Development, Justice and Citizenship

Civil Society and the Governance of Development

Opposing Global Institutions

Sara Kalm
Anders Uhlin

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Development, Justice and Citizenship

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Opposing Global Institutions

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To Alva and Eva

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Sara Kalm
Anders Uhlin

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFFORD	African Foundation for Development
ANGOC	Asian NGO Coalition
APMM	Asia-Pacific Mission for Migrants
APRODEV	Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe
ATIN	Access to Information Network
ATTAC	Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens
BIC	Bank Information Centre
CARAM-Asia	Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility
CIDSE	international alliance of Catholic development agencies
CLONG	NGO-EU Liaison Committee
CMA	Center for Migrant Advocacy
CONCORD	European NGO confederation for relief and development
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSD	Civil Society Days
CSO	civil society organization
DG	Directorate General
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENOP	European Network of Political Foundations
EP	European Parliament
EPLO	European Peace-building Liaison Office
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU	European Union
Eurodad	European Network of Debt and Development
Eurostep	European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDC	Freedom from Debt Coalition
G8	Group of Eight
GCM	Global Coalition on Migration
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration

GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GGI	global governance institution
GONGO	government-organized NGO
GTI	Global Transparency Initiative
HLD	High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development
HRDN	Human Rights and Democracy Network
IAC	International Advisory Committee
IAMR	International Assembly of Migrants and Refugees
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFI	international financial institution
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ICMC	International Catholic Migration Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMA	International Migrants Alliance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INFID	International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
INGO	international non-governmental organization
IO	international organization
IR	international relations
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MFA	Migrant Forum in Asia
MRI	Migrants Rights International
MWC	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
NGDO	non-governmental development organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NNIRR	National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights
NSA	non-state actor
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PANiDMR	Pan-African Network in Defense of Migrants' Rights
PCP	Public Communications Policy
PGA	People's Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights

PICUM	Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants
SAF	strategic action field
SMO	social movement organization
SPI	Indonesian Peasants' Union
TNC	transnational corporation
TRIPS	trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
UIA	Union of International Associations
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VOICE	Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WSF	World Social Forum
WSFM	World Social Forum on Migrations
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

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Opposition in Global Governance: An Introduction

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, civil society organizations (CSOs) have increasingly targeted international organizations (IOs) and other global governance institutions (GGIs). Sometimes this has taken the forms of mass protests expressing grave critique or outright refusal, as was the case with the demonstrations against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999, subsequently referred to as the Battle of Seattle, and similar protest events directed against economic globalization in the years that followed. At other occasions civil society actors have formed campaigns to influence GGIs in a particular area. An example is the Global Campaign for Decent Work and Rights for Domestic Workers which, in 2011, succeeded in having the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopt its Domestic Workers Convention. Besides, a large share of political engagement is of a slow and continuous character, as when CSOs strive to affect policy by participating in consultations and lobbying individual staff members. A broad range of CSOs, for instance, participate in more or less frequent consultations concerning overarching policies as well as specific projects of multilateral development banks. These varied examples show how organized civil society activism is not restricted to the local and national political arenas, but increasingly target GGIs as well. They also demonstrate the different forms this activism takes. Many civil society actors do not have the financial or organizational resources to even engage with GGIs that may be headquartered in faraway locations, but among those who do, strategies display great variation. While some willingly cooperate with GGIs and welcome each opportunity for making their voices heard in consultations, others engage in outside protest, reject the institution on normative and political grounds and would not turn up for hearings even if they were given the chance to do so. Others do a little of both, or anything in between. It is thus clear that CSOs relate to GGIs in very different ways, while also having differing opportunities for so doing.

This more or less dissenting civil society engagement with GGIs can be found across many different issue areas; however, the intensity of civil society activism targeting GGIs varies greatly. Some issues are more politicized than others and GGIs with a high level of political authority tend to be most contested (Zürn et al. 2012). It is not a coincidence that all the examples above relate to the global governance of development in a broad sense. Much transnational activism since the 1990s has focused on challenging what the critics describe as the dominant neoliberal model for global development. Moreover, and despite the general high level of politicization in this area, few GGIs apart from those concerned with development have as much relatively non-conflictual engagement with CSOs who are often hired as project implementers and consultants.

The prevalence of civil society actors in global governance seems to demonstrate that states are no longer the only players to be reckoned with on the international arena (Lipschutz 1992; Kaldor 2003). This defies what was for long a guiding assumption in the International Relations (IR) discipline. Until relatively recently, few scholars turned their attention to non-state-led processes or recognized the relevance of actors other than states. This has indeed changed, and CSOs along with other non-state actors are now acknowledged – in research as well as among many policy makers – as significant agents within current global governance structures. But there is not yet any consensus regarding the nature and effect of this involvement. Some authors take this trend as an indication of the emergence of a global civil society, holding great promise for transforming international relations in enlightened, rational and peaceful directions (Boli and Thomas 1997). Others claim that CSOs are little more than instruments of state interests, which means that their increased visibility in global governance does not signify any fundamental change to the Westphalian pattern of interstate power struggles (Drezner 2007). Yet others argue that CSOs are granted access to IOs to the extent that they possess expertise, local knowledge or some other resource that the IO requires, meaning that the trend towards involvement amounts to little more than the fulfilment of a functional-rational need (Reimann 2006; Tallberg et al. 2013b). Curiously, the ambitions and strategies of the CSOs themselves are missing from much of the debate on GGI–CSO relations in the discipline of International Relations. While scholars of different theoretical and political convictions come to conflictive conclusions from their observations, many tend to share a general point of view in their matter of inquiry: the trend towards CSO involvement is analysed from a top-down perspective, which privileges questions of how, when and under what conditions GGIs open up for civil society engagement. But the agency, motivations and strategies of CSOs themselves are largely left outside of this picture.

Therefore, in this book we want to explore the perceptions, tactics, motives and interactions of civil society actors themselves. More specifically, we want to understand the varied ways in which relationships between civil society actors targeting the same institution are patterned and how these actors choose strategies towards that institution. A bottom-up-oriented perspective, we argue, is needed to move away from state-centrism and understand questions of how CSOs develop different tactics and strategies, why they perceive of some GGIs as legitimate and not others, what makes them choose among different repertoires of action, and under what conditions they engage in relations of cooperation or conflict with other civil society actors in global governance. This knowledge is vital for more fully comprehending contemporary relations of power and influence in global governance (cf. Grugel and Uhlin 2012). It may furthermore be vital for assessing the democratic qualities of global governance arrangements, which are often associated with access, participation and influence of civil society actors (Steffek and Nanz 2008; Scholte 2011a; Pallas 2013).

We hence side with the strands of research that have taken a more bottom-up perspective to civil society engagement with GGIs, focusing on the advocacy and influence of transnational activists (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; O'Brien et al. 2000; Tarrow 2005; Smith 2008; Scholte 2011a; Pallas 2013). But we add to that literature by conceptualizing CSO activism as *opposition* in global governance. The term 'opposition' has etymological roots in the Latin word 'oppositus', which means to be positioned against (Kubát 2010: 15). In its broadest definition, it refers to any act of resistance: spontaneous or organized, individual or collective. In its more common, narrower, sense, it refers to institutional opposition. Opposition as a concept, as patterned interactions among the contenders and as a strategy to influence power, was thoroughly explored by scholars of comparative politics in the 1960s and 1970s (Dahl 1965, 1968b, 1973; Barker 1971b; Ionescu and de Madariaga 1972; McLennan 1973; Sartori 1976). This literature was mainly concerned with opposition in modern democracies, where oppositional political parties counter and challenge the government. Opposition has with a few notable exceptions (Mair 2007; Helms 2008;

Deitelhoff 2010) been absent from scholarship on global governance. In this book we argue that the relationship between CSOs and GGIs can (with caveats and restrictions) be thought of analogously to that between oppositional parties and a government in power. We also maintain that elements of the comparative politics literature on opposition can fruitfully complement existing global governance scholarship, helping us to gain a fuller understanding of CSO–GGI relations.

Research questions and contributions

The overarching ambition of this study is to understand how CSOs interact between themselves and towards GGIs. For this purpose, we revive the notion of political opposition and rework it theoretically to fit the context of global governance. We argue that 'opposition' can assist in understanding patterns of CSO interactions as well as in explaining their choice of strategies towards GGIs. We have three specific aims. First, the overarching theoretical ambition is to *re-conceptualize* CSO–GGI relations in terms of opposition. Second, we aim to use this re-conceptualization of opposition to *describe* the pattern of inter-organizational relations in novel ways. Third, we aim to use the re-conceptualization of opposition to help *explain* individual organizations' choice of strategy. Each ambition corresponds to one research question: (1) How can opposition help us understand CSO–GGI relations? (2) What is the pattern of civil society opposition targeting GGIs? (3) How can CSOs' choice of strategy towards a particular GGI be explained? While the first question is treated in chapters 1 and 2 and throughout the study, the second and third are specified in chapter 3 and answered in chapters 4 to 6.

Our main theoretical contribution is that we introduce the concept of opposition in a global governance context. To this end, we combine insights from the literature on opposition in comparative politics with research on global governance, transnational civil society and social movements. The empirical contribution consists of the knowledge generated from the case studies that we present, namely the European Union (EU), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). As concerns the EU, we focus on its policies and practices of development cooperation. Two of our institution-cases are regional and one is global in terms of membership. All of them are involved with development, which is a hotly contested issue area. Its specific character will be further discussed at a later stage in this chapter.

Conceptualizing opposition in global governance

We will now describe the rationale for theorizing CSO strategies in terms of opposition. Our ambition has been to account for the full spectrum of more or less dissenting civil society engagement with GGIs. We do not want to focus on only one type of strategy and disregard others. This, we argue, is a shortcoming that marks much of the existing scholarship on the topic. Previous research tends to follow two parallel paths. One is the literature on non-governmental organization (NGO) and interest group lobbying that explores different forms of 'inside' activities (attending hearings, approaching individual staff members) and seeks to explain when these are successful (Betsill and Corell 2008b; Chalmers 2011, 2013; Dellmuth 2012). The other is the literature on transnational activism, which focuses on social movements that pursue contentious politics in relation to the GGI and therefore tend to engage in various 'outside' protest activities (O'Brien et al. 2000; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005; Smith 2008). It is thus the different civil society repertoires of action that have formed the basis of a division within research. This division is unfortunate since manifest political behaviour is not necessarily correlated with ideological positions or perceptions of legitimacy, which this division tends to assume. Furthermore, empirical observations indicate that many civil society actors combine inside and outside strategies, which this research may overlook. And lastly, the division conceals from analysis some dimensions of inter-organizational interactions, that is, the relations between 'insiders' and 'outsider'. What is needed therefore is a way of capturing the full range of civil society engagement strategies and interactions, which feature some degree of disagreement with the GGI in question.

The term 'social movement' is often used in this context. But in order to account specifically for CSO activism towards GGIs, we have found it slightly inadequate and we will now describe why. For one thing, many scholars see protest activity as a defining feature of social movements. This limits its applicability to the 'outside' part of the division mentioned above, which means that the 'inside' activity is neglected in the analysis. And even when defined differently, there are still limitations to its usefulness in a GGI context. To Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani (2006: 20), a social movement is a process in which actors are involved in relations of conflict towards a specific adversary, are tied by dense and informal networks and share a collective identity. Compared to our context, a similarity is the existence of a specific adversary, namely the GGI in question. But it would not be correct to say that it is a movement in della Porta and Diani's term that is in focus here. Although many of the civil society actors that target a particular institution are likely to identify with some (or other) broader social movement, many of them are not, so we cannot assume at the outset that they are all participants in the same movement. And this means, in turn, that the networks and linkages between them are multiple, uneven, possibly antagonistic and not necessarily as dense as della Porta and Diani's definition suggests. Furthermore, while all of them want to influence the GGI and some of them are quite radical, many of them may be largely sympathetic with the institution's mandate and have much more modest proposals for change. The degree of conflictive stance is therefore neither uniform nor necessarily as confrontational as the social movement term suggests. This is not meant as a critique of the social movement literature, which we find in many ways useful. Rather, the limitations of the concept arise because we want to cut through the empirics a bit differently. To sum up, we have been searching for a way of conceptualizing the full landscape of civil society actors that seek to influence a particular GGI and who do not necessarily share the same goals or collective identity, a conceptualization that moreover may help us understand the forms of relations and interactions between them as well as their strategies towards the GGI in question.

We have found that the concept of political *opposition* can do precisely this. The term is normally reserved for national-level politics, and with very few exceptions, it has not been used in global governance analyses. Our ambition is hence to begin to develop the concept of opposition in a global governance context. We are primarily interested in its potential as a conceptual tool for grasping a particular *empirical* phenomenon, rather than as a *normative* concept or benchmark – although the two admittedly are difficult to tease apart in practice. We suggest, as mentioned above, that the relationship between CSOs and GGIs can be thought of analogously as that between oppositional parties and the government in power. This will be discussed and qualified below.

We argue that the concept of opposition helps us address the limitations of the social movement concept identified above. Among its benefits are, first, that it enables us to grasp a larger set of CSOs in terms of their level of contention. Political opposition is always a position of non-agreement, but this non-agreement can be more or less radical, as some form of opposition only concerns specific policies or even personnel, while others are directed at the polity as such (Mair 2007: 5). In Dahl's (1968a: 342) terminology, which we will use in this book, oppositional groups can be 'non-structural', 'limited structural' or 'major structural' in terms of their goals. Second, opposition does not presuppose a shared identity. Parties to an opposition are 'united' in their resistance to the government in power, but have different and often conflicting goals, interests and ideologies, and hence we cannot expect them to be as densely networked as social movements. Third, as opposition can be used in the plural ('the opposition') as well as in the singular ('an oppositional organization'), it is consistent with a double research focus on the interactions between CSOs targeting the same institution on the one hand and the motivations of individual CSOs on the other. Fourth, 'opposition' puts the targeted institution at the centre of analysis. The members of the opposition are those who surround and seek to challenge or affect the ruling power, which is consistent with the way that we want to delimit our objects of analysis as those oriented towards a particular GGI. This means that we retain the notion of a specific adversary from the social movement literature, but in a somewhat more specific and institutional sense. The adversaries of social movements are sometimes more abstractly defined, as 'empire' (Hardt and Negri 2000), 'patriarchy' (Eschle 2001) or 'globalization' (Amoore 2005), although they can be fought concretely at multiple locations and levels. For us, the adversary of opposition is, more plainly, the GGI in question. Individual CSOs, of course, may have several different adversaries, but our analytical focus is a particular GGI and the civil society opposition targeting it. To sum up, dissenting CSO activities towards GGIs appear to be well captured by 'opposition'. We therefore propose that the concept, with some cautions and amendments, can be fruitfully used in a global governance context, although it originated elsewhere.

We also argue that one reason for using the term 'opposition' is its democratic connotations. The existence of a strong opposition is generally believed to be a key aspect of a democratic system (see, for instance, Ionescu and de Madariaga 1972), and the relative lack of formal avenues for opposition beyond the nation-state might be seen as an aspect of the democratic deficit in global governance. In chapter 7 we will further elaborate how Pierre Rosanvallon's term 'counter-democracy' and John Keane's term 'monitory democracy' help us specify the democratic qualities of the oppositional activities of CSOs that are not striving to replace power in global governance, but to oversee it.

We follow the relatively broad theoretical definition of political opposition developed by Brack and Weinblum (2011: 74): 'a disagreement with the government or its policies, the political elite, or the political regime as a whole, expressed in the public sphere, by an organized actor through different modes of action'. This definition is sufficiently broad to be applicable in both national-political and global governance contexts. In this book, and as will be elaborated in chapter 2, we define opposition in global governance operationally as the sum total of CSOs that target a particular GGI with some level of disagreement. As our point of departure is an interest in CSO–GGI interactions, we delimit our concern to civil society actors. However, there are other feasible ways of defining opposition in global governance theoretically that would include many other state and non-state actors, too. Certain states may oppose GGIs that they believe work against their interests. For instance, more or less radical governments in low-income countries may oppose the leading economic GGIs, whose global trade and financial policies are seen as benefitting rich countries only. States with a particularly bad human rights record may oppose international human rights regimes, and states that are major contributors to global warming may oppose international agreements on climate change. In addition, non-state actors that are not commonly understood as civil society actors may also oppose elements of global governance. For instance, political parties may oppose certain GGIs on ideological grounds, as in the case of EU-sceptical parties in Europe. Private companies, which consider that certain GGIs work against their business interests, could be understood as oppositional too. Terrorist groups and criminal networks may be considered in opposition to global governance norms and power structures, and sometimes, more specifically, to initiatives to fight international criminal and terrorist networks. However, the way that we operationalize opposition in this study is limited in that we only consider CSO–GGI interactions.

It should be stressed that we do not take all civil society actors to be oppositional. As will be clear from our analysis, many CSOs do not qualify as opposition to GGIs in any meaningful sense. In order to be considered part of the opposition against a specific GGI, a CSO has to show some disagreement with the GGI at large or specific policies or activities carried out by the GGI. That is, they have to engage in advocacy in one way or another. Many CSOs, however, cooperate with GGIs as partners, implementing specific projects or providing information without demonstrating any disagreement or trying to influence the GGI to change its policies. Such CSOs that do not voice any form of criticism or disagreement when interacting with the GGI are not considered oppositional.

Studying opposition in global governance

Above, we have argued that 'opposition' helps us grasp CSO activism towards GGIs in a novel way. It directs our attention to the interactions between, and the strategies of, the CSOs surrounding a particular institution, that hold some level of disagreement towards that institution but that do not necessarily identify with the same social movement. We have attempted to show that this conceptualization allows us to focus empirical observations slightly differently. In a next step, we need to ask where this conceptualization leaves us regarding our empirical studies. In other words, to what extent and precisely how does 'opposition' guide our study? The classic literature on opposition in comparative politics, by Robert Dahl and others, presents descriptive taxonomies as well as explanatory theories on the subject. Since the context of global governance is very different, these cannot be uncritically transferred. They can inspire us, but we ultimately need to combine them with other theories that directly concern CSOs and GGIs in order to develop a workable theoretical framework for our context. Below we will discuss in what ways we use opposition in relation to our aims and research questions and which methodological considerations are warranted.

As stated above, we have three different ambitions in this study. Our first ambition is to *re-conceptualize* CSO–GGI relations in terms of opposition. This is our main theoretical contribution. The second ambition is to *describe* the pattern of inter-organizational relations. And the third ambition is to *explain* individual organizations' choice of strategy.

The re-conceptualization is what allows us to elaborate novel empirical descriptions and explanations and is therefore the basis of our theoretical contribution. The overarching research question corresponding to this aim is, 'How can opposition help us understand CSO–GGI relations?' We re-conceptualize, in a first step, by comparing CSO–GGI interactions to opposition, and second, by therefore letting elements of opposition influence our theorization of inter-CSO patterns as well as CSO strategies. To 'discuss something in terms of something else' is the general definition of a metaphor, which dates back to antiquity (Hellsten 2002: 17). Thus transferring meanings from one domain to another is at its best very creative in that a known phenomenon is described from a novel perspective so that new ideas and theories can be generated (Schön 1993; Rigney 2001). A little more specifically, our transfer of meaning is by way of analogy. (An analogy does not claim that 'A is B' but only that 'A is like B'.) Such exercises are always partial, as one only maps some of the characteristics of the original domain to the target domain (Hellsten 2002: 17–20). In this study we let elements of the opposition literature inform our study of global governance, but we combine that with other literatures. Another way of capturing the role of opposition in our project is as an 'orienting concept' in Derek Layder's terms. An orienting concept is one that is borrowed from an adjacent literature and applied in one's domain of research because one wishes to illuminate it in ways that differ from the usual (Layder 1998: 110). A challenge in this type of studies, no matter what term one uses to describe it, is to avoid ambiguities that may arise from metaphorical complexities and vaguenesses regarding which features from the original usage are being transferred (Hellsten 2002: 20). We hope to avoid this fallacy by precision in specifications and a clear and logical structure of the text.

The second research question reads, 'What is the pattern of civil society opposition targeting GGIs?' This indicates an essentially descriptive undertaking, which can be characterized as 'associational' in that it seeks to map interrelations between units of analysis – in this case between the CSOs surrounding a particular institution (Gerring 2012: 726). Such an endeavour is quite uncommon in political science and International Relations, which are typically more concerned with influence. It is more related to network analysis, especially within social movement research (Gerlach 2001; Diani 2003, see also Murdie and Davis 2011). But we map relations slightly differently. We theorize what we call *oppositional fields* in two steps. First, we argue that at a meta-theoretical level, inter-CSO relations in global governance can be understood as a strategic action field (SAF) (Fligstein and McAdam 2011). That is, as 'a meso-level social order where actors [. . .] interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field [. . .], and the field's rules' (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 3). In a second step, we argue that this field has particular characteristics, which arise from its gravitation towards the institution in its midst, and that it therefore can be fruitfully mapped with elements from the opposition literature. In contrast to the network models in social movement research, we map relations between CSOs that do not necessarily belong to the same social movements, and we are not concerned with their overall relations but only with how they cluster around a particular institution. Since the literature on opposition is all about tracing patterns of interaction in the view of an opposed power, it is particularly apt for this purpose. Specifically, we want to capture the internal configuration of an oppositional field in terms of *concentration*, *distinctiveness* and *goals* (Dahl 1968a).

While we take a bird's-eye view with the second research question, our third one instead addresses individual organizations and their strategies: 'How can CSOs' choice of strategy towards a particular GGI be explained?' Although our two research questions are treated separately, and although we recognize the independent value of descriptive studies

(Shapiro 2004; Gerring 2012), we see the descriptive endeavour as to some extent paving the way for the explanatory one. Previous literature on social movements, resistance, CSO diplomacy and interest group lobbying in international relations describes the different available strategies as *inside* (lobbying) and *outside* (protest), respectively (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Betsill and Corell 2008b; cf. Fogarty 2011). Existing studies emphasize different factors when trying to explain the strategic behaviour of transnational CSOs: for instance, norms and values (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999), instrumental material concerns and resources (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Prakash and Gugerty 2010), the opportunities and constraints offered by the broader political opportunity structure (Joachim and Locher 2009b), hostile competition between coalitions of CSOs with different agendas (Bob 2012), organizational identity (Barakso 2010; Fogarty 2011) and nature of political issues (Beyers 2008). We wish to contribute to this literature by bringing in insights from opposition scholarship. We argue that the literature on opposition can assist in explaining how CSOs choose between inside and outside strategies, or combinations between them. Specifically, we emphasize the character of an organization's goals as important for the choice of inside or outside strategies: whether the CSO can be characterized as non-structural opposition, limited structural opposition or major structural opposition has implications for its choice of strategy (cf. Dahl 1968a: 341–344). We develop an analytical framework in which we combine *goals* with another actor characteristic, namely *organizational identity* (that is, whether an organization identifies as a grassroots organization or a professional organization). We also complement our actor variables with a structural one: namely *political opportunity structure* (Eisinger 1973), which we operationalize by reference to institutional access and the existence of elite allies.

We are inspired by Hendrik Wagenaar's concept, 'intentional explanation', by which he emphasizes that any causality is mediated by the meaning that agents ascribe their actions, which is why we rely heavily on interviews with activists (Wagenaar 2011). We argue that the combination of variables can help us understand CSO strategies in a more fine-grained way, accounting for when a particular CSO is likely to occupy any of the positions of a principled or pragmatic insider, or a principled, pragmatic or forced outsider, respectively.

Global governance of development as an area of inquiry

Development as an issue area in global governance has several significant characteristics that make it a fruitful focus of our investigation. First, development issues are of fundamental importance for the well-being of people, and a large number of global governance arrangements have been set up to deal with problems related to poverty, hunger, health and so on. In fact, the vast majority of GGIs and other global governance arrangements focus on problems of socio-economic development and related issues of finance, trade, environmental problems and human rights. In the 1990s, a number of major UN conferences focused on development-related issues. The UN Millennium Development Goals have more recently become a focal point for the global governance of development and several UN agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), are directly involved in the work to meet these goals. The multilateral development banks – including the World Bank and the regional development banks – are other key players. Other economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization also have considerable impact on global development policies. Rich countries increasingly coordinate their development aid, for instance, within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union. Moreover, a large number of partnerships including private actors address specific development problems. Examples include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. Hence, development issues feature prominently in both global and regional governance.

Second, development is a highly contested issue. The dominant neoliberal development paradigm of the major GGIs, such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO as well as the regional development banks, have been severely criticized by broad civil society movements. Most transnational activism targeting GGIs since the late 1990s has actually focused on a critique of the dominant view of development as manifested in the 'Washington Consensus' (Danaher 2001; Smith 2008; Pleyers 2010). Hence, by selecting GGIs within the subject area of development, we can expect to find a relatively high level of contestation and the use of outside strategy.

Third, GGIs concerned with development are among those that have gone furthest in opening up to civil society actors (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 13, 76). Development GGIs have for a long time considered certain CSOs as useful partners when it comes to implementing development projects. The local knowledge and grassroots contacts of many CSOs have given them access to GGIs (Long 2001). More recently, also more critical CSOs engaged in monitoring and advocacy activities have been given some access to global development institutions (Pallas 2005; Uhlin 2011). Hence, the issue area of development features comparatively open GGIs and we can thus expect to find many CSOs directly engaging with the GGIs making use of inside strategy.

In sum, development is a useful focus for our research purpose because it is a major area of global governance where we can expect to find both significant outside civil society advocacy due to the controversial and contested character of mainstream development polices and considerable inside civil society advocacy because of the relative openness of many GGIs. Still, variation within the issue area of global governance of development is great and we have good opportunities to compare GGIs with very different focus and institutional design. We will now turn to our specific case selection.

Selection of cases

> Opposition is a 'dependent' concept [. . .] This means that the character of the opposition is tied to the character of the government. [. . .] One might therefore seem entitled to draw the conclusion that the only way to discover the true character of opposition is by examining first government, rule, authority, or state.
>
> (Blondel 1997: 463)

Blondel wrote of opposition in national polities, but we believe that this general argument holds true for GGIs as well. That is, we assume that the character of the opposed institution has some effect on the formation of oppositional ties and strategies among CSOs. We have already contended that development in comparison to other issue areas is characterized by high levels of both inside and outside advocacy. Within the broader issue area, we have selected three cases, three GGIs, that are different in terms of their institutional architecture, and that therefore together give a fairly broad picture.

We have chosen to select cases that vary in institutional design along two main dimensions.[1] The first is *legalization*, and ranks from high to low. GGIs with a high degree of legalization are those (1) where decisions are binding, (2) where there are precisely formulated norms of conduct and (3) where authority to implement and interpret the rules have been delegated to a third party. Such institutions could be characterized as supranational and examples include WTO's trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), and the International Criminal Court. GGIs characterized by a low degree of legalization fall short on any or all of these aspects: it could be that decisions are non-binding or even non-existing, if the GGI is little more than a talk-shop for state representatives. Examples include Non-Legally Binding Forest Principles, different technical standards and the Group of 8 (Abbott et al. 2000).

We expect to find more opposition in general (featuring both inside and outside strategies) towards highly legalized GGIs. With Michael Zürn and his colleagues, we assume that institutions with a high level of political authority (here understood as legalization) will be more politicized. The more intrusive GGIs, with capacities to take binding decisions and to enforce and implement them, are those most likely to be politicized (Zürn et al. 2012). It is less likely that an institution with a low degree of legalization, which thus has low authority, would provoke much opposition. CSOs are simply not likely to consider relatively powerless institutions worth their attention. Moreover, a GGI with a high degree of legalization is likely to be surrounded by a more complex oppositional field, consisting of CSOs with diverse goals.

The second dimension is *access*. This has to do with formal channels of participation for CSOs, that is, the possibilities for inside activities. It has been a trend in global governance during the past two decades to open up for more participation of CSOs, but the trend is very uneven (Tallberg et al. 2013b). GGIs vary both in terms of the number and political positions of the CSOs that they invite and in what function they allow participation (for instance, agenda setting, consultation, decision making, implementation and/or monitoring) (Tallberg and Jönsson 2010). An institution with a high level of access would admit a large number of civil society actors representing a wide spectrum of views to participate in all of the policy-making phases, in the strongest cases even including decision making. In contrast a low-access institution would admit few civil society actors into less decisive phases of the policy-making process, for instance, implementation or consultation. Hence, we assume that a high level of access will support the inside strategy. If access is low, CSOs will be forced to apply outside advocacy in order to engage with the GGI, or alternatively, choose the 'exit' option and cease to even try.

Our three cases vary along these two dimensions. The EU, in many respects, has an unusually high degree of legalization, with supra-state authority to make binding decisions in several areas. Development cooperation falls in the broad category where the union and the member states have shared competence, and we regard it as displaying a comparatively high degree of legalization. A major focus of our study, EuropeAid, is a new (since 2011) directorate-general that formulates and implements EU development policy. The EU in general, including its governance of development cooperation, provides many forms of institutionalized access for a broad spectrum of civil society actors. The EU, and its work on the global governance of development, must therefore be characterized as a highly legalized and high-access institution.

The GFMD does not take binding decisions and does not even formulate common non-binding standards; instead it merely provides an arena for discussion among states. Government discussions take place behind closed doors, away from both media and civil society, which nevertheless organize 'civil society days' in connection with the government meeting. The GFMD can therefore be characterized as a low-legalized and low-access institution. It should be noted that the GFMD describes itself as a process and as a forum – and decidedly *not* as an organization.

The ADB falls somewhere in between the GFMD and EU concerning both legalization and access. Unlike the GFMD, ADB does take binding decisions, but those are mainly limited to specific projects and negotiated with specific states. More general policy recommendations by the ADB are not formally binding for member states, but in practice they may work as a form of conditionality forcing a borrowing country to adjust its development policy in order to receive loans. Decisions are taken by the Board of Directors without any broader participation, but the ADB increasingly provides access for CSOs in other parts of its activities. Civil society participation is not as formalized as in the EU, but there are still relatively good opportunities for CSOs to participate in agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The ADB can therefore be described as a medium-legalized and medium-access institution.

It should be noted that two of our three selected GGIs – the EU and ADB – have a regional rather than fully global character. This is in line with a common usage of the term 'global governance' as including also regional institutions (Ba 2005: 190). The EU and the ADB are regional in somewhat different ways. Whereas EU membership is limited to a specific world region, its scope of activities – not least concerning the governance of development – is truly global. The ADB, by contrast, has a broad membership including several world regions, but its activities are focused on one region: Asia.

Our research design is laid out in a way in which each case is, first, treated separately. Three consecutive chapters present within-case analyses on the CSOs that make up the oppositional field to each GGI investigated, in terms of interrelations and strategies. The final chapter considers the three together in a between-case comparative analysis (cf. George and Bennett 2005).

Material

Official documents are available on the websites of the respective GGIs. In-depth qualitative content analysis of such documents is essential for grasping the institutional context. Major CSOs also have more or less substantial and updated websites and many produce a large number of statements, magazines and other documents. Such texts give insights into the advocacy strategies applied by various CSOs and may also give an indication of how they understand the political opportunity structure of a specific GGI.

In addition to written material – accessed on the websites of GGIs and CSOs or obtained directly from the organizations during fieldwork – the study makes substantial use of interview material gathered specifically for this project. Qualitative interviews with about 100 respondents have been conducted between 2009 and 2014. Only interviews explicitly cited in the text are listed in the reference section. Respondents include activists representing different CSOs interacting with the GGIs as well as some representatives of the GGIs. Concerning oppositional civil society activists, the selection of interviewees is based on the aim to cover the most active CSOs and networks and ensure a broad coverage in terms of goals and organizational identity. A thorough reading of available documents and the limited previous research provided an initial understanding of which were the most relevant CSOs. People interviewed were asked to identify other relevant actors. Through this 'snowballing' technique (Berg 2009: 51) a clearer picture of the oppositional fields surrounding the EU Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, ADB and GFMD developed.

We conducted semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. The benefit of this technique is that it can be used both to test theories and to provide detailed and complex accounts from the respondents' perspectives. When conducting the interviews, the interviewer made it clear that the respondent was the expert on the specific topic of the interview (cf. Leech 2002: 665). Most interviews lasted roughly between 30 minutes and 2 hours. Many of the GFMD interviews were, however, considerably shorter (10–15 minutes). These were conducted in a forum context (at the annual GFMD 2011 and 2012 and at the World Social Forum on Migration 2012), and the interviewed delegates were particularly pressed for time. Most interviews were recorded, except in a few cases when the interviewed did not agree to the use of a recorder or when the interview was conducted through email. These instances are indicated in the reference list. Name and organizational position of the interviewed are provided except for the respondents who requested anonymity. The semi-structured interviews followed an interview guide focusing on themes such as access to the GGI and goals, strategies and activities of CSOs. Interviews were transcribed in full. The interviews were conducted by the two authors and three research assistants.[2] Interviews were essential for the analysis of the goals and strategic choices made by civil society activists, and they also contributed to the understanding of activist' interpretations of political opportunity structures.

Terminology and delimitations

The abbreviations CSO and GGI are used extensively in this study, and we therefore need to clarify how we understand them. The term 'civil society organization' is used in a broad and inclusive way to capture a broad range of non-state and non-profit actors, including NGOs, social movement organizations (SMOs), grassroots organizations, labour unions and so on.[3] The term 'organization' is not intended to necessarily signal a highly formalized organizational structure. CSOs may have many different organizational forms, including fairly loose networks (Hilhorst 2007; Heyse 2011), but we take the concept to mean more than a set of individual activists.

The term 'global governance institution' is used within International Relations scholarship to denote a broad range of governance arrangements that have become increasingly significant in the post-World War II era. Examples include those in which membership is delimited to national governments (such as formal IOs and relatively informal arrangements such as G8) as well as those where non-governmental actors are participating (such as the Forest Stewardship Council and various public–private partnerships). In this book, we use the term in a limited fashion, only referring to intergovernmental institutions that range from formal IOs (EU, ADB) to 'looser' forums for discussion (GFMD). This means that we only examine a limited scope of oppositional behaviour, namely that which is directed at specific intergovernmental institutions. One could probably speak of opposition to other global governance targets, such as public–private partnerships, epistemic communities, transnational corporations (TNCs) and so on – but this is not included in this particular investigation.

Moreover, our study is restricted to the oppositional activities of CSOs. We do not include oppositional activities by, for instance, transnational corporations or dissenting member state governments within the institution. In this sense, our conceptualization follows the mainstay within the literature on civil society and transnational activism, to which we mainly relate.

Finally, it should be stressed that our inquiry is limited to empirically describing and explaining the patterns and strategies of civil society opposition. This means that we do not draw any conclusions as to whether such acts are successful or not. Such studies would require a different set of research questions and employ different methods than the current one.

Outline of the book

Following this introduction, chapters 2 and 3 are mainly theoretical chapters. In chapter 2 we broadly situate our study in relation to extant research on global governance, civil society activism and opposition. The main aim of the chapter is to continue the re-conceptualization of opposition in global governance that has been initiated in chapter 1. In chapter 3, we develop a more specific analytical framework for the study of oppositional fields and opposition strategies in global governance. Chapters 4 to 6 present the three empirical case studies of civil society opposition in relation to the EU's policies and practices of development cooperation (chapter 4), the ADB (chapter 5) and the GFMD (chapter 6). Chapter 7, finally, summarizes the empirical findings and provides a comparative analysis across the three cases. It also elaborates on the theoretical implications of the findings and suggests directions for future research.

2
Global Governance, Civil Society and Opposition: Empirical and Theoretical Context

Introduction

This chapter continues the re-conceptualization of CSO–GGI relations in terms of opposition, which was initiated in chapter 1, and it also provides a crucial contextual backdrop to our area of inquiry. It draws out some of the more general points of our argumentation, whereas the analytical framework is specified in chapter 3. The structure is as follows. First, we sketch the historical evolvement of CSO–GGI relations and pinpoint some major current trends. Second, we discuss agency in relation to proposed theoretical explanations of the evolvement of this relationship. Third, we move from the notion of collective agency to introduce our conception of 'oppositional fields'. Fourth, we present and defend our definition of opposition in global governance, through an engagement with the literature on opposition in comparative politics, as well as with the literature on resistance to global governance.

The emergence of civil society opposition in global governance

Over the past few decades, the overall number of CSOs has exploded. This has been called 'a political innovation of world historical dimensions', as it has had deeply felt effects on international affairs as well as state–society relations in all world regions (Tvedt 2007: 25). One integrated part of this process is that broad layers of civil society now target not only governments and other national actors but increasingly also turn their efforts to IOs and other GGIs. In this section, we will show that although this phenomenon has grown in the post-war period, it has historical roots.

Steve Charnovitz has elaborated the following general periodization of CSO involvement in international affairs: 1775–1918: emergence; 1919–1934: engagement; 1935–1944: disengagement; 1945–1949: formalization; 1950–1971: underachievement; 1972–1991: intensification; 1992–: empowerment. He demonstrates that although CSO involvement has successively grown, the pattern is uneven and cyclical rather than linear and periods of expansion tend to correlate with periods of peace and multilateralism (Charnovitz 1997).

The role of CSOs in international affairs became especially visible when international governmental organizations emerged and successively grew in number and competence (the first was the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine in 1815) (Reinalda 2010: 6). It is also around the turn of the 19th century that civil society acquired its modern meaning as a sphere distinct from the state, and it is from then onwards that transnationally operating associations and networks emerged. A few historically specific factors account for the emergence of transnational civil society linkages at this point in time. First, the middle class expanded, especially in the UK and the USA, and with it emerged groupings in society equipped with social consciousness as well as with enough time, education and money to partake in associations. Second, while the 19th century is often associated with nationalism, it was simultaneously an era when internationalism, cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism took hold, ideological orientations that were favourable for transnational activism. Third, the era's technical developments, such as the telegraph system and the reforms of postal services, provided the practical possibilities for developing and upholding transnational linkages between civil society actors in different states (Seary 1996: 18).

The anti-slavery movement is arguably the forerunner of today's transnational activism. The movement joined abolitionists in many countries, as they were fighting for the same cause. It gained success in the 1815 Congress of Vienna, where participating governments adopted a declaration condemning slavery. Other examples of transnational organizing include philanthropic societies and organizations for peace, worker solidarity and women's rights (Charnovitz 1997: 191–195; Reinalda 2010: 2; Götz 2011: 190–191). Of particular significance was the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), founded in 1863. Another was the 1910 formation of the umbrella organization Union of International Associations (UIA), which is today most famous for publishing the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (Seary 1996). Around the turn of the 20th century, CSOs were seen as legitimate contributors to international affairs.

> During this period [. . .] NGOs discovered their capacity to influence governments. There were NGO fingerprints on new international conventions regarding rules of war, intellectual property, admiralty, prostitution, narcotics, labour, and nature protection. When general multilateral conferences were being held, NGOs invited themselves.
>
> (Charnovitz 1997: 212)

In the aftermath of the First World War the League of Nations was formed. The League formally recognized very few CSOs but initially incorporated them through various informal arrangements. In its first period, CSOs had 'assessors' on various committees who had many of the privileges of governments apart from the right to vote. Women representatives had the same formal rights as men, as a significant early achievement of the women's movement was to secure in the League Covenant an article that access should be equal. Many of the arrangements for openness to CSOs were subsequently removed but CSOs were still, in practice, incorporated in many governance areas such as health and trafficking (Seary 1996: 22–24; Reinalda 2010: 5). It is possible to discern inside and outside strategies already at the time of the League. Charnovitz connects them to different stages of the policy process rather than to different actors: 'In the first stage, CSOs were outsiders working to ripen issues for intergovernmental consideration. In the second stage, CSOs were insiders working directly with government officials and international civil servants to address an international problem' (Charnovitz 1997: 245). From the mid-1930s to the end of the Second World War, direct engagement with CSOs was low as international cooperation overall was stifled by the war (Charnovitz 1997: 249).

The UN has formally acknowledged CSOs since its early days. Article 71 of the 1945 UN Charter reads: 'The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.' The conditions for CSO access were in practice initially no better than in the early days of the League. But Article 71 was important as it provided CSOs with a ground for their struggles for incorporation into the overall UN system (Charnovitz 1997: 258).

The Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC) consultative arrangements are structured around different categories of CSOs, with falling privileges. Category I are multi-issue organizations and may speak at meetings, suggest topics for discussion and submit written statements. Category II are single-issue organizations that may speak only on topics that are currently dealt with and may submit only very short statements. Roster organizations have even more limited privileges: for instance, they may only be present as observers at those bodies that work within their own field, and the forums they may speak to are limited to functional commissions and subsidiary bodies. From the beginning, CSO access was limited to internationally operating organizations. But in 1996 national and grassroots organizations were allowed to apply for accreditation, which resulted in a sudden growth in ECOSOC-accredited organizations from 1126 in 1996 to 2151 in 2001 (Joachim 2011: 294–295).

The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment is considered an important turning point in CSO involvement as it followed a period of low participation due to Cold War politics. There were 113 governments in the Stockholm conference and at least twice as many CSOs with accreditation (Charnovitz 1997: 258–262). In the 1990s it became common for CSOs to organize parallel forums at the major international conferences that characterized international cooperation in this era. For instance, CSO presence was very high at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 and the UN International Conference on Population and Development in 1994 (Götz 2011: 191–192).

In the early days of the UN, consultation was restricted to economic and social affairs through the ECOSOC. But today UN agencies working in many different issue areas have offered some degree of access to CSOs, for instance, the ILO, the World Bank and the WHO. Even the Security Council has recently opened up for CSO cooperation, although of a very limited kind (Joachim 2011: 295; Stephenson 2011). The trend to grant access to CSOs to intergovernmental forums goes beyond the UN system. For instance, in the EU, institutionalized relations with civil society has gradually expanded from narrow consultation with labour market actors to include 'participation' of CSOs in a broad set of issue areas (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007). Across the board, as noted by one of the leading scholars in the field, 'since the late 1990s, a general consensus prevailed that CSOs are rightly involved in transplanetary regulation' (Scholte 2011c: 311). Engaging with CSOs has become something of a criterion for legitimate governance.

CSOs' position as rightful actors in global governance was consolidated in the 1990s. Several key documents attest to their status. The Commission on Global Governance in 1995 suggested an annual Civil Society Forum to provide advice to the UN General Assembly. In the same year, the independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations recommended to set up a UN Social Council which would have

CSOs assist at all stages of its work. None of these suggestions have materialized, but they testify to the post-Cold War prominent position of CSOs in global governance (Charnovitz 1997). In the EU context, a key document was the 2001 White Paper on European Governance, which stated that CSOs were key to improving governance. This pro-CSO attitude has over time led to participatory initiatives such as the Civil Dialogue and the European Citizen's Initiative. Additionally, the Commission has deliberately encouraged the formation of European-level CSOs through various funding programmes (Greenwood 2007; Sánchez-Salgado 2007).

In their seminal work on access to international organizations for transnational actors (which the authors define as including not only CSOs but also corporations), Jonas Tallberg and his colleagues observe a strong trend towards increased transnational access across issue areas, phases in the policy process and world regions (Tallberg et al. 2013b). Drawing on a data set consisting of 298 organizational bodies of 50 international organizations from 1950 to 2010, they find that formal access has expanded dramatically since the end of the Cold War (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 53). Only 5 of the 50 organizations in the sample did not provide formal access in 2010 (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 95). Hence, opportunities for civil society involvement in global governance are widespread. Development and human rights are the two issue areas that provide most access. Finance and security are the two least open fields (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 13, 76). As concerns the policy phases, GGIs tend to provide most access in the monitoring and enforcement phases, and they tend to be most closed in the decision-making phase. Medium openness was found in the policy formulation and implementation phases (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 13, 77).

One should be cautious to avoid general conclusions of a structural and long-term trend that implies a power shift from states to civil society. CSO influence is often accused of being more apparent than real, as state actors and GGIs organize access to suit their own interests. Deep and broad access is still highly unusual (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 13). The EU's participatory arrangements, for instance, have been criticized for window-dressing – not aiming at genuine, democratic participation but only instrumentally serving the need to enhance the image of the EU in the eyes of the populations (Kohler-Koch 2007; Smismans 2008; Shore 2011). Also, participation is not equally open to all civil society actors. GGIs select the organizations that they want to cooperate with, as is very clear in, for instance, the ECOSOC's formal accreditation procedures mentioned above. CSO 'partners' that are considered legitimate are as a rule non-commercial, not advocating or carrying out violence, not actively striving to replace the government in their respective home countries and generally supportive of the access-granting intergovernmental organization's missions and actions (Willetts 1996). Beyond these very general features, each GGI elaborates its own rules and procedures for civil society inclusion. An overall pattern is that professionally organized and well-funded CSOs with headquarters in the global North are overrepresented, while smaller grassroots organizations representing marginalized groups and located in the global South are underrepresented in IO access (Kamat 2004; Scholte 2011c: 329). Moreover, it has been suggested that the overall trend towards CSO access is halting. Norbert Götz writes about the weak reception of the 2004 Cardoso Report, which was produced by the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations. The lack of enthusiasm 'suggests that this relationship is characterized by a new stalemate in the current century, despite the lip service frequently paid by politicians to civil society' (Götz 2011: 191). In this study we do not investigate whether this is indeed the case. Instead, we contend that overall CSO involvement is currently high, acknowledging that this may be in a process of change.

So far, we have mainly approached CSO involvement in GGIs in a top-down manner by focusing on the institutional openings provided for them by states and intergovernmental organizations. But CSOs, and social movements more generally, target GGIs in many different ways and not only upon invitation. Outside or protest activities have been common. The protest repertoire of local and national social movements, including strikes, rallies and demonstrations, has been applied when targeting GGIs too. Smith identifies three generations of transnational activism: multilateralist (pre-1980), transnational advocacy networks (late 1980s to the 1990s) and direct action (late 1990s onwards). She argues that 'strategies have shifted from a focus on global institutions in the earliest generation of activism toward the cultivation of issue-based campaigns led by key organizations to more permanent and Internet-based forms of mobilization with more decentralized leadership and individualized identities' (Smith 2008: 127–128). This interpretation points at outside protest activities becoming increasingly common. Other social movement scholars have made somewhat different observations. Della Porta et al. (2006: 118–119) argue that there has been a normalization of protest, at least in the global North. Unconventional forms of action have become more accepted, but social movement organizations have also increasingly turned to conventional collective action, like lobbying. This is important because social movements were previously conceived as more or less defined by their unconventional protest repertoire.

Of particular relevance for our study is the new protest wave that began in the late 1990s, as the global justice movement (sometimes called the anti-globalization or alter-globalization movement) vocally and visibly targeted the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF as well as G8 meetings. Although it began earlier, its inception is often associated with the 'Battle of Seattle' in 1999. Demonstrations were televised and spurred similar protest activities in different world regions. There are indications that this wave of protests against GGIs peaked around the turn of the millennium. In an attempt to quantitatively measure protests against international organizations, Jonas Tallberg and his colleagues relied on newspaper articles from across the world available in the LexisNexis database. The number of articles containing the terms 'demonstrator' or 'protester' combined with the name of specific organizations were counted (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 102). This analysis showed that there were almost no reports of protests against international organizations prior to the 1990s and that protests peaked around the year 2000 and then declined. Most protests were reported against organizations in the field of trade followed by finance and development. Protests against international organizations in other fields have been rare. Almost all the targets of these protests were global institutions (like the World Bank, IMF and WTO). Reports on protests against regional institutions were not common, although some protest events focusing on regional institutions in Europe (EU) and Asia were noted (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 123–124).

The new global protest movement is comprised of a wide set of actors that range from formally organized NGOs to loosely formed social movement organizations. Besides targeting GGIs – the activities that are the focus of this investigation – they also organize separate meetings and forums such as the World Social Forum, the European Social Forum and so on. These activities exemplify bottom-up involvement of civil society in global governance (cf. della Porta et al. 2006; Smith 2008; Pleyers 2010). The popularity of outside protest activities, as compared to inside lobbying, varies across movements and issue areas. According to della Porta et al. (2006: 129), activists associated with the European Social Forum have a tendency to put more emphasis on street demonstrations and show an increasing scepticism towards lobbying related to counter-summits. Conversely, Pandey (2013: 80) argues that civil society engagement with WTO has changed 'from confrontational to cooperational'. In chapter 3 as well as in our case studies, we will elaborate much more on the dynamics of inside and outside civil society strategies targeting GGIs.

Agents of change: understanding the emergence of civil society opposition

In our definition, opposition in global governance consists of the sum total of CSOs that target a particular GGI with some level of disagreement. We will now discuss how the emergence of such opposition (or oppositional fields, as we will refer to it) can be accounted for theoretically by reference to Piotr Sztompka's theory of social change (Sztompka 1993).

In Sztompka's model there are two main dimensions of social change. The first is *locus of agency* and concerns whether change is initiated from above or below, that is, from powerful elites (including governmental authorities) or from 'ordinary people'. The second is *intentionality of agency* and can be either manifest or latent. In the former, the change is intended, while in the latter it is not: in this case, it can be an unintended consequence or a by-product of actions taken to achieve very different goals. When these two dimensions are combined, we end up in a typology of four possible types of social change, of which three are relevant here.[1] The first is intended change that emerges from above. We are here talking of occasions when policies or institutional reforms have been successfully carried out according to plans. The second is unintended change emerging from above, which denotes the cases when government policies have consequences that are other than, and sometimes even contrary to, what was intended. The third type is intended change emerging from below, which results from the mobilization and organization among people wishing to produce some sort of societal change.

Opposition to GGIs, we argue, emerges from a combination of these three processes. First, when intended and from above, it is the result of governing elites' conscious will at involving and inviting civil society actors into GGIs. There are several possible reasons for this: to gain leverage in GGIs, to benefit from the CSOs' expertise, to use their connections to the local or grassroots level to carry out or monitor projects, to have them provide the views and experiences of grassroots or to use them for legitimizing one's own governmental business, to mention a few (Raustiala 1997; Tallberg 2010). In such cases, governments and GGIs provide institutional access for civil society actors. Such inclusion can take many forms, ranging from information sharing, over consultation, implementation, monitoring and, less often, involving them in decision making. Sometimes the GGIs provide material incentives, as when the EU provides core funding for many of its civil society partners

(Cullen 2010; Sánchez-Salgado 2010). The UN, too, funds not only project implementation, but also civil society capacity building, networking and conference participation (Reimann 2006).

Second, oppositions partly result as unintended consequences of governmental action. Not all CSO action is as well behaved and controlled as that which follows and complies with the granted institutional access. When policy discussions and decisions are moved to regional or global levels, and when GGIs are set up, governments create incentives for action that they cannot wholly control or foresee. New political opportunity structures are created that spur and affect activism. G8 meetings, for instance, give little or no formal access to civil society, but have incentivized global activists who travel to the location of the meeting to protest (Gorringe and Rosie 2008). In the course of action, activists have learnt to know each other and formed new transnational networks for mobilization. The same pattern can be observed in many issue areas of world politics, where new international organizations and forums have enabled and facilitated transnational mobilization (Bandy and Smith 2005: 243).

Third, opposition in global governance is also brought forward through intentional action from below. This occurs when activists make a scale shift from the local or national to the regional or global level (Tarrow 2005; Tarrow and McAdam 2005). The motives for targeting a GGI are varied: CSOs may engage in such activities because they are critical of the power and politics of the GGI, because they find the GGI to be more accessible than certain states, because they take this as an opportunity to network with other CSOs or simply because they have acquired the resources to do so (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith 2004, 2008; Friedman et al. 2005; Pallas and Uhlin 2014). The agents in this type of change are those that are associated with civil society and that make up oppositional fields, such as NGOs, social movements and other CSOs with the capacity for some form of concerted collective action. Activists from these categories take advantage of the opportunities that GGIs offer or are perceived to offer. They may partake in the consultative arrangements that governments invite them to, but they may also engage in protest activities or networking and thereby use these political opportunities in unintended ways. This has, for instance, been the case with the WTO. In the early 2000s it was subject to intense critique and direct protests from organizations such as Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens (ATTAC), which accused it of being (among other things) non-participatory and lacking in transparency. Largely because of these protests, the WTO leadership felt compelled to publish more material on its webpage and to initiate forums for consultation with civil society (Williams 2011: 114). This demonstrates that the institutional structures that provide conditions for political action ('political opportunity structures' in social movement theory) are not static and unchangeable but subject to influence and elaborations initiated from below (cf. Tarrow 1998: 19).

Considering the relation among these three positions, it is clear that the difference between the second and the third concerns the observer's perspective more than anything else. We may imagine (or recall) a situation when governments set up a forum for discussion on a new issue, and that forum is targeted by large-scale demonstrations with participants from different countries. In the eyes of governments, this may appear as an 'unintended consequence' (in the sense that transnational protesting would not have materialized if it were not for their decision to begin international cooperation on a particular issue), whereas for activists it is the result of strategic (although surely also passionate, ideological, etc.) behaviour. We therefore end up with two main processes leading to the emergence of opposition in global governance: those from 'above' (GGIs, governments) and those from 'below' (civil society actors: social movements, NGOs, etc.). These different loci of agency are mirrored in the division within the scholarly literature between those focusing on institutional design and those focusing on social movements.

From collective agency to oppositional field

We have now sketched an overarching historical background to CSO–GGIs relations and argued that contemporary configurations of CSO actors surrounding GGIs result from a combination of top-down and bottom-up processes. Now we will continue the re-conceptualization of CSO–GGI relations in terms of opposition, which we began in chapter 1, particularly through an engagement with the literature on opposition in comparative politics. In this way we begin to provide an answer to the overarching research question, 'How can opposition help us understand CSO–GGI relations?' – an endeavour that will continue throughout the book.

We need to begin by specifying what it is that we want to re-conceptualize and what our objectives are with this effort. There is by now a very large literature on 'global civil society', a term that was popularized in the 1990s and has been extensively debated since then (Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003; Amoore and Langley 2004; Bartelson 2006; Jaeger

2007). In comparison to this literature, our research focus is much more modest. We do not claim to draw any general conclusions regarding the nature, potentials and future of global civil society, if ever there is one. The institutional focus that results from our squaring in on CSO–GGI relations gives us a more delimited aim and a more easily observable research object.

As already mentioned, the academic literature on civil society in global governance has been marked by a division between those that are mainly concerned with institutional design and those concerned with CSO agency. The latter, 'bottom-up', approach has also been divided between those concentrating on the strategies and influence of CSO 'insiders' and those concerned with CSOs' 'outside' protests. What we aim to do is to contribute to the 'bottom-up' approach precisely by finding a way of capturing the interactions and strategies of both sets of actors (insiders and outsiders) that target a GGI. Then, what other attempts have there been at grasping this relationship in a way comparable to ours?

A dominating approach is to conceive of transnational mobilization as constituting collective agency of one type or another. As mentioned in chapter 1, the most common approach is to understand transnationally active CSOs as composing a *social movement*. Briefly, to avoid too much repetition, a social movement is understood as being involved in social conflict against an adversary, its participants sharing collective identity as mutual recognition defines the boundaries of the movement and they are involved in dense exchanges of information and other resources in pursuit of common goals (Diani 2003; della Porta and Diani 2006; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). The conflict element sets it apart from consensus movements and solidarity movements (Lofland 1989; Giugni and Passy 2001), and researchers tend to see it expressed in protest activities. Collective identities enable individuals and organizations to see themselves as parts of larger movements and facilitate solidarity across long distances, and members' ongoing involvement in communication and exchange enables political coordination and awareness and sets movements apart from more temporary forms of cooperation (della Porta and Diani 2006: 20–22). In comparison, coalitions and networks display lower levels of cohesiveness. In *coalitions*, participating actors share the same goals and opponents, but not necessarily a collective identity, sense of belonging and long-term visions. While they engage in joint actions, these have the character of short-term campaigns rather than sustained movements (Fox 2004: 476; della Porta and Diani 2006: 24). *Networks* are generally dedicated to informal information exchange.

They do not, by definition, require collective identity or shared goals or even aim at joint actions. Comparing the terms, Jonathan Fox explains that 'coalitions are networks in action mode' (2004: 475). A particular version of networks, and a particularly famous one, is the 'transnational advocacy network' defined by Keck and Sikkink as 'those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services' (1998: 2). This type of network is distinguished by relatively dense forms of exchange between participants, who share values and goals – although not necessarily identity. Critics have pointed out that Keck and Sikkink conflate networks with coalitions in their definition (Dijkzeul and DeMars 2011: 215).

We find all of these conceptualizations wanting from our perspective. In order to grasp CSO–GGI relations in a comprehensive way, we need a conceptualization of actor configuration which (1) does not exclude actors employing a particular strategy (that is, inside or outside strategies), (2) does not assume that the disagreement with the adversary GGI is uniform, since we want to capture the full range of advocacy CSOs, ranging from more modest to more radical in terms of goals, (3) is relatively lasting, as overall CSO–GGI relations are more durable than, say, campaigns and coalitions, although individual participating CSOs may come and disappear, and (4) does not presuppose the existence of dense links of communication, shared identity or even a common cause. In short we want a conceptualization, which does not assume the existence of collective agency.

We suggest that CSOs targeting GGIs can be understood as an *oppositional field*. This means that we think of the ontology of this actor configuration as a field rather than as a collective agent. Field theory is not yet common in international relations and political science (but see Bernhard 2011; Bigo 2011; Georgakakis 2011), but is an established sociological approach to investigate relations between actors. It comes in several different versions (see Wooten and Hoffman 2008 for an overview), and we more specifically use the notion of a SAF (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012).

> A strategic action field is a constructed mesolevel social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the field. A stable field is one

> in which the main actors are able to reproduce themselves and the field over a fairly long period of time.
>
> (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 9)

In contrast to, for instance, Pierre Bourdieu's field theory, SAF theory has been developed to account for interrelations among collective actors, which makes it apt for our context. In a SAF, incumbent and challenger actors interact with each other and with the governing units in their midst. This interaction sometimes takes the form of cooperation and sometimes as a competitive 'jockeying for position' (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 5). In our opinion, SAF theory solves the problems identified above: it allows us to conceive of CSO–GGI relations as relatively lasting, as including actors of all degrees of political radicalism and conflictual stance and as employing varied strategies towards the GGI in question. It gives a framework for understanding their interrelations but does not see them as constituting a particular kind of collective agent. Importantly, a field *may* include (and in our cases surely does include) participants that do share collective identity and common cause and that consider themselves as part of this or that social movement. But a field perspective does not presuppose that this is the case. Instead, participants are likely to be diverse and have varied motivations and different levels of conflictive stance.

We see oppositions, including national level oppositions, as a particular kind of field. In what follows, we will discuss and define what we mean by opposition in global governance, particularly through an engagement with the literature in comparative politics.

Re-conceptualizing CSO–GGI relations

Above, we argued that an oppositional field is not a form of collective action. It is neither movement, coalition, nor network. The agents of oppositional fields do not by definition share goals or collective identity, and they are not necessarily even connected by informal channels of information exchange. Moreover, they are not all involved in a strong form of social conflict, although a certain level of opposition to the GGI is required. Surely, all of these features may be present in practice, as oppositional fields include actors from different movements, campaigns and networks. But the extent to which they exist in a given case is a matter for empirical analysis.

We now need to leave meta-theoretical considerations and move on to the specifics of oppositional fields. As was made clear in the introduction, we proceed by way of analogy when we use the term 'opposition' in the global governance context. Opposition is used as an 'orienting concept', as we have borrowed from adjacent scholarship and applied it in our own in order to illuminate our object of investigation a bit differently than the usual. Such concepts are primarily used heuristically for 'suggesting or indicating (although not forcing) patterns upon data' and providing 'a centrepoint for conceptual extension and theoretical elaboration' (Layder 1998: 110).

This is certainly not the first time that a concept that originated in a national context is adopted into international relations. Participation, civil society, accountability, transparency, governance and democracy are all examples of terms that have been transferred and that lead a parallel existence in global governance scholarship. The challenge is to modify the concept to make it useful in the global governance context, without letting go of its central characteristics. This exercise is not without risks, and as a researcher one should be attentive to the multiple connotations that accompany it, as well as to the political significance this shift implies – so that one does not, for instance, end up inadvertently lending undeserved legitimacy to a particular institution (Greven 2007; Erman 2010). But these difficulties need not make one abstain from trying. The reason is that we have no other vocabulary to talk of these issues in than that derived from the national political level. R. B. J. Walker has demonstrated that in conceptual history as well as in actual politics the 'domestic' has been associated with peace, order, emancipation and the possibilities of lasting institutions and progress. As its darker counterpart, the 'international' has traditionally been perceived as everything the domestic is not: war, anarchy, raw power struggles, endless recurrence and the impossibility of progress (Walker 1993). This influences the supply of analytical conceptual tools so that the researcher who wishes to describe elements of order and institutionalization at the international arena must necessarily toil with concepts that were originally developed domestically. There is no way around it but to adjust the terms and provide modified definitions, which is precisely what we strive to do with opposition in global governance.

Opposition in comparative politics

While the starting point of our argumentation is that opposition is virtually absent from the global governance literature, it is interesting to note that it was for long an overlooked subject within nationally oriented political science as well (Ionescu and de Madariaga 1972: 11–12). The 'extraordinary neglect of opposition' relative to other comparable concepts in political thought was one impetus for the then (in 1965) new journal, *Government and Opposition*, as editor Leonard Schapiro explained in the introduction of the first issue (Schapiro 1965: 1). Schapiro then suggested that scholars' unwillingness to engage with the topic could be explained by the persistence within scholarship of a vision of a conflict-free utopia, and with the tendency to confuse all conflict with violence (Schapiro 1965: 2–4). Another reason may be the preference for associating democracy with consensus rather than conflict (Rosanvallon 2008; Kubát 2010: 12).

In the late 1960s and 1970s, a number of books and edited volumes on the subject were published, arguably the most important being Robert A. Dahl's *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (Dahl 1968b; see also Barker 1971b; Ionescu and de Madariaga 1972; McLennan 1973). These works are still main references in the literature on opposition. There is now a rather extensive literature on opposition in comparative politics (Blondel 1997; Helms 2004), in the literature on transitions to democracy (Stepan 1990) and case studies on the role of opposition in non-democratic regimes (Albrecht 2005; Cavatorta 2009). However, very few works in the more recent strands of scholarship concern opposition specifically and exclusively. Theoretical and conceptual developments regarding opposition have therefore been slow in relation to other aspects of political systems (Blondel 1997: 462; Brack and Weinblum 2011: 69). We will now discuss the classic definitions of opposition and contrast it with the broader one proposed by Brock and Weinblum.

The concept of opposition is an 'inflated' one, as it has been used in many different ways to cover many different phenomena (Alibasic 1999: 17). Rodney Barker has listed six different meanings the term is invested with: (1) total resistance to the state and determination to overthrow it, (2) resistance to the state when conceived of as an oppressive institution, (3) resistance to the groups or faction in control of the state, (4) loyal opposition against the government but recognizing it as well as the state basis as legitimate, (5) the system of checks and balances through which a state constitution guards against its own excess and (6) attempts of citizen groups to modify the harshness of the ruling elite (Barker 1971a: 5). At its most basic, opposition 'stipulates a relationship – standing in some form of disagreement to another body'; however, this can clearly cover many different manifestations (Norton 2008: 236). Robert Dahl has, in the introduction to his 1968 edited volume, provided a well-known and broad definition which captures a wide range of oppositional behaviour: 'Suppose that *A* determines the conduct of some aspect of the government of a particular political system during some interval [. . .] Suppose that during this interval *B* cannot determine the conduct of the government; and that *B* is opposed to the conduct of government by *A*. Then *B* is what we mean by "an opposition"' (Dahl 1968c: xviii). But then he narrows down the study to only established Western democratic systems where conflict has been institutionalized within the framework of elections and party competitions. This is quite telling for how opposition has tended to be treated within the classic literature on the subject.

In the classic literature, opposition has overwhelmingly been understood as *parliamentary opposition*, taking place in the context of established democratic systems (Helms 2004: 24). Ionescu and de Madariaga admit that opposition can be understood in a very broad sense, as an instinct rooted in human nature, but argue that it should be reserved for the instances where opposition constitutes 'the most advanced and institutionalized form of political conflict', that is, in stable democratic systems (1972: 16). In this restricted sense, opposition is often seen as 'an organized political group, or groups, of which the aim is to oust the government in power and to replace it by one of its own choosing' (Schapiro 1967: 182).

No institution fulfils this role in global governance. The one that comes closest is the European Parliament (EP), but it falls short in several regards. Especially, 'there have been no devices specifically designed to enable parliamentary opposition actors to play a decisive role in producing alternations in governmental office at the European level' (Helms 2008: 229; cf. Neunreither 1998).

There are two aspects from the classic literature on opposition that we however want to retain. First, opposition is understood as directed towards a specific and identifiable target, usually the government or regime. The concept of opposition does not stand for itself but depends on the existence of a power that it counters: 'Logically, organically and morphologically opposition is the dialectic counterpart of power' (Ionescu and de Madariaga 1972: 10). This corresponds to our ambition to grasp activities directed at particular GGIs. There are of course strands of important scholarship that conceive of power and counterpower in more structural or fragmented terms, some of which will be reviewed at a later stage in this chapter. We are not disputing that there are other forms of power than that which is manifested in particular institutions, but this is what interests us in this particular volume. By drawing on the classical comparative politics research on opposition, we focus on power as working through the interaction of specific actors. This includes the more diffuse institutional power of the targeted GGIs as well as the direct attempts by specific CSOs to influence the GGIs (cf. Barnett and Duval 2005).

Second, opposition may encompass actors that do not necessarily share goals or identity and whose level of contentiousness is varied. Barbara McLennan states that by opposition 'one can refer to total systemic opposition, as that of revolutionary groups; to moderate differences in policy among institutionalized groups such as courts, legislatures, and political parties; or to the more informal oppositions of interest groups' (McLennan 1973: 2; cf. Dahl 1968a). Opposition therefore is more reminiscent of a field than of a collective agent. Some oppositions *may* display more unitary and cohesive characteristics but they are not by definition so. This is consistent with our ambition to capture CSOs with varying political agendas, sometimes differing goals and identities and varied levels of contentiousness.

However, it is clear that our usage in the global governance context deviates in several respects from the classical one. But this is not only because we transfer it to global governance. The period when these theories were elaborated was one when Western political systems were characterized by strong political parties acting on a comparatively strong political arena. The political context has changed so much that researchers concerned with national-level oppositions need to modify these theories. Contemporary critics have drawn attention to three particular weaknesses of classical theories (Brack and Weinblum 2011). First, they hold a narrow view of oppositional actors as restricted to those political parties that have failed to join the government, disregarding opposition within coalitions and within parties, as well as from other actors such as lobby groups and CSOs (see also Norton 2008 on different opposition 'modes'). Second, they assume that the opposition's core function is to counter the government and strive to replace it, as in the case of UK's Her Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition. This has not only disregarded many other functions (for instance, channel marginalized groups' voice, politicize new issues, raise awareness), it has often also had strong normative overtones. Sartori, for instance, has argued that 'an opposition must oppose, but not obstruct; it must be constructive, not disruptive' (1966: 151). Third, it holds a restrictive view of the locus of opposition by focusing on national parliaments only, overlooking, for instance, opposition in regional, local, transnational and supranational forums, as well as the extra-parliamentary opposition by small and niche parties.

Brack and Weinblum therefore suggest a broader definition of opposition as 'a disagreement with the government or its policies, the political elite or the political regime as a whole, expressed in the public sphere, by an organized actor through different modes of action' (2011: 74). We find that this theoretical definition is broad enough to function in the global governance setting as well. The site or locus of opposition does not cover only national parliaments but also political regimes and elites in a wider sense, which may include GGIs. Oppositional actors are widened beyond parties so that CSOs and others may be included. And the oppositional 'modes of action' covers a much broader span of activities than the earlier focus on replacement of power.

The theoretical definition is broad enough to capture many types of oppositions in both national and transnational contexts. But to specify it for our particular locus of investigation, CSO–GGI relations, we specify opposition in global governance operationally as the sum total of CSOs that target a particular GGI with some level of disagreement. This approach can of course be criticized and we will now turn to a discussion of how we defend our conceptualization against possible objections.

Objections and responses

There are several possible objections to talking of opposition in global governance. One is that opposition does not stand on its own but requires its Siamese twin *government* to be conceivable (Alibasic 1999: 11). And the international arena is defined precisely by the absence of government, most clearly articulated in the notion of anarchy. Global governance, for its part, is distinguished from government through its shifting, dispersed and non-hierarchical centres of power and its multiplicity of actors and arrangements, none of which has ultimate authority (Rosenau 1995). Then, how can one talk of opposition in a context that is defined as 'governance without government'? Our response is that although there is no single source of power in global governance, there are multiple centres of authority that are primarily structured around institutions (Deitelhoff 2010). We hence want to avoid addressing global governance in the summative, as one broad system of rule (Knight 2009), and instead approach it in the plural, that is, a multiplicity of issue-specific, or sectoral, global governance*s* (Whitman 2009). Most issue-specific global governances (for instance, the global governance of development, of climate change and of trade) are populated by a variety of different interstate institutions at regional as well as global levels. In this study, it is these institutions that we consider the locus of power and the site of opposition.

Another objection concerns the designation of CSOs as members of the opposition. As pointed out above, it is usually assumed that only political parties can play the role of opposition since they are the ones that challenge and seek to replace government. The most clear-cut example is the British system of Her Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition where (traditionally) one contending party challenges and seeks to replace the governing one. Then, may one reasonably think of CSOs as constituting the opposition? Here, one should note that this assumption has already been challenged by scholars concerned with opposition in non-democratic regimes. In such settings, the formation of contending political parties as well as a variety of other groups that make up the opposition to the regime is often prohibited. Writes Kubát:

> In reality, institutionalization itself can take many forms; we are not limited solely to the consideration of political parties as we know them from democracy. A group of artists, church, trade union, intellectual club, war veterans association, discussion group, student society, environmentalist movement, and so on.; all more or less institutionalized organizations. All have [. . .] a political underpinning and can exist in opposition to a non-democratic regime [. . .]. [W]e cannot negate the existence of opposition [. . .] in a non-democracy and thereby apply the concept only to democracies, as many authors have previously done.
>
> (Kubát 2010: 22–23)

Also, 'we can consider political movements as de facto political parties, which, for various reasons, are not referred to as such' (Kubát 2010: 44). We consider global governance as a particular kind of 'non-democratic regime', a feature of which is that there are no institutionalized possibilities to replace power. Therefore, civil society actors play the role of opposition in this setting. However, one can also distinguish between *active* and *passive* opposition. Active opposition occurs when the opposing actor makes a conscious and deliberate move aimed to influence government. In passive opposition, the opposing actor does recognize that there is a conflict between itself and the government, but does not take any deliberate action to alter the situation (Dahl 1968c: xix). Passive opposition is close to what Edward Shils in his study of opposition in Asia and Africa calls 'mute' opposition, that is, the obstinacy, apathy and unorganized non-compliance which may exist alongside party politics or exist in its absence (Shils 1971: 66–68). We only include CSOs that actively act in relation to the institution in question, which means we delimit the study to 'active' opposition.

The main point of objection, which comprises the other two, is whether it is at all feasible to talk of opposition outside of the political structure of Western democracies without stretching the term too far. An important distinction in the literature is between opposition in the general and the institutional sense.[2] Opposition in the *general sense* denotes disagreement with power in the broadest terms possible, encompassing all formal and informal actors and intentional as well as spontaneous acts of resistance. It does not rely on a particular institutional form for expression, but is a historical constant synonymous to conflict in general. Opposition in the *institutional sense*, in contrast, has, as we have seen so far, mainly been theorized against the backdrop of post-war Western liberal-democratic states. Many commentators have thought that opposition can only thrive in these systems, which have the necessary pluralism (Kubát 2010: 22). It can be thought of as political conflict, given the particular form of non-violent inter-party competition for power. In this setting, opposition is not only permitted but also assigned with the function of questioning power and providing an alternative. Classic writers of the 1960s and 1970s hailed it as a sign of political maturity of a system. To Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga, for instance, opposition is 'the crowning institution of a fully institutionalized political society and the hallmark of those political societies which are variously called democratic, liberal, parliamentary, constitutional, pluralistic-constitutionalized, or even open or free' (Ionesco and de Madariaga 1972: 16; cf. Ionescu 1966).

In this book we use opposition in the institutional sense, although in a redefined way. Had we meant it in the general sense, we could as well have used any other of the terms that are more established in the global governance and transnational activism literature, such as protest, resistance, counter-conduct or bottom-up politics (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Polet 2007; Death 2010; Kostovicova and Glasius 2011). And although global governance does not offer the same institutional structures as democratic national regimes do, it is not entirely un-institutionalized either. Indeed, the degree of institutionalization varies considerably between issue areas and institutional forms (Abbot and Snidal 2000). The EU stands out among global and regional governance institutions for having a parliament with directly elected representatives which may serve as an institutionalized opposition, although this opposition is not able to replace the ruling power. The ILO has its tripartite structure through which representatives of employers' associations and labour unions are participating together with state representatives. This inclusion of labour unions might be seen as a way to institutionalize labour opposition. As concerns CSO participation specifically, the UN Charter encourages ECOSOC to make arrangements for consultation in its various areas of competence. The Lisbon Treaty encourages EU institutions to enhance transparency, engage in consultations and allow for both citizens and associations to make their voices heard, perhaps most innovatively in the creation of the European Citizens' Initiative. The past two decades have also seen the consolidation of a norm of civil society consultation procedures as a prerequisite for legitimate governance in international institutions (Reimann 2006; Scholte 2011c: 311).

We hence want to decouple institutionalized opposition from its ties to the Western democratic regime type. If understood more loosely, as the existence of established channels for criticizing, interrogating, scrutinizing or in other ways engaging power, we argue that it is possible to talk of opposition in global governance. True, opposition in global governance is not in a position to replace power. But this has been the case for several historical forms of institutionalized opposition as well. If one ventures far back in history, a well-known example is the Roman Tribunes of the Plebs. The tribunes were officially recognized organs through which the people could oppose the government's decisions, but could not itself initiate or make decisions (Ionescu and de Madariaga 1972: 21). It has in fact been said of it that 'the essential value of the Tribunate was that the people were defended by those that did not aspire to become masters' (de Jouvenel 1966: 161).

Resistance and opposition

What other conceptualizations of resistance are there, and how do they relate to our conceptualization of opposition? One's standpoint as regards resistance mirrors one's conception of power, and more specifically, with how one conceives of the level of autonomy of civil society (for fuller overviews, see Chin and Mittelman 2000; Amoore 2005).

The literature on transnational activism of the 1990s onwards has been dominated by the concerns to distinguish movement activity from structures of power. This strand of scholarship has carefully separated the two spheres of non-state actors such as CSOs on the one hand and global power actors, including GGIs, on the other. Much research has then been oriented to teasing out the impact of movements on the actors of global powers (Friedman et al. 2005; Smith 2008; Scholte 2011a), and to some extent to studying the impact of the governing structures on the organization of contestation (Reimann 2006; Joachim and Locher 2009b).

Large parts of this literature have constructed the conceptualization of global contestation as a counter-point to global economic power. Inspired by Polanyi's theory of the 'double movement', Ronaldo Munck argues that neoliberal economic globalization has generated a counter-movement, composed by many different actors that in diverse ways strive to embed the economy in social relations (Munck 2006). Richard Falk talks of the need to counter the dominating 'globalization-from-above', propagated by transnational market forces, with 'globalization-from-below' conceived of as mobilization of transnationally organized protest networks (Falk 1997). Similarly, Jackie Smith talks of a struggle between two networks: the neoliberal globalizers, which are composed of governments of wealthy states and economic actors such as currency speculators, TNCs and the global financial institutions, and the democratic globalizers, which are made up of various social movement organizations and other CSOs (Smith 2008: 5). These accounts conceive of resistance as made up by complex aggregates of actors, but they retain the dualistic conceptualization of power and resistance.

Other scholars have questioned precisely this neat distinction between power and resistance. Neo-Gramscians have suggested that the practices of resistance may be furthering the power structures they claim to contest. This tradition questions the division between state and non-state actors and sees them as constitutive of the same governing order. Civil society is not considered a neutral zone of social relations, but the arena where willing consent to power is formed. At the same time, it is also in civil society that authentic counter-hegemonic struggles can begin (Buttigieg 1995). Robert W. Cox expresses this dualistic conceptualization by the terms 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' global civil society. In the first category are those organizations and actors that are influenced by the concepts and powers of economic and state elites and that tend to stabilize the status quo, and in the second are those actors and networks that are truly counter-hegemonic – often grassroot organizations of those that have been marginalized by globalization processes (Cox 1999: 10–11). This scholarship draws a sharp line through civil society, dividing those that preserve status quo from those that challenge it. They draw the line between power and resistance differently, but it is still there.

Scholars in a broader post-structural tradition question this dividing line altogether. Often inspired by Michel Foucault's thoughts on power as ubiquitous, mobile and micro-physical, they see power as permeating the whole realm of civil society, itself constitutive of rather than challenging the governing order. From this perspective, it has been argued that 'the self-association and political will-formation characteristic of civil society and nonstate actors do not stand in opposition to the political power of the state but is a most central feature of how power operates in late modern society' (Sending and Neumann 2006: 658; see also Amoore and Langley 2004; Jaeger 2007; Death 2010). Hence, power is not only exercised by governments, corporations and status quo-oriented professional CSOs; instead 'governmental power may be exercised and the status quo stabilized in and through even the most grassroots or subaltern practices of contestation' (Coleman and Tucker 2011: 401). This perspective points at the need for employing a different set of methodological tools in empirical research, often ethnography, in order to capture localized and micro-level forms of resistance and control (Coleman 2013).

Compared to many of these accounts, our conceptualization of opposition is quite delimited. First, not denying that power might be identified and fought at many different locations and levels, our account puts the GGI squarely at the centre of analysis. We do not claim to give a full picture of power relations in global governance, but follow the common institution-centrism of global governance. Second, whereas many of the above accounts could be understood as preoccupied with opposition in the general sense (*sensu largo*), our investigation is delimited to a particular kind of opposition in the institutional sense (*sensu stricto*). Again, this does not mean that power cannot be fought by many other actors and in many other locations than the ones studied here, but we delimit the scope of investigation to organized civil society actors targeting particular GGIs. Third, we do not presume to tell status quo CSOs from counter-hegemonic CSOs. Our study does not proceed from the assumption that any of them is involved in assumedly benign struggles. As Munck has noted, much of the literature on resistance in global governance focuses on the actors assumed to be involved in a progressive struggle and disregards the reactionary, backwards and/or nationalist movements whose transnational mobilization may also have resulted from processes of globalization (Munck 2007; see also Bob 2012). Our conceptualization of opposition does not theoretically and a priori exclude such actors from analysis. We do not assume that the oppositional actors are either fully co-opted or counter-hegemonic.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a background to the empirical study by sketching how CSO–GGI relations have evolved over time and discussed top-down as well as bottom-up explanations as to the establishment of these relations. We have also introduced the notion of oppositional field in order to understand the configuration of CSO actors surrounding GGIs. The field concept is a meta-theoretical one, which we think captures what we are looking for better than does any notion that denotes collective agency (movement, coalition, network). The chapter has provided a re-conceptualization of CSO–GGI relations in terms of opposition, drawing on comparative politics literature and developing our arguments in relation to literature on resistance against global governance. We prefer the concept of opposition because it captures activities directed at a particular power centre (in our case the GGI) yet includes actors with different political agendas and with different levels of contentiousness. In these respects our approach differs from much of the literature on resistance to global governance, which tends to deal with opposition in a more general sense and often assumes some degree of common (anti-neoliberal) ideology within resistance movements. We maintain that this re-conceptualization of CSO–GGI relations as opposition provides a fruitful base for examining this phenomenon in a novel way. The following chapter will outline a more specific analytical framework for this purpose.

3
Opposition in Global Governance: An Analytical Framework

Introduction

This chapter presents the analytical framework that guides our empirical investigations. The first part of the chapter is introductory. It recapitulates and discusses our definition of opposition in global governance and presents an overview of the types of agents in oppositional fields. In the second part of the chapter, we elaborate on the analytical tools used for answering our second research question – What is the pattern of civil society opposition targeting GGIs? At this point the aim is to find ways of characterizing the 'oppositional' field of CSOs targeting a particular GGI. The third and fourth parts of the chapter are related to our third research question – How can CSOs' choice of strategy towards a particular GGI be explained? – and turn attention to the strategies of individual CSOs. We first present the different existing types of strategies and then develop a model for explaining CSOs' choice of oppositional strategy towards a particular GGI.

The oppositional field

We define oppositions in global governance operationally as the sum total of CSOs that target a particular GGI with some level of disagreement. This definition is *broad* in the sense that it captures a wide variety of actors who target it from the inside as well as from the outside, and for different purposes. Formally organized NGOs as well as more loosely structured SMOs and activist networks are covered by this concept, as are actors belonging to different political camps. The definition is *narrow* in that it only concerns how civil society actors target particular GGIs. Of course, it is common for civil society actors to direct their claims at multiple targets, to work simultaneously on national governments and different GGIs, but we are only concerned with their activities in this more limited sense.

The term 'oppositional field' was introduced in chapter 2 and only needs to be briefly recapitulated here. Conceiving of civil society in global governance analogously to an institutionalized (national) opposition allows us to capture a set of activities directed at a particular target, yet include a broad set of actors that may differ in levels of contentiousness and that may not identify as pertaining to the same movement. The conceptualization of opposition in the literature of the 1960s and 1970s is too narrow to directly transfer to the global governance context (and may even be too narrow to be fruitful for today's national level as well), but a broader one such as Brack and Weinblum's (2011: 74) may be used in both national and global governance contexts.

We argue that the qualities of opposition, both in general and in global governance, are at a meta-theoretical level better captured as a SAF than as a collective agent (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012). Actors in a SAF need not share political goals or collective identity, and need not stand in a uniform position of contentiousness vis-à-vis the targeted power. Instead, interactions within a SAF are as much about competition as cooperation. It is a configuration of actors that have broadly shared views of the purpose of the field and that partake in the same field-specific struggle. In our case, the purpose would be the need to represent civil society in relation to the GGI in question, and the struggle would concern who is to be civil society's legitimate representative in this context. In a SAF, moreover, interactions are structured among other things by field-specific rules of action and by existing types of relationships between actors.

While an oppositional field is not an agent, it is made up of agents – and it is to them that we now need to turn. To begin, we need to handle the tension in that we delimit opposition in global governance to those CSOs that display 'some level of disagreement' to the GGI they counter, but at the same time we want to include agents with low as well as high degrees of contentiousness. How do we in practice distinguish oppositional and non-oppositional agents when 'oppositional' is conceived to include those with low levels of disagreement? We handle this question by excluding those that only function as service providers and/or merely carry out policies for the GGI, while including all advocacy organizations that in one way or another strive to change the policies of the GGI.[1]

Several categories of agents interact in an oppositional field. Among the main ones we find the following: (1) *Non-governmental organizations* that are usually defined as formal, self-governing, voluntary and non-profit organizations (cf. Gordenker and Weiss 1996: 20). Many of the NGOs we encounter in our studies are internationally organized (INGOs [international non-governmental organizations]), but oppositional fields may also include national and local NGOs. (2) *Social movement organizations* that have emerged from within a social movement and taken on a formal type of organization. SMOs are often difficult to distinguish from NGOs but are as a rule more contentious in character and tend to make more radical claims for social change. Of particular importance are the 'Big Ten', the SMOs with millions of members, a high level of bureaucratization and many national chapters, for instance, Amnesty, Greenpeace, Oxfam and ATTAC (Anheier and Themudo 2002; della Porta and Diani 2006: 147). (3) *Grassroots organizations* are also linked to social movements but are characterized by mass participation by members and claims to self-representation rather than by formal organization. They often have strong ties to a particular locality, and participation is encouraged by appeals to solidarity and ideology (della Porta and Diani 2006: 149). Examples of grassroots organizations that have gained some say in global governance are Women in the Informal Economy Globalizing and Organizing and Slum/Shack Dwellers International (Batlilawa 2002; Mayo 2005: 129) as well as broader transnational networks such as the Peoples' Global Action (Maiba 2005). (4) *Faith-based organizations* whose activities are motivated by religious concerns and duties. It is common for faith-based organizations to carry out humanitarian relief services to particularly vulnerable groups such as war victims and refugees. When they engage in advocacy, which many of them do, they tend to be more modest and do not demand the radical and fundamental social change that some SMOs do (cf. Pallas 2010). Well-known and influential examples include the Aga Khan Foundation, the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent and Caritas. (5) *Trade unions* are also actively targeting GGIs. It has been widely assumed that labour has been weakened relative to capital in the current form of economic globalization, yet trade unions now often turn their efforts at GGIs working in different issue areas and are sometimes successful (Piper 2010; Leiren and Parks 2014). In oppositional fields we tend to find internationally organized trade unions, such as Building and Woodworkers International and the International and European Trade Union Confederations (ITUC and ETUC), but one may also find locally and nationally organized ones. (6) *Think tanks* are organizations that carry out research as well as advocacy. Many of them have links to governments, political parties, business or other interest or advocacy groups, and most are non-profit. Examples of think tanks that actively partake in global governance are International Crisis Group, Global Trade Watch and the Transnational Institute.

In this study we use the term 'civil society organization' as shorthand for all the different individual agents in an oppositional field. In so doing we follow what has become standard practice among scholars and GGIs as well as among activists themselves (Willetts 2011: 25). The term 'NGO' is sometimes used in this overarching way, but we prefer to reserve it in the specific meaning discussed above, recognizing that civil society includes many more types of organizations.

The different individual agents sometimes partake in collective action. They may identify with a particular *social movement*, they may be part of a larger *network*, in which they exchange information, or they may form a short-term *coalition* for a specific purpose (see chapter 2). It is extremely rare that a whole oppositional field is involved in one such collective endeavour. Such collective formations instead usually have participants from both outside and inside an oppositional field. This means that the oppositional field is an arena where different and sometimes competing collective political endeavours may meet, interact and at occasions clash.

The non-exhaustive list of agents above is based on differences in organizational forms and purpose and not on ideological orientation and political goals. Over the past two decades, the global justice movement has gained a great deal of attention, particularly in development governance, as anti-capitalist activists have targeted major institutions such as the World Bank and IMF (Bandy and Smith 2005; della Porta 2007; Smith 2008). The transnational organization and agenda-setting successes of the human rights movement have also received a lot of scholarly attention (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Brysk 2005; Nelson and Dorsey 2008). But transnational organization is very diverse. Nationalist and fundamentalist movements have had an upswing in many regions of the globe, which is often interpreted as a reaction against globalization and modernity, and they now increasingly organize transnationally (Kaldor 2003: 97–101; Caiani 2013). Clifford Bob has demonstrated how anti-gun control and anti-LGBT rights movements have strengthened transnational bonds and increased their policy efforts directed at GGIs (Bob 2012). Our definition of opposition in global governance does not exclude such actors. Whether the NGOs, SMOs, grassroots organizations and so on that operate in a particular oppositional field hold leftist or rightist (or both of them, or any other) views is a matter for empirical investigation.

Mapping oppositional fields

We will now outline how oppositional fields can be mapped and characterized, as one way of accounting for forms of mobilization. The objective is to make clear how we will go about answering our descriptive research question – What is the pattern of civil society opposition targeting GGIs? – in our empirical case studies.

We will turn to the opposition literature for analytical dimensions. But inter-organizational relations have been treated in other strands of literatures too, especially the ones concerned with networks. In IR scholarship some researchers have described and compared networks between CSOs in different issue areas (Murdie and Davis 2011). Network analysis has also been used in social movement studies (Gerlach 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003). Mario Diani (2003) has, for instance, developed a model based on the dimensions of centralization and segmentation, from which he distinguishes four main network forms.

That literature focuses on relations between actors that partake in the same social movement. But in this study we are concerned with mapping relations within fields rather than within collective action. Another difference is that that literature maps relations between actors without any preconceived notion of any one particular centre to which they all gravitate. We, however, map fields of agents that have a GGI firmly at their centre. We characterize such fields by reference to organizational interrelations as well as their distance or proximity to the GGI. To repeat, the actors' relations to a specific GGI are our analytical focus and delimitation, although we are aware that in practice many of the studied actors direct their advocacy efforts simultaneously at multiple targets at national as well as global and local levels. The literature on opposition is more directly suitable for this particular purpose.

We argue that oppositions in global governance may vary at least along the three dimensions enlisted below. The main source of inspiration is Robert A. Dahl's classic and influential model (1968a). This was developed from his studies of opposition in Western democracies, and we have elaborated it for our particular context.

Concentration

Concentration has to do with organizational cohesiveness. If the opposition is concentrated into one single organization, or a small number of organizations, concentration is high. But if it is fragmented into many smaller ones, concentration is low. In Dahl's account an important aspect besides number is internal unity of each of the participant organizations – which in his context amounted to party loyalty (Dahl 1968a: 333–336). This is not easily translatable to the global governance context, so we will only focus on numbers. We will think of a particular oppositional field as highly concentrated if the number of major CSOs is small. The presence of 'meta-organizations' whose members are other organizations (Ahrne and Brunsson 2005) is also an indication of a concentrated organizational field. If most of the actors in an oppositional field are united in one or a few meta-organizations, this is a sign of a high degree of concentration. If the number of CSOs is large and there are no attempts to form large coordinated networks or meta-organizations, concentration is low.

Distinctiveness

Distinctiveness concerns whether it is easy or difficult to identify the opposition and distinguish it from the government. In the classic UK two-party model of opposition (or at least in an ideal typical model of it) distinctiveness is very pronounced. In this model there are two unified opposing parties that are strictly competitive, which makes it easy to identify the opposition. In other national contexts, the relationship may be much more indistinct and ambiguous (Dahl 1968a: 340–341).

In this study we take distinctiveness to refer to the level of autonomy of CSOs from the GGI in question. The level of autonomy concerns both institutional and financial independence. The term 'GONGO' has been coined to denote a government-organized NGO, which has been set up for a purpose, for instance attracting foreign aid. In other cases CSOs have been set up by governments or GGIs, and/or received financial resources from them, because the government or GGI wants a civil society partner for consultation (Smismans 2003; Reimann 2006). We understand distinctiveness to be high if the CSOs tend to be both institutionally and financially independent from the GGI they target and low if they are not.

Goals

This dimension differs from the above ones in being individual rather than systemic in character. Yet, the incidence of different goals has systemic effects, and it is this that we are mainly concerned with in the mapping objective of our studies. As Dahl noted, goals are difficult to study because an actor's stated goals may not be his real ones, and because short-term goals may differ from long-term ones. Like Dahl, we will simplify by assuming that some goals are dominant and that these can be studied (Dahl 1968a: 341).[2] Oppositional goals can be directed towards changing the government's *personnel*, its specific *policies* or the *polity* more fundamentally (targeting the political or economic structure or both). As will be detailed later on in this chapter, with Dahl we refer to these different forms of oppositional goals as non-structural, limited structural and major structural, respectively (Dahl 1968a: 341–344; cf. Mair 2007).

When mapping the structure of goals in our case studies, we want to find out (1) what types of goals are represented, (2) whether one type of goals dominate the oppositional fields (which is related to the level of concentration) and (3) whether the goal structure of CSO is close to, or far apart from, those of the GGIs. The last aspect is neglected by Dahl, but we are convinced by Jean Blondel who argues that 'the "landscape" [*sic*] of the opposition is determined by the differences which exist among the opposition bodies and the distance between the goals of each of these bodies and those of the government' (Blondel 1997: 470).

We have discussed the systemic qualities of oppositional fields in terms of their concentration, distinctiveness and goals. These are our analytical tools for mapping oppositional fields. We will now turn to the strategies and tactics used by individual opposition actors.

Opposition strategies

In the previous part of this chapter we discussed the systemic qualities of oppositional fields, and thus approached the opposition as a configuration of actors. Here we will instead turn to individual CSOs and approach them as oppositional agents. The objective is to understand how they choose between different strategies in their dealings with GGIs. This and the next part of the chapter therefore clarify how we will answer our third research question – How can CSOs' choice of strategy towards a particular GGI be explained? – in our case studies.

In this study, we assume that CSOs are agents capable of strategic behaviour, and therefore ascribe them a measure of rationality. This is not a wholly unproblematic assumption. Constructivists argue that CSOs are fundamentally divergent from the image of a rational organization. Dijkzeul and DeMars argue, for instance, that 'NGOs and their partners are part of one another. Rather than being hard-shelled, autonomous organizations, NGOs have permeable boundaries and a mingled ontology' (2011: 219). They are not unitary actors but tend to present themselves differently to different stakeholders. Moreover, they are often rippled by internal strife between different groups and subgroups with competing agendas (Hilhorst 2007: 299). From this perspective, notions of rationality and strategic behaviour appear at best dubious, as CSOs seem to lack the unified core that we associate with such an agency. Strategies chosen may not stem from inner conviction, thorough contemplation or consensual agreement, but may in contrast be the result of power struggles, nepotism or pure chance and be subject to strong internal disagreement. The solution that we have chosen is to make a couple of simplifications, while we are aware of the limitations this has for our conclusions. We simply postulate that (1) CSOs have dominating goals that can be studied (as mentioned above), (2) they are capable of a level of strategic behaviour and (3) observable strategies are the intended ones. This means, methodologically, that we are only concerned with manifest strategies and therefore disregard the internal workings of the CSOs, that is, the preparatory work and internal negotiations that may have preceded them.

When we assume that CSOs are to some degree strategic, we side with a relatively broad strand of research (cf. Joachim and Locher 2009b; Fogarty 2011; Pallas and Uhlin 2014). In this literature it is asserted that whether they are interested in organizational survival (for example, Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Prakash and Gugerty 2010) or aim at morally driven policy change (for example, Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2002), CSOs can be expected to act strategically in some ways.

We see goals as the ends a CSO wants to achieve through its engagement with the GGI, and we see strategy as the means that it chooses towards these ends (Dahl 1968a: 341). However, the choice of strategy cannot be explained by goals alone. In the explanatory model we will elaborate below, we take into account organizational identity as well as the degree of openness of the political opportunity structure.

Before we tackle the task of explaining the choice of strategy, we first need to provide a map of existing strategies. We make a distinction between tactics and strategy. A *tactic* is a specific action, for instance, organizing a protest event or participating in consultation, while *strategy* denotes a broader set of tactics, or 'repertoires' of action (cf. Dür and Matteo 2013). We talk of two main strategies, 'inside' and 'outside', and a number of specific tactics. The literature on the topic has tended to follow the division between strategies, so that IR and interest groups scholars have tended to concentrate on the former and social movement scholars have privileged the latter. As argued above, our definition of opposition in global governance has the benefit of allowing us to capture both.

A short note on our position on 'information diffusion' is warranted. Sidney Tarrow has argued that transnational activism works through three main mechanisms (2005: 147). The first two correspond to outside and inside strategies (which he terms 'direct action' and 'institutional access'). The third one is information diffusion, and it has attracted a great deal of attention. Social movement and IR scholars have convincingly shown that CSOs often exercise a 'power of ideas' – through skilful construction of frames and different tactics of persuasion, CSOs have sometimes managed to put new items on the global policy agenda, turning discussions in GGIs in their preferred direction as well as influencing the wider public opinion (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Brysk 2005; Joachim and Locher 2009a: 7). But rather than treating it as a separate strategy, besides inside and outside, we see it as overlapping. We argue that information diffusion tactics are best understood as an integral part of most civil society advocacy, be they of the inside or outside character, and we will hence not treat them as a distinct category below (cf. Chalmers 2013).

Outside strategy

Research on contentious politics and social movements has identified a number of tactics that are often referred to as a protest repertoire. Protest can be defined as 'nonroutinized ways of affecting political, social, and cultural processes' (della Porta and Diani 2006: 165). What different tactics associated with outside strategy have in common are that they imply indirect forms of engagement with policy makers. Rather than direct contact, actors try to influence policy making through campaigns gaining media attention and, hence, mobilizing other actors to put pressure on decision makers.

Broadly speaking, social movement theorists identify three main types of contentious politics: violence, disruption and conventional protest (Tarrow 1998: 93). Violence physically targets people, whereas disruption refers to obstructing the routine activities of opponents, for example, through the destruction of property. Disruptive and violent activism are at the margins of transnational protest movements but have gained considerable media attention. Conventional non-violent protest activities are the favoured basic strategic choice by the large majority of oppositional civil society groups in our selected cases as well as in global governance in general.

A traditional protest repertoire includes activities such as demonstrations, occupations, petitions and strikes. These are frequently used in a global governance context as well as at the national level. Other, innovative forms of protests have become increasingly widespread. Examples include counter-summits, consumer boycotts and Internet-based 'connective action' (della Porta et al. 2006: 119, 147; Bennett and Segerberg 2013). Counter-summits have given activists an opportunity to gain considerable media attention to various demonstrations and other protest activities, but they have also frequently provided some opportunity for more direct lobbying of the political leaders taking part in the official summits (Death 2011).

Inside strategy

Inside strategy involves more direct forms of contact between CSOs and policy makers. It includes formal as well as informal lobbying tactics. Formal lobbying occurs at specific meetings and includes written and oral statements in accordance with the GGI's established consultation processes. It can rely on formal accreditation providing consultative status, but also other formalized attempts to lobby policy makers in GGI secretariats and national delegations (Lowery 2007; Betsill and Corell 2008b; Fogarty 2011: 209). In addition to participation in consultations, CSOs may be incorporated in committees and exercise policy influence through delegation of power and contracting out of services (cf. della Porta 2009: 102). Informal lobbying refers to ad hoc interaction with specific GGI staff members or management beyond any formal procedures and often kept secret from other representatives of the GGI. Both formal and informal lobbying can use a variety of channels, including face-to-face meetings, letters, phone calls and email (cf. Chalmers 2013: 53).

As discussed in chapter 2, opportunities for inside lobbying have increased tremendously across most areas of global governance because access points have been expanded (Tallberg et al. 2013b). Since the 1970s there has been intensive lobbying by numerous NGOs at world conferences sponsored by the UN (Friedman et al. 2005). Multilateral development banks have also experienced a lot of civil society lobbying. During the height of neoliberal economic policy in the 1990s, civil society and broader stakeholder participation in multilateral development banks was limited, but since then there has been an increased focus on consultation with CSOs.

It makes intuitive sense that inside strategy is common among more moderate, reform-oriented CSOs. More surprisingly, inside strategy also seems to be a preference among several more radical SMOs. In a study of attitudes among activists involved in SMOs linked to the global justice movement, della Porta (2009) found relatively strong support for collaboration with GGIs.

However, opportunities for inside lobbying are not the same for all CSOs. Some CSOs are invited and accredited; others are not. As a rule, it is easier to get accredited if one's political agenda is not too far removed from the GGI's dominant framing of the problem (Raustiala 1997; Betsill and Corell 2008a: 41). Hence, unlike the outside strategy, which in principle is a possible option for all CSOs, the inside strategy cannot be *chosen* by everyone. This direct form of engagement depends on the access provided by the GGI.

On inside, outside and combined strategies

We have specified how the inside strategy relies on direct contact with GGI policy makers and includes formal as well as informal lobbying, whereas the outside strategy makes use of indirect protest activities, ranging from conventional non-violent civil disobedience to disruptive and violent protests. From the perspective of CSOs, inside and outside strategies have their respective pros and cons. Inside strategy may seem a more efficient road to maximize influence on policy makers, for those that have gained access. This assumption has found some support in research although the results are not conclusive (Chalmers 2013: 41–43; Tallberg et al. 2013a). Research has also shown that the CSOs most likely to get policy makers' ear are those that manage to frame their demands in a way that 'resonates' with the dominant framing of the GGI, that is, does not diverge too much from accepted problem formulations (Benford and Snow 2000; Shawki 2010). These are also the CSOs that are more likely to get accredited to formal access. It seems to follow that a rational CSO should therefore strive to present its arguments and claims in a way that demonstrates congruence to the GGI's existing values and norms. In other words, it seems more effective and rational to be (or at least appear to be) moderate than radical (cf. Snow and Benford 1988; McCammon et al. 2007).

Myra Marx Ferree disputes this view (2003). Many CSOs choose to persist in their demands and do not seek resonance, not because of a lack of political skills but because of conviction. Resisting to seeking resonance may also be a different strategic choice. In the short term, one may lose some political influence, but in the longer term, one may gain credibility among potential followers and some policy makers, as well as in internal cohesiveness, because 'when movements seek the advantages resonance offers they also accept political costs, particularly in marginalizing alternative frames, the speakers who offer them, and the constituencies whose concerns they express' (Ferree 2003: 306).

Opting for inside strategy may of course be in line with the political conviction of the CSO and does certainly not by definition involve adaptation and or opportunism. But when it does, we can see that it is attached to some costs in terms of political integrity and credibility of the organization. Mary Kaldor argues that the major international NGOs are the 'tamed' versions of the 'new social movements' that emerged in the 1970s (women's, LGBT rights, environmentalist movements, etc.). This is a historical parallel to the 'old social movements' (workers', national autonomy, first-generation women's movements, etc.) of the 20th century. But in contrast to the latter, NGOs have been tamed within the political structures of global governance rather than the nation state. Through taming, the new social movements have been institutionalized and integrated into the political process. This is not, in her view, a one-sided process but one that involves mutual adaptation: the GGI accepts parts of the movement's agenda while the movements modify their goals to become respectable 'partners' (Kaldor 2003: 86–89). To some activists, this may be a desirable or at least acceptable process since it may allow them to gain hearing for some of their demands. But it may estrange others, and is one of the reasons that some CSOs consciously resist taking on the organizational form of the professional NGO (Scaramuzzino and Scaramuzzino 2014).

The risk of co-optation is therefore often discussed in activist circles. Critical CSOs may become less radical when they interact a lot with GGI representatives as this interaction might lead to an assimilation of the CSO agenda towards the overall goals of the GGI. Individual activists may also be recruited to the GGI in explicit co-optation attempts. In particular, critics have warned that there is a risk that co-optation may occur when advocacy CSOs which aim at monitoring the activities of a GGI receive funding from that GGI. There are, for instance, extensive EU funding of civil society platforms set up to interact with various EU institutions (Greenwood 2007: 344) (see also chapter 4). To use the terminology developed in the previous part of this chapter, these warnings of co-optation have been heard in instances where the level of distinctiveness has been low.

The advantages and disadvantages of inside and outside strategies (and possible combinations thereof) are frequently debated among transnational activists. However, this is something that is poorly followed up in extant research. A reason for this is probably that much of the IR and NGO literature, as well as research on interest groups in the EU, has focused on civil society 'insiders' and their lobbying activities within GGIs, whereas the social movement and transnational activism literature has tended to only look at outside protest activities by movements which do not have (and often do not strive at) direct access to GGIs. However, inside and outside strategies are interrelated as outside civil society activities impact on conditions for inside advocacy and vice versa. It has also been observed that inside and outside strategies are often combined and understood to strengthen each other. For instance, della Porta and Diani (2006: 233) have shown that when trying to influence political institutions, protest is considered less effective if not combined with more traditional lobbying activities. Scholte (2011b: 83–84) concludes that outside protests and inside lobbying targeting IMF have often worked in tandem. Mass demonstrations have put IMF officials on the defensive and expanded political space for insiders. This way, the potential insiders have profited from a 'radical flank' effect whereby the presence of more radical elements have forced authorities to engage with the moderate forces (McAdam 1996: 15). Moreover, activists do not necessarily have to choose between inside and outside strategies as two opposing alternatives. Instead they are frequently combined in specific civil society campaigns, as Bindercrantz (2005) has shown at the national (Danish) level and Beyers (2004) has demonstrated in the case of the EU. Sometimes the combination of inside and outside strategy may follow an organization's double purpose: to pursue advocacy on the one hand and mobilize consensus and hence legitimacy among participants and prospective members on the other (cf. Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 125).

The complex dynamics of inside and outside civil society advocacy need to be highlighted in order to further our understanding of civil society engagement with GGIs. We argue that this is a more fruitful and less well-researched approach than the more common focus on only inside lobbying, outside protest or information diffusion in the transnational advocacy literature. Our conceptualization of opposition in global governance allows us to do precisely this.

Explaining opposition strategies

In the previous section, we saw that oppositional CSOs may engage in (1) inside strategy only, (2) outside strategy only or (3) a combination of inside and outside strategies. The task is now to explain why individual CSOs choose the way they do. In this section we present the factors that we have chosen to focus on, whereas the following section presents the model of how they interrelate.

Previous research on CSO strategies in global governance has often had a broader focus than our specific on strategies towards particular GGIs. In this literature different factors have been identified as influencing CSO mobilization and activism. Constructivist scholars have focused on *norms and values* (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999) while rationalist approaches have privileged *material concerns* (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Prakash and Gugerty 2010). Another important factor is the amount and the kind of *resources* that an actor can mobilize (Joachim and Locher 2009b). Research has also shown that *diffusion*, that is, the spread of activist repertoires across time and space as activists learn from each other, can explain some choices of strategy (McAdam and Rucht 1993; Uhlin 1997; Wang and Soule 2012). Other factors that have been suggested in the interest group literature include *internal culture* and *ideological orientation* (Barakso 2010: 162) and the nature of *political issues* (Beyers 2008).

The research on the more specific topic of strategic choices of CSOs when targeting GGIs has so far been dominated by the focus on institutional design and other factors relating to the political opportunity structure (Joachim and Locher 2009b; Uhlin 2011). We argue that such structural factors are necessary but not sufficient for explaining why some CSOs choose inside and others outside or combined strategies. In order to get a fuller understanding it is important to consider actor characteristics of individual CSOs too. In the pages that follow, we develop an explanatory model that combines goals and organizational identity (actor-related factors) with aspects of the political opportunity structure (structural factors).

As concerns the explanatory ambition we are a bit cautious when it comes to attributing direct causality. We follow Hendrik Wagenaar (2011) who suggests with the concept 'intentional explanation' (rather than causal explanation) that any causality in the social world is mediated by the meanings that agents ascribe their actions. This means that we see a CSO's choice of strategy as an intentional action, imbued with meaning, which requires a sort of interpretative-oriented explanation to be uncovered. In this study we have therefore relied quite heavily on interview material. We believe this tells us something of the interpretation that the interviewed activist makes of his or her context and action, an interpretation which is then subjected to our own – subjective, of course – interpretation as researchers. But it also affects the way we regard the explanatory factors that we include in our model. One may distinguish subjective from objective meaning. Subjective meaning denotes the agent's conscious reasons and motives that are part of his/her self-understanding. Our two actor-related factors, goals and organizational identity, belong to this category. Objective meaning, on the other hand, are the rules and conventions belonging to a social context rather than an individual agent; it is 'the meaning that a pattern of activity has in and for the larger culture' (Wagenaar 2011: 18) which makes a particular action possible. Our structural factor, the political opportunity structure as viewed from the perspective of activists, belongs to this category.

We now need to briefly discuss some factors of potential explanatory significance that we have chosen *not* to include in our model. A theoretical model cannot cover all potentially relevant factors, as there is always a trade-off between comprehensiveness on the one hand and clarity and parsimoniousness on the other. The factors that we have selected are those that we find particularly important for understanding the strategic choices of oppositional CSOs and that are insufficiently covered and combined in previous research. One factor that we have chosen to exclude is *resources*. It is probably true that the worldwide allocation of the capacity to mobilize resources between different CSOs significantly impacts who has voice in global governance, and thus accounts for crucial power differentials within civil society between those located in the Global South and North, respectively (Scholte 2011c: 329). But its impact appears less significant in our specific context. We want to understand the oppositional strategies of CSOs that confront GGIs, which by itself excludes those that do not have the resources to engage in such activity. This means that although there may be important resource differentials among our studied CSOs, these differences are not, in our view, decisive. For similar reasons we also exclude *issue characteristics*. We have delimited our study to the issue area of development, and while this might include a number of more or less contentious issues, given different weight in the different analysed contexts, we still do not have sufficient variation on issue characteristics to believe that these should be decisive for the choice of strategy in our cases. Finally we exclude *diffusion* from our model. Research has shown that specific forms of activism, such as certain types of civil disobedience, have been diffused through processes of learning and imitation (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002). It appears less likely that the more fundamental choice between inside and outside strategy, that interests us here, can be explained by such processes.

Below, we introduce our three factors and in the next section present the model of how they relate. We begin with goals – one of the key features of oppositional fields as outlined earlier in this chapter – thus linking the two main aspects of our analytical framework (oppositional fields and opposition strategies).

Actor characteristics: goals

The literature on opposition gives great importance to goals in explaining oppositional agents' behaviour, in particular their tendency to cooperate with or challenge the governance unit they target. Different typologies regarding oppositional goals have been launched. Juan J. Linz distinguishes among loyal, semi-loyal and disloyal opposition to denote the respective groups' overall support for the democratic system as a whole (Linz 1978). Gordon Skilling proposes a fourfold typology among integral opposition, factional opposition, fundamental opposition and specific opposition in non-democratic settings (Skilling 1968). Giovani Capoccia picks up Sartori's term 'anti-system' opposition (Sartori 1976), and develops a model on ideological and relational anti- and pro-systemness (Capoccia 2002). For the most part, these typologies tend to revolve around the level of disagreement, where the most radical ones challenge the political system fundamentally and the least radical ones are faithful to the system's basic principles but oppose specific features or policies.

A classic and very influential typology is Otto Kirchheimer's 'classical opposition', the idea of which is modelled on the UK system, that recognizes the government's right to govern but provide alternative policies. 'Opposition of principle' opposes the whole system of governance and not just specific policies. The 'waning of opposition' is when the opposition does no longer raise real alternatives but merely opposes the personnel of government. The history of Western democracies shows the relation among the three types. Democratization opened up spaces for oppositional voices within the system, which led to a progressive trend from principled to classic opposition. But in the post-war context, the trend has been towards waning of opposition. Traditional ideological divisions were gradually softened with the emergence of the welfare state, and decision making was increasingly delegated to corporatist bodies (Kirchheimer 1957). Dahl has referred to this as the 'surplus of consensus' (Dahl 1965: 19). The result is that citizens have become either politically alienated or turned to form principled opposition. Nicole Deitelhoff summarizes the learnings one can draw from this: 'In other words, the less opportunities citizens have to form a classical opposition within the system, the more they will either radicalize their opposition [. . .] or will drop out of politics and become alienated to their political system' (Deitelhoff 2010: 6). If we assume that the same pattern holds for global governance as well, it would mean that if CSOs are not allowed to pursue inside strategy (that is, if access points are few, restrictive or non-existent), there is a risk they will either radicalize or become politically passive (cf. Deitelhoff 2010). Mair suggests that this holds true for the EU, in which the lack of opportunities to form opposition within the system has developed into strong anti-European sentiments towards the polity as a whole. 'Because we cannot mobilize opposition *in* Europe, and because we are denied an appropriate political arena in which to hold European governance accountable, we are almost pushed into organizing opposition *to* Europe' (Mair 2007: 12, emphasis added). We will return to this dynamic when we discuss different types of outsiders and insiders below.

In this study we use a slightly modified version of Dahl's typology of oppositional goals. He claims that oppositional agents can be distinguished by whether they oppose (1) the government's personnel, (2) the government's specific policies, (3) the political system or (4) the socio-economic structure.[3] The four goals lead to three basic types of opposition: *Non-structural* opposition is 'normal', limited and pragmatic, and it is directed at the government's personnel and/or policies only. Examples include pressure groups and parties that are purely office seeking or policy oriented. *Limited structural* opposition is directed at changing the political system and in some cases the personnel of government, but does not aim at more far-reaching structural change. While challenging the political structure, limited structural opposition is still reformist, and Dahl exemplifies with the women's suffrage movements. *Major structural* opposition wants to change not only the personnel and policies of government but also the political system and/or the socio-economic structure in a more radical way, which Dahl exemplified with communist parties and movements (Dahl 1968a: 341–344).

The actors that seek to influence GGIs obviously differ from a national political party that wants to replace the government. Nevertheless, the typology of goals elaborated by Dahl is applicable (with some modifications) also in a global governance context (see Table 3.1). Non-structural opposition focuses on specific GGI policies or projects. Examples of this type of opposition include both CSOs lobbying on a specific issue and local community groups opposing a specific development project. What they have in common is that they try to change a specific policy but they do not challenge the overall political structure of the GGI or its general development policy and approach to socio-economic justice. Many local community groups and protest movements have a broader perspective, representing a more fundamental challenge against the GGI at large and placing their local opposition within a broader struggle for global justice. Such groups and movements, however, belong to the category of major structural opposition. Transformist CSOs in this category want to abolish the GGI in question and aim at far-reaching socio-economic change.[4] In our context, major structural opposition primarily takes the form of leftist anti-capitalist movements, but this kind of radical anti-systemic opposition could also include, for instance, nationalist and Islamist groups that sometimes reject the EU, the UN and other international organizations. In between the non-structural and the major structural opposition, we find limited structural opposition focusing on the political structure of the GGI and possibly dealing with socio-economic structures too. What they have in common, and what defines them as limited structural opposition, is their reformist approach. Unlike non-structural opposition, limited structural opposition aims at structural change, but unlike major structural opposition, it is reformist rather than transformist. Limited structural opposition groups believe that the GGI, in principle, can be reformed and they typically lobby in order to change the internal governance structure of the GGI. More radical limited structural opposition also makes attempts to change more fundamental socio-economic structures, but still in a reformist rather than transformist way.

One might assume that oppositional goals are reflected in the strategies chosen, but some scholars have argued that there is no necessary link between the two. Sartori emphasized, for instance, that what he calls anti-system parties are not necessarily revolutionary in their tactics (Sartori 1976; cf. Kubát 2010: 76). The assumption that actions can be explained by intentions is commonsensical in that it resonates with daily life experiences (cf. Wagenaar 2011: 16). In our context that would imply that non-structural oppositional CSOs always would opt for inside strategy while major structural oppositional CSOs always would choose outside strategy. But there are many instances where this does not hold true. For instance, it is quite common that CSOs sharing the same ideological conviction choose radically different strategies. Therefore, we argue, we cannot explain strategic choice by goals alone but need to take other factors into account too.

Actor characteristics: organizational identity

While goals are important for intentional action, they cannot alone account for a CSO's choice of strategy. To get a fuller picture, we have chosen to take into account organizational identity (to be discussed here) and political opportunity structure (discussed in the next section). Organizational identity has often been understood as that which is distinctive and enduring about the character of an organization (Albert and Whetten 1985). Newer organizational theory has pointed out that organizational identity is not static but subject to interpretation and negotiation and hence changeable over the longer run (Gioia et al. 2000). In this study we assume that the main features of organizational

Table 3.1 Goals of civil society opposition against GGIs

Type of opposition	**Change management of GGI**	**Change specific policies or projects**	**Change political structure**	**Change socio-economic structure**	**Examples**
Non-structural opposition: policy-oriented CSOs	Yes or no	Yes	No	No	Environmental CSO lobbying on specific policy; local protest by project-affected people
Limited structural opposition: radical but reformist CSOs	Yes or no	Yes or no	Yes: reform GGI	Yes: reform of global economy	Campaign to reform the UN, Oxfam
Major structural opposition: transformist CSOs	Not relevant	Yes or no	Yes: abolish or transform GGI	Yes: global socio-economic transformation	Radical part of 'Global Justice Movement'

Inspired by Dahl (1968b: 342).

identity are nevertheless relatively stable and that they are possible for the researcher to grasp. More specifically, we make a distinction between professional and grassroots identity, a distinction which we take to be at a level of generality that (1) is unlikely to change very quickly, although there may be internal disputes on the more precise forms and directions of the organization, and (2) has bearing on a particular CSO's choice of strategy.

A professional social movement organization has been described as characterized by having a leadership working full time and resources mainly originating outside the aggrieved group it claims to represent, having a small or non-existing membership base, making claims to represent and speak for a potential constituency and trying to influence policy to the benefit of that constituency. A grassroots organization, on the other hand, is as we have seen above characterized by its orientation towards participatory structures. It relies on a broad membership base, it usually makes claims to spring out of and embody rather than represent the group it speaks for and its members are often motivated by solidarity and ideological incentives (della Porta and Diani 2006: 145–149).

These definitions involve elements of formal organizational structure as well as of identity. It is often assumed that there is a clear relation between them, so that the bureaucratically structured organization has a professional identity and the more loosely structured one has a grassroots identity (cf. Fogarty 2011). Although this makes intuitive sense, we think there is reason to loosen this assumption and separate the two. In a somewhat similar but reversed move, Fogarty teases out organizational form from everything else and claims that the level of formal organization accounts for the choice of inside or outside strategy regardless of ideology and other factors (Fogarty 2011). But it remains puzzling why some very professionally structured organizations still pursue outside or combined strategy. In order to comprehend this we suggest that organizational identity has some independent explanatory power, regardless of formal organizational structure, although we recognize that they are often related.

Organizational form hence relates to the formal structure of the CSO, and organizational identity relates to the claims that the organization makes towards its membership base and towards the groups it represents. An organization with *grassroots identity* claims to have a 'deep-rooted' connection with its constituency, and it gives great importance to its members as participants and as sources of legitimacy. An organization with *professional* identity relies far less on members, and its principal source of legitimacy is not active participation but claims to possess expertise and/or represent 'wider interests and new voices' (common humanity, public opinions or a new particular group) that have not been heard in that debate before (cf. Saward 2009).[5] We recognize that most CSOs do not display this identity in a 'pure' form, but we still argue that it is possible to identify the basic difference in the majority of cases.

Structural factors: the political opportunity structure

The political context affects the choices and the alternatives available for oppositional actors. At the level of national politics, the constitutional design of the political system can significantly impact the ends and means of opposition (Dahl 1968d: 348–352). In global governance, the institutional structure of the GGI has similar effects. Such factors are structural in that they in principle exist externally to actors. The social movement literature has contributed the notion of political opportunity structure for grasping these contextual factors. The political opportunity structure enables as well as constrains social movement activities. The theoretical strand of literature that centres on this concept, political process theory, to some commentators even its 'hegemonic paradigm', has become enormously influential in social movement research. (Godwin and Jasper 2004: 3). Yet it has also been severely criticized, particularly for the tendency towards conceptual stretching of its central notion (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275).[6] Precision in definition is therefore important.

According to one of the most cited definitions, a political opportunity structure includes the degree of openness of the institutionalized political system, the degree of stability of elite alignments that undergird the polity, the presence of elite allies and the extent to which the state is prepared to use repression against oppositional movements (McAdam 1996: 27). Then, what factors are relevant in the context of global governance examined here? One suggestion comes from Van der Heijden who has reworked the concept to fit the structure of environmental governance in the international realm. He discerned four different dimensions, namely the degree of openness of the formal institutional structure, the degree of inclusivity of informal elite strategies, the degree of unity between elites and the degree of strength of the political output structure (Van der Heijden 2006).

We have chosen to simplify our operationalization of political opportunity structure. We suggest that the main point of consideration is to what extent the political structure of the GGI is *open* or *closed*. In this broad sense, we follow Eisinger (1973) who made a basic distinction between open and closed political opportunity structures to explain the responsiveness of government institutions. In order to grasp the degree of openness, we look at two different factors: *access* and the *presence of elite allies*. Both of these are present in most definitions of political opportunity structures, but we adapt them to suit the global governance context. These factors are structural in the sense that they are not easily changed within a short time frame. But this does not mean that they are unchangeable and in the longer perspective oppositional activists can contribute to modifying them, thus shaping the political opportunity structure for themselves and for other activists (Tarrow 1998: 19).

Access is here understood as the formal and informal institutional features that determine the level and types of admission of CSOs to a GGI (cf. Sikkink 2005: 155). The focus is on the different bodies of a GGI that CSOs can approach, as well as on the rules, norms and informal practices that regulate CSO admission (Joachim and Locher 2009a: 8–11; Tallberg et al. 2013b: 8). In determining the degree of access we take into account its two main dimensions. The first is the *range* of access, which refers to how many and which CSOs are granted access and which are excluded. GGIs tend to be selective concerning which CSOs they interact with, so access is not equally available to all (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 259). Perceived functional benefits and moderate political orientation are often important criteria (Raustiala 1997; McKeon 2009: 130, 155; Martens 2011: 54). The second dimension is the depth of access, which concerns the quality of CSO interaction. Public disclosure of documents is a shallow form of access, while full participation in decision making is a deep form of access. In between are various forms of consultations and collaborations. More shallow forms of access tend to coincide with the early and final phases of the policy process (for instance, agenda setting, consultation, implementation and monitoring) and are the most common ones. The deepest form of access – decision making – is related to the central phase of the policy process and is the least common one (Tallberg and Jönsson 2010: 6–7).

The *presence of elite allies* is the second aspect of openness of the political opportunity structure that we investigate (cf. McAdam 1996: 27). A significant type of elite allies is politicians in member states. State power remains strong in many GGIs, and approaching representatives of national governments or parliaments is often a more effective strategy to influence a GGI compared to directly targeting the GGI (Pallas and Uhlin 2014). As noted by Grugel (2004: 33), 'for civil society activism, transnational or otherwise, reading the state correctly is crucial to strategy and organisation.' If CSOs manage to cultivate relationships with state representatives sympathetic to their cause, they can considerably strengthen their influence on a GGI, although working closely with government officials and other elite allies also means a risk of being co-opted, as previously discussed. Another important potential form of elite ally is GGI officials, who may share the views of oppositional actors and try to steer the GGI's policies in the desired direction. GGI officials are sometimes mentioned in the transnational activism literature (for example, Smith 2000: 71). Keck and Sikkink even consider them potential participants in their conceptualization of transnational advocacy networks (1998: 9). A parallel can be drawn to the notion of 'amphibians' in the literature on opposition in democratizing contexts. Amphibians work within the non-democratic regime but share the views of the opposition. They intermingle with both government and opposition and in fact constitute a crucial link between them (Stepan 1997: 668). Although we do not consider elite allies as by definition part of opposition in global governance, their presence or absence may be crucial for the degree of openness of the GGI's political opportunity structure.

Political opportunity structures can to some degree reasonably be thought of as existing independently to mind. This is most clear in the case of written formal rules of accreditation. Yet, in order to understand CSOs' choice of strategy, it is important to also grasp how activists interpret them. For instance, even if there are formal openings, 'activists must *believe* that an opportunity exist, that they have the power to bring about change' (della Porta and Diani 2006: 18, emphasis added) in order for them to take action (cf. Gamson and Meyer 1996). Returning to Wagenaar's reasoning referred to above, the objective and subjective meanings of political opportunity structures are processed through cultural filters as well as individual interpretation (cf. Goodwin and Jasper 2004: 9). In order to conclude whether the political opportunity structure of a particular GGI is open rather than closed, we therefore need a twofold method: we need to consider political opportunity structures both in the 'external' sense by turning to observable institutional rules and features and in the 'internal' sense by interviewing activists about their perceptions.

When assessing the degree of open/closed political opportunity structure, we consider the range of access (how many and which CSOs are granted access) and the depth of access (the quality of civil society participation). A relatively *open* political opportunity structure implies the existence of several viable access points and inclusive norms and rules on civil society participation. Access is given to a broad set of CSOs in a non-discriminatory way and CSOs are offered relatively deep forms of access, which enables them to have meaningful influence on GGI policy making. A relatively *closed* political opportunity structure is characterized by few access points and restrictive norms and rules. Access is limited to a narrow range of selected CSOs and shallow forms of participation, excluding real influence on policy making. The political opportunity structure is more favourable if there are many different potential elite allies associated with the GGI. This implies that there are individual GGI management and staff or state representatives who are not only open to civil society contacts, but also have potential aligned interests. If such elite allies are few or non-existent, the political opportunity structure is relatively closed. When analysing political opportunity structures as operationalized here, we focus both on observable institutional characteristics and how these are perceived by civil society activists.

Explaining opposition strategies: the model

We are now ready to bring together the different factors in a coherent model. To some extent inspired by Dahl's (1968a: 347) model for explaining the choice of opposition strategies, we illustrate this in Figure 3.1.

We identified inside and outside strategies and the combination of the two as basic alternatives when opposition actors choose a strategy for influencing a GGI. This is our dependent variable in the model. We then



Figure 3.1 Actor characteristics and structural factors explaining choice of opposition strategy

considered characteristics of the opposition actors that may explain their choice of strategy, highlighting goals and organizational identity. Finally, we argued that what Dahl labelled system characteristics and we conceptualize as political opportunity structure must be part of the analysis if we are to fully understand the strategic choices of oppositional CSOs in global governance.

The direct arrow from actor characteristics to choice of strategy indicates that in some cases the choice of strategy can be explained without reference to structural factors. Some CSOs have a preference for outside strategy irrespective of the political opportunity structure. This has to be explained by actor characteristics such as goals and organizational identity. Actor characteristics also influence what kind of political opportunity structure is available and how it is perceived. The political opportunity structure tends to be relatively more open for non-structural opposition groups with limited goals, whereas major structural opposition with far-reaching, system-challenging goals are less likely to be granted access and find elite allies.

When considering reasons for choosing the outside strategy, we distinguish among three types of 'outsiders' (see Uhlin 2012). First, applying outside advocacy might be the only viable option when the political opportunity structure is closed. Outside protest activities have been seen as the only available strategy for those who do not enjoy institutional access. In this sense, protest is said to be the 'political resource of the powerless' (della Porta and Diani 2006: 166). The lack of an open political opportunity structure makes CSOs *forced outsiders*. If political opportunities improve, these activists may turn to inside advocacy. The political opportunity structure perspective describes outside strategy as enforced by structural conditions, rather than as an outcome of the strategic choice by oppositional actors.

Second, there are ideological reasons for choosing the outside strategy. Radical critics of GGIs argue that the institutions cannot be reformed; they have to be abolished. If you engage with the GGIs through the channels they provide, you only contribute to legitimizing fundamentally unjust institutions and policies. This is the position of *principled outsiders*, or outsiders by choice, who would not change their advocacy strategy because of variations in political opportunity structure. Principled outsiders in the field of development are mainly found among left-leaning global justice activists and popular movements targeting GGIs. Hence, the explanation focusing on the ideologies and goals of oppositional CSOs points at the use of outside strategy as a deliberate choice based on ideological conviction.

Third, it has been noted that not only social movement activists, but also other actors like political parties and pressure groups make use of protest activities (della Porta and Diani 2006: 168). Many of these actors might enjoy institutional access, but they still choose to apply outside protest activities too. For them outside strategy is a deliberate choice based on the belief that in a certain situation such activities (often in combination with inside advocacy) are most effective for influencing policy as well as gaining grassroots legitimacy. This is the position of *pragmatic outsiders*.

In a similar way we can distinguish between *principled* and *pragmatic insiders*. *Principled insiders* do not consider outside strategy an option. Based on their limited goals as a non-structural opposition and a professional organizational identity, they will always pursue the inside strategy only. If the political opportunity structure for a specific GGI is closed, they will choose to have no engagement with that GGI instead of being involved in any form of outside protests.

Pragmatic insiders, like pragmatic outsiders, choose the strategy they find most effective in maximizing policy influence, given the political opportunity structure. Pragmatic insiders will change to outside strategy if the political opportunity structure changes and they believe that outside activities will be more effective in influencing the GGI.

Having further elaborated the dependent variable to include not only the choice among inside, outside or a combination of inside and outside strategies but also two different types of insiders (principled and pragmatic) and three different types of outsiders (forced, principled and pragmatic), we are now ready to analyse how variations of political opportunity structure and the opposition's goals and organizational identity combine to shape opposition strategies. This is outlined in Table 3.2.

Focusing on goals and organizational identity, we identify six types of opposition. First, non-structural opposition with a professional identity includes issue-specific NGOs with limited, non-system-challenging goals, such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Second, non-structural opposition with a grassroots identity refers to, for instance, a local movement mobilizing against a specific development project funded by a GGI. Third, limited structural opposition with a professional identity includes politically oriented advocacy and watchdog NGOs monitoring GGIs focusing on their internal governance structure and alleged lack of accountability and transparency. One example is Transparency International, a global coalition against corruption. Fourth, limited structural opposition with a grassroots identity includes prominent transnational SMOs like Greenpeace. Fifth, major structural opposition with a professional identity might be a less common category as most major structural oppositions tend to stress their grassroots connections

Table 3.2 Main opposition strategies depending on opposition's goals and identity as well as political opportunity structures

Opposition goals and organizational identity	**Relatively closed political opportunity structure**	**Relatively open political opportunity structure**
Non-structural, professional identity	No engagement (or principled inside strategy)	Principled inside strategy
Non-structural, grassroots identity	Forced outside strategy (or pragmatic inside strategy)	Pragmatic inside and/or outside strategy
Limited structural, professional identity	Forced outside strategy (or pragmatic inside strategy)	Pragmatic inside strategy and/or outside strategy
Limited structural, grassroots identity	Forced (or pragmatic) outside strategy	Pragmatic inside and/or outside strategy
Major structural, professional identity	Forced (or principled) outside strategy	Pragmatic inside and/or principled outside strategy
Major structural, grassroots identity	Principled outside strategy	Principled outside strategy

rather than professional character. However, one example is Focus on the Global South, a very formalized and professional NGO, which nevertheless takes a highly critical anti-capitalist position challenging not only neoliberal globalization in general, but also the very existence of the major international financial institutions. Sixth and finally, we have major structural opposition with a grassroots identity. There are numerous examples of this category within the broad 'global justice movement' associated with the World Social Forum (WSF). One example is the transnational peasants' movement Via Campesina.

In addition to these six types of opposition, we consider the political opportunity structure, which is dichotomized into relatively closed and relatively open. The type of political opportunity structure has implications for expected oppositional strategies and the kinds of insidership and outsidership experienced. For instance, when relatively closed, the result is likely more forced outsider strategy.

This theoretical model should be seen as a heuristic device, which indicates the possible causal mechanisms at play when combining our structural factor with two actor characteristics. This will help us identify the causal mechanisms which are most relevant in each of our case studies.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have developed our analytical framework. In order to describe the pattern of civil society opposition targeting a specific GGI we make use of the concept of oppositional field. This allows us to capture a set of activities directed at a particular target, but still including a broad set of actors that may differ in levels of contentiousness and that may not identify as pertaining to the same movement. While an oppositional field is not an agent, it is made up of agents, including, for example, NGOs, SMOs, grassroots organizations, faith-based organizations, trade unions and think tanks. We use the concept of CSO to cover all these diverse expressions of more or less organized civil society activities. We suggest mapping oppositional fields in terms of their concentration, distinctiveness and goals. Concentration is high if there is a relatively small number of CSOs and/or large parts of the opposition are united in meta-organizations. Distinctiveness is high if CSOs are institutionally and financially independent from the GGI. When it comes to goals, we are interested in whether or not the oppositional field is dominated by one type of goal: non-structural, limited structural or major structural.

In order to explain individual oppositional CSOs' choice of strategy towards a particular GGI we developed a model based on two actor characteristics (goals and organizational identity) and one structural factor (political opportunity structure). Opposition goals are divided into non-structural, limited structural and major structural. We identify two main organizational identities: professional and grassroots identities. The relative openness or closure of the political opportunity structure is measured in terms of access (both range and depth) and the existence of elite allies. Elaborating on inside and outside strategies, the model contains three types of outsiders (forced, principled and pragmatic) and two types of insiders (principled and pragmatic). With this analytical framework in place we are now ready to engage with our empirical case studies.

4
European Union Aid and Development Cooperation

Introduction

In this chapter we analyse the oppositional field surrounding the EU's policies and practices of aid and development cooperation and the strategies used by various opposition groups in this field. We begin with a brief description of the main features of the EU and its activities related to development cooperation and then turn to an analysis of the oppositional field. The next section contains an analysis of the political opportunity structure providing access and elite allies for civil society opposition. Then follows a section describing and explaining different inside and outside strategies that are applied by different opposition actors targeting the EU. Finally, we offer some conclusions from this case study.

Established through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EU traces its origin to the European Coal and Steel Community formed in 1951 and the European Economic Community formed in 1958. Today it consists of 28 member states. The far-reaching supra-national cooperation and complex power sharing between different institutions make the EU a unique regional governance institution. The main decision-making institutions are the European Commission (which acts as the executive power), the European Parliament (directly elected by EU citizens) and the Council of the European Union (representing the governments of the member states).

Development policy is obviously just one of the many areas in which this multipurpose GGI is active, but it is still a significant actor in the global governance of development. More than half of all money spent on development aid comes from the EU and its member states, making it the world's biggest aid donor. The EU and its member states have shared competence over development cooperation. EU development policies and aid programmes and projects are the responsibility of Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, which is a new directorate-general (DG) incorporating the former Development and EuropeAid DGs. It operates under the guidance of the Commissioner for Development. Organizationally, EuropeAid consists of nine directorates headed by a director general. Within the European Commission, EuropeAid is the DG responsible for formulating EU development policy and defining sectoral policies in the field of external aid. EuropeAid also fosters coordination between the EU and the member states on development cooperation (EuropeAid 2014f). Development issues are frequently debated in the European Parliament, which has a Development Committee (European Parliament 2014).

The oppositional field

The oppositional field surrounding EU institutions dealing with development issues is dominated by Brussels-based CSO platforms linking together a large number of international and national CSOs. The DG EuropeAid particularly highlights its close contacts with CONCORD, the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development. EuropeAid also mentions EU-level CSO platforms on peace building (the European Peace-building Liaison Office [EPLO]) and human rights and democracy (Human Rights and Democracy Network [HRDN]), as well as the European Network of Political Foundations (ENOP) and the ITUC (EuropeAid 2014b). The main interlocutor with the EU on emergency aid and disaster risk reduction is Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), a network of humanitarian NGOs (VOICE 2014). Other CSO networks not highlighted on the EuropeAid website but still active on development policy and practice on the EU-level include the European Network of Debt and Development (Eurodad) and the European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People (Eurostep). There is considerable overlap in membership across several of these networks. A prominent advocacy CSO in the field of development like Oxfam is a member of seven different European civil society networks and also targets EU institutions as an individual organization (interview, Alonso, 26 April 2013).

The great number of development-oriented CSOs active on the EU-level might indicate an oppositional field with a relatively low degree of concentration. However, the prominent role of meta-organizations or civil society platforms actually makes the oppositional field rather concentrated. This is especially so within the specific area of aid and development cooperation where one of the networks, CONCORD, has a very prominent position. CONCORD is made up of national platforms in EU member states as well as international CSO networks. Having the feature of an umbrella organization of umbrella organizations, CONCORD claims to represent over 1,800 NGOs across Europe. Replacing a previous key organization, CLONG (or the Liaison Committee), CONCORD was founded in 2003 to act as the main interlocutor with the EU institutions on development policy (CONCORD 2014). CLONG was established in 1975. It consisted of national NGO platforms in the European Commission member states and cooperated with some international NGO networks like CIDSE (Catholic), APRODEV (Protestant) and Eurostep (secular) (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013). The initiative to create this NGO platform came more from the European Commission than the CSO community. It was seen as a way to make the EU's civil society engagement more efficient by reducing the number of civil society representatives with which to interact. It also entailed funding of the selected NGOs (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). The way this civil society platform was set up on the initiative of the European Commission and with heavy EU funding of the CSOs are indications of a relatively low level of distinctiveness of the oppositional field, at least as far as the central actor (CONCORD) and its predecessor are concerned. The general closeness to EU institutions and the financial dependency in particular gave rise to critical voices concerning the lack of autonomy of this civil society opposition. Critics argued that the Liaison Committee was 'becoming a little bit too much like an extension of the Commission' (interview, Stocker, 14 May 2013). From a civil society perspective, an incentive to reform or replace the Liaison Committee was to reduce the financial dependency on the EU (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013). However, the main driving force behind the closing down of the Liaison Committee and the establishment of CONCORD, and hence the restructuring of this oppositional field, again came from above. In the early 2000s there was severe EU criticism of the financial management of CLONG. This led to CLONG being dissolved and replaced by CONCORD (Carbone 2006: 202). The role of the EU in the creation of CONCORD is acknowledged by representatives of the network: 'We have to acknowledge that the vision of organizing the European international NGO sector across Europe [. . .] didn't come at all from the civil society sector as such' (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013).

Financial dependency on the EU is still an issue for CONCORD although that dependency has decreased. CONCORD still receives about 50 per cent of its budget from the EU, but for CLONG it used to be about 90 per cent. Some see the continued financial dependency on the EU as a weakness in the advocacy. There are important members of CONCORD that have decided not to accept any EU funding in order to secure their autonomy. APRODEV is one example, being financed only by its members (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013). However, representatives of CONCORD point out that the EU funding is not tied to specific activities. It is a core budget, and not an activity-based budget, which means that there are no attempts from the EU to influence the activities of CONCORD (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013).

Another argument against the risk of co-optation through EU funding is that 'it is very unlikely that the three EU institutions will try to influence in the same direction' (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). In fact, EU funding of CSOs does not necessarily have the negative effects often assumed. Funding dependency does not automatically lead to a loss of autonomy. Sanchez Salgado (2014b: 351) argues that 'if EU funds did not support weakly articulated and fragmented interests, the predominance of business interests and wealthy organizations at the EU level would be even more overwhelming'.

Nevertheless, CONCORD has tried to decrease its dependence on the European Commission. There is a strategy to diversify its funding and large amounts are received from foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. CONCORD also has core funding from its members, which is seen as a guarantee for its autonomy. However, receiving funding from the EU is considered important not only because of the financial resources as such, but also because it is attached to opportunities for dialogue with the European Commission and other EU institutions (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). Moreover, EU funding does not have to be more autonomy constraining than funding from other sources, as one CONCORD member argues: 'Sometimes I have the feeling that this kind of money [from the Gates Foundation] is much more directed than what you get from the public sources like the EU' (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013).

The civil society opposition's financial dependency on the targeted governance institution, in sum, is an indication of a relatively low level of distinctiveness characterizing this oppositional field. However, this case study indicates that financial dependency does not automatically reduce the autonomy of CSOs. Moreover, in the case of CONCORD measures have been taken to decrease this dependency. Nevertheless, as will be revealed through the following analysis, compared to the two other cases examined in this book, the distinctiveness of the oppositional field surrounding the EU's policies and practices in the area of development cooperation is low.

As argued above, the degree of concentration of this oppositional field is high because of the predominance of meta-organizations, and especially the central position of CONCORD. As testified in all interviews with CSO representatives, the advantage of working through CONCORD Europe is the privileged access to EU institutions. CONCORD is believed to 'open up political space for civil society engagement' and that is something smaller CSOs alone cannot do (interview, Bosselmann, 16 May 2013). However, most CONCORD members also pursue other channels when interacting with the EU. The larger networks often do their own campaigning and several of them are members of other Brussels-based umbrella organizations, such as Eurodad focusing on aid and VOICE dealing with humanitarian assistance.

In particular, the large civil society networks with their own EU offices have the capacity to engage EU institutions on their own too. The national platforms are more dependent on CONCORD Europe for their advocacy. The big networks are generally the driving forces in CONCORD, but some of the bigger national platforms (especially the UK and French platforms) are also quite influential, and not least the Belgian platform, which has the advantage of being present in Brussels. The national platform in the state holding the EU presidency also plays an important role within CONCORD (interview, Falklöf, 8 March 2013). An important responsibility of the board and staff of CONCORD Europe is to make sure that the Brussels-based big networks, which have most of the expertise and access, are not dominating the agenda too much compared to the national platforms (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). Several CONCORD representatives argue that Action Aid is currently the most active network, but APRODEV, CIDSE, Oxfam and Save the Children are also mentioned as particularly active and influential members. CONCORD Europe's General Assembly decides on new members. A CSO must show that international development work is its core activity, should meet criteria on democratic governance and must have offices in five member states since at least three years to qualify. CSOs not qualifying as full members may become 'associate members' (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013).

Since 2012 there are national CONCORD platforms in all EU member states. The activities of CONCORD are facilitated by a secretariat in Brussels and led by a board and a director. Members are organized in different working groups (CONCORD 2014). As a confederation of national and international NGOs, CONCORD is designed to have a member-participatory democratic structure, something that contributes to the network being seen as a legitimate formal partner in dialogue with the EU (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013).

In addition to concentration and distinctiveness, an important aspect of an oppositional field is the goals of CSOs. The overarching goal of CONCORD is 'a world in which poverty and inequality have been ended; in which decisions are based on social justice, gender equality and upon our responsibility to future generations'. More specifically, CONCORD works to ensure that the EU and its member states are committed to policies towards the developing world that are 'based on the principles of solidarity, human rights, justice and democracy, and which aim to address the causes of poverty and conflict and promote sustainable economic and social development'. Moreover, CONCORD seeks to ensure that the 'role of the NGDOs [non-governmental development organizations] is valued and protected as an authentic voice of European civil society that is engaged in issues of development and global justice' (CONCORD 2014). While in a sense far-reaching, these general goals of CONCORD are not fundamentally different from the stated goals of the EU concerning its policies for development cooperation. In general there is more of a common view between the EU and the civil society opposition concerning development issues than in the related fields of trade and agriculture, which is also an indication of the relatively low level of distinctiveness of this oppositional field. Neither CONCORD nor any other major actor within the oppositional field fundamentally challenges the legitimacy of the EU institutions in dealing with problems of global development. The goals of CONCORD and most of the wider oppositional field are focused on changing specific policies (non-structural opposition) or reforming EU institutions and/or global socio-economic structures (limited structural opposition).

A reason for the relative absence of radical transformative goals (major structural opposition) in the case of CONCORD is its character as a meta-organization. As a broad confederation including religious and secular organizations and politically moderate as well as more radical groups, CONCORD features many partly diverging ideological positions. Several interviewed CONCORD members testify to the difficulties in finding a common position (interview, Alonso, 26 April 2013; interview, Jult, 15 May 2013). As a staff of CONCORD Europe puts it, 'You have all ideologies [. . .] and it also delays every process because it takes much longer to build consensus' (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013). Internally democratic consultation processes take a lot of time. Often comments are required quickly and CONCORD is not able to take advantage of sudden lobbying opportunities because of the need for negotiation to reach consensus (personal communication, former CONCORD staff, 12 June 2014). Moreover, there is a potential trade-off between trying to find a common civil society position to enhance chances of gaining influence and the need to demonstrate the pluralism within civil society (interview, Sörbom, 8 March 2013). Sometimes it is decided to limit a controversial policy paper to the position of a specific working group or individual member organizations rather than having a more watered-down version that CONCORD as a whole can endorse (interview, Bosselmann, 16 May 2013; interview, Jult, 15 May 2013).

Gender equality is a controversial issue within CONCORD Europe, especially sexual and reproductive rights, which is a very sensitive issue for the Catholic network CIDSE. It also took a long time to build consensus on the role of the private sector in development (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013). Interviewed CONCORD representatives argue that the organization has been quite successful in reaching strong consensus despite different initial positions. The director of CONCORD Europe argues that 'all the members are absolutely aware that if we want to be relevant we need to reach strong consensus – and it works!' (Interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). The President of CONCORD Europe who is also representing Action Aid, one of the more radical CONCORD members, is also largely happy with the organization's ability to reach meaningful consensus.

> I think we have mechanisms for disagreement, for reaching consensus, for ensuring that that consensus is not the lowest common denominator but takes us a step forward. [. . .] And there's actually a high amount of consensus about the fact that we don't believe in the current development model as something that can bring an end to poverty. So, that's quite political and that's quite strong and I've never found that to be that controversial, interestingly, within the membership. So, diversity of membership is really important, it's part of our strength, it's part of how we get better decisions, it's how we, I think, get a stronger impact as well.
>
> (Interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013)

Other radical members of CONCORD are more concerned that trying to reach consensus within the umbrella organization leads to too moderate policy positions. 'The danger is always going to be that CONCORD tends to promote kind of status quo politics in a way. Not challenging, not moving with sufficient force,' argues the director of Eurostep (interview, Stocker, 14 May 2013). However, there are also CSOs that find CONCORD too critical towards the EU. CSOs that want to be seen as EU partners rather than opposition might choose not to work with CONCORD (personal communication, former CONCORD staff, 12 June 2014).

To sum up, the central actor within this oppositional field, CONCORD, has quite moderate non-structural and limited structural goals. However, CONCORD is not the only actor in the field and many of its members target the EU through other networks too. Somewhat more radical goals can be found among other CSOs (both inside and outside CONCORD), but it is still difficult to find any clear example of major structural opposition in the specific oppositional field surrounding the EU's development cooperation.

One CONCORD member that describes itself as somewhat more politically radical is Eurostep. Established in 1990 by the directors of 19 European NGOs actively involved in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the network promotes European development cooperation with a politically progressive secular identity (Eurostep 2014b). Eurostep is involved in most task groups and working groups of CONCORD, while also pursuing its own campaigns and linking up to other networks. Unlike CONCORD, the principal source of funding of Eurostep comes from within the membership. With a Secretariat in Brussels the organization has a professional identity, but it also emphasizes more of a grassroots identity than what is common in CONCORD. Eurostep members commit themselves to be 'an active part of the global social movement which concerns itself with the eradication of injustice and poverty' (Eurostep 2014a). In 2013 Eurostep was in a process of transition towards being defined more clearly as a Social Watch constituency in Europe. Social Watch is an international network of CSOs struggling to eradicate poverty and promote equality and human rights (interview, Stocker, 14 May 2013).

Another meta-organization in this oppositional field is Eurodad. This is a network of European NGOs working on issues related to debt, development finance and poverty reduction. Eurodad targets not only the EU and European governments, but also international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Eurodad is funded by its members (about one third of its budget), by the European Commission and by private foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Eurodad

2014). Eurodad helped establish CONCORD, and all its members are also CONCORD members (interview, Griffiths, 14 May 2013). Eurodad's goals appear somewhat more radical than CONCORD's, but the major tendency of the network is still limited structural rather than major structural. For tactical reasons the network tries to focus on significant but more limited issues rather than radical far-reaching demands for a restructuring of the global economy. As stated by the director of Eurodad:

> Our kind of tactic is to try to make our quite radical demands effective. You know, there's a huge number of poor people, inequality, structural unfairness, the global economy does not work for most of the citizens of the world. You don't change that through small incremental changes. There's got to be a significant change to many things but we can't just say that we want to have significant change. What we're trying to do is to find issues where we can change something [. . .] which will have a big change going outwards.
>
> (Interview, Griffiths, 14 May 2013)

In sum, the oppositional field surrounding the EU's policies and practices on aid and development cooperation can be characterized as highly concentrated (despite the large number of CSOs), with a low level of distinctiveness (given the closeness to EU institutions, not least in terms of funding) and dominated by non-structural and limited structural goals. Some might even question whether or not some of these CSOs can be described as an opposition to the EU in the area of development cooperation. However, with our relatively broad definition of opposition as including the sum total of CSOs that target a particular GGI with some level of disagreement, it is obvious that we have to do with opposition. The CSOs examined here certainly disagree with many of the policies and practices of the EU's development cooperation and they are very active in trying to achieve policy change. Key actors in this oppositional field also talk of themselves in terms of an opposition.

> So we need genuine civil society: independent, vocal, everywhere – in Europe and in the South. This is the opposition, the counter-power. I don't know how it sounds in English but in French we use a lot the 'contre pouvoir'. So it's not an opposition in terms of systemic opposition but it is the capacity to check and balance powers in society.
>
> (Interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013)

The political opportunity structure

The political opportunity structure for civil society engagement with the EU is generally considered open when compared to other GGIs. This is reflected in virtually all interviews conducted for this project. In particular, the power sharing between different institutions – Commission, Parliament and Council – is something that is stressed as contributing to the relatively open political opportunity structure. As argued by one Brussels-based CSO representative, 'The institutions hold each other accountable, which I think is very helpful' (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013). Moreover, despite being typically described as a complex bureaucracy, the EU still compares favourably with the UN in terms of transparency and accountability, according to the same civil society activist:

> We tend to see Brussels as a big bureaucracy but when I speak to my colleagues in New York it's like oh my god, it's really a jungle. Whereas in Brussels [. . .] there are many technical groups and so on, but I think it's easier to find your navigation. [. . .] I think in terms of accountability and transparency I would say that the EU is maybe in a better position than the UN.
>
> (Interview, Asin, 25 May 2013)

Others view the complexity of the Brussels bureaucracy as an obstacle to access. There are so many potential access points that it is difficult to know where you should focus your advocacy (interview, Bosselmann, 16 May 2013). Compared to many of its member states, the EU is considered to be more transparent and to provide better access for CSOs (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013). The relative openness of the EU, however, does not only, or even primarily, benefit CSOs. Around 10,000 lobbyists are based in Brussels and about 90 per cent of these represent private business interests. CSOs claiming to represent public interests make up a small minority of the EU lobbyists (interview, Alonso, 26 April 2013).

The Commission has gradually extended the forms and levels of access. Kohler-Koch and Finke discern three 'generations' of EU-CSO relations (2007: 209–212). The first stretched over the 1960s and 1970s and was dominated by concerns related to the emerging economic integration of Europe. In order to facilitate this process, the Commission formed relations with federations of economic interest groups such as employers, trade unions and farmers. The consultations were largely informal in character. The second generation (1980s and 1990s) was marked by a concern to form 'partnerships' with civil society in different policy areas. The 'European Social Dialogue' was institutionalized with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Commission also developed a funding policy that meant to support general interest groups in fields like human rights, women's issues and so on. This funding policy also aimed at creating representative partners of CSO platforms for dialogue and consultations. The move from the first to the second generation can be understood as one from hierarchy to cooperation on more equal terms (in which the EU institutions still had final say, however). In contrast, in the third generation (2000s–), 'participation' of CSOs has explicitly been framed as a question of democratic legitimacy. This is clear in the decisive White Paper on European Governance from 2001. Also, the Draft Constitutional Treaty included 'participatory democracy' as one of the governance principles; however, in the final Lisbon Treaty this formulation was abandoned. Since the turn of the millennium, efforts have been made at increasing transparency among CSOs and other organized actors, and many new forms for dialogue and consultation have been designed (Ruzza 2006; Trenz 2009). The democratic qualities of these new forms of engagement have been questioned by several scholars (see, for example, Smismans 2003, 2008; Kohler-Koch 2010). One of the most significant recent participatory innovations is the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI), which was introduced in article 11 (4) of the Lisbon Treaty. The ECI allows citizens (rather than CSOs) to propose a legal act in an area of EU competence. However, this right is in practice subject to many restrictions (Greenwood 2012).

A large number of CSOs are now targeting the EU in different policy areas. Some are European representatives of global organizations, such as Amnesty or Oxfam. Others are networks of national organizations in different member countries. For instance, the European Women's Lobby (EWL) represents 2,500 national organizations. Large EU-based CSOs such as the EWL are moreover often organized into even larger networks. CONCORD, which is at the centre of this study, is one such example. Another is the Social Platform, which organizes European-level CSOs working on social issues and anti-discrimination and functions as interlocutor for civil society in consultations with EU institutions on these issues (Cullen 2010). Many of these networks and meta-networks have been both initiated and largely funded by the EU. Different issue areas have faced different political opportunity structures. Development and social issues are both relatively open ones, while humanitarian aid is particularly open and the area of human rights protection within the EU is relatively closed (Sanchez Salgado 2014a).

Previous research on civil society engagement with the EU's development policy has observed a more limited role for European CSOs during the first decade of the 2000s. According to Carbone (2006), European CSOs have been increasingly marginalized as the EU has given more emphasis to participation of Southern CSOs. Whereas Southern CSOs have become more involved in all phases of the development process, the EU's preferred roles for European CSOs are now that of capacity builders for Southern partners and awareness raisers in relation to the European public. It is the political opportunity structure related to the Commission that has become more closed. Civil society interaction with the European Commission concerning development policies has become increasingly difficult, while civil society relations to the European Parliament and most member states in the Council are good, according to Carbone's (2008) assessment.

Interviews conducted for this project in 2013 give somewhat mixed, but overall more positive, assessments of the political opportunity structure. Some activists believe that civil society relations to the EU in the field of development have improved during recent years and that CSOs generally have more influence now (interview, Janrell, 8 March 2013; interview, Sörbom, 8 March 2013). The director of CONCORD even states that 'the relation with the EU institutions have *dramatically* improved over the last ten years' (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). Another Brussels-based CSO representative, while acknowledging a generally positive trend, is more sceptical towards relations with the Commission:

> It's not perfect but I think there has been a lot of improvement. And the doors, broadly speaking, are very open to us in general I would say – there are exceptions for the Commission. The Council I've observed as well a lot of improvement.
>
> (Interview, Asin, 25 May 2013)

There are a number of policy documents providing access to CSOs in the field of development. These policy documents on EU-civil society relations reflect a strong focus on policy-implementing local CSOs in Southern countries. Less attention is paid to the role of European advocacy CSOs. A 2002 'Communication' from the Commission outlines the policy on the participation of 'non-state actors' (NSAs) in the EU's development policy. 'Non-state actors' is the preferred broader term, which blurs the distinction between profit- and non-profit-making actors. While most of the document deals with non-profit-making actors, the business sector is provided a role in development dialogues as well as policy implementation (European Commission 2002: 5). While project implementation and capacity building are seen as important functions of CSOs, more oppositional advocacy activities are not highlighted. European CSOs, in particular, are given a quite limited role. 'The Northern NSAs' role in the South is progressively moving from implementing projects towards capacity building by assisting their partners in the developing countries to become active, credible and well structured' (European Commission 2002: 19). However, the importance of non-state actors' participation in consultations is also acknowledged (European Commission 2002: 20).

In a 'Communication' from 2012 on civil society engagement in external relations, the European Commission only devotes a short section to regional and global advocacy. This short text, however, does promote consultations and dialogue with CSOs:

> At the EU level, particular attention is given to CSOs dialogue with European institutions. In addition to existing mechanisms for consultations on policies and programmes the Commission will set up a consultative multi-stakeholder group allowing CSOs and relevant development actors to dialogue with the EU institutions on EU development policies, as well as on the provisions proposed in this Communication.
> (European Commission 2012: 10)

The most important access points for CSOs are related to three major decision-making EU institutions: the Commission, the Parliament and the Council.[1] We will discuss them in turn. The main access point and target for civil society advocacy concerning EU development policy in the *European Commission* is the DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, but other DGs (especially that on trade) are also relevant.

The European Commission has some standard rules about consultation and civil society engagement, and most DG's have some kind of formalized consultation process with civil society and other stakeholders, but there are also significant differences across the different DGs. There is generally more access in the field of environmental policy and less so concerning trade. Development is somewhere in between concerning civil society access. This field is complicated as it is related to the policies of several DGs and it is also a 'third pillar' issue so it depends on member-state consensus (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013).

The DG Development Cooperation – EuropeAid has a unit particularly dealing with civil society, but most units are more or less accessible to CSOs. However, the political opportunity structure of the Commission's

DG Development Cooperation – EuropeAid is not very institutionalized, according to many CSOs. There is general agreement among CSO representatives interviewed for this project that the degree of openness of the DG to a large extent depends on the commissioner. Poul Nielson (commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid 1999–2004) is described as having had a very instrumental view on CSOs, limiting their role to implementers of EU programmes. Louis Michel (commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid 2004–2009) is sometimes described as even more hostile to advocacy CSOs (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013; interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013), whereas others see him as slightly better than Nielson (interview, Falklöf, 8 March 2013). According to Carbone (2008: 247), CSOs were marginalized under Commissioner Louis Michel. Instead of being given access to decision-making processes CSOs were offered participation in 'open consultations' on the Internet (Carbone 2008: 247). However, not all CSO representatives felt marginalized at this time (personal communication, former CONCORD staff, 12 June 2014). Oppositional CSOs generally view Andris Piebalgs (commissioner for Development since 2010) much more positively than his predecessors. CONCORD is considered to have a 'very strong relationship' with Piebalgs (Bennett 2011: 3). For the first time ever, CONCORD has regular meetings with the commissioner and his cabinet (CONCORD 2011). Piebalgs is said to be very open to civil society input (interview, Falklöf, 8 March 2013). 'I can't think of a time when he hasn't agreed to see us when we've asked to see him,' states the president of CONCORD Europe (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). However, he is also described as a relatively weak commissioner, which means he is 'not a tool to defend development policies strongly' (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013).

The DG Development Cooperation – EuropeAid has provided a number of spaces for consultation and dialogue with CSOs, including informal meetings in Brussels and regional seminars across the world. It has also set up an electronic helpdesk to process information about and for civil society (EuropeAid 2014a). One example of a multi-stakeholder consultation coordinated by the DG Development Cooperation – EuropeAid is the 'Structured Dialogue' involving more than 700 CSOs and local authorities from all over the world, as well as participants from EU member states and the European Parliament. Focusing on EU development cooperation and aiming at aid effectiveness, the intensive consultation was held between March 2010 and May 2011, ending with a conference in Budapest (EuropeAid 2014e). Opinions concerning the effectiveness of this channel to influence the Commission's development policy vary. Some see the 'Structured Dialogue' as a very good experience (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013; interview, Asin, 25 May 2013), whereas others are more sceptical. Non-CONCORD activists tend to criticize the 'Structured Dialogue' because they claim it was driven by a funding desire (interview, Stocker, 14 May 2013).

As a follow-up to the 'Structured Dialogue' process, the so-called Policy Forum on Development was established (EuropeAid 2014c). Seats are allocated to selected representatives of civil society umbrella organizations as well as local authorities, trade unions, cooperatives and the private sector in four world regions. The Policy Forum is described as a 'confidence and trust-building mechanism and not as a negotiation or decision-making space' (EuropeAid 2014d). Hence, it is not an opportunity for deeper forms of access. While representatives of CONCORD who have been involved in the process tend to see it as a quite good development in terms of dialogue and openness, it is also pointed out that it has meant a challenge for CONCORD as the Policy Forum is open to a variety of stakeholders and CONCORD has only received two seats, which does not really recognize the broad constituency of the umbrella organization (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013). CSO representatives argue that there has been little genuine dialogue. 'It has mainly been a description of the Commission's position' (interview, Janrell, 8 March 2013). Similarly, Sanchez Salgado (2014a) reports mixed civil society opinions on Policy Forum on Development.

In addition to the most obvious target, DG Development Cooperation – EuropeAid, CSOs concerned with European development policy also have contacts with other DGs, particularly on trade and environment (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013). This interaction, however, is more ad hoc (CONCORD 2011: 2).

The *European Parliament* is an important component of the EU political opportunity structure. An elected parliament is an institutional feature of the EU that is not found in other GGIs. This contributes to the EU having a more open political opportunity structure than most other international institutions. The Parliament has been the EU institution most supportive of CSOs. Its Development Committee in particular has been very critical of the less civil society friendly approach of the Commission (Carbone 2006: 205). The positive aspects of the Parliament in terms of openness to civil society are often pointed out by CSO representatives.

> You have the European Parliament which you don't have anywhere else, which is very valuable. You have some genuine democratic input through elected representatives which doesn't exist in any

> other multilateral. [. . .] /I/t's not the most powerful in the European system but it's there.
>
> (Interview, Griffiths, 14 May 2013)

In addition to the possibility to approach individual parliamentarians, the European Parliament Development Committee has regular meetings with CSOs. CONCORD has formal meetings with the Committee at least twice a year and more frequent informal contacts with the Secretariat of the Development Committee (CONCORD 2011: 2). However, the lack of institutionalization of the political opportunity structure noted in relation to the Commission is also true for the Parliament. A civil society activist with long enough experience to compare several development committees argues that the current Committee might be sympathetic to some civil society concerns, but it is not particularly strong and active (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013). CSO representatives have observed a decrease in openness of the Parliament, which they associate with a general increase in the number of lobbyists leading to more limited access (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013).

The third major EU institution, the *Council of the European Union*, is also important to consider when analysing the political opportunity structure for civil society advocacy. The Council offers selected CSOs regular meetings with the Development Cooperation Working Party, which prepares Council Conclusions. CONCORD, as the favoured civil society interlocutor concerning development policy, has a regular slot in formal bi-annual meetings and also has more frequent meetings with individual members of the Working Party. The Informal Council of Development Ministers used to provide access for selected CSOs, but this opportunity to influence the Council has become less available with the shrinking role of the EU presidencies (CONCORD 2011: 2). Another access point is the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), a body of representatives from member states that meets each week to prepare the work of the Council. This is a new form of access that CONCORD claims to have gained due to its lobbying efforts (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013), hence being an example of CSOs reshaping the political opportunity structure to their advantage. However, the quality of this form of access depends to a large extent on the attitude of the presidency. Says a representative of CONCORD: 'Some countries are really open to civil society. There you can choose the topics you want. Some are really more rigid, those that are not used yet to work with civil society, so they say "please just talk on this", and you are very restricted' (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013).

Hence, in addition to the political opportunity structure of the EU institutions, we also have to consider national political opportunity structures in the member states. Although the Commission is considered a very powerful institution within the EU, CSOs increasingly realize that in the end decisions are often taken by the national governments and not by the Commission (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013). CONCORD national platforms engage with their national governments. The level of civil society access varies across national polities, depending, for instance, on the political culture and the strength of national CSOs. CSO representatives point to the difference between the original EU-15 members and the newer East European member states in terms of approach to development cooperation as well as civil society participation (interview, Jult, 15 May 2013; interview, Alonso, 26 April 2013). However, this is not only about different experiences in Western and Eastern Europe. There are nation-specific conditions to consider in every member state when assessing opportunities for civil society advocacy concerning EU development policy. In the UK, for instance, CSOs have to be very careful because of the anti-Europe feelings in the population (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013). A CONCORD activist has also noted a change among those countries that used to be considered the most progressive concerning development policy, including the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. These countries, he argues, have become increasingly conservative and defensive, even challenging their own relations with CSOs (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013).

Whereas oppositional CSOs can take advantage of the mixed institutional setting and approach both central EU institutions and national governments, the complex and not-so-clear policy process may imply that the political opportunity structure is less open in practice than expected. As argued by one civil society activist:

> When organizations were raising questions to their government they would say: ‘oh, yeah, we agree with you but the decisions aren’t just made here, they’re made in Brussels’. And you would go to Brussels, to the Commission, and they would say: ‘ah, yes, we agree with you but the decisions aren’t made by us, they are made by the member states’.
>
> (Interview, Stocker, 14 May 2013)

When comparing the three major EU institutions, most CSOs in the oppositional field related to development cooperation tend to agree on the relative openness of the political opportunity structure. The Head of Oxfam

International's EU Advocacy Office is representative of this dominant view when she argues that 'the most closed institution is the Council. Probably the most transparent one is the Parliament and the Commission in between' (interview, Alonso, 26 April 2013). More recently, the different institutions have offered a joint access point for CSOs through the 'quadrilogue'; deliberations among representatives of the Commission, Parliament, member states and civil society (Carbone 2008: 244). This is something that CONCORD finds useful when analysing the different positions of the three institutions in order to decide the direction of its lobbying efforts (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013).

As outlined in chapter 3, access should be assessed in terms of both depth and range. The depth of access varies across institutional access points, issues and CSOs.

> It depends very much actually on the topic at stake I must say. There are political processes that are fairly open, where civil society is consulted from the beginning, before actually the first draft proposal even is released. [. . .] But on the other hand there are also other examples where it's very difficult to get involved at the different stages.
>
> (Interview, Bosselmann, 16 May 2013)

Generally speaking there is more access early in the policy process, which often involves the Commission. Access to decision making is not as common. Some activists claim that this is particularly so at the member-state level (interview, Bosselmann, 16 May 2013). Most access takes the form of consultations and meetings. The quality of these is not always high from the perspective of CSOs. Sometimes meetings are not adequately prepared and documents might not always be distributed in advance (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013). Another problem might be that there are too many CSOs participating in a consultation. The range of access might then be considered OK, but it becomes a very shallow form of access. With too many actors no one will be able to have any influence (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). Moreover, consultations are often performed through the Internet, which typically means an even more shallow form of access. As one activist argues:

> The Commission is using a lot all these internet-based consultations because they think that is the best way to reach out to thousands of organizations. I'm not that convinced to be very honest. I think the face-to-face is still very important.
>
> (Interview, Asin, 25 May 2013)

Another factor limiting the depth of access is the fact that CSO input in consultations might not be taken into account. As noted by a former CONCORD member, 'Often nobody knew what happened to comments submitted and there was no feedback from the institutions in this regard' (personal communication, 12 June 2014).

The range of CSOs offered access to the EU is generally quite broad, but not all CSOs are offered the same access to EU's policy making on development cooperation. It is obvious that CONCORD has a privileged position, being an umbrella organization to a large extent shaped and funded by the EU in order to simplify its civil society engagement in the field of development. Not only has CONCORD better access to formal meetings, its representatives are also able to arrange many informal meetings (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013). This does not mean that EU institutions are closed to other CSOs, but access is certainly easier for the privileged key organizations.

The range of access also varies across issues. It is much more difficult to have influence in policy formulation around trade than it is around gender in development (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). 'If they organize something on trade they will be very reluctant to invite civil society. [. . .] They were really afraid that we would be so critical that they tried to keep us away as long as possible', says a representative of CONCORD (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013).

In addition to access, the other main aspect of the political opportunity structure that we consider is the existence of elite allies. Previous research on civil society advocacy on EU development cooperation indicates that CSOs have had more influence when they have found elite allies within the Parliament and/or member states (Carbone 2008: 247). Some interviewed CSO representatives do stress the importance of elite allies in the Parliament and member states (interview, Janrell, 8 March 2013; interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013), but many point to the significance of elite allies in the Commission too. Not only high-ranking policy makers but also technical staff might be important civil society allies. EU officials who are actually putting together agendas for meetings and drafting documents often look for input, and lobbying at this lower level might be effective (personal communication, former CONCORD staff, 12 June 2014). Informal contacts and alliances rely on an individual's willingness to engage (CONCORD 2011: 2) and hence vary over time and across institutions. CSOs sometimes form some kind of alliance with the Commission when targeting member states that do not live up to their obligations on aid quantity and quality targets, but the Commission is definitely not an ally concerning trade (interview, Janrell, 8 March 2013; interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). The director of CONCORD recalls an episode when the commissioner acted as a strong elite ally of CSOs against members of the European Parliament:

> I remember the liberal group five, seven years ago has been challenging even CONCORD funding [. . .] and I have seen the Director General of the European Commission standing in the Parliament to defend CSOs and the right to opposition that we have as genuine civil society in Europe. That was for me a very important moment of democracy.
>
> (Interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013)

Finding elite allies is an important aspect of navigating the political opportunity structure. Says a CSO activist: 'Access has always been relatively easy. It's a question of who you know' (interview, Stocker, 14 May 2013). CONCORD is actively attempting to locate potential upcoming key people with whom to align (interview, Terlecki, 15 May 2013). Cultivating relationships with elite allies inside EU institutions is also about 'creating space for people inside the system to be able to push the agenda forward' (interview, Stocker, 14 May 2013). The ambition to form alliances is not limited to the EU institutions. According to one civil society activist, the most successful civil society campaigns have featured strong support from Southern as well as Northern governments (interview, Griffiths, 14 May 2013).

In sum, the political opportunity structure for civil society engagement with EU institutions concerning development cooperation must be considered as fairly open. There are numerous institutional access points and consultations with CSOs are very common. The complex institutional design of the EU, with several institutions taking part in the policy process, contributes to the open political opportunity structure and enables CSOs to find many elite allies. The range of access is broad, although meta-organizations like CONCORD enjoy a privileged position. Even if civil society access is typically not of a deeper kind, the EU compares favourably to many other GGIs, including the ADB and GFMD, which will be analysed in the following chapters.

Opposition strategies

Inside strategy

As analysed in the first part of this chapter, the oppositional field surrounding the EU's policy making on development cooperation and aid is heavily dominated by non-structural and limited structural opposition. Therefore, it is not surprising that most opposition actors use the inside advocacy strategy, including formal and informal lobbying activities targeting different EU institutions. The central actor in this oppositional field, CONCORD, makes use of the relatively open political opportunity structure related to the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, while simultaneously lobbying many national governments on the same issue. As one Brussels-based CSO representative puts it, 'You work out who is going to be important in drafting that law and you try to influence them. So we work at the European level with the Members of European Parliament (MEPs), Development Committee, with the Commission and then our members work at the national level with their governments' (interview, Griffiths, 14 May 2013). CONCORD Europe and other actors based in Brussels are most active in the early phases of the policy process. National platforms are most active in later phases when member states get involved (interview, Janrell, 8 March 2013). Moreover, members of CONCORD tend to approach EU institutions both through CONCORD and by themselves (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013).

CSOs take part in formal consultations, for example, when the Commission presents a paper and there is a debate or when CSOs are invited to submit written comment on a 'Green Paper'. Many CSOs also work more proactively, sending emails and requesting meetings with individual policy makers to lobby on specific issues (interview, Alonso, 26 April 2013; interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). Large civil society networks like CONCORD also invite EU officials to various events they are organizing (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013). The Commission has increasingly tried to direct civil society access to formal consultations, often Internet-based. Many CSO representatives, however, argue that the formal large consultation processes are the least effective in influencing policy (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). Most CSOs prefer more informal face-to-face meetings (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013). Informal contacts are common in Brussels, but they always tend to be in some formal spaces. Unlike in New York, a Brussels-based CSO representative points out, you do not invite policy makers to your home. Meetings might be informal, but they usually take place in the offices of the policy makers or over lunch. This, she argues, is an advantage considering transparency and accountability (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013).

While there seems to be agreement within CONCORD on the usefulness of meeting representatives within the EU institutions, one

CONCORD activist criticizes a tendency to only talk to those who are already on your side, that is, meeting with MEPs and people in the Commission who already are aligned with CONCORD's interests. She argues that there is no need to convince those who are already on the same side. Rather, the focus should be on trying to change the opinion of those who do not agree with the organization (interview, Terlecki, 15 May 2013).

Applying the inside strategy, CSOs claim to have been successful in influencing the EU on many policies. Examples include safeguarding the big principles of the development cooperation framework with its poverty focus (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013), the multi-annual financial framework, where CSOs claim to have been able to influence the initial proposals of the Commission (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013), and shifting the agenda on the role of CSOs in the developmental framework (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). More specifically, one of the big success stories of CONCORD is said to be the inclusion of the 'policy coherence for development' principles in the Lisbon Treaty (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). CONCORD's influence on the Lisbon Treaty is also highlighted in an external review of its strategy, which also mentions influence on the EU Consensus on Development and the existence of a Development commissioner outside the EEAS (Bennett 2011). Another example of civil society influence through inside advocacy is the monitoring of how well the EU member states are delivering on their aid targets. In this case CSOs usually work with the European Commission (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013).

While recognizing the potential for gaining influence through the inside strategy, CSOs also discuss possible problems of getting too close to the EU institutions. The active participation in formal consultations risks legitimizing processes which may not be genuinely participatory. 'There are cases of CSOs feeling high-jacked when EU institutions claim that there has been civil society consultations, but participating CSOs believe that there has been no meaningful dialogue' (interview, Sörbom, 8 March 2013). In contrast to the cases of the ADB and GFMD to be analysed in the following chapters, in this case there is no sharp border between EU institutions and CSOs. People working for CSOs may be recruited to EU institutions and the other way around. The director of CONCORD, for instance, has been working for an EU delegation for three years, in charge of relations with CSOs and some bilateral programming (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013), and the EU representative of Care International has worked for the Commission (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013). CSO representatives, not least within CONCORD, reflect on the problem of co-optation:

> I think that is the general risk, not just for CONCORD, I would say for any organization that engages in policy – and advocacy work. I mean to what extent your agenda finishes and the agenda of the institutions starts – it's hard to say. [. . .] /I/f I look for instance at the issue of the 'Structured Dialogue', I really see a lot of our points being taken up. And I don't think that we were co-opted in the end by the institutions. I think maybe what you can argue is that we managed to reach consensus around ideas and proposals.
>
> (Interview, Asin, 25 May 2013)

Another member of CONCORD argues that the risk of co-optation is minimized as CONCORD's position on different issues is decided by member organizations and their partners in the field rather than CONCORD representatives in Brussels (interview, Janrell, 8 March 2013). Says the president of CONCORD:

> Are we co-opted because we're insiders? Well, that's very very likely and something we definitely talk about. Partly what helps us is this broad membership and the fact that we're in the member states as well as in Brussels. I think if CONCORD was a purely Brussels thing there is a big danger that people would just be part of the institutional scene.
>
> (Interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013)

In addition to the relatively open political opportunity structure and the mainly non-structural and limited-structural goals of the civil society opposition, the highly professional identity of Brussels-based CSOs also contributes to the predominance of inside advocacy. The major CSOs in Brussels are umbrella organizations with weak grassroots connections. This is not only a matter of organizational identity. It is also a practical matter as you need to mobilize a grassroots constituency for outside protest activities and this might be very difficult on the European level. A representative of APRODEV explains this:

> We do not go for campaigns because we realized that we don't have the constituency for that. [. . .] /A/ll members have very strong constituencies in their national contexts, like Church of Sweden, but in the European context it is really difficult to mobilize that constituency

> at the same time in all the countries on an EU issue. So, in fact our role is more really advocacy and lobbying.
>
> (Interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013)

Outside strategy

Influencing public opinion and media strategies are integrated in the agenda-setting activities of CONCORD, but not protests, demonstrations and so on (interview, Sörbom, 8 March 2013). As a representative of CONCORD puts it, 'European civil society is less on the barricades than, for example, in Asia or Africa or Latin America' (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013). 'Campaigning concerns "tailored messaging", it is not about taking to the streets or standing on the barricades but media strategies, raising public awareness, making issues visible, and so on' (interview, Terlecki, 15 May 2013). Even CSOs that apply the outside strategy when targeting other GGIs tend to focus more on inside advocacy in relation to the EU. A representative of Oxfam explains the position of her organization:

> CONCORD is not a campaigning organization. Oxfam is a campaigning organization but we do much more [of that] at national or global levels but not on the EU level. So we don't run campaigns targeting the EU per se. There have been some cases though. There have been some petitions and so on.
>
> (Interview, Alonso, 26 April 2013)

Most notable, Aid Watch does a stunt before it launches its annual report. A representative of CONCORD recalls the last event: 'Everyone had these cat suits and big balloons with faces of all the EU leaders which attract a lot of attention. It was in the middle of the square next to all the institutions so you have a lot of awareness' (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013). However, such public campaigns are typically carried out by some of the big networks that are members of CONCORD, such as Plan, Oxfam and Save the Children (interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013).

The choice of strategy varies across issues. Action Aid, one of the key members of CONCORD, engages in outside activities concerning certain controversial issues. 'We are often in quite an opposition mode I think around trade, sometimes around energy policy,' states an activist (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). The general picture, however, is one of limited and rather moderate forms of outside advocacy activities concerning the EU's development policy. Key factors, such as a relatively open political opportunity structure, relatively limited goals and a highly professional identity of the major CSOs in this oppositional field, all work against more contentious protest activities. Unlike the two other cases analysed in this study, there are hardly any 'principled outsiders' in this oppositional field. The absence of contentious action at the EU level has been related to the absence of a sense of belonging to Europe, the absence of a public space and the fact that protest is usually territorially rooted (Sanchez Sagaldo 2014a). To the extent that the outside strategy is at all used, it is for pragmatic reasons and mainly in combination with the inside strategy, as we will discuss below.

Inside and outside strategies combined

Even if CSOs targeting the EU in the field of development cooperation do not engage in highly contentious activities, this does not necessarily mean that they are 'tamed' or that they are not very critical of the Commission (Sanchez Sagaldo 2014a). Despite the dominance of the inside strategy, there is agreement among all CSO representatives interviewed for this project that inside and outside strategies can be combined. Ideally, there should be a 'mixture of insider and outsider opposition and lobbying in different policy areas at different times' (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013). CONCORD, as a federation, tries to be both an efficient and respected service provider managing a lot of operational grants from all over the world and at the same time a strong watchdog and voice for advocacy work (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013; interview, CONCORD staff, 3 April 2013). CONCORD Europe, however, mainly apply the inside strategy, whereas it is up to its national members to mobilize outside activities (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). For example, CONCORD Belgium has organized a very big demonstration in Brussels while simultaneously seeking alliance with the president of the Council.

> We did a really big campaign in 2010 on the MDGs and then we had like 15 000 people coming in the street for more political movement on the MDGs. [. . .] And then we decided [. . .] it was best to go to Van Rompuy who is President of the Council because he was going to defend together with us within the UN the position.
>
> (Interview, Jult, 15 May 2013)

Similarly, umbrella organizations that are members of CONCORD may choose to have their members getting involved in outside campaigns while the office in Brussels focuses on inside work on the same issue (interview, Sohet, 3 April 2013; cf. Sanchez Sagaldo 2014a). The EU supported umbrella organizations do not have direct contact with citizens. They have a very strong professional identity. National sections of the Brussels-based CSOs, however, frequently use the Internet and social media to engage citizens in their activities (Sanchez Sagaldo 2014a). This division of labour concerning inside and outside advocacy is also determined by the character of the issue in focus. The technical character of many of the issues CONCORD Europe deals with makes it difficult to mobilize public opinion (interview, Consolo, 3 April 2013). Nevertheless, there is one specific form of combination of inside and outside strategies that is easily applied by Brussels-based activists: CSOs participating in a formal consultation process may withdraw from that process as a protest. This is something that CONCORD has done (interview, Maycock, 4 April 2013).

Interviewed CSO representatives point out that combined inside-outside strategy is often effective in gaining influence. One example of a successful campaign combining inside and outside strategies concerns the accounting directive, which forces companies to report their payments to governments as an anti-corruption measure (interview, Alonso, 26 April 2013; interview, Griffiths, 14 May 2013). Many of the most striking CSO successes in Brussels have been related to advocacy campaigns that were widely relayed in the media and supported by public opinion (Sanchez Sagaldo 2014a).

Extant research has put much emphasis on political opportunity structures (or 'institutional variables') as explanations to the choice of civil society strategy targeting the EU (Beyers 2004; Joachim and Locher 2009b). This study indicates that we also need to consider actor characteristics like the goals and organizational identities of oppositional CSOs. The predominance of inside advocacy in this case is not only related to the relatively open political opportunity structure of EU institutions and the mainly non-structural and limited structural goals of oppositional CSOs, but also the professional identity of Brussels-based CSOs. This identity or culture of the organization is referred to by a representative of CARE International when comparing her organization to Oxfam, an organization that combines the inside strategy with some outside activities:

> We are a bit risk-adverse organization and it has to do with the culture. [. . .] /I/f you compare with Oxfam, they go public much more than we do. That's part of the organization. So we are more like behind the scenes advocacy.
>
> (Interview, Asin, 25 May 2013)

Conclusion

In this chapter we have analysed the oppositional field surrounding the EU's policies and practices of development cooperation and the strategies used by various opposition groups. Despite the large number of CSOs targeting the EU on these issues, the oppositional field can still be described as relatively concentrated because of the central position of meta-organizations, in particular CONCORD. The common EU practice of encouraging CSOs to unite in civil society platforms and to fund these umbrella organizations means that many CSOs are less autonomous in relation to the GGI they target than in many other cases. Hence, this oppositional field has a relatively low degree of distinctiveness. Most CSOs making up this oppositional field have non-structural or limited structural goals. The political opportunity structure for civil society engagement with the EU is generally open. The openness of the political opportunity structure means that the inside strategy is possible for most civil society opposition and such opportunities are taken advantage of by all segments of the oppositional field. The dominance of a professional identity and of non-structural and limited structural goals contributes to the preference of the inside strategy. Some opposition groups (including CONCORD) to some extent combine the inside strategy with some outside advocacy, but only for pragmatic reasons and mainly in less contentious forms. Instances of outside protest activities cannot be explained with reference to a closed political opportunity structure. Instead, actor characteristics such as goals and organizational identity explain why some CSOs sometimes choose to use the outside strategy in addition to inside lobbying despite having direct access to the EU. This case study, indicating a dominance of the inside strategy, is in line with our assumptions (in chapter 3) about how the political opportunity structure of the GGI and the goals and organizational identities of oppositional CSOs impact on the choice of opposition strategy.

5
The Asian Development Bank

Introduction

In this chapter we analyse the oppositional field surrounding ADB and the strategies used by various opposition groups targeting this GGI. We begin with a brief description of the main features of this particular GGI and then turn to an analysis of the oppositional field. The next section contains an analysis of the political opportunity structure providing access and elite allies for some civil society opposition. Then follows a section describing and explaining different inside and outside strategies applied by various opposition actors targeting ADB. Finally, we offer some conclusions from this case study.

Like the EU analysed in the previous chapter, ADB is also a regional organization, but with a broader membership than the EU. ADB is owned and financed by its 67 member countries, of which 48 are from the Asian region. The most influential members are the non-borrowing states, most of which are North American and European. With this broader and more diverse membership, we can assume that the oppositional field is less concentrated than in the case of EU development policies. Whereas the EU covers virtually all issue areas and we had to limit our study to the oppositional field surrounding its policies and practices on development cooperation, all ADB activities are solely focused on the governance of development. Hence, we are interested in the opposition towards this GGI as a whole.

Like the other multilateral development banks, ADB provides financial support through low-interest long-term loans and grants and advice concerning development policies to developing countries. Traditionally most loans have been given to large infrastructure projects. Since the 1990s, ADB also provides programme loans aiming at policy reforms within a specific sector, like water or energy. Established in 1966, ADB has its headquarters in Manila and 26 field offices in different member countries.[1] Its highest decision-making body is the Board of Governors, consisting mainly of finance ministers from each member country. They meet once a year at the ADB annual meeting. The Board of Governors elects the ADB president for a five-year term. The president has always come from Japan and many other key positions are also held by Japanese nationals. All operational decisions are taken by the 12 people in the Board of Directors, who are primarily officials from member governments' ministry of finance (or, in the case of several European members, the ministry of foreign affairs). The Board of Directors meets twice a week to make decisions on all loans, guarantees and technical assistance grants (ADB 2013a). Voting power is determined by the amount of investment in ADB. This means that the non-borrowing members have more than 60 per cent of the voting power. Japan and the USA are the largest contributors, with almost 13 per cent of the total votes each. Like in most other GGIs, decision making typically aims at consensus, but this is a form of consensus that is established on specific power relations (Bøås and McNeill 2003: 8).

The oppositional field

Like the other multilateral development banks, the ADB has increasingly included NGOs in the implementation of projects. This is a major aspect of the GGI's civil society engagement. However, project-implementing NGOs often do not voice any criticism against the ADB or try to influence its policies. If they do not show any disagreement with the GGI, they are by definition not part of the oppositional field. But there are also an increasing number of CSOs that actively oppose the ADB and its policies and projects. The oppositional field surrounding ADB has emerged since the late 1980s. One of the first civil society campaigns targeting ADB was carried out in 1988 by the Asian NGO Coalition (ANGOC) and the USA-based Environmental Policy Institute (later Friends of the Earth). In 1989 CSOs began to attend ADB annual meetings. In 1992 representatives of a number of mainly Philippine-based CSOs decided to create a 'NGO Working Group on ADB' with a secretariat in Manila. During the following years, the NGO Working Group criticized a number of ADB policies and projects during ADB annual meetings, through letters and other publications and in direct dialogue with ADB management and staff. In 1998–1999 the NGO Working Group was restructured and renamed the NGO Forum on ADB (NGO Forum on ADB 2013c).

Since then, most civil society advocacy targeting ADB has been coordinated by the NGO Forum on ADB.[2] Hence, the oppositional field surrounding ADB can be described as relatively concentrated. The NGO Forum on ADB has a prominent role in this oppositional field, similar to CONCORD in the case of the EU's policies on development cooperation analysed in the previous chapter. But unlike the EU case, which featured a number of other meta-organizations too, the oppositional field surrounding ADB does contain only one major meta-organization.

With a secretariat in Manila, Philippines, the NGO Forum has established regional working groups in Central Asia, the Mekong sub-region, the Pacific, South Asia and Southeast Asia. There is also participation from Europe, Japan, Australia and the USA. The NGO Forum facilitates its member organization's monitoring of ADB operations in the respective sub-regions and supports advocacy activities, including making use of ADB's accountability mechanism for community complaints against ADB-funded projects. This means that the NGO Forum Secretariat has direct contact with ADB's Board of Directors, management and staff concerning specific projects. Forum activists monitor and assess the whole ADB project cycle. They also participate in consultations regarding the review of ADB policies. The NGO Forum publishes a quarterly magazine, *Bankwatch*, and a number of other documents criticizing ADB policies. Its website covers information on different aspects of ADB's policies and projects. While often highly critical towards ADB, representatives of the NGO Forum have noted an increasing respect from ADB management and staff. 'If there is a possibility of policy review they definitely look for our comments,' claims the head of the NGO Forum (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011).

Unlike many other contemporary transnational activist networks that tend to avoid formal representative structures, the NGO Forum on ADB has an international committee with elected representatives from each of the sub-regional working groups. Overarching decisions are taken by the NGO Forum annual meeting, whereas the secretariat in Manila coordinates the day-to-day activities. The NGO Forum clearly has a professional identity, although some of its members identify themselves more as grassroots activists. Members of the NGO Forum include national CSOs as well as grassroots groups and communities, including mass-based movements such as vendors and farmers' associations. Decision making seems to be rather decentralized. The secretariat with about five staff members runs the day-to-day activities, but for all policy and strategic issues, email lists to which all members have access are extensively used. Proposals for new policies or activities are posted on the relevant list and members have ten days to give their input. Then the secretariat gathers all comments, revises and sharpens the proposal and sends it to everyone again for approval (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011). The leadership of the NGO Forum claims that local communities affected by ADB projects set the agenda. The main role of the NGO Forum is as facilitator. The NGO Forum provides support and training and contributes with its detailed understanding of the workings of ADB, but the local communities decide on goals and strategy (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011).

The professional identity of key members of the NGO Forum is combined with a rather strong grassroots identity. Strong links to local communities are essential for the NGO Forum. Certain ADB officials might argue that the NGO Forum is not a relevant stakeholder and thus refuse to engage with activists from the network. In such cases, activists in the NGO Forum can claim to represent the real stakeholders in specific projects and, therefore, ADB officials responsible for the project should be obliged to talk to them. According to the leader of the NGO Forum, 'The Bank officials can say no, because we are not stakeholders on their project. But our members are their stakeholders [. . .] so in that way, we can substantiate the argument to make grounds for engagement' (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011).

The distinctiveness of this oppositional field appears as high when focusing on the central actor – the NGO Forum on ADB. The NGO Forum stresses its autonomy in relation to ADB. In sharp contrast with CONCORD (see chapter 4), member organizations must not accept any financial support from ADB (NGO Forum on ADB 2007). This excludes all NGOs working in partnership with ADB to help implement various projects. With this principle, the NGO Forum has been able to safeguard its independence and its critical watchdog character. Funding comes from major international foundations and NGOs such as the C.S. Mott Foundation, Ford Foundation and Oxfam, as is clearly detailed in the organization's annual reports (for example, NGO Forum on ADB 2013b).

Also in terms of goals, the NGO Forum appears as more radical and critical towards the ADB than CONCORD is in relation to the EU. Focusing on social justice, gender, the environment and so on, members of the NGO Forum unite in a struggle against specific ADB policies, projects and programmes that they believe threaten people's lives and the environment. The main goal of the NGO Forum is to make ADB responsible and accountable for the impacts of its projects and policies. 'The Bank is not a private bank, it's a public institution. It has to be accountable to every single dollar investment, anywhere,' argues the head of the NGO Forum (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011). The NGO Forum criticizes both ADB's development paradigm, which is described as top-down, pro-market and oriented towards economic growth, and the lack of accountability of the institution. The NGO Forum tries to influence ADB to adopt 'poverty reduction focused and grassroots-based policies for sustainable development' and demands a thorough democratization of policy-making processes within the Bank. In terms of goals, the NGO Forum can thus be characterized as a limited structural opposition. It strives at changing not only specific policies and projects, but also the political structure of ADB. Moreover, it voices fundamental disagreement with the dominant approach to development taken by the Bank, which has implications for broader socio-economic structures. Nevertheless, the NGO Forum does not argue that ADB should be abolished. Its overarching goal is to reform the Bank. This often radical, but still reformist stance makes the NGO Forum a clear example of a limited structural opposition.

The oppositional field surrounding ADB, however, does not only consist of the NGO Forum. In many campaigns the NGO Forum has close cooperation with the Bank Information Center (BIC), linking the advocacy to similar campaigns targeting other multilateral development banks (BIC 2013). Established in 1987, BIC has its central office in Washington, DC, and additional offices in New Delhi, Bangkok and Jakarta. It has about 30 staff, including regional representatives across the world. An explicitly stated aim is to democratize institutions working on the global governance of development. In this respect, four aspects are highlighted: protecting rights (for instance, linked to safeguards of global development institutions), promoting transparency, strengthening accountability and increasing civil society engagement. Like the NGO Forum, BIC does not receive any funding from ADB or any other international financial institution (IFI). Like other CSOs in this field, BIC relies on funding from a number of international foundations with a progressive orientation focusing on environmental and social issues. BIC views itself as a facilitator or bridge between local communities and IFIs. Like representatives of the NGO Forum, BIC activists also stress that local communities should decide about the activities (interview, Hadad, 16 December 2010), hence adding a grassroots orientation to its professional identity.

Another transnational coalition of CSOs which has worked closely with the NGO Forum in campaigns for increased transparency of ADB is the Global Transparency Initiative (GTI). Several prominent Bank Watch organizations (including BIC, Article 19 in the UK and the Access to Information Network [ATIN] in the Philippines) are linked together in the GTI. Focusing on promoting openness within the IFIs, the aim is to create political space to debate development models (Global Transparency Initiative 2013).

Both BIC and GTI are typical representatives of the limited structural opposition against ADB. Their goals and organizational identities are similar to the NGO Forum. But there are also CSOs which tend to be sceptical towards too much negotiation with ADB and criticize the NGO Forum for not being sufficiently radical. This kind of criticism comes from radical national CSOs such as the Indonesian *Koalisi Anti Utang* (Anti-Debt Coalition), which is still a member of the NGO Forum, as well as from mass-based organizations like the Indonesian Peasants' Union (SPI), which collaborates with the NGO Forum in certain activities, but has chosen not to become a member (interviews, anti-debt activist, 18 April 2012; Kartini, 11 April 2012).

Another CSO targeting ADB from a more critical position than the NGO Forum is Focus on the Global South. This organization, established in 1995, has offices in India, the Philippines and Thailand. About ten people work at the main Bangkok office and a few more in the Manila and New Delhi offices. Focus on the Global South challenges neoliberal globalization and promotes 'deglobalization' as an alternative. The organization works on many different issues, in particular related to trade and finance. Activities range from research to direct action (Focus on the Global South 2013). It is highly critical against GGIs like the WTO, the World Bank and ADB and doubts that these institutions can be reformed. The leader of the organization, prominent activist academic Walden Bello, has argued that reform of ADB is the wrong agenda. According to him, ADB (and the World Bank and IMF) are 'structural and ideological expressions of obsolete paradigms that cannot handle the multiple problems confronting the world economy' (Bello 2000: 8). Therefore, ADB (and other IFIs) should be disempowered, if not abolished, rather than reformed.

Another critical CSO network is the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), a coalition of more than 250 CSOs and individuals in the Philippines. Despite being a national coalition, FDC has played an important role in regional civil society advocacy targeting ADB. FDC is an advocacy coalition focusing on economic justice and development. Established in 1988, it has a background in the criticism against foreign loans that boosted the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos and the conviction that loans to an illegitimate regime are illegitimate debts that should be cancelled. FDC has continued to monitor the activities of IFIs in the Philippines and protested against imposed structural adjustment policies and the privatization of water and electricity (FDC 2013). FDC was instrumental in the establishment of the NGO Forum on ADB, but unlike the NGO Forum, FDC does not cultivate direct relations with ADB management and staff members, instead focusing on protest activities. FDC is actually contesting ADB's presence in the Philippines and more generally in Asia (interview, Tanchuling, 24 November 2011). Similarly, the director of DebtWatch Indonesia argues that she can see no use of ADB (interview, Heroepoetri, 26 October 2011). This outright rejection of ADB is also manifested in radical protests organized by different grassroots movements in connection with ADB annual meetings. Militant Thai grassroots movements, for instance, mobilized large demonstrations at the 2000 annual meeting in Chiang Mai (Tadem 2003).

Hence, the major structural opposition targeting ADB is represented by several national coalitions and grassroots movements against foreign debt in countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, but also by the transnational NGO Focus on the Global South. What they have in common is their radical anti-neoliberal ideological position and their goal to abolish rather than reform ADB.

At the other end of the spectrum, a few prominent CSOs have very formalized cooperation with ADB. The WWF signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with ADB in 2001. The intention was to 'develop a partnership to contribute toward the sustainable management of natural resources' (ADB/WWF 2001). ADB and WWF have been working closely together since then. WWF even has an office at the ADB headquarters in Manila (interview, Shrestha, 14 November 2011). Ten years after the signing of the MoU, ADB's Director General for Regional and Sustainable Development Xianbin Yao praised WWF as a 'faithful friend' (ADB 2011). ADB signed a similar MoU with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 2004 (ADB/IUCN 2004) and has entered a somewhat softer relationship with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) through a 'letter of intent' signed in 2008 (ADB/IFRC 2008). While these INGOs have close cooperation with ADB, they are not completely uncritical of the Bank and can thus be seen as part of the oppositional field, although their criticism is very moderate compared to the more vocal advocacy CSOs related to the NGO Forum. They clearly represent the non-structural opposition to ADB.

To sum up, there are three critical civil society positions towards ADB (in addition to the uncritical partnership position of project-implementing NGOs). First, the non-structural opposition focuses on shortcomings of specific projects which they think should be corrected. Second, the limited structural opposition argues that ADB policies should be reformed. This might refer to both substantive development policies and internal governance policies. Third, the major structural opposition believes that ADB should be abolished. The NGO Forum on ADB, in a sense, bridges all the three critical positions. While excluding CSOs having too close connections to ADB, and in particular those being funded by the Bank, its basic position is reformist in the way activists make use of the formal political opportunity structure for engagement and focus on policy reform within ADB. Nevertheless, the NGO Forum also facilitates and supports a number of protest activities carried out by movements and associations with a more radical, uncompromising agenda. Hence, the oppositional field surrounding ADB is dominated by limited structural opposition as manifested in the radical but reformist stance of the NGO Forum on ADB, but both non-structural and major structural opposition are part of the overall oppositional pattern. Given the prominent position of the NGO Forum it is still a relatively concentrated oppositional field. In terms of distinctiveness, the pattern is mixed. On the one hand, the NGO Forum on ADB and other parts of the limited structural and major structural opposition have goals that are very far removed from the ADB and safeguard their financial independence from the Bank. On the other hand, there are many NGOs which receive funding from the ADB and have very moderate goals in relation to the Bank.

The political opportunity structure

Generally regarded as one of the most closed, non-transparent and unaccountable GGIs well into the 1990s, ADB has more recently introduced a number of policy reforms which have provided a more open political opportunity structure for CSOs to engage with the Bank. The first ADB policy paper to deal specifically with civil society was the 'The Bank's Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations' from 1987. Acknowledging the rather limited experience ADB had in engaging NGOs, the policy paper declared the intention to 'endeavor to cooperate more closely with NGOs than in the past in the identification, preparation, implementation and evaluation of Bank-assisted projects, in selected sectors'. NGO-cooperation should be selective, focusing on 'those NGOs which are well established and have gained extensive expertise and experience in socio-economic activities' (ADB 1987: 5). NGOs were seen as potential sources of information, consultants, executing or cooperating agencies or even co-financers (ADB 1987: 6–7).

At this time, there was no reference to critical advocacy NGOs or the possibility to broaden participation and strengthen ADB accountability through the involvement of CSOs. The limited technical view of NGOs as potentially useful partners in certain projects was reflected in the fact that the Co-financing Unit of the Program Department was given the responsibility to be the focal point for initial contacts with NGOs (ADB 1987: 8).

In the late 1990s, following emerging civil society opposition against ADB and an increased focus on social development within the Bank, the 1987 policy appeared dated, and in March 1998 a new policy on cooperation with NGOs was adopted. This is still the main formal policy document regulating ADBs engagement with CSOs. In 2005 this document was typeset as a booklet and made more available. Here it is stated that ADB is concerned primarily with development NGOs (ADB 2005: 3). It is stressed that, while NGOs are of increasing significance for ADB, governments remain the main focus for the Bank: 'The fundamental relationship between ADB and a government and the sovereignty of governments must be recognized. The ability of ADB to work with governments and execute its development mandate remains a priority' (ADB 2005: 17). Cooperation with NGOs is divided in three broad areas: loan and technical assistance, programming and country-level work and policy development (ADB 2005: 18). The contribution of operational NGOs is emphasized, but unlike in the previous policy paper, there is also a role for advocacy NGOs, particularly through representing marginalized groups and communities (ADB 2005: 19). Concerning policy development, it is stated that NGOs have been and should be consulted. Consultations with NGOs have in most cases resulted in constructive and valuable input, according to ADB. Such consultations are supposed to take place at ADB annual meetings, but also 'throughout the year on an ad hoc basis to address specific policy and project concerns' (ADB 2005: 26). In addition to ad hoc informal consultations with NGOs, the document calls for the establishment of 'an institutionalized mechanism for consultation and dialogue between ADB and NGOs outside the structure of the annual meeting' (ADB 2005: 27). Overall responsibility for ADB's cooperation with NGOs, according to the document, rests with the Office of Environment and Social Development (ADB 2005: 29). This resulted in the establishment of an NGO centre in 2001 (see below). However, the document also gives the mandate to programme and project departments, Resident Missions and a number of specialized offices to interact with NGOs (ADB 2005: 29–31). In sum, this document from 1998, while stressing ADBs remaining focus on governments, indicates a clear will to expand and strengthen the involvement of NGOs in ADB projects, country programmes and policy development. The objective is clearly to draw on NGO expertise in order to increase ADB's efficiency.

In 2006 ADB published a 'Staff Guide on Consultation and Participation' to strengthen the involvement of CSOs in ADB-funded activities. A revised version was published in 2012 as 'Strengthening Participation for development Results: An Asian Development Bank Guide to Participation' (ADB 2012c). Approaches to participation ranges from information generation and sharing through consultation and collaboration to partnership (ADB 2012c: 3). Various consultation methods – including online consultations, public meetings, workshops, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and surveys – are discussed in some detail (ADB 2012c: 29). While the publication deals with participation in general, the significance of CSOs is frequently highlighted. It is recommended that CSOs be involved already in the earliest phase of the project cycle. 'Treating them purely as commercial subcontractors in implementation may lead to tensions,' the document warns. The recommendation is to 'if possible, establish shared decision making in operations to help build mutual understanding and avoid conflicts' (ADB 2012c: 56). In sum, this publication contributes to establishing stakeholder participation in general, and civil society participation in particular, as a norm within ADB. It also outlines specific advice on what forms such participation can take.

Another publication which performs similar functions, focusing solely on civil society, is the 'Civil Society Organization Sourcebook: A Staff Guide to Cooperation with Civil Society Organizations', published in 2009. Prepared by the NGO and Civil Society Center, this booklet is intended to enhance ADB staff members' understanding of civil society and provide guidance on how to cooperate with CSOs. While generally promoting a view of CSOs as potentially useful partners in improving the efficiency of ADB, the publication also warns that CSOs may 'be prone to politicization, and suffer strained relationships with governments' (ADB 2009a: 9). This formulation is indication of a prevailing hesitancy towards critical advocacy CSOs, which ADB views as 'politicized' in a negative sense. The most useful CSOs, according to ADB, are still non-critical operational NGOs accepted by the government in their home country, irrespective of the democratic credentials of this government. Nevertheless, ADB staff members are advised to maintain an open dialogue also with critical 'watchdog' CSOs. 'In only a minority of cases do CSOs totally reject engagement and instead opt for a firmly oppositional stance, typically for ideological or political reasons,' it is argued (ADB 2009a: 68).

Taken together, these policy documents, despite the ambivalence referred to above, clearly state that ADB staff are expected to engage with CSOs. Hence, they provide a general normative political opportunity structure in favour of civil society access.

More general ADB policies on transparency, accountability and safeguards are also part of the political opportunity structure which can be used by oppositional CSOs. ADB's policy on transparency is arguably one of the most important aspects of the political opportunity structure for CSOs. The London-based NGO One World Trust highlighted ADB's Public Communications Policy (PCP) as a model of good practice in an evaluation of a number of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and transnational corporations (Lloyd et al. 2007: 25). However, civil society actors monitoring ADB point out that there are still limits to ADB's transparency. Many Board and private sector documents are not publicly available and the public disclosure system is electronically driven and most documents are available only in English, making them inaccessible to most people affected by ADB projects (NGO Forum on ADB and BIC 2008: 47).

Like the other multilateral development banks, ADB cannot be subject to any judicial proceedings. No legal action can be taken in a court against ADB in any of its member countries. Hence it is very difficult to hold the bank accountable when it violates international declarations or national laws. ADB's own accountability mechanism is therefore the only way people affected by ADB projects can hold the bank accountable. Following the initiative of the World Bank, ADB set up an Inspection Panel in 1996. After a review process with substantial civil society input, a new accountability mechanism was established in 2003 (and later revised in 2012). ADB's accountability mechanism features two institutions: a Special Project Facilitator and a Compliance Review Panel (ADB 2012a). Whereas oppositional CSOs generally consider the accountability mechanism to be too technical and difficult to use for project-affected people, the NGO Forum on ADB has assisted local communities in filing a number of complaints using these formal avenues.

Another major policy document that some CSOs believe create political opportunities for engaging the Bank is ADB's Safeguard Policy Statement, which became effective on 20 January 2010. It replaces three previously separate safeguard policies: on the environment, involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples (ADB 2009b: 15). The aim is to avoid adverse environmental and social impacts that may result from development projects. Referring to this document, critical CSOs can claim that ADB violates its own policies.

In addition to these general policy documents, ADB provides a number of institutional access points for CSOs. Generally, ADB cooperates with civil society on three levels: on the policy level, on the country strategy level and on the level of projects (ADB 2013b). In 2001 ADB established an NGO centre (renamed the NGO and Civil Society Center in 2005) to coordinate its cooperation with civil society actors. The ADB NGO and Civil Society Center, consisting of four to five staff members, has become a major access point for CSOs that want to engage with ADB. The Center denies that it serves as a 'gatekeeper' for CSO contact with ADB (ADB 2009a: 64; interview, Edes, 18 March 2009), but some management and staff members may still perceive it this way (interview, 20 March 2009).

Broadening civil society access beyond the Center itself, the NGO and Civil Society Center coordinates and trains an institution-wide network of some 30 operational key staff, or 'CSO anchors'. The network consists of staff members in each of the operational departments, civil society specialists in the Resident Missions and other ADB departments. An aim is to 'ensure consistency and synergy in NGO cooperation initiatives across ADB' (ADB 2013c). Civil society activists targeting ADB nowadays find most parts of the institution open for direct interaction. According to the leader of the NGO Forum on ADB, the NGO and Civil Society Centre 'is definitely one of the key contact points. But mostly we can communicate directly with country officers, the Board members, and even the Bank President' (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011).

The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making body of ADB, and its annual meeting has since 1992 been an important venue for CSOs to try to influence major Bank policies. More than 150 CSO representatives typically attend the annual meetings when hosted in Asia (ADB 2009a: 54). There is an accreditation procedure, requiring CSOs to be endorsed by the government of the country in which they are based. The NGO and Civil Society Center administers the accreditation process and the Board of Directors decides on accreditation. An accredited CSO will normally not have to go through a new process the following year. More than 400 CSOs have been accredited to attend ADB annual meetings (ADB 2009a: 55). Among accredited CSOs are many critical and radical groups. During annual meetings CSOs can attend certain seminars and workshops and ADB provides a 'civil society room' where NGOs can have their press conferences and meetings. However, the Board of Governors Meeting is closed (interview, Chavez, 31 March 2012). The

NGO Forum is mostly present at General Meetings, often both in the formal ADB programme and in various side events and demonstrations. Many other transnational and national CSOs also attend. For instance, DebtWatch Indonesia considers this the most important venue when targeting ADB (interview, Heroepoetri, 26 October 2011).

Some Resident Missions include CSOs in the process of preparing a Country Strategy and invite CSOs to help identify good projects. The Philippine Resident Mission seems to be particularly active in this respect, having organized a large number of civil society consultation meetings on governance and corruption, climate change, environment, disaster management and infrastructure, as well as education, health and social issues (interview, Buentjen, 17 November 2011). The Indonesian Resident Mission has a civil society contact person since 2002 and has also done some consultations with selected CSOs. Most other Resident Missions are far less proactive and many tend to be very sceptical towards CSO participation (interview, Sundari, 15 December 2010).

Last, but not least, CSOs may approach governments of the ADB member states in order to try to influence the Bank. Making use of this 'state channel' is a common strategy, not only for national civil society actors, but also for a transnational CSO like the Washington-based BIC (interview, Hadad, 16 December 2010) (cf. Pallas and Uhlin 2014).

The depth of access to ADB varies. Generally, the ADB has provided most access for CSOs in the implementation phase, but there has also been significant access in the policy formulation and monitoring and enforcement phases of the policy process, whereas civil society access to decision making has been limited (Tallberg et al. 2013b: 193). Most civil society access is through various forms of consultations. Sometimes certain CSOs have been able to influence ADB policies in a significant way, especially concerning major policies on accountability, transparency and safeguards (Uhlin forthcoming). In many other cases, however, formal and informal consultations seem to be a rather shallow form of access seldom directly linked to decision making within ADB.

The range of access is relatively broad. Despite the bias favouring non-critical, 'useful' CSOs, evident in major policy documents and virtually all interviews with representatives of ADB, advocacy CSOs that are more critical towards the ADB have considerable access too. The head of the NGO Forum cannot recall a single case when the network has been denied access. However, there are CSOs in certain member countries which have been denied access to Resident Missions (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011). Even if the NGO Forum is always accepted when they demand to take part in consultations, ADB's preference for less critical

CSOs can be a problem as this often means that so many non-critical and relatively uninformed CSOs are invited that consultations become less useful and constructive from the perspective of the NGO Forum (interview, Soentoro, 10 December 2010).

Both the depth and range of civil society participation depends to a large extent on the leadership in a specific Resident Mission, as well as the nature of ADB projects and national dynamics (interview, ADB staff, 14 November 2011). The attitudes to civil society in the developing member country's government is a decisive factor in this respect. Many Asian governments are highly sceptical towards civil society, and under the more authoritarian regimes, domestic civil society is severely repressed or even non-existent. Nevertheless, in 2010, for the first time all member countries reported civil society participation in their ADB-funded projects (ADB 2012b: vi).

Despite the political opportunity structure that different ADB policies and arrangements might offer CSOs, many civil society activists look at ADB policies on civil society participation with suspicion. Rather than being perceived as a political opportunity structure by CSOs, many of the policies are seen as a form of containment, instead providing avenues for ADB-controlled civil society engagement (interview, Constantino, 19 March 2009). Furthermore, there is a concern that the political opportunity structure is poorly institutionalized, mainly depending on the staff responsible for a particular project. However, civil society activists see a clear improvement over time concerning civil society access to ADB – improvements that they would like to take credit for themselves, arguing that every new political opportunity for engagement is a result of civil society struggles (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011).

In addition to institutional access, the existence of elite allies is another aspect of the political opportunity structure. Splits within an international institution might create opportunities for CSOs to take advantage of. There might be certain individuals who are supportive of some civil society demands and who can act as elite allies of CSOs. At least two major divisions concerning internal governance policies can be found within ADB. First there is a split between different member governments. When ADB has come under pressure from civil society actors to become more accountable and pay attention to issues related to, among others, gender, indigenous people and the environment, only non-regional donor governments have typically been in favour of change. Most of the Asian governments have viewed the new issues with suspicion (Bøås and McNeill 2003: 76–77). The USA under the Clinton administration, in particular, pressured hard for policy reforms in line with the notion of 'good governance', as testified by several ADB officials (interviews 29 January 2009; 3 March 2009). Second, within ADB, officials responsible for social development have generally been in favour of reform, whereas staff members at project departments working with infrastructure projects have wanted to stick to traditional technical assistance. Both divisions should be seen as general patterns. The actual situation is somewhat more complex and policy positions tend to vary between different issues.

Many activists consider finding elite allies within the Board of Directors essential as it is where decisions are made. A representative of the NGO Forum recalls a recent advocacy campaign on an ADB-funded railway project in Cambodia. Activists had communication with ADB officials, but they did not get any real response. Then they wrote a letter to the directors and within five days the project was changed. The conclusion is that you 'have to push from the top' (interview, Soentoro, 10 December 2010). Western directors are typically considered to be the most likely elite allies, especially concerning human rights and gender issues and so on (interviews, Soentoro, 10 December 2010; Wardarina, 14 December 2010). US directors have arguably been most sensitive to CSO demands, probably mainly because there is significant civil society influence on the US Congress (interview, ADB Executive Director, 15 November 2011).

Few CSOs seem to find elite allies among ADB management, but there are certainly individual officials on a lower level who might support civil society claims (interview, Wardarina, 14 December 2010). Many senior officials are political appointments and tend to be more conservative. More progressive staff members are typically also less influential (interview, Lahiri, 4 November 2010). ADB has actively recruited some people with a civil society background, including the former director of the prominent Indonesian civil society network INFID and a member of Amnesty International (interview, Susilo, 10 April 2012; interview, Wardarina, 14 December 2010). While such people are not necessarily elite allies of CSOs, they are at least very familiar with civil society advocacy.

Sometimes ADB staff members – especially in the Social Development department – actively seek out CSOs to get input. Informal contacts between ADB representatives and CSOs may provide valuable information in the form of leaked documents and so on. The head of the NGO Forum claims to receive an unofficial email from some staff or Board member about new documents and so on at least every second week. He considers such informal relationships with elite allies extremely important for the work of the NGO Forum (interview, Constantino, 19 March 2009). Other activists also argue that they receive important documents from contacts within the Bank (interview, Bello, 16 November 2011).

In sum, the political opportunity structure for civil society engagement with ADB has improved significantly during the last decades and ADB must now be considered a fairly open GGI. There are a number of policy documents establishing civil society participation and public disclosure as a norm. More specific policies on accountability and safeguards can also be seen as part of the political opportunity structure. There are a large number of institutional access points for CSOs, although the highest decision-making bodies are still closed. This means that access often takes a rather shallow form, although there are important examples of substantial civil society influence on some important policy reviews (as will be further discussed in the next section). The range of access is also fairly broad as not only moderate project-implementing NGOs but also critical advocacy CSOs are granted access. Moreover, there are a number of potential elite allies among ADB staff and government officials associated with the Bank. Hence, the political opportunity structure for civil society engagement might not be as open as in the case of the EU, but it is certainly much more open than in the case of GFMD (to be analysed in the next chapter).

Opposition strategies

Inside strategy

As outlined above, since more than a decade, ADB has provided a number of institutionalized mechanisms for formal lobbying and consultations. Informal civil society contacts with individual directors, management and staff are also quite common. Lobbying by the NGO Forum on ADB and other CSOs take many different forms. CSOs have increasingly been invited to take part in deliberations on policy reforms. Such deliberations are always formal and participants are registered (interview, Buentjen, 17 November 2011). CSOs have provided detailed input on policy reviews within ADB, including the ADB PCP, accountability mechanism and safeguard policies. Many civil society activists, however, are suspicious against the formal mechanisms for consultation provided by ADB. A former head of the NGO Forum argues that ADB's establishment of avenues for civil society engagement should be seen as a form of containment in order to avoid more radical protests (interview, Constantino, 19 March 2009). Informal lobbying is often considered more effective than formal lobbying. CSOs frequently approach not only the ADB NGO Centre, but also directors, management and staff on various levels. Email addresses of individual management and staff members are available on the webpage so it is easy to approach any representative of the organization.

CSOs have been lobbying particularly actively on three major governance policies of ADB: the accountability mechanism, the PCP and the safeguard policies. In the review of the ADB accountability mechanism, the NGO Forum on ADB and other CSOs submitted detailed comments on all consultation and working papers (Uhlin 2011). In 2001 ADB set up an internal working group to review the inspection function (as the accountability mechanism was then called), with CSOs, including the NGO Forum on ADB, invited to take part in the review process. Taking advantage of this opportunity, a 40-page document, inclusive of detailed recommendations concerning the ADB Inspection Policy, was submitted in March 2002 by the Washington-based BIC, the NGO Forum on ADB, Oxfam, International Rivers Network and a number of NGOs from Pakistan and Sri Lanka (BIC et al. 2002). Additionally, BIC and the NGO Forum also organized a seminar on the inspection policy at the ADB annual meeting in Shanghai in May 2002. When the new policy was in place in 2003 it provided a more open political opportunity structure, which the NGO Forum has sought to take advantage of. Between 2004 and 2011 members of the NGO Forum filed 4 complaints with the Compliance Review Panel and 17 complaints with the Office of the Special Project Facilitator, the two components of the new accountability mechanism (NGO Forum on ADB 2013a). The NGO Forum, together with other parts of the civil society opposition to ADB, was even more active in the new review process of the accountability mechanism 2010–2012 (Uhlin forthcoming).

The second policy review that has featured significant civil society lobbying concerns ADB's policy on transparency. Under pressure from CSOs and certain governments, ADB began a review of its information disclosure policy in August 2003. While criticizing ADB's consultation process for not being inclusive enough and calling for the inclusion of project-affected people (ADB 2004), CSOs did participate in the review process, submitting reform proposals and taking part in consultations arranged by ADB. Public consultations on a draft policy were conducted in March–July 2004. A transnational civil society network headed by Article 19 (UK), BIC (USA) and the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (India) provided detailed comments on the ADB second draft PCP. The 14-page document dated 24 November 2004 was endorsed by 39 other NGOs and NGO networks, including the NGO Forum on ADB (Article 19 et al. 2004).

The most active civil society coalitions were very proactive in the second review of the PCP too. They organized workshops and consultations with project-affected communities before the formal launch of the review process by ADB. In February 2009 the GTI, the NGO Forum on ADB and the FDC (Philippines) organized a workshop on the PCP in Manila. The NGO Forum also organized workshops on the PCP during the ADB annual meeting in April 2009 in Bali, Indonesia (Malaluan 2009: 1). A series of community level consultations were also held by the NGO Forum and local CSOs (Don 2010). In November 2009, before ADB had launched its PCP review process, the NGO Forum on ADB and GTI wrote a letter to the director of ADB's Office of External Relations demanding that ADB should recognize that affected communities are primary stakeholders in the review, recognize the right to information and expand areas of mandatory disclosure (Constantino and Malaluan 2009). Several CSOs put a lot of effort into the formal PCP review process. In addition to holding consultations with project-affected people, the NGO Forum on ADB submitted several very detailed proposals for revisions, the longest being a 56-page document submitted on 15 April 2010 containing many case studies from across Asia demonstrating the lack of access to information in numerous ADB-funded projects (NGO Forum on ADB 2010). The GTI, by itself as well as together with the NGO Forum, also submitted very detailed recommendations. Several other international and national CSOs commented on the ADB consultation drafts. Civil society activists involved in the process had mixed experiences. An Indian activist affiliated with the NGO Forum argued that meetings with ADB were not very useful. According to him the agenda was driven by ADB and affected people did not get much voice (interview, Lahiri, 4 November 2010). By contrast, the head of the NGO Forum thought that ADB did take the substantial civil society input seriously.

> We have been monitoring 44 projects in 23 countries, with the communities and groups. So for five years, there has been experience in getting information and in communication, whatever the problems. So we put these concerns forward for the discussion. This has been very interesting, [. . .] it has been very open, the internal consultation group. They discussed with us, the members, staff, who have been involved. [. . .] In that way the process is good enough. But as I said, civil society groups are one of the stakeholders, which they may or may not accept. Most of our recommendations were accepted,

> so ADB has accepted that getting access to information is a right to information. So that's our great achievement.
>
> (Interview, Roul, 17 November 2011)

The third ADB policy on which CSO lobbying has been intense concerns safeguards. In order to avoid, minimize or mitigate adverse environmental and social impacts that may result from development projects, ADB developed three safeguard policies: Involuntary Resettlement Policy (1995), Indigenous Peoples Policy (1998) and Environment Policy (2002). In 2005 ADB initiated a safeguard policy update. For this purpose a website was set up as a forum for stakeholder feedback. Two consultation drafts and the draft working policy paper were published here together with comments from various stakeholders and the ADB's response. Between October 2007 and April 2008, 14 multi-stakeholder workshops with significant civil society participation were held in several Asian countries as well as in North America and Europe (ADB 2009c: 82). In May 2009, the ADB Board of Directors approved the Safeguard Policy Statement. Already in 2006, before the formal consultation began, the NGO Forum on ADB published detailed documentation on how ADB's existing safeguard policies had been violated in Bangladesh, India, Laos and Pakistan (NGO Forum on ADB 2006). The NGO Forum on ADB then provided very detailed and technical input in the formal review process. Comments on the second draft of the Safeguard Policy Statement constitute a 263-page document that, in a matrix form, goes through each page of the draft policy document, suggesting changes in virtually every paragraph and also providing reasons for the proposed changes (NGO Forum on ADB 2008). The overall concern of CSOs was to avoid dilution of existing safeguard policies. Reading the first draft policy statements, CSOs suspected that the outcome of the policy review would be weakened safeguards. Many civil society activists were so upset about the content of the first drafts that they boycotted consultations. In February 2008 the major regional and international CSOs withdrew from consultations with ADB in order to demonstrate their disappointment with the draft consultation paper. In March 2008 CSOs from Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma refused to attend the ADB Safeguard Policy Update consultations in Hanoi, referring to severe weaknesses of the draft. The second draft, according to the NGO Forum on ADB, meant 'a significant dilution of the Bank's existing safeguards' and 'a marked decrease in transparency' (NGO Forum on ADB 2008). However, moving from the second draft paper to the Review Paper of Safeguard Policy Statement, ADB made significant revisions in line with civil society demands.

Commenting on the ADB Review Paper of Safeguard Policy Statement, the NGO Forum on ADB welcomed the revisions and stated that 'the ADB is close to achieving President Kuroda's goal of "no dilution" from existing policy' (NGO Forum on ADB 2009b: 1).

While the inside strategy of lobbying, as illustrated above, is generally considered by activists involved in the processes to have been successful in influencing ADB, there is also concern about dangers of participating as 'insiders' in ADB's official consultation and review processes. Many civil society activists frequently involved in lobbying ADB tell about fears of being co-opted. ADB has deliberately recruited people with a civil society background. One example is an official at the ADB Public Communication Department who used to work for Amnesty International. The head of the NGO Forum on ADB claims that he has been asked to join the Bank (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011). As one activist put it: 'Quite frequently, friends who are lobbying suddenly disappear, suddenly become [government or GGI] officials' (interview, Heroepoetri, 26 October 2011).

To sum up, the inside strategy requires a relatively open political opportunity structure. During the last decades the political opportunity structure in ADB has improved significantly and this has led to very substantial inside lobbying from most sections of the civil society opposition. The only part of the oppositional field that does not use the inside strategy is the major structural opposition with a grassroots identity, that is, some radical anti-debt coalitions and grassroots movements in countries like India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Not only non-structural opposition, but also limited structural opposition, the NGO Forum on ADB in particular, very actively apply the inside strategy of lobbying. This can be explained not only by the relatively favourable political opportunity structure, but also by the often radical but basically reformist goals and the professional identity of this major part of the opposition.

Outside strategy

As a lending and development institution, ADB is involved in many projects that severely affect large groups of people. More or less spontaneous local demonstrations against negative impacts of ADB-funded development projects have taken place mainly in countries like India, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, countries with relatively open political systems tolerating such manifestations. More organized demonstrations in connection with ADB annual meetings and at the ADB headquarter in Manila have also been quite common. The NGO Forum on ADB, which as we saw in the previous section is heavily involved in inside advocacy, has frequently organized outside protests too. Since its establishment the NGO Forum has been involved in organizing various campaigns and protest activities in connection with most ADB annual meetings. The 2000 annual meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, and the 2006 annual meeting in Hyderabad, India, were the targets of particularly massive protests.

Outside advocacy has been peaceful. Demonstrators have sometimes practiced different forms of civil disobedience, but there have been no reports of violent uprisings or other forms of disruptive behaviour. To the extent that protest manifestations have turned violent, the violent acts have been committed by police or other security staff – not the protesters. The Secretary General of FDC in the Philippines is representative of most activists organizing protests against ADB when he argues that 'as much as possible, we get the protest action permit and we also inform the local authorities that there will be a protest action' (interview, Tanchuling, 24 November 2011).

Civil society protests against ADB-funded projects have often focused on controversial infrastructure projects. Most media attention has been directed at demonstrations in connection with ADB annual meetings. The situation has often been somewhat tense and ADB representatives have not known how to handle the protests. The biggest demonstrations so far were organized by Thai NGOs and social movements at the ADB annual meeting in Chiang Mai in 2000. The anti-ADB campaign in Chiang Mai combined two strategies: the organization of a parallel conference to the ADB conference and demonstrations during the ADB annual meeting (Tadem 2003). Criticism focused on the ADB-funded Wastewater Treatment Project in the province of Samut Prakarn. Protesters complained about the lack of environmental assessment when the project site was changed and claimed that the project threatened to destroy the livelihood of 14 villages. There were also allegations of corruption as land was bought at an artificially high price. When a network of Thai NGOs and people's organizations staged demonstrations outside the conference venue, the ADB president refused to meet the protesters, instead sending the ADB NGO coordinator (Tadem 2003: 385). The protests provoked splits between hardliners and softliners within ADB. The failure of ADB (and the Thai government) to handle the criticism in a constructive way provided the impetus for it to reconsider and develop its civil society policies. In order to prevent such protests the following year, the meeting was held in Hawaii, which made it more difficult for Asian activists to take part in protest activities at the meeting site.

Nevertheless, activists managed to stage a demonstration in Hawaii too. One activist recalls the demonstrations at the ADB annual meeting in Honolulu in 2001: 'The president came down. [. . .] One of the Thai activists held his hand. When she shook his hand, she would not let go and she started lecturing him for 15 minutes. It was a very dramatic moment, because the guy kept pulling back his hand, but she wouldn't let go' (interview, Bello, 16 November 2011).

ADB has also been targeted by a number of protests in Indonesia. There have been demonstrations in connection with the Safeguard Policy review and the PCP review. Sometimes groups of project-affected people have come to the ADB Resident Mission in Jakarta to demand compensation or to try to stop a project.

Outside protest activities are seen as effective in gaining media attention. 'Even if we do not meet directly [. . .], we do at least voice our opinion through media,' argues an activist representing an Indonesian peasant movement (interview, Kartini, 11 April 2012). Some even see outside protests as necessary in order to make GGIs change decisions and policies. An activist makes a comparison with people power movements against authoritarian regimes: 'Based on our experience in the past, how people's movement changed governments in the Philippines, Indonesia. That is the force to change' (interview, Swee Seng, 7 November 2011). Civil disobedience is seen as an effective way of putting pressure on GGIs. As one prominent activist puts it: 'I would say that peaceful, non-violent tactics have a real role to play in terms of making these institutions sensitive to the demands of civil society' (interview, Bello, 16 November 2011).

As discussed in chapter 3, there are three main reasons for applying outside advocacy strategies. First, this might be the only viable option when there is no favourable political opportunity structure. The lack of an open political opportunity structure makes CSOs *forced outsiders*. If the political opportunity structure improves, these activists may turn to inside advocacy. For a local chapter of FDC in Cebu, Philippines, outside protests against ADB projects used to be the only available form of engagement. However, when ADB opened up for more formal consultations, the organization took advantage of this (interview, Pedrosa, 21 November 2011). Second, there are ideological reasons for choosing the outside strategy. Radical critics of ADB argue that the Bank cannot be reformed. It has to be abolished. If you engage with ADB through the channels it provides, you only contribute to legitimizing a fundamentally unjust institution (interviews, Lahiri, 4 November 2010; Anti-debt activist, 18 April 2012). This is the position of *principled outsiders*, or outsiders by choice, who would not change their advocacy strategy because of variations in the political opportunity structure. Principled outsiders are found among the major structural opposition with a strong grassroots identity consisting mainly of left-leaning global justice activists and certain popular movements targeting ADB. Third, the outside strategy might be a deliberate choice based on the belief that such activities are most effective in a certain situation, often in combination with inside advocacy. This is the position of *pragmatic outsiders*, common in the most active limited structural civil society opposition targeting ADB. Hence, a combination of a changing political opportunity structure and actors' goals and organizational identities explains the use of outside strategies.

Inside and outside strategies combined

As argued in the previous sections, some CSOs only engage GGIs as insiders, making use of formal and informal aspects of the political opportunity structure, whereas others refuse to have any direct interaction with the GGI, concentrating instead on outside protest activities. A large number of CSOs, including the most active networks targeting ADB, have a more pragmatic attitude to the choice of inside and outside strategies, arguing that they have to be combined. Sometimes inside lobbying is deemed more effective. Sometimes activists believe that outside protests are more likely to further their goals. And often inside and outside strategies are believed to complement and strengthen each other.

In all the major policy review processes in which there was substantial inside lobbying from the civil society opposition (as described above), there were also instances of the outside strategy being used. Concerning the accountability mechanism, the NGO Forum and other CSOs participated in ADB's formal review process and submitted detailed recommendations for reform. Activists involved also stress the importance of informal contacts with elite allies in the ADB Board of Directors. However, more radical tactics were also important in putting pressure on ADB hardliners and strengthening pro-reform staff members within the Bank, for example, the demonstrations at the ADB annual meeting in Chiang Mai in May 2000.

A coalition of Indonesian CSOs participating in the review of the ADB PCP was very critical of the way ADB handled the review process. The CSOs pointed out that ADB held separate and secret consultations with the Indonesian government and limited the number of participants from those CSOs which had a record of critically monitoring ADB. Moreover, they claimed that the invitation to a consultation came only three days in advance and did not include a consultation agenda (Solidaritas

Perempuan et al. 2010: 1). This led a group of Indonesian civil society activists to walk out from the PCP consultations at the Indonesian Resident Mission, instead staging a rally outside the building, something that upset ADB staff otherwise believed to be somewhat sympathetic to civil society (interview, Wardarina, 14 December 2010). This is an example of pragmatic civil society opposition applying the combination of inside and outside strategies believed to be most useful in a specific situation. Similarly, while the NGO Forum on ADB and other CSOs had frequent formal and informal discussions with ADB directors and staff concerning the ADB safeguard policies, they also made use of outside tactics like demonstrations and seeking to influence public opinion through media (interview, Soentoro, 10 December 2010).

The pragmatic view on inside versus outside strategies is clearly demonstrated in the actions of the NGO Forum on ADB. One of its key members says: 'I am in Manila so it is most efficient to talk to the Board, but demonstrations by other groups are very useful too' (interview, Soentoro, 10 December 2010). Hence, the difference between insiders and outsiders should not be overstated. In civil society advocacy focusing on GGIs the same people who are part of delegations negotiating with GGI officials often also organize demonstrations. For the NGO Forum on ADB, the distinction between inside negotiations and outside protests is not even relevant. The Board of the NGO Forum decided to abolish the term 'inside-outside strategy', which activists thought was a false dichotomy. 'If you want to stop a project or policy you do whatever you have to do. It does not matter if you are inside or outside,' argues a leader of the NGO Forum on ADB (interview, Constantino, 19 March 2009). Hence, the NGO Forum on ADB is engaged in a lot of formal and informal lobbying, making use of all aspects of the political opportunity structure. But the network is also engaged in outside protests. When member organizations prefer to stage demonstrations without trying to talk directly to ADB, representatives of the NGO Forum facilitate such protests (interview, Roul, 17 November 2011).

Even when insiders and outsiders do not represent the same organization, there is often a deliberate division of labour and coordination between CSOs focusing on inside and outside advocacy, respectively. Activists point out that insiders and outsiders have to be connected. Those invited to do inside lobbying should represent the outsiders. As one activist puts it: 'If I take part in lobbying I do not only represent myself or my organization, but at least the network, so I bring the aspirations of those outside. We have mobilized many people and then only two or three are allowed in' (interview, Heroepoetri, 26 October 2011).

Activists favouring the outside strategy argue that it creates political space and strengthens the position of those doing inside lobbying.

> Whether it's the WTO or the IMF, World Bank, or ADB, you know, there were inside strategies of CSOs, and we respected their work, but we were mainly on the outside because that is where we really excel. I think our work, has made ADB and IMF, and the World Bank much more sensitive to accountability issues, which, then, gave insiders the space to try to create some mechanisms of accountability.
>
> (Interview, Bello, 16 November 2011)

Representatives of ADB typically feel uncomfortable about protests and argue that there are channels for more constructive engagement. As one activist who has taken part in several demonstrations outside the ADB headquarters in Manila put it, 'If you form a picket in front of their office to protest, they want you to go inside. They don't want you to draw public attention so they rather invite you' (interview, Tanchuling, 24 November 2011). GGI representatives frequently make a distinction between 'constructive' NGOs and outside protesters who are not seen as constructive. A staff member at the ADB Resident Mission for the Philippines argues: 'We need those who are going to support us constructively rather than just demonstrations' (interview, Buentjen, 17 November 2011). However, as the previous analysis has demonstrated, it is not easy to make a clear distinction between insiders (constructive according to the GGI) and outsiders (not constructive according to the GGI). Frequently the same CSO participates in both inside and outside activities and, when there is a division of labour between groups, they typically coordinate their advocacy.

In sum, the oppositional field surrounding ADB is dominated by oppositional actors combining inside and outside strategies in a pragmatic way. The relative openness of the political opportunity structure means that the inside strategy is possible for most civil society opposition and these opportunities are taken advantage of by all segments of the oppositional field with the exception of the major structural opposition with a grassroots identity. Rejecting any direct interaction with ADB, these 'principled outsiders' (for example, radical CSO coalitions and grassroots movements in some of the least authoritarian Asian countries) stick to outside protests. However, limited structural opposition (the NGO Forum on ADB and many other transnational civil society networks) also make use of the outside strategy, as do non-structural opposition with a grassroots identity (for example, local community protests against specific development projects). Their use of the outside strategy cannot be explained with reference to a closed political opportunity structure. Instead, actor characteristics such as goals and organizational identity explain why they sometimes use the outside strategy despite having direct access to ADB. Similarly, relatively moderate goals and a deep-rooted professional identity explain why other parts of the non-structural opposition (such as well-established INGOs like the WWF and the IFRC) never use the outside strategy.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have analysed the oppositional field surrounding ADB and the strategies used by various opposition groups targeting this GGI. Despite the large number of diverse CSOs targeting the ADB, the oppositional field can still be described as relatively concentrated because of the central position of the NGO Forum on ADB. While the high degree of autonomy of the NGO Forum (and many other CSOs) in relation to the ADB indicates a high level of distinctiveness, other parts of the oppositional field are much closer to the Bank, not least in terms of being dependent on ADB funding. The radical but reformist position of the NGO Forum testifies to the dominance of limited structural opposition in this oppositional field. The political opportunity structure for civil society engagement with ADB has improved significantly during the last decade and ADB must now be considered a fairly open GGI although still with very limited access to decision making. The relative openness of the political opportunity structure means that the inside strategy is possible for most civil society opposition and such opportunities are taken advantage of by all segments of the oppositional field with the exception of the most radical social movements. Rejecting any direct interaction with ADB, these 'principled outsiders' stick to outside protests. However, most opposition groups (including the NGO Forum on ADB and many other transnational civil society networks) also make use of the outside strategy. Their use of outside protest activities cannot be explained with reference to a closed political opportunity structure. Instead, actor characteristics such as goals and organizational identity explain why they sometimes use the outside strategy despite having direct access to ADB. Hence, this case study fully confirms our assumptions (in chapter 3) about how the political opportunity structure of the GGI and the goals and organizational identities of oppositional CSOs impact the choice of opposition strategy.

6
The Global Forum on Migration and Development

Introduction

In our final case study we turn attention to the oppositional field encircling the Global Forum on Migration and Development and CSO strategies towards it. After a brief introduction to the GFMD below, the next part of the chapter moves on to exploring the oppositional field. The following section details the political opportunity structure; we then proceed to the advocacy strategies chosen by various CSOs. The final part sums up the main findings.

The GFMD differs from our other two case studies in three important respects. First, GFMD is not a formal international organization. It does not have those attributes that make up an IO, such as a constitution, an explicit mission, a formal organizational structure and staffed headquarters. It does not implement policies and does not aim at taking any binding decisions. Instead, it is described on its webpage as 'a voluntary, informal, nonbinding and government-led *process*' (emphasis added) (GFMD 2014b). Its objectives are (1) to offer a venue for policy makers and practitioners to informally discuss the pros and cons related to migration and development and engage with other stakeholders to foster practical policy outcomes; (2) to exchange good practices in order to maximize the developmental benefits of migration; (3) to identify policy, institutional and informational gaps at different policy levels; (4) to enhance cooperation and partnerships between governments, as well as between governmental and non-governmental actors and (5) to structure the international policy agenda on the migration-development nexus (GFMD 2014c). The GFMD takes concrete form in the annually (with few exceptions) recurring meetings and in the various preparatory events that proceed them. Hence, while not a proper IO, GFMD definitely has what it takes to be described by the broader term 'global governance institution'.

Second, in contrast to the others, GFMD is global rather than regional in scope. It is open to all state members and observers to the UN, including both migrant origin and destination states, coming from all world regions and all income levels. However, as GFMD is not a formal IO these participating states are not official members but precisely 'participants' or 'contributors'.

The last way in which GFMD differs from the other two case studies is in its more restricted agenda. While the EU as well as the ADB approaches development in multiple ways, the GFMD is only concerned with the migration and development nexus. This is in itself a very broad topic, as the causal linkages between migration and development are complex, ambiguous, still to a large extent unknown and vary with different levels of analysis (local, regional, national, etc.) (Skeldon 2002). Discussions have successively broadened from a narrow focus on remittances and other economic factors to include questions of, for instance, migrants' human rights. Yet the agenda is narrower compared to the other two GGIs.

Critics have described GFMD as a 'talkshop' for governments, which accomplishes little, lacks in transparency and public control and is normatively dubious as it is formally outside of the UN system. We will return to some of these arguments below as they are relatively frequent among oppositional CSOs. No matter what position one takes on the GFMD in substantive terms, one has to recognize that it is a remarkable institutional development if one takes the history and structure of the governance of migration into account. States were for long extremely reluctant to even discuss migration in multilateral forums, not to mention entering any form of agreement or commitment not strictly bilateral or regional. As a result the level of international cooperation in this area is very low when compared to other transboundary issues such as trade or contagious disease. It differs from the neighbouring issue area refugee protection, where there exists an established international regime centred on the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the work of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This difference can to some extent be explained by the traditional framing of the different forms of mobility: while the forced movement of refugees is understood as a humanitarian concern for the international community, migration is considered an economic, social and political question on which receiving states are justified to decide on their own. But the low level of institutionalization of this field is also to be attributed to the controversial character of migration, which stems from conflicting interests between the North and the South, negative popular attitudes towards migrants in many countries and the more fundamental reluctance to cooperate in an area so closely associated with the core of Westphalian sovereignty (control of territory and population) (Kalm 2010; Newland 2012).

Between the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo 1994 (where migration was discussed as one among many sub-themes) and the High-Level Dialogue (HLD) on Migration and Development in the UN General Assembly 2006, migration was not debated in any UN setting. Against this background, the establishment and survival of the annual GFMD is remarkable, even if weak and non-binding in character. Between the two mentioned events a series of small steps were taken that elevated migration on the international agenda. Among them were the appointment of the UN Special Rapporteur on Migration, the coming-into-force of the 'Migrant Workers Convention' (see below) and the work of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (Newland 2012). A decisive move was probably the character of the issue linkage with development, which appears to have allowed the institutionalization of the GFMD. Migration is consistently framed in positive terms in GFMD, as a potential developmental resource for both South and North. This allows countries from different regions to find areas of common interest and avoid controversial security- and control-related topics.

A main topic in the migration and development debate is the developmental potential of remittances, the money that migrants send home. Remittances have been estimated to two to three times the total development assistance, and the share that went to developing countries in 2013 amounted to 404 billion dollars (World Bank 2014). The 'discovery' of remittances has spurred a great deal of interest from the World Bank, among others. Many low-income countries are dependent on this source of foreign exchange. Other topics in this debate include the pros and cons of circular migration schemes and the developmental potential of collective diaspora investments. Difficulties such as brain drain and the exploitation of migrants are also important subjects (UNDP 2009). The more critical voices emphasize the need to ensure a rights-based approach and fear that the positive tone in the migration-development debate places responsibility for development on the backs of migrants instead of calling for political and redistributive reforms which would make migration a genuine choice rather than a necessity (Raghuram 2009; Basok and Piper 2012; Piper and Rother 2012; cf. Nelson and Dorsey 2008).

States agreed to set up the GFMD at the 2006 HLD, and it was first convened in Brussels (Belgium) in 2007. Subsequently the host cities were as follows: 2008 Manila (Philippines), 2009 Athens (Greece), 2010 Puerto Vallarta (Mexico), 2011 Geneva (Switzerland) and 2012 Port Louis (Mauritius). In 2013 the second HLD on Migration and Development was held in the UN General Assembly to assess the GFMD process so far. States agreed to continue the process and the seventh GFMD has at the time of writing recently been held in Stockholm (Sweden). The texts that are analysed in this chapter are related to all GFMD meetings. The interviews were conducted in 2011 and 2012 at the meetings and counter-events in Geneva and Port Louis. The interview material was broadened to include the 2012 World Social Forum on Migrations (WSFM), an important CSO event held in Manila that to a large extent concerned the GFMD, as well as the counter-forum International Migrants' Tribunal on the GFMD.

The oppositional field

The oppositional field that surrounds GFMD began to take shape in 2006 around the time of the HLD on Migration and Development in the UN General Assembly. Transnational migrant activism had previously revolved largely around the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (often referred to simply as the Migrant Workers Convention [MWC]). This is one of the UN's core human rights instruments, and the one with lowest ratification rate. For a number of reasons, among them the limited protection granted to irregular migrant workers, states have been very suspicious towards it (Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2006). It was adopted by the General Assembly in 1990, but it did not enter into force until 2003 when it had finally reached the required number of ratifications.[1] CSOs were very active in its promotion, and it was during these campaigns in the 1990s and early 2000s that linkages between CSOs in different world regions were formed (Grugel and Piper 2007). In this process, the CSO alliance Migrants Rights International (MRI) was established in 1994 (MRI 2014).

While CSOs were overall positive towards the initiative to arrange an HLD, many of them were disappointed by the ways in which it was taking shape in the period leading up to the actual event. The report of the Secretary-General laying out the groundwork was criticized for paying insufficient attention to migrants' rights, as it barely mentioned the MWC and other human rights mechanisms, not firmly emphasizing that multilateral discussions on migration should take place under the aegis of the UN system, as it opened up for other possibilities, and insufficiently allowing for CSO participation as it merely recommended governments to engage in consultation 'when they deem it desirable and necessary' (Report of the Secretary-General 2006: 11). The same points of critique have been raised many times since then, which is why they merit attention here (MFA 2007: 88–99).

In the actual HLD discussions only 12 non-state participants were admitted, 8 of which were CSOs. Among them were the International Catholic Migration Committee (ICMC), MRI, Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) and the ITUC[2] – all of which were to become important in the GFMD opposition later on. Participants had been chosen at an informal hearing with CSOs and the private sector which the UN organized shortly before (MFA 2007: 76).

Since so few CSO representatives were allowed to participate in the HLD, CSOs organized a parallel event called the 'Global Community Dialogue on Migration, Development and Human Rights', which drew 80 people from 45 organizations from all regions. It was organized by MRI, MFA and the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR) (MFA 2007: 24). Pablo Ciriani and William Gois of the MRI explained that it was part of their organization's 'inside-outside strategy' towards the HLD. The inside strategy alluded to was to work together with other admitted CSOs in HLD roundtable discussions, and the outside strategy was to organize the Community Dialogue as a side event, allowing for consultations with a broader set of CSOs (MFA 2007: 17).

The reason to discuss the activism in relation to the HLD in some detail here is that many of its features are of continuing importance for the oppositional field surrounding the GFMD. Several of the significant CSOs were important then, and the main points of critique of the GFMD have lived on albeit in slightly different phrasings. Moreover, the 'inside-outside' strategy dominates among important CSOs; we will return to this later on in this chapter. The Community Dialogue has since turned into the 'People's Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights' (PGA) and in that form remains one of the main 'outside' forums in relation to the GFMD.

Then, how can the GFMD oppositional field be characterized? We will argue that it is one where concentration is low, distinctiveness is high and there is a relatively marked polarization among CSOs in terms of goals. We will begin to illustrate the oppositional field by presenting the main CSO processes and some of their respective participants.

The GFMD Civil Society Days (CSD) is part of the official GFMD process. It is organized in the days preceding the state-led forum; it takes the form of plenaries and group discussions among a limited number of participants, and it ends in a session where CSOs present recommendations to government and both parts engage in discussions in a 'Common Space' session. As will be detailed in the next section of this chapter, the room for civil society has gradually expanded over the years. Here, we shall limit the scope of discussions to what is relevant for distinctiveness, that is, the institutional and financial autonomy vis-à-vis the GGI. The CSD can be reached from the GFMD webpage and shares the same logotype, which underscores its linkages to the state-led forum. The relationship between the two is presented on the webpage in this way: 'There are two component [sic] in the annual global GFMD meeting: a Government program, and a civil society program, the CSD, that accompanies, complements and feeds into the Government program' (GFMD CSD 2014). The strong linkage seems to cast doubt on its institutional autonomy. In the first years, moreover, the CSD agenda was required to mirror the governments, so that each subject of the governments' debates was taken up under the same heading in civil society debates. But civil society has become increasingly autonomous from its government counterpart and is now allowed to set its agenda independently. CSOs have also taken over responsibility for the arrangement. The first years, CSD were arranged by foundations of the respective host countries, but since 2011 they are arranged by a Coordinating Office, which is hosted by the ICMC and which is advised by an International Steering Committee. This move has benefitted continuity as well as civil society autonomy. But it has also carried with it financial difficulties since civil society has nowhere near the amount of money as the foundations, explains John Bingham who is head of policy at the ICMC as well as coordinator for GFMD civil society activities (interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012). The GFMD itself is not an IO and does not have funds for civil society organizing, so CSOs need to ask for contributions from national governments and foundations.

CSD participants include human rights and development organizations, trade unions, diaspora and other migrant organizations, as well as representatives from academia and the private sector. The emphasis in on organizations with non-structural and limited structural goals. CSOs with major structural goals reject the GFMD altogether and therefore do not usually attend the CSD. As we will see below (in sections 'The Political Opportunity Structure' and 'Opposition Strategies'), this is not clear cut and it occasionally happens that more radical organizations apply to the CSD.

People's Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights (PGA) is an alternative civil society process. Its forerunner was, as we have seen, the 'Global Community Dialogue on Migration, Development and Human Rights', which was the parallel forum to the High Level Dialogue in 2006. In the first GFMD, held in 2007 in Brussels, the alternative forum was called 'The Global Community Forum on Migration, Development and Human Rights'. It was organized by MRI and hosted by the Brussels-based Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM). Around 160 persons from 100 CSOs attended (MFA 2008: 31–32). In 2008, the first PGA was arranged in connection to the GFMD in Manila, and it drew 4,000 participants from across the globe. It has since been convened each year that the GFMD has taken place, with the exception of 2012 when it was replaced by the WSFM and held in Manila instead of Mauritius where the government forum was arranged. The first one was arranged in 2008 by MRI together with Philippine CSOs. A Global Call to Action was circulated ahead of the event and explained the PGA rationale in a manner very critical to the GFMD's agenda:

> We oppose the perspectives being promoted in the GFMD that perpetuate migrants' exploitation, reinforce gender oppression, undermine human rights, and surrender State responsibility for development. We oppose the perspective of making the GFMD an extension of neoliberal globalization, so that it becomes an instrument of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to promote corporate globalization, this time capitalizing on the migrant workers.
>
> (MFA 2009: Annex G)

But although the critical stance of the PGA is sometimes quite radically framed, it does not reject the GFMD altogether. This makes it reformist rather than transformist in character, and we conceive of it as embodying a limited structural rather than major structural goals agenda. 'PGA is not against the GFMD *per se* but it aims to make the GFMD genuinely about migrants – to see the GFMD under a framework of multilateral institution that is binding, adhering to and building upon existing human rights frameworks and obligations' (MFA 2009: 78). One of its main objectives is to promote a rights-based perspective to migration. Participants tend to favour that GFMD be brought under the UN umbrella in order to further its adherence to human rights norms and to ensure a greater role for civil society (MFA 2009: 75).

The closed government discussions of the GFMD and the restricted CSO participation in CSD are important rationales for the PGA. There are no restrictions on participation to the PGA, and it is freestanding from the government forum. One of its main initiators, Colin Rajah of the MRI, explains that this was one of its main rationales: 'to really have a process that's self-organized and autonomous. So this is *our* event that we completely organize it on our own. It won't be the same if the governments are involved in organizing it. At the same time, we hope that this will have some kind of influence to that process as well' (interview, Rajah, 1 December 2011).

The PGA has provided a real impetus for further organization on migrants' rights. Explains Rajah again: 'Over the years it has just grown and grown and grown. In fact, it got to a point where we're bringing the trade unions; we're bringing in human rights organizations, of course migrants associations. Now we have a number of different regional as well as sectoral networks that are involved in this' (interview, Rajah, 1 December 2011). Two of the most tangible organizational outcomes that have emerged from the PGA are the Pan-African Network in Defense of Migrants' Rights (PANiDMR) and the Global Coalition on Migration (GCM), a coalition of worldwide CSO networks.

Many CSOs that attend CSD also attend PGA. In comparison, the PGA tends to draw more local and grassroots organizations, while private sector actors have less presence. Ellene Sana of Center for Migrant Advocacy (CMA) in the Philippines who attends both explains that the atmosphere in PGA is more informal and relaxed. She believes this may have to do with the homogeneity of PGA participants.

> The last two days, I was co-moderating sessions with the employers [at the CSD], and it's very interesting to have that interaction as well with those people, the private sector. Whereas in the PGA, it's more filtered, sort of, like-minded groups, more of a mix of activists and trade unions, civil society. Therefore probably in terms of language, tone of recommendations, it's more . . . is it uniformity? . . . in the sense that you talk rights-based, you know exactly that, you don't have disagreement; you talk about the UN, the ILO standards, etcetera.
>
> (Interview, Sana, 20 November 2012)

A third civil society process is called the International Assembly of Migrants and Refugees (IAMR). It was first arranged in 2008 and has been held in relation to GFMD at several occasions since then. The IAMR convenes CSOs with a strong grassroots orientation that tend to be very sceptical towards GFMD as well as to the possibilities of reforming it. We conceive of it as displaying a major structural goals agenda because of its rejection of GFMD altogether.

It is mainly organized by the International Migrants Alliance (IMA), which was itself founded in 2008 by 130 organizations. It presents itself as the first global alliance of grassroots organizations, and its grassroots identity is demonstrated by its slogan: 'For a long time, others spoke on our behalf. Now we speak for ourselves' (IMA 2014). Its constitution explains that it is a 'broad anti-imperialist alliance that will uphold and promote the rights and welfare of all migrant workers, immigrants and refugees'. Most of its stated intentions are formulated in rights language, similarly to the CSOs that are involved in CSD and PGA, and they commit to the UN and ILO conventions (IMA 2008). Its member organizations include, among others, Migrante International, Tenaganita, Asia-Pacific Mission for Migrants (APMM) and Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility (CARAM-Asia). Its chairperson is Eni Lestari.

The IMA has since the beginning been committed to 'expose the real agenda of the GFMD' (interview, Punongbayan, 1 December 2011). To this end, it arranges IAMR in connection to the government forum, always partnering with local organizations. In the IAMR Declaration, circulated before its first meeting in Manila 2008, it is stated explicitly that 'IAMR is the response of grassroots migrants and refugees to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) process'. The GFMD is charged with embodying a neoliberal vision of development designed by international institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD. GFMD's optimistic approach to migration and especially migrants' remittances as a 'tool for development' is accused of being a neoliberal instrument which preserves the semi-feudal character of many poor countries as it shoves the burden of underdevelopment on to the shoulders of migrant workers who suffer from poverty, exploitation, racism, denial of human rights and so on (IAMR 2008). 'The whole concept of remittances as a tool for development only commodifies the migrant workers, rather than looking at the migrant workers as a human being with rights and dignity' (interview, Fernandez, 4 November 2011). In IAMR's analysis, the causality between migration and development is different from the one promoted by GFMD: 'Migration does not promote development, but it is the underdevelopment of poor countries which causes migration. That's the point that has to be exposed' (interview, Punongbayan, 1 December 2011).

The organizations partaking in IAMR consider the GFMD complicit in neoliberal globalization, ignoring the voices of migrant workers and its leadership dominated by business interests. They therefore reject the GFMD altogether (interviews, Jaramillo; Fernandez; Punongbayan; Lestari; Al Rashid; Martinez; Maza).

As explained in chapter 2, we consider opposition in global governance as a particular kind of SAF (Fligstein and McAdam 2011). Participants in fields interact with each other cooperatively or competitively and share basic understandings about the purposes of the field even though they have differing ambitions and opinions. We consider oppositional fields in global governance as marked by ongoing struggles about who is the legitimate representative of civil society. It is therefore interesting to study how participant CSOs view one another, in particular focusing on their perceptions of the possibilities for cooperation and shared understandings within civil society. This is what we try to capture with the 'goals' dimension: this has to do with the distance between the goals of CSOs and the GGI in question, and also with the distance in terms of goals between CSOs themselves.

The three civil society processes composing the GFMD oppositional field are dominated by different types of goals: the IAMR is dominated by organizations with major structural goals, the PGA/WSFM participants' goals can be characterized as limited structural and the CSD are dominated by CSOs with non-structural and limited structural goals. Then how do they relate to each other?

A first thing to note is that participants in the CSD and PGA/WSFM tend to view each other favourably. This goes in particular for the human rights-oriented organizations and labour unions. (The CSD are attended by private sector interests also, and these are often viewed with suspicion by other CSD as well as PGA/WSFM participants.) Bingham of the ICMC has at an earlier point emphasized the need to build bridges between the two. 'We must be strategic. NGOs and labour have to talk about commonalities and about the importance of joining together, especially when there are others joining us as "civil society". We have more common interests than with business and with the academic community' (MFA 2008: 65). Now the commonalities among CSD and PGA participants have grown: 'My sense is that 70–80% of the participants tend to speak and act in the same way, with the same priorities and voice. And that is the rights agenda, in short' (interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012). Sana emphasizes that the CSD and PGA have grown closer over time: 'We started as very much far apart from each other, and then we got closer, and now it started to be integrated in Mexico . . . if you do check on the people who have been engaging in the GFMD, a lot of them are the same people who have been engaging in the PGA. Not only engaging at the level of participation, but they actually took part and are taking part in key positions of the CSD-GFMD' (interview, Sana, 2 December 2011). Some influential participants think that shared understandings have grown so that we are now possibly approaching a 'global civil society' on migration issues. To one observer, the new global meta-network GCM testifies to the emergence of a more unified civil society: 'Obviously there's a lot of different movements, regionally and internationally, but up to now that hasn't been a unified, broad, global civil society. I think the GCM is making that happen. I hesitate to say that it has already happened, but it is *happening*. We are really building the process . . .' (interview, Rajah, 20 November 2012).

If commonalities between CSD and PGA have increased, relations to the IAMR are strained or non-existent. Several of our interviewed representatives in the CSD and PGA/WSFM were not even aware of the existence of IAMR, which speaks to the distance between the different clusters of actors. Sometimes relations are relatively hostile. This does not have so much to do with differing views of the subject matter, it seems (Rodriguez 2010). Some participants in the CSD/PGA are quite radical in their analysis of the neoliberal and exploitative character of current migration policy. Walden Bello, for instance, talks of migration as exemplifying 'the new slave trade' of cheap labour in the current structure of capitalism, and does not hold much hope for the GFMD: 'I think GFMD is a liberal reform kind of project that does not really confront the roots of the crisis in the dynamics of global capitalist accumulation in the 21st century' (interview, Bello, 6 December 2012). And Bingham claims that a lot of the analyses of the different groups are similar: 'We all share probably almost all of the disappointments with the way the GFMD has been structured and moved forward, including the exclusion of civil society . . . we all share the same advocacy list of rights and conventions and human development, we all absolutely share an emphasis on the need to change the whole paradigm of migration policy . . .' (interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012). The main difference instead seems to concern whether one rejects the GFMD or not. To Bello, although GFMD has its limitations, it is still an 'essential forum' (interview, Bello, 6 December 2012). To Bingham, participants in CSD/PGA:

> [D]on't share the idea that the global forum has no value. Simply said. We don't march under a banner that says 'Down with the GFMD!' or

> 'Abolish the GFMD!' We think it has a value for discussion; it makes possible discussions among governments and makes possible organization among civil society. . . . But you know the GFMD is an easy process to dislike! Very easy.
>
> (Interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012)

For their part, IAMR participants take different stands in relation to other civil society groups. For instance, Liza Maza is quite critical of those that believe in reforming the GFMD: 'That's a tricky position, because how are you going to reform it if its very essence is how you can get more profit from exporting labour? So it's just actually icing on the cake' (interview, Maza, 6 December 2012). But others are quite understanding of the different positions and strategies taken by other CSO actors. A representative of CARAM-Asia, who rejects the GFMD, is still understanding of the CSD/PGA participants' will to cooperate and does not accuse them of co-optation. 'It's not a problem. I'm not blaming civil society for supporting here' (interview, Al Rashid 19 November, 2012). The division between the two groups of migrant CSOs does not only relate to different ideological positions, but also to the rift within the Philippine Left, which has active representatives in both camps (Rother 2009b).

To sum up our findings on the oppositional field, we argue, first, that the oppositional field in GFMD shows a relatively high level of distinctiveness. The GFMD is not an international organization and it does not have any funding for CSOs, which means that financial autonomy is high. Institutional autonomy has been gradually strengthened. At the outset, the CSD were required to model their agenda on that of the government meeting, but that is no longer the case. CSOs have taken over the role of organizing the CSD from the national foundations. While this has caused some financial difficulties, it has increased institutional autonomy. The other two processess (PGA and IAMR) are alternative forums that are freestanding from the government meeting of the GFMD.

Second, we consider the level of concentration in the GFMD oppositional field relatively low. A high concentration results when there is one or a small number of dominating CSOs, and we have not found that to be the case here. The ICMC now has an important position for the CSDs as it hosts the coordinating office. This role has followed on the processes towards increased civil society autonomy. But, explains ICMC's representative, the organization is careful to act as part of a movement rather than on its own, and it has discussed every step of the expansion of its role with other CSOs, gaining their approval before proceeding (interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012). Moreover, the oppositional field is not dominated by the CSD. Instead there are three different and relatively freestanding processes, populated by different CSOs. This too speaks to low concentration.

Finally, we find the goals structure relatively polarized between the different actors that attend the three main processes. The main rift divides the IAMR participants from the others, which is due to their rejection of the GFMD.

The political opportunity structure

The GFMD is a state-led process that aims to foster dialogue among governments and explicitly avoids binding commitments. Forum discussions are held under Chatham House rules, which means that participants cannot reveal who has made what remark (Matsas 2008: 8). Each year a report of the proceedings is published, which summarizes government discussions. The discussions themselves are however strictly limited to state representatives, which means that there is no insight from civil society or the media. The political opportunity structure facing oppositional CSOs is therefore very closed in comparison to our other two cases.

Although access is not deep, it is not non-existent. As we have seen above the CSD is conceived of as one of two components of the GFMD process. On the GFMD webpage it is explained that civil society actors are vital partners for enhancing coherence in policy making and institution building at national, regional and global levels (GFMD 2014a). Since the beginning the pattern has been that CSD are held right before the government discussions, and that representatives of civil society present a report and recommendations at a joint session with government participants. Even this very weak form of engagement seems to have been controversial at first. In the report of the first GFMD it was explained that this pattern came about as a way of striking a 'balance between the views of those who stressed that the Forum should remain a government-led exercise, and those who wanted a wider debate' (GFMD 2008a: 30). The government of Belgium together with the Friends of the Forum (a consultative body open to all UN members) then came up with the formula of consultations ahead of the government meeting (ibid.). In this section we will explore how the GGI–CSO interactions have evolved over time.

Interactions with civil society have successively broadened. At the first GFMD (Brussels, 2007) there was only one civil society day, but from 2008 (Manila) onwards, there have been two. The interactive session between governments and civil society representatives has also been gradually expanded, although CSOs tend to think that it is still very limited. At the first CSD an hour was allotted for consultation, 15 minutes of which was for CSO delegates to present their recommendations and the rest for governments (MFA 2008: 64). In the 2014 CSD in Stockholm, almost a full day was dedicated to CSO–government interactions (Rother 2014).

The range of access in the CSD selection of delegates has always been a matter of debate and controversy. At the first occasion, the organizing foundation (King Baudoin Foundation) convened a steering committee to develop criteria for participation. Besides representation based on region and gender, selection was also made on the basis of a classification of CSOs, which included NGOs, trade unions, diaspora organizations, academia and business organizations. The final selection was made by the 12 people in the steering committee, which also worked within very restricted time frames (MFA 2008: 35, 64). Business representatives were hence understood as part of civil society, and at this occasion included, for instance, the Vodafone Group, the US Chamber of Commerce and the Rockefeller Foundation. It was controversial already at this occasion. Nunu Kidane of the Priority Africa Network in the 2007 Community Forum said rhetorically, alluding to the CSD delegates in Brussels: 'Who is civil society? Does it include the World Bank? Western Union representatives?' She also worried that the CSD lent too much credibility to the GFMD process: 'We need to stay engaged, but how much of this engagement is just legitimizing a process that we are not really a part of?' (MFA 2008: 34).

The restrictive stance towards civil society participation at the first CSD was severely criticized by CSOs. In preparing for the second one, in Manila 2008, MFA along with other organizations arranged a great number of consultations and preparatory events. It was also in this process that the PGA was initiated (MFA 2009: 12). To the second CSD, delegates were selected in two ways. The Ayala Foundation organized two committees. One was in charge of selecting 30 Philippine participants. The other one was the International Advisory Committee (IAC), which was responsible for selecting 200 international delegates. The former was composed of NGOs, faith-based organizations and the business sector. The IAC set its own criteria for selection, and was itself composed of representatives of different sectors such as human rights and development NGOs, diaspora organizations, employers, trade unions, faith-based organizations, academia and microfinance organizations (MFA 2009: 20).

The Philippine meeting was affected by the repressive actions of the host country authorities. The PGA had obtained a permit to host their activities in a park near the government meeting of the GFMD. This permit was withdrawn, and the official reason stated was the potential 'infiltration of the PGA by leftists'. The authorities were also interfering in the GFMD proceedings with the view to prevent dissenting voices. The time frame for CSO representatives to present their report was reduced several times, and this appears to have been motivated by the authorities' will to exclude two Filipino representatives who were also involved as organizers in the PGA (Rother, 2009a: 102). At the Manila meeting the political opportunity structure was broadened somewhat as the session where CSOs present their report was complemented by a new 'interface' session. However,

> the interface between civil society and government turned out to be a major disappointment. Here, Sharan Burrow, president of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and chairperson of the civil society days, who had been a fairly outspoken advocate during the preceding events including the PGA, chose to give a seemingly toned down statement. Also, a significant amount of the two and a half hours set aside for the meeting were taken up by presentations of questionable relevance, leading to some participants characterizing the event as a 'show'.
>
> (Rother 2009a: 103)

The Manila government meeting also reviewed relationships with civil society. The Report of the Proceedings restates that the fundamental purpose of GFMD is to offer a platform for government discussions, but these discussions should be 'informed' by civil society. While the Manila meeting is described as having achieved a good balance, one of the ways in which CSO relations could be improved is by 'an expansion of the range of stakeholders, with special emphasis on private sector, fostering a continual consultation process at the national level and a greater involvement in the preparation of the Civil Society meetings' (GFMD 2008b: 26).

While the calls for affecting the range of access to increased involvement of the private sector was taken up at the Athens meeting in 2009, which was organized by the Onassis Foundation, many CSOs felt this meeting to be dominated by business. There were some modifications of the scheduled events. The interface session was now expanded so that four parallel CSO–government sessions were held, mirroring the themes of the roundtable sessions that were held in both the governments' and CSOs' meetings. Although this appears to have been an improvement, the

Athens meeting seems to have been generally considered a 'setback' (interview, migrant activist a, 1 December 2011), as 'two steps back' in relation to Manila (Rother 2010: 6). Many CSOs were unhappy with the unclear selection process, which they felt favoured business. The IAC selected 200 international delegates (out of 1,000 applications) from the migrant and diaspora organizations, development NGOs, trade unions, academia and the private sector. In addition, a Greek committee selected 30 domestic organizations. There were disappointments with the perceived overall increased business orientation of the CSD. The discovery in the closing ceremony that money transfer company Western Union was sponsoring the event came as a shock to many, as the company is considered by many to exploit migrants by charging excessively for its services. There were also disappointments with the ways in which the more progressive demands of the roundtables were absent from the summaries that were presented (Rother 2010: 6–9). Some CSD delegates suspected that this was because the roundtable chairs did not come from civil society but from the Onassis Foundation itself (interview, migrant activist a, 1 December 2011).

The Mexican GFMD was held in Puerto Vallarta in 2010, and the CSD was organized by the Bancomer Foundation. The Mexican organizers had at an early stage made clear that they wanted to improve civil society participation (GFMD 2009: 43). This was noted in several ways. One was the increased attention to migrants' human rights, the main issue for CSOs. Another was the token of recognition in that the Mexican president as well as the first lady attended parts of the CSD. This was, however, criticized by some CSOs who complained about 'too much harmony' between governments and CSOs (Rother 2011: 183). A third sign of civil society emphasis on the part of the host government was that the PGA was now officially recognized by the GFMD. CSD delegates were invited to attend and PGA representatives were welcomed to present a statement to the CSD. Fourth, the 'interface' sessions were replaced by a more ambitious 'Common Space' which was divided into two sessions, one during the CSD and one during the government meeting. In both sessions, there were several roundtables in which governments as well as CSO representatives participated in front of large audiences. In the GFMD report it is explained that 'the Common Space constituted a further step forward and away from the "interfaces" of the earlier meetings of the Forum, where governments asked for a presentation of the CSD discussions. The objective of the 2010 GFMD was to increase the spaces for substantive discussions in both segments' (GFMD 2010: 9). Stefan Rother argues that one benefit of the Common Space was that it 'demonstrated to government representatives that they can discuss controversial issues with civil society representatives in a suitably civilized manner (keeping in mind that the more radical opponents of the process were prevented from coming even close to the venue)' (Rother 2011: 184). Finally, the emphasis on civil society participation was seen in the enlarged number of participants. The Bancomer Foundation established an IAC to help with the selection procedure, taking into account regional and gender balance as well as different sectors of civil society (including the private sector). The number of delegates selected by this IAC was around 400, compared to the 200 of the previous year (ibid.: 8). In the CSD statement presented to the government participants, the Mexican government and the Bancomer Foundation were acknowledged to have made progress in CSO–government interactions, although even more could be done to integrate civil society (GFMD CSD 2010). Given that the PGA and IAMR events were also vocal and well-attended, the Mexican meeting was one where CSOs almost eclipsed the government meeting (Rother 2011).

The Mexican host also initiated the process towards greater civil society autonomy. It asked ICMC to chair the steering committee for the CSD. ICMC's head of policy explains that the ICMC had been on the IAC for several years, but before Mexico there had never been a steering committee or chair for the CSD; ICMC at first did not know what to believe of this offer. But the Mexicans assured that what they wanted was an element of continuity. Each year, the organization of the CSD had begun anew: new host country, new foundation and so on. ICMC first refused the offer because they wanted to discuss it with the others in IAC; the other CSOs agreed so this was decided. To be chair of the steering committee, Bingham explains, was mainly about managing and organizing the two CSD (interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012).

But for the following year (2011), host Switzerland asked the ICMC to take on the expanded role of overall coordinator. Basically, Switzerland wanted the ICMC to take up the role that the different foundations had played. Switzerland, ICMC and the other civil society partners thought this to be a step towards self-management of civil society since one of their own was to organize the whole year of activities and not merely be advisory. ICMC discussed this offer with other CSOs who approved. ICMC assured them that they would do this not on their own but as part of a movement (interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012). In this role, ICMC took overall responsibility for civil society activities, including the preparatory events and the actual CSDs. It continued to work with the IAC composed of 15 civil society leaders, and also discussed with a 'consultation circle' of almost 100 CSOs (ICMC 2011: 10–11). The ICMC and the IAC also selected the delegates for the CSD, and like prior years followed a model of sectoral representation as well as taking into account gender and geographic balance. They also invited some government representatives as special guests. They very drastically reduced the number of delegates, from around 400 in Mexico to 186 in Geneva (ibid.: 17; interview, Salim, 30 November 2011). The large number of people had affected the quality of discussions negatively, they felt. 'In Mexico there were like 200 in each workshop sessions, they were like plenaries. Interventions limited to 2.5 minutes. It was surface stuff, no discussions' (interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012). But to limit the number of delegates, and generally have a selection process, was not a clear-cut decision. There were discussions in the IAC about whether to have an open-door policy instead. But in the end, they opted for a selection process since they felt it facilitated the process of civil society organizing (ibid.). It was in 2011 when civil society was first allowed to set its own agenda for discussions instead of following the government meeting's. Together, the ICMC and the other IAC participants worked out the themes of discussion for the CSD that were no longer required to follow those of the government meeting. They choose a relatively similar theme to that of the governments. The government meeting's theme was called 'Taking Action on Migration and Development: Coherence, Capacity and Cooperation', and the theme of the CSD was 'Taking Action on Labour Migration, Development and the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families'. Cynthia Salim of the ICMC explained the thematic similarity: '/W/e try not to be completely off. There's an understanding that this is a theme priority, but within that priority there are certain priorities of civil society practitioners who work directly with the vulnerable and the marginalized' (interview, Salim, 30 November 2011).

ICMC has kept its role as coordinating office for GFMD civil society activities in Mauritius 2012 and Stockholm 2014 (GFMD 2014a). In Mauritius there were around 140 CSD delegates, of which 50 per cent were from developing and low-income countries and comparatively large numbers were African. The selection process was made by ICMC and the IAC which was expanded to 28 civil society leaders in 2014. This year, the ambition was to produce very concrete recommendations and benchmarks on the theme 'Operationalizing Protection and Human Development in International Migration' (ICMC 2012a). In connection with the Mauritius meeting, there was an online survey with CSD delegates. Among the results one can note the desire to expand CSO–government interaction to a full day, to increase participation to geographically under-represented areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Latin America, including through targeted invitations, to ensure funding for participants from lower income countries and (a bit surprisingly) to make 'a specific effort to involve more private sector representatives and civil society organizations working with companies, investors, in fair-trade and on corporate social responsibility' (ICMC 2012b: 2). In 2013, there was a second HLD on Migration and Development at the UN General Assembly, and there was therefore no GFMD meeting that year. Civil society activities were focused on developing and launching an eight-point, five-year Action Agenda on key migration issues (HLD Civil Society 2013). The 2014 meeting followed roughly the same structure as previous years, with the exception that the common space was expanded to cover almost a whole day.

From our interviews it is clear that CSOs tend to perceive of the selection process to the CSD as relatively closed. Considering the range of access, grassroots organizations especially often experience that they are excluded at the expense of others. ''The problem with the CSD is that it's very elitist I would call'. If they invite grassroots organizations, they only invite the big ones, the most important ones, and only the directors, only one [. . .] But, people like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, they are definitely invited. And diplomats, for sure. And governments who want to make a presence' (interview, migrant activist b, 1 December 2011). Lestari, of the IMA, retells how several of the organizations with ties to the IMA have been denied participation in the CSD. Migrante International and other organizations that 'advocate for the genuine voices of the migrants' from different world regions were denied, including in Manila and Mexico that they had expected to be the more open meetings. If some associates have managed to gain entrance, it has been for other reasons: '/S/omehow few of our members were able to go inside the civil society consultation, like only like two or three, and they are so selected because they are working in the university or NGO but for the grassroot you know no matter how many times you apply online you will never be admitted' (interview, Lestari, 29 November 2012). Maza of the Gabriela Women's Party and the International Women's Alliance, which also has linkages with the IMA, suspects that CSD participation in any case serves other purposes than genuine consultation. 'I think participation works in order to develop legitimacy. That's what's in vogue in the international forums [. . .]. /P/articipation can also be deceptive. You can have a semblance of participation but at the end of the day who is this really for?' (interview, Maza, 6 December 2012).

In relation to the depth of access, the forms of interaction between governments and CSOs are also the subject of critique. This partly concerns the short time frame for presenting the civil society report, which has been described as 'a 15-minutes of glory that you can present your points with knife hanging on your head'. Therefore, 'It's not a dialogue. It shouldn't be presented as a dialogue – in reality it's not' (interview, Soova, 1 December 2011). One of our interviewees was complaining that only CSOs and sending country governments spoke at the Common Space while no major destination country took the opportunity (interview, Koomson, 2 December 2011). Colin Rajah of the MRI, who has been in this process since the beginning, however, notices some progress. His sense is that governments increasingly have recognized the role of civil society, which is noticeable in the augmented time of interaction. However, time is still very limited which also affects the quality of interaction that so far has not been 'deep enough in terms of substance' (interview, Rajah, 1 December 2011).

We have not been able to find much information concerning elite allies. This may not be very surprising as the GFMD is no proper IO and it does not have its own staff that CSOs could approach. And governments are not members of GFMD but merely participants. But one example is MFA's lobbying activity ahead of the Manila meeting in 2008. They targeted 'sympathetic governments' in order to find out about their positions and enable CSOs to know of their governments' positions. Of the 35 embassies, 17 responded to MFA request for meeting. Among those who were supportive of MFA's activities surrounding GFMD were Sri Lanka, Mexico, Qatar, India, Korea, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland and Germany (MFA 2009: 70–71).

To sum up, the political opportunity structure of the GFMD must be considered relatively closed, although CSO–government interactions as well as CSO autonomy have increased over the years. The range of access is limited because of the restricted number of CSD delegates as well as the denial of access to some more radical and grassroots organizations. The depth of access is also very limited since the forms of participation are restricted to CSD participation and rather shallow forms of dialogue and consultation and falls far short of expectations of real influence.

Opposition strategies

Inside strategy

As access to GFMD is very limited, it is difficult to speak of inside strategy as covering all the different tactics to which it is usually associated. In a way, the closed political opportunity structure makes even the most willing CSO into something of a forced outsider. However, as we have seen, there is still some space for CSO–GGI interaction. To participate in

CSD and to write and orally present civil society recommendations to governments and/or participate in Common Space dialogues are types of inside tactics, although of a weaker kind than those that are possible in the EU and ADB cases.

Participants in the CSD include CSOs from different sectors, employers, trade unions, academics and business. Many of them have non-structural goals. The Catholic organization Caritas is one of them. One representative explains that the reason this organization stays away from formulating very radical critique or participating in outside protest action is that they often work in difficult circumstances where no other organization reaches (like North Korea). In order to continue helping people in such circumstances, they cannot engage in too far-reaching critique. 'It puts us in a very delicate, sensitive situation where we don't have the freedom to go out and say what we would like to say, as that would endanger what we do. For us, the first and foremost [thing] is the access and accommodation of the people; we cannot jeopardize it with public political action' (interview, Joseph, 22 November 2012). This organization also has a rather favourable although not uncritical view of the GFMD as a first step towards building confidence among states and in the longer run creating conditions for strengthening the protection of migrants' rights.

Several of the leading organizations that participate in the CSD could be described as limited structural in terms of their goals. ICMC, MFA, PICUM and MRI are examples of organizations that have a relatively critical analysis of current migration policies as well as of the GFMD but still choose to engage with this GGI. To some of these organizations, this could probably be explained by reference to their professional rather than grassroots identity. PICUM, for instance, does not engage in public campaigning or rallying. One representative says she is not sure but believes that this follows from a lack of resources and the small secretariat. Instead, they engage in lobbying and advocacy at different levels: 'We were co-organizing the CSD in Brussels and in Athens . . . So we do engage at different levels. We engaged at the national level, EU level, mainly we focus on EU level – Council of Europe – but also global level. And our global work is mainly focused on the UN institutions, and then the GFMD' (interview, Soova, 1 December 2011).

The ICMC is an interesting example since it has acquired the confidence of governments as well as other CSOs to assume a leading role. But Bingham underscores that this is not because they are uncritical of the GFMD: 'We also have criticism and disappointments with this global forum process, so we're not the achieved cheerleader, we're not even a full cheerleader, we've got concerns, almost all civil society that's been involved have disappointments.' He also explains that they share a whole lot of critique of the GFMD with other CSOs for unsatisfying institutional structure and for not sufficiently focusing on migrants' human rights. He believes instead that the reason they got this leading role was their preference for partnerships and collaborations in all kinds of policy and operations (interview, Bingham, 7 November 2012). Salim, of the same organization, explains that ICMC does not engage in 'grassroots community action' but instead focuses on advocacy towards governments, the UN and the GFMD among others (interview, Salim, 30 November 2011).

Although the organizations associated with IAMR that do apply for the CSD are seldom accepted, it does happen sometimes. In Mauritius, a representative of CARAM-Asia was admitted. Although his organization does reject the GFMD, which makes this person a 'pragmatic insider', he had an understanding rather than hostile view of the other CSD participants. 'We're on the same issue; maybe we're taking a different strategy. We're on the same board.' Moreover, he sees it as a difference in strategy, but still considers civil society having a relatively coherent vision: 'Yes, civil society has a common vision, but strategy might be different. We have the same thing, same common vision . . . Some are working with the government; some are outside, campaigning. Each of us has complemented each other.' And there is not a conflict between the different processes (CSD, PGA, IAMR): 'No, it's not a conflict. Human rights, political will, transparency . . . The PGA, CSD, IAMR – if you go through all these three [issues] – are all aiming for the same thing on different platforms.' (interview, Al Rashid 19 November, 2012).

Outside strategy

Both alternative forums (PGA and IAMR) exemplify outside strategy, although to different degrees. For instance, they both feature some form of protest event. Here, we address IAMR while we focus on PGA under the next heading since it forms part of the combined strategy that many organizations pursue.

The participant organizations in IAMR tend to have a very strong grassroots identity, and their leaders have themselves experiences of being migrant workers. Gary Martinez, chairperson of Migrante International, retells his personal story:

> I started as a migrant worker in 1991. I was a victim of human trafficking and, like what I stated in my affidavit, working in a sweatshop all those years I was dehumanized. I no longer had strength as a person, I felt like I was treated like a machine. Though, what really

> pushed me to be a migrant activist was when I, myself, approached to the [Philippine] government. I told the embassy that I have not yet received my salary for over 6 months already. I told them what my job was. And all they did was to get my name and scold me saying 'an adult like you shouldn't have been so stupid. People like you are a disgrace to our country. You shouldn't emigrate if you're stupid.' That's what motivated me to swear to myself that when the time comes where people would be needing my help, I am going to help them. And that was it. That was my 180 degree turn. The following day I was already helping people. That was what started it and I eventually decided to put up an organization in Korea.
>
> (Interview, Martinez, 29 November 2012)

Lestari, chairperson of the IMA, was an Indonesian domestic worker in Hong Kong, where she began her migrant activism (see also Hsia 2009).

> OK so I'm Indonesian, then I moved to Hong Kong as a domestic worker in 1999 up to now and then the story in organizing begins when I had my case. Begins when employer underpaid and did not give me my holidays so [. . .] then I file a case in the labor department of Hong Kong there. I stay in the shelter it's called Veteran House Migrants Movers Refuge. This shelter is actually run by a mission for migrant workers. [. . .] I attended several educations on 'know your rights' you know as a domestic worker training [. . .] Domestic worker, when having a case, cannot work formally, you should wait until it is settled and I used that to do a lot of things [. . .] 6 months later finally I formed the Association of Indonesian Migrant Workers. I was one of the founding members. I became chairperson for 10 years. And in between I also engaged in the formation of different nationalities of domestic workers groups under the umbrella of the ASEAN migrants coordinating body or AMCB, we call it in short. [. . .] So I became the spokesperson for that. Yeah, so the IMA chairperson came in 2008 when I was elected as the first chairperson of IMA and then second elected last year, so that's how I started in activism.
>
> (Interview, Lestari, 29 November 2012)

These organizations make 'deep roots' claims to represent grassroots migrant workers. The chairperson of IMA Europe talks about how 'we', meaning the migrants, the refugees, the asylum seekers and undocumented workers, do not feel represented or protected by the GFMD (interview, Jaramillo, 29 November 2012). Lestari explains that in migration governance, academics and NGOs are recognized but grass-root people are usually absent.

> So IMA wants to play that role and the other advocates [. . .] should actually help here because it is not their movement, it is our movement. It is not their problem, it is our problem. They've never been migrant workers, you know, domestic workers nanny like us. [. . .] But we need help on reaching out [. . .] but they cannot replace who we are because they are not us.
>
> (Interview, Lestari, 29 November 2012)

IAMR meetings tend to feature a demonstration and also often some other protest event that is meant to be a bit provocative. As a counter-forum to the Manila WSFM in 2012, they arranged an 'International Migrants' Tribunal on the GFMD'. The Tribunal accused the GFMD for its neoliberal policies that assume that migration leads to development; it featured testimonies from migrant grassroots organizations, and judges found GFMD and its key state governments guilty of all charges (IAMR 2012). According to Martinez, their outside strategy is motivated by the absence of dialogue, their forced outsidership.

> The only time we resort to militant acts such as picketing, demonstrations, [. . .] like what we did last week when we brought them a real coffin, is when all venues for dialogue have been exhausted. When our dialogue partners start to sound like broken records with all their empty promises that's when we become militant. It is they, and not us, who encourage people to become militant, when their excuses are no longer acceptable.
>
> (Interview, Martinez, 29 November 2012)

The IAMR-aligned organizations definitely appear as 'principled outsiders' in relation to the GFMD: 'We do not engage [governments in GFMD] because our position is "No!" In short, we're rejecting, so we cannot have a form of engagement. That is the reason why we are not with the civil society organizations to sit in in dialogue with the GFMD people because we see that there is no point of engaging because these governments promote [. . .] since the Washington Consensus in 1989, they promoted this neo-liberal policies of deregulation, liberalization, privatization' (interview, Punongbayan, 1 December 2011). However, they do not necessarily reject all global governance instruments and institutions. Lestari, for instance, considers the UN as well as the ILO and their respective rights instruments as good international institutions (interview, Lestari, 29 November 2012). Also, as we saw in the previous section on the GFMD political opportunity structure, these organizations have often applied for participation in the CSD. This is especially surprising since their goals, in particular their rejection of the GFMD, are major structural in nature. It is interesting that they wanted to participate in this forum although they often condemn it by principle. While they have often been rejected, this seems to be a sign that they are not only principled but also forced outsiders, and maybe pragmatic outsiders:

> Even if you could go to the civil society consultation doesn't mean they will listen to you [. . .] Now talking outside, it might be harder because you don't really meet them. But you have them listen by putting them in the media, by putting them in the public, and asking for their accountability, right? So that is more effective for us than taking this inside. But I don't say that inside is bad. Someone has to go in and say and you know educate the other NGO who are there.
>
> (Interview, Lestari, 29 November 2012)

Inside and outside strategies combined

An interesting finding is that many of the organizations with limited structural goals engage in combined strategies. Some of them make quite radical assessments of migration policy as well as the GFMD, although they choose the path of cooperation rather than rejection. Many of the leading organizations in the CSD also partake in PGA/WSFM. These CSOs tend to have a relatively strong professional identity. Apart from these large organizations, the alternative forums also allow for participation of smaller, often local and/or grassroots organizations too. The PGA also always features a protest march or other type of public event. As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, the choice of combined strategy appeared already in the 2006 Community Dialogue ahead of the HLD. William Gois and Pablo Cipriani of the MRI, who were two of the very few CSO representatives selected as key speakers at the HLD, as well as actively organizing the Community Dialogue, explicitly defended this strategy. The MFA has explained this strategy in writing:

> Consistent with its multi-level stakeholder approach, MFA adopted an inside-outside strategy, which involved substantive engagement of both governments and the civil society's sectoral groups. In the context of the GFMD; MFA worked along two lines of action – first, with

> direct intervention in the official GFMD process and second, through the creation of a democratic space for an open multi-stakeholder civil society engagement. MFA strongly believes that CSOs must work with governments as partners in the policy-making process.
>
> (MFA 2009: 24)

Why do organizations choose this combination of strategies? An MRI representative underscores that it is 'a tactical approach, obviously [. . .] We really want to see political changes happen. In order for that to happen, we have to be able to negotiate inside as well as take political action outside. We have to take this "dual-strategy"' [. . .] (interview, Rajah, 20 November 2012). Complementarities are a major benefit of combining inside and outside strategy.

> Outside strategies can allow more participants, more voices; inside are always very limited to a selected number. If you have 'inside' and 'outside', in our opinion it can always be productive and complementary. In our experience they are. Maybe there are other situations when that won't be the case, but in the processes that we've been involved, we think it's complementary.
>
> (Interview, Levoy, 21 November 2012)

However, as we discussed in the section on the oppositional field, those CSD delegates who choose to engage in combined strategies attend the PGA event for their outside activity. Since a few years back, the PGA is even officially recognized by the GFMD. The real rift is between IAMR participants and the others. Judging from the interview material the rejection comes at least as much from the CSD/PGA participants as from the other direction.

Conclusion

The oppositional field surrounding the GFMD has been found to be one where concentration is low, as there is a marked division between the different CSO processes to which different actors cluster, and there is no dominating meta-organization comparable to the ADB and EU cases. It is also a field where distinctiveness is high, as the institutional and financial autonomy of civil society is relatively high, and has become even more so over the years. Moreover, this oppositional field is marked by a rather sharp polarization among CSOs in terms of their goals. The political opportunity structure of the GFMD has been found to be relatively closed, although there have been some expansions of CSO–GGI interactions. Because of the relatively closed political opportunity structure, there are quite a high number of forced outsiders. Overall, outside strategies are more prevalent here than in our other two case studies. But *relatively* close is not the same as *completely* closed, and we have observed many examples of inside strategy as well. A finding which we did not expect in elaborating our theoretical model in chapter 3 was the widespread use of combined strategy, which especially the professional organizations with limited-structural goals engaged in. Many of the leading organizations of the GFMD CSDs are also partaking in the outside and more accessible PGA forum. These organizations quite pragmatically find this dual strategy fruitful for achieving their goals. The organizations that participate in IAMR by contrast tend to have a strong grassroots identity. While the former tend to be 'pragmatic' when acting as outsiders, the latter tend towards 'principled' outsidership. The difference is however not clear cut, and there are instances when IAMR organizations have deviated from the principled outside strategy and applied for participation in the CSD. There is still a sharp rift between PGA and IAMR, a rift which does not seem to be motivated foremost by different opinions when it comes to migration policy. The main area of contention is instead whether to cooperate with or reject the GFMD.

In the first chapter of this study, we suggested that GGIs displaying a low level of legalization are less likely to be targeted by CSOs that assumedly will not think it is worthwhile. The GFMD case study disproves the generalizability of this expectation. In contrast to the ADB and the EU, the GFMD is not an IO and it does not take any binding decisions. Yet, it has attracted a lot of attention from CSOs from across the political spectrum and on occasion CSO activity has even seemed to overshadow the government meeting (Rother 2011). One reason seems to be the fact that GFMD is the first attempt at discussing migration at the global level. The global-level government meetings have, consciously or not, provided a platform for civil society networking. This has spurred the creation of new alliances for the movement of migrants' rights, for instance, the Global Coalition on Migrants as well as a counter-movement as seen in the grassroots coalition International Migrants Alliance.

7
Conclusion: Opposing Global Institutions

In this chapter we first summarize our findings from the case studies and make comparisons across cases, answering our second and third research questions on the patterns and strategies of opposition. Second, we discuss the democratic dimensions of opposition in global governance, arguing that this is well captured both through notions of 'counter-democracy' (Rosanvallon 2008) and 'monitory democracy' (Keane 2009) and – especially in the field of development – a focus on global justice as a prerequisite for a more substantial form of global democracy. Finally, we return to our first research question on the re-conceptualization of CSO–GGI relations in terms of 'opposition' and discuss some further implications of this for research on civil society activism in a global governance context. We also suggest directions for future research in this field.

Opposing the global governance of development: the EU, ADB and GFMD compared

In this book we have analysed civil society activism targeting the global governance of development, as played out in relation to three regional and global governance institutions: the EU, ADB and GFMD. Our conceptualization has been that of 'opposition'. Drawing on classical comparative politics literature on opposition politics in Western democracies, as well as the (within this field) more common theories of social movements and transnational activism, we have described the patterns of civil society opposition surrounding the GGIs in terms of 'oppositional fields' and explained the choice of opposition strategies (inside and outside) with reference to the political opportunity structure of the GGI as well as organizational identities and goals of opposition actors. The empirical analysis has been presented in the form of three case studies. Now it is time to make more systematic comparisons across our three cases.

When we selected the cases we had some assumptions about how they would differ based on variation in degree of legalization and access. We expected to find more opposition in general (featuring both inside and outside strategies) towards highly legalized GGIs. To some extent our case studies contradicted this assumption. The GFMD has a very low degree of legalization, but nevertheless attracts a considerable amount of opposition. The EU has a high degree of legalization, but its governance of development cooperation does not provoke much protest (though there is considerable inside opposition in this case). We also assumed that a high level of access will support the inside strategy. This assumption is confirmed by our three case studies as the case with most access (EU) featured mainly inside opposition whereas the case with least access (GFMD) had much more of the outside strategy. The ADB was placed in between both in terms of access and the balance of inside and outside strategies.

We analysed the pattern of civil society opposition targeting the selected GGIs in terms of oppositional fields. The oppositional fields were mapped according to their degree of concentration, their distinctiveness in relation to the GGI and the goals of the actors making up the field. The three cases feature interesting differences in this respect (see Table 7.1).

We consider the oppositional field surrounding both the EU's policies and practices concerning development cooperation and the ADB as having a high degree of concentration. Both fields are characterized by the presence of a large number of CSOs, which would imply a low concentration, but the fact that the activities of most CSOs are coordinated through meta-organizations makes the oppositional fields concentrated. In the case of the EU there are several meta-organizations, but the position of CONCORD as the key organization with privileged access to EU institutions stands out. In the case of the ADB much oppositional activism targeting the Bank is coordinated by the NGO Forum on ADB. The oppositional field surrounding the GFMD differs from the other two cases in this respect as the degree of concentration is low. While there are important networking and coordinating activities going on within the different civil society processes making up the oppositional field surrounding the GFMD, there is no single meta-organization.

Concerning distinctiveness, it is the oppositional field in the EU case that stands out in comparison with the other two cases. Distinctiveness

Table 7.1 Oppositional fields in the EU, ADB and GFMD cases

	EU	**ADB**	**GFMD**
Concentration	High (because of meta-organizations)	High (because of meta-organization)	Low
Distinctiveness	Low	High (concerning most significant actors)	High
Goals	Non-structural and limited structural	Whole spectrum, but mainly limited structural	Whole spectrum, but mainly major structural and limited structural
Type of oppositional field	Unified, non-distinct	Semi-unified, distinct	Polarized, distinct

is low in the oppositional field surrounding the EU's work on development cooperation as the major opposition actors must be considered to be relatively close to the EU institutions. Many CSOs rely on funding from the EU, individuals may easily move from working for an EU institution to working for a CSO and vice versa, and the goals of the opposition are often not that far removed from the goals of the EU (as will be discussed in more detail below). Several meta-organizations, including the central actor CONCORD, were actually created on the initiative of the EU. Similar to the EU case there are many CSOs that rely on funding from the ADB and are very close to the Bank. However, the main opposition actors in this field are much more autonomous from the GGI they target. The NGO Forum on ADB does not accept any CSOs as members if they receive funding from the ADB. Compared to CONCORD, the NGO Forum on ADB appears as much more distinct and autonomous from its GGI. The distinctiveness of the oppositional field surrounding the GFMD is even higher. The GFMD does not offer any funding for CSOs, so this is not an issue in this case. Moreover, the institutional autonomy of the oppositional field has grown successively as CSOs has taken over responsibility for civil society activities.

The goals of individual CSOs within the same oppositional field vary a lot, but when focusing on the dominant goals there is a clear pattern. Most CSOs in the EU case have non-structural and limited structural goals. It is in fact hard to find major structural goals in this oppositional field (although there is certainly major structural opposition against the EU at large). The oppositional field surrounding the ADB is more heterogeneous in this respect, including many CSOs with non-structural, limited structural as well as major structural goals. Although the whole spectrum of goals is well represented, the most common goals can be characterized as limited structural. This is particularly true for the central actor in this field, the NGO Forum on ADB, which has often quite radical but still reformist goals in its engagement with the ADB. In the case of the GFMD there is one part of the oppositional field which is characterized by major structural goals (IAMR) and one which is dominated by limited structural goals (PGA), whereas another important section holds non-structural and limited structural goals (many CSOs participating in the GFMD CSD). Overall, opposition goals in the case of GFMD appear as further removed from the goals of the GGI than in the case of the ADB and especially the EU case.

Based on this comparative analysis we identify three different types of oppositional fields. The EU's policies and practices on development cooperation are surrounded by a *unified, non-distinct* oppositional field. Concentration is high and distinctiveness is low and goals are relatively moderate and not that far removed from the goals of the EU. The oppositional field surrounding the ADB can be described as *semi-unified, distinct*. Concentration is high and distinctiveness high with more radical goals than in the EU case. The GFMD, finally, is surrounded by a *polarized, distinct* oppositional field. Concentration is low and distinctiveness high, including major structural goals challenging the very existence of the GGI. We will return to these different types of oppositional fields below and discuss to what extent they can be related to different opposition strategies, but first we will try to explain the choice of opposition strategy with reference to our theoretical model.

In order to explain CSOs' choice of strategy towards a particular GGI, we developed a theoretical framework highlighting one structural factor (the political opportunity structure) and two actor characteristics (organizational identity and goals). While this framework focuses on the strategic choice of individual CSOs, we will say something about the dominant strategies in the three oppositional fields analysed in this book. The political opportunity structure is clearly different in our three cases. The EU features an open political opportunity structure (at least concerning development cooperation, which is the focus of this study). Access is relatively easy for a broad range of CSOs – even if not all CSOs are offered the same access and very deep forms of access are rare – and there are plenty of potential elite allies. By contrast, the GFMD has a relatively closed political opportunity structure. Access is very limited both in terms of range and depth and there are few if any elite allies.

The political opportunity structure of the ADB can be described as somewhere in between the two other cases, although closer to the EU case. While having a very closed political opportunity structure well into the 1990s, the ADB must now be considered a fairly open GGI. A broad range of CSOs have access to different parts of the institution, although access is often of a rather shallow form. There are also an increasing number of elite allies.

Turning to actor characteristics, the organizational identity of the major CSOs in the three cases also differs. Most CSOs in the EU case have a highly professional identity. The leading actors in the oppositional field surrounding the ADB have a professional identity too, but there are also many CSOs with a clear grassroots identity and the NGO Forum on ADB has both a professional and a grassroots identity. In the case of GFMD you also find both grassroots and professional identities, although mainly in different sections of this oppositional field. As discussed above, most CSOs in the EU case have non-structural and limited structural goals, whereas all types of goals can be found within the oppositional field surrounding the ADB and major structural and limited structural goals dominate the oppositional field surrounding the GFMD.

These differences across cases, we argue, explain the variation in dominant opposition strategies. With an open political opportunity structure, a professional identity of most CSOs and the dominance of non-structural and limited structural goals, it is not surprising that CSOs targeting the EU concerning its policies and practices of development cooperation mainly use the inside strategy. The GFMD has the opposite characteristics of the EU case. A closed political opportunity structure, a significant grassroots identity of oppositional CSOs (although there are also those with a professional identity) and radical major structural as well as limited structural goals all lead to much more focus on the outside strategy. Some actors (those with a professional identity and less radical goals) also make use of the very limited political opportunity structure providing some access for inside advocacy, but most opposition in this case is of the outside character. The ADB falls somewhere in between the two other cases. The political opportunity structure is much more open than in the case of the GFMD, but not really as open as for the EU. As for organizational identity, both professional and grassroots identities are significant, sometimes within the same CSO. The goals cover the whole spectrum, but are mainly of the limited structural character. This particular mix of goals and organizational identities combined with a fairly open political opportunity structure explains the dominance of combined inside and outside strategies (see Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 Factors explaining dominant opposition strategies in the oppositional fields surrounding the EU's development cooperation, the ADB and the GFMD

	EU	**ADB**	**GFMD**
Political opportunity structure	Open	Relatively open	Closed
Organizational identity	Professional	Professional and grassroots	Grassroots and professional
Goals	Non-structural and limited structural	Whole spectrum, mainly limited structural	Whole spectrum, mainly major structural and limited structural
Opposition strategy	Inside	Inside-outside combined	Inside and outside and combined

To sum up, an open political opportunity structure of a GGI will encourage civil society opposition to use the inside strategy. If the political opportunity structure is completely closed, the inside strategy is not possible and the oppositional CSOs have to choose between outside protests and no engagement at all. CSOs with a professional identity have a preference for the inside strategy, whereas CSOs with a grassroots identity prefer the outside strategy. However, organizational identity alone does not explain the choice of opposition strategy. CSO goals also have explanatory power. The more moderate the goals the more likely that the CSO will pursue the inside strategy, and the more radical the goals the more likely that the outside strategy will be chosen. When combining these three explanatory factors we find that the EU case offers a clear-cut example of what we call a *unified, non-distinct oppositional field* in which all factors point in the direction of the inside strategy.

The GFMD case also provides a fairly clear-cut example of an oppositional field, in which all factors, contrary to the EU case, support the outside strategy. We label this a *polarized, distinct oppositional field*. The outside strategy is significant in this case, but there are also instances of inside strategy and the conscious combination of the two. The political opportunity structure must be described as relatively, but not completely, closed. At least, there are the CSD, which offer some limited opportunity for inside advocacy. Whereas a grassroots identity is prominent in this oppositional field, there are also CSOs with more of a professional identity. And while many CSOs have major structural goals, there are also significant actors with limited structural goals. With these nuances in mind it is not surprising that this *polarized, distinct oppositional field* displays the inside strategy in addition to the main outside strategy. What is a bit unexpected, however, is the tendency for many organizations to pragmatically choose a combined inside-outside strategy.

The oppositional field surrounding the ADB is even less clear cut and characterized as *semi-unified, distinct*. The political opportunity structure is relatively open, favouring the inside strategy. The organizational identity of CSOs features both professional and grassroots identities, sometimes within the same CSO. The whole spectrum of goals is present, ranging from moderate non-structural to radical major structural. With this particular mix in the oppositional field at large as well as within its major actor, the NGO Forum on ADB, all explanatory factors point in the directions of both inside and outside strategies. This is also what we find in the case study on civil society opposition targeting the ADB. The combined inside-outside strategy is in fact the most prominent strategy in this case. The three types of oppositional fields and the main opposition strategies found within them are summarized in Table 7.3.

In order to understand the strategic choices of CSOs targeting GGIs it is important to distinguish between different reasons for choosing one or another strategy. In chapter 3 we distinguished between principled and pragmatic insiders and forced, principled and pragmatic outsiders. In the EU and ADB cases we find examples of principled insiders, who, based on their professional identity and non-structural goals, would never turn to outside protests. This is a common position of many European development NGOs and project-implementing NGOs cooperating with the ADB. However, most actors in the three oppositional fields who apply the inside strategy have a more pragmatic view. They choose the inside strategy because they believe that it will be most effective in gaining policy influence in a given situation, but in another situation they might be prepared to use outside advocacy as well. Turning to the outsiders, we also find that most of them in all three cases are of the pragmatic character. They choose the outside strategy because they believe it to be more useful, often in combination with inside lobbying. Such pragmatic outsiders are particularly common in the oppositional

Table 7.3 Types of oppositional fields and main opposition strategies in the EU, ADB and GFMD cases

	Oppositional field	**Main opposition strategies**
EU	Unified, non-distinct	Inside
ADB	Semi-unified, distinct	Inside-outside combined
GFMD	Polarized, distinct	Inside and outside and combined

field surrounding the ADB. The political opportunity structures of the EU and the ADB are so open that it is not appropriate to describe any of the outsiders as forced. In the GFMD case, with its relatively closed political opportunity structure, we find many forced outsiders. But in this oppositional field we also find a large segment of principled outsiders, CSOs with a strong grassroots identity and major structural goals, who would not change their strategy because of an improved political opportunity structure. Such principled outsiders are also found in the oppositional field surrounding the ADB, but not in the EU case.

Opposition in global governance and the question of democracy

In this study, we have used the concept of opposition empirically in order to advance the understanding of civil society interactions and strategies. But the term also has strong democratic connotations, which motivates a slight detour into the normative domain. In this section we will tentatively answer the question of how to conceive of the democratic function of opposition in global governance.

'Democracy is an ideology of opposition as much as it is one of government' (Shapiro 1996: 51). We first need to ask how opposition functions in national democratic contexts.[1] There, it entails but exceeds the right to say no through the vote: it also provides alternative and otherwise unavailable information to governments and publics, it represents minority interests that governments overlook, it scrutinizes leaders and their policies, it engages government in constant justifications and makes alternative policies and choices known to the public. Many authors also expect it to appease the public's sentiments, channelling dissenting voices and giving them space within the existing system and thereby safeguarding public order and protecting it from overthrows (Dahl 1965, 1968b; Sartori 1966; Ionescu and de Madariaga 1972; see also overview in Kubát 2010: 54–56). To Dahl, the institutionalization of conflict makes opposition one of the three great milestones in modern democracy, besides the right to vote and the right to be represented (Dahl 1968a: xiii).

It is very difficult to find anything reminiscent of institutionalized opposition in global governance. Opposition is also an aspect of democracy that scholars rarely request in the global governance context. However, there is indeed a vivid academic debate on the potentials of CSOs to democratize global governance. Democratization is then not understood as an overthrow of the current international system and its replacement by a worldwide democratic polity. Instead, it is typically discussed in piecemeal terms, as the debate revolves around the potentials of civil society to strengthen separate democratic values in global governance. Examples of such values are accountability, transparency and participation.[2] The participation of civil society actors is typically understood as conducive to democracy insofar as it may bring new questions onto the political agenda, increase the quality of deliberations, expand the voices heard in international affairs and effectively represent the needs and interests of marginalized groups. Discussions then run high on how to best arrange the participation of these actors, whether conceived of as CSOs, stakeholders or bearers of discourses (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008; Macdonald 2008; Steffek and Nanz 2008; Bexell et al. 2010; Tallberg and Uhlin 2011).

In practice, CSOs have often been granted access to GGIs on terms that effectively prevent these benefits from materializing. They have often been contracted to provide technical expertise or to implement policies on the ground, rather than participate in policy making and voicing challenging views. This has especially been the case for the governance institutions in the area of development (Kamat 2004). Therefore, the conscribed participation of CSOs there has been accused for contributing to the 'rendering technical' of development (Murray Li 2007: 7) and for being part of the 'anti-politics machine' of development governance (Ferguson 1994).

Participation in itself does not necessarily contribute to democratization. As Robert Dahl once argued, 'in the absence of the right to oppose, participation is stripped of a very large part of [its] significance' (Dahl 1971: 5). Such participation instead may have depoliticizing effects. It is therefore surprising that calls for institutionalizing the right to oppose do not resound more often in the normative debate on democracy and global governance (but see Mair 2007). Although we would be sympathetic to such arguments, elaborating them is not strictly the objective here, either. That would require, among other things, careful considerations of the pros and cons of alternative forms for institutional design. And in this book we have focused not so much on potential institutional design but more on actually existing civil society activities.

What we need to ask at this point is therefore: do advocacy CSOs in global governance fulfil any of the democratic functions that oppositions do at the national level? If so, how can this be conceptualized? We have already concluded that CSOs in global governance cannot challenge and replace the ruling power, which is a key function of opposition in national-level democracies. It therefore cannot fulfil the associated functions of institutionalizing conflict or providing a governing alternative, at least not in a strong sense. But CSOs targeting GGIs *can* fulfil some of the other democratic functions of oppositions: they may provide the GGI with new information and with knowledge on minorities' situation that would otherwise have remained outside the radar, and they may communicate information on GGI policies and activities to the general public – thereby acting as a 'transmission belt' between the GGI and the public (Steffek and Nanz 2008). And, as is less noticed in the scholarly debate, they may fulfil the function of scrutinizing, monitoring and exposing the GGI, forcing its staff and member states to engage in constant justification of its actions.

We argue that these democratic functions that CSOs can fulfil (and many already do fulfil) can be captured by Pierre Rosanvallon's notion of 'counter-democracy' (2008) and John Keane's notion of 'monitory democracy' (2009). Rosanvallon, a political historian, argues that there are two dimensions to democracy. The first has to do with the functions and problems of electoral-representative institutions, where dissatisfaction has led to a range of proposals for improvement: for instance, increasing the frequency of elections and developing mechanisms for direct democracy. The various proposals of strengthening global democracy through creating stakeholder forums or chambers of discourses belong here too (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008; Macdonald 2008). The second and much less studied dimension instead has to do with the organization of distrust, and it concerns the emergence of practices, attitudes and institutions that arise because of a lack of confidence in democratic institutions. Another distinction runs through the organization of distrust and divides it into one liberal form – concerned with the division of powers, the felt need to delimit state power to prevent misuse and so on – and one democratic form, aiming at making sure that democratic institutions stay faithful to their tasks and serve the common good. It is this democratic form of distrust that Rosanvallon refers to as counter-democracy. It does not work against electoral democracy but strengthens it: 'counter-democracy is part of a larger system that also includes legal democratic institutions. It seeks to complement those institutions and extend their influence, to shore them up' (2008: 8).

Counter-democracy has long historical roots (in part preceding modern democracy) and includes all functions, institutions and practices that involve overseeing, refusing and scrutinizing power holders. A few examples are the evaluations of rulers in forms of opinion polls and ratings of the quality of government, internal audits, claims for transparency and accountability, the scrutiny of the reputations of those in government, the right to resist and raise vetoes against power and, of particular interest here, institutionalized national opposition. Opposition in global governance, in the sense that we use it in this book, seems to belong to the subgroup of surveillance mechanisms. When Rosanvallon summarizes the characteristics of such actors, the description fits well with CSOs targeting GGIs.

> Counter-democratic movements have sympathizers and donors but do not necessarily seek members as such. [. . .] Their goal is to identify issues and exert pressure on governments, not to represent groups of people. [. . .] Finally, they seek influence rather than power. They see democracy not as a competition for government power but as a composite of two realms – a sphere of electoral representation and a constellation of counter-democratic organizations – in constant tension with each other.
>
> (Rosanvallon 2008: 65)

Surveillance can in turn be divided into three, vigilance, evaluation and denunciation, and CSO opposition in global governance fulfils all these three roles (Rosanvallon 2008: 33–56). Some opposition groups function as watchdogs (vigilance) in their respective fields and often rely on counter-expertise that challenges the knowledge of the institution it watches. An example is the Corporate Europe Observatory. The evaluation function is taken on by the oppositional CSOs that are dedicated to rating. Examples include Transparency International, which rates the level of corruption in national governments, and One World Trust, which rates GGIs (and CSOs and companies) according to their level of accountability. The function of denunciation is actualized when a government or IO is found guilty of mismanagement of some kind. In such cases, some groups engage in naming and shaming campaigns (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1998: 23).

Similar to Rosanvallon's notion of surveillance, Keane has elaborated on the term 'monitory democracy'. In a seminal work on the history and future of democracy, Keane argues that we have had three major forms of democracy: first, the ancient assembly-based democracy; second, the representative democracy of modern nation states and third, monitory democracy, which has emerged since 1945. According to Keane (2009: xxix), monitory democracy is a 'brand-new historical form of democracy'. It is characterized by the 'rapid growth of many different kinds of extra-parliamentary, power-scrutinizing mechanisms', in domestic as well as transnational fields (Keane 2013: 23). Territorially bounded representative institutions are still important, but they are no longer the main features of democracy. In monitory democracy power-scrutinizing institutions are not limited to the standard institutions of representative democracy, but include 'a whole host of *non-party, extra-parliamentary, and often unelected bodies* operating within, underneath, and beyond the boundaries of territorial states' (Keane 2013: 27). Born out of the experiences of the devastating Second World War, monitory democracy is to a large extent driven by the development of new communication media (Keane 2009: 737). 'Communicative abundance' (Keane 2013: 41) provides the necessary context for most of the new monitoring mechanisms.

Keane (2009: 692-–693) identifies nearly 100 new types of power-scrutinizing institutions which have developed since 1945, including, for instance, citizen juries, surveys, focus groups, deliberative polling, participatory budgeting, online petitions, human rights organizations and other kinds of watchdog groups. An essential feature of these monitoring mechanisms is that the less powerful monitor the more powerful. Furthermore, according to Keane (2013: 26), 'monitors give a voice to the losers and provide independent representation for minorities, especially to indigenous, the disabled, and other peoples who can never expect to lay claim to being a majority.'

Beyond this, however, Keane does not present any specified criteria for what constitutes a power-scrutinizing institution of monitory democracy and how we can distinguish between different types of monitoring mechanisms. Based on the examples he provides, two democratic functions appear to be particularly important. The monitoring innovations seem to either increase the transparency of power-wielding institutions through the provision of information about policy-making or broaden political participation by giving voice to previously marginalized affected people. Many monitoring actors and mechanisms may do both. The essence of monitory democracy seems to be to strengthen the accountability of power-wielding institutions through more transparency and broader participation. These are core democratic values associated with representative (and in some respects assembly-based) democracy, suggesting more of continuity than in Keane's account. To us, the innovativeness of monitory democracy is more related to the emergence of new techniques (mainly associated with developments of new communication technology) for realizing old democratic values like representation, transparency, accountability and participation in new settings. We believe that monitory democracy implies an extension of democratic values central to representative and assembly-based democracy to new spheres of life rather than to the emergence of new democratic values. This broadening of the scope of democracy is also something that is stressed by Keane who states that: 'in the age of monitory democracy, the rules of representation, democratic accountability and public participation are applied to a much wider range of settings than ever before' (Keane 2009: 690).

We find the notion of monitory democracy attractive because it takes into account the blurring of borders among local, national and global levels and highlights the potential democratic role of advocacy-oriented civil society groups. We maintain that the civil society opposition against GGIs which we analyse in this book is a core aspect of monitory democracy.

We have argued that the existence of a strong opposition is generally believed to be a key aspect of a democratic system, and the relative lack of formal avenues for opposition beyond the nation state might be seen as an aspect of the democratic deficit in global governance. Here we suggest that Pierre Rosanvallon's term 'counter-democracy' and Keane's term 'monitory democracy' help us specify the democratic qualities of the oppositional activities of CSOs that are not striving to replace power in global governance, but to oversee it. Counter-democracy and monitory democracy are broader and less institutionally dependent than the notion of opposition in comparative politics research, and they still allow us to place CSOs' activities towards GGIs in the same 'family' of political mechanisms as national opposition. And in relation to the IR literature on CSOs' democratic function in global governance, these concepts allow us to adjust the conceptualization from one concerned overwhelmingly with voice and participation. Counter-democracy supports rather than challenges democracy, which means that activities that oppositional CSOs often engage in, such as monitoring and scrutinizing the GGI, are ascribed a democratic meaning.

Moving beyond the debate on democratic procedures, much civil society opposition in global governance, and especially so within the field of development, may be seen as taking part in a struggle for global democracy in a more substantial sense through the promotion of global justice. In a recent contribution Klaus Dingwerth (2014) challenges the preoccupation in academic debates on global democracy with formalistic institutional aspects promoting civil society access, transparency and accountability to stakeholders. This, he argues, draws on a narrow view of democracy. A more normatively persuasive conception of global democracy has to include areas such as health, education and subsistence. What is most needed is not more democratic procedures in global governance, but investments to fight poverty. That would help poor and marginalized people to make use of the democracy-relevant institutions that exist in global governance. Fighting poverty and promoting health and education and other aspects of global justice are among the overarching goals of the majority of CSOs in the oppositional fields surrounding institutions for the global governance of development. Hence, they can be ascribed a democracy-strengthening role in the broader sense of promoting global socio-economic justice – not only through their attempts to scrutinize powerful GGIs.

Concluding remarks

We have defined opposition in the context of global governance as the sum total of CSOs that target a particular GGI with some level of disagreement. We argue that our conceptualization of CSO–GGI relations in terms of opposition has been useful in providing new perspectives, enabling us to gain new insights concerning the patterns of CSOs targeting a particular GGI and the strategic choices of individual CSOs. We have demonstrated that the relationship between CSOs and GGIs can be thought of analogously to that between oppositional parties and a government in power. For this purpose, part of the comparative politics literature on opposition can fruitfully complement existing global governance scholarship. In short, the opposition perspective allows us to account for the full spectrum of more or less dissenting civil society engagement with GGIs, capturing both inside lobbying and outside protests which have mainly been treated separately in previous research. This framework highlights that many civil society actors that seek to influence a particular GGI do not share the same goals or collective identity. Far from being a collective agent they are better understood as inhabiting the same oppositional field although with very different goals and identities. Actors in an oppositional field are united in their resistance to the government in power/GGI, but have different and often conflicting goals, interests and ideologies. This, we maintain, better reflects the observed patterns of civil society interaction with the analysed GGIs in the field of development.

Development has been a valuable focus for our research purpose because it is a major area of global governance featuring both significant outside civil society advocacy due to the controversial and contested character of mainstream development policies and considerable inside civil society advocacy because of the relative openness of many GGIs. However, the usefulness of the opposition framework is hardly limited to the field of development. Extant research has demonstrated increasing civil society engagement in most forms of global governance (for example, Scholte 2011a; Tallberg et al. 2013b), and analysing this in terms of oppositional fields and opposition strategies can give us a more comprehensive understanding of how CSOs lacking a collective identity and common goals still interact and why they choose inside, outside or combined strategies. Hence, we argue that our framework should be applicable to all sections of global governance where we find some form of civil society disagreement.

With this new perspective we contribute to a 'bottom-up' approach to global governance studies (cf. Grugel and Uhlin 2012) by finding a way of capturing the interactions and strategies of civil society insiders as well as outsiders targeting a GGI. At the same time we take the institutional design of GGIs emphasized in more 'top-down' approaches seriously when we consider the political opportunity structure of a GGI to be an important factor shaping civil society strategies. In this way we contribute to bridging 'top-down' IR theory and 'bottom-up' social movement perspectives.

More specifically, we add to research on politicization in global governance. Our findings indicate that politicization does not necessarily require broad public awareness as claimed by Zürn et al. (2012). As demonstrated by our case studies, a relatively small group of oppositional CSOs can politicize a GGI and its activities without any indications of broad public awareness of the institution. There is broad public awareness of the EU in general, but hardly concerning its policies for global development and aid. In the case of the ADB there is some public awareness, but only in certain countries with highly controversial ADB-funded projects. There is no broad public awareness of GFMD. Still, all our cases demonstrated significant opposition and, thus, a high degree of politicization despite a lack of broader public awareness of the activities of these GGIs. Future research should pay more attention to the mechanisms behind processes of politicization in global governance. Our case studies indicate that broad public awareness of a GGI might not be as important for its politicization as generally believed. Well-organized oppositional CSOs pursuing both inside and outside strategies may contribute to the politicization of the institutions even when there is a relative lack of broader public contestation of their activities.

Our opposition framework, drawing on comparative politics literature on national party opposition as well as IR and social movement theorizing on civil society actors in global governance, offers a somewhat different and innovative take on a significant recent development: the increasingly common more or less contentious civil society engagement with GGIs. Our case studies of civil society engagement with the EU's policies for global development as well as the ADB and the GFMD indicate that the concept of 'oppositional field' usefully captures the whole spectrum of more or less dissenting civil society interaction with a particular GGI without assuming that all CSOs are united as a collective agent. Furthermore, the case studies suggest that our tentative theoretical model for explaining the strategic choices of CSOs as resulting from the combined effects of CSOs' goals and organizational identities and the political opportunity structure of the GGI has explanatory power. While our studies are limited to the field of development, there is reason to believe that the framework can be fruitfully applied to other issue areas too. Future research could fruitfully examine oppositional fields and civil society strategies related to a broader set of GGIs. Large N-studies would be particularly useful in order to provide a more robust test of the theory explaining civil society strategies. The democratic implications of civil society opposition in global governance need more research. There is still a lack of empirical studies of the 'monitoring' and 'counter-democratic' activities of oppositional CSOs in global governance. New studies in this field would usefully complement the normative theoretical literature on global civil society and global democracy.

Notes

1 Opposition in Global Governance: An Introduction

1 The two dimensions roughly correspond to those identified in Tilly and Tarrow's typology of national regimes that are thought important for the formation of social movements. These dimensions are *capacity* – a government's ability to intervene in a way that has real consequences for the distribution of resources and character of the population – and *democracy* – the extent to which people that are subject to a government's activities has influence over it and enjoy protection from it (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 55). 'Capacity' is mirrored in 'legalization', we argue, and 'democracy' to some degree corresponds to 'access'. Since there are no elections to GGIs (apart from the European Parliament), we cannot talk of democracy in a way comparable to the national level. But the level of access offered to civil society is often taken as a proxy, as it allows for more voices to be heard and more groups represented and therefore increases the democratic quality of participation (cf. Steffek et al. 2008).

2 We are extremely grateful for the excellent interview research carried out by Yocie Hierofani (ADB and GFMD), Jewellord Nem Singh (ADB and GFMD) and Pelle Åberg (EU).

3 Some scholars use 'NGO' in this inclusive sense (for example, Willets 2011). But we use CSO as the all-embracing term and consider NGO a particular type of organization. See chapter 3 for more elaborate definitions.

2 Global Governance, Civil Society and Opposition: Empirical and Theoretical Context

1 The fourth position is unintended change emerging from below. This denotes macro-level demographic, social, or economic developments that result from the myriad actions that masses of people take in their ordinary lives. As it is very difficult to locate an agent here, Sztompka prefers to talk of this as 'tendencies' or 'shifts' instead, and for the same reason we do not find it relevant in our context. One could object that the dispersed effects and experiences of macro-level power structures (such as global capitalism, patriarchy, colonial patterns of rule, etc.) have produced the grievances that are at the bottom of popular mobilization that in some cases is directed at GGIs. One could also point at the macro-level factors that facilitate mobilization to GGIs but that are difficult to link to particular actors, such as the cognitive, educational and technological factors related to the social awareness of GGIs (Zürn et al. 2012). But grievances and structural conflicts do not automatically lead to mobilization – historical record shows that people often endure, and that discontent is only transformed into mobilization under certain circumstances, which invariably involve some form of intentional agency (della Porta and Diani 2006: 15).

2 Ionescu and de Madariaga use the terms opposition as instinct and opposition as institution (1972: 14–19). Michel Kubát talks of opposition sensu largo and sensu stricto (2010: 17).

3 Opposition in Global Governance: An Analytical Framework

1 One should, however, not translate the distinction between advocacy and service-delivery organizations as one between political and non-political organizations. Service-delivery organizations often have important roles in social movements – one example is the role of women's shelters in the women's rights movement (Dijkzeul and DeMars 2011: 215).
2 And like Jean Blondel, we will subsume Dahl's dimension site under goals, assuming that the choice of site (the GGI in our context) is related to the goals the CSOs pursue at the moment (Blondel 1997).
3 In practice, it may not always be that easy to tell them apart. Moreover, short-term goals may differ from long-term ones, and on top of this the real objectives of an actor may be different from the stated ones. Dahl's solution to these problems, which we will follow as mentioned earlier in this chapter, is to assume the existence of dominant goals that are moreover analytically separate from the strategies used to arrive at them.
4 Here we refer to Scholte's (2005: 42–46) distinction between transformists and reformists. While reformists aim at making the existing social order work better through institutional reform, transformists advocate more fundamental social change transcending prevailing social structures.
5 This view on organizational identity resonates with two underlying logics of transnational activism identified by Pleyers (2010: 12). He distinguishes between, on the one hand, subjectivity and creativity and, on the other hand, reason and rationality. The first implies a bottom-up struggle to create autonomous spaces, what we would call a typical grassroots ethos. The second results in attempts to offer alternatives based on knowledge and expertise in a more top-down fashion, which we associate with a professional identity.
6 Adding to the conceptual confusion, some scholars refer to political opportunities instead of political opportunity structure and some even talk about opportunities more generally. These concepts are not synonymous. As Koopmans (2004: 68) aptly puts it, 'Opportunity is not always political opportunity, and political opportunity is not always structural.' As Tarrow (1998: 77) points out, most opportunities and constraints are situational rather than structural and it might therefore be more accurate to use the concept of political opportunities. In order not to contribute to the conceptual stretching evident in this field of research, however, we will stick to the concept of political opportunity structure and define it in a more narrow, structural way as we believe that structural factors have explanatory power when analysing actors' strategic choices.

4 European Union Aid and Development Cooperation

1 A more recently established institution that may provide access for CSOs is the European External Action Service (EEAS) set up in 2010. However, development has been absent from the agenda, which is dominated by more traditional foreign policy issues, hence limiting the influence of development CSOs through this channel (CONCORD 2011: 3). Among development CSOs there is an expectation that the EEAS will play a more important role in the field of development in the future. 'I think they [EEAS] are likely to be the ones setting the political development for the external relations, including development policy, and maybe DG Development Cooperation – EuropeAid will remain a more implementing agency,' argues one CSO activist (interview, Asin, 25 May 2013).

5 The Asian Development Bank

1 On the history of ADB see Kappagoda (1995) and Dent (2008).
2 Unless otherwise stated, all information on the NGO Forum on ADB in this section is found at the organization's webpage (NGO Forum on ADB 2013d).

6 The Global Forum on Migration and Development

1 At the time of writing, 47 countries have ratified it, not including any of the major destination countries.
2 At the time, it was known as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Later in 2006 it merged with the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) to form ITUC.

7 Conclusion: Opposing Global Institutions

1 The roles of oppositions in authoritarian regimes are arguably different. Alfred Stepan lists five different functions: (1) resisting integration into the regime; (2) guarding zones of autonomy against it; (3) disputing its legitimacy; (4) raising the costs of authoritarian rule; and (5) creating a credible democratic alternative (Stepan 1990: 44).
2 For a critique of this approach to democracy, see Erman (2010).

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