structurally similar, identifying the bill, its proponent, status

and, in the case of GIFE, a priority level, a brief analysis of the project's impact, and a broader range of tracked projects that includes bills in the areas of culture, education, and environment that may have greater impact for CSOs.

Another relevant point in the comparison between the two organizations is that they are both established as associations and mention the occasional need to deal with members' corporate interests. However, they claim to address these interests in such a manner as to benefit public interest.

In light of the education, culture and environment related projects GIFE monitors and the emphasis ABONG places on issues of gender and racial equality as we observed in different statements and documents of the organization, the following questions arise: 1) By advocating on behalf of environment, culture and education public policies, isn't GIFE focusing in its members corporate interests? Should GIFE focus on the defense of rights that enable organizations in the areas of culture, environment, education and others to advocate for themselves in their respective fields of action? 2) By emphasizing issues of racial equality and gender, does not ABONG privilege one cause to the detriment of others? 3) Should ABONG and GIFE focus on the broader defense of CSOs rights as IS does?

In some cases, literature argues that organizations can be influenced by those in control of their resources, the so-called theory of resource dependency. According to this the environment is a source of resources within which the organization interacts and that exerts influence over the organizational structure and individual behavior of organizations (Hudock, 1995). Analyzing from the perspective of resource dependence theory, we raise a doubt if GIFE and ABONG organizational structures are affected by donors.

Finally, concerning the coalition-style action of the two organizations, we note that, despite the presence of several positions in common, no formal coalition exists between GIFE and ABONG. Some interviewees affirm that there is a common awareness that, together, the two organizations would have greater persuasive power but that the process of aligning their discourse is complicated as a result of the intrinsic differences of their membership profiles. Although their advocacy efforts are very similar, as are their stances relative to certain bills, significant differences arise from those each one represents. As noted by Lavalle et al. (2006), understanding the role of actors and CSOs as actors that perform political representation tasks, is crucial in a context of democracy and participation.

Therefore, we find that the reason why a proper coalition is not formed has to do with ideological differences. In this case, the ideologies and the

resulting divergence as to whom each organization represents are the essence of the non-coalition, preventing more solid and constant joint action. We perceive a difference from North-American coalitions, where the instrumentality apparently prevails, and many ad-hoc coalitions are formed to achieve certain objectives, even between organizations with different ideological positions as stated by IS members.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that in a deliberative democracy context, the role of advocacy and, more specifically, the role of public policy advocacy strengthens the democratic process by bringing to the deliberative process CSOs that represent different social groups, so that these can deliberate and manifest their views on public policy and other subjects topics, making the process more participatory. But the process also includes risks and challenges that must be taken into consideration (Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998; Gambeta, 1998; Habermas, 1996).

Social and political North-American scientists have divergent opinions regarding the benefits of advocacy and lobbying activities carried out by CSOs. If on one hand the positive role of these organizations in strengthening both the democratic process and the civic drive of citizens (Berry, 1977; Eisenberg, 2004) and in correcting and unbalanced political representation, assuring participation (Jenkins, 2006), on the other hand, researches also raise a doubt regarding the legitimacy and representation of organizations supposed to advocate for major interests. Which are those interests? Who defines them? Whose interests these organizations represent? Those are some of the relevant questions to ask to evaluate correctly if this organizations' advocacy role is really being beneficial to society (Boris & Krehely, 2002). Jenkins also raises this point by affirming that the conception that CSOs advocate for the public welfare has been challenged many times based on the question: Who defines what is public welfare? What is considered good for some may be seen as bad by others.

Since its independence North American civil society developed itself based on advocacy, protecting different interests. Fiorina and Skocpol (1999) consider civil society democratic when individuals and social groups influence the government and the public life. Nevertheless, Skocpol's (2003) recent studies points significant changes in North-American civic engagement pattern in the past decades, and, consequently, its changes in democracy. Citizens are becoming less interested over time in shaping

common interests' projects and their power over institutions and leaders is decreasing. In addition, there is a growing tendency that individuals stop taking part into membership organizations and start making donations to advocacy organizations which, in some cases, have no members and are managed by a small group of professionals whose decisions are highly significant but without the legitimacy of decisions made in associations. Furthermore, those advocacy organizations may often serve as a political voice for wealthy Americans' interests.

This tendency concerns contemporary analysts of different political spectra. They affirm that advocacy activities in the United States have grown to a level that has overloaded the political system, generating political paralysis and discredit, causing political weakening and contributing to economic stagnation (Jenkins, 2006).

New ways of organizing, advocating, and participating are part of nowadays political process. The social gain of this new advocacy and civic engagement model can be discussed but its influence is unquestionable and calls for future research (Boris & Krehely, 2002).

If on one hand CSOs advocacy stimulates and strengthen the deliberative process and the discussion among citizens involved in the public sphere, on the other hand, it can serve specific groups' interests not necessarily in accordance to public welfare – which is not an easy concept to define. As democracy includes also the representation of small groups' interests, it is fundamental to guarantee that civil society participation is conducted in a transparent and organized way, to allow diversity of opinions and the participation of the weakest parties, but shall be controlled and regulated, to prevent abuses.

Some of the challenges facing the establishment of CSOs as participative agents in Brazil are: 1) difficulties to obtain financial support for advocacy activities because these have long-term results; 2) lack of knowledge and tradition in advocacy and, mainly, about the legislative and executive processes; 3) absence of State policies for CSOs and their policy advocacy role; 4) CSOs mistrust caused by corruption in the sector; 5) cooptation of CSOs leaders by Government; 6) institutional spaces for deliberation, such as public policy councils, for example, are not always democratic and effective; 7) the issue of louder voices and "Claro" trends of Brazilian society; 8) the absence of clear rules for exerting influence on public policy, such as the lobbying disclosure act, which would add legitimacy and transparency to the process; 9) the need and difficulties to act in coalition: by acting in coalition with other CSO, government bodies and business-sector organizations, these organizations could become stronger and gain

legitimacy in their actions; 10) representation of advocacy organizations: who each organization represent and what are the interests involved?

Political deliberation process consists in a network of discourses and bargains that are supposed to facilitate the rational solution of pragmatic, oral, and ethical issues (Habermas, 1996). Such a process requires a space for deliberation and mobilization on the part of the State and Civil Society, so that deliberation and mobilization can in fact take place, and the high costs entailed are part and parcel of the deliberative decision-making process. In this context, an ideal communication community arises as the ideal type to be pursued, but which is rarely attained. In this ideal type, argumentation is left to those that are part of the process before and expanded ideal audience. These ideal communities form by means of a socialization process and by an accurate analysis of the arguments, based on truth (Apel, 1980; Habermas, 1996).

Such an ideal type is naturally a "methodological fiction" that allows highlighting the complexities of the matter, as reality is more complex and cannot be modeled. Completing this journey requires cultural and personal learning by the participants in the process, where "dogmatic worldviews and rigid patterns of socialization can block a discursive mode of association" (Habermas, 1996, p. 325). It is important to point out that ideological differences between the analyzed organizations might be blocking the deliberation process and consequently weakening deliberative democracy.

The analysis of IS and how it deliberates within the specific context of the public sphere provide evidence that the United States has institutional mechanisms in place for the interaction between the State and Civil Society, due largely to its path dependence. On the contrary, Brazil shows signs that it is beginning to address these issues, but there is still a long way to go before institutional and effective deliberation practices are created, in addition to public policy councils themselves. Could we argue that Brazil is at a learning stage? We see that it befalls both CSOs and the State to find the paths leading to deliberation, expanding them and replicating them, and to mobilize in face of the inherent difficulties, in an attempt to identify the asymmetries present in the process, such as stronger voices, resource, information, and skill asymmetries.

This study opens the doors to formulating hypotheses about the advocacy role of CSOs that should be verified by new field studies: 1) Although statistics show an increase in the number of advocacy organizations in Brazil, what are the real influence this organizations exert over public policy formulation, monitoring and execution? 2) Is this sphere in fact becoming more professionalized, that is, must actors be skilled to influence public

policy? 3) What is the role of coalitions over policy advocacy? 4) Who funds these activities and how democratic is the availability of such funds? What are the risks inherent to the funding process? 5) How do government agents perceive this action by CSOs? How open are certain governmental levels in terms of deliberative spaces? 6) What are the main difficulties governments and CSOs face to develop this form of action? 7) How is it possible to encourage this form of action at the local, state and federal levels? 8) How to deal with the issues of agenda-setting and hidden agendas? 9) How to deal with CSOs problems of representation? How to control and held them accountable?

Countless opportunities of investigation open up. We attempted to contribute to the knowledge and better understanding of the advocacy role CSOs play, especially in Brazil. Policy advocacy shows itself as an important form of action, one of extreme relevance within a deliberative context towards a better discussion of public policies that affect society.

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THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN DIFFERENT NONPROFIT REGIMES: EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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A SMALL STEP TOWARDS MEASURING CSOS' FUNCTIONS

Civil society organisations (CSOs) contribute essentially to welfare states and society. In Europe they play a key role in the provision of social services, but also fulfil a large variety of other functions, such as giving voice to unaddressed issues, offering alternative ways of occupational socialisation or facilitating social inclusion (cf. Kramer, 1981; Rose-Ackerman & James, 1986; Kendall, 2003). Current research suggests that the third sectors' societal roles considerably vary between countries, depending on the welfare state they are embedded in: Starting with a revision of Esping-Andersen's welfare regime typology (1990) and also based on the earlier work of Moore (1966), Salamon and his colleagues developed a typology of four different 'non-profit regimes' (Salamon & Anheier, 1998;

Salamon, Hems, & Chinnock, 2000a). As key dimensions for this classifi-
cation, they applied the extent of governmental welfare spending and the
size of the third sector (cf. Johnson, 1999). According to this typology of
nonprofit regimes, in countries with a large third-sector CSOs mainly fulfil
the service function. Countries with a relatively small third sector, so the
implicit conclusion, would tend to engage in 'the expression of political,
social, or even recreational interests' (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, p. 229).

   As an alternative to this rather macro-oriented approach, we suggest
that it is CSOs'[1] role and societal functions that should be the focal point
when defining nonprofit regimes and which need to be considered for this
taxonomy. Unlike Salamon and Anheier (1998), we further take into
account that a single CSO might accomplish more than one function, as we
would lose information if we assign a CSO or even a complete field to a
single function. This chapter therefore seeks to contribute to the discussion
on the categorisation of nonprofit regimes by analysing data on CSOs in two
different countries, Austria and the Czech Republic. Thus we will take the
following steps:

(1) After a short literature review on CSOs' functions, we first develop a
    theoretically based concept of these functions.
(2) Empirically we then investigate the functions of CSOs in both countries
    and compare the relative importance of these functions between the
    Austrian and the Czech third sector.
(3) In a third step, we discuss different indicators to measure CSOs'
    functions and argue whether our findings support the assignments of
    Austria and the Czech Republic to a certain nonprofit regime,
    accompanied by a certain functional orientation.
(4) Finally, we reflect on our findings from this comparative approach
    against the backdrop of the components of mixed welfare systems.

   In our empirical research, we analyse both qualitative and quantitative
data. Referring to our theoretical framework of CSOs' functions, with
service delivery, advocacy and community building as the main functions,
we collect organisational data from a sample of 523 CSOs in both countries.
These are analysed to compare the relative importance of the CSOs'
functions in Austria and the Czech Republic and to confront the results with
findings from prior comparative research. Descriptions of the activities and
objectives of CSOs supplement the quantitative analysis, in order to give a
better understanding of the way CSOs fulfil their societal role. These data
arise from qualitative interviews with representatives from 18 CSOs from
Austria and the Czech Republic.

In doing so, we enhance current research on CSOs' functions using a conceptual framework that does not constrain CSOs to either fulfilling the service or the expressive function. The detailed description of the way societal functions are performed reveals the differences between the roles of the third sector in both countries, which cannot be captured by quantitative data. Furthermore, the chapter gives insight into the institutional configuration in both countries and the relation of CSOs with the other relevant actors of a mixed welfare economy, the state, the market and the community at large. The reflection of these collaborations might give an idea of relevant categories for the elaboration of nonprofit regimes, finally.

CSOS' CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIETY

From prior comparative research, mainly from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP), we know that in different welfare states third sectors are not only composed differently but also contribute to very different roles and functions within society (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004). The following section gives an overview on the multifarious functions associated with CSOs.

CSOs' Functions Revisited

The variety between national third sectors and the heterogeneity of functions provided by CSOs in different national societies is mostly attributed to different historical backgrounds and traditions, which also results in different terms used for CSOs (cf. Lyons, 1996, in Nowland-Foreman, 1998): the notion of 'nonprofit-organisation' on the one hand, rooted in the United States and constituting a modern legal and economic paradigm, primarily describes a special form of a 'firm' and emphasises the distinction from business companies. In most cases this nonprofit firm is a public-serving or charitable organisation. The civil society approach, on the other hand, has a longer tradition – anchored in European scholarship – and draws mainly from sociology and political science. Here the role of civil society, in which CSOs can be denoted as the 'organized part of civil society' (Zimmer & Freise, 2005, p. 2), is rather one of providing 'people with the opportunity to organize' themselves, 'to discover shared views and advance those views, and to provide facilities or services to be used by themselves or by others' (cf. Lyons, 1996, in Nowland-Foreman, 1998, p. 112).

This notion, which is more common in the European context, thus embraces a much broader functional spectrum of CSOs.

Another reason for the large number of functions associated with CSOs is due to several disciplines dealing with the role of the third sector, with each of them identifying and emphasising different aspects. Despite the broad range of functions CSOs are said to fulfil, only few scholars have dedicated themselves to the functional spectrum of CSOs and have tried to compare and systematise them.

Following Kramer (1981), Kendall (2003), Salamon et al. (2000a), and Frumkin (2002), CSOs main societal functions are the service-, the expressive- and the advocacy function. Although the first one refers to the delivery of goods and services, the expressive function involves activities that express cultural, spiritual and professional or policy values, interests and beliefs. Advocacy can be defined as 'every activity that focuses on changing policies or securing collective goods' (Jenkins, 1987, p. 297).

Kramer (1981), Kendall (2003) and Salamon et al. (2000a) credit CSOs with a fourth main function, namely *innovation*. In fulfilling it, CSOs are pioneers that 'identify unaddressed issues and focus attention to them, formulate new approaches to problems, and generally serve as a source of innovation in the solution of societal problems' (Salamon et al., 2000a, p. 6). Kendall (2003) and Salamon et al. (2000a) even mention a fifth function: *community building*. It represents a younger concept, based on the work of Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993). Community building that also embraces social capital building refers to the integrative role of CSOs. As CSOs encourage social interaction, they generate a sense of community, based on mutual trust, common norms and reciprocity.

A quite different, rather US-minded approach on CSOs functions is offered by Land (2001). In his concept service delivery is accompanied by philanthropy, charity and fellowship. Although charity refers to the transfer of resources from groups who are better off to the more needy, philanthropy embraces all activities that aim at setting up and sustaining CSOs (Wolpert, 2001).

These concepts identify between three to five functions, which can be fulfilled by CSOs at the same time. Against this, Rose-Ackerman & James (1986) as well as Salamon, Sokolowski & Associates (2004) draw a distinction between two functions only. Their approach assigns CSOs according to the field [following the International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO)] they are predominately active in and restrict them either to be service providing or expressive. This approach, however, neglects the multi-functional character of CSOs. On the contrary,

it is quite convenient and therefore used by CNP to classify countries according to the main function of their third sector.

Not all of the conceptions on CSOs' functions presented earlier intend to classify CSOs by their functions. Nevertheless, a closer look at the concepts reveals that the authors use quite different definitions. Thus, similar functions are labelled by varying terms on the one hand, and similar terms are used for diverging definitions on the other hand. It becomes clear that they lack a common definition of the term 'function', making it quite challenging for empirical investigations to operationalise and compare studies on CSOs' functions.

A Triangle Model of CSOs' Function

To approach a common understanding of 'function', we refer to a conceptual framework that introduces a systematic approach on CSOs' contributions to society. This approach is based on a literature review and on case studies in Austria and the Czech Republic and condenses various CSOs' functions to the empirically most relevant ones.[2] Thus, it identifies service delivery, advocacy and community building as CSOs' three most important functions. Conceptually, the term 'function' refers to the contribution that CSOs make to society, which is implicitly inherent in the concepts presented earlier, too. More explicitly phrased, we define CSOs' functions as (the total of) single actions and decisions that CSOs perform, each of which serves a certain subsystems of society (cf. Anheier, 2005). Those systems are defined as the economic subsystem, the political subsystem and the community subset (Fig. 1).

The theoretical background of this conceptual triangle refers to social systems theory (Luhmann, 1984; Luhmann, 1998), with each of the three functions referring to a certain functional subsystems of society:

- Service delivery is the function towards the subsystem economy as hereby CSOs deliver outputs that can be priced and are somehow paid for – either by the beneficiaries themselves or by some other public or private organisation. These services are, for the most part, marketable, though often the positive externalities are even more important than the service itself (quasi-public goods or meritory goods) or some nonmarketable benefits are linked with these services (public goods such as social security or democratic participation). Mostly these outputs will also concern other societal subsystems such as the health care system in the case of hospitals,

Fig. 1. Conceptual Framework on CSOs' Functions. *Source:* Own Source.

the educational system in the case of schools or kindergartens, or the scholarly system in the case of universities.

- Advocacy is tied to the political subsystem of society. Hereby CSOs contribute to political decision-making and governance, thus to the making of collectively binding rules. There are various ways to fulfil this function; they range from formal contributions to legislation and executive processes to informal lobbying and PR-campaigns to raise public awareness on specific problems.
- Community building is the third function, which is directed towards enhancing social capital, that is, establishing and consolidating relationships between individuals and/or organisations. This generally means either strengthening groups (in-groups, bonding social capital) or fostering social inclusion and integration (bridging social capital). Thus, the function comprises all activities that lead to generating a sense of community and to uniting individuals – either on a certain issue or on the basis of their shared locality.

According to this model, all decisions and actions of a CSO fulfil functions, and these can be directed towards one, two, or all three subsystems of society. Thus we assume CSOs to be multifunctional, contributing to up to three different aspects, even though, most often, at different levels. This frame with its three major functions somewhat

resembles Edwards and Foley (2001) and Zimmer and Freise (2005), who stress CSOs' multifunctional character by participating 'in at least three societal spheres simultaneously' (*ibid.*, p. 8 f.). Referring to social systems theory we provide a systematic base for this model.

Although our concept shows similarities with the welfare triangle by Pestoff (1998) and the triangle presented by Evers & Laville (2004a), it is theoretically slightly different. These authors place CSOs in a triangle between market, state, and community/family with CSOs combining three different exchange modes to pursue their objectives. Thus, they display an important component of a plural and mixed economy (Evers & Laville, 2004a), not only providing goods and services, but being a relevant factor of social and political coordination (Seibel, 1990). Our model by contrast distinguishes more clearly between organisations and societal subsystems as two distinctive categories of social systems. In this understanding CSOs functions can be also regarded as structural couplings between CSOs and the subsystems (Baecker, 2005). Accordingly we refer to specific decisions, activities, and actions of CSOs, which contribute to the environmental systems, that is, they provide them with a certain function. From the comparison of both theoretical concepts, however, the nexus of CSOs' function and the components of a mixed welfare state become clear.

CSOs and Nonprofit Regimes

Findings from the CNP suggest that the societal functions of the third sector substantially depend on the welfare regime they are embedded in. This argument is based on Esping-Andersen's (1990) classification of welfare regimes and elaborates on it, stating that the level and type of welfare state activity leaves more or less room for CSOs either to complement or to substitute the public provision of services and to express the needs of groups in society. On the basis of quantitative data from 22 countries, Salamon et al. (2000b) identify four different nonprofit regimes. For classification they applied the extent of governmental social spending (as % of GDP) and the size of the third sector[3] as key dimensions. The so-called liberal (e.g., US, IR) and the corporatist (e.g., D, NL) nonprofit regimes are both characterised by a large third sector, but accompanied by low governmental welfare spending in the former, and by high public welfare expenditure in the latter, case. In liberal nonprofit regimes, CSOs have to substitute for the ideological and political aversion to the extension of governmental social welfare protection, in the corporatist regime CSOs cooperate with the state

and support its demands for social welfare (Salamon et al., 2000b). The 'social democratic' (e.g., FL, AT) and the 'statist' (e.g., RO, CZ) nonprofit regimes, on the contrary, are both characterised by a small third sector. In the statist regime the limited public welfare expenditure does not translate into high levels of CSOs action as in liberal regimes, but remains constrained. In the social-democratic nonprofit regime, the extensive welfare protection by the state leaves little room for service providing CSOs. However, this does not necessarily mean that the third sector is not active, but rather that it has a different role 'not as [a] service provider[s] but as [a] vehicle[s] for the expression of political, social or even recreational interests' (Salamon et al., 2000b, p. 16).

Although Salamon and colleagues emphasise that the different configurations of nonprofit regimes 'reflect the particular constellations of social forces' (Salamon et al., 2000b, p. 16) and have been shaped by 'interrelationships among social classes and social institutions', 'above all, by matters of power' (*ibid.*, p. 15), when classifying certain countries to these regimes they only refer to two key dimensions, which both focus on the service delivery function of CSOs only. As the size of the third sector is measured by paid employees, who are mainly employed in the social service and health fields of the third sector, countries with a large third sector are said to predominately fulfil the service function. Public welfare spending refers to the provision of services in the first place, too. Thus this approach – as many US-based theories on CSOs – concentrates on the service-providing function of CSOs and neglects their other functions (Kuti, 1990). Although the expressive function is attributed to countries with a small third sector, this attribution happens indirectly, deduced from the dichotomous concept of service delivery and something else. However, as the conceptual framework on CSOs' functions shows, CSOs fulfil more than these two roles. As these societal functions should serve as the focal point when elaborating nonprofit regimes, it is essential to consider not only the dimensions that refer only to service delivery and hence the economic system but also those that refer to the advocacy and community building functions, that is, serving the political system and the community.

We will therefore investigate indicators for CSOs' functions directly on the organisational level and – by the description of the activities and objectives of CSOs – hopefully provide a deeper insight into their societal role. We compare our findings with the CNP's assignment of the referenced countries, i.e. Austria's classification as social-democratic and the Czech Republic's as statist.

INVESTIGATE CSOS' FUNCTIONS – RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS

The quantitative data used to describe CSOs' role in Austria and the Czech Republic derive from a survey among CSOs in both countries that was conducted between November 2007 and January 2008. We used an identical standardised questionnaire for data collection in both countries, which is based on the conceptual framework of CSOs' functions presented earlier. The data collection consisted of two phases: (1) A part of the questionnaire had to be answered through phone-interviews; (2) a second part mainly consisting of questions on financial and organisational facts was answered by email afterwards. Respondents were the CEOs, CFOs or other key informants from a total of 523 CSOs.

Interview statements regarding the activities, objectives, and achievements of CSOs in both countries, which contribute to a better understanding of the way the functions are fulfilled, supplement these quantitative survey data on CSOs' functions. They arise from 18 case-study-like interviews with the heads of CSOs from Austria and the Czech Republic, conducted before the quantitative survey. Additionally, we use secondary data on the third sectors of both countries from a literature review to embed and discuss our findings.

Sample

For the quantitative study, the Austrian sample partly derives from the Austrian business register, which is administered by Statistics Austria. However, as this register only comprises CSOs with at least one paid employee, an important part of the organised civil society is not listed there. Hence, we generated a stratified sample of CSOs without paid employees according to each federal country's population density and their respective frequency of large and small municipalities. Added together, 215 randomly selected CSOs from the business register and 37 CSOs operating with volunteer staff only were collected for our sample. Due to reasons of data security, Statistics Austria draws the sample and conducted the collection of data. The Czech sample was derived from the Albertina Company Monitor Register, which represents all Czech CSOs. A stratified sample was drawn, containing 223 CSOs with and 48 CSOs without paid employees. The data were gathered by Augur Consulting, a Czech sociological and public opinion research company. Thanks to the stratified approach, our samples represent the full ranges of the relevant populations – including very small

CSOs – and thus provide a corrective to the bias towards the large, long-established organisations on which most empirical studies on the third sector are based.

For our qualitative interviews, we draw a sample of 18 CSOs – 9 from each country – according to the criteria of the number of employees, the revenue structure and the sphere of action, which guarantee as a diverse sample as possible. To be able to compare our data from both countries, each CSO corresponds to a twin-organisation in the other country. Moreover, four CSOs belong to the same organisation (e.g., Amnesty International Austria and Amnesty International Czech Republic), the remaining five CSOs belong to organisations of comparable size and geographical focus and which are active in the same field of activity.

Measures for CSOs' Functions

Whether or not and to what extent CSOs fulfil the service, the advocacy and the community building function was addressed by several survey-questions in order to get a comprehensive picture. The findings presented in this article are based on two questions that offer different approaches to measure CSOs' fulfilment of the functions.

The first question consists of 19 pre-tested statements, of which six relate to service delivery, five to advocacy, and eight to community building (Table 1). Respondents were asked to indicate the importance of the individual statements in the framework of the mission of their organisation on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). Out of the means of the ratings, an overall score for each of the three functions was calculated. As displayed in Table 1, the three additive indices show a satisfying reliability with Cronbach's α internal consistency values of 0.694, 0.807 and 0.794, respectively. To examine the relative importance of each function, the means of each of the three functions where weighted in comparison to the sum of the means of all three functions. This measure of the relative importance is used to describe the relevance of service delivery, advocacy and community building in each country.

For the second question, respondents had to state what percentage of the total working hours worked within the organisation – voluntary as well as paid work – was devoted to certain fields of duties. From a range of 10 given fields, the category (i) on the delivery of goods and services referred to the service function, and the category (ii) on lobbying and representation of interests to the advocacy function. To calculate the share of working hours

Table 1. Indices for Measuring CSOs' Functions.

	Please State the Importance of the Following Statements in the Framework of the Mission of Your Organisation from 1 (Not Important) to 5 (Very Important)	Cronbach's α If Item Left Out
Index on service delivery	(1) Providing those services demanded by our clients	.658
	(2) Improvement of the life of our clients through the services offered	.640
	(3) Continuous advancement and diversification of services offered	.642
	(4) Initiating offers according to the desires and needs of our target group	.623
	(5) Offering individual assistance for our target groups	.675
	(6) Offering services and products also to those people who cannot pay for them.	.685
	Cronbach's α (6 items)	*.694*
Index on advocacy	(1) Influence political and statutory decisions on behalf of our stakeholders	.765
	(2) Writing political/ideological statements	.755
	(3) Be a public voice for a certain group or issue	.784
	(4) Sensitize the general public on a certain issue	.785
	(5) To seek to amend political changes	.759
	Cronbach's α (5 items)	*.807*
Index on community building	(1) Forming/establishing friendships within the organisation	.785
	(2) Integration of our members into a group, which carries out common activities	.774
	(3) Connecting people with common interests	.782
	(4) Promoting solidarity within the municipality/district/country	.763
	(5) Conquer/overcome boundaries between different groups	.754
	(6) To counteract processes of exclusion due to activities taken	.781
	(7) To foster regular meetings of members of the organisation	.780
	(8) Building confidence between people with different backgrounds.	.747
	Cronbach's α (8 items)	*.794*

Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey, 2007.

on community building, the categories (iii) *management of volunteers*, and (iv) *caring for members* were taken together. Besides these categories, six further fields of duties[4] were offered, making up the total of 100% of working hours. We are aware that measuring volunteer work is quite

difficult, as records quite often are not available. Thus estimating the share of paid and unpaid work dedicated to a certain field of duties might involve fuzziness. Nevertheless it seems to be the most appropriate measure, since applying paid work only would result in very biased findings, as paid work strongly corresponds with the service delivery function (Salamon, Sokolowski, & Associates, 2004, p. 24 f). For examining the relative importance of the three functions, the percentages used on function fulfilment were added and the relative share assigned to the individual functions calculated. That implies that out of 100% of hours dedicated so function fulfilment, the relative share dedicated by a CSO to each of the three functions can be measured.

Analysis Strategy

To picture the relative importance of the functions on the sector level, we calculate the means of each of the three functions over the samples in each country. For testing differences in the function fulfilment between Austria and the Czech Republic we apply a nonparametric test (Mann–Whitney test), as the variables in our samples on the relative importance of the service, the advocacy and the community building are not distributed normally. This method enables us to identify whether significant differences between both countries appear. After this analysis on the aggregate level, individual statements are scrutinised. These results are confronted with findings from our qualitative interviews, which have been fully transcribed and analysed by qualitative content analysis (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, Vetter, & Jenner, 2000, p. 55 ff; Mayring, 2003) following the conceptual framework of CSOs functions above.

THE BIG PICTURE: CSOS' FUNCTIONS IN AUSTRIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

To examine the relative importance of CSOs' contributions to the economic, the political and the social system of society, different approaches for capturing these functions – one resting upon subjective ratings, the other on the distribution of work time – are used. As shown in Fig. 2, the application of subjective ratings deliver quite similar results for Austria and the Czech Republic: in both countries service delivery with an average of about 42% (CZ) and 38% (AT) makes up the most important function

Fig. 2. Relative Importance of Service Delivery, Advocacy and Community Building by Ratings. *Source:* Czech-Austria NPO-Survey, 2007.

Fig. 3. Relative Importance of Service Delivery, Advocacy and Community Building by Working Hours. *Source:* Czech-Austria NPO-Survey, 2007.

across the sample, community building the second, and advocacy the least important one. For Czech CSOs, however, service delivery is slightly, but significantly ($p = 0.000$), more relevant than for Austrian CSOs. Advocacy, on the other hand, is significantly ($p = 0.000$) more important within Austrian CSOs (average of 22% compared to 27%). Concerning community building, no significant differences appear ($p = 0.135$).

The allocation of working hours to these three functions, however, offers a completely different picture (Fig. 3). Not only do the findings vary from the subjective ratings, but differences between the two counties appear, too. The most important function – relatively as well as absolutely – in both countries is still service delivery, as on average 75% of the labour in Austrian and 56% in Czech CSOs are dedicated to this function. That is much higher than the subjective ratings suggested, and it implies that service delivery is significantly ($p = 0.000$) more important in Austria. The remaining two functions occupy much less work time in the organisations than the subjective ratings indicated, and, again, the differences between the two countries are quite apparent. Efforts towards community building are

significantly ($p = 0.000$) more relevant within Czech CSOs, as they assign 33%, while Austrian CSOs only 19%, of all working hours to community building activities. The third function, advocacy, is of minor importance if this method of measuring is applied: Merely 7% of the labour within Austrian and 11% within Czech CSOs are dedicated to it. These results contradict the findings from the subjective ratings, as the importance of advocacy is rated higher in the Czech Republic now, even though this difference is statistically not significant ($p = 0.077$).

Even though the results on the relative importance of CSOs' functions from these different approaches appear to be inconsistent, most variations are explainable if the way of measuring is reconsidered. Conspicuously diverting is the importance of community building, which is very high when CSOs are asked to rate its significance, but much lower when measuring the labour dedicated to it. As defined above, the community building function comprises all activities that unite individuals and generate a sense of community. Hence, community building might not only occur as a result of intentional events, meetings, and activities specifically designed for that purpose, but it also forms a part – or sometimes emerges as a by-product – of other activities, or results from institutional settings. Thus, although CSOs may contribute to community building to a great extent, it can be assumed that the share of working hours exclusively used for the purpose might be much lower.

A further cause for the smaller weight of community building in terms of working hours could result from the fact that this function is quite often carried out by volunteers. Although CSOs were asked to state the share of the paid and the unpaid labour dedicated to certain fields of duties, the unpaid labour might easily be underestimated by key-informants. Furthermore, as already stated, it is difficult to measure volunteer work, as many CSOs do not record it formally. From regression analyses on the importance of community building we learned that in both countries having volunteers has a highly significant, positive effect on community building,[5] which would support this assumption.

Differing appraisals for different kinds of work could also be a reason for the higher importance of the advocacy function when subjective ratings were questioned, since it was mostly CEOs that were interviewed. First, as advocacy is often carried out by staff working close with the executive board or even by CEOs themselves, and second, because staff engaged in advocacy might be better educated, CEOs would give advocacy a higher value, although the share of labour dedicated to it is smaller. Third, top management often rates advocacy and community building as distinctive and highly relevant for strategic positioning of CSOs.

When comparing the results by ratings and by the distribution of working hours, most of the arguments referring to the decrease of the importance of community building and advocacy serve to explain the increase of the importance of the service function, too. However, the country specific difference in the increase of service delivery, which is much higher in Austria, raises the question, whether this is due to the size of the organisations, as CSOs in Austria on average are larger than Czech CSOs.[6] It is quite possible that this remarkable difference is rather a function of size than an effect by country: as advocacy can be assumed to inhere economies of scale, for example, the workforce carrying out advocacy is relatively smaller in large CSOs (which fulfil both functions), as it is less labour intensive compared to service delivery.

Even if we can find plausible explanations for the differences between the subjective assessments of the importance of individual functions and time allocations, what remains striking are the differences between the two countries. Czech CSOs seem to spend a much higher percentage of their energy and time on community building and advocacy than their Austrian counterparts, while the relative part of all working time spent on service delivery is much higher in Austria.

Confronting these results with the conclusions of the CNP's nonprofit regime assignment, which classifies Austria and the Czech Republic as countries with an expressive-dominated third sector, these classifications cannot be confirmed. Our data show that both countries have a service-dominated third sector, when referring to the allocation of working hours. Thus our method, which refers to the voluntary and paid workforce, brings up the fact that CSOs in the Czech Republic and Austria do definitely not concentrate on expressive activities, neither in terms of working hours nor in terms of ratings of subjective importance. We suppose that not even the fact that CNP only considered two functions (service, expressive) can explain this divergence. It is rather the direct and differentiated view on single CSOs that reveals completely different pictures and provides more valid results on CSOs' functions.

As our analysis shows, barely half of the CSOs of the sample (49%) contribute solely to one function. In Austria a larger share of the sample (59%) is specialised in one function than in the Czech Republic (40%). That's probably because the third sector in Austria is considerably older and functionally more specialised and differentiated. The majority of CSOs in the sample, however, are multifunctional and thus justify our approach. Hence, in Austria about 31% and about 43% in the Czech sample contribute to two functions, with service provision and community building

being the most frequent combination. About 10% of the CSOs in Austria and 17% in the Czech Republic contribute to all three functions simultaneously (Neumayr & Schneider, 2008).

SERVICE, ADVOCACY AND COMMUNITY BUILDING IN A DETAILED VIEW

Along with the relative importance of service delivery, the advocacy, and the community-building functions, the following section gives insights into the way these functions are fulfilled. The analyses are based on the indices regarding the three functions, which were rated by key informants from CSOs (Table 1).

Service Delivery – CSOs' Contribution Towards the Economic System

As already shown, the relative importance of service delivery – based on ratings – in the Czech Republic is slightly higher than in Austria (Fig. 2). However, when the absolute importance of individual statements is compared, no obvious differences between both countries appear, as the graphs, which connect the means of each item per country, show (Fig. 4). Only the item 'offering services and products to those who cannot pay for it' is much lower rated by Czech CSOs.

These very similar ratings are quite surprising, as the allocation of the workforce shows that Austrian CSOs dedicate a much higher share of work time to service delivery. Thus, we could follow that service delivery for CSOs in the Czech Republic is an important issue; however, they do not offer as resource- and personal-intensive services as CSOs in Austria do. The fact

Fig. 4. Importance of Service Delivery in the Czech Republic and Austria. *Source:* Czech-Austria NPO-Survey, 2007.

that CSOs in the Czech Republic are mainly active in the fields of sports and recreation, and only marginally in the fields of social services, which are the more labour-intensive fields (Hyánek & Pospíšil, 2007), has historical roots. The paternalistic communist state was a monopoly provider of all educational, cultural, social, healthcare and other services, and public administration still finds it very hard to accept the loss of its monopoly in the public services after 1989. Thus, in the field of public services the dominance of state- and state-run organisations is obvious, even though CSOs expand their activities to these fields more and more: 'Today, because the number of clients has been growing, we also run a short stay shelter for the mentally and physically handicapped so that our services to people with some health handicap have become more comprehensive' (Interview with CSO, Czech Republic).

In Austria, on the contrary, CSOs are very much involved in the provision of health and social services, as a close cooperation between the public sector (financing services) and the third sector (providing the services) is a given: 'So, we are, quasi, we offer services for handicapped people, for elderly people, are active in nursing, in-patient and mobile...' (Interview with CSO, Austria).

Advocacy – CSOs' Contribution Towards the Political System

The advocacy function can be fulfilled through different activities, which either address political decision makers directly or focus on awareness-raising among citizens – and thus address politicians or any other institutional elite (Jenkins, 1987) indirectly. 'Presenting materials on the town square, or … having cages at the … square, well, doing politicking' (Interview with CSO, Austria) or 'organizing education on human rights, conducting workshops in schools' (Interview with CSO, Czech Republic) serve as examples for indirect activities, which are labelled by the term *citizens' advocacy*. The more direct activities on the contrary, like political campaigns or legislative activities are labelled by the term '*public advocacy*' (McCarthy, 2001; Boris & Mosher-Williams, 1998). As CSOs might emphasise different ways of how to advocate for their issues, we deal with either kind of activity separately.

As displayed in Fig. 5, for CSOs in both countries citizens' advocacy – questioned by items on raising awareness, being a public voice, or sensitising the public – is much more important than activities contributing to public advocacy. Thus, CSOs are more engaged in mobilising the public, but less in

CITIZENS'S ADVOCACY	
Raise awareness and mobilize for actions	
Be a public voice for a certain group or issue	
Sensitize the general public on a certain issue	
PUBLIC ADVOCACY	
Influence political/statutory desicions on behalf of stakeholders	
Writing political/ideological statements	
Seek to amend political changes	

1.0   1.5   2.0   2.5   3.0   3.5   4.0   4.5   5.0

1 Scale: mean of ratings from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important); Czech Republic: _____ ; Austria: - - - -

Fig. 5. Importance of Citizens' and Public Advocacy in the Czech Republic and Austria. *Source:* Czech-Austria NPO-Survey, 2007.

influencing politics through more direct interventions. In addition, the graphs, which connect the means of each item per country, show that for all single items Austrian CSOs state a higher importance than Czech ones. In particular, Czech CSOs rate amending political changes or writing political ideologies or statements relatively low within their organisations mission, as the average for both is 2.0 (on a scale between 1.0 and 5.0).

The minor importance of advocacy – especially of public advocacy – in the Czech Republic might be associated with the institutional settings and the relationship between the government and the third sector in both countries. Although in Austria a large part of organised civil society has good affiliations with one of the political parties and close links to public administration (Heitzmann & Simsa, 2004), Czech CSOs are very suspicious of any relation or contact with political parties (Hyánek & Pospíšil, 2007). The mutual mistrust and ignorance between CSOs and government is one of the legacies of the communist years, which is hard to overcome: On the one hand, as under the communist regime it was quite impossible to influence public policy, CSOs continue to believe that public advocacy is not useful. On the other hand, the political representation was, until 1998, more than hesitant about accepting the third sector as partner in public policy and public administration. The politicians may have overestimated their own legitimacy in the nascent representative democracy on the one hand and underestimated the role, or the potential, of civil society in identifying social injustices on the other hand. At the same time, CSOs with their demand for a relationship of 'equal' partnership were largely ahead of their actual capabilities. This situation contributed to a polarisation of organised civil society, which was feeling threatened and not appreciated. As a result, a number of organisations intensified their negative stance towards the government.

After 1998, the incoming government started to seek a somewhat different platform for the cooperation with civil society. In January 1999 a first seminar was held under the title 'The relation between the state and nongovernmental nonprofit organisations'. Since that time, the relations and the cooperation between the government and the third sector have been gradually improving. The progress has been very slow, however, as it is only limited to some central departments, some individual politicians, and a small number of the most active CSOs. Thus most governmental departments and most CSOs remain unchanged in their attitudes and activities, and the two sides have not managed to lead a meaningful and conclusive dialogue about their relationship. The state has not attempted to formulate its stance or policy towards the third sector (cf. Hyánek & Pospíšil, 2007).

In contrast to this, the close link of many CSOs with political parties is one of the main characteristics of the Austrian third sector, as many CSOs have their roots in the workers' movement or its Christian Catholic counterpart at the end of the 19th century (Heitzmann & Simsa, 2004). By then, the parties as well as the church had built up their own CSOs to bind their members, and these organisations still have close links and influence in the political decision making. For small and newly established CSOs, which do not have such affiliations to political parties; however, it is very difficult to make themselves heard and to promote their interests.

Beside these individual affiliations, another important principle of Austrian society – corporatism – provides third sector organisations with political influence, especially professional associations. In the course of the Social and Economic Partnership (*Sozialpartnerschaft*), large and traditional CSOs are recognised as participants in social and economic questions and are highly valued by the public administration. Thus, CSOs are involved in the course of preparing law, although this right is given only to a few associations and only for bills concerning the tasks of these associations. In practice, however, all bills made by a ministry are sent to a large number of CSOs that are invited to comment (Neumayr, Schneider, Meyer, & Haider, 2007), even if the practice has no legal foundations, but is informal. Some CSOs even have the feeling that they get involved in the legislative process too much and they fear that they might be exploited:

> *We are in many cases certainly exploited, too. They say that … [our organisation] also has said so, has contributed [to the law], too. [Government] massively asks us, often, yes … and we do, yes for sure we try to participate in formulating legislation in favour of our clients. But we always say as well that the decision is a political decision. And we only can give advice. Not more (Interview with CSO, Austria).*

The lack of such opportunities and traditions to participate in public affairs and the political process in the Czech Republic might be responsible for the lower importance of public advocacy for Czech CSOs: 'Czech politicians generally are unwilling to acknowledge the third sector's political role. Despite institutional and legal guarantees … they resist CSOs' involvement in decision making and are still unwilling to provide information on public matters'(Frič, Goulli, & Vyskočilov, 2004, p. 622). Only some of the relevant relations and procedures have been institutionalised, most are informal and depend very much on individual relations between the CSOs involved and their counterparts (Hyánek & Pospíšil, 2007).

> *The worst is that there are no rules … not like it was in the past … in the twenties … when everybody understood what we stood for and what we did. Today, we have to keep explaining and fighting and persuading … and begging … And when you have finally made the right contacts and explained things, everything changes at the next election and you are back to square one with the new councillors (Interview with CSO, Czech Republic).*

In this situation, many CSOs 'have turned increasingly to informal personal contacts with people in state and administrative bodies' (Frič et al., 2004, p. 622), as our interviews also confirm: 'Well, we always went to … we used … we did things through personal contacts' (Interview CSO, Czech Republic). Preferring personal contacts with relevant officials to open action and regular procedure is, again, a legacy of the past, as in an environment of nepotism all entities, and thus CSOs too, search for personal contacts: 'In fact, through direct talks, directly speaking with the politicians. In both chambers. With public servants, ministry officials also … if they are people we know and can talk to' (Interview CSO, Czech Republic). Nevertheless, for Austrian CSOs personal contacts with politicians are an important way for public advocacy, too.

A quite obvious difference between Austria and the Czech Republic concerns the use of media for citizens' advocacy, as all the interviewed CSOs from Austria stressed the importance of good relations with media and the strategic use of them for advocacy: '... me or my press spokesman call three, four journalists in appropriate leading media and tell them that we've got some troubles somewhere and, well, ask if we may say a bit about it' (Interview CSO, Austria). It is not only that media help to distribute information and to raise awareness 'So, we've got contacts, like our media databank with 20.000 addresses. And we then easily send things out and hope to receive some answers', but they also function to exert pressure on politicians:

> *But we always have the trump card of the media. So, in case we do not agree at all with something, yes, then we have for sure, I don't want to name it trump card, but for sure we*

can say, well, I mean, when they have another opinion on it, then, and we are asked on it, then we'll speak our mind. And then, let's see. Well, with this for sure one can influence, yes. And that is important (Interview CSO, Austria).

In the interviews with Czech CSOs, the media were hardly ever mentioned. Only one organisation stated that the use of the media was of crucial importance, another organisation said that they realised the importance of the media, but they unfortunately worked very badly with them, in fact did not work with the media at all. The activities Czech CSOs prefer to influence political decision-making, therefore, are to offer workshops in schools or to do educational work, which almost all organisations stated.

Community Building – CSOs' Contribution Towards the Social System

Like the advocacy function, community building can be subdivided into different forms, depending on the groups addressed by the function. Generally speaking, community building stands for the integration of individuals into a larger milieu and for allying or uniting groups on a certain topic or of a certain region. However, though individuals benefit from the community as they are provided with the opportunity to learn norms, to acquire information, organisational skills, and political competence (cf. Kramer, 1981), the 'quality' of the information and the social contacts they gain differs largely depending on whether they associate with like-minded or not-like minded individuals (Land, 2001). 'To recruit as many volunteer collaborators and members as possible who would take an active part in our activities and get involved in issues that concern us all' (Interview, CSO Czech Republic) or 'Bringing children to the Scouts, where every day they experience things, learn things, have a good circle of friends, benefit personally' (Interview, CSO Austria) are examples for community building of like-minded individuals. Although this kind of 'bonding' community building brings people together, it involves the danger of the separation of certain groups and the mergence of mechanisms of exclusion, too.

By contrast, when individuals build communities with 'distant acquaintances who move in different circles' (Putnam, 2000, p. 22), community building fulfils a 'bridging' function, establishing linkages in society at a larger scale, which results in building social trust and tolerance. Examples therefore from our interviews are 'Well, in many municipalities Scouts play an important role for the social life there' (Interview, CSO Austria), or 'we offer those people that have disadvantages of a language barriers and would still like to work with us as volunteers to join an English speaking group,

where they can more easily fit in' (Interview, CSO Czech Republic). This kind of community building, which 'bridges' groups, is often also cited to be a prerequisite for democratisation.

In our findings from quantitative data, this differentiation showed up surprisingly clear. As displayed in Fig. 6, Czech CSOs rate activities connecting organisational members or encouraging friendship within the organisation very high on average, while to combat social exclusion or to overcome boundaries between different groups is of less importance. Thus the 'bonding' type of community building is more relevant for Czech CSOs. In Austrian CSOs, no difference in the importance between 'bonding' and 'bridging' activities can be identified. Only when considering the overall means of both kinds of activities, bridging appears to be slightly more important.[7]

Although all in all community building is more important for Czech CSOs (cf. Fig. 2 and 3), this seems to be due to the higher relevance of 'bonding' activities. As the graphs in Fig. 6 nicely indicate, bonding is – with the exception of integrating members into a group – much more important in the Czech Republic. On the contrary, community building contributing to 'bridging' is of minor relevance for Czech CSOs.

A straightforward explanation can be drawn from the fact that a huge part of Czech CSOs is active in the fields of culture, recreation, sports and education, which are mostly populated by membership organisations, compared to the vast majority of Austrian CSOs, which are active in the social service and health care fields.

1 Scale: mean of ratings from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important); Czech Republic : _____ ; Austria: - - - -

Fig. 6.   Importance of Community Building in the Czech Republic and Austria.
Source: Czech-Austria NPO-Survey, 2007.

Another reason for the higher importance of bonding, but the lower importance of bridging, in the Czech Republic compared to Austria might be explained by the not yet settled situation of the third sector in the Czech Republic. The rich tradition of charitable and voluntary organisations in the country was annihilated in the fifty years of Nazi and Communist totalitarianisms (1939–1989). It therefore became a necessary task for the revived, transformed or new organisations that started mushrooming after the democratic revolution of 1989 to both build their organisations and to develop their communities. In spite of some considerable progress, their position in society and community is still far from being taken for granted by the majority of people, they are not as established and embedded in their communities as they are in Austria. So, even 18 years after the political change of 1989 the amount of energy and time devoted by Czech CSOs to community building remains high.

It appears natural that in this effort Czech CSOs pay more attention to bonding because it is more closely related to the success of their mission and to their success with their stakeholders and in their communities, rather than to bridging which requires a more political stance and higher aspirations in democracy building, as this statements suggests: 'In the 90's, the movement was revived and was first engrossed in itself, because it was necessary to build the organisation and its organs … structure … and to recruit members and so on'. Nevertheless, as the statements goes on: 'But it soon became clear that our task was wider, we felt we must work in the outside world too, help the transition to democracy, educate the public and so …' (Interview CSO, Czech Republic).

Thus, besides fulfilling their mission, CSOs have to invest a considerable amount of resources in establishing and defending their place in their communities and in society at large (Hyánek & Pospíšil, 2007). This might also be connected with the recognition and reception of CSOs by society in general, as the sector was remaining rather secretive for some time or even had a negative image, because a lot of CSOs tended to operate out of the public view and were not taken seriously as a result (Hoogland DeHoog & Racanska, 2001).[8]

It is not only in the relations with the public and private sectors and with the public at large that Czech CSOs have had to overcome a lot of difficulties. The relations within the civil society sector have also evolved only slowly and gradually, the situation tending to be much better on lower levels, within the individual fields of nonprofit activity or in the regions, than on the national level. For pragmatic and practical reasons the CSOs working in the same field and/or the same geographical region have proved

more likely to form alliances and mutual-support organisations to promote their common interests. Thus there are around 80 umbrella associations in the country, covering most fields of activity and all the country's regions, but, despite several attempts to establish it, there is no national general nonprofit umbrella organisation that would serve and represent the entire sector (Pospíšil, 2006). So, the behaviour of CSOs towards one another also seems to support the research finding that Czech CSOs pay more attention to bonding than bridging.

Nevertheless, CSOs in the Czech Republic are well aware that coordination and collaboration with other CSOs is of crucial importance, and not only so that they will work more efficiently: 'We try to avoid being competitors to others. One reason is that if somebody comes with a case that is not suitable for us, we can send the person to an organisation that can help him or her. We happily publicise other organisations that provide help' (Interview CSO, Czech Republic), but also for reasons of successful representation: 'We cooperate and act in unison, because this gives us more weight' (Interview CSO, Czech Republic). By the same token, Austrian CSOs see a need for closer cooperation: 'We are linked well with the others, but I think not well enough. So, more is possible and thus more, well, we have to invest more energy in networking than we are doing right now' (Interview CSO, Austria). Overall, however, Austrian CSOs rated the importance of this special form of community building – networking with other CSOs – slightly higher than Czech CSOs.[9]

LEARNINGS FOR ANALYSING NONPROFIT REGIMES

In this chapter, we started with a criticism of the CNP's approach to categorising countries into different nonprofit regimes solely on the basis of macro indicators. Against the use of indicators such as governmental social spending, which first and foremost refers to the service-function of the third sector (and thus to the relation to the market), we argue that the relation of CSOs to the state and public administration on the one hand and to communities on the other has to be taken into consideration as well – and that the nature and strength of these couplings must be assessed with the help of organisational rather than macro-indicators. Compared with CNP, our methodology yielded completely different results.

We tried to contrast and complement the well-established triangle of the welfare mix (Pestoff, 1998; Evers & Laville, 2004b), which depicts CSOs' position between market, state and family/community, with a conceptual triangle of CSOs' functions. From that it follows that CSOs use exchange mechanisms with the other components of the welfare mix to reach their objectives. By analysing organisational data, we describe CSOs activities, and through them the relative importance of the three functions of CSOs in Austria and the Czech Republic. Against the background of the different relationships of CSOs to market, government, the general public and communities, we analyse, interpret and describe their societal roles. In doing so, we are aware that these differences are shaped by history, by varying developments of the democratic state and by the configuration of the welfare state.

Our investigation of empirical data reveals that service delivery is the most important function in both countries, when the distribution of work time is considered. For Austrian CSOs, however, which spend about three quarters of their working time for service delivery, it is much more important than for Czech CSOs. On the contrary, CSOs in the Czech Republic spend more working time on community building than Austrian CSOs. Furthermore, their community building activities focus much more on bonding than on bridging activities. Regarding advocacy activities, that is, contributions to the political system, Czech CSOs prefer indirect advocacy through workshops and education, but hesitate to engage in more direct activities. Compared with them, Austrian CSOs engage more in public and direct advocacy.

These findings largely contradict the results of the CNP, where the Czech Republic is classified as a country with a predominately expressive third sector (Salamon et al., 2004, p. 28). Against this, our findings show that Czech CSOs devote more than 50% of their work time to service delivery. This disparity might partly be due to recent developments in the Czech Republic, since the findings of the CNP are based on data from about 2000, while our research employs data collected in 2007/2008. CSOs in the Czech Republic have moved towards the social service and health fields, which are mainly connected with the service function. This is a plausible, but insufficient, explanation. Another important cause lies in the different methodologies applied. Like the CNP, we refer to the voluntary and paid labour worked in the CSOs to identify the functions they fulfil. But the CNP assigns functions to CSOs according to the field of activity they are active in, not taking into account what it is that CSO are concretely engaged in doing. As our organisational data clearly show, most CSOs are multi-functional,

and so a part of CSOs activities get mismatched by a method that relates field-of-activity and function. Besides, the fields of activity as defined by ICNPO embrace very heterogeneous CSOs (e.g., artists' and tourists' associations in the field of culture and recreation).

A factor that seems to be crucial for the decision about which specific nonprofit regime a country belongs to is the CSOs' overall relation with government on the one hand and with the unorganised part of Civil Society on the other. As Czechoslovakia was ruled by a communist regime from 1948 until 1989, many Czech CSOs are quite young, since the whole sector started to awaken and to experience rapid growth after the revolution in 1989 only (Hyánek & Pospíšil, 2007; Potůček, 2000). More than 67% of the CSOs in our sample from the Czech Republic (only 38% of Austrian CSOs) were established, or re-established after 1990. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the young and small Czech organisations working in the flux of the post-totalitarian situation need to spend a much higher relative part of their resources on building their communities and on promoting their causes than the older and larger Austrian CSOs, which are well-established in their communities and within the institutionalised partnership of the third sector and public administration in the democratic regime.

Furthermore, we have to keep in mind that the differences are partly based on the funding structure: Although in Austria half of the CSOs' income derives from public sources (46.6%), in the Czech Republic it is only one third (33.5%). The difference is also economic: Austrian CSOs are richer than Czech ones. Thus, since Czech CSOs feel obliged or pressed to allocate quite a considerable portion of their resources to community building and advocacy, they can develop their service providing function to a limited extent only. Moreover, service delivery is the function that can be assumed to be the most resource-intensive, so that when organisations lack resources, service provision would suffer in the first place.

To classify individual countries to nonprofit regimes, not only governmental spending, which primarily reflects CSOs' engagement in the social service and health fields, but also other activities of the third sector have to be taken into consideration. Methodologically, we tried to show that a detailed analysis of quantitative organisational data, combined with qualitatively collected perceptions and assessments by CSO leaders and with additional socio-economic, political and historical interpretations, lead to more colourful pictures of nonprofit regimes.

Austria and the Czech Republic, the former is assumed to belong to the social-democratic and the latter to the statist nonprofit regime, share common historical roots. Both countries have had a vital civil society until

the turn of the 19th century. Today, the roles of their third sectors are quite different, as they are framed by the interplay of societal forces in their respective countries. In the course of the 20th century, diverging socio-economic and political histories of the Austrians and the Czechs have resulted in substantial distinctions between the two societies.

A major share of Austrian CSOs provides society with social and health services in close collaboration with the government. This function has slowly been emerging in the Czech Republic, too, but there is still very little trust in public-private-partnerships, which, however, are well established and generally appreciated in Austria. Advocacy and cooperation with the media is more openly discussed in Austria than in the Czech Republic, where distrust between government, media and civil society still prevails (Večerník, 2008, p. 515). Similarly, the relationship with communities and the general public is not yet so well established and Czech CSOs have to fight for their recognition. Although in Austria these links are established, in the Czech Republic they are in flux. That is why community building is such an important function in Czech CSOs.

The gradual, slow and painful progress towards the new societal order in the Czech Republic has been in conflict with old legacies, old habits and mindsets. Civil society is part of that transition, suffering from the same difficulties and pains, which our interviews substantiate:

> *The way we had been indoctrinated in those forty years, that we should mind our own business and not interfere in things public, in politics, it had become second nature, and if we wanted democracy we would have to change that, but we had to teach ourselves to behave differently, and to teach others…. (Interview CSO, Czech Republic)*

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

NOTES

1. Although we use the term CSO in this chapter, we refer to the structural-operational definitions of third sector organisations (cf. Salamon & Sokolowski, 2001). Accordingly, CSOs have a formal structure (legal form), are self-governing, do not distribute profits and are private entities. Furthermore, they are voluntary

organisations, thus membership is not mandated by law and they customary receive donations of money or labour (*Ibid.*).

2. The conceptual framework on CSOs' functions was developed in a former state of this research project.

3. Measured as the percentage of all nonagricultural employees employed in CSOs.

4. These categories referred to public relations, human resource management, sponsoring and donations management, project acquisition, administration and other fields of duties.

5. Having volunteers as an independent variable was specified as a dummy in the regressions.

6. On average, Austrian CSOs in the sample have about 34, Czech CSOs only 15 paid employees (in full time equivalents).

7. Mean for bridging activities 3.88; for bonding activities 3.82.

8. Owing to two events – a flood in Moravia in 1997, where charitable CSOs led the disaster relief, and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1998, where a Czech CSO made a successful national appeal for humanitarian aid to assist refugees, the public opinion could be turned around and to see CSOs greater value for society. Hoogland Dehoog, R. & Racanska, L. (2001) Democratization, civil society, and nonprofits: Comparing the Czech and Slovak Republics. The Aspen Institute. Nonprofit Sector Research Fund.

9. Average of 3.5 compared to 3.3 on a range between 1 (not important) and 5 (very important).

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MAKING VOLUNTEERING WORK: THE POWER OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS TO ENHANCE CIVIC SKILLS. SOME EVIDENCES FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY

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ABSTRACT

The evolution of European Union (EU) toward a real political integration cannot omit the importance of building a European civic culture. Generating civic virtues is directly linked to the establishment of associative networks. In this sense, voluntary organizations, as "schools of democracy," work as one of the main channels and mechanisms, from liberal tradition as well as republican one, to improve the quality of democracies.

Some works have already argued that involvement in voluntary organizations presents positive effects on several elements that shape political culture in a country, by increasing political interest in public affairs, growing individual political efficacy, encouraging people to put in practice a broader socio-political activism, etc. Only by this way, it is

possible to create a genuine "European public sphere," where public debate and independent judgements can exist beyond EU institutions.

From that theoretic framework, this document expounds the connections between socio-political participation in voluntary organizations and some elements of political culture linked to civic skills. The first wave of the European Social Survey (2002–2003) will be used as the main data source for a comparative analysis among more than twenty European countries.

The individual in his isolation is nothing; only in and through and absorption of the aims and meaning of organized institutions does he attain true personality. (Dewey, 1916, p. 81)

INTRODUCTION

The decline in civic participation is often regarded as a consequence of ongoing individualization. The growing emphasis on the individual has eroded interest and participation in public sphere, leading to what Sennett has called "the fall of public man" (Sennett, 1977).[1] In the European context, scholarly and political literature often criticizes the European Union (EU) for its democratic deficit. Despite numerous attempts at reform undertaken by the European institutions, the main reproach is linked to the absence of a properly functioning political representational system at the European level (Saurugger, 2007, p. 386). At the beginning of the 1990s, it began to attract interest at the international and, in particular, at the EU level. Confronted with criticism regarding its democratic deficit, the EU has started a reflection process on how to link citizens and so-called organized civil society more closely to its decision-making processes. The EU itself has reacted and called increasingly often upon European civil society in its institutional reform projects (European Commission, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2002) and in particular in the constitutional treaty. Linking civil society to the European decision-making process reflects a new understanding of representation, closer to a concept of participatory democracy.

Participation is vital to social and political life in the sense that democratic regimes are sustained by many types of citizen participation (voting in election, joining to political parties, signing petitions, engaging in local and civic affairs, discussing politics or supporting local voluntary associations). At the same time, democratic development and the

maintenance of democracy requires that citizens participate actively in society, not only as voters but also in all kinds of civil and political bodies and organizations (Halman, 2003, p. 181).

We underline the idea that if it is true that a flourishing market economy makes liberal democracy stable (Lipset, 1959), what makes a truly civil society, and not only liberal and formally democratic, is a wider range of aspects than the market economy (Diamond, 1997). Among these elements sociopolitical involvement is crucial to understand the building of civil society. From this assertion, there is a wide consensus about the importance of increasing and reviving citizen civic engagement to balance the obvious shortcomings of modern democracies (Van Deth, 2002, p. 7). In this sense, we argue that voluntary organizations, as ''schools of democracy'' (Putnam) work as one of the main channels and mechanisms, from liberal tradition as well as republican one, to improve the quality of democracies. This is because, as we show later, generating civic virtues is directly linked to the establishment of associative networks. Whereas the understanding of elective representative democracy defends the view that direct citizen participation in policy-making processes is not essential to democracy and should be limited to voting for leaders and thus producing a government, in particular in the Schumpeterian view (Schumpeter, 1942), theorists of participatory democracy see participation as more than voting in elections. Participatory democracy theory views democracy first and foremost as the people's business, where citizens are the central agents (Pateman, 1970). When dealing with voluntary associations, we support a wider concept of representation, which includes more communitarian sense and closer relationships. As Urbinati and Warren (2008, p. 394) have argued, "we need to understand representation as a relationship, mediated by group histories and experiences, through which relevant constituencies – particularly those related to fairness – come into existence. Finally, fair representation requires some relationship of trust between individuals and representatives, based on shared experiences, perspectives, and interests."

GENERATING CIVIC VALUES THROUGH VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

Voluntary organizations as regarded as the bridges between citizens and the state. As Almond and Verba (1965, p. 245) have noted, "voluntary associations are the prime means by which the functions of mediating

between the individual and the state is performed. Through them the individual is able to relate himself effectively and meaningfully to the political system.'' More or less participative, more or less representative, liberal democracies facilitate the infrastructure for the formation of all kind of organization, not only political, and enable people to take part in social life and to express their preferences.

Until this moment, most of studies on voluntary associations from political science have focused on the determinants which affect the participation of citizenship in this type of organizations; that is, those political, social, cultural, demographic factors that drive people to engage in socio-political associations (Morales, 2004). Nevertheless, voluntary associations can also play an important role as explanatory variables to understand the generation of social capital and civic virtue among individuals, and therefore, to broaden civil society and to improve the quality of democratic praxis (Halman, 2003, p. 179). Voluntary organizations, as ''schools of democracy'' work as one of the main channels and mechanisms, from liberal tradition as well as republican one, to improve the quality of democracies. Some works have already argued that involvement in voluntary organizations presents positive effects on several elements that shape political culture in a country, by increasing political interest in public affairs, growing individual political efficacy, encouraging people to put in practice a broader socio-political activism, etc. Moreover, many evidences about the relationship between associations and social capital have been founded, since voluntary organizations seem to have a clear effect on generating interpersonal trust. That is, voluntary associations are seen as places where citizens learn social and civic skills and habits (Putnam, 2000, p. 338).

What makes civil society ''civil'' is the fact that it is a sphere within which citizens may freely organize themselves into groups and, mainly, associations at various levels. We also use the concept here because of its great explanatory potential for the theory of the political as well as for the theory of transition and consolidation of democracies. Most theorists from Tocqueville have focused in the importance of civic society, and specially, voluntary associations as vital to the performance and life of democracy (Selle & Stromsnes, 2001, p. 135). For current political theorists, ''typical face-to-face deliberative activities ad horizontal collaboration within voluntary associations far removed from the political sphere, such as sports clubs, agricultural cooperatives, or philanthropic groups, promote interpersonal trust, fostering the capacity to work together in future, creating the bonds of social life that are the basis for civil society and democracy''

(Norris, 2002). In addition, civic society based in associations makes citizens themselves stronger, in a democratic way, by providing civic and political skills as improving their sense of efficacy. As Laura Morales (2002, p. 498) has written "associations work as schools of democracy, and their development should, therefore, be promoted for their positive consequences for democracy as a whole." The effects are a too large to enumerate them one by one, but what is most important to highlight is that literature about associational participation has notably increased since 1990s with Putnam's works.

Political theorist Mark Warren (2000, p. 61) identifies three general ways in which associations might produce positive effects and potentially "democratic." First, effects what he refers as developmental effects on individuals: "ideally, associations would underwrite the capacities of individuals to participate in collective judgement and decision making". This idea appears in other recent publications and it is the point of view of many governmental agendas (Clark, 2000). Second, associations may contribute to the formation of public (public sphere effects). Finally, they also "contribute to institutional conditions and venues that support, express, and actualise individual and political autonomy as well as transform autonomous judgements into collective decisions." Warren places civil society halfway between political society, public sphere and intimate spaces where family and friendship are dominant elements (Warren, 2000, p. 57). Civil society[2] is the domain of social organization within voluntary associative relations are dominant, and political mediating associations are excluded.

Also Dekker (2004) and Dekker and Van den Broek (1998) refer to the concept of civil society as a place where voluntary organisations appear as dominant collective actors. Social capital and public civic discourses are, in this way, generated by debates inside voluntary associations. This is the place, mainly in social and not political ones, where people learn civic skills (like attending meetings or writing letters to politicians or to public administration) or develop civic virtues (like tolerance, the capability to accept divergent opinions, a predisposition to acquire more information and knowledge about politics, a stronger interest in politics or, even all, a tendency to get involved in other forms of socio-political participation (vote, public demonstrations, contact politicians, support a political option, etc.) (Warren, 2000, pp. 70–93). However, some other studies, especially from anthropologists, have suggested using the concept to refer to a wider range of associational activity outside of the state in not Western societies (Hall, 1995; Hann & Dunn, 2004). These studies "argue for a more inclusive usage of civil society, in which it is not defined negatively, in opposition to the

state, but positively in the context of the ideas and practices through which cooperation and trust are established in social life'' (Hann, 2004, pp. 21–22).

In this sense, voluntary organizations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic governments. It happens, following Putnam, due to the ''internal'' effects over individual members as well as ''external'' ones toward general politics. The first of them, especially important in our research, allude to cooperative habits, solidarity and public commitment. As Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999, p. 427) have underlined, involvement in associations is very relevant in three areas: development of individual self, creation of communities and production of civic virtues, and finally, a potential protection of equal rights and interests in public life. The image of secondary voluntary associations as producers of civic virtues is, therefore, quite widespread in academic literature: from Tocqueville many scholars have focused their attention on the power of organizations in socializing individuals at first stage, and as a consequence, over the whole democratic regimes. The ideas are sharing by associative democrats as Cole (1920, pp. 34–35; Cohen & Rogers, 1992), participatory democrats (Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970), deliberative democrats (Mansbridge, 1995, pp. 133–147) or civic republicans (Sandel, 1996; Pettit, 1999).

Putnam (1993), based on his analysis of Italian regional government, claims that abundant and dense skeins of associational connections and rich civic societies encourage good governance and the sense of community. ''Through them [voluntary associations], individuals gain a sense of social belonging and identity in their community. By creating overlapping and interlocking networks of people and organisations, the help to bind society together and create trust, cooperation and a common purpose among citizens'' (Newton & Montero, 2007, p. 210). In addition, voluntary organizations contribute to democracy because within them people are able to express their interests and demands on government. Moreover, voluntary associations teach citizens not only social and civic skills but also ''the civic virtues of trust, moderation, compromise, reciprocity, and the skills of democratic discussion and organization'' (Newton, 1999, p. 15).

At individual level analysis, developed civic society and civic norms, as a result of participating in voluntary organizations, are believed to strengthen connections between citizens and the state, such as by encouraging political discussion and mobilising people in several activities. There is pretty evidence that volunteers exhibit a set of values, perceptions, and beliefs that are different from those of non-volunteers, something like an ethos that is distinctive to volunteers (Reed & Selbee, 2003, p. 97). Hodgkinson (2003, pp. 46–49) has tested the hypothesis that individuals who volunteer in some

voluntary organization are more likely to be members of any other voluntary organization than those who do not volunteer. The same conclusion has been noted by other scholars using EVS/WVS data and other database (Dekker & Van den Broek, 1998; Hall, 1999). It could be argued that the associational connection provides more direct opportunities for being engaged in other voluntary organization. Many other studies have marked that individuals who volunteer are more likely to be engaged in some kind of civil affairs than those who are not engaged in voluntary associations. The participatory ethos includes the recognition of the existence and importance of a civic or communal good. Citizens involved in organizations maintain the belief in the necessity of active personal involvement in contributing to the common good over and above the standard obligations of citizenship such as paying taxes. Volunteers are more likely to be politically engaged in almost all countries using data from World Values Survey, specially regarding with the frequency of discussing politics and signing a petition (Hodgkinson, 2003, pp. 50–51; Stolle & Rochon, 1998). In parallel, volunteers usually show a "worldview that is notable rather more universalistic or cosmopolitan than particularistic, inclusive, trusting, and more pro-social than individualistic" (Reed & Selbee, 2003, p. 97). And finally, it has been proved that individuals who volunteer will socialize more frequently, often with other members of the community, beyond family and friends than those who do not volunteer (Hodgkinson, 2003, pp. 49–50). Results from the European Social Survey indicate that individuals who volunteer are more likely to socialize at least monthly with members of sports or voluntary groups or colleagues from work that are individuals who do not volunteer.

Nevertheless, there are important empirical evidences that show clear doubts about significant correlations between participation in voluntary organizations and the generation of civic attitudes (Berman, 1997; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Claibourn & Martin, 2000). In addition, many other studies have alerted about the negative effects of volunteering through the dark side of social capital (Putnam, 2000; Fiorina, 1999). Therefore, the evolution of associational life cannot escape from an important criticism (Rosenblum, 1998; Warren, 2000; Fung, 2003; Skocpol, 2003; Stolle, 2003).

ANALYSIS

From that theoretic framework, this document expounds the connections between socio-political participation in voluntary organizations and some

elements of political culture linked to civic virtue. We distinguish different types of voluntary associations and diverse modes of participation inside them. The first wave of the European Social Survey (2002–2003) will be used as the main data source for a comparative analysis among more than 20 European countries.[3]

When explaining the meaning of voluntary organizations, there is a wide variety of definitions (Leete, 2006). To establish a typology could result a quite hard task, due to the huge variety of associations. Empirical evidences based on comparative studies show a large number of classifications. Anyway, there are always some ingredients that can be considered absolutely relevant to identify voluntary organizations: the action is always voluntary; they produce public services and goods; the results are perceived by the whole society and not by volunteers themselves or the families and friends; and finally, monetary contributions can not be received.

Regarding socio-economic variables used in the analysis, age is measured by four cohorts (15–34; 35–45; 55–74; 75+), the level of instruction implies seven categories (Appendix) and ideology refers to the classic scale from left to right with left, center-left, center, center-right, and right.

The ESS asks about 12 kinds of voluntary organizations – namely business, consumer, cultural, environmental, humanitarian, political, religious, science, social, sport, trade union, and one last category ''others.'' At the same time, and since voluntary participation within organizations takes different forms, the survey also asks respondents to specify whether they are members of, participators in, donors of money to, or voluntarily workers for each kind of association. The ESS therefore provides is with measures of four different sorts of participation in 12 different types of voluntary organizations.[4]

Table 1 presents a detailed overview of the eighteen countries taken into consideration. They are analyzed in relation with the most important aspects that people consider to be necessary to be a good citizen. Participation in voluntary associations, which is more linked to the possibilities for generating social capital, seems to be more important for people than exclusive political involvement. This situation does not mean, necessarily, that there is a massive decision to take part in associations, but at least, associations are considered more important for democratic life. This table proves that existing civic virtue is only related to legalism but not with active participation. That is a common feature for all the countries. In addition, the importance of forming an independent opinion stands up. That makes true the predominance of a liberal vision, close to a individualist conception of political life, where having personal and exclusive ideas is

Table 1. Most Important Aspects to Be a Good Citizen.

	Support People Who Are Worse Off Than Themselves	Vote in Elections	Always Obey Laws and Regulations	Form Their Own Opinion, Independently of Others	Be Active in Voluntary Associations	Be Active in Politics
Germany	7.31 (1.91)	7.55 (2.62)	7.54 (2.06)	8.81 (1.63)	4.84 (2.64)	4.25 (2.42)
Norway	7.94 (1.57)	8.19 (1.93)	8.18 (1.71)	8.62 (1.45)	5.95 (2.14)	4.75 (2.20)
Finland	8.02 (1.53)	7.59 (2.42)	8.56 (1.50)	8.51 (1.51)	5.5 (2.46)	4.43 (2.53)
Netherlands	7.41 (1.56)	7.48 (2.23)	7.28 (1.72)	8.19 (1.49)	5.82 (2.26)	4.24 (2.25)
Switzerland	7.4 (1.83)	7.37 (2.40)	7.28 (2.06)	8.68 (1.52)	5.68 (2.36)	4.4 (2.46)
Ireland	7.67 (1.91)	7.7 (2.52)	8.35 (1.76)	8.16 (1.97)	5.78 (2.57)	3.82 (2.55)
Luxembourg	7.55 (2.40)	8.0 (2.68)	8.43 (2.06)	9.14 (1.57)	6.72 (2.71)	3.77 (2.8)
Austria	7.56 (2.19)	8.07 (2.92)	7.69 (2.05)	8.78 (1.86)	5.28 (2.61)	4.89 (2.82)
United Kingdom	6.82 (2.07)	7.16 (2.79)	8.31 (1.84)	8.25 (1.83)	5.17 (2.51)	3.48 (2.41)
Israel	8.46 (1.79)	7.98 (2.53)	8.91 (1.59)	8.47 (1.90)	6.8 (2.62)	4.41 (2.76)
Spain	7.76 (1.74)	6.43 (2.74)	7.12 (2.44)	7.52 (2.07)	5.85 (2.30)	3.52 (2.39)
Belgium	6.95 (1.97)	6.56 (2.82)	7.43 (2.08)	7.81 (1.91)	5.35 (2.64)	3.41 (2.52)
Italy	7.84 (1.89)	7.51 (2.51)	8.48 (1.74)	7.98 (1.93)	6.43 (2.50)	3.99 (2.60)
Czech Republic	6.15 (2.39)	6.16 (3.07)	8.16 (2.18)	7.98 (2.17)	4.45 (2.67)	2.93 (2.57)
Hungary	6.71 (2.46)	8.26 (2.3)	9.1 (1.76)	7.93 (1.97)	4.51 (2.57)	3.66 (2.55)
Poland	7.48 (2.67)	7.65 (2.40)	8.99 (1.59)	8.16 (1.90)	5.54 (2.71)	5.11 (2.81)
Greece	8.37 (1.87)	8.12 (2.32)	8.75 (1.65)	8.54 (1.77)	6.01 (2.72)	5.42 (2.82)
Europe	7.58	7.61	8.13	8.41	5.62	4.24

Source: ESS (2002–2003).
Scale 0–10. Standard deviation in brackets.

more important that getting opinions by socialization in groups and deliberation in associations.

In this situation of distrusting each other and privacy, the most important aspect in people's life is always the family (Table 2). It is the closest space where they often find protection and security. Economic security is also very important, so this is the second most important aspect for people. Inside the same private area, we have to take into account friendship and leisure time, normally spent with friends. Politics, finally, is the least important aspect in European everyday life. Most people do not spend a lot of time engaging themselves in organizational activities nor in political involvement compared with the time they spend in school, work, or the family, with friends or in leisure time. These are likely to be more important spaces for the generation of trust, of security than voluntary associations and political

Table 2. Most Important Aspects in Personal Life.

	Family	Friends	Leisure Time	Politics	Work	Religion	Voluntary Organizations
Germany	9.16 (1.55)	8.4 (1.72)	7.62 (2.01)	5.1 (2.44)	7.34 (2.76)	3.95 (3.15)	4.06 (2.78)
Denmark	9.5 (1.12)	8.93 (1.29)	8.38 (1.89)	4.89 (2.35)	6.79 (3.05)	3.91 (2.87)	3.82 (2.89)
Finland	9.38 (1.39)	8.79 (1.36)	8.34 (1.57)	3.85 (2.43)	7.48 (2.67)	5.13 (3.05)	4.30 (2.88)
Norway	9.46 (1.08)	8.71 (1.36)	7.99 (1.88)	4.37 (2.22)	7.35 (2.57)	3.69 (2.92)	4.40 (2.68)
Sweden	9.55 (1.10)	8.70 (1.13)	8.32 (1.71)	4.41 (2.43)	7.37 (2.70)	3.27 (3.02)	4.01 (2.93)
Netherlands	8.63 (1.71)	8.34 (1.59)	8.16 (1.59)	5.02 (2.21)	6.76 (2.62)	4.37 (3.19)	5.03 (2.67)
Switzerland	9.3 (1.36)	8.53 (1.52)	7.79 (1.75)	4.61 (2.39)	7.66 (2.14)	4.52 (3.08)	4.88 (2.67)
Ireland	9.66 (0.97)	9.02 (1.39)	7.89 (2.01)	3.85 (2.63)	6.79 (2.86)	6.19 (3.03)	4.54 (2.93)
Israel	9.76 (0.77)	8.48 (1.83)	7.89 (2.21)	4.69 (2.90)	7.97 (2.67)	5.82 (3.54)	5.48 (3.20)
Austria	9.32 (1.21)	8.7 (1.43)	8.09 (1.73)	4.91 (2.20)	7.62 (2.32)	5.01 (3.01)	4.34 (2.24)
Luxembourg	9.59 (1.23)	8.79 (1.75)	8.78 (1.74)	4.50 (2.90)	8.28 (2.36)	4.16 (3.44)	6.80 (2.40)
United Kingdom	9.56 (1.20)	8.53 (1.63)	7.69 (2.02)	3.77 (2.47)	5.78 (3.45)	3.88 (3.24)	3.61 (2.90)
Spain	9.47 (1.03)	8.34 (1.78)	8.03 (1.83)	3.68 (2.64)	7.77 (2.42)	4.71 (3.08)	5.6 (2.65)
Belgium	9.05 (1.50)	8.26 (1.73)	7.8 (1.85)	4.03 (2.59)	7.53 (2.42)	4.14 (3.17)	5.02 (3.03)
Italy	9.22 (1.49)	7.65 (1.92)	7.57 (2.02)	4.34 (2.58)	8.18 (2.19)	6.47 (2.84)	6.38 (2.57)
Czech Republic	9.42 (1.57)	8.18 (1.99)	7.5 (2.11)	3.51 (2.56)	7.37 (2.76)	2.62 (3.15)	3.09 (2.78)
Poland	9.75 (0.88)	8.07 (1.96)	7.51 (2.20)	3.83 (2.56)	8.12 (2.58)	7.26 (2.76)	3.33 (2.62)
Hungary	9.7 (1.06)	7.5 (2.58)	7.41 (2.48)	3.75 (2.71)	7.46 (2.62)	4.29 (3.42)	2.1 (2.69)
Slovenia	9.55 (1.19)	8.51 (1.70)	8.18 (1.93)	3.18 (2.54)	8.30 (1.85)	4.63 (3.31)	4.59 (2.82)
Greece	9.74 (0.89)	8.62 (1.68)	7.8 (2.08)	4.92 (2.90)	8.75 (2.01)	8.3 (2.26)	4.97 (2.86)
Portugal	9.62 (0.90)	8.35 (1.75)	7.37 (1.74)	3.52 (2.90)	7.69 (2.36)	5.87 (3.44)	5.36 (2.40)
Europe	9.44	8.47	7.91	4.3	7.53	4.93	4.53

Source: ESS (2002–2003).
Scale 0–10. Standard deviation in brackets.

sphere of course. This situation could be defined as liberal privatism, where citizens are conceived as legal persons but not as neighbors, bounded together by contract but not by a common participatory activity, and among others considerations, a representative democracy with a mistrustful and passive political style (Vázquez, 2007, p. 182). This is not a strong democracy, which would have a cooperative and active pattern of political and social transactions (Barber, 1984). In the absence of strong traditions of group loyalty, especially in Mediterranean countries (Magone, 2003), it seems likely that many individuals would use most organizations and patron–client networks in an instrumental fashion and that they would give primacy to a narrow definition of individual (or family) self-interest (Pizzorno, 1966). The growing emphasis on individual achievement may have sharpened the sense that opportunism was an important dimension of social advancement and a pervasive feature of society. This trend obviously could readily lead to some decline in overall levels of social trust and, what is most important, of civic engagement.

We have serious doubts about if we can say that this kind of interactions as sign a petition, take part in lawful public demonstrations can be considered as social capital. They are sporadic and they do not often need social trust to exist. They do not have a long life and there is no continuity. In most of cases, they enjoy only a short life. Once they have been produced, they disappear. They do not produce solid networks and nor strong ties (see the table below) and what is most important the do not create reciprocity: they are, in most of times, individualistic and hedonistic values which consequences are limited to a very small group but there is no an idea of common good. As can be observed in Table 3, the greater is the implication in activities and costs are higher, the lower is the importance of them. While signing a petition does not carry too many costs, participating in political or nonpolitical associations or a strike and an illegal protest activities do it, with personal costs in terms of leisure time, money, and physical integrity.

Most of European citizens tend to participate only in some type of voluntary organizations. That is really important to be marked, since not every type produce the same effects on democracy and civic virtue. Diverse associations produce different results for generating civic virtue among their members and deepening the quality of democracy. Some of them generate more collaborative efforts but other ones promote a high individualism and hedonist lifestyle (Vázquez, 2004, p. 23). Let us analyze Warren's classification applied to European context (Table 4).

Individual material goods: trade unions and business organization. They are not obviously the best type for producing social capital. Anyway,

Table 3. Socio Political Involvement during the Past 12 Months (Percentage).

	Worked in a Political Party or Action Group	Worked in Another Organization or Association	Signed a Petition	Taken Part in a Lawful Public Demonstration	Participated in Illegal Protest Activities
Denmark	4.1	17.3	28.2	8.3	1.1
Sweden	5	24.6	40.8	6.4	0.8
Norway	9.2	28.2	36	8.5	0.7
Netherlands	3.4	23.1	22.4	2.9	0.4
Finland	3.5	30.7	24	2	0.3
Belgium	5.4	23.2	33.9	8.4	2.4
Germany	3.9	17.8	30.5	10.6	1.1
United Kingdom	3.4	9.2	40	4.4	0.8
Ireland	4.7	13.8	27.6	7.1	0.8
Israel	5.7	7.4	18.4	9.9	1.4
Slovenia	3.5	2.3	11.8	2.7	0.8
Czech Republic	4.7	15.1	16.1	4.6	1.4
Spain	6.1	16.7	24.2	17.5	1.7
Italy	3	7.6	17.4	11	1.8
Portugal	4.2	4.2	7.3	4.3	0.3
Hungary	2.9	2.9	4.2	3.7	0.8
Greece	4.8	5.7	4.8	4.5	1.5
Poland	2.9	5.9	6.9	1.3	0.2
Europe	5	15.1	23.8	7.3	1.2

Source: ESS (2002–2003).

people, generally speaking, do not usually use them (not for membership, nor participating, nor donating money neither making voluntary work). Only Nordic traditions, joint to an important developing of welfare state, present important percentages, mainly referred to trade unions. Mediterranean countries and new members are situated at the end of the list with the lowest percentages.

Public material goods. In our table, they are represented by parties, environmental protection groups, and human rights associations. Owing to their nature, they could play a very distinguished role, but they have not too many volunteers. Anyway, parties are not always totally representative of civil society and they are situated closer to political spheres. Although there is a significant role for political parties to be played in representing social

Table 4. Socio-Political Association in Europe (Membership).

	Sports	Cultural	Trade Union	Business or Professional	Consumer	Human Rights/ Minorities	Environmental/ Peace/Animal Rights	Religious Organization	Political Party	Science/ Education/ Parents	Social Club (Young/ Retired/ Women)	Any Other Not Mentioned
Belgium	29	22	28	9	9	7	8	7	6	8	20	8
Germany	32	17	14	9	28	6	6	19	3	6	13	7
Denmark	36	26	65	14	18	11	12	27	6	7	18	7
Spain	12	11	6	5	4	4	2	6	3	8	7	3
Finland	22	13	46	12	5	4	2	25	6	5	9	7
United Kingdom	27	16	16	13	32	4	6	14	3	7	16	5
Greece	4	6	5	6	0	1	1	1	4	4	3	2
Hungary	5	4.5	6	3	3	1	0	6	2	3	5	2
Ireland	34	18	19	16	9	5	4	25	4	8	16	6
Israel	17	13	14	8	25	3	4	5	8	9	11	7
Italy	8	7	9	9	6	4	3	5	3	2	5	2
Luxembourg	26	21	22	11	46	9	14	5	6	11	17	5
Netherlands	46	19	22	13	32	8	20	26	5	10	10	12
Norway	32	22	47	15	33	17	5	15	9	8	22	14
Poland	4	3	6	1	0	1	1	3	2	2	2	3
Portugal	8.3	4	5	3	2	2	1	5	4	1	5	5
Sweden	39	25	56	9	37	14	7	15	8	11	19	11
Slovenia	16	8	19	8	9	5	1	8	4	5	0	5
Europe	21	13	14	8	17	5	5	11	4	5	10	5

Source: ESS (2002–2003).
Percentage of people who is engaged in a voluntary organization as a member.

interests and mediating between the civil and the political, they are not sufficient in the long term. Political parties tend to represent particular interests, and the main goal they seek is the access to institutional power. Membership in these associations is really low in most of the countries, and similar numbers can be applied to environmental protection groups, and human rights associations.

Interpersonal identity groups. Sport associations are the most likely to be used by Europeans, but with important differences among countries. However, their importance is more connected with hedonist and individualistic reasons than societal solidarity. They are often closed groups which activities are not to the advantage of society. Nordic countries and Northern Europe have presented more volunteers than the rest of states

Group identity groups. They only generate effects for specific social sectors. In European Social Survey, we distinguish some examples: religious, gender, age associations. As we can observe in Table 4 they are not at the top and their outcomes cannot usually be expanded for the rest of society.

The table seems to present a clear pattern in which a country level of participation in any kind of association is generally repeated in most of the others. At one extreme, Norway generally has comparatively high figures for all 12 kinds of voluntary organizations, and they are usually clear above the average for all the countries in the survey. At the other extreme, Poland and Greece almost always have low levels of participation for all 12 voluntary associations and are quite below the European average. Other countries such as Spain, Slovenia, Italy, or Portugal present generally low levels of participation across each type of organization and bellow the average. On the contrary, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, or the Netherlands generally have higher level of involvement and often above the European average. We could conclude that participation in voluntary organizations in different countries is not fragmented or multidimensional. As some scholars have underline "countries do no have their own unique and variegated participatory profiles so far as voluntary associations are concerned. On the contrary, high involvement in one kind of association in any given country means that there is generally high involvement in all the other kinds of association in that country (…) Although we have a diverse range of voluntary associations and an equally diverse array of countries, participations follows a regular pattern, allowing us to rank countries on a single voluntary association scale" (Newton & Montero, 2007, pp. 213–214).

As it can be seen in Table 5, the differences in percentages for simple membership are so important as those we find for participation, donation, or voluntary work (Morales, 2004, p. 91). In fact, associational membership

Table 5. Type of Involvement in Associations (Europe) (Percentage).

	Member	Participated	Donated Money	Voluntary Work
Denmark	92	48	34	28
Sweden	90	47	44	35
Norway	84	47	44	38
Netherlands	84	41	43	29
Finland	76	36	19	12
Belgium	71	49	26	23
Germany	71	44	34	26
United Kingdom	70	49	39	23
Ireland	68	38	32	16
Israel	55	27	13	7
Slovenia	52	26	31	19
Czech Republic	43	19	13	8
Spain	36	25	15	7
Italy	35	22	12	5
Portugal	29	18	16	6
Hungary	27	20	6	9
Greece	25	13	9	6
Poland	21	11	12	5
Europe	54	34	25	17

Source: ESS (2002–2003).

in European democracies oscillates between 92% for Denmark and 21% for Poland, what is more than four times members in the former country (Table 5). Participation in activities is situated between 49% in Belgium and United Kingdom and again Poland at the end with 11%. Considering money donation, Sweden and Norway are at the top (44%) whereas Mediterranean democracies and newcomers are at the bottom. The same is true for voluntary work.

In Warren's typology, no association became really important in Mediterranean countries and in new members coming from Central Eastern Europe, not even at the level of membership. Active engagement, donation of money and voluntary work is even lower in all cases. Positive effects, through associations, have not much chance to be successful in these countries, where individualist and traditional values are predominated over communitarian and republican virtues. In any case, methodological difficulties come from the fact that there is no micro-theory of social capital, of voluntary organizations that explicitly states which aspects of civic engagement, of social interactions matter for the creation of social

Table 6.   European Citizenship by Number of Civic Actions
(Percentage).

	No Civic Actions	One or Two	Three or More
Sweden	23	44	33
Norway	28	40	32
Finland	28	43	29
Switzerland	30	37	33
Denmark	32	44	24
United Kingdom	35	40	25
Luxemburg	36	41	23
Germany	37	37	26
Belgium	39	38	23
Ireland	46	34	20
Czech Republic	47	37	16
Netherlands	47	37	16
Israel	53	30	17
Spain	60	24	16
Italy	68	22	10
Slovenia	69	25	6
Poland	73	21	6
Greece	74	19	7
Hungary	75	21	4
Portugal	77	16	7
Europe	51	31	18

Source: ESS (2002–2003).

capital and civic virtue. "The efficacy of voluntary associations in creating trust and reciprocity has so far only been assumed in the literature and has not been empirically tested or explored" (Stolle, 2003, pp. 23–24). National and cross-national surveys include questions on generalized attitudes and values, but do not give specific information about respondent's involvement in different types of associations (Table 6). Our hypothesis tries to supply it with some analyses.

In this chapter we wonder if volunteers, joiners are more civic, more virtuous, as some scholars have asserted, or on the contrary it is difficult to establish differences between joiners and people who not participate in voluntary organizations. To measure it we will use a simple indicator of social involvement – member of social and voluntary organization – and indicators of some civic virtues such as trust, politicization, and effectiveness to be involved in other forms of socio-political engagement. The results are presented in Tables 7–10. To measure trust, we have some indicators of

Table 7. Volunteering and Trust.

	Trust (Percentage)							
	High trust in others		High trust in politicians		High trust in (national) parliament		High trust in legal system	
	Volunteer		Volunteer		Volunteer		Volunteer	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Belgium (1,899)	41	25	34	24	22	13	28	20
Switzerland (2,040)	55	38	43	37	22	20	57	49
Czech Republic (1,360)	21	20	18	10	6	6	20	13
Germany (2,919)	32	23	23	19	9	7	44	43
Denmark (1,506)	69	67	58	48	43	32	79	69
Spain (1,729)	28	27	23	24	7	9	16	19
Finland (2,000)	64	57	48	4	26	24	65	63
United Kingdom (2,052)	43	27	30	23	12	11	38	31
Greece (2,566)	20	15	27	29	12	14	52	54
Hungary (1,685)	22	15	32	28	17	12	36	31
Ireland (2,046)	42	31	34	21	13	12	39	33
Israel (2,499)	47	30	24	28	12	11	62	62
Italy (1,207)	41	19	28	20	12	6	48	35
Luxembourg (1,552)	33	28	40	33	17	22	50	48
Netherlands (2,364)	52	39	36	27	22	18	43	32
Norway (2,036)	69	59	50	35	27	14	57	52
Poland (2,110)	17	11	8	9	4	3	10	13
Portugal (1,511)	23	16	27	17	6	4	20	16
Sweden (1,999)	59	50	52	43	27	19	56	47
Slovenia (1,519)	25	18	50	16	25	6	50	23
Europe	38	23	33	25	18	13	44	38

Source: ESS (2002–2003).
In brackets (*N*): number of carried out interviews in each country.

interpersonal trust, the image of politicians, and the confidence in parliament and in legal system (high trust comprises values between 7 and 10 in a 0–10 scale). In all the countries we can observe that people who are involved in social associations tend to trust more other people than those who are not. However, the differences are not so important in the overall of countries. The percentages for both groups are very similar in Czech Republic, Denmark, and Spain. Related to trust in politicians, volunteers are more trusted, and in a great extent in some countries such as Finland

Table 8. Volunteering and Politicization.

	Politicization (Percentage)							
	Interest in politics		Political discussion		Political understanding		Member of political party	
	Volunteer		Volunteer		Volunteer		Volunteer	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Belgium (1,899)	65	39	37	26	34	27	12	6
Switzerland (2,040)	78	57	63	44	40	28	22	6
Czech Republic (1,360)	45	29	47	34	34	22	11	3
Germany (2,919)	81	60	60	44	47	30	11	2
Denmark (1,506)	83	59	58	36	47	30	13	4
Spain (1,729)	39	18	47	25	40	21	8	2
Finland (2,000)	62	40	52	36	27	17	13	5
United Kingdom (2,052)	76	50	48	27	38	22	8	2
Greece (2,566)	59	30	49	17	39	17	25	4
Hungary (1,685)	65	45	57	36	41	29	17	1
Ireland (2,046)	71	43	44	24	44	29	10	4
Israel (2,499)	71	63	61	43	46	40	29	8
Italy (1,207)	66	30	62	28	30	25	22	3
Luxembourg (1,552)	67	40	50	41	33	32	17	7
Netherlands (2,364)	81	62	52	35	47	27	10	3
Norway (2,036)	62	43	54	35	35	26	20	5
Poland (2,110)	68	39	64	33	45	21	8,1	1
Portugal (1,511)	82	34	77	30	33	23	29	4
Sweden (1,999)	71	53	49	31	40	32	16	6
Slovenia (1,519)	100	41	50	25	25	26	33	4
Europe	70	44	54	33	36	25	17	4

Source: ESS (2002–2003).
In brackets (*N*): number of carried out interviews in each country.

and Slovenia. However, there are some other contexts with the opposite evidence. In Spain, Greece, Israel, and Poland, no volunteers present more trust in politicians than involved people. The same evidence can be found in Greece and Luxembourg when we analyze confidence in parliament, although the trend is the contrary.

To measure politicization, we have chosen some variables to correlate with voluntary membership (interest in politics, levels of political discussion, capability to understand politics and political party membership). We can observe that as far as politicization is concerned, joining associations definitely makes a difference. Associations members are clearly, for all the

Table 9. Volunteering and Socio-Political Involvement.

	Socio-Political Involvement (Percentage)							
	Vote		Contact a politician		Work in a political party		Worn or display a campaign	
	Volunteer		Volunteer		Volunteer		Volunteer	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Belgium (1,899)	87	77	33	13	14	3	15	5
Switzerland (2,040)	74	54	44	12	25	4	27	6
Czech Republic (1,360)	80	61	42	19	17	3	12	4
Germany (2,919)	89	76	35	8	13	2	13	4
Denmark (1,506)	92	88	40	13	15	2	15	3
Spain (1,729)	81	71	33	8	26	2	35	5
Finland (2,000)	84	66	43	16	9	10	32	9
United Kingdom (2,052)	79	66	50	15	17	2	32	8
Greece (2,566)	88	84	61	12	37	3	26	1
Hungary (1,685)	91	79	64	13	52	1	52	2
Ireland (2,046)	85	74	49	18	17	2	24	7
Israel (2,499)	77	72	41	10	27	4	27	10
Italy (1,207)	92	84	48	9	21	4	51	4
Luxembourg (1,552)	67	48	50	13	17	0	17	4
Netherlands (2,364)	91	78	34	9	10	1	10	2
Norway (2,036)	87	78	41	16	21	4	39	16
Poland (2,110)	80	61	41	8	18	2	17	2
Portugal (1,511)	89	68	63	10	41	3	47	5
Sweden (1,999)	88	80	32	11	13	2	21	7
Slovenia (1,519)	100	75	75	11	33	3	0	2
Europe	85	76	46	12	22	3	24	5

Source: ESS (2002–2003).
In brackets (*N*): number of carried out interviews in each country.

countries, more interested in political affairs, and consequently with more tendency to discuss about politics (in the sense of discussing with friends or chatting about politics or policies at workplace or in a bus). At the same time the show more capability to understand political world. Finally, citizens who get involved in voluntary organizations are more predisposed to became a member of political party and, as we observe in Tables 9 and 10, to participate in many other forms of socio-political involvement such as contacting a politician, working in a political party, displaying a campaign,

Table 10. Volunteering and Socio-Political Involvement.

	Socio-Political Involvement (Percentage)							
	Sign a petition		Lawful public demonstrations		Donate money to a political organization		Participate in illegal protest activities	
	Volunteer		Volunteer		Volunteer		Volunteer	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Belgium (1,899)	55	28	15	6	15	8	5	2
Switzerland (2,040)	62	35	17	6	40	13	6	1
Czech Republic (1,360)	32	13	10	4	18	11	2	1
Germany (2,919)	51	26	19	9	21	7	2	1
Denmark (1,506)	40	26	17	6	23	6	3	1
Spain (1,729)	63	17	51	10	21	2	6	1
Finland (2,000)	33	20	3	1	11	5	1	0
United Kingdom (2,052)	64	38	11	4	19	7	2	1
Greece (2,566)	31	3	29	3	23	1	12	1
Hungary (1,685)	39	3	48	2	32	1	26	0
Ireland (2,046)	54	23	17	5	24	8	2	0,
Israel (2,499)	41	16	32	8	38	10	6	1
Italy (1,207)	63	14	42	8	17	2	13	1
Luxembourg (1,552)	50	24	40	17	33	13	0	3
Netherlands (2,364)	38	18	6	2	15	6	1	0
Norway (2,036)	49	31	13	6	21	9	1	0
Poland (2,110)	23	6	8	1	38	7	0	0
Portugal (1,511)	46	6	31	3	26	3	3	0
Sweden (1,999)	60	34	12	4	12	5	2	0
Slovenia (1,519)	75	11	25	2	35	6	0	0
Europe	49	20	22	5	24	7	5	0,7

Source: ESS (2002–2003).
In brackets (*N*): number of carried out interviews in each country.

signing a petition, attending lawful public demonstrations, donating money, or participating in illegal protest activities.

In addition to this clear relation between getting involved in politics and the development of many civic virtues, we do observe real important evidence about the effects of social volunteering on other variables when we use multiple regression model (Table 11). Some strong positive relationship is founded between social volunteering and interpersonal trust and political understanding and something less related to interest in politics. In the case of working for a political party, there are some special positive correlations

Table 11. Multiple Regression Model.

	Interpersonal Trust	Confidence in Parliament	Interest in Politics	Political Discussion	Political Understanding	Political Party Membership	Vote
	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B
Trust/confidence							
Interpersonal trust		.023	.152 ***	-.089*	.071	.095*	-.073
Confidence in politicians		.028	.080	-.058	.035	.080	.003
Confidence in parliament			.058	.110**	.273***	-.084*	-.054
Confidence in legal system		.099**	.058	-.044	.034	.138**	.195***
Politicization							
Interest in politics	.158***	.256***		.108**	.031	.016	.147***
Political discussion	-.089*	.111**	.006		.098**	-.042	-.123**
Political understanding	-.070	.071	.131**	.111**		-.069	-.134**
Political party membership	-.087	-.134**	.041	.046	.085*		.169***
Socio-political involvement							
Vote	.171***	-.044	.004	.145***	.038	.0106**	
Contact a politician	-.023	-.036	.066	.053	.090*	.089*	.193***
Work for a political party	.025	.063	.296***	.179***	.078*	.223***	.131**

Table 11. (Continued)

	Interpersonal Trust	Confidence in Parliament	Interest in Politics	Political Discussion	Political Understanding	Political Party Membership	Vote
	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B	Coef. B
Social volunteering	.145***	.034	.098**	.025	.172***	.062	.040
Display a campaign	−.076	.009	.153***	.033	.032	.079	.039
Sign a petition	−.079	−.084*	.203**	.131**	−.064	−.036	.040
Participate in legal demonstrations	.049	−.240***	.048	.063	.026	.058	.047
Donate money to a voluntary association	−.093**	−.037	.198***	.079*	.092*	.079	.026
Participate in illegal activities of protest	.036	.076	−.219***	.029	.062	−.039	.033
Socio-economic factors							
Gender	−.004	−.074	−.122**	.006	−.160***	.069	−.024
Age	.051	.029	.051	.031	.045	−.089*	−.066
Education	.127**	.083*	.007	.229***	.195***	.053	−.181***
Ideology	−.013	.040	−.003	−.026	.007	.006	−.010
Adjusted R^2	0.198***	0.234***	0.210***	0.324***	0.197***	0.298***	0.342***

with interest in politics, political understanding, political party membership and vote. And finally, regarding to donate money to a voluntary association, the relation with interpersonal trust is relevant but in a negative direction, but positive with interest in politics, political discussion and political understanding. As the adjusted R^2 have shown all the models have certain statistical significance.

SOME REMARKS

For most of the Europeans, participating in voluntary organizations is not considered as essential requirement in order to become a "good citizen" and generate civic virtue. People often prefer to stay at home and spend their free time enjoying themselves with friends or family. In any case, we can find important differences among European countries related to participation in voluntary organizations. Citizens usually tend to get involved in sports clubs and cultural associations rather than others with more jointly shared tendency. Political parties are associations with a lower number of members along all the countries, whereas trade unions present a much higher percentage in some countries. We have enough evidence to corroborate that number of volunteers is declining in accordance with the level of implication.

The second part of the analysis has tried to check whether to be a member in an organization has some influence on generating civic virtues. Analysis shows that important differences exist between who are involved in voluntary organizations and who are not. Volunteers develop more interpersonal trust and confidence toward institutions, they are more interested in politics and they think to be able for understanding most about political affairs. Moreover, as members of socio-political organizations they participate to a greater extent in other types of socio-political activities like contacting politicians, working inside (is not clear), attending to demonstrations, a political party, or donating money to a socio-political association.

Despite civil society in the various nations of Europe shares a sufficient number of features in common (a belief in democratic forms of government, an adherence to the rule of law, a respect for human rights and so on) (Ashford & Timms, 1992), we are not able to talk about one single European civil society. On the contrary, we could distinguish some models of civil society in Europe. The "Anglosaxon," with ancient roots and unbroken history, very well established, non-political-party, extensive, and free co-operation with public authorities. The "Southern," with tendency toward co-operatives and important degree of clientelism; and the "statist"

model, with associations seen by the state as contributing to solidarity but otherwise still strong traces of historical distrust emphasis on social rather than civic dialogue and consultation.

So, in any case, an obvious deficit of civic attitudes can be found in Europe as a whole. Democratizing the EU, the new and current EU of 25 members do not only involve strong parliamentary or presidential institutions, mainly based on elections (party democracy) but we need to add a great doses of popular democracy, even strong democracy in Barber's terms. *Liberal privatism*[5], where citizens are conceived as legal persons but not as neighbors, bounded together by contract but not by a common participatory activity, and among others considerations, a representative democracy with a mistrustful and passive political style. This is not a strong democracy, which would have a cooperative and active pattern of political and social transactions (see Barber, 1984). This is because the main task is to recover the dynamics of civil society, the space between markets and macro-politics and private sphere, and that supposes to deposit more confidence in civic associations, voluntary organizations as channels of representation in modern societies. As Offe has noticed about post-communist countries "by installing the appreciation and a favourable attitude toward the routines of democratic participation and representation into their respective social domains, and also by developing a strong interest in their own respective role in the making of public policies independent trade unions, employer's associations, leagues of framers, professional associations, political parties, etc, can reinforce the popular consensus that supports the constitution and the practice of democratic government" (Offe, 1991, p. 9) Furthermore, democratic constitution of the society implies democratic processes. Institutional change and democratic politics may promote the creation of social capital in some degree, but it′s not enough to break a situation of low intensity equilibrium. The instauration and development of new democratic institutions do not per se create social capital beyond this level. Changes in civil society need something more than formal institutions and an established democratic system (Vázquez, 2004, p. 31).

As Habermas has signed a real public sphere requires more than the institutional guarantees of the constitutional state since it also needs "the supportive spirit of cultural traditions and patterns of socialization, of the political culture, of a populace accustomed to freedom" (Habermas, 1992, p. 453). Examining contemporary theory of democracy, we conclude that nowadays, the most of current democratic systems, representative democracies, are too far from being participative democracies. In addition, and what is more important, associations by themselves don't make more democratic societies, but most democratic societies has more and better associations (Rossteutscher, 2002, p. 525). It seems that beyond formal and

liberal democracy, there is not just yet genuine democratic *mores* (customs), what somebody has called "habits of the heart" or "strong democracy."

NOTES

1. The public sphere mediates between the *private sphere* and the *sphere of Public Authority*. The private sphere comprised civil society in the narrower sense. It is the discursive space in which strangers discuss issues they perceive to be of consequence for them and their group. Its rhetorical exchanges are the bases for shared awareness of common issues, shared interests, tendencies of extent and strength of difference and agreement, and self-constitution as a public whose opinions bear on the organization of society. The people themselves came to see the public sphere as a regulatory institution against the authority of the state. The study of the public sphere centers on the idea of participatory democracy, and how public opinion becomes political action (Habermas, 1989, pp. 27–31). The basic belief in public sphere theory is that political action is steered by the public sphere and that the only legitimate governments are those that listen to the public sphere. Democratic governance rests on the capacity of and opportunity for citizens to engage in enlightened debate. Much of the debate over the public sphere involves what is the basic theoretical structure of the public sphere, how information is deliberated in the public sphere, and what influence the public sphere has over society.

2. The concept of civil society has surfaced in a breadth of literature spanning communitarianism, social movements, social capital, associative democracy, deliberative democracy, and more recently in the work on the "democratic deficit." Its prolific usage has given civil society an ambiguous character. It is often used interchangeably with terms such as "the public sphere" and "the community" (Hendriks, 2006, p. 448).

3. The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically social survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns of its diverse populations. The ESS is funded jointly by the European Commission, the European Science Foundation and scientific funding bodies in each participating country. In the round (2002–2003) 22 countries participated, including all 15 EU member states – until that moment – 4 accession and applicant countries – members at this moment (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia), plus Norway, Switzerland, and Israel.

4. See http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ for developed information.

5. That is, the social position of being noncommittal to or uninvolved with anything other than one's own immediate interests and lifestyle.

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APPENDIX. EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY (QUESTIONS AND VARIABLES)

Associational participation

For each of the voluntary organizations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, If so, which?

[Code all that apply within this organization] None (0), member (1), participated (2), donated money (3), did voluntary work (4).

Interpersonal trust

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? On a score of 0 to 10, where o means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.

(NEW INTERPERSONAL: Recodified variable: 7–10 high trust)

Confidence in institutions
> Using this card, please tell me on store of 10 how much you personally trust each of the I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust
> B7: Country's parliament (NEW INTERPERSONAL: Recodified variable: 7–10 high trust)
> B8: The legal system (NEW LEGAL: Recodified variable: 7–10 high trust)
> B10: Politicians (NEW POLITICIANS: Recodified variable: 7–10 high trust)

Interest in politics
> B1 How interested would you say you are in politics – are you…
> > Very interested
> > Quite interested
> > Hardly Interested
> > Or, not at all interested?
> > DK/NA

(NEW INTEREST: Recodified variable: quite or very interested)

Political understanding
> B2 How often does politics seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on?
> > Never
> > Seldom
> > Occasionally
> > Regularly
> > Frecuently

(NEW UNDERSTANDING: Recodified variable: seldom or never)

Member of political party
> B26 Are you a member of any political party?
> > Yes
> > No

Vote
> B13 Did you vote in the last (country) national election in month/year?
> Yes
> No
> Not eligible to vote

Ideology
> B28 In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right." Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Political discussion

   E21 How often would you say you discuss politics and current affairs?
     Every day
     Several times a week
     Once a week
     Several times a month
     Once a month
     Less often
     Never

(NEW DISCUSSION: Recodified variable: every day or several times a week)

Education

   F6 What is the highest level of education you have achieved?

     No qualifications
     CSE grade 2–5/GCSE grades D–G or equivalent
     CSE grade 1/O-level/GCSE grades A–C or equivalent
     A-level, AS-level or equivalent
     Degree/postgraduate qualification or equivalent
     Other

OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN A EUROPEAN NETWORK CIVIL SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bernard Enjolras

INTRODUCTION

The issue of citizens' participation in civil society in Europe is perceived as crucial for the democratization and the legitimacy of the European Union (EU) as well as for the development of a European identity. There are at least three reasons for the increasing attention devoted to the role played by civil society in the European integration process (Rumford, 2003). Firstly, by providing knowledge and plural inputs in decision-making processes, civil society is a necessary component in efficient and "good" governance. Secondly, civil society demarcates the space for the enactment of citizenship rights and participation (the turn from formal citizenship to citizenship practice). This is essential since the notion of a European citizenship requires, in addition to a set of formal rights and obligations, a *public space* for active participation by the citizens beyond the arenas offered by the nation-state. Thirdly, civil society can serve as a source of legitimacy, possibly reducing

the much-debated democratic deficit of the EU. The rather imprecise term "democratic deficit" encompasses issues such as the lack of democratic anchorage of EU institutions and decisions as well as the gap between policy-makers and citizens. Hence, the belief that to reduce the democratic deficit, the EU democratic institutions have to become more accountable to its citizen and that European citizens need to get a sense of "ownership" of the EU democratic institutions.

In this view, the EU needs to become a true polity including a European public sphere (the realm of public debate and social communication and interaction) and civil society (the realm of association and participation of autonomous non-state political and social actors). To many analysts, the development of a European civil society is a condition for EU democracy to exist. However, it is unclear whether the European civil society needs to be congruent to a nation-state on whether it may exist on a larger scale. According to Habermas (2001), a European-wide civil society could not be imagined as the projection of a familiar design from the national onto the European level. It will rather emerge from "the mutual opening of existing national universes to one another." The question is whether and in what form a European civil society can develop within a European context. Further-more, may it contribute to the formation of a "transnational social space" traversing the national space and altering our understanding of territoriality?

With the globalization of markets, increased migration and changes in communication, technology, and cultural production, new practices of participation in civil society have developed that increasingly transcend the borders of the nation-state. Participation in European civil society is conceived of as an institutional mediation between state actors and citizens' representatives at all levels raising issues of common concern that should be dealt with by European governance (the input dimension). European civil society is further delivering the basic legitimation for collectively binding decisions that have agreed upon by all affected parties and through these procedures helps to promote the solidarity and identity of European citizens (the output dimension).

Governance and European civil society are thematically connected as a result of the EU's governmental practices in which civil society organiza-tions (CSOs) play a central role as a partner in governance. In addition, European governance has to be conceptualized in a multi-level context, involving interactions between multiple levels of government, as well as the involvement of civil society actors in the policy-making process. Multi-level governance in the European setting entails a partnership between EU institutions, national governments, regional and local authorities, and civil

society, forming a "network Europe," in which local, regional, and national arenas of participation are interconnected (Prodi, 2001).

In this context of a transformation of the terms of citizenship, this chapter explores the hypothesis of the emergence of a new post-national model of citizenship linked to the European construction. The focus of this chapter will be on developing a theoretical conceptualization of the *opportunity structure* enabling citizens' participation in European policy-making through CSOs. The concept of "political opportunity structure" has been used mainly by social movement research and is defined as "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectation for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1994, p. 85). Another way to think about opportunity structure is that put forward by Coleman (1988) and Scharpf (1997) emphasizing the structural characteristics of networks as enabling and constraining structures for social action. In this chapter, we do not look at the opportunity structure for participation and mobilization in European-related policy issues of the political system as a whole, but *focus on civil society as a sub-system, more specifically on the networks linking European CSOs across (1) national boundaries, (2) levels of governance, and (3) policy domains*. Indeed, one channel allowing citizens' participation in European policy-making is that of civil society. From this perspective, the opportunity structure offered by the participative mechanisms of CSOs influence both the level of citizens' participation in the EU and the level of Europeanization of civil society.

EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY

A central issue is to what extent the European civil society departs from the organization prevailing within the nation-states. A first conception of the way in which a European civil society is structured considers that the actors involved in European governance are part of a polity-building process of the EU. Here, one imagines that a supra-national civil society is slowly established by transnational CSOs and associations in Brussels as partners in the EU governance structure (Kohler-Koch & Finke, 2007). Another conception takes the opposite view; that a transnational civil society is not necessarily tied to the European space of policy-making but unfolds through post-national belongings and new forms of participation that are given expression in the national and local sphere (Delanty, 2000, p. 88). Accordingly, Grundmann (1999) distinguishes two routes toward an

enhanced European civil society: The emergence of a supranational, genuinely European civil society and the Europeanization of national civil societies. A third route may be envisaged as a combination between these two. We imagine that the evolving networks between the embryonic European-level CSOs and the further-advanced Europeanized aspects of the national CSOs may offer the most viable road to an enhanced European civil society.

It is therefore necessary to achieve a better understanding of how CSOs at the local, national, and European levels are interlinked and interact. One hypothesis is that transformations of civil society are shaped by new communication technologies. Another hypothesis is that vertical hierarchical organizations increasingly incorporate network forms of organization (Podolny & Page, 1998), transforming the ways in which CSOs operate and are linked to each other and to the political system. According to Castells (2004, p. 5), these two factors are interrelated in the sense that "networks became the most efficient organizational form as a result of three major features of networks that benefited from the new technological environment: flexibility, scalability, and survivability." The development of a "network society" (Castells, 2004) entails that of a "multi-media system presenting a large variety of channels of communication, with increasing interactivity."

These flexible and interactive communication forms have a decisive effect on politics and citizenship participation, offering a new public space. CSOs in this new communicative landscape display three features (Juris, 2004). Firstly, they are *global* movements. "Coordinating and communicating through transnational networks, activists think of themselves as belonging to global movements, discursively linking their local protests and activities to diverse struggle elsewhere" (Juris, 2004, p. 345). Secondly, these organizations are *informational*. Their activities aim at producing meaningful communication and at "framing" collective action, meaning, and collective identities (Melucci, 1996). Thirdly, they are increasingly organized around flexible, decentralized *networks*. Whereas democratic participation has historically been tied to local and national contexts, new organizational practices combining networks and hierarchies are facilitating citizenship participation coordinated at local, regional, and European levels.

CIVIL SOCIETY, POLICY-MAKING, AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

The EU's 2001 White Paper on Governance and the enlargement process have opened new opportunities for participation on a transnational level.

New networks, coalitions, and umbrella organizations are formed across Europe as tools for interest representation and advocacy. New civic institutions have arguably taken over some of the functions of political parties and state institutions, by providing policy advice and expert opinions on a broad range of political arenas (Ruzza, 2004). The influence and competence of economic interests, local, and national governments are welcome in an extensive system of consultation in the EU, characterized by pluralist rather than corporatist relations (Schmitter, 2000). Partly based on the perceived European ''crisis of politics,'' as noted in the White Paper on Governance, the EU is paying increasing attention to finding ways of broadening participation from civil society in this system of consultation.

Normative commitment and independence from vested interests may lend a distinctive type of legitimacy to certain CSOs, while others are perceived as disruptive, unrepresentative, or extremist. From the perspective of the CSOs, the complex political environment of the EU and fierce competition from more established interest groups may form entrance barriers to participation. An important way of meeting such challenges has been offered by co-ordination and coalition building with similar organizations on the European level (Ruzza, 2004).

To navigate in the polity of the EU, the CSOs will have to familiarize themselves with different organizational and institutional structures, which may be made more tangible by applying some of the following concepts. As a starting point, the concept of *multi-level governance* refers to the dispersion of decision-making power, from national states up to European level institutions, and from national level down to subnational levels of government (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). On the European level, political decision-making can be divided into different categories according to types of policy processes and principal actors (Weiler, Haltern, & Mayer, 1995). In the *intergovernmental* area, the main actors are representatives of nation-states, and policy processes are characterized by diplomatic negotiation. Access for CSOs is limited but influence is possible because their input can improve acceptability of policies at the national level. In the *EU-institutional area*, the main actors are politicians and high-level civil servants, and policy processes are oriented toward harmonizing regulations. Here, the CSOs have access in preparatory stages in the decision-making process, where they may for instance contribute to impact assessment of policies.

The *policy communities* (Commission directorates, committees, etc.) of the EU are characterized by tightly knit networks between many types of actors, and the focus is on policy implementation. CSOs have influence to the extent that personnel are normatively committed to movement ideas (Stevens &

Stevens, 2001) or as part of coalitions that occur in a system of extensive deliberations to promote consensus. Thus, in different areas and stages of the policy process, CSOs and social movements encounter different institutional constraints and opportunities. The political opportunity structures can be analyzed in terms of openness, stability, presence of potential allies, and prospects for repression (McAdam, Zald, & McCarthy, 1996).

Successful influence on policy-making is facilitated by ideas that are easy to recognize and communicate. CSOs are often involved in the process of framing (Benford & Snow, 2000), negotiating, and communicating policy ideas to bridge and create coalitions between different kinds of actors (Klandermans, 1988). Carlo Ruzza uses the concept *Movement related advocacy coalition* (MAC) to analyze such processes: "Movements are organized into networks of individuals and organizations on the basis of shared collective identities. Around these networks arise broader advocacy coalitions with less cohesion in ideological and structural terms but which disseminate movements throughout the institutional realm" (Ruzza, 2004). Such coalitions are multi-centric, inter-organizational fields where communication takes place in more or less tightly knit networks of actors. There is a need for a thorough conceptualization of the role of multi-level and cross-sector networks linking together European-level organizations and national and local organizations, forming a European network civil society.

EUROPEAN NETWORK CIVIL SOCIETY

New social movement theorists have long argued that, in contrast to the centralized, vertically integrated working-class movements, newer social movements are organized around more flexible, dispersed, and horizontal networks. As stated by Gerlach (2001, pp. 295–296), "the diverse groups of a movement … form an integrated network or reticulate structure through nonhierarchical social linkages among their participants." In short, "networking enables movement participants to exchange information and ideas and to coordinate participation in joint action."

CSOs increasingly display features of both hierarchical and network-based organizational forms allowing them to coordinate meaning formation, deliberation, and political activities at multiple levels and across sectors. This combination of decentralized, flexible, local/global activist networks and of hierarchical vertical organization seems to constitute the dominant organizational forms within CSO constitutive of a European civil

society. Following Podolny and Page (1998, p. 59), a network form of organization might be defined "as any collection of actors (N> = 2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during exchange." By contrast, "in hierarchies, relations may endure for longer than a brief episode, but clearly recognized, legitimate authority exists to resolve disputes that arise among actors." CSOs may be considered as exhibiting both features depending on the tasks considered. Network governance being characterized by a distinct ethic or value orientation, a commitment to the use of "voice" rather than "exit," a norm of reciprocity as guiding principle underlying network forms of organization (Powell, 1990), and hierarchical governance involving coercion (Scharpf, 1997; Enjolras, 2000).

The nexus of multi-level governance and European policy-making on the one hand and that of supra-national CSOs and of network-based organizations on the other suggest a post-national European society in the making. This post-national civil society should not be conceived as a "souped-up" version of the national civil society, more as a result of local, national, and European level interaction within and across complex, interrelated networks. CSOs in Brussels are at most only the "tip of the iceberg," a node in the network, rather than European civil society per se. Such a conception of European civil society allows us to think of active participation in the European public sphere not as the preserve of small elite in Brussels but as multi-level, interrelated citizen participation through different means of action.

There is a veritable diversity of network-based civil society movements in Europe's post-national civil society, with widely varying degrees of citizen engagement, and working within almost all sectors of social life and policy field. Carlos Ruzza (2004) studied three types of MAC in three policy areas – environment, regionalism, and anti-racism – that are active in Brussels and connected across levels of governance by multiple networks linking actors at all levels and constituting an opportunity structure for active citizen participation in politics.

There are seven environmental NGOs based in Brussels.[1] Some have collaborated with EU institutions for a long time. For example, the European Environmental Bureau, an umbrella organization for 1,500 European environmental groups, is 20 years old already. The groups are connected across space and levels of governance, through different organizations and networks, and contribute to the structuring of a post-national civil society.

Similarly, the "regionalist movements" act as agents of representation at the European level of the interests of citizens living in regions with strong identities and autonomist claims – such as Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom; Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia in Spain; and Corsica and Brittany in France. The process of Europeanization offers new opportunities for these movements since it increases the legitimacy of their claims for autonomy in a multi-level post-national Europe.

The anti-racism movement, long established in the United Kingdom and France thanks to groups such as SOS Racism, is expanding in response to right-wing populism and rise of the extreme right. These anti-racist movements emerge occasionally from smaller migrant associations. They are typically fragmented and heterogeneous in terms of occupational, religious, and ethnic profiles; they fight segregation and discrimination of ethnic minorities and migrants while promoting ideals of tolerance and openness in a post-national Europe.

The focus on the multi-level organizational features of the civil society networks has eclipsed the equally important cross-sectoral features of the European civil society, as for instance when environmental organizations have joined forces with consumer organizations in the policy area of genetically modified foods. We therefore propose the concept of a European network society that grasps the horizontal, cross-sectoral dimension in addition to the vertical, multi-level form of organization. The intermediary function of European CSOs across levels of governance and across policy fields is best conceptualized by developing further the understanding of a decentralized EU network of governance to a decentralized EU *society* through network.

A European civil society may be considered as an intermediary space of participation, expressing the constitutive relationship between the EU polity and its social constituency (Trenz, 2007a). Networks are particularly effective at crossing boundaries, both across levels of governance and across sectors and policy fields, and networks of CSOs connecting European decision-makers to local, regional, and national actors can act as motors of Europeanization.

Taking into account this intermediary function of civil society allows us at the same time to conceptualize different avenues of Europeanization of civil society. The term "Europeanization" assumes different meanings, which cannot be reduced to a one-way causal relationship (Olsen, 2001), but rather than condemning conceptual ambivalence, we suppose that these different meanings have a heuristic value for the understanding of the different paths of the unfolding of a European network civil society and its internal

cohesion. Following Trenz (2007b), we consider that the Europeanization of civil society should be understood as a relational mechanism between societal actors and European authorities within a field of collective action (interactive, network-based Europeanization), and as a communicative mode that binds societal actors together through shared normative ideas, justificatory claims, and discourses (discursive, frame-based Europeanization). That leads us to study to avenues of the Europeanization of civil society: through networks and through frames of meaning.

CONCEPTUAL MODEL

To analyze the opportunity structure for citizens' participation in European policy-making through CSOs, the following conceptual model may be proposed: The opportunity structure for participation of a CSO is defined by three components or dimensions – (i) the mediation capacity of the organization across levels of governance and across policy domains; (ii) its structural position within the network linking the organization to the European level, to other organizations, and to European policy-makers; and (iii) the participative and communication mechanisms embodied in the organization.

Mediation Capacity

CSOs may be viewed as operating two types of mediation from particular to general interest across levels of governance. To be able to operate at the level of European policies, CSOs need to translate their specific demands into more general interests. Accordingly, they must be able to mediate interests both across levels and across sectors. For instance, a local interest associations constituted by citizens affected by traffic noise can take part in broader consultations with government at the national or European level. This, however, requires some capacities to de-contextualize their local concerns expressing them in the form of general interest acceptable for national or EU institutions (e.g., ecological sustainability). This de-contextualization of local concerns across different policy levels is further re-enforced by the necessity to enter alliances with other CSOs active in the broader field (e.g., environmental organization and agricultural organizations). In the European setting, CSOs are thus depending on cross-sectoral and multi-level mediation capacities.

Structural Network Position

The structural network position of an organization will constrain action but also mark out opportunities for cooperation and involvement. In analyzing the structural network position of CSOs, we will apply a concept of organizational social capital. In this, we will build on traditional understandings of social capital such as Lin (1982), conceiving social capital as resources that can be used through social connections, and Coleman (1988), distinguishing between three entities that constitute social capital: obligations and trust that are associated to a social structure; the information channels associated to a social structure; and norms, to the extent that they facilitate or restrain certain actions.

The volume of social capital depends on the social structure, that is, the structure of the networks of which the individual is an element. In addition, a network is a semi-permanent structure within which individual interactions are embedded. The fact that two actors have a memory of past encounters as well as an expectation of future dealings with each others has an effect on individual interaction since a higher level of trust characterize the interactions (Scharpf, 1997). There is a premium, therefore, on relationships that allow actors to accept higher degrees of vulnerability because they are able to trust each other. This fact is also central to the definition of social capital (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993).

This network approach to social capital stresses the importance of the social structure in explaining opportunities for action and cooperation. Such an approach (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) contains four principles. First, actors and their actions are conceived as interdependent units, which are relationships that constitute the unit of analysis. Second, relational bounds between individuals constitute channels through which transfers of material and symbolic resources are made possible. Third, networks and their structure constrain and enable action. Fourth, it is possible to model networks as structures of stable relationships between actors. For an actor, social capital does not depend uniquely on the number of persons with whom he is connected but also on the *structural characteristics* of the network (which he is not necessarily aware about) (Granovetter, 1974). The analysis of the social capital of the CSOs and the larger network linking them to European decision-makers will make it possible to present one map of the opportunity structure for citizens' participation and involvement in European policy matters.

Participative and Communication Mechanisms

Different mechanisms may be employed by CSOs to make possible citizens' participation in activities related to European policy-making: aggregation, deliberation, bargaining, representation, and dissemination. The three first mechanisms (aggregation, deliberation, and bargaining) are associated to collective decision-making. The procedures involve different processes affecting the preferences of the individuals taking part in collective decision-making: aggregation, transformation, and (mis-)representation (Elster, 1998). Aggregation of preferences is synonym of voting and may also include vote trading, which is a form of bargaining. The transformation of preferences through arguing is the main goal of deliberation. Representation of preferences can be induced by each of the three decision-making procedures. However, when civil society is identified through participation, civil society is the arena for "the participation of the few who claim to stand for the many" (Trenz, 2007a, p. 15) since civil society is a selective voice. Another perspective consists in seeing civil society not only as a form of collective participation but also as "an idealised form of collective representation" emphasizing the symbolic component of representation and cultural framing. Thus, civil society is not only an organized space for participation but also a discursive field for making claims of representation and legitimacy.

Representative mechanisms are complex since they involve different conceptions of representation. Pitkin (1967) differentiates a formalist conception of representation from a substantive one, each of these conceptions taking different forms and modalities. The *formalist conception* may be authoritative, that is, the representative is conferred by the group authority and legitimacy, for acting on behalf of the group, or may be expressed in terms of accountability, that is, the representative has to answer before the group for what he does. The *substantive conception* may take the form of (i) "standing for," that is, being something for the group, that is either mirroring, reflecting the composition of the group, or "standing for" symbolically, that is, expressing the group; (ii) "acting for" the group, the action of the representative has to be judged accordingly to what he does and how he does it (how he performs his role). In addition, *two conceptions of the substance of acting for* may be distinguished: representing unattached interests (general interest) vs. representing particular interests, as well as *two modalities of acting for:* imperative mandate vs. independence of the

representative. Dissemination mechanisms operate in the opposite direction of representative mechanisms: they convey information from policy-makers toward citizens.

There are thus several, important dimensions to our central conceptual model of how *opportunity structures* guide citizens' participation in a European network society, running from *organizational social capital* in maneuvering within the multi-level and cross-sectoral environment of policy networks and advocacy coalitions to the employment of *aggregative, deliberative, bargaining, representative, and dissemination mechanisms* as forms of participation.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS: FURTHER RESEARCHES AND HYPOTHESIS

This conceptualization of the opportunity structure for citizens' participation may be at the outset of researches aiming at analyzing how collective actors and organizations operating within a European network civil society enhance citizens' participation. They may do so by the play of diverse processes, instruments, and structures, build and employ a new kind of social capital that is used for participation and involvement in EU decision-making processes (input), enabling information and intermediation with the citizens on European policy-making (throughput), and contribute to the legitimacy of European integration and enhance a sense of democratic "ownership" among citizens (output).

The main questions to be addressed by such researches would be the following:

- How do CSOs mediate particular and general interest across levels of governance and across sectors?
- How do CSOs occupy opportunities for participation and involvement in EU decision-making?
- What is the shape of the networks in which CSOs operate in relation to European policy fields and issues?
- What kind of social capital is developed to occupy network positions and to expand social relations?
- How and by which conductive mechanisms do CSOs enable citizens' participation and involvement in European policy-making as well as their inclusion through communication and information?

- How and to what extent do CSOs become Europeanized by the play of their integration into European networks?
- How do CSOs contribute to the legitimacy of European integration? What vision of the EU as a legitimate order is promoted within civil society?

In relation to such empirical research, it will be necessary to test out one critical hypothesis, which will anticipate that the level of citizens' participation in an organization will be inversely proportional to the level of Europeanization of the organization. The principal reason for expecting this relationship is that the organization's mediation capacity and structural network position is likely to be enhanced by professional activism. In turn, professional activism and advocacy may stand in contradiction with the implementation of internal participative mechanisms oriented toward mobilizing citizens' participation. (The tendency in direction of a professionalization of activism and advocacy may, in turn, result from the technical complexity characterizing European policy-making as well as those of successful advocacy coalitions.) A verification of such a hypothesis, showing an inverse relationship between Europeanization and participation, would have policy implications if the objectives of European governance are to allow civil society participation in European policy-making to increase citizens' ''democratic ownership'' in relation to European politics and political institutions.

NOTE

1. EEB, Greenpeace, Transports and the Environment, Friends of the Earth, WWF, Climate Network, and Birdslife.

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ORGANIZED CIVIL SOCIETY, VOLUNTEERING AND CITIZENSHIP

Thomas P. Boje

INTRODUCTION

Civil society-based institutions have had a significant historical impact in Europe on the one hand in formation of modern notions of the nation and on the creation of national identity and on the other hand in definition of citizenship rights and understanding of the democratic culture. If support for citizenship rights through civil society organizations – at the workplace and in public institutions – is weakly articulated, it creates a fragile democratic culture and, consequently, less comprehensive social protection. The possibility of civil society becoming a locus for democratic learning, political reflexivity and governance depends, firstly, on its specific institutional mechanisms and, secondly, on the broader institutional configuration, which civil society forms part of.

The definition of civil society used in this context is broad and comprehensive. Organized civil society includes public interest organizations, social movement organizations, churches, NGOs and promotional associations. In research on civil society focus has primarily been on participation and non-profit institutions meaning the formal aspects of civil

society (Salamon, Sokolowski, & Anheier, 2000). However, the informal social networks and social contacts in local communities and friendship circles are just as important for the cohesion of the society and the integration of individuals. This chapter is based on an understanding that civil society and citizenship rights are strongly dependent on social participation in all spheres of everyday life – from involvement in labour market, family matters and community networks to the shaping of civic, public and private institutions and the realization of democratic rights more generally within contemporary societies (Janoski, 1998; Trägårdh, 2007).

The growth of interest in the concept of social and civic participation is based on experiences of deficiency in the way democratic processes function, and, consequently, a crisis of legitimacy for the modern idea of democracy. Therefore in conceptualizing citizenship and civil society, the involvement of citizens has become a key issue on the political and institutional agenda in recent years. An additional reason can be found in the difficulties of establishing frameworks that involve citizens in strategic decision-making for the community and in the identification and organization of services and welfare. These problems have been ascribed to the limitations of representative forms of democracy in capturing the heterogeneity, complex interests, and multiple identities characterizing groups and individuals living in the contemporary European societies.

In this chapter I will not deal with the big issues concerning the crisis of legitimacy in the democratic institutions and the growing differentiation in modern societies, but alone focus on the development and structuring of organized civil society and volunteering as an expression for citizens' involvement in the democratic processes. The aim is thus to discuss the impact of organized civil society - non-profit institutions and volunteering - on citizenship, participation and welfare. For this purpose I will analyse the inter-relationship between welfare system, non-profit institutions and volunteering in a selection of European welfare systems.

The chapter starts with a discussion of the relationship between organized civil society, citizenship and active participation followed by analysis of the institutional context in Europe for civic participation and volunteering. In the rest of the chapter the differences and similarities in volunteering among European countries are explained on both individual and organizational level.

ORGANIZED CIVIL SOCIETY, CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICIPATION

The vibrancy of civil society depends on the active participation of members of the society in a variety of organizations. These represent both a bulwark against an oppressive state and also a system of representation of interests in a complex society and may help to ensure democracy and social cohesion. Variations in associational life and informal activities follow typically the different structuring of the welfare system in the European societies. It is not obvious if merely being a member is sufficient or whether active membership is a condition in evaluating the strength of civil society institutions. In a comparative study Dekker and van den Broek (1998) distinguish between different types of organized civil society. One type is 'parochial' civil society characterized by relatively low rates of membership of voluntary organization but those who are members of voluntary organizations have a high level of voluntary activities – France, Spain and Italy. Another type is 'broad' civil society where the rate of membership in voluntary organizations is high, but the level of activities among members is relatively low – the Scandinavian countries (Dekker & van den Broek, 1998, pp. 28–30). However, it is evident that the level of participation and the strength of social networks are important in both contexts. There are a number of ways in which this can be assessed – either through surveys analysing the type and level of civic participation and the involvement in social network or through measuring the function and coverage of civil society institutions. I will in this chapter combine these two measures of civicness.

Citizenship and Participation

Citizenship on the one hand and citizens' participation and involvement in civic organizations on the other hand have become key issues on the political and institutional agenda in recent years. The great interest in the concept of social and civic participation can be explained by the various reasons, which as already mentioned highlight the deficient democratic processes and legitimacy crisis of the modern idea of democracy. The intensified interest in citizenship and its impact on active civic participation and cultural identity has appeared at a time when a number of historical developments and socio-economic changes are transforming the social systems of European countries from being relatively homogenous to being

societies where citizens of different cultural, religious and ethnic back-
grounds work, live and communicate (see Schierup, Hansen, & Castles,
2006, Chapter 3). This transformation process has confronted the societies
with several challenges: combining social inclusion and ethnic multiplicity;
managing the social, cultural and religious differences between the ethnic
minority groups and the national majority population; and preventing
populist and racist reactions in politics. These developments have
collectively questioned the political classes and the state institutions in
Europe and have contributed in enhancing the role of citizenship, organized
civil society and civic participation in integration of marginalized groups
into the labour market as well as into local communities through
involvement of various civic organizations. However, in addition to the
problems of representation the traditional concept of citizenship has also
been unable to reflect the diversity in needs and aspirations expressed by
different social groups in their efforts to combine the rights to paid work,
unpaid work and caring activities.

The definition and perception of citizenship rights are supposed to reflect
the social issues and problems of a specific time period. The classical concept
of Marshall (1992 [1950]), defines a set of universal rights – those that are
economic, political and social – inherent to citizens' membership in the
nation-state. This understanding of citizenship was stressed against the
backdrop of a wider range of rights and duties, such as the right of
information, housing, health, social protection, etc. Today's researchers of
citizenship have embraced a more pro-active understanding linking citizen-
ship rights to civic participation and civil society initiatives (Janoski, 1998).
This new conceptualization of citizenship envisages it not as a passive
conferring of social rights and responsibilities but as the active appropria-
tion by the groups previously excluded from them. In this perception,
citizenship rights and obligations are linked to people's willingness and
ability to participate actively in society (see Habermas, 1998). The active
participation may be in the form of gainful employment, active involvement
in unpaid work or in caring activities. The active citizenship is performed
when citizens are taking responsibility in their relations to a wide range of
private and public obligations.

Active citizenship is thus closely related to social participation and
volunteering in all spheres of everyday life: from the shaping of civic, public
and private institutions to increased participation in social network and
voluntary activities and to the realization of democratic rights in con-
temporary societies. The main problems related to the understanding of
active participation/volunteering are two-fold: on the one hand, stereotyped

interpretations of active participation processes need to be overcome by an improved empirical knowledge concerning all forms of participation: formal volunteering in non-profit organizations, informal activities related to ad hoc network, family and neighbourhood as well as virtual networks created in mobilizing support for single cases; on the other hand, it is of crucial importance to understand how different types of institutions – public, for-profit and non-profit – separate or in cooperation practically contribute to encourage the participation of citizens and make it possible.

Organized Civil Society and Citizenship

The role of civil society within democratic institutions can be understood in a number of ways, according to different perceptions of what a legitimate political process should be. The literature lists a number of advantages that derive from the inclusion of civil society in political processes: engagement in dialogue with civil society is seen as a viable way to enhance public participation, in the context of decreasing trust in political institutions (Putnam, 2000; Rothstein, 2001); civil society organizations can supplement political parties in informing debates and aggregating preferences and they can take account of the increased cultural and ethnic differentiation of European countries. Civil society organizations should also be involved in the implementation of policies, because public authorities are often no longer able to deliver services that meet the needs of an increasingly differentiated population (Evers & Laville, 2004). At the EU level, the participation of civil society is said to be a useful way addressing the perceived democratic deficit of the European Union, and in this context organizations would be required to act as agents of political socialization (Ruzza, 2007).

Associative organizations and civic participation/volunteering take as well many different forms, but they are all embedded in the prevailing social and economic structure of a specific welfare system. The extent and shape of civic activities depend on the type of societal environment. Associations and civic participation blossom and are democratic in democratic societies whereas it is scare and undemocratic in totalitarian or less democratic societies. This is clearly phrased by Alapuro (2009, p. 3) 'that it is not the associations that account for democratic features of the political culture in general but on the contrary it is the democratic nature of the political culture that accounts for the democratic capacity of the associations'. These differences in shaping of organized civil society and in level of civic participation we clearly find in comparing volunteering in different parts of Europe. In the East and Central European countries formal network and

civil society organizations are spare and a long tradition of totalitarian government has lead to distrust in the formalized associative life and public organizations (Wallace, Haerpfer, & Latcheva, 2004). In building up the civil society in these countries the more informal forms of social networks have played a significant role. In the Northern European countries it is, however, the institutionalized collective organizations which for long time have been the core element of the civil society and therefore it is through these organizations that most people are establishing their social networks.

The basic idea of participation coincides with the move from a government model towards a governance model. In this new model, a decentralization process is promoted – especially in highly centralized states – and innovative forms of horizontal collaboration between state actors and civil society replace strong state power. As a result, networks emerge as an increasingly significant mode of coordination. A shift from a system characterized predominantly by government models to a more 'polycentric' system has taken place, and this shift has been supported both at the national and European level with an effort in promoting inclusive decision-making processes that involve citizens actively. In the polycentric decision-making model that has come to the forefront, decisions are made through negotiations, interactions and more horizontal cooperation. These trends towards more active citizen involvement have been paralleled by the revitalization of the role played by citizens in influencing and regulating the economy and society at various geographical levels – local, regional, national or even international.

However, scholars have pointed out a number of critical issues associated with the involvement of civil society in governance arrangements and in decision-making processes. Such critical issues refer to notions of accountability, representativeness and responsiveness. In short, scholars started to make the involvement of civil society problematic and to enquire under which conditions new forms of governance enhance democracy and are better able to empower citizens. The growth of the European Union poses additional questions about the national differences in civic cultures and forms of political participation. To explain the variations in civic involvement is not an easy task in view of the rapid social changes in each country.

VOLUNTEERING AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE – EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES

Civic participation has not only been perceived and discussed mainly in terms of citizens' raising their voices and taking part in public affairs and

interest negotiation, but also as active involvement in providing welfare services. Service provision through citizens' involvement takes place in most European countries through the organized civil society in joint cooperation with the state. Civic participation thus occurs in many different forms of social service provision within civil society but outside the state, through volunteering in civic organizations, community groups and the family (see Evers & Laville, 2004). Furthermore, social cohesion and a vigorous democracy seem to depend on a high level of civic participation as argued by Putnam and other authors discussing the importance of social capital in the communities (Putnam, 2000, 2002). Therefore, civic participation and volunteering is linked to the idea of civil society, or the layer of independent organizations between the individual and the state (Cohen & Arato, 1992).

Empirical studies of civic participation defined as membership of organizations and volunteering find huge variations both between countries and between social groups. However, empirical studies of volunteering also find marked commonalities among volunteers in Europe. The citizens most frequently doing voluntary work are individuals who are interested in politics and have strong ties in the local community. It is the most integrated citizens with the highest level of human and cultural capital who participate most in voluntary activities. Social integration as measured by paid work, education and occupational status boosts the level of volunteerism in the community because it means having a strong social network, self-confidence and the organizational skills needed for being involved in voluntary work (see Boje, 2008; Pichler & Wallace, 2007).

The social prestige given to voluntary activities and the possibilities of getting access to valuable social contact through the non-profit organizations might be an important dimension in explaining the strong correlation between human capital and voluntarism (Putnam & Feldstein, 2003; Deakin, 2001; Wilson, 2000). Community studies show clearly that vivid social networks are crucial for the social stability and cohesion of a neighbourhood, and these networks must include both institutional and personal relationships in the community. The community will not function without neighbourhood contacts across the ethnic, cultural and social boundaries as well as stable relationships among family members in and outside the individual households (Bertaux, Boje, & McIntosh, 2002).

Comparative studies show that the level of volunteering and other types of civic participation has developed in different directions among the European countries (see Dekker & van den Broek, 1998; OECD, 2001; Putnam, 2002; van Oorschot & Arts, 2005; Wallace, 2005). These variations in associational life and informal activities typically follow the different structuring of the

welfare system in the European societies and are confirmed in Table 1, which reports results from some of the major European studies of volunteering and membership in non-profit organizations.

According to Table 1, the different surveys show similar results in measuring formal civic participation measured by proportion of citizens doing voluntary work among the EU Member States. Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands show high levels in all studies of volunteering. In the Southern and Central European countries, however, the level of participation in social networks and involvement in voluntary activities are low.

Table 1. Volunteering for a Non-profit Organization and Organizational Membership in European Countries – Results from Recent Surveys. Ranged by Proportion Doing Voluntary Work in the European Social Survey.

Nation	Johns Hopkins[a] Voluntary Work as Proportion of the Economically Active Population	Eurobarometer[b] Proportion of the Population Who Has Done Voluntary Work in a Year	Eurobarometer[b] Membership of Non-profit Organizations – 3 or more Organizations	European Social Survey[c] Proportion of the Population Who Has Done Voluntary Work in a Year
Norway	5.1	–	42	37
Sweden	5.4	50	56	35
The Netherlands	5.8	48	39	29
Denmark	3.0	42	43	28
Germany	3.0	36	10	26
United Kingdom	5.6	33	12	23
Belgium	2.4	38	16	23
France	4.2	36	8	19
Ireland	2.3	41	12	16
Austria	1.1	43	13	14
Hungary	0.2	16	1	9
Spain	1.5	15	5	7
Portugal	1.2	13	2	6
Italy	1.7	23	4	5
Poland	0.2	20	2	5
Czech Republic	0.8	23	2	–

[a]Johns Hopkins: Voluntary labour force (FTE) in Percentage of the active population in 2004.
[b]Eurobarometer: Proportion of the population who has done voluntary work in 2004 (European Commission, 2002).
[c]European Social Survey: Proportion of the population who has done voluntary work for an organization in 2002/2003.

Pichler and Wallace (2007) show similar results in an analysis of formal and informal social capital among the EU Member States. Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands score high on all types of social capital. It concerns both close relations for friend, neighbours and family – bonding social capital – and when it comes to participation in social network and volunteering in organized civil society-bridging social capital. In the Southern, and Central European countries, the level of participation in social network and involvement in political activities are low, while some of these countries – for example, Portugal and Bulgaria score high in comprehensive informal networks around family.

Social participation, however, can take other forms than being active within formal organizations. What is an appropriate measure for civic participation or social capital in one context may not be appropriate in others. Thus, the Nordic countries tend to emerge as those having the highest levels of social capital as measured by civic-mindedness and civic participation, whereas these indicators as mentioned are low in Southern and Eastern Europe (van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). This raises the question of whether other forms of social cohesion and civic participation are evident – not only in Eastern and Southern Europe but also in other parts of the world as well – that may offer alternatives to formal civic participation as defined earlier. Yet civil society has through ad hoc and informal social organizations been building up and now plays a growing impact in governance and social cohesion for several Eastern European countries and even more in the post-totalitarian countries in Southern Europe.

In the Northern European countries, however, it is the institutionalized collective organizations that for a long time have been the core element of the civil society, and thus it is through these organizations that most people are establishing their social networks (Sivesind, 2006; Trägårdh, 2007). The informal social networks created through social relations with relatives, neighbours and friends are also in the Nordic context extremely important in establishing reliable social integration, but this type of social participation is seldom a factor in measuring social capital or social cohesion (Boje, 2007).

The relationship between the comprehensiveness of the welfare system, its organization and capability in providing social services and the important of the voluntary sector in the society has been analysed in a number of international studies. The overall conclusion seems to be that there is no 'crowding out' effect between level of government spending and the amount of volunteering in the society (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004; Rothstein & Kumlin 2005; van Oorschot & Arts, 2005; Boje 2008). Instead both the level of volunteering for non-profit organizations and the economic importance

Table 2. The Relationship between Volunteering
and Public Financed Welfare Services.

Public Expenditure on Welfare Services – Percentage of National GDP	The Voluntary Workforce in Percentage of the Total Working Population	
	High	Low
High	Sweden, Denmark Norway and the Netherlands	Austria, Belgium and France
Low	United Kingdom and Germany	Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary Italy, Portugal and Spain

Sources: Boje (2008) and OECD (2007).

of the non-profit sector in the national economy seem to grow in societies with the most comprehensive welfare system. In Table 2 I have illustrated this relationship by figures for the size of the voluntary workforce – both paid and unpaid work – in the European countries and OCED-figures for public expenditures on welfare services.

The relationship between level of volunteering in non-profit organizations and public-financed welfare services confirms the thesis arguing that societies with a high degree of universalism in provision of social services and high social equality also are characterized by extensive social networks, high level of institutional trust and a significant level of voluntary involvement (Rothstein & Kumlin, 2005). Social inequality means not only poverty risk, exclusion from consumption and from cultural events but also a low level of civic participation in organizations and networks as well as a low level of trust in the core institutions of the society.

The amount of volunteering and the prosperity of the non-profit sector seem to be stimulated rather than restricted by highly developed and formalized public welfare organizations and the formal organizational base for non-profit activities seems to grow as a result of public support. A main conclusion from the Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Project states 'that volunteering, and, more generally, civic participation and self-organization of individuals to pursue common interests, are instruments and outcomes of social policies that are highly dependent on each country's institutional path of development' (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004, p. 1).

The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands score high on both dimensions. These countries have a highly developed social welfare system

and a high level of membership in associative organizations combined with widespread volunteering (see Table 1). We also find a relatively high level of public-financed social services in Belgium, France and Austria but in all three countries the level of volunteering is restricted. In these countries, the rate of membership in non-profit organizations is low but those who are members have a high level of volunteering. A large number of non-profit organizations in these countries as well as in the UK and Germany are involved in production of social services – elderly care and institutions for children – but the costs for providing these services are financed by the state. Furthermore these social services are primarily produced by paid labour employed by the non-profit organizations and the involvement of voluntary unpaid labour is restricted.

In the other end of the scale characterized by low level of volunteering and a low public involvement in financing welfare services we find the Southern – and Central European countries. The Southern countries are in Gallie and Paugam's welfare typology described as a 'sub-protective' welfare system meaning a system with no or very modest social protection. In these countries the tradition for associative democratic grass-root organizations is low and volunteering is scare in these organizations. Social protection is primarily provided through the kinship network or by private – mostly – religious organizations (Gallie & Paugam, 2000, p. 5). In their analysis Gallie and Paugam uses this label on the Southern European welfare systems, but the description fits very well on today's Central European welfare systems too. Here we are talking about countries with a high level of social differentiation and large socio-economic inequality where the previous comprehensive system of public social protection has been demolished. These societies are characterized by social conditions, which typically are restricting creation of social capital and viability of social network and reducing the involvement in voluntary activities (Pichler & Wallace, 2009).

COMPOSITION OF THE VOLUNTARY LABOUR FORCE

Most empirical studies find that the level of volunteering in all European countries is growing or at least stable whereas there has been a decline in the institutional membership of the more conventional non-profit organizations like political parties, unions, charity organizations, etc. (Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 1996; Rothstein, 2001). Instead we have seen a growing affiliation to the grass-roots organizations at community level, single-case

organizations dealing with, for example environmental issues and counsel-ling groups where membership is not a precondition for being active participants. In this section I will look at the non-profit voluntary sector from two different perspectives. First, its organizational composition measured by the composition of the workforce and the type of activities; and secondly who are volunteering and here I look at both formal and informal voluntary work.

Voluntary Sector by Size and Composition

The size of the non-profit, voluntary workforce among the European/ Western countries varies from a large non-profits workforce – paid and unpaid work – in the Netherlands of 15.1% of the economical active population to a tiny non-profit workforce in several of the Central and East European countries (Table 3).

The variation between the countries not only concerns the size of the non-profit workforce but also its composition on paid and unpaid labour. In the Scandinavian countries, the total non-profit labour force is relativily large but it is composed by a small paid non-profit staff and a large amount of voluntary activities. For nearly all other European countries the relation is opposite. Denmark represents a slightly deviant case. Here we find a higher level of non-profit involvement in production of social services – social services and education – than in the other Scandinavian countries. This pattern is to some extent similar to the situation in the Continental European countries, which all are characterized by a non-profit workforce dominated by paid labour. This is most obvious in Benelux and Austria where the voluntary activities count for less than one-third of the total work-load in the non-profit sector.

The decisive dimension in determining the composition of the workforce in the non-profit sector in paid and unpaid, voluntary work seems to be the level of non-profit involvement in provision of welfare services. The more involved the non-profit sector is in providing welfare services in a given country, the higher is the proportion of paid work compared to the unpaid, voluntary workforce, and the more professional and formalized the non-profit organizations tend to be (Sivesind, 2006; Boje, 2008). This assumption is true for the Nordic countries. In Norway and especially Sweden the public sector – government and municipalities – are providing the welfare services, whereas it is primarily in culture and recreation, in advocacy organization

Table 3. The Workforce in the Non-profit Sector for Selected Countries as Percentage of the Economically Active Population – Divided in Paid Work Unpaid Voluntary Work and Calculated in Full-Time Equivalent (FTE).

Country	Paid Workforce (FTE)	Unpaid Voluntary Workforce (FTE)	Total Workforce in the Non-profit Sector
Scandinavia			
Denmark (2004)	3.9	3.1	7.1
Sweden (2002)	2.6	7.4	10.0
Norway (2004)	3.0	5.1	8.1
Continental Europe			
Germany (1995)	3.5	2.3	5.9
France (1995)	3.7	3.7	7.6
Austria (1995)	3.8	1.1	4.9
Benelux			
Belgium (2001)	8.6	2.3	10.9
The Netherlands (2002)	9.3	5.8	15.1
Southern Europe			
Italy (1999)	2.3	1.5	3.8
Portugal (2002)	2.8	1.1	4.0
Central Europe			
Hungary (1995)	0.9	0.2	0.8
Czech Republic (1995)	1.3	0.7	2.0
Anglo-American			
The UK (1995)	4.8	3.6	8.5
The US (1995)	6.3	3.5	9.8
Canada (2002)	8.4	2.7	11.1
Scandinavian countries	2.7	3.7	6.5
Continental Europe	5.5	2.3	7.8
Central Europe	0.8	0.4	1.1
Anglo-American	5.2	3.0	8.2

Sources: The Danish figures are calculated based on figures provided from the national population survey 2004, SFI and Statistics Denmark: Survey of National Account 2003. For other countries it is from the John Hopkins Non-Profit Sector project.
Note: All workforce figures are excluding religious worship organizations and estimated in Full-Time Equivalents (Denmark 1650 h).

and other non-service-producing sectors that the non-profit and voluntary organizations play a significant role.

To give a more precise picture of the non-profit and the voluntary activities taking place in the different welfare systems we distinguish between four types of activities (see Table 4).

Table 4.   Paid and Unpaid Workforce in the Non-profit Sector by Type
of Activity in Selected European Countries.

	Denmark	Norway	Sweden	The Netherlands	Germany	Spain	Ireland	Hungary
Paid workforce								
Welfare services	66	56	42	88	79	69	81	26
Recreative activities	7	12	27	4	5	12	6	38
Advocacy	21	17	21	5	10	13	6	29
Political activities	4	15	9	3	6	6	7	7
Other activities	2	0	1	–	0	0	–	–
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Unpaid voluntary workforce								
Welfare services	16	11	10	42	16	48	52	41
Recreative activities	49	51	51	36	33	22	26	30
Advocacy	12	15	20	2	6	7	10	7
Political activities	16	23	17	20	33	23	11	22
Other activities	7	0	2	–	13	0	1	–
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: The Danish figures are calculated based on figures provided from the national population survey 2004, SFI and Statistics Denmark: Survey of National Account 2003. For the other countries it is the John Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Project.
Note: Definition of the four categories (see Boje, 2008):
Welfare activities: education, health and social services
Expressive activities: culture, recreation and sport.
Advocacy: trade unions, business organizations and local interest organizations.
Political and ideological activities: political parties, religious organizations, human rights groups and environmental organizations.
Others: international aid organizations, philanthropy and others.

Looking first at the paid workforce in the non-profit sector we find that welfare activities play a dominant role in all countries included in Table 4, but most pronounced in the Netherlands and Ireland followed by Germany and Spain. Here a substantial proportion of social services for children and elderly people are provided by non-profit organizations, which have contracts with the government and are reimbursed for producing services for children and elderly people. Denmark comes close to the Continental countries with two-thirds of the paid labour force in the non-profit sector employed in welfare services. In the other Nordic countries the non-profit paid workforce is less concentrated towards welfare production whereas a larger proportion of the paid non-profit workforce is employed in advocatory activities in relation to policy organizations, professional organizations, unions and advocacy groups. This type of institutions is

part of the welfare society as pressure or supportive groups defending the interests of social groups in the cooperative Nordic democracies. Finally, the Central European countries represented by Hungary are characterized by a small non-profit sector where most of the paid work takes place in recreation and political activities.

Turning to the composition of the unpaid voluntary workforce the composition is different. In the volunteer workforce the welfare services only play a minor role in the Nordic countries whereas this type of voluntary work is much more widespread in the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland, where large groups of women are volunteering in social non-profit institutions providing services for children and elderly people. In all the Nordic countries the unpaid, voluntary workforce is dominated by recreation activities and next comes the advocacy and political activities – especially in Norway and Sweden. The large proportion of voluntary activities in political and ideological activities in Germany, Spain and partly in the Netherlands can be explained by a significant amount of voluntary work in connection to the religious organizations.

Civic Participation – Who Volunteer?

Volunteering is an integrated aspect of the individual's human capital and involvement seems to increases this type of capital (Wilson, 2000). Previous assumptions arguing for a negative relationship between paid work and volunteering meaning that lack of gainful employment and free time available will be compensated by doing voluntary work do not find any empirical evidence. In most recent studies it rather seems to be the other way round that social integration measured by paid work, education and occupational status are boosting volunteering because it means having a strong social network, self-confidence and the organizational skills are important for being involved in voluntary work (see van Oorschot, Arts, & Gelissen, 2006; Koch-Nielsen, Fridberg, Skov Henriksen, & Rosdahl, 2005). The social prestige given to volunteer activities and the possibilities of getting access to valuable social contact through the non-profit organizations might be an important dimension in explaining the strong correlation between human capital and voluntarism (Putnam & Feldstein, 2003; Deakin, 2001; Jeppsson Grassman & Svedberg, 2003; Wilson, 2000).

Social networks are developed in many different contexts. On the one hand social networking means participation in public institutions in the civil society. This is seen as a basis for social capital by serving the community.

Participation in non-profit organizations helps to build social networks and to enforce social norms. This type of volunteering is often taken as a good indicator of the social cohesion of a society. On the other hand, social networks are also developed in a more informal face-to-face manner by people's involvement in social interaction at individual, group or neighbourhood level (Wilson, 2000). This last type of unpaid work or informal care is typically not considered as voluntary work because it takes place in an unstructured way and in a non-institutional framework. Consequently, such activities are not registered when surveys are asking about membership of non-profit organizations or participation in non-profit activities. In a study analysing the relationship between household and workforce activities we have asked about both formal and informal voluntary activities carried out by the household members (see Wallace, 2003). Here I shall describe the differences in the two types of voluntary work – unpaid work for a non-profit organization and informal care work for friends or relatives – among the seven European countries included in this survey. However, I will restrict the analysis to gender (see Table 5).

Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have a high level of voluntary work for non-profit organizations. The United Kingdom takes a middle

Table 5. Proportions of the Respondents having done Voluntary Work for a Non-profit Organization or for Friends and Family at least Monthly Totally by Gender and Country – In Per cent.

	Total Population		Men		Women	
	Non-profit organization	Friends or family	Non-profit organization	Friends or family	Non-profit organization	Friends or family
Denmark	28.1	28.4	31.8	36.2	24.3	20.6
Sweden	25.6	24.6	31.6	25.6	19.5	23.6
The Netherlands	28.1	20.8	26.7	18.6	29.6	22.8
United Kingdom	18.4	15.9	16.7	17.3	20.4	14.3
Czech Republic	10.5	25.7	12.8	27.0	8.4	24.5
Hungary	6.2	16.5	7.0	18.7	5.4	14.4
Bulgaria	4.0	19.6	4.4	22.6	3.6	16.7

Sources: HWF-database 2001 and Danish Survey 2004.

position whereas the four Central and East European countries have a significantly lower level of voluntarism. This result fits very well into the figures on volunteering from the Johns Hopkins Study shown in Table 1. Turning to the informal unpaid work done for a friend or relative the differences between the seven countries are less pronounced and the ranking has changed. The level of unpaid informal work is high in Sweden, Denmark and Czech Republic, medium in the Netherlands and Bulgaria and low in the United Kingdom and Hungary. For this type of voluntary work we are not able to find any clear differences between the conventional types of welfare systems. However, comparing the two types of voluntary work we find that the level in all three Western countries is higher for unpaid work done for a non-profit organization than for informal unpaid work, whereas the opposite is the case among the Central and East European countries. Here informal unpaid work is more widespread than work for a non-profit organization and the level of difference is remarkably high especially in Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This supports the previous-stated argument that informal social organizations play a larger role in building up the civil society in Central – East Europe – and South Europe – than it is the case in North-West Europe.

Looking at gender differences we find the same ranking between the countries for men and women, respectively, except for the United Kingdom where voluntary work for men is relatively lower than in the other two Western countries while the level for women on the other hand is higher. Women are doing voluntary work for non-profit organizations more frequently than men in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom whereas it is the opposite in all the other countries. In these two countries provision of welfare plays a significant role in the non-profit sector and it is typically women who are active in this type of volunteering. Especially remarkable is the difference in men's favour in Sweden, where voluntary work in an organizational context seems to be a male-dominated activity. Turning to the gender differences in informal unpaid work for friends and relatives this type of activities is more widespread among men than women in all countries except the Netherlands.

The gender differences in volunteering depend primarily on the sector composition of the non-profit sector and the type of voluntary work, which again is strongly related to the type of welfare regimes prevailing in the individual society. Men are typically volunteering in the political, cultural and recreation sectors and in counselling and administrative types of activities whereas women favouring services, caring and face-to-face activities in their voluntary activities (Gaskin & Smith, 1995).

CONCLUSION

In the European discussion of social cohesion and integration citizenship rights and obligations on the one hand and citizens' participation and involvement in civic organizations on the other hand have become key issues on the political and institutional agenda. In this chapter I have documented a clear connection between civic participation and a comprehensive welfare system. Szreter (2002) has developed this relation even further and argues that in a democratic society a high level of civic participation/volunteering can only be developed if the citizens are actively involved in the democratic decision-making and if the decisions are made in a trustful cooperation between citizens and the state. The level of civic participation/volunteering seems thus to be determined by the citizens' embeddedness in social networks that encourage democratic decision-making and volunteering. It might in this context be argued that the amount of volunteering in a country depends on the extensiveness of social network, associative organizations and social equality in the society (see Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004, p. 10).

In the chapter I find that volunteering is most widespread in the North-Western European countries where it is correlated with a high level of public welfare commitment, whereas it is low in both Southern and Central European countries characterized by few associative organizations and restricted public welfare provision. It is obvious that the level of welfare commitment measured by the level of universalism in access to social security and provision of social services is a great importance for both the democratic involvement of citizens and for volunteering. A high level of governmental spending on social welfare and consequently a low level of inequality seem to facilitate higher levels of voluntary involvement of the citizens whereas low spending on social welfare are not necessarily compensated by higher levels of voluntary involvement in solving social problems. In countries with low public spending on social welfare we typically also find restricted social networks and high economic inequality. According to studies analysing social capital and volunteering these are indicators of low civic participation and few associative organizations mobilizing the citizens.

Another important welfare dimension in determining level of voluntary involvement seems thus to be the organization of the welfare system. A highly organized and institutionalized welfare system tends to stimulate voluntary involvement and to increase the role of the non-profit sector. It may be organized through the state apparatus as in the Social Democratic

system or through the corporative organizations as in the Continental system. These dimensions describing the welfare system concern primarily voluntary work done in an institutional frame for a non-profit organization. When it comes to the other type of voluntarism discussed in this chapter – informal care for friends and family members outside the household – this type of voluntarism seems to be high both in countries characterized by equalized social structure such as Social Democratic welfare systems and in countries with a less developed system of social protection but characterized a strong familialism in the system of social network (see Esping-Andersen, 1999; Wallace, 2005)

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THE SPIRIT OF THE CIVIL SPHERE: ACTIVATING STATIC CONCEPTIONS OF VOLUNTEERISM AND CITIZENSHIP ☆

Thomas Janoski

Explanations of volunteering have been dominated by ascriptive and structural accounts. Many ascriptive studies look at the effects of gender, race, ethnicity, and age. Structural explanations are most often based on occupational status and income with education being one of the most consistent and strongest explanatory factors. But volunteering is clearly embedded within larger social processes of the civil sphere and civil society. A wider sociological approach to volunteer behavior and organization is needed, which provides the mechanisms by which volunteering is activated and channeled in formal and especially informal groups. Explanations of

volunteering also need a wider view that includes societal, political, and activist volunteering. This chapter proposes a two-pronged approach to provide a more group-focused theory of volunteering beginning in the private sphere and then moving to the public or civil sphere.

First, using principles from public opinion research, volunteering is embedded in informal groups in social networks that sometimes emerge into social movements. People exist in informal networks of volunteers and non-volunteers with what amounts to volunteer leaders who provide information and recruit volunteers through a multi-step process. In these interpretive communities, ''being asked'' is socially organized. People from these more active networks may also meet non-volunteer networks that deaden volunteering or suggest that they should be doing something totally different (e.g., the cynical and hard-living Buffalos in Eliasoph, 1998). Voluntary leaders and sometimes activists recruit and influence volunteers to join and invest their identities in organizations. This may be mundane volunteering for church or episodic events (e.g., walk for autism, or run for the cure) or may be more activist with advocacy in political parties or demonstrations in social movements. This approach to the networks of volunteering is much more socially but informally organized in the private sphere than the previously discussed ascriptive and structural approaches to volunteering.

Second, taking a much broader focus, volunteering is embedded in three levels of the private and civil spheres that consist of (1) the private sphere of dinner table conversations with friends and family, (2) the ''civil sphere 1'' of voluntary associations and organizations, and (3) the ''civil sphere 2'' or regulatory sphere of political, media, and economic institutions. Five processes of repair, adjustment, maintenance, diminution, and degradation operate in these spheres. Civil repair and civil adjustment operate vertically within these spheres with voluntary associations that generate volunteering and then social movements that impact on the regulatory sphere to create major and minor improvements in society. Civil degradation and civil diminution are the opposite processes that create negative outcomes. Civil maintenance operates horizontally in the private and first civil sphere to provide good works under accepted (i.e., not challenging) norms. The end result is a theory of the civil sphere that makes volunteering a vertical and horizontal process that operates in the civil sphere in both radical and conservative ways.

In what follows, the first section critiques Tocquevillean and then neo-Tocquevillean theory as being too static and non-contextual. The second section presents the correction to this view by providing the informal

context of small groups with varying opinion leaders on a host of issues. One such issue involves opinion leaders in many groups connecting others to voluntary opportunities. Third, Alexander's process theory of how social movements gain civil power to engage in civil repair to create a new solidarity for society, and this is elaborated upon with a three-level view of civil society (of which the civil sphere is a part) that shows how volunteering and its more intense form in social movements leads to two processes of solidarity: (1) value maintenance or reproduction that occurs in the private sphere and the organizational sphere (e.g., everyday church, union, or community volunteering) and (2) value transformation or civil repair that occurs when movements garner enough volunteers and civil power to force a major change in society (e.g., the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, or the Jewish emergence after the holocaust). Let us turn first to the critique.

THEORIES OF VOLUNTEERING AND PARTICIPATION

Tocqueville's theory emerged from a social movement–infested society rather than from the rather bucolic and static American democracy that he sometimes portrays. And while Putnam (2001) and others try to resurrect this cooperative view of society using the concept of social capital, this approach is inadequate to explain major changes in society and, indeed, only repeats power resources theory with a different linguistic cloak.

Tocqueville's Theory of Volunteering

Tocqueville's theory probably has the strongest connection to volunteering and associations. He saw volunteering and voluntary associations as being an essential part of American democracy; however, Tocqueville had a delimited and somewhat static view of voluntary associations that results in a somewhat innocent view of the American project in the 1830s.

There were four intimately related processes that were going on at this time, and Tocqueville only focused on the first two. The four processes are (1) informal volunteering, such as community members helping others in barn raisings; (2) formal voluntary associations, as when Tocqueville refers to Americans incessant need to form associations to deal with many different types of situations; (3) voluntary association requests for help as when pioneer and communal groups pressured the state to protect them

from native Americans or the easy availability of alcohol (i.e., lobbying); and (4) voluntary association promotion as when settlers pressured the government to take lands from native Americans, survey it, and make it available for purchase (mostly through land speculators, who were often politicians). It is not the purpose of this chapter to either praise or condemn these settlers but rather to point out that there is a social context and/or interest group aspect of what they did.[1] Their actions partially involved getting the state to do something for them. Tocqueville witnessed part of the trail of tears as the Choctaws were removed from Memphis, Tennessee, in 1831:

> In the whole scene there was an air of ruin and destruction, something which betrayed a final and irrevocable adieu; one couldn't watch without feeling one's heart wrung. The Indians were tranquil, but somber and taciturn. There was one who could speak English and of whom I asked why the Chactaws were leaving their country. "To be free," he answered, I could never get any other reason out of him. We … watch the expulsion … of one of the most celebrated and ancient American peoples. Finally the old people were led on. Among them was a woman 110 years old. I have never seen a more appalling shape. She was naked save for a covering which left visible, at a thousand places, the most emaciated figure imaginable. She was escorted by two or three generations of grandchildren. To leave one's country at that age to seek one's fortune in a foreign land, what misery! Among the old people there was a young girl who had broken her arm a week before; for want of care the arm had been frozen below the fracture. Yet she had to follow the common journey." (Tocqueville's letter to his Mother, written December 25, 1831 on board The Louisville leaving Memphis; see Pierson, 1996[1938], pp. 595–98, 615)

In this and other encounters with American Indians, Tocqueville did comprehend the destruction of these tribes, but despite making an amazing number of connections between American values, institutions, and organizations, he did not connect voluntary behavior and associations with the Indian removal and social movements more generally.

In the 1830s, especially throughout New England and the Midwest, Tocqueville traveled through the United States at the height of the Second Great Awakening. He clearly saw the effects of this contextual movement and even connected them to politics: "On my arrival in the United States, the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed there, the more I perceived the great political consequences resulting from this new state of things" (Tocqueville, 2003[1840]). Thus, Tocqueville encountered elements of the "Great Awakening" of religious activity and connected them to politics.

Tocqueville viewed voluntary associations consisting of four types: voluntary political associations (e.g., political parties), voluntary civic

associations (e.g., trade or civic associations), small private associations (e.g., clubs of various sorts), and permanent associations (the township in the United States or communes in France) (Gannett, 2003, p. 2). There are many interesting issues concerning these different types of associations, but social movement organizations and activities are not part of them. The most movement oriented of these might be the sect or cult in a religious vein, since it does show activism, emotion, and a thrust toward a new objective. Tocqueville was amazed by the influence of religion on his visit, but he avoided seeing religious organizations as associations (Gannett, 2003, p. 2). But current views clearly recognize religious organizations as voluntary associations, especially in the United States.

Many of the studies of volunteering and voluntary association participation developed what one might call the "unencumbered volunteer" (Sandel, 1984). While the Tocquevillean volunteer was "encumbered" by a community and most often a family, the volunteer was not considered to be an engaged citizen. On a basic level, there are citizens who have specific needs. You may volunteer for a voluntary association because the organization benefits you (e.g., a union or professional association), your children (e.g., a PTA or one of many disability groups like the ARC), or because you are part of a minority that faces discrimination (e.g., NAACP, MALDEF, NOW, and other groups that work for African Americans, Hispanics, and women). Thus, volunteering is encumbered in two ways: (1) it is as active as the group to which it belongs (ranging from the organizational maintenance of a church or club to an activist social movement), and (2) it takes place within a larger context oriented toward particular groups and movements ranging from religious movements in the United States, union movements in Sweden, and sometimes in Germany to the remnants of colonialism in the United Kingdom and France (see the different national contexts of associational membership and volunteering in Curtis, Baer, and Grabb, 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001).

Neo-Tocquevillean Theory

Many studies of volunteers and voluntary association participation have not had much in the way of a unique theory of their own. Some studies of voluntary associations simply take up the view of organizational studies, and within sociology, presentations of voluntary associations come in the organizations and occupations section at ASA conventions. Studies of volunteering have often focused on education, family values, and sometimes

altruism or trust, but many studies have not used a ''theory of volunteering'' or ''voluntary association organization.'' But what has come to be called neo-Tocquevillean theory has done so.

Within neo-Tocquevillean theory, there are three strands represented by Robert Putnam; Mark Musick and John Wilson; and Sidney Verba, Kay Schozman, and Henry Brady. First, Putnam focuses on what social capital often divided into bonding capital in more homogenous groups and bridging capital between different types of communities. Putnam's (1994) study of Italy attributes more social capital to certain well-functioning regions of Italy than to less well-off areas. Social capital is the ability to mobilize leaders, to bring them together despite their differences, and to generate volunteerism and trust among the people in each type of community. In later books such as *Bowling Alone*, Putnam (2001) laments the decline of voluntary association membership. His active mobilizing mechanisms that promote social capital as voluntary association activities are bonding capital and bridging capital.

First, bonding capital basically refers to the sanctioned norms and values that informal groups, families, or organizations can use to create a certain amount of social control. When such values are accepted and followed, there generally is a greater amount of trust. All told, this is not a new concept as either a wider Durkheimian or a more union-oriented concept of solidarity can easily be used. Just everywhere Putnam says social capital, one could say social or group solidarity.

Second, bridging capital is a bit more useful. It is almost like having the abilities to conduct diplomacy between groups to establish some sorts of useful ties. Power brokers, boundary maintainers, liaisons, and other terms can easily refer to bridging capital. This is a useful term, but the theory of social capital does not say much about this concept in the larger scheme of society. One simply seems to visit some fortunate areas where social capital is strewn about the fields like flowers for the picking or other areas where there seem to be social capital droughts with parched earth.

Opportunity structures or power resources seem to capture many of these same concepts. Even in Bourdieu's hands, social and cultural capital seem to present the same power resources to get something done, usually to benefit the elites in society. Is ''capital'' simply a ''resource''? If there is something intrinsically useful about borrowing a term from economics that denotes some kind of investment in a person, organization, or goal, then where exactly is the investment? If the investment is the same as an outcome, then the intrinsic meaning of ''capital'' is tautological. Human capital makes sense as an investment to secure another outcome, but too often, social

capital is an advantageous network structure that explains itself. This theory is more of a typology of resources than an explanation of volunteering.

Second, John Wilson and Mark Musick (1997) analyze volunteering using the social and cultural capital concepts. The authors construct an integrated theory of formal and informal volunteer work based on volunteer work being (1) "productive work that requires human capital" measured by education, income, and health; (2) "collective behavior that requires social capital" measured by the number of children in the household and informal social interaction; and (3) "ethically guided work that requires cultural capital" measured by religiosity. Using two waves of panel data, they find that formal volunteering and informal helping are related but differ in some ways in their connections to human, social, and cultural capital. Human (children in the household), social (informal social interaction), and cultural (religiosity) capital cause formal volunteering and may indirectly cause informal volunteering. Human capital (health), gender, and age cause informal helping of neighbors or church members. This establishes some hierarchy between formal and informal volunteering, but this is not exactly a theory.[2]

But when Musick and Wilson (2008, p. 532) assemble their impressive review of volunteering in a 663-page tome, they abandon social capital "because of its nebulous quality." What "post-social capital theory" do they develop about volunteering in advanced industrial societies after summarizing the vast array of work done in this area? They define volunteering in a rather formal way as unpaid work connected to an organization, usually a non-profit or voluntary association but also including volunteers at government agencies. Musick and Wilson focus on (1) subjective dispositions such as personality, motives, values, attitudes, and norms; (2) individual resources such as class, income, education, time, health, gender, and race; (3) the social context of volunteering including the life course, social resources, volunteer recruitment, schools, congregations, communities, neighborhoods, cities, and regions; (4) cross-national differences in volunteering and trends over time in volunteering; (5) the organization of volunteering in terms of volunteer tasks and roles; and (6) the consequences of volunteering including occupations, income, social mobility, health, citizenship, and pro-social behavior. They do a masterful job in delineating the work done on voluntary associations over the past few decades reviewing numerous ethnographic studies and thousands of quantitative studies. And they provide their own analyses of a large number of data sets themselves with many over 100 regression equations on a website. They conclude that volunteering is a very important aspect of society, one that by its very voluntary nature is connected to each

individual's valued needs and desires. Throughout the book, they make mention of the various gaps in the literature that provide possibilities and opening for new research. One might ask, what more could be discussed on the topic of volunteering?

Musick and Wilson (2008, p. 218) mention social networks in their discussion of the social context. Although "(s)ocial resources add richness and complexity to our explanation of volunteer behavior" what really matters is "not only what is going on in people's minds or how many individual resources they have but who they know and who they mix with on a routine basis." This points to the importance of social networks, but they note "(t)his fact is often obscured by social survey methods, which focus on the individual as the unit of analysis" (p. 218). They go on to mention a variety of social networks: "peer groups" that are social networks of youths (pp. 232–236), "informal social networks" concerning friends and family (pp. 268–270), and social networks more generally (pp. 139, 190–191, 206–207, 214, 267, 278, 284–286, 470–471, 492, 528–529).

Volunteers is not expressly a theoretical work, though there is much theory in it, but it does help advance theory in two areas. First, they demonstrate that theories of social capital, if you can pin down the actual theory, are really resource theories much like "resource mobilization theory" in social movements, "power resources theory" in political sociology, and "social support theory" in a variety of areas that use social psychological approaches. What is really needed are connections from resources to the larger society, and they often mention social networks as a way to do this. But social networks, though often referred to as a theory, are not. Second, they connect social networks to the larger society when they say that "if we interact frequently with other members of our social group or community we develop a sense of solidarity with them" and that this "makes it more likely we will respond to calls to volunteer on behalf of that group (p. 218). However, they do not systematically connect social networks to the larger society, and their discussion of this area is somewhat brief as they move on to other topics in their "social profile." Nonetheless, connecting social networks to solidarity in a Durkheimian sense (or legitimacy in a Weberian approach) gets beyond the gap between theories of volunteering and society as a whole.[3]

Third, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady in *Voice and Equality* are mainly interested in political participation, and they have little interest in building an overall theory of volunteering. However, they take an unusually sociological path toward explaining political participation. They find that voluntary association participation and volunteering build pre-political or "civic skills," especially in churches and more so in mainstream Protestant

denominations. While this could fit into the category of social or other types of capital, it targets a more dynamic aspect of leading to political volunteering and participation (i.e., voting is not really volunteering) that leads to political party work and social movement activity. This gives a new meaning or at least emphasizes an implicit view of the civil rights movement portrayed by Aldon Morris (1984) in his work. The church with members being ushers, giving epistles, raising funds, and serving on committees are the pre-political skills that enable protests, demonstrations, and overall strategies for social change. While most voluntary associations are pre-political in maintaining or emphasizing current solidarities or building new solidarities, but in either case, volunteering and related associations create the civic skills that activate greater participation in society and stronger (but sometimes competing) social solidarities. How this dynamic develops is the subject of extending this a theory of volunteering in the next sections of this chapter.

Each of these three approaches makes different contributions. The social capital approach (more the community-oriented than the individual approach) has activated volunteerism to a larger social realm with its plea for more social capital in the community. The volunteering approach of Musick and Wilson addresses, albeit in somewhat short passages, two aspects of social organization: first, the social networks of people interacting with each other on a daily or weekly basis, and second, the social organization of the civil or public sphere in civil society, which now, more than the past, operates in conjunction with the state. Both of these approaches to volunteering are overlooked because of the dominant methods used in looking at volunteering focus on the social bases of class, race, gender, religion, or ethnicity. And the *Voice and Equality* authors give us a bridge to activism through their pre-political and civil skills approach.

However, future studies in this area should take two different and complementary directions that focus much more on process than on structure. The first is a specific form of the organization of social networks, and the second is a multi-leveled view of civil society that combines volunteering with political participation and social movements. Let us first proceed in the social network direction.

RE-BUILDING VOLUNTEERING AND PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS

Compared to a number of areas in the social sciences, the social organization of voluntary activity has come rather late. Social movement

scholars dropped their spontaneous approach long ago and have embraced the social organization of the most seemingly random acts of protests, demonstrations, and riots. These activities are led by human leaders not by some instinct of the crowd. The organization literature recognized that formal organization by managers and other rule makers had a rather strong "other side" of informal organization. Why wouldn't this social organization, sometimes referred to "informal organization" or the "informal group," affect volunteering and voluntary association participation? This section reviews these other approaches (organizations and public opinion in political sociology) and then takes up how this could be applied to volunteering.

The Group-Based Roots of the Civil Sphere

Since the bank wiring room experiment discovered the informal group (Homans, 1950), individual activities can be viewed in the context of social networks. Theories of volunteering and civil society tend to ignore this, but volunteers do form social networks in finding out about voluntary opportunities, in doing various volunteer jobs, and in recruiting other volunteers. These networks become the basis for creating or maintaining various kinds of social norms that encourage volunteering or frown upon it.

These networks can be linked to Paul Lazarsfeld and associates' first scientific studies of public opinion and voting (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) that found that voting was not an isolated phenomenon. Instead, various friends, family members, neighbors, and work associates interacted with any particular voter in sometimes different ways. They established four important principles: (1) *mass media overloads most citizens* – the mass media present a constant flow of information on many topics, which is too much for most people; (2) *some pay attention more than others* – certain people called opinion leaders or influentials pay attention to certain topics including politics, especially as it is covered in the media (Weimann 1982, 1994); (3) *those who don't pay attention listen to those who do* – people in social networks pay attention to their opinion leaders and use information or interpretations that they provide;[4] and (4) *opinion leaders become influential* – those opinion leaders become influential in their social networks by interpreting mass media content for the other people in the group (Katz, 1957). But the Columbia school of the 1940s and 1950s was superseded by the Michigan school that focused on a more psychological approach with

the media directly influencing voters through framing and emotional appeals.

However, since 1990, a group of political scientists has updated Lazarsfeld and colleagues (Mutz, 2002a, 2002b, 2006; Mutz & Mondak, 2006, Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Zuckerman, 2005). They and others proposed three major modifications to the original theory: (1) there are a variety of media, (2) that create different interpretive communities, and this leads to (3) multiple opinion leaders and the circular flow of information. Since the 1940s and 1950s, media sources have expanded immensely. One no longer confronts a homogenous group of media since there are AM, FM, satellite radio hundreds of TV channels, newspapers and magazines, e-mail, and millions of websites. In Mutz & Martin's (2001) study of exposure to opposing views, they found that most dissimilar views came from newspapers followed by television news and news magazines. Talk shows showed a marked decline in the diversity of opinion (e.g., Rush Limbaugh), and the workplace showed a small amount of dissimilar views. And the internet is now making mass media into an almost personal media. Consequently, people in small groups attend to different types of media that they report back to among themselves. While in the 1930s and 1940s the newspapers and the radio were it, now there are a bewildering variety of media outlets.

Second, there are multiple opinion leaders through which there is a circular flow of information managed by multiple opinion leaders. One may be an opinion leader on health care, another person in your group may be an opinion leader on the economy, and another on foreign affairs. Based on multiple opinion leaders, the two-step flow morphed into a multi-step flow and then into the circular flow. Thus, to some degree, the transmission process of media becomes more interactive and less hierarchical (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005, p. 200; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Mondak, 1995; Robinson, 1976; Robinson & Levy, 1986).

Third, this creates interpretive and challenging communities. In interpretative communities, people talk to each other about what is in the media. These groups – marriage partners, families and kin, some established neighborhoods, closely knit voluntary associations (e.g., some small churches or larger churches that employ small groups for faith sharing), and some work groups – tend to be homogenous in terms of education, occupation, income, and race (Jeffres, Atkin, & Neuendorf, 2002, p. 414). Beck, Dalton, Greene, and Huckfeldt (2002, p. 68) show that ''perceived discussants'' (what the respondent ''thinks'' his discussant believes) are the strongest factor in determining presidential vote, and

''actual discussants'' (discussant opinions as the discussant actually states them) were stronger for Democrats than Republicans. They tested a host of TV, newspaper, organizational, and other factors and controlled for socio-economic status and religious factors. They also found that about 60% of people had politically partisan social networks, and 30% had non-partisan or indifferent social networks. Voluntary association interactions showed more similar views, and their three top discussant partners showed the most similar views. Thus, while a majority of discussion networks have a strong focus on politics, there are about a third of networks that do not form a strong opinion, and some of these are somewhat apolitical (i.e., they are oriented toward entertainment, religion, sports, or other issues).

In challenging communities, people encounter diverse opinions. Not all groups are homogenous. While a few work groups are homogenous in their attitudes, most work groups, especially at larger organizations, tend to consist of cross-cutting social circles. Democrats meet Republicans, Christian Democrats meet Social Democrats and even right wing party members. It is in these workplace encounters that the most diverse political dialog takes place (Mutz & Mondak, 2006). Especially important are (1) the simple exposure to different views and (2) the simple contests that often occur when one person mentions the strength of their side or the weakness of the other that may have just appeared in the media. These are clearly not full blown debates, but more like ''what did you think of Hillary Clinton's speech last night'' or ''did you see Sarah Pallin's first interview?'' This debate is mostly civil, but it sometimes flares up for few minutes. These interpretations may be positive (e.g., reinforcement from the friends in your group) or negative (e.g., opposition form opinion leaders for an opposing group). They are important in how we form our attitudes, opinions, and eventually our behavior.

Clearly, a theory of volunteering and participation in the public sphere should reflect these same processes whether they are volunteering for church clean-up or social movement demonstrations. Especially important is the opinion leader or influential who is often responsible for ''asking someone to volunteer.'' Among friends, family, or workmates, there may be an informal network of people who may frequently or rarely discuss volunteering. Among some informal groups, people discuss various volunteering activities, what they found interesting, what they did not like, and what they did over the weekend. Secular volunteering is more likely to be discussed, but religious volunteering will also enter in at times depending on the context. The discussion group forms a set of norms about

Fig. 1. Social Networks Where Influentials Inform and Establish Norms Concerning Volunteering (OL = Opinion Leader).

volunteering. It can be very favorable to volunteering, oblivious to it, or hostile to contributing your time and efforts. One's network of close friends and family establishes an interpretive community or network oriented toward volunteering. These networks are infrequently voluntaristic cells, but much more often networks with moderate or weak orientations toward volunteering. Not everyone belongs to a volunteering network, but this would be a variable that would be tested, and then its applicability would be subject to empirical verification. Fig. 1 shows how the opinion leader, who may be different persons for religion or union organizing, as the central figure (marked "OL") in volunteering networks.

In the informal group in these social networks, there are often people who are members of voluntary associations, and among them, there are people who actively volunteer. Certain opinion leaders may be connected to voluntary associations, and they then become opinion leaders about membership and volunteering to the other members of the informal group. There may also be multiple volunteer opinion leaders, and they provide information on a number of groups. An informal hierarchy of opinion leaders also exists with community leaders who organize specific volunteering events.[5]

The volunteer leaders provide information about voluntary associations and activities at one level and then communicate to their informal group.

But members of the group may also get information directly from mail, e-mail, and phone calls. They may also talk to acquaintances. Therefore, the flow may be from direct media to interpretive opinion leader with concrete experience to members of the informal group (i.e., finding out about voluntary activities), or it can be between informal group members and then they encounter the opinion leader. Furthermore, these circumstances may lead to local framing and deliberation producing even more deeply held results (Druckman & Nelson, 2003).

Volunteer opinion leaders may often recruit members of their social networks to volunteer. This most often is not an activist push, but rather something that evolves over time. If someone expresses sympathy or admiration for one's volunteering, a volunteer leader may suggest that they volunteer. Or it might be a request at an activity that is interesting or has a special need. Usually, the request is about relatively light work. A brother could ask a sister for help when he is overwhelmed with a fundraising auction held by a voluntary association. Sometimes, the request may be directly from the organization as with the second voluntary association as in Fig. 1. For instance, a minister or priest will actively preach about the values of good works and directly ask people to formally sign up for church or parish activities. Or the request could come in a letter, e-mail message, or on TV. Sometimes, the voluntary association has an activist push for more volunteers as when a Habitat for Humanity group starts a new house and needs volunteers. Thus, "being asked" goes beyond the realm of structural characteristics of education and membership to the molding process of membership and volunteering. In Musick and Wilson, "being asked" seemed to come out of nowhere. In this approach, "being asked" comes out of informal and formal groups, often from a volunteer opinion leader.

As with politics, there may be a negative form of being asked. This may occur in more diverse groups where one person is discussing how they volunteered for their group, and this instigates volunteering with the opposite group. For instance, an anti-abortionist talking about volunteering may cause a pro-lifer to contact her group to volunteer and perhaps cancel out her workmate's efforts. Or it could be less combative. The work group member who volunteers for the "Jesus Prom" for mentally challenged adults done by one church may prompt a member of another church to think "why don't we do something like that?" This may result in organizing somewhat competitive volunteering opportunities.[6] Thus, volunteering is explained by informal networks and processes of communication with informal voluntary leaders.

A FRAMEWORK OF VOLUNTEERING AND PARTICIPATION

Studies of civil society have focused too much on the socio-economic status explanations of these phenomena. More effort needs to go into the mechanisms and institutional processes by which these phenomena occur. This involves the mechanisms of membership and volunteering in social networks, but it also refers to the intentions of voluntary associations, social movements, interest groups, and political parties in trying to cause some sort of change.

To remedy Tocqueville's myopia toward mundane volunteering that is embedded in social contexts, all forms of volunteering and voluntary association activity should be considered within larger contexts of religious, union, corporate, or state contexts of civil society. This includes belonging to voluntary associations, volunteering for voluntary association activities, but it also includes all forms of political participation, some of which fits the voluntary categories just mentioned, but also includes voting, campaigning, contributing money to campaigns, holding office, and so forth. Even more importantly, it should include social movement participation and activism. There is no reason that we should separate these different forms of participation. In their conclusion, Musick and Wilson (2008, pp. 517–521) criticize the way the political aspects of volunteering are avoided, especially by upper class charity groups and by historians. And finally, political parties are voluntary associations and their very lifeblood is the volunteering of their party faithful and perhaps others. Why have a wall between volunteering for churches and service organizations, and social movements and political participation? In the end, we need to discuss both the integrative aspects of volunteering (al la Tocqueville and Durkheim) and the more activist and structural parts of it too (Weber and Marx).

The Civil Sphere Approach to Volunteering and Participation

Operationalizing Civil Society
Janoski (1998, pp. 112–114) maps out public, private, market and state spheres in a structural but still static way. It is useful to conceptualize the different size and power of these spheres in various countries and to approximate the greater or lesser overlap of each sphere. However, this does not give a very dynamic picture of what is going on in civil society, especially large changes that change peoples' level of citizenship.

Another attempt to get an idea of the strength of the public sphere came in mapping the social networks of various anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant groups, parties, and institutions in civil society (Witte, 1996). In trying to predict the number of immigrant deaths over a 20-year period, it appeared that the denser the network of groups and institutions in a society such as the Netherlands led to fewer immigrant deaths while a much less dense network of groups led to more deaths in France and Germany. The United Kingdom and United States were in between. This density of groups in the civil sphere directly connects to voluntary associations and volunteering at the service and the political levels. This approach could look at the dynamics of social network change at the macro level in a society or in a particular community. But some groups are more important than others at certain times, or they are at least momentarily strategic. As a result, this network approach, though useful, does not quite capture the interaction of groups and institutions.

Alexander (2006) proposes a process model of how the civil sphere is activated to make a major change in social solidarity (Fig. 2). Movement from one solidarity to another requires changes in group identity that motivate a social movement that seeks a major change. To get that change, they need to invoke some sort of civil power by motivating communicative


Fig. 2. A Process Account of Alexander's Theory of the Civil Sphere.

institutions to communicate a translational moment engendering empathy from or emotional shifting of public opinion and some fundamental values. This creates the emotional energy to motivate civil power to create civil repair, which involves a fundamental change in social and cultural values, and a shift in regulatory institutions (e.g., state legislation and/or economic shifts). The state and economy overlap partially with this to provide some aspects of the change and then also some aspects of the new situation. However, political economy is not the primary force for change, which is the job of civil power. Alexander presents a cultural explanation for these major changes, but it does not need to be made purely cultural.[7] As a result, economic and political changes could very well play an important instigating role in change too.

Alexander's work is explicitly cultural, but one can see how political economy factors could easily fit into his theory. For instance, the organization of social movements is lightly touched upon. The civil rights movement in the United States can clearly use resource mobilization and political economy theories to explain how the movement was organized through the churches and then with contributions from the North. Concerning the Jewish question, resource mobilization and power resources were certainly important in the formation of Israel and the transportation of hundreds of thousands of Jews to form a society under a Zionist state. One can argue about the relative importance of the ''the chicken and the egg'' of ideas and resources, but clearly both play a role.

Levels of Civil Society

To elaborate Alexander's approach to the civil sphere, one may consider a three-layered view of civil society. This contextualizes volunteering and voluntary membership into the larger civil sphere. It integrates some of Habermas (1989), Alexander, Janoski, Verba, Brady, and Schlozman's work into a more multi-level process model. These layers are mapped out in Fig. 3.

It relies on the civil sphere instead of civil society. This is because civil society includes the market sphere of paid work, and this approach to volunteering does not find them to be a major player until they enter into the public sphere. Civil society is also not used because previous theories focus too much on an oppressive state and often ignore oppressive market controls and private corporations. And although the civil and public spheres are largely the same thing, I use Alexander's civil sphere because I will use some of his other concepts later.[8] There are three levels to this approach.

Fig. 3. The Volunteering, Voluntary Association Participation, and Political Activism in the Civil Society.

1. From "categories" to "informal groups." First, there are the structural categories that each of us as individuals live – our largely ascriptive situations and labels. We have a certain gender, age, ethnicity, or race. These are clearly ascriptive. Second, we also have a certain class and religious membership, which are not totally ascriptive but more often than not they have a strong tendency to be passed down from one generation to another. Third, we have a certain status toward the state concerning whether we are citizens or not. This is often due to

immigration laws and also includes naturalization laws that give us full membership or not. This status can also be affected by criminal sentencing that in some countries takes away rights during imprisonment and afterwards. In the center of the parallelogram is the private sphere where we with our families and friends may sit together to eat dinner and discuss the world about us – a sort of mini-public sphere that assesses to some degree our kin and informal group opinions. And Stoker and Jennings (2005) show that men and women in marriages are most often their own decisive discussion partners on politics and other issues.

It is here that one might ask whether people will go on to participate in a civil or public sphere through volunteering, joining associations, voting, protesting, or otherwise engaging in public action. Verba, Brady, and Scholzman's three negative explanations of why people participate are relevant here (items 1, 2, and 3 between levels 1 and 2 in Fig. 3). First, as to "motivation," they mention peoples' responses that they "don't want to." This fits with Musick and Wilson's "values" in that one may not participate because the association simply does not interest or benefit them. Second, they do not have the capacities to participate or the "can't do it." Not all people have the time, money, or skills to participate. For instance, we would not have the skills to be a professional in a free legal clinic or free medical clinic. Or people in wheelchairs (and many others) might have difficulty fighting wild fires in mountainous or rocky terrain. And third, it may be that "nobody asked." This is more group-oriented and bespeaks of one's social networks. If one belongs to a voluntary association that is active in the community, it is highly likely that they will be asked to volunteer. If one belongs to a church or union, they most likely will be asked. The positive aspects of Verba, Brady, and Scholzman's approach lead to people having the motivation, the capacities, and the social networks that lead them to belong and volunteer. But they need to enter into these organizations and participate in them. Then, the more they belong and volunteer, the larger their networks of like-minded people become.

2. From "informal groups" to the "civil sphere." In level 2, intermediate change groups or voluntary associations try to improve some aspect of political or social life. These groups range from political parties to teachers and intellectuals in schools and universities. It also includes social movements, trade unions, firms, and interest groups. People volunteer in all sorts of groups, and Verba, Brady, and Schlozman show how these groups build pre-political skills in a number of ways. Churches for instance have their members read the epistles in front of

congregations, which goes a long way toward bolstering public speaking skills that may lay fallow until the time comes for secular activities. Furthermore, nearly all these organizations engage in fundraising, which causes people to ask others from friends to strangers for money. It is not a stretch to ask them to support a social movement or political candidate. Thus, although volunteering and participation do not make everyone politically active, they do create a reservoir of skilled volunteers who may then more effectively engage in promoting democracy or other worthy causes. But this can also happen in a negative way. For instance, the "anti-immigrant" Freedom Party in Austria and KKK in the American South recruited volunteers, and the associations of these groups (often in sports or cultural groups) fed into these movements too. Thus, not all volunteers are acting on the behalf of inclusive or civil causes.

While people can belong to many different groups that could change society (from churches to football fan clubs, to the singing associations maligned by Weber and praised by Putnam), the groups I have just mentioned (i.e., social movements, trade unions, and interest groups) are more often in the fray (Edwards, 2004, p. 19). These members and volunteers operate in these intermediate groups in "civil sphere 1" where they vote, volunteer, participate in service voluntary associations, and often contribute to their own communities and political campaigns.

And just as there is a transition between the private sphere and the larger organizational or community civil sphere, there is a transition between intermediate change groups and larger regulative institutions (see items 1, 2, and 3 between levels 2 and 3 in Fig. 3).[9] First, intellectuals develop new ideas to guide these groups or adapt older established ideas to new situations. According to Alexander (2006), it is particularly important that leaders of various groups "translate" particular ideas and claims that their groups may have into more "universalistic ideals" that can be absorbed in the societal civil sphere or civil sphere 2. In many ways, repackaging a particular group message in a much more universalistic way is critical as to whether various groups receive positive attention in the media. Second, the social movements, parties, and groups need effective organization. Just in the nominations of a Democratic presidential candidate within the civil sphere, the organization of the campaigns of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were quite different (Lizza, 2008, 2007). And third, organizations and associations need the resources to get their messages across, to build their organizations, and to finance their activities.

3. From "groups and movements" to the "larger civil sphere." The third level is that of regulative institutions. These consist of the state or government that passes legislation, the law as a separate institution with its courts and cases, and the media, which has a major impact on how the various parties are perceived. Also included here are economic institutions that do not determine non-economic outcomes, but they certainly have a strong effect in terms of predicting how resources are generated and how much they will be. This includes economic growth, trade balances, and employment among other things. They also have a strong impact on economic changes. In the center is the societal or civil sphere 2 that consists of a country's public opinion, discourses, and debates involving institutional changes and their cultural values.

Discourse and debates are held within this field in a way that has important outcomes, but one should be careful to delimit these processes. Each discourse involves policy domains that consist of actors who have a direct interest in the policy with some affected by the policy being left out. Those relatively unaffected by the policy are definitely left out. Thus, employers, labor unions, and economists will be concerned about labor market policies in a labor market domain; ethnic and racial groups, churches, state governors, and representatives from the south and liberals from the north were concerned about civil rights policies; hospital associations, medical associations, insurance companies, labor unions, and employers are concerned about medical policy; state department, veterans groups, certain ethnic groups, certain corporations, the military, and others are concerned about foreign policy, and so forth. Thus, not all members of each sphere are involved in the discourse over a certain policy. Instead, there is a policy domain that privileges certain interests for that discussion. David Knoke and his colleagues have effectively mapped out the networks of these players in three different policy domains (Knoke, Pappi, Broadbent, & Tsujinaka, 1996).[10]

This diagram is inspired in a number of ways on Jeffrey Alexander's civil sphere, though he does not use diagrams. In it, he proposes a cultural theory that goes along with the political economics of resources and organizations. The three levels proposed here go beyond his approach but incorporate many of his ideas.

Processes that Operate in and between Spheres
Five different processes flow through these levels: civil repair, civil adjustment, civil maintenance, civil degradation, and civil diminution.

He advances civil repair throughout his book but spends little time on "facilitating input" and "destructive intrusion" (2006, pp. 205–209) though he refers to what could be called destructive intrusion throughout the book, especially concerning the Jewish question. But these alternative processes are filled out in more detail by first using civil degradation as the opposite process that creates the divisions that civil repair creates in the first place. Then, "civil maintenance" replaces his "civil solidarity" because value reinforcement can be solidaristic or it can be a bit less solidifying as social conventions. Also, to avoid the binary bounce between repair and degradation, I add two categories of civil adjustment and civil diminution that illustrate the volunteering processes or voluntary association pressures than are actually more common that the social movement inspired changes in society. These changes, while not revolutionary, are still important triumphs or disasters for smaller but significant movements. The next section summarizes one of Alexander's two extended examples of civil repair based on the civil rights movement in the United States.[11]

Civil Repair.   The civil rights movement built on the social networks of black Americans in the African-American church, which was a near total institution in the South since it was one of the few black organizations that was not systematically persecuted. Christian ideology protected it to a large degree. While many young men avoided the church, it provided a strong institutional base for most others in black society. As a result, social networks were very strong. Following Aldon Morris' (1984) account, the legal strategy of the NAACP led white leaders in the south to persecute and find reasons to outlaw this organization. This made the church the only effective organization that could take on issues of inequality. While this was not the church's traditional role, it began to recruit black pastors who could carry the struggle forward. Martin Luther King was expressly hired or approved to lead this effort. Much of this follows Aldon Morris' (1984) resource mobilization and political economy approach.

   In passing from stage 1 of the structural category of race and gender to stage 2 of intermediate change groups, the church provided motivation ("You want to") and the operationalization of social networks ("we are asking"). Instead of "nobody asked," many people started asking and were quite persistent. In terms of capacities, for those who claimed that they had none ("can't do it"), church leaders provided training for specific non-violent tasks and support efforts in the organization so that they "can do it." But by and large, this was still a local organization and effort.

The critical issue according to Alexander was gaining resources and organizational support beyond their own members. Initially, this was tried concerning white churches, white voluntary associations, and the media in the South (2006, pp. 265–391). This proved to be ineffectual as the white churches rebuffed the black churches and the southern Newspapers belittled their efforts. Martin Luther King turned to the North, but the North and its media had turned a deaf ear to their efforts in the past. What could be different at this point in time? To get the North's attention, he had to portray the particular ideas of civil rights movement (fair treatment, access to jobs, and sanctity of their lives) as more universalistic ideas in the civil sphere of the American nation as a whole. This was not a struggle to eliminate particular injustices, this was a human struggle of all people to obtain their rights within a democratic framework when the constitution and the laws of the nation were being ignored. To state their points even further, King violated racist state laws that often put him in jail but would not ever consider violating a federal law since his target was the universalistic support of the federal government and its constitution. He would try to reach the president and possibly the federal courts.

But the civil rights movement had to move the civil sphere in their direction with universalistic appeals to public opinion. Simple appeals would not work since they had been amply ignored in the past. The movement would have to make these universalistic appeals through dramatic narratives that could be shown on television and in the headlines of Northern newspapers with wide distribution. This would then put the pressure on Northern politicians to do something to help them. The movement designed a number of struggles that got coverage in the media including the Montgomery bus boycott, lunch counter sit-ins, the Freedom bus rides, and the less successful Albany protests. But from this last failure, King and his organizers realized that to create the dramatic impact they needed to get on public opinion, they needed an unstable and violent chief of police (unlike the Albany Chief Laurie Pritchard). They found what they needed in Sheriff Bull Connor in Birmingham and Sheriff James Clark in Selma Alabama. Bull Connor turned the attack dogs lose and used high-powered fire hoses on high school and middle school protesters, and James Clark sent his flying wedges of his police through the demonstrators on US Route 80 crushing bones and skulls with police batons. Both events were widely reported on TV and in the newspapers, and they horrified the public in the North. Citizens contacted their senators stating that "These Gestapo tactics simply do not happen in America," and 80% of the Senators condemned them (including many but not all southern senators). Although

the events and protests continued, Martin Luther King and his organizers had moved Northern public opinion in the public sphere. This was now a universalistic event involving basic human rights, and Alexander refers to the media coverage and the legislation that followed as a process of civil repair. Not all civil repairs need to follow this exact pattern, but they must hit at least two or three of the regulative institutions to have a major effect.

Civil Adjustment. The civil repair involved with the civil rights movement is a well-known example that brought about major changes through a large social movement concerning major human rights violations. But similar actions take place at other levels with less successful but not unimportant results, and this is "civil adjustment" (a term not mentioned by Alexander). For example, parents of mentally challenged children belonged to parental support groups and voluntary associations such as the National Down Syndrome Congress and the ARC formerly known as the Association of Retarded Citizens. Each group is expressly non-political and can lose its tax exempt status if they engage in outright politics. Nonetheless, these groups have relied on dramatic events, usually with parents testifying before conventions to motivate other parents in social networks, and before congress to motivate politicians to change legislation. This testimony is as dramatic and universalistic as the civil rights movement. And there are these voluntary associations that create new laws such as the one allowing the "least restrictive environment" in state schooling, which has made a major difference for students with mental challenges. Thus, less publicized but equally dramatic groups have also taken a similar course through the three levels of the civil sphere.

Civil Maintenance. The activities in the civil sphere need not always be involved with a major social movement effort involving civil repair. Volunteering and voluntary associations may go a long way toward promoting consensus and trust within the civil sphere. These actions are much more in the area of supporting existing social norms and values, and they may range from intense social solidarities to more mundane conventions in society.[12] For this reason, this is represented by the circular arrows (a) and (b) in Fig. 3 that connect the various forms of everyday volunteering with the organizations that sponsor them. The voluntary associations involved facilitate the activities necessary for smooth social integration. Instead of directly challenging the state or parts of it, voluntary associations complement state activities. Or from another regulatory perspective, they can support the dominant economic regime,

and this is why corporations often promote volunteering with civil maintenance but not activism with civil repair. This is represented by the circular arrows (c) and (d) in Fig. 3. Civil maintenance may happen in a number of ways. For instance, various self-help and service groups may band together to provide their constituencies with advice on how to understand, apply for, and navigate government programs (Lundstrom & Svedberg, 2003). In times of crisis, many of these groups will band together to support disaster relief and promote patriotic values that establish solidarity. For instance, the AARP, the VFW, the American Legion, and the Red Cross were involved with disaster relief during the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This was followed by an intense social solidarity built around volunteering and patriotism. Other times, civil maintenance is much less intense and involves charity work and pleas for financial contributions. Economic interests are involved with employee groups, but they also consult with politicians and government concerning their roles in dealing with the economy and their own conduct (professional groups from doctors, lawyers, and accountants). Perhaps closer to social movements than voluntary associations, a number of groups organized for change still provide their members with information on their connections to social and public policies (e.g., women's groups from NOW to Women for Women International, environmental groups from the friends of a local park to Greenpeace, and justice groups such as the ACLU, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch). And churches, synagogues, temples, and mosques bring people together in a strong sense of spirituality in a private sphere of one's relationship to God, but they have also entered into the public or civil sphere to pursue or prevent government policies, and to influence public opinion. Most of these activities are more horizontal than vertical.

Civil Degradation.   Civil processes may also evolve in a negative way that leads to serious divisions in society. The 1890s enactment of Jim Crow laws in the South of the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. The nationalistic movements in the former Yugoslavia showed many of the destructive aspects of civil degradation with not only new divisions but also ethnic cleansing and mass murders. Clearly, one should not present a theory of volunteering in civil society that relies only on volunteering for good or at least neutral causes. These segregated and divisive movements can be highly effective gatherings of volunteers and true believers. These divisive transformation processes use particularistic rather than universalistic arguments, and the end result can be a form of domination. This makes

the civil sphere less open to the principles of universalistic citizenship principles.

Civil Diminution.   This is a lesser form of civil degradation. These processes are when politics produces corrupt deals between politicians and those who seek particularistic favors or even bribes. Individual legislators may obtain preferential treatment for their districts through particularistic "ear-marks." However, these exceptions or immunities written into laws are not held up to the light of the civil sphere and public opinion. They are not translated into universalistic language because if they were, they would cause a furor. Also, private firms and interest groups can get particularistic exemptions, immunities, or other favors written into laws for their own particularistic benefit. Thus, one should not make the mistake of considering all politics as taking place in universalistic terms in the public sphere.

Vertical and Horizontal Relationships
These four processes work differently and how they relate to Putnam and Granovetter. In *civil repair*, vertical relationships between levels are important. For the repair process to work, social action must proceed from level 1, through level 2, and ultimately operate in level 3. In civil repair, horizontal elements also have a role in forging solidarity or at least value maintenance at levels 1 and 2, but the process does not work unless the movement goes vertically through all three levels. Clearly, social networks in this model must rely on Putnam's "bridging capital" between groups and institutions, which has a strong connection to Granovetter's concept of "weak ties." In the opposite direction in *civil maintenance*, horizontal relationships are strongest within levels are important to maintain values though vertical elements remain. This fits with Putnam's "bonding capital" and Granovetter "strong ties." The process of *civil adjustment* is in between the two other approaches. It is moderately horizontal and moderately vertical. There is less social movement impact on society, but there is some that gains moderate social change, and there is a significant amount of bonding and strong ties within groups.

   Sometimes, civil maintenance is criticized as being conservative; however, both vertical and horizontal processes are needed to maintain an effective society. No society can be in a permanent revolution. Some values need to be maintained while a few of them can be changed through civil repair. Kristin Goss and Theda Skocpol presents the example of NOW, which told its members to avoid civil maintenance volunteering because it reinforced

patriarchal values in society. Instead, women should engage in carefully targeted civil repair to change women's roles in education, economics, and politics. This had some unforeseen consequences in that women's groups started to testify less for many important issues concerning caring, medical treatments, and family issues (Goss & Skocpol, 2006).

But here the point is that all societies need both order and change, and civil maintenance with all the implications of Tocqueville's ideas of social order and the benefits of horizontal volunteering are indeed valuable. And at the same time, so are vertical relations of civil repair. These processes operate quite differently in diversely structured societies. Sweden has more union influence, and Germany has stronger tri- or bipartite institutions (works councils, codetermination, etc.), but this process model should be able to accommodate them.

CONCLUSION

Volunteering needs to have a more prominent position in theories of sociology, the civil sphere, and politics. As such, it places in such a position at the levels of social interaction, group interaction, and institutional regulation. This approach points to two somewhat new (though clearly borrowed) approaches to the social bases of volunteering. One has been through the social creation of volunteering activities in small groups with opinion leaders, and the other looks at how the civil sphere is organized in both horizontal and vertical ways to support volunteering and activism to achieve a new society or to maintain democratic processes already established. These processes can be done through civil repair, civil adjustment, civil maintenance, and civil degradation.

This points toward developing more specific mechanisms in the civil sphere that mobilize people to volunteer to solve everyday needs and to engage in contentious politics in social movements. This approach is not a harsh critique of the past. All this past work has been necessary and quite valuable. However, Musick and Wilson's massive review of this literature points to a many holes, especially group and social gaps, that can be filled. It is time to move forward with a new agenda that looks more extensively at how volunteering and participation is socially organized through opinion leaders and informal groups in the contexts of different types of civil spheres and civil societies.

NOTES

1. The approach of Omi and Winant would see this social movement activity as a "racial project." In some ways, the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of 'celebratory' pioneers as land hungry and politicians as 'land speculators' as greedy. Immigration feeds into this process in its continual demand for more land whether it comes from immigrants themselves or from second or third generation immigrants (then considered natives) who move west due to overcrowding and competition. Even many of the American presidents were land speculators (Thomas Jefferson for one was a speculator but apparently not very good at it.)

2. In the end, one is inclined to agree with Furstenburg and Kaplan (2004, p. 219) that "social capita, while attractive, is being used so promiscuously that it is on the verge of becoming quite useless in empirical research." The Putnam approach is overly optimistic and the Bourdieu approach adds a major dose of pessimism through inequality, but neither provides a comprehensive "sociological theory of volunteering."

3. Reversing themselves from an earlier work in the *American Sociological Review* (2004), they avoid using "social capital" (2008, p. 532) "because of its nebulous quality" but they do address the debate about the "alleged decline in social capital." And they state that volunteering is certainly not declining (2008, p. 533).

4. Keller and Berry (2003) provide an even more forceful statement with their book titled *The Influentials: One American in Ten Tells the Other Nine How to Vote, Where to Eat, and What to Buy*.

5. Here are two examples of leadership beyond the informal group level. Susan Eckstein (2001) describes Marcello's role in organizing many community voluntary activities on a regular basis in a Boston neighborhood. He was clearly the voluntary leader of a working-class community that was largely Italian. But he had no formal role. Similarly, in a Midwest community, Georgina was able to buy an old Social Security building with a large private donation and then organized large projects through the Homeless Action Center. It provided meals and shelter. While both Marcello and Georgina were sometimes difficult to get along with their own version of Michel's "iron law of oligarchy," they both created voluntary activities for many hundreds of volunteers each year. These two examples (both of which are disguised with pseudonyms) are a step up from the opinion leader in an informal group, but they are still largely informal.

6. Pastor Dexter from Northland Christian Church organized a "Promenade Dance" for over 1,000 mentally challenged adults providing them with tuxedos and elaborate dresses. They mobilized teenagers and young adults to provide a realistic prom experience for people who had never considered going to a high school prom. Their effort then more or less shamed other churches to do something similar. For instance, Father Thomas from St. Michaels Church organized a somewhat similar St. Nicholas Ball and a Catholic middle and high school organized various theme dances in their gymnasium. All of the dances were huge successes.

7. One can see a similar approach to revolutions in Chalmers Johnson (1982) and Mark Gould (1987). However, the explanation does not need to be totally cultural.

8. Habermas' approach (1989) has led to an emphasis on deliberation (and the "perfect speech situation"); however, I do not want to feel compelled to describe

interpretive communities and the concepts mentioned later (e.g., civil repair, civil maintenance, and civil adaptation) as "deliberative." That puts too much of a burden on these processes. They may sometimes be "deliberative" but at other times they are much less so, especially the two later processes of civil maintenance and adaptation. If one adopts deliberation as necessary to the process, that would unnecessarily narrow the empirical range of activities that one would be able to consider in the civil sphere. Finally, using the public sphere and deliberation would change the focus of this chapter. Thus, while the public and civil spheres are similar, I use the later term for this chapter.

9. John Kingdon (1984) presents a more precise view of three windows of opportunity that need to be simultaneously open for a policy to become enacted. In my view, his approach is quite useful but is a little too passive in terms of allowing groups to influence these windows.

10. Policy domains have an elective affinity to Bourdieu's concept of fields. However, his concept has not been as fully developed empirically and defined as precisely to fit discourse in the civil sphere as the concept of policy domains.

11. The other example is the Jewish Question in Europe and America.

12. This approach differs somewhat from Alexander. In this section, he uses the term "civil solidarity" in place of "civil maintenance." But this is a bit too positive or idealistic. Also, more generally, Alexander outlines a cultural theory of binary processes in discourse analysis, especially in the translation process. While this is quite interesting, it takes some of the questions involved in this chapter rather far afield. See Alexander (2006) for further details.

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