Dirk Berg-Schlosser (ed.)

Democratization
The state of the art

2nd revised and updated edition

The World of Political Science:
The Development of the Discipline Book Series

Edited by Michael Stein and John Trent

Barbara Budrich Publishers

Democratization

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The development of the discipline

Book series edited by
Michael Stein and John Trent

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Second revised edition

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For Tatu Vanhanen,
a steadfast pioneer of democratization research.

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Foreword

This is the first volume in our new book series entitled "The World of Political Science" sponsored by the Research Committee on the Study of Political Science as a Discipline (RC 33), one of about 50 Research Committees of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). Each volume of the series is being prepared by leading international scholars representing one of the research committees of IPSA. We expect to publish up to 20 volumes in the series over the next three years.

"The World of Political Science" series is intended to fulfil several objectives. First, it is international in scope, and includes contributors from all corners of the globe. Second, it aims to provide an up-to-date overview of a specific subfield of political science. Third, although prepared by leading academic specialists, it is written in a manner which is meant to be accessible both to students of that field and those who want to learn more about it. Fourth, the books offer both a state-of-the-art overview of the sub-field and an explanation of how it has evolved into what it is today. Thus it serves as part of a broader objective of evaluating the current state of development of political science. Fifth, on the basis of this evaluation, the volume editors and authors will make proposals for the improvement of each sub-field and eventually, for the discipline as a whole.

It is entirely appropriate that the first volume in the series should be devoted to the subject of democratization. It is surely among the most topical and central political issues of our contemporary world. We want to express our profound appreciation to the editor of the volume, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, for his initiative and persistence in the project, and to the authors of Research Committee 13 on Comparative Democratization for their notable contributions to it. We also want to thank the Publications Editor, Barbara Budrich, whose vision and determination on behalf of our publisher, Leske + Budrich, are largely responsible for bringing the series to fruition. We also acknowledge our deep gratitude to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), whose initial Research Development Initiatives Grant #820-1999-1022 and later extensions made the project pos-

sible. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the work of IPSA Research Committee 33 on the Study of Political Science as a Discipline and its Project Sub-Committee members, as well as the support given by the IPSA Committee an Research and Training (CRT) to Research Committee 13 on Comparative Democratization in the development of this book. Finally, a special word of thanks is owed to our Project Coordinator, Tim Heinmiller, who applied his considerable academic and administrative capabilities to all major concerns of this volume.

Of course, ultimate responsibility for the series belongs to us, the co-editors. This project has been a joint and equal collaborative effort on our part right from its beginning, and we are very pleased to see this effort finally come to fruition.

August 2003,
John Trent (University of Ottawa)
Michael Stein (McMaster University)

Preface to the first edition

This volume is the first in the "World of Political Science" series initiated by the Research Committee 33 on "The study of political science as a discipline" of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and its chairs John Gunnell, Michael Stein and John Trent. This series is to present an overview of the state of the art in major sub-fields of political science as represented by IPSA's Research Committees. These overviews consist of an assessment of significant recent developments in the field, a summary of current concepts and methodology, an overview of findings and trends, and a critical evaluation that includes suggestions for the future.

This book is in part based on presentations and discussions of these topics at IPSA's World Congress at Quebec in August 2000 which have been supplemented and up-dated. It is the outcome of activities of Research Committee 13 on "Democratization in Comparative Perspective" which had been founded as a Study Group at IPSA's World Congress at Washington/D.C. in 1988, i.e. *before* the latest wave of democratization began in Eastern Europe. Tatu Vanhanen, to whom this book is dedicated, and Dirk Berg-Schlosser had been the first co-chairs of this Study Group which became a recognized Research Committee in 1994.

In the course of time, this Research Committee has been fortunate to have had among its members many of the most productive persons in this field. To them this book owes a great deal. Among those, who also hosted and organized conferences of the RC, are Tatu Vanhanen; Larry Diamond, its longtime vice-chairman; Omo Omoruyi from Nigeria; Renato Boschi, Eli Diniz and Lourdes Sola from Brazil; Surinder Shukla and S.S. Muni from India; Kim Kwang-Woong from South Korea; Raivo Vetik from Estonia; Erik Komarow from Russia; and Gabriella Ilonszki from Hungary. In addition, such inspiring personalities as Juan Linz, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter also contributed at various stages. The activities and conferences of the RC have been documented in a number of separate volumes (see Omoruyi et al. 1994, Diniz 1996, and Berg-Schlosser and Vetik 2001).

In the past, the field of democratization research has been beset, as other fields of contemporary political science, with problems of conceptual diver-

sity, limited measurements, and ethnocentric or paradigmatic biases. The International Political Science Association today has become an organization with a worldwide membership of people with common methodological skills and theoretical concerns. This makes possible, for the first time, a genuine and meaningful intercultural scientific dialogue on an equal basis. This is an opportunity that should be embraced. With the communication facilities of the Internet, where we can exchange knowledge and views at almost no cost and in real time, we now have the opportunity to exchange and constantly update our databases, to refine our concepts and tools, and reduce specific limitations and biases. Only if participation in such exchanges becomes truly multicultural and interactive can further progress be expected.

This volume, and the series as a whole, is, therefore, a step in this direction. Much, of course, remains to be done and we will have to find workable mechanisms and organizational arrangements in the future that ensure as much equality, objectivity and relevance as possible.

Among those who have contributed to this volume and whose efforts surely must be acknowledged are the helpful comments by the series editors Michael Stein and John Trent and their assistant Tim Heinmiller, two anonymous reviewers, the careful copy-editing at Montreal, and the valuable and always cheerful assistance by Lasse Cronqvist, Cornelia Schöler, and Karin Sattler at Marburg. All remaining faults and errors are, of course, mine.

The editor gratefully acknowledges the work of the IPSA Research Committee on the State of the Discipline and the Support of the IPSA Committee on Research and Training to the Research Committee on Democratization in Comparative Perspective in the development of this book.

Marburg, October 2003 *Dirk Berg-Schlosser*

Preface to the second edition

Even though there have been some distribution problems in the overseas markets in the beginning, the first edition of this book has been sold out quite rapidly. It is now the first in the series to appear in a second edition, which is in the trusted hands of Barbara Budrich again. All chapters have been revised, some quite extensively, and one chapter by Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius, which nicely complements the others, has been added.

The success of this little book confirms the continuing concern with its subject matter, the problems and prospects of further democratization in a constantly changing world.

The continuing assistance of Lasse Cronqvist and Diana Rogalski in preparing the final manuscript is gratefully acknowledged.

Marburg, April 2007 *Dirk Berg-Schlosser*

"Une grande révolution démocratique s'opère parmi nous."
Alexis de Tocqueville

1. Introduction

Dirk Berg-Schlosser

Tocqueville's prescient statement today applies more than ever. According to the latest counts, roughly 120 out of the world's more than 190 states presently claim to be a "democracy" of some kind (see, for example, Freedom House 1999). About half of them emerged after the crest of the latest wave of democratization (1989–90) (see also Huntington 1991). At a closer look, however, these new democracies show a bewildering variety of specific subtypes and concrete defects when compared with their more established counterparts, especially those in Western countries (see also O'Donnell 1994, Linz and Stepan 1996, Merkel and Puhle 1999, Lijphart 1999, Diamond 1999, Schmidt 2000). With this enormous enlargement of political science's field of study, the problems of appropriately conceptualizing, precisely measuring and adequately theorizing these developments are all the more urgent. This is not least because this also implies concerns of practical politics vis-à-vis these new democracies (for example, with regard to the "political conditionality" of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and similar institutions) (World Bank 1997).

Among the questions raised are: How are the previous regimes in these countries to be classified, and what legacies have they left? At what point can the new systems be called "democratic"? How democratic are they? Are there significant differences in their degree of democratization? Are there distinct democratic sub-types? What are their characteristic features and possible defects? How durable and stable (consolidated) have they become? How can their overall quality be further improved (in what areas, and according to what criteria)? (This question also applies to the "established" democracies.) Since we are all involved, as national and cosmopolitan citizens, what can and should we do about these developments? What perspectives and concrete policy advice can political scientists provide? What actions should we take? These and similar questions are of particular urgence and relevance, even though political science's concepts and methodological tools to cope with them remain limited.

Political science is a rapidly expanding and ever-changing field. An assessment of its state of the art is, therefore, limited. The authors can present

only a snapshot of the ever more universal processes that have continued since Tocqueville's time. As he put it: *"La question que j'ai soulevée n'interesse pas seulement les Etats-Unis, mais le monde entier; non pas une nation, mais tous les hommes."* (Tocqueville 1963: 175)

1.1. Conditions of Democracy

Any assessment of contemporary processes of democratization has to begin with an overview of the background conditions of modern democracies and some of their historical, regional and cultural specificities. This includes a look at the processes of state formation and nation-building, which often have pre-democratic or external origins. Sovereign states are the most important geopolitical units today, and they are the most influential actors in international politics. Their identities and perceived legitimacy have dimensions both objective (in terms of concrete boundaries and specific institutions) and subjective. Discrepancies between these two dimensions may appear during processes of democratization because the participatory aspirations of citizens and their respective identities will not necessarily coincide with the existing political boundaries and the institutional framework. This may lead to a more or less peaceful redrawing of boundaries and attempts of internal democratic reforms. But it can also result in attempts of secession, wars with neighboring countries, or internal civil strife, together with more abrupt and sometimes revolutionary and violent regime changes. These processes and possible conflicts cannot be resolved by democratic standards and procedures because the rule of law pre-supposes an existing political unit, and procedures such as majority decisions may exclude and possibly suppress important segments of the population. If democracy, in a broad and simple sense, means "rule of the people," it first has to be decided *who* the people are and which boundaries should be respected. In this sense, state formation and nation-building must be considered as prerequisites of any meaningful democratization. As such they are, however, only rarely addressed by many works of democratic theory. Rather, they constitute, in Dahl's (1989) terms, a "shadow theory" of democracy.

In modern times, large nation-states were first formed in Europe, in particular after the "Westphalian Peace" treaty in 1648 and the agreements of the Vienna Congress in 1815. Both coercive military interventions and commercial-capitalist interests were most instrumental in that process (see also Tilly 1990). In the 20th century, the re-drawing of boundaries after the two world wars and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia changed the political landscape and gave it its present shape.

In other parts of the world, the colonialism and imperialism of the major European powers determined most present-day boundaries. This applies to

Latin America and the Caribbean, most parts of Africa and large parts of Asia. Exceptions include Ethiopia, Iran, Afghanistan, Thailand and, most significantly, Japan and China. In the Middle East, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and League of Nations mandates for Great Britain and France shaped most of the present political landscape (for a more detailed account, see Berg-Schlosser, 1999b).

Most modern states have relatively firm and undisputed boundaries (which in some regions are beginning to be transcended by "supra-national" arrangements and institutions). Nevertheless, some critical places have not resolved their territorial problems. These include Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, Lebanon, the Kurdish areas in the Middle East, war-torn states such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, and, in particular, the "collapsed states" in Africa: Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc. (see, for example, Zartman 1995). In others, severe internal conflicts between contending ethnic and other identities still predominate (see Horowitz 2000; a more general recent assessment of democracy's outer and inner edges can also be found in Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón 1999 a).

Over and above these basic historical pre-conditions of present-day democracies, a great number of other factors contributed to their emergence over time. If we take only formally established democratic regimes, as covered in the "Polity" time series data set (Jaggers and Gurr 1996; for a discussion of some of its limits, see also Chapter 2, below), the worldwide growth of the number of countries with democratic governments can be depicted as in Figure 1.

Democracies have emerged in increasing numbers since the beginning of the 19th century, mostly in Anglo-Saxon and Western European countries. This culminated in a more rapid expansion shortly after Word War I, still mostly in Europe but now including some parts of the former Tsarist, Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. This trend was then considerably reversed, leading to fascist or other types of authoritarian regimes, until the end of World War II (see also Linz and Stepan 1978, Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000 and 2002). The breakdown of the colonial empires after World War II then led to the emergence of many more independent states, first in Asia and then in the Middle East and Africa. These included a number of new democracies. In addition to the latter, some civil-authoritarian or military regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America have also democratized or redemocratized since the middle of the 1970s. The most recent upsurge occurred after the democratic changes in Eastern Europe in 1989–90, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its worldwide repercussions.

Figure 1: Emergence of Democracies



Source: based on Jaggers and Gurr (1996), countries with 8 and more points on the "Polity III" democracy scale.

To speak of these developments as three distinct waves with their respective "reverse waves," as does, for example, Huntington (1991), is an oversimplification. The causes and inter-relationships of this pattern are far from being undisputed (see also Markoff 1996, Green 1999a and 1999b, Doorenspleet 2000). In empirical democratic theory a great number of contending approaches and perspectives to explain these developments can be distinguished. To these we now turn.

1.2. Contending approaches and perspectives

The analysis of conditions conducive to the emergence of democratic political systems has always been one of the central concerns of political science. From Aristotle through Locke, Rousseau and Tocqueville, up to the multitude of contemporary studies, this analysis has been attempted again and again. Under closer scrutiny, however, the results obtained are still controversial.

This is not surprising if one considers the complexity of the notion of "democracy." To begin with, there are, at the micro-level, aspects relating to "democratic personalities" (compare, for example, Sniderman 1975 and Berg-Schlosser 1982) and to the conditions of "rational choice" (including the "economic theory of democracy" by Downs 1957). Then there are questions relating to a more general participatory, tolerant, "civic" political culture with accepted "rules of the game" and "rational-legal" sources of legitimacy (Al-

mond and Verba 1963, 1980, Weber 1922). The more general bases include social-structural characteristics and their specific historical dynamics (see, for example, Moore 1966). These, of course, are related to the respective modes of production, the economic mechanisms of distribution, aspects of class formation, social mobility, etc. (see also Schumpeter 1943).

At the level of intermediate structures, the "plurality" of interest groups and voluntary associations (cf., e.g. Dahl 1971), the formation of party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and "new social movements" (cf., e.g., Brand 1985) are of special concern. Within the central political system, constitutional questions relating to the formal division of power, "presidential" or "prime-ministerial" executives, electoral laws, the independence of the judiciary, centralized or federative administrative structures, etc. become relevant (cf., e.g., Loewenstein 1957). In addition, "consociational" or majoritarian patterns of decision-making (Lijphart 1977) and the more general questions raised by organization theory (Etzioni 1968, Naschold 1969) require discussion. The tolerance of institutionalized forms of opposition, a political style that allows for compromise, the accountability of government decisions, an "open" administration, and the avoidance of nepotism and corruption constitute further attributes of such systems, at least in an "ideal" sense (Dahl 1956).

Between these various levels, there exist problems of "congruence" (Eckstein 1966), multiple feedback mechanisms, and dynamic adaptations over time. In many instances, external factors, such as questions of military security, economic dependence, population migration and the global context of the "world system" (cf. Thompson 1983), also require consideration. All this must be evaluated from a normative perspective and measured against the central concerns of political philosophy: the question of a "good" political order, a "humane" existence in both a material and nonmaterial sense, basic rights and freedoms, the realization of the emancipatory potential of human beings, the protection of minority rights, etc. (cf., for example, Pateman 1970, Scharpf 1972).

Among this multitude, some major emphases in the more recent literature are evident. The broadest is closely linked to what has become known as "modernization" theory. Based on studies by Lerner (1958), Lipset (1960), and Almond and Coleman 1960 (among others), this approach takes general trends of socio-economic development, urbanization, literacy, etc. and considers them as basic conditions for modern "political development," including democratization. This approach employs a number of indicators, such as the levels of GNP per capita and of literacy, as independent variables on which the resulting level of democratization (also measured with certain indices; see also Chapter 3) is seen to depend.

In a more extreme version, a high level of socio-economic development is seen as a requisite of democracy (this was expressed in the title of Lipset's

original article [1959]; his later, more "probabilistic," view can be found in Lipset 1994).

There always have been a number of counter-factual examples guarding against an all-too-simple interpretation of this thesis. These include the breakdown of democratic regimes in highly modern countries, as happened in Weimar Germany, and the continued existence of workable democracies in poor countries such as in India and some other Third World states (see also Berg-Schlosser 1989). In particular, some of the policy recommendations based on such perspectives advocating "development dictatorships" in the early stages of modernization (for example, Löwenthal 1963) have turned out to be false. The most comprehensive recent study of this kind clearly shows this: "Democracies can survive even in the poorest nations if they manage to *generate* development, if they reduce inequality, if the international climate is propitious, and if they have parliamentary institutions" (Przeworski et al. 1996:49, our emphasis added). Rather than being a prerequisite, economic development can be a condition favoring the emergence of democracy and an associated factor that increases its sustainability.

Against these broad "macro-quantitative" statistical analyses based on the respective means and correlations of their major indicators, more specific **"**structuralist**"** approaches have been developed. These consider the specific emerging class structures and their dynamic interactions, rather than the overall level of economic development, to be decisive.

In a neo-Marxist sense, Moore's (1966) study distinguished three paths to modernity, one based on a successful bourgeois revolution and strong middle classes (as in the United States, the United Kingdom or France) leading to the contemporary democracies, another based on an alliance of the old landed oligarchy and the more recent capitalist class ending in fascism (as in Germany or Japan), and a third one emanating from a successful peasants' and workers' revolution establishing communist regimes (as in the Soviet Union and China).

In a more refined and extended version, which includes smaller European states and Latin American countries, Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens (1992) and Collier (1999) followed up this line of argument and pointed out the sometimes ambivalent role of the middle classes and the significance of workers' organizations, such as unions and socialist parties, in the process of democratization.

In many cases, the vertical ("class") dimension of social structures has to be supplemented by a horizontal one juxtaposing ethnic, religious and similar social cleavages that often have particular regional strongholds. These may interact with the vertical dimension, forming crosscutting or reinforcing patterns. They can also be ordered in hierarchical ("ranked") or parallel ways (see, for example, Horowitz 2000). In addition, ethnic or religious groups are usually also internally stratified, which complicates their potential for conflict even further (Waldmann 1989).

The most comprehensive integration of dominant vertical and horizontal cleavages and their consequences for state formation, nation-building and democratization for a concrete region and period has been attempted by Stein Rokkan in his "Typological-Topological Model of (Western and Central) Europe" (see Flora 1999). There, he identifies the major social cleavages in Europe since about the 16th century concerning the relationship between church and state (in particular after the Protestant Reformation in Northern Europe), relations between the respective political center and the regional periphery/ peripheries in each country, conflicts of interest between the rural (often formerly feudal) and the urban (including the emergent bourgeoisie) classes, and, finally, modern conflicts between capital and labor in increasingly industrialized states. On this pattern, in his view, can be based many important political developments. These include trajectories of the respective countries towards authoritarianism, fascism or democracy in the 20th century and the major characteristics of their party systems up to the present time (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967 and the more recent assessments in Karvonen and Kuhnle 2000). Attempts to develop and apply similar models to other parts of the world have, however, remained very limited (see, for example, Shiratori 1997, Temelli 1999, Randall 2001).

These "objective" social-structural dimensions of the social bases of democratic development were also contrasted by more "subjectively" oriented political-cultural studies. Pioneering among these was Almond and Verba's "Civic Culture" (1963). They showed that the democracies in the United States and Great Britain were also deeply rooted in the attitudes and values of the population at large, in contrast to the situation in (post-war) Germany, Italy and Mexico. More recent studies indicate that, in the meantime, democracy has become more anchored in the minds of (west) Germans and (northern) Italians as well, but with strong remaining regional sub-milieus (see, for example, Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt 1981, Berg-Schlosser and Rytlewski 1993, and Putnam et al. 1993).

Similar studies in the behavioralist tradition have also been extended to other parts of the world, including the "Latino-", the "Afro-", and the "New Democracies" barometers (see, for example, Latinobarometro 2001, Afro-Barometer 2005, Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch 1998, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998) and the three waves of the World Values Survey (see, for example, Inglehart 1997). The scope of political attitudes and (potential) political actions has also been considerably widened, including the "conventional" and "unconventional," legal and illegal, and peaceful and violent forms in the panels of the Political Action study (see Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979, Jennings and van Deth 1990). This "subjective dimension" of politics is an important factor for the long-term consolidation of democracy. It interacts with the objective social-structural and institutional aspects, but only rarely can it be considered as an independent variable in early processes of democratization (see also Elkins and Simeon 1979).

The impact of these objective and subjective social bases of politics depends on their interactions and forms of aggregation at the intermediate ("meso-") level. There, certain cleavages and their cultural expressions often harden into particular "sub-milieus," which can reproduce themselves over long periods (see also Lepsius 1966). The party system may also reflect such structural or cultural strongholds. If the party system is mainly based on strong horizontal affinities and identities among contending (such as ethnic or religious) groups, then no "floating vote" from one election to another can be expected. Elections then become just another form of a population census. This may lead, depending on the respective number of such groups and their relative sizes, to permanent majorities of one or a few groups. This seriously endangers, if no "consociational" agreement can be found, the long-run stability of any democratic system (see also Lijphart 1977, 1999). In addition, various forms of (economic and other) interest organizations and (often more temporary) social movements shape this sphere. Taken together, they constitute the most important collective actors (see also Olson 1965).

In recent times, the importance of this intermediate realm between the "micro" (individual) and "macro" (state) level for ongoing processes of democratization has also been emphasized by proponents of civil society (see, for example, Keane 1988 and Hall 1995). These included all kinds of non-governmental organizations that act in the public sphere. The major modes of transmission of interests can be pluralist, emanating from the more-or-less open competition of a multitude of social groups; corporatist or neo-corporatist, involving the major economic interest groups of employers and unions in conjunction with the state authorities (see e.g. Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979); or clientelist, based on personal vertical relationships of "unequal exchanges" (for example material benefits in exchange for political support) (see, for example, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

The major link between social structural cleavages, particular sub-milieus, the party system and the representative institutions at the macro-level of democratic systems is provided by the electoral system. To some extent, electoral systems, such as majoritarian or proportional ones, exert a certain influence of their own. This may work in different directions. For example majority systems in single-member constituencies may lead to two-party systems in horizontally relatively homogenous but vertically stratified societies and, consequently, to clear-cut majorities in representative institutions (Duverger 1962). Conversely, simple majority systems in societies that are highly fragmented horizontally tend to reproduce this pattern in the party system and parliament. By contrast, strong proportional systems can lead to highly fragmented party systems and parliaments in economically stratified societies, but tend to create more crosscutting parties in countries with strong ethnic or regional divisions (see, for example, Grofman and Lijphart 1986,

Nohlen 2000). The choice of an electoral system, therefore, forms an important part of the constitutional engineering and crafting of new democracies (see also Di Palma 1990 and Sartori 1994). It often involves, however, a trade-off between the exigencies of a more "just" political representation and democratic stability and efficiency.

The other major institutional choices concern a centralized or federal set-up of the state structure. This also depends on the size and on the degree of regional fragmentation of a country and on the separation of powers at the central level, such as in parliamentary or presidential systems or some of their variations (for discussions of their advantages and disadvantages, see Shugart and Carey 1992, Linz and Valenzuela 1994). Presidential systems may, for example, be "culturally" more suited in countries with strong personalistic traditions, as in Latin America, but they also tend to reinforce clientelistic relationships, with their often concomitant high level of nepotism and corruption. This makes constitutionally limited terms of office in such systems all the more necessary. In any case, the full independence of the judiciary must be safeguarded in all democratic systems to ensure the rule of law and, together with independent media and a well-informed public, the accountability of all public leaders and organizations, which also enhances their efficiency and effectiveness.

Within a given institutional set-up, the matters and decisions of major actors also play an important role. These can be analyzed (with the advantage of hindsight) by historians looking at specific events, but also, in a more general sense, through psychological or socio-cultural approaches (see, for example, Elms 1976, Furnham and Heaven 1999). In recent years, **"**rational choice" and "game-theoretical" models and arguments have been employed in this context. This was, for example, the case with the strategies and decisions that crucial actors made in the various modes of transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of government. Rational pacts of this kind thus have been concluded by softliners and moderates in the authoritarian and democratic camps respectively in a number of cases (see, for example, Colomer 2000). Games such as "Battle of the Sexes" and "Staghunt" can also be modeled for such transitions (see, for example, Geddes 1999). In a more general sense, an "actor-centered institutionalism" (see Scharpf 1997) can help explain such developments.

Complex theories of democracy must look at more than the general historical and social conditions—the "input" side of the political system and the central institutions and actors. They must also take account of the respective "outputs" and the more general performance over time. In this respect, a number of studies have compared the results of democratic regimes with different types of authoritarian ones (see, for example, Berg-Schlosser and Kersting 1996, Schmidt 1998, Przeworski 2000). This applies not only to the common economic indicators (GDP per capita growth, etc.), but also the

more differentiated social and quality-of-life criteria (see, for example, UNDP 2002) and normative aspects as reported by organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or Freedom House. Such criteria are also increasingly taken into account by the major international development agencies, which have become concerned about good governance (see, for example, World Bank 1992). The extent of public waste, corruption and private enrichment from public sources is now also regularly monitored by organizations such as Transparency International. In this regard, a critical public, independent media, and a well-functioning judiciary, which are characteristic of the more democratic states, contribute to the performance of democracies in the longer run. Amartya Sen, winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize for economics, stated: "A country does not have to be deemed fit *for* democracy, rather it has to become fit *through* democracy" (Sen 1999, emphasis in the original).

All this takes place, of course, in an international environment that may or may not be favorable to such developments. During the Cold War, for example, superpowers or camps often gave external (including military and financial) support to their "friends" without taking into account the internal conditions of those regimes. Then, after 1989–90, a number of authoritarian regimes collapsed when this external support (or threat of intervention) was withdrawn. This occurred in a number of East European and African countries, for example. Events in one country may also have significant "demonstration" (chain reaction and domino) effects as media and other contacts transmit news to neighboring states in a similar situation as well as to countries further afield (Whitehead 1996). The international political climate may also be less (as in the inter-war period in Europe 1919-1939) or more (as in present times) favorable for democratic regimes. Furthermore, external support can help to stabilize and consolidate new democracies, as the European Union is currently doing in Eastern Europe.

Over longer periods of time, all these factors interact and may form particular patterns, sequences, or "path-dependent" effects, such as Huntington's "waves." But apart from such metaphors, the actual causal links and their dynamics and the subsequent feedback mechanisms must be analyzed more closely. As the following chapters show, a lot remains to be done. This requires both better information and data, but also, and even more importantly, clearer conceptional and theoretical tools. Some recent attempts to integrate different levels of analysis and to put them together in a more comprehensive "systems" framework can serve as a starting point.

1.3. Possibilities of theoretical synthesis; remaining issues

James S. Coleman (1990) made the most elaborate attempt to coherently link macro-, meso- and micro-levels of analysis. He linked a given objective ("structural") situation at the macro-level with the subjective perceptions and motivations of individuals at the micro-level, then took into account their possibilities of aggregating their interests and activities at the meso-level in order to "explain" as much as possible the final outcome ("the explanandum") at the macro-level (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Linking Levels of Analysis



Source: Adapted from Coleman (1990) and Esser (1993)

For our purposes, this model can integrate social structural conditions, in Moore's or Rokkan's sense, in the upper left-hand side, with the resulting political culture at the micro-level and the differing forms of group aggregation at the meso-level (interest groups, party systems, etc.) in order to more clearly establish the broader social bases of democratic regimes, again at the macro-level (on the upper right-hand side). At the macro-level, then, the more specific political institutions are established, in which the major individual actors (presidents, prime ministers, leaders of the opposition, etc.) are involved. The concrete situation at each level can be filled by empirical data for the respective cases under investigation. From the systematic comparative observation of several similar cases, certain generalizations may result in an "analytically inductive" manner (for the use of this term see, for example, Blalock 1984). These generalizations may, in turn, serve as hypotheses to be

tested across a more diverse selection of cases in order to establish their theoretical "range" in space and time (for the use of such macro-qualitative comparisons, see also Ragin, Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 1996, Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2002). Most of the concepts and hypotheses of the "transitology" and "consolidology" literature mentioned above are of this kind.

At some points, but not in the sense of an overarching unified theory (Wallerstein 2001), even more general hypotheses concerning the reasoning and actions of individuals and groups can be introduced. An example is the concept of "restricted, resourceful, evaluating, expecting, maximizing men" (RREEMM) or women at the micro-level (see Esser 1993: 231 ff). But even such general assumptions in the "rational choice" and "collective action" traditions are embedded in a more specific structure ("restricted") and cultural ("evaluating") context. Similarly, at the level of individual actions within certain institutions and their respective strategies, such assumptions and various specific models concerning their concrete "games" may be applied.

In an even more comprehensive manner, such models can be embedded in a general "systems" framework (see, for example, Easton 1965, Almond and Powell 1978). In this way, the major social sub-systems and their interactions can be meaningfully integrated (see Figure 3).

Here, the cultural, social and economic sub-systems, originally derived from Parsons' (1951) AGIL scheme (see also Münch 1984), interact and set the scene for the political system, which derives its main inputs from these spheres. At the meso-level, again, these inputs are aggregated and mediated in specific ways and then "ruled" upon by the central political system in a narrower sense of the term as the overall decision-making unit. Its outputs are fed back to the respective sub-systems by the usual administrative structures and complete the cycle, which, of course, will be repeated over and over again in a dynamic sense. At the same time, all this is also embedded in the encompassing international system, with which all sub-systems interact at different levels. Within this framework current problems of "governance" can also be considered (March and Olsen 1995).

This is not the place to elaborate further on this framework (see also Berg-Schlosser and Giegel 1999), but it must be emphasized that this framework does not assume *a priori* any far-reaching implications in a more ambitious "systems theoretical" sense such as Easton's (1965) or Luhmann's (1984, 2000) concerning, for example, certain equilibria or the long-term stability of such systems. But it is helpful to locate the emphases of different approaches and to assess their potential overall contribution to a more general but still empirically founded theory of democracies concerning their stability, their potential centrifugal or centripetal tendencies, and their effectiveness and overall quality in both a functional and a normative sense.

Figure 3: Interactive Model of Democratic Systems



Source: Berg-Schlosser/Giegel 1999, p.21.

In any case, such a framework must be "filled" by operationalized concepts and empirical data that are historically and culturally grounded. These pose many more problems of appropriate conceptualization, temporal and regional range, adequate measurement, resulting sub-types and categories, and better overall grasp and fit of our theories.

In Chapter 2, Dirk Berg-Schlosser first turns to problems of an appropriate conceptualization and empirical measurement of democracy. He discusses the basic dimensions, operationalization, and the validity, reliability and availability of a number of indices that have been developed in this respect. From such a perspective, criteria concerning certain sub-types of democracy and their characteristics as well as defects (actual or potential) can also be established. This also has concrete practical implications and may lead to some institutional proposals or policy advice for the major internal and external actors involved.

Chapter 3, by Gerardo L. Munck, examines recent studies in the field of democratization and organizes them according to three major agendas: democratic transitions, democratic stability, and democratic quality. Munck shows the increasing richness of this literature and points out some of the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches. His balanced assessment constructively maps out some fruitful avenues for future research.

In Chapter 4, Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius take a critical look at much of the "large N" literature of a statistical nature and develop their own model which helps to explain significant developments over a longer period of time.

In Chapter 5, Axel Hadenius and Dirk Berg-Schlosser assess, on a regional basis, the actual spread of democratic regimes after the last "wave," and they provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of these regimes with regard to their longer-term consolidation.

In Chapter 6, Laurence Whitehead critically examines the state of scholarly debate and actual experiences in the field of democratization since the beginning of the new century. In particular, he emphasizes the uneasy (and often unresolved) relationship between processes of state formation and democratization. These may be more blurred and intertwined than much of the current literature suggests. This he illustrates with the paired concrete examples of Indonesia and Nigeria, Colombia and Sri Lanka, and Brazil and India. Furthermore, even stronger weight must be given to international factors in present processes of democratization (or failed attempts imposed from the outside). The events after "9/11" and the subsequent reactions constitute another watershed for international relations and the prospects of democracy. Again, as Whitehead emphasizes, these have to be perceived in a differentiated manner, which balances demands of longer-term analytical rigour and concrete political relevance. Finally, he discusses the role of international norms and (potentially) universal values, such as basic human and political rights, in the present world: His conclusions point to the continuing chal-

lenges of scholarly endeavours and real world politics in an ever-changing and ever-closer international environment.

The final chapter, by Juan J. Linz, reflects on democracy's recent "victory" and considers its future. Linz discusses some of democracy's remaining shortcomings and risks, as well as the continuing theoretical debates. This, of course, is not only an empirical or comparative question, but also a profoundly normative and, in this sense, political-philosophical one (for such concerns and problems, see also Shapiro 2001). In an addendum, he reflects about the current international political situation and some of the consequences of U.S. foreign policy after "9/11".

Attempts to impose "democracy" from the outside by force in cases where the internal conditions are very unfavorable for such systems, as the American-led invasion of Irak in 2003 again has shown, are mostly doomed to failure. A simple check of the conditions favorable to democracy as summarized by Dahl (1989:264) would have demonstrated that Irak fulfilled none of them:

– means of coercion (and their legitimate use) controlled by the state;
– a modern, dynamic and pluralist society,
– a political culture supportive of democracy;
– no strong and distinctive subcultures;
– and no interventions by foreign powers hostile to democracy.

The often-heard argument that Germany and Japan after World War II were successful examples of establishing a democracy from outside is quite misleading. First of all, the preceding regimes in these countries had been thoroughly de-legitimized by the defeat in the (self-inflicted!) war. Secondly, and even more importantly, these were countries with a secured statehood, a relatively homogeneous population, a high level of "modernization", and, in the case of Germany, significant pre-war democratic traditions and social forces, even if they had succumbed to the National Socialists in the Weimar period (see, e.g., Berg-Schlosser/Mitchell 2002).

Only in relatively rare cases of post-conflict societies, as in present-day Bosnia, may initially very unfavorable conditions be overcome by external intervention and long lasting outside support (see Schneckener 2002, Gromes forth.). In such instances, it is all the more important that more generally agreed upon principles of human rights and self-determination, as laid down in the United Nations and similar charters, are adhered to. Again, in this respect, the situation in Irak, as demonstrated by the creation of "law-free" zones for the detention of suspected terrorists and blatant human rights abuses, is different.

Altogether, the international "climate" for democracy has again deteriorated somewhat after "9/11" and the subsequent events. Existing democracies may be threatened by terrorist acts from the outside, but they must also be

careful not to overreact and impose “big brother”-like controls on a large scale, which impinge upon the very values they stand for.

In this and similar ways, empirical, theoretical, normative and practical issues of political science can be brought together and culminate in a political order that approaches and respects potentially universal values—human dignity, justice, peace, the satisfaction of basic material needs, cultural self-expression and ecological sustainability—as they are epitomized in a meaningful notion of democracy.

2. Concepts, Measurements and Sub-Types in Democratization Research

Dirk Berg-Schlosser

In this chapter, I will first address some of the conceptual issues of democratization and empirical democratic theory. I will then turn to some of the concrete measurements and operationalizations that have been proposed and are currently applied in this regard, pointing out some of their advantages and disadvantages. The third section will look at some of the more specific sub-types which have emerged, followed by the broader methodological and theoretical and, to some extent, even "paradigmatic" and metatheoretical implications of this kind of research. I will then draw some preliminary conclusions.

2.1. Conceptual background

The starting point for all these considerations must be a sufficiently complex, consensual, and workable notion of democracy that can capture the differing forms of contemporary appearances of this kind of rule. At the same time, it should be sufficiently distinct to draw meaningful boundaries between democracy and other types of political systems, and sufficiently open to be linked to existing sub-types and to future developments. We thus need a "root concept" in Collier and Levitsky's (1997) sense, which satisfies these demands and allows the further differentiation and characterization of present and possible future sub-types by adding the respective attributes ("democracy with adjectives") up or down the "ladder of generality."

Such a root concept is Robert Dahl's notion of polyarchy (Dahl 1956, 1971, 1989), which has become the most frequently cited referent of empirically oriented democratization studies in the last decades (see also, for example, O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986, Hadenius 1992, Sørensen 1993, Diamond 1999, Berg-Schlosser 1999a). He explicitly distinguishes two dimensions of this more modest characterization of contemporary democracies, the amount of regular and open competition in a political system, and the extent of different forms of participation in the process of political decision-making by the population of a given society. Implicit in his notion is

a third (normative) dimension that concerns basic civil liberties, such as freedom of information and organization, and a political order that guarantees and maintains the rule of law to make regular political contestation and participation possible and meaningful. Even though there are some variations between different authors' formulations and interpretations, these three dimensions of the root concept of democracy that emphasize the "input" side of political systems and the necessary institutional and legal framework have become largely accepted.

To be distinguished from such a definition are the respective bases (historical, economic, cultural, etc.) and *conditions* of democracy, which often have been seen as requisites (see, for example, Lipset 1960, 1994), and the actual *performance* and effectiveness of democratic systems, which comprise the "output" side and various distinct policy areas.

Over and above such broad conceptual classifications, we must employ some further distinctions and criteria when discussing concrete problems of the "measurement" of democracy. These are, first of all, related to the purpose of a particular study, and the kind of method and research instrument used. Such a purpose may be, for example, the development of a comprehensive typology of political systems and the existence of more or less "democratic" forms among them. A second purpose, which must be distinguished from the first one, may be the development and measurement of concrete sub-types of democratic political systems: for example, presidential or parliamentary, majoritarian or consensual (see, for example, Lijphart 1977, 1984, Powell 1982, Linz 1994, Sartori 1994). A third purpose can be the further improvement and qualification of democratic systems in a functional or normative sense, which also identifies deficiencies or articulates desired further options. At this point, the wider field of normatively and philosophically motivated as well as empirically oriented theories of democracy is reached (see also Sartori 1987, Habermas 1992, Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón 1999b, Berg-Schlosser and Giegel 1999).

Furthermore, these purposes are related to different levels and "scales" of political maps, which have to be measured, and varying historical periods and regions. Thus, it makes a considerable difference, for example, whether you want to measure the long-term development trends of democracies and their major features, as in the time-series data established by Vanhanen, Gurr and associates or Freedom House, or whether you want to supervise and "audit" all major features of a contemporary democracy and develop specific criticisms and policy advice, as done by Beetham and Weir (all of these will be discussed below).

In addition, of course, the usual "quality" criteria of empirical research, such as the validity and reliability of the respective measures and indices, will also be employed. Some authors, such as Cook and Campbell (1979), also distinguish in this regard between the "internal" validity and consistency

of individual findings and their "external" validity, which may lie in their possible generalization and broader theoretical relevance.

2.2. Longitudinal quantitative measurements

In the past, there have been frequent attempts to measure the degree of "democraticness" of political systems using quantitative indicators (see, for example, Cutright 1963, Coulter 1975, Bollen 1980, Coppedge and Reinicke 1990, Hadenius 1992). These and similar measures are also discussed in Inkeles (1991), Beetham (1994) and, in a very detailed and constructive way, in Munck and Verkuilen (2002). Today the most frequently employed indices of democratization, which are also the only ones reaching back over a longer period, are the ones mentioned by Vanhanen (1984, 1990, 1997), Gurr (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore 1990, Jaggers and Gurr 1996), and Freedom House (Gastil 1978 ff., Freedom House 1990 ff.). Each has its particular merits, but also a number of problems and deficiencies.

The index of democracy (ID) developed by Tatu Vanhanen takes as its point of departure the two basic dimensions considered by Dahl— competitiveness and political participation—and operationalises them in a relatively simple, straightforward and more easily objectifiable manner, taking more generally available electoral data as its base. In his latest version (Vanhanen 1997), he covers 172 countries with data reaching back in some cases to the middle of the 19th century.

The index of democracy works this way: the degree of participation (P) is assessed by the voter turnout in consecutive elections in terms of the share of persons voting of the total population of a country. The competitiveness of elections (C) is measured by the share of the largest party in national parliamentary elections subtracted from 100. Both measures are then multiplied by each other and divided by 100 to result in a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (P•C/100).

The aggregation by multiplication of these two dimensions is important because it avoids the possibility that one registers only sham elections with the usual 99.9% turnout, as in many of the former Communist states, but with zero competition, as has been done, for example, by purely additive procedures in previous indices (see, for example, Coulter 1975). Taking the share of voters of the total population, instead of the adult population only, distorts this index somewhat, disadvantaging "young" nations with a high population growth. But the author defends this on pragmatic grounds: total population data are more easily available than differentiated demographic census results. The index also necessarily disregards the fact that some countries, such as Brazil and Belgium, have compulsory voter registration and/or voting. This gives them a higher score on this index. The share of the votes of the largest

party in parliament also may produce certain distortions favoring highly fragmented party systems with many small parties, which may be a result of the electoral systems (for example, highly proportional ones). Therefore, beyond a certain threshold, a higher score on this count does not necessarily mean that a country has a "better" democracy in a functional or normative sense.

Ted Gurr and his associates have assembled another large historical data set (Polity I, II, III, and IV), which in its latest version comprises 157 contemporary countries that had populations of more than 500,000 inhabitants in the early 1990s. The data go back, in the oldest states, to about 1800, and to the year of independence of the more recently created states. Based on a variety of documents for each country, including, where they exist, the respective constitutions, Gurr and his associates identify three major dimensions of an "institutionalized democracy": the competitiveness of political participation, the openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. Five major indicators of these—the regulation and competitiveness of participation, the regulation, competitiveness and openness of the recruitment of the chief executive, and constraints on the chief executive—were coded separately, weighted and added up to a 11-point scale (which ranges from 0 to 10). In this way, they provide a wealth of information on most countries in the world on an annual basis in modern times. This can and has been used for a number of comparative and longitudinal studies (see also Harmel 1980, Jaggers and Gurr 1996).

Nevertheless, this data set has a number of important limitations. Its focus on the institutional side of democracy neglects certain broader aspects of social and political reality, such as the extent and kind of actual participation or the observance of civil liberties and human rights. It also tends to take some of the coded features of the "institutional democracies" at their face value without being able to assess their substance and actual performance. A certain coding bias favoring an American type of democracy, with a strict separation of powers, is also evident. This is probably to some extent inevitable with "judgmental" data of this kind. These data, therefore, need to be supplemented with other sources.

The third continuous (since 1972) and constantly updated source of information are the Freedom House surveys on political rights and civil liberties. With the help of an elaborate checklist, Freedom House scores each country on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the best value. Both indicators are also added up to provide an overall assessment of, at certain thresholds, "free," "partly free" and "not free" regimes. Strictly speaking, this is not an "index of democracy," but both the "political rights" (including competitive and fair and free elections) and the "civil liberties" indicators (concerning freedom of information, organization and religion, the absence of arbitrary repressive measures by the state, etc.) cover important dimensions of democratic systems. It must be noted, however, that these are basically subjective measures, the reliability of which cannot well be controlled by outsiders. In

the beginning, the coding was done by Raymond Gastil alone, with some inevitable bias and, by necessity, limited sources of information (see also Gastil 1991). In the meantime, the coding system and the data sources have become more elaborate, but a certain degree of subjectivity in the coding and weighting procedures (to avoid "numerical nonsense") and a lack of transparency of these procedures persist (see also Karatnycky 1998).

Thus, each long-term measure has certain emphases, but also certain weaknesses. Taken altogether, they correlate quite highly (with values of Pearson's r in the area of 0.80 to 0.90). Still, these correlations have become considerably weaker for the greater variety of the more recent democracies or regions with often less reliable sources of information, such as considerable parts of sub-Saharan Africa (see also Mc Henry 2000). High overall correlations may also disguise stronger discrepancies in individual cases and, indeed, quite differing assessments. For example, Yeltsin's Russia was rated with highly positive values in the Gurr and Vanhanen scales yet received only intermediate scores from Freedom House.

In recent years, two additional sources of information have become available which, having solid organizational bases, will be continuously up-dated in the future. One source are the comprehensive "good governance" indicators of the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2006) which among their six dimensions also assess the "voice and accountability" and the "rule of law" in 213 countries and territories on a regular basis since 1996. These also may be considered as indicators of two important dimensions of democracy. Their scales range from –2.5 to +2.5 where 0 can taken as a threshold distinguishing democratic from non-democratic regimes. The World Bank research group does not collect specific data for this purpose itself, but it draws on a large variety of sources and as, again, Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Standard and Poor's Country Risk Review, the Gallup Millenium Survey etc. from which they compile their indicators by means of an "unobserved components model" (Kaufmann et al. 1999).

The other source is the "Bertelsmann Transformation Index" which assesses the political and economic transformation in 116 states worldwide (leaving out the more established OECD countries) since 1998. The criteria for political transformation include established statehood, political participation, rule of law, institutional stability, and political and social integration. Each of these dimensions is scored between 1 and 5 (5 being the best value) and then aggregated as a simple arithmetic mean into a single score. No specific thresholds are indicated. The scores are based on a panel of respective country experts (mostly from Germany), but counter-checked by informants, where possible, from these countries.

To varying degrees, all these indices share some common problems. First of all, there are some difficulties with the respective data bases and the sources of information available. The Vanhanen data are the "hardest" and

most objectifiable, being based on official election statistics, but even some of these statistics have to be taken at their face value without, in many instances, the opportunity to assess whether the elections have, in fact, been "free and fair" or whether a considerable amount of fraud and manipulation occurred. The "judgmental" data of the other two indices, with their problems of varying sources of information, selective perceptions, coder reliability, etc., are even more problematic.

Secondly, since all these indices tap several dimensions of democracy, there is the problem of aggregating them in a meaningful way. Multiplication (as done by Vanhanen), which means that if one dimension has a value of zero the entire score is also zero, is certainly better than merely additive indices, which may simply combine "apples and oranges."

Thirdly, even though these indices look like interval or ratio scales with equal distances between the scoring points, they should not be (mis-) interpreted in this way. At least, they indicate some ordinal degrees of difference between the countries. But a difference between 1 and 2 on the Freedom House scale or 7 and 8 on the Jaggers/Gurr scale does not mean that this is the same difference as between 6 and 7 for Freedom House or 2 and 3 for Jaggers/Gurr (see also Elklit 1994).

Fourthly, and most importantly, the thresholds established in each scale to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic systems (5 for the Vanhanen index, 2.5 for Freedom House, 8 for Jaggers/Gurr) refer to *qualitative* differences between different types of political systems. As aggregated multidimensional indices, they should not be used to measure the "democraticness" of other distinct political system types, such as traditional monarchies, military dictatorships, communist one-party states or other types of authoritarian regimes. These are not more or less "democratic" in a comprehensive sense; they are qualitatively different. Otherwise, one would measure the "banananess" of apples and oranges! Instead, it makes more sense to keep the respective measured dimensions apart and to assess their values across different system types. Then it does, indeed, make sense to measure and compare the degree of participation, of competitiveness, of civil liberties, etc. in the respective regimes, just as one can measure the varying water or sugar content, etc., of different types of fruit.

Finally, one must remember that each index is at best a partial measure of some dimensions of democracy. Each index can, to some extent, supplement each other in a disaggregated way, but combining more dimensions may cause even more problems. This may eventually be done with the help of factor analysis in order to identify some common broader dimensions, but this requires still more comprehensive and consistent data. It is also evident that, so far, none of these indices, not even all of them combined in some way, cover all relevant dimensions of democracy in a comprehensive and nuanced sense (see Figure 3 in Chapter 1).

2.3. Qualitative assessments

The current indices of democratization provide information only about the state of affairs in a country at a given point in time; they do not assess the stability and durability of democratic systems as such. Therefore, countries' scores can abruptly change. Indeed, this has happened rather often. At least, the longer a democratic system has been in existence, the more likely it is to survive even further (see, for example, Przeworski et al. 1996), but democracies' actual effectiveness and longer-term chances of consolidation cannot be assessed in this way. Similarly, present indices neglect the output and overall "performance" side of democracies. The overall economic and "developmental" performance of political systems can be assessed with the usual indicators of GDP per capita growth rates, the "Human Development Index" and similar measures. In this regard, on the whole, during the last four decades, polyarchies have performed favorably compared with other political system types (see also Berg-Schlosser and Kersting 1996, Schmidt 1998, Przeworski et al. 2000).

From this overall "system" performance, we must distinguish a more specific "democratic" performance that refers to the overall quality of democratic systems in a functional and normative sense. The functional aspects refer to the specific "responsiveness" of political systems, their ability to provide effective mechanisms to respond to the articulated and aggregated preferences of large parts of the population in a meaningful way and to satisfy, at least to a larger extent and in the longer run, their demands and expectations. This idea of efficient feedback mechanisms of democracies is implied in the original system models by Easton (1965) and Almond and Powell (1978), but their actual workings need to be made more explicit and should also be amenable to some kind of empirical measurement (see also Westle 1989).

Taking a more comprehensive "systems" view also makes the question of democratic consolidation more understandable and open to qualitative empirical assessments. In a widely accepted conceptualization of this term, Linz and Stepan (1996) distinguish between three aspects of consolidation at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of democratic systems.

At the macro-level, what they call "institutional consolidation," the proper functioning of the established political institutions and their interactions can be assessed. At the meso-level, which Linz and Stepan refer to as the "behavioral" one, one must examine whether there still are any significant anti-democratic social forces and actors, such as extremist right-wing or left-wing political organizations, a landed oligarchy, or parts of the military. At the micro- level, the "attitudinal" one in Linz and Stepan's terms, one considers the widespread acceptance of democratic values and procedures, and in this sense, the overall democratic legitimacy of a system as it is rooted in the respective political culture.

Only if at all three levels, for which specific qualitative evaluations and, to some extent, quantitative survey data with certain thresholds may be used, sufficient favorable evidence can be found, can a democracy be considered to be "consolidated." But even this state may not last forever. New crises may emerge which have to be coped with.

Taking a normatively even more demanding perspective is the "democratic audit" proposed by David Beetham and Stuart Weir. This, in part, has been put into practice (Klug, Starmer and Weir 1996, Weir and Beetham 1999). In a comprehensive and painstaking exercise, they originally examined four major aspects of democratic quality and performance: free and fair elections; open, accountable and responsive government; civil and political rights; and democratic society. For example, they found in the United Kingdom (in a way the mother of all contemporary democracies) severe constraints on the effective implementation and protection of civil and political rights and liberties. Furthermore, they consider the Westminster-type parliamentary system, which is often regarded as a model, to be, in fact, extraordinarily executive-dominated. They report that "the hallowed principle of parliamentary sovereignty amounts in practice to the supremacy of the near absolute executive over parliament" (ibid. pp. 491-496).

In the meantime, Beetham and Weir have expanded the original audit to cover 14 more detailed areas: nationhood and citizenship; the rule of law; civil and political rights; economic and social rights; free and fair elections; the democratic role of political parties; government effectiveness and accountability; civilian control of the military and police; minimization of corruption; the media and open government; political participation; government responsiveness; decentralization; and the international dimensions of democracy. At the same time, they are now attempting to develop their "democratic audit" in a comparative manner, work that is supported by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Stockholm. The results of these efforts remain to be seen, but are contributing an important development to the idea of a critical qualitative assessment, even of the "established" democracies.

Theo Schiller (1999) has listed such and similar criteria in a more systematic and comprehensive way (see Figure 4). They constitute a kind of "ideal type" of a full-fledged modern democracy, against which the "real, existing" ones can be contrasted and measured. He distinguishes five major principles of democratic systems (basic human rights, openness of power structure, political equality, transparency and rationality, and political effectiveness), which cover both the input and output sides and the respective feedback mechanisms. In addition, he lists the usual micro-, meso-, and macro-levels (see also Chapter 1), which results in this differentiated matrix with the respective emphases. Not all parts of this matrix are covered by currently available indices or have been sufficiently operationalized. But a variety of sources of information is available for such purposes, and it can be

further enhanced through the use of modern information technologies and the Internet's potential to bring together expert judgments from practically all countries and backgrounds.

Figure 4: Principles of Democracy

Level: Principles:	micro: individual citizens	meso: social and political groups and organizations	macro: political system, institutions
1. Basic human rights	personal rights, legal protection, freedom of opinion	freedom of organization, protection of minorities	limited state power, independence of judiciary, rule of law
2. Openness of power structure	free access to political communication and political power, rights of control	organizational pluralism, elite pluralism	separation of powers, limited terms of office, mutual checks and balances
3. Political equality	equality of voting rights, equality of political recruitment	equal opportunity for organizational resources	equal opportunity in the electoral system
4. Transparency and rationality	plurality of sources of information, chances for political education	independence and plurality of media, critical public	transparency of decision-making processes, rational discourses, documented bureaucratic procedures
5. Political efficiency and effectiveness	political interest, political participation, civic competence	effective aggregation of interests, mobilization of political support	effective decision-making rules and institutional balance, sufficient resources

Source: Adapted from Schiller (1999), p. 33.

2.4. Democratic sub-types

From such a comprehensive systems perspective and with the use of certain qualitative criteria, some sub-types of democracies can be distinguished. Most frequently, these refer to the particularities of the institutional set-up of certain sub-types. These include the usual distinctions between these types: presidential versus parliamentary (see, for example, Linz 1994), majoritarian versus consensual (Lijphart 1984, 1999), or federal versus centralized (Riker 1975). More differentiated regime types include "semi-presidential" (Duverger 1980, Sartori 1994), "parliamentary-presidential" and "presidential-parliamentary" (Shugart and Carey 1992). These have been extensively discussed elsewhere (see also Lijphart 1992) and need not concern us here.

In addition, a number of typologies have been developed that refer, in a broader system sense, to the social bases of politics, the particularities of the *input* structures (such as the party systems or the structures of interest media-

tion) and the extent and shape of *output* institutions (including the military and the welfare system). Among the better-known of these typologies are those referring to particular class structures and their dynamics (Moore 1966, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), the "parochial," "subject" or "participatory" political cultures (Almond and Verba 1963), two-or multi-party systems (for example, Sartori 1976), pluralist or (neo-)corporatist forms of interest mediation (for example, Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979), problems of political control of the military (for example, Diamond and Plattner 1996), or particular types of welfare states (for example, Esping-Andersen 1990). Again, these sub-system specific typologies have generated their own extensive debates, which other publications have addressed.

What is of particular concern at this point are more recent notions of specific sub-types that cut across several of these sub-systems and mark specific deficiencies or defects of contemporary democracies (compare, for example, O'Donnell 1994, Merkel 1999). These can also be located in the overall systems framework and deserve some further discussion.

One of these, the "exclusionary" sub-type, refers to particular social groups or strata being excluded, de jure or de facto, from the regular institutionalized democratic processes of participation and decision-making. In the past, criteria of wealth or gender were often used to discriminate in this respect against some parts of the population (see, for example, Nohlen 2000). In many of today's new democracies, certain ethnic, religious or regional groupings are in some ways excluded from current political processes (compare, for example, Horowitz 1985, Diamond and Plattner 1994), and some socially and economically marginalized strata do not fully participate in local and national politics (Berg-Schlosser and Kersting 2000). This also raises the question of national citizenship, in particular that of recent immigrant communities and their respective legal status and possibilities of naturalization. This problem also concerns the more established democracies (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón 1999a).

A second sub-type that is relevant for this discussion concerns "enclave" democracy. This refers, for example, to countries where important groups and representatives of the preceding authoritarian regimes have secured a specifically protected position in the transition process that leaves them outside the mechanisms of usual democratic and judicial control. This includes particular constitutional prerogatives of the military, as in Brazil and Chile, or strong informal pressures, as in Paraguay, Thailand or Turkey (Loveman 1994). A special kind of "enclave" or rather "exclave" outside the regular control of democratic authorities can also be found in certain *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, for example, or, even more extremely, in some regions of Colombia where drug barons and/or rebel groups have created virtually "stateless" areas.

A third sub-type is constituted by "illiberal" democracies. In such systems, the independent normative and judicial control of the political execu-

tive is defective, and the rule of law both for the citizens in general and political opponents in particular is seriously impaired. This may even be endorsed by some populist measures, such as general referenda, to change the constitution in order to extend the president's term of office, as in Fujimori's Peru. O'Donnell's (1994) notion of "delegative democracy" also refers to such illiberal or populist practices.

Finally, a strongly "clientelist" sub-type can be distinguished. Here, the informal ties between leaders and followers and their particular groups or regions prevail. In such asymmetric and unequal relationships, political support for the patron is exchanged for some material, often personal, benefits to the clients (Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981). These informal ties may be based on feudal or neo-feudal relationships in a modern context (as in a number of countries and regions where large landholdings prevail), on kinship or ethnic relations (as in a considerable number of African states), on religious affiliations and leadership (as with the marabouts in Senegal, for example), common regional or local origins, or populist personal appeals. There are also cases where hegemonic or long-time dominant political parties (as in Mexico, Japan, and Italy up to the early 1990s) or consociational systems, with their respective "political families" (as in Austria or Belgium, for example) have developed strong clientelist structures (Lauth and Liebert 1999).

As the latter examples show, the boundaries between particular defective sub-types and consolidated democracies that function adequately can be relatively hazy and fluid, and transitions (in both directions!) may occur (see, for example, Fox 1994). Similarly, some of these sub-types may be more prevalent in particular groups, regions, or localities of a certain country, where they may reinforce themselves over long periods of time and where particular "political cultural" patterns persist (Putnam et al. 1993).

In all such cases, it is, therefore, all the more important that the usual corrective mechanisms—open elective and parliamentary procedures, independent judicial control, pluralistic and independent media, and a well-informed general public and "civil society" (including attentive foreign observers)—be enhanced, and that stronger countervailing forces be created. Even some small steps in these directions, as with a more "competitive clientelism" in the new "electoral" democracies, the proliferation of new and more independent media, and greater international attention, may become important in the longer run. Once more and more groups and citizens become accustomed to democratic norms and procedures, they tend to become committed to maintaining and expanding those norms and procedures, and they can set in motion significant "self-cleansing" processes.

2.5. Conclusions

In this chapter I have presented a brief overview of some of the current concepts of empirical democratic research, some concrete procedures for their quantitative and qualitative assessment, and certain "defective" sub-types that are evident in some of the recent developments. I also made some criticisms and further proposals. Over and above these conceptual considerations and problems of empirical measurements and operationalizations, the more general theoretical concerns in which these are embedded must also be briefly addressed.

Regarding comparative empirical democratization research, we all share to some extent a "critical-rational" perspective in a Popperian sense. This need not be strictly "falsificatory" at all times with regard to our highly complex and malleable subject matter (see Popper 1972, Almond and Genco 1977), but, I would say, a certain progress can nevertheless be noted. We have a clearer perception and much broader and varied empirical evidence of what has happened during the last 15 years in particular, and even before that (see also, for example, the comprehensive analysis of the conditions of democracy and its failures in the inter-war period in Europe, Berg-Schlosser 1998, Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000).

As is mentioned in Chapter 1, meta-theoretical, competing paradigms and approaches continue to confront political scientists. One concerns the "behavioralist" tradition, which has been dominant for a long time, at least in some countries. This tradition still plays an important role, in , for example, survey research of democratization processes and political cultural changes at the micro-level (cf., for example, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998). A second school of thought continues to work in a historical-sociological and social-structuralist tradition (for example, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Thirdly, institutionalist and "neo-institutionalist" approaches are receiving renewed attention (March and Olsen 1995). A fourth paradigm, which has gained increased popularity, in particular in the U.S. in the 1990s, is the "public" or more generally "rational choice" one (see, for example, Weingast 1996). At the same time, current national and sub-national developments are increasingly embedded in international trends of economic and political globalization, as emphasized, for example, by the "international political economy" school (see, for example, Cox 1987) and more general "cosmopolitan" concerns (for example, Archibugi and Held 1995). All these differing paradigms and emphases can and must also be seen from a "critical-normative" perspective (see, for example, Habermas 1992, Held 1995).

In my view, these paradigms, along with their respective groups of followers, need not be mutually exclusive. To some extent, they can meaningfully supplement each other and can be integrated into more comprehensive conceptual frameworks (such as structure- and actor-oriented

ones, and longitudinal historical and contemporary comparative analysis), through which we can share some of the respective advantages and overcome some of the specific limitations. Nevertheless, certain conflicts and confrontations, as in the real world, will continue. This too, in the long run, will advance our common knowledge and mutual understanding.

As both political scientists and citizens of this world, we are also confronted with the dilemma of the limits to our knowledge and expertise on the one hand and our desire to bring about change where we have detected serious flaws in contemporary democracies and practical politics on the other. International organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, in their "political conditionality" and also in the "political risk" analyses of internationally operating private banks and companies, already apply certain specific criteria in their current proceedings. These are often not very transparent and may also be seriously flawed. We have learned a lot in the meantime and, though history never repeats itself, political scientists have sound advice to offer that might affect the lives of many millions of people. The dilemma between scientific rigor and political relevance, as Laurence Whitehead writes in Chapter 5, however, will always be with us, and we each have our particular role to choose and to play.

3. Democracy Studies: Agendas, Findings, Challenges[1]

Gerardo L. Munck

Scholarly interest in the wave of democratization that began in southern Europe in 1974 resulted in a large amount of theoretical and empirical research. These studies took the nation state as the unit of analysis and focused on democracy as the outcome or dependent variable. Beyond this common overarching interest, however, different researchers have emphasized a broad range of aspects of the politics of democratizing countries, drawn upon various theoretical traditions, and used a diverse set of methods. As the literature has grown and evolved, the need for an assessment and synthesis of this literature has become imperative. Indeed, as with any research program, such periodic assessments and syntheses play a critical role, in ascertaining whether knowledge has been generated, and in identifying the challenges that remain to be tackled and the lines of research that are most likely to be productive.

This chapter responds to this need, offering a comprehensive evaluation of the body of literature on democracy that has been produced over the past 25 years.[2] To organize the discussion, I distinguish among three agendas, which are identified by three concepts that define their primary explanatory concern: democratic transition, democratic stability, and democratic quality. For each agenda, I discuss the ways in which the subject matter has been or can be delimited and justified, and the main research findings. I also discuss challenges in three areas—the measurement of the dependent variables, the development and integration of causal theories, and the assessment of causal theories—and offer suggestions for tackling these challenges.

The challenges facing scholars currently active in the research program on democracy studies are considerable. My emphasis on these challenges, how-

1 I would like to thank Michael Bratton, Joe Foweraker, Venelin Ganev, Sebastián Mazzuca, Guillermo O'Donnell, Robert Pahre, Timothy Power, Richard Snyder and Kurt Weyland for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

2 This chapter does not discuss the extensive literature in comparative politics and international relations that focuses on democracy as an independent variable. Neither does this chapter address the growing literature on notions of citizenship that reach beyond and beneath the national state.

ever, is not meant to suggest that this research program faces insuperable hurdles. Rather, the point of this discussion is to use this assessment of the current state of the literature to identify the most productive avenues for future research. Indeed, my assessment is positive with regard to the achievements already made in the field of democracy studies and is also optimistic concerning the likely payoffs of future efforts to advance this research program.

3.1. Democratic Transitions

3.1.1. The Subject Matter

Research on democratic transitions is a part of the broader field of democratic theory that gains its distinctiveness from a sharply defined focus on elections or, more specifically, on the critical step in the history of democracy when a country passes a threshold marked by the introduction of competitive elections with mass suffrage for the main political offices in the land. In other words, the status of democratic transitions as a distinctive field of research is given by an undeniably Schumpeterian approach to democracy, which emphasizes some key aspects of the procedures that regulate access to political power. This delimitation of the subject matter did little to spur interest at the time university-based research was expanding dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s. Not only did the realities of world politics appear to devalue this line of research. In addition, the Schumpeterian conception of democracy was widely out of favor. Even though some landmark studies on democratic transitions were published as early as 1960 (Lipset 1960, Rustow 1970), interest in democratic transitions took a back seat to other, more pressing and/or more valued concerns.

The status of research on democratic transitions, however, changed quite considerably thereafter. First and most important, the wave of democratization beginning in 1974 made the subject matter immediately relevant. Second, the change in values, especially among the left in both the South and the East (Barros 1986, Heller and Feher 1987), did much to place the Schumpeterian approach to democracy in a positive light.[3] Finally, the seminal work of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) did much to set the initial terms of the debate and hence to crystallize a field of research on democratic transitions.[4] With the boom of research in the 1980s and 1990s, by the turn of the century research on democratic transitions had attained the status of an established field, justified on political and analytic grounds.

3 Probably the most careful defense of a Schumpeterian approach to democracy is offered by Przeworski (1999).

4 On the landmark status of O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) work, see Karl (2006).

First, the real-world significance of democratic transitions is undeniable. It has affected the lives of people all over the globe since approximately 1870, a rough landmark for the beginning of mass democracy (Finer 1997: 30). It emerged as a critical issue relatively early in a number of English-speaking countries: Great Britain, the United States of America, New Zealand, and Australia. For Western Europe as a whole, however, democracy remained a key issue on the political agenda from the late 19th century through to the end of World War II. And for yet an even larger number of countries, it was a dominant issue in the last quarter of the 20th century, as a wave of democratization that started in southern Europe in 1974 swept through Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, the communist-dominated countries that were part of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, and parts of Africa.

The continued significance of democratic transitions, moreover, should not be underestimated. To be sure, when a democratic threshold is passed, the challenge of a democratic transition fades into the past and other issues begin to dominate the agenda. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the problem of democratic transitions will cease to be of importance to the lives of tens of millions and even billions of people. On the one hand, the challenge of a democratic transition remains one of vital importance to a large number of countries. Depending upon the precise way in which the crossing of the threshold between authoritarianism and democracy is measured, in the year 2000 a full 40 to 60 percent of the countries in the world, including cases as significant as China and practically entire regions such as the Middle East, have never achieved democracy (Huntington 1991: 26, Diamond 1999: 25-28, Diamond 2003). And the "electoral revolutions" in post-Soviet countries (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005), among other political events, showed that the push for democratic transitions continued into the new century. On the other hand, countries that have passed the democratic threshold always face the possibility of a democratic breakdown. Indeed, even in the middle of the democratic wave of the last quarter of the 20th century, numerous countries experienced breakdowns. And there are grounds to think that many of the newly minted democracies are unlikely to endure as the 21st century unfolds. In sum, a concern with democratic transitions has had, and is likely to continue to have, great relevance.

This delimitation of a field of research focused on democratic transitions is also justified on analytic grounds. The conceptualization of democratic transitions in terms of a threshold marked by the introduction of competitive elections with mass suffrage for the main political offices excludes a large number of issues that are a concern of democratic theory. For example, it is set off from such fundamental issues as the variable ways in which public policy is formulated and implemented in democratic countries; the extent to which the rule of law is respected; and the increasingly important concern

about the extension of democratic rule, traditionally a principle applied to the nation-state, to a range of other units, both of different territorial scope and with different functional aims. What may appear to be an unwarranted narrowing of concerns, however, is analytically justifiable.

The decision to focus on democratic transitions is driven by two insights. First, it is based on the understanding that the introduction of competitive elections is an event that is fundamental enough to alter a country's political dynamics and that calls, therefore, for its own explanation (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: Ch. 6, Shain and Linz 1995: 76-78). Second, this decision is justified on the ground that a transition to democracy is a process that is distinct enough, compared with the other concerns raised in democratic theory, to suggest that it is caused by factors that probably do not affect other aspects of democracy and that it is most fruitfully theorized on its own terms (Rustow 1970, see also Mazzuca 2007).

A focus on democratic transitions, thus, does not deny that countries vary along other dimensions or that these other dimensions may be as important as those highlighted by a Schumpeterian approach. Indeed, as current scholarship shows, a range of issues not encompassed by Schumpeterian definitions of democracy are likely to have great relevance in countries where democracy is firmly established (O'Donnell 1999: Part IV). Therefore, the delimitation of democratic transitions as a distinct area for scholarship is not based on a judgment about the importance of a Schumpeterian approach compared with any other approach but is rather a conceptual decision, which helps to distinguish dimensions of concern within democratic theory that most likely vary independently from each other. That is, the point is not to argue that one or another issue is more important but to provide a basis for an analytic approach by breaking down democratic theory into a series of distinct and hence manageable explanatory challenges.

3.1.2. Findings

The sharp delimitation of the subject matter of democratic transitions and hence the formulation of a fairly clear question—why have some countries had democratic transitions while others have not?—had an important benefit. By providing researchers with a pointed and widely shared agenda, it allowed for the rapid generation of an impressive basis of knowledge through a succession of studies that eventually came to encompass most cases of democratic transition in world history.

Following in the wake of a key study of transitions in southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and early 1980s (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986), major cross-regional analyses were conducted comparing Latin America with East and Southeast Asia (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), and southern Europe and Latin America with Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union (Linz and Stepan 1996). Excellent region-based studies were produced, focusing on Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997), Eastern Europe and the USSR/Russia (Beyme 1996, Offe 1996, Bunce 1999), post-Soviet Eurasia (Hale 2005, Collins 2006), as well as the three major regions of the developing world (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989a, 1989b, 1989c; Huntington 1991). In addition, impressive efforts were made to put the transitions of the last quarter of the 20th century in historical perspective through cross-regional analyses of Europe and Latin America ranging across the 19th and 20th centuries (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992, Collier 1999) and, along similar lines, analyses focused on the older European cases of transitions were offered (Boix 2003, Tilly 2004).[5] Finally, a number of statistical studies contributed to the debate.[6]

The richness of this literature is undeniable. It offers a wealth of ideas on the causes of transitions, a great amount of nuanced information on complex processes, and some fruitful comparative analyses that have generated a number of important and surprising findings. This literature has challenged the longstanding modernization argument that level of economic development is a good predictor of transitions to democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997).[7] It has shown, again contrary to what was posited by modernization theory, that democratic transitions do not occur through a single process but rather through multiple paths defined by factors such as the power and strategies of elites and masses and the top-down or bottom-up impetus for political reform (Dahl 1971: Ch. 3, Stepan 1986, Dix 1994, Collier 1999, Tilly 2004).

The codification of these distinct paths of democratic transition has led to other important findings. First, it has allowed analysts to establish that the path toward democracy that a country follows is strongly influenced by its type of prior, non-democratic regime, and that the very likelihood of a transition to democracy is affected by the type of actors that oppose authoritarian

5 See also Janoski (1998: Chs. 6 and 7), who carries out a useful test of influential theories against European history from 1200 to 1990, and Halperin (1997), who studies Europe in the period 1789–1945 and draws some comparisons between Europe's and Latin America's experience.

6 Gasiorowski (1995), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Coppedge (1997), Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000), Boix (2003), Boix and Stokes (2003), Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

7 See also Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000: Ch. 2), Mainwaring and Pérez-Linán (2003), and Gleditsch and Ward (2006: 925-26). Relatedly, a new literature considers the actual resources that underpin a country's level of economic development and theorizes how these resources are politically used and that wealth does not necessarily lead to democratization (Ross 2001, Bellin 2004, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, Snyder 2006). However, the extent to which level of economic development is or is not a good predictor of democratic transitions continues to be debated and various authors have contested Przeworski and Limongi's (1997) argument (Geddes 1999, Boix and Stokes 2003, Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen and O'Halloran 2006).

rule (Linz and Stepan 1996, Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 9-14, Munck 1998: 17-22, Ch. 7, Leff 1999). More pointedly, because pacts may be a necessary condition for a successful transition to democracy in the context of certain types of regime, the prospects of democracy are enhanced when opposition demands are amenable to negotiated resolution. This is most likely, in turn, when the supporters and opponents of authoritarianism are economically interdependent—that is, class actors—than when opposition to authoritarianism is led by a nationalist or fundamentalist religious movement (Arfi 1998, Roeder 1999, Wood 2000, Hamladji 2002).

With regard to specific classes, though much research has been conducted to ascertain whether the bourgeoisie (Moore 1966), the middle class (Lipset 1960) or labor (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992) is the prime agent of democratization, and whether the landed elites are an inherently undemocratic force (Moore 1966), the literature is mostly inconclusive. Indeed, probably the only clear finding about the social origins of democracy is that landed elites that depend on labor-repressive practices have a negative effect on the installation of a democratic regime (Mahoney 2003: 137-45, Bernhard 2005, see also Mainwaring and Pérez-Linán 2003: 1046-50).[8]

Research has also shown that democratic transitions are closely linked with matters of the state, conceived in Weberian terms. As shown, processes of regime change that lead to state decay or state collapse reduce the prospects of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996: 17-19). Thus, a key finding is the principle: "no state, no democracy."[9] And a growing body of literature offers considerable evidence that international factors have an influence on democratic transitions. The scholarship that considers the broad historical sweep of

8 To anticipate partially some of the suggestions offered below, there are two significant problems with the literature on the class origins of democracy. On the one hand, efforts to theorize and test hypotheses about the role of different classes have operated with an aggregate dependent variable. The role of different classes may have a strong impact at different stages in the process of democratization, but this impact may not be discerned or may become diluted when democratization is viewed as an aggregate process. Relatedly, inasmuch as there are various paths to democracy, one would expect that different classes would play a more prominent role in certain paths (Collier 1999), a finding that again gets lost when the dependent variable is studied at an aggregate level. On the other hand, this literature has tended to focus on the impact of each class viewed in isolation of other classes and other explanatory factors, and to conceive of the impact of classes in linear terms. Yet it seems quite obvious that theorizing requires attention to interaction and threshold effects. For example, the strength of the masses may induce elites to extend the right to vote, as a way to foster moderation. But if the masses are very strong relative to the elites, democracy may be forestalled by a successful revolution from below or a retreat from a commitment to reform by elites fearful of the redistributive consequences of mass democracy. Similarly, the disposition of middle classes to fight for democracy has oscillated in response to shifts in the relative power of other actors (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992: 272). Inasmuch as these issues are tackled, it is quite possible that this important line of research will yield clearer findings than it currently offers.

9 I am indebted to Richard Snyder for his suggestion of this phrase.

democratization makes a strong case for the role of conquest and colonization (Therborn 1977, 1992, Tilly 2004). Furthermore, recent statistical research has found that contiguous neighbors and regional contexts are associated with a diffusion effect and, specifically, that the likelihood that a country will undergo a democratic transition increases when neighboring countries and a country's region are more democratic.[10] Likewise, belonging to international organizations with high membership of democratic states increases the probability of a transition to democracy (Pevehouse 2005: Ch. 4).

It is important not to exaggerate the confidence placed in these findings. There are many exceptions. Indeed, numerous works on the USSR and post-Soviet countries strongly question the extension of generalizations based on democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America to cases where communism held sway in the post-World War II decades (Bunce 2000, 2003, McFaul 2002, Gelman 2003). Moreover, the results of much statistical research are neither very robust nor based on strong research designs (Robinson 2006: 504, 517-25). Nonetheless, with this caveat, it is important to have a clear sense of the current state of knowledge and to build on this knowledge as research continues and as new challenges are tackled.

3.1.3. Challenges

The challenges faced by students of democratic transitions concern many basic research tasks. The way in which the outcome of interest has been measured is open to improvement. The need for greater integration of causal theories is increasingly apparent. And the assessment of causal theories that combine qualitative and quantitative forms of research is emerging as yet another important challenge. Indeed, the future development of the research agenda on democratic transitions is likely to hinge on the ability of scholars to tackle some broad and fundamental challenges.

Measuring the Dependent Variable

A first challenge concerns the dependent variable of research on democratic transitions. As stated, this research has focused on a sharply defined subject matter. But the common practice of using an event—the holding of free and fair elections that lead to the installation of authorities with democratic legitimacy—as an indicator that justifies changing the way an entire country is scored on the outcome of interest is problematic.

To be sure, this way of coding cases, which draws on the notion of a "founding election" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 61), has some validity when applied to transitions in the post-1974 period. The reason is that a

10 Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Brinks and Coppedge (2006), Gleditsch and Ward (2006), Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2007).

common elite strategy in the late-19th and early-20th centuries—the gradual extension of voting rights, first to propertied males, then to all males, and subsequently to women—was probably not viable and thus not used in late-20th century transitions. Thus, to a certain extent, it is appropriate to view recent democratic transitions as unfolding in a non-incremental fashion and along the various dimensions of democracy all at once. But even when applied to recent transitions, the limitations of this approach to measuring democracy are significant.

For example, though some researchers use this approach to code Chile as a democracy from 1990 onward (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000: 64), it is obvious that even though Chile became fully democratic along some dimensions of democracy, it did not do so along others. Specifically, the fact that a sizable portion of the Senate was not popularly elected meant that it suffered from an important democratic deficit concerning the range of offices filled through elections. Moreover, as this example illustrates, the use of a dichotomous measure does little to capture the incremental nature of Chile's democratic transition and hence the distinctive nature of Chile's politics in the 1990s: the gradual and incomplete nature of its transition to democracy. What is needed is a measure of democratic transitions that clearly distinguishes among multiple dimensions and can capture the possibility of gradual change.

Some efforts have been made to address this problem. A recent literature on hybrid regimes has drawn attention to a key insight: that a considerable number of countries seem to be neither fully democratic nor blatantly authoritarian and thus are best characterized with intermediate categories (Diamond 2002, Schedler 2002, 2006). And a well-developed literature on quantitative measurement offers several examples of multi-dimensional measures that do not use dichotomous scales (Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen and O'Halloran 2006, Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán 2007). But these efforts fall short of solving the problem. The discussion of hybrid regimes is characterized by the proposal of an unwieldy number of dimensions and has still not been linked with any efforts to develop systematic data. And efforts to develop quantitative measures are still grappling with the problem of establishing thresholds that correspond to the concept of a democratic transition. Thus, they still are not able to clearly distinguish changes *of* regime, that is, from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, from changes *within* a regime. In short, much remains to be done before the study of democratic transitions can rely on good data.[11]

11 For more on these issues, see Munck and Verkuilen (2002), and Munck (2006).

Integrating Causal Theories

A second challenge concerns the need for greater integration of causal theories. The evolution of the literature on democratic transitions has been characterized by the frequent introduction of new causal factors considered critical to an explanation of why democratic transitions occur. These new explanatory variables sometimes reflect the experience of new cases of transition to democracy, which have brought to light factors that had not seemed important in the cases until then considered. In other instances, the focus on new variables has been driven more by an effort to rescue insights from older bodies of literature. Over time, then, the number of explanatory variables has multiplied, pointing to an important trade-off in this literature between theoretical fertility and orderly theory building.

As challenging as the task of theoretical organization and integration is likely to be, it is facilitated somewhat because theoretical debates have evolved around a number of central axes. One main axis contrasts short-term factors and the choices made by actors (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Przeworski 1991) with medium-term factors, such as the characteristics of the old regime (Linz and Stepan 1996, Chehabi and Linz 1998) and long-term, more structural factors, such as the mode of production or the model of development (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992, Castells 1998). Another axis of debate contrasts elite-centered explanations (Dogan and Higley 1998) with mass-centered explanations, which focus either on class actors (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, Collier 1999, Bellin 2000), social movements (Foweraker 1995: Ch. 5, Tilly 2004), or ethnic groups (Offe 1997: Ch. 4). Yet another axis contrasts political with economic determinants of transitions (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). And one more critical axis of debate opposes domestic factors to international factors (Whitehead 1996, Levitsky and Way 2006), an axis along which one might also locate explanations centered on stateness and "intermestic" nationality issues (Linz and Stepan 1996).

This way of organizing the literature has merit and helps to introduce some order into the debate. Moreover, it is noteworthy that, as the literature on democratic transitions grew and introduced new explanatory variables, scholars sought to impose some organization on theorizing, either by pulling together the range of explanatory variables (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995) or by attempting to synthesize a range of these explanatory factors (Kitschelt 1995: 452-55, Mahoney and Snyder 1999). However, the challenge of integrating and synthesizing the diverse set of explanatory factors proposed in this literature and the generation of a more parsimonious theory remains to be adequately tackled.

In this regard, the potential gains associated with efforts to build rational choice-theoretic and game-theoretic models of democratic transitions should

be noted. This literature is distinctive in that it employs a common theory, which facilitates theoretical cumulation. Moreover, inasmuch as it employs a formal methodology, it also brings to bear the power of deductive logic, which has the advantage of demonstrating what implications follow from a given set of assumptions. These advantages notwithstanding, it is worth highlighting that, to a large extent, the rational choice literature on democratic transitions has reproduced the problems of the broader literature.

On the one hand, much as with any approach to theory generation, game-theoretic models are driven by insights about specific cases or regions. As a result of this inductive aspect of the modeling process, game-theoretic models propose explanatory factors that diverge widely in terms of their empirical scope. On the other hand, the explanatory variables themselves differ from model to model. Thus, some rational choice theorists seek to explain democratic transitions with tipping models, which focus on proximate factors and draw attention to the contingent nature of processes of democratic transition, specifically by highlighting the critical role of triggers or tippers (typically students, intellectuals or dissidents), and cognitive aspects, such as belief cascades (Kuran 1995, Petersen 2001). Others offer models that emphasize the explanatory role of the prior, non-democratic regime, seeking to show how actors within certain institutional settings engage in patterned forms of action (Geddes 1999). And yet others develop what might be labeled political economic models that focus on the long term and see action as driven by the interests of actors, which are conceived either in class terms or more broadly as elites and masses (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006, Boix 2003). In sum, much as the rest of the literature, rational choice theories of democratic transitions diverge in terms of their empirical scope and explanatory variables.

Even as the search for theoretical principles that would provide a basis for theoretical integration and synthesis thus continues, another approach to the task of theoretical integration that deserves emphasis is closely connected to the previous challenge of defining and measuring the dependent variable more carefully. This strategy has gone, for the most part, unrecognized. But it has the potential to yield important payoffs. Indeed, inasmuch as the concept of democratic transition is carefully disaggregated and measured in a nuanced way, such work can be used to break down the big question at the heart of research on democratic transitions—why have some countries had democratic transitions while others have not?—into smaller, more analytically tractable questions.

The disaggregation of the broad problem of democratic transitions into its constituent parts, and the use of measures that distinguish a variety of meaningful thresholds, is likely to assist in the identification of explanations by helping analysts distinguish and avoid the conflation of aspects of democracy that are likely to be driven by different processes. For example, because there

are good reasons to believe that the extension of the right of suffrage for men is driven by a different process than the extension of the right to vote for women, the disaggregation of the explanatory challenge in such a way as to explicitly capture this distinction is likely to help analysts uncover stronger associations. And, in turn, such an approach may help to show how arguments that are presented as competing may actually be complementary. Indeed, once a disaggregated approach to democracy is employed, there would be little reason to consider the theses advanced by Barrington Moore (1966) and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John Stephens (1992) as rival explanations. Rather, in that democracy is defined by Moore (1966: 414) in terms of the dimension of contestation, and by Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens (1992: 303-04) in terms of participation, it seems clear how their theories might be considered as partial contributions to a general theory of democratic transitions.

In short, it is important to focus on the challenge of theoretical integration. And to tackle this challenge it is worth considering the way in which theoretical debates have already been organized to a large extent along certain axes, to continue the search for theories that serve as unifying principles, and to recognize how analysts might integrate research findings regarding conceptually connected parts of a broad question.

Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Forms of Causal Assessment

Finally, a third challenge, concerning causal assessment, touches upon the as-yet barely addressed problem of how to combine qualitative and quantitative forms of research. Research on democratic transitions has been pioneered by researchers who have given primacy to small-N and medium-N comparisons. The reason for this strategy is obvious, in that the comparison of a small number of cases has been particularly well suited to the crafting of fertile concepts and has also provided a sufficient basis for introducing new ideas into the debate—and for doing so rapidly. Moreover, the use of qualitative forms of analysis has had the added benefit of being useful for the task of causal assessment, in particular because its intensive nature and its emphasis on process tracing makes it suited to address theories that highlight the role of actors and changing situations.

This strategy, however, has also had its problems. Qualitative researchers are limited in their ability to test the generalizability of their theories and to offer precise estimates of causal effect that take into consideration a variety of sources of bias. Moreover, they have not always been as systematic as they could be. For example, though this literature has generated a great amount of nuanced data, researchers have not always gathered data on all the explanatory variables for all the cases they analyze, nor have they always coded cases ex-

plicitly according to a set of clear criteria. Finally, small-N researchers have not given enough attention to issues of research design and have rarely conducted stringent tests of their theories. As a consequence, researchers' ability to test their theories and draw strong conclusions has been constrained.

Though the weaknesses of qualitative research on democratic transitions are not all inherent to the methods used and thus much progress can be made by improving qualitative research, they certainly point to the need to combine qualitative and quantitative forms of analysis. But, unfortunately, combining these two types of research is far from easy. Indeed, though quantitative research on the question of democratic transitions has been produced, the links between qualitative and quantitative research on democracy have been very weak. First, the measures of democracy used by quantitative scholars tend to differ significantly from those used by qualitative scholars. What these scholars think of as democratic transitions, thus, may be quite different things. Second, the causal theories quantitative scholars actually test are often caricatures of the theories discussed in the qualitative literature. In this regard, existing statistical tests have been very limited. Practically without exception, they have focused on a narrow range of independent variables, related primarily to social and economic questions, ignoring a variety of theories cast in terms of the role of actors and choices. Moreover, tests have tended to use additive models and also, for the most part, linear models that severely misrepresent the causal argument in the literature. Finally, large-N data sets have typically consisted of one observation per case per year. This restricts their sensitivity to issues of time and process, which rarely obey the cycle of calendar years. Indeed, it is important to recognize that there is a very steep trade-off in the level of richness of information and explanatory arguments discussed as one moves from the literature based on intensive but relatively narrow comparisons of a small set of cases to the statistical literature based on a large number of cases.[12]

The difficulties of using a genuine multi-method approach that combines qualitative and quantitative methods suggest that future research should probably be based on a continuation of the multi-track approach used so far. The qualitative track is likely to yield significant dividends by extending the intensive analysis of a small to medium number of cases to some relatively unexplored questions. Some significant works offer a historical perspective on the democratic transitions that have been at the heart of the debate, those occurring in the last quarter of the 20th century (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992, Collier 1999). But much

12 Indeed, from this perspective, the most fruitful comparative studies, in that they use hard-to-collect data to test complex and dynamic theories, while retaining a broad enough basis to make claims about generalizability, have focused on a medium number of cases (that is, roughly 8 to 20 cases) (see, for example, Huntington 1991, Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996, Collier 1999).

remains to be learned by cross-time comparisons and a re-analysis, in light of new theories, of the older cases of transitions discussed by Barrington Moore (1966), Reinhard Bendix (1978), and Michael Mann (1987, 1993).

In addition, qualitative research can make contributions by broadening the variation on the dependent variable it seeks to explain. The existing literature has tended to focus on positive cases and has introduced variation longitudinally by studying the process whereby countries that were authoritarian become democratic, and through the concept of modes of transition (Mainwaring 1992: 317-26). Beyond this, some insightful work has been done comparing cases of transitions that led to democracy but also to other outcomes (Collier and Collier 1991, Yashar 1997, Snyder 1998, Mahoney 2001). But, overall, when it comes to events in recent decades, little attention has been given to the need to explain failed democratic transitions, that is, cases where transitions from authoritarian regimes did not occur or lead to new authoritarian regimes.[13] Indeed, important questions that remain to be fully answered are: why did many countries that saw the collapse of authoritarian regimes during the last quarter of the 20th century experience transitions that did not lead to democracy? And, why have some countries not had transitions at all? Especially inasmuch as this research is explicitly connected to the existing literature and both draws upon its strengths and hones in on its lingering problems, the continued use of qualitative methods focused on these and other questions is likely to be highly rewarding.

The quantitative research track, in turn, is likely to contribute to the debate inasmuch as it addresses two tasks. One is the need for statistical research that is more keenly aware of problems of omitted variables and endogeneity, and hence that is more concerned with matters of research design and is more closely connected to theory. A second, related task concerns the collection of data. Not only should data collection focus on factors other than the standard economic and institutional ones, which are the staple of statistical analyses. Data collection should also be driven by the need for data that reflect the unfolding of events more closely than the standard practice of gathering one observation per case per year. Indeed, the full benefits of statistical tools are likely to be felt in the debate on democratic transitions only once data sets are generated with information on the actors involved in the process of democratic transitions, the choices these actors make, the sequence of events whereby democratic transitions unfold, and the institutional setting in which actors operate.

The tasks facing quantitative researchers are formidable but they promise important payoffs; thus, they are well worth pursuing. It is this sort of research that will finally bring the strengths of distinct research traditions to

13 See, however, the discussion of post-Soviet cases in McFaul (2002) and Collins (2006), of the Middle East in Bellin (2004) and Anderson (2006), and of China in Pei (1994, 2006).

bear on the same research question, rather than remain as two somewhat disconnected approaches that never quite talk to each other. Indeed, a multitrack approach, if properly implemented, could offer an important stepping-stone and gradually give way to a truly multi-method approach that would show how qualitative and quantitative research can be conducted in a complementary fashion.

3.2. Beyond Democratic Transitions

3.2.1. The Subject Matter

Research on the politics that follows the completion of democratic transitions is harder to assess than research on democratic transitions for the simple reason that there is a lack of consensus concerning the subject matter. Moreover, some ways of defining the subject matter do not offer a clearly delimited focus for research. Overall, the agenda put forth by what might be labeled regime analysts does share certain common elements. Thus, it can be contrasted as a whole with the voluminous research on narrower, institutional issues, which are standard in the study of advanced democracies and are increasingly a concern of students of new democracies.[14] This commonality notwithstanding, regime analysts have conceptualized post-transitional politics in such diverse ways that the organization of the field of research around clearly defined questions has been hampered.

The core of the problem is as follows. Initially, one concept—democratic consolidation—was widely used as a way to identify the subject matter of interest. This concept was useful. It helped to identify issues that went beyond those discussed in the literature on democratic transitions. And it provided an overarching frame for theorizing (Schmitter 1995, Schedler 1998, Merkel 1998, Hartlyn 2002). However, over time this concept was used in such different ways that it ended up creating severe confusion. Then, as a way to clarify the agenda of research, scholars gradually introduced a new concept, the quality of democracy.[15] But this new concept was itself defined in such a variety of different ways that it did little to solve the problems

14 Institutional issues are of obvious relevance to fundamental questions in regime analysis. This much is evident, for example, from the debate over the relative impact of consociational versus majoritarian arrangements, and presidentialism versus parliamentarism, on the durability of democracies. But institutionalists more frequently take the democratic nature of the regime for granted, while regime analysts are explicitly concerned with the ongoing salience of the democracy question.

15 Przeworski et al. (1995: 64), Linz and Stepan (1996: 137-38, 200), Linz (1997: 406, 417-23), Diamond (1999: 28, 132), Huber and Stephens (1999: 774), Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Toka (1999: 4-9), O'Donnell, Vargas Cullell and Iazzetta (2004), Diamond and Morlino (2005).

associated with the concept of democratic consolidation. Indeed, the concepts of democratic consolidation and the quality of democracy used by scholars have varied so much that research could simply not build around a clear set of shared questions.

To move forward, hence, some basic terminological and conceptual choices must be made. First, with regard to democratic consolidation, it is probably best, as some researchers have suggested, to simply jettison the term "democratic consolidation" (O'Donnell 1996) and focus instead on democratic stability, understood as involving nothing more than the sustainability or durability of the democracy defined in Schumpeterian terms, which result from successful democratic transitions. Second, with regard to the quality of democracy, it is necessary to make some theoretically based decisions concerning the concept that would serve to specify precisely how this agenda is distinct from those of democratic transitions and democratic stability. Indeed, these choices are essential to future progress in the field of democracy studies.

3.2.2. Democratic Stability

A focus on democratic stability, as opposed to democratic consolidation, helps to articulate a delimited yet still relevant subject matter. Indeed, research on democratic stability focuses on a clear question, why have some democracies been more stable than others? And the relevance of this question is hard to dispute. Very few countries have followed the path of Great Britain, which moved toward democracy without ever suffering any major reversal of its democratic gains. Thus, the potential breakdown of democracy has been an important concern of students of democracy.

In the context of Western Europe, the history of France offers dramatic evidence of the potential for democratic reversals. In turn, the interwar period not only gave us the paradigmatic case of breakdown, Weimar Germany, but also showed how the breakdown of democracy could become a widespread phenomenon (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000, 2002). And the collapse of democracy in Greece in 1967 showed that even post-World War II Europe was not immune to the forces that could lead to an authoritarian backlash.

Beyond Western Europe, the history of post-World War II Latin America is punctuated by frequent democratic breakdowns, including the dramatic replacement of democracies by harsh authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, the African continent witnessed the breakdown of numerous democracies in the early post-colonial period, and the history of important cases such as Nigeria is essentially one of the oscillation between democracy and authoritarianism. Even in Asia, where India provides a nota-

ble exception,[16] cases such as Pakistan are a reminder of the lack of guarantees that the establishment of democracy does not always lead to democratic stability.

Finally, even the most recent wave of democratization did not end the continued relevance of concerns about democratic stability. In Russia, the closing and bombing of the parliament in 1993, the serious doubts about whether elections were going to be held in 1996, and the lack of basic freedoms during the Putin years, helped drive this point home. Developments in Belarus under Lukashenka, added further weight to worries about the erosion of democracy in post-communist countries. Even more unambiguously, democratic breakdowns in several cases in Latin America (Haiti 1991 and 2004, Peru 1992, Ecuador 2000), Africa (Nigeria 1983, Sudan 1989, Niger 1996, Sierra Leone 1997, Ivory Coast 1999, Central African Republic 2003, Guinea-Bissau 2003) and Asia (Thailand 1991 and 2006, Pakistan 1999) raised concerns about the potential of significant democratic losses. In short, democratic stability offers a more tractable object of analysis and one that has been and continues to be of great relevance.

Findings

A focus on the more delimited subject matter of democratic stability also greatly aids the task of sorting through the large relevant literature and uncovering findings.[17] Much of this research, and especially the qualitative research, relies on the concept of democratic consolidation. But it is usually possible to separate out a narrower understanding of consolidation as stability. And it is also possible to identify some surprising and some not so surprising findings on this delimited subject matter.

It is worth highlighting at the outset that a set of factors that were considered as potential determinants of the durability of democracy have been

16 But even this exception is somewhat tainted by the restrictions placed on Indian democracy during the 1975–77 years.

17 The research on democratic stability, much as that on democratic transitions, draws on various approaches. It includes important regional studies, on Latin America (Karl 1990, Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela 1992), Southern Europe (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995, Morlino 1998), Eastern Europe (Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998, Tismaneanu 1999, Janos 2000), and Africa (Joseph 1997, Wiseman 1999, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, Lindberg 2006). Noteworthy works also offer cross-regional analyses, comparing southern Europe and Latin America (Higley and Gunther 1992), Latin America with East and Southeast Asia (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: Part III), southern Europe and Eastern Europe (Maravall 1997), southern Europe and Latin America with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Linz and Stepan 1996, Przeworski et al. 1995, Diamond 1999), and Asia with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Shin and Lee 2003). Moreover, thinking about democratic stability has been influenced by statistical studies to a greater extent than has research on democratic transitions (Remmer 1990, 1991, 1996, Diamond 1992, Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Power and Gasiorowski 1997, Gasiorowski and Power 1998, Mainwaring 2000, Hadenius and Teorell 2005).

shown not to have much explanatory power. This applies to various propositions about the impact of the old regime and the modality of transition to democracy (Karl 1990, Karl and Schmitter 1991),[18] sequencing of economic and political reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 1992, Przeworski 1991: 180-87), economic performance and crises (Przeworski 1991: 32, 188), the strength of civil society and political parties (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992: 6, 49-50, 156, Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 1-2, 21-28), and the presidential or parliamentary form of democracy (Linz 1994).[19] In brief, countries that became democratic since 1974 display a tremendous amount of variation with regard to these explanatory factors, yet they have had a fairly common outcome: a durable democracy. Moreover, even departures from this trend toward democratic stability do not appear to be strongly correlated to these factors.

This research has also produced some positive findings about the conditions of democratic stability. To a considerable extent, the evidence confirms Dankwart Rustow's (1970) broad proposition that the causes of the origins of democracy are likely to be different from those that account for the stability of democracy (see also O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 65-66). Most notably, this proposition is supported by the finding that even if economic development is not a determinant of democratic transitions, the part of Seymour Lipset's (1959, 1960) old hypothesis that states that there is an association between the level of economic development and the stability of democracy does hold (Przeworski and Limongi 1997).[20]

But Rustow's proposition should not be pushed too far. Indeed, another old hypothesis that has received empirical support concerns the argument that

18 See also Valenzuela (1992: 73-78), Linz and Stepan (1996: Ch. 4), and Munck and Leff (1997).

19 Concerning Linz's (1994) hypotheses that parliamentary democracies are more stable than presidential democracies, some tests indicate strong support for the argument that parliamentary forms of government better promote democratic stability (Linz and Valenzuela 1994a, 1994b, Stepan and Skach 1993, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 1996), but others purport to show equally strong support for the argument that presidential forms of government also promote democratic stability (Shugart and Carey 1992, Mainwaring 1993, Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a, 1997b, Power and Gasiorowski 1997). As various authors have stated, more plausible hypotheses would have to focus on variations within the broad choice between parliamentary and presidential forms of government, as well as consider the link between the power of presidents and the other institutional features such as the fragmentation of the party system and party discipline (Shugart and Carey 1992, Mainwaring 1993, Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a, 1997b). It is unclear, however, whether such hypotheses would refer to the likelihood of the survival of democracy as opposed to the variable workings of stable democracies.

20 See also Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000: Ch. 2), Diamond (1992), Geddes (1999), and Mainwaring (2000). For a theory and empirical test that shows why economic development can have a different impact on democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns, see Gould and Maggio (2007). However, for a skeptical view of the argument that economic development accounts for democratic stability, see Robinson (2006: 519-24).

democratic stability is less likely in plural societies or multinational states (Dahl 1971: 108-11, Powell 1982: 40-53, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995: 42-43), even if, as Arend Lijphart (1977, 1984) stresses, this negative factor is mediated and potentially ameliorated by elite choices and power sharing arrangements (see also Dahl 1989: 254-60, Linz 1997: 414-14).[21] Thus, what might be labeled as the national question seems to affect, in broadly the same manner, the prospects of democratic transition and democratic stability.

Another finding is that, much as there are multiple paths to democracy, so too are there multiple equilibria that can sustain democracy. This basic thesis is best established in research on the orientation of class actors in more equal and less equal countries. In more equal countries, as research on post-World War II Western Europe shows, a class compromise underpins the stability of democracy (Przeworski 1985, Boix 2003). In this scenario, democratic stability was premised on a political exchange, whereby the moderation of the demands of labor and the left—a key goal of elites—is exchanged for redistributive policies, which is a core demand of mass actors. Both elites and masses, thus, have an incentive to accept democracy. In less equal countries, in contrast, a class compromise does not represent an equilibrium. As evidence from Latin America during the 1950s to 1970s shows, the redistributive consequences of democracy threatened elite interests and thus weakened the commitment of elites to democracy (O'Donnell 1973, 1999: Ch. 1). Thus, democratic stability in less equal countries rests on a different basis: the breaking, rather than the establishment, of any link between democracy and redistribution.

The stability of the democracies that emerged in less equal countries in the post-1974 period can then be related to two sets of factors. The potential destabilization of democracy due to the polarization of politics has been reduced due to the weakening of popular sector actors and labor as a result of recent experiences with authoritarian rule (Drake 1996, Munck 1998: Ch. 7) and the conscious lowering of expectations and self-restraint, especially among the left, which is a result of a learning process begun in the context of repressive, authoritarian regimes (McCoy 1999, Mainwaring 2000). Yet, more broadly, democratic stability is also the result of the widespread adoption of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Put in different words, because democracy in these countries is currently not associated with redistribution, business elites, who previously felt threatened by democracy and

21 One institutional proposal that has been the focus of much discussion is federalism. Some authors argue that federalism is a particularly apt institutional choice for multinational societies (Stepan 2004). However, others show that at least under certain circumstances ethnofederalism can be destabilizing and lead to the breakup of the state (Hale 2004).

frequently sought to undermine democracy, have come to accept democracy (Payne and Bartell 1995, Huber and Stephens 1999: 775-80).[22]

Finally, research has also shown that democratic stability is influenced by international factors. Much as transitions to democracy, the stability of democracy is aided when neighboring countries, a country's region and the global context are more democratic (Gleditsch and Ward 2006, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2007). In addition, joining international organizations with high membership of democratic states increases the probability that democracies will endure (Pevehouse 2005: Ch. 6).

Challenges

The accomplishments of this literature notwithstanding, scholars of democratic stability face a series of challenges that are quite similar to those discussed in the context of research on democratic transitions. With regard to the manner in which democratic stability, the dependent variable in this research, is measured, the problem and the solution are largely the same as in the literature on democratic transitions. Indeed, though discussions of the erosion, in contrast to the breakdown, of democracy introduce nuance in the discussion of democratic stability, there is still a need for explicit criteria for distinguishing changes *of* regime, that is, from a democratic to an authoritarian regime, from changes *within* democracy. This challenge, it bears noting, is simply the flip side of the challenge of measuring democratic transitions. Thus, it does not constitute a new challenge in the context of the broader study of democracy.

A second challenge concerns the pressing need for integration of causal theories. Some scholars have proposed causal factors that are structural in nature and focus primarily on economic aspects (Lipset 1959, 1960, O'Donnell 1973, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Others have emphasized the explanatory significance of a range of institutional arrangements (Shugart and Carey 1992). And yet others advance theories that stress the importance of choice (Linz 1978) and strategic issues (Przeworski 1991: Ch. 1, O'Donnell 1992). As scholars have argued, each of these types of factors

22 This basic point can be fleshed out further. As Boix (2003: 38-44) argues, democratic stability is affected by the types of assets owned by elites and, specifically, is positively correlated with factor mobility (see also Rogowski 1998 and Wood 2000). In this argument, then, the turn to neoliberalism has a positive effect on democratic stability in that it has increased the credibility of the threat of capital flight, which induces moderation among the poor and reduces the likelihood that electoral majorities would even propose redistributive policies, and hence makes democracy acceptable to elites. This argument has some distinct implications. First, it suggests that the moderation of labor and the left can be induced by globalization as much as by harsh authoritarian rule. Second, and relatedly, it points to the possibility that the rare and happy coincidence of democracy and prosperity that was the trademark of post-World War II Europe may become rarer as neoliberalism takes root.

seems to have some explanatory power; hence, a theory that ignored any of these types of factors would be incomplete. The problem, however, is that with a few exceptions (Lijphart 1977, Collier and Collier 1991), this literature has treated these variables in isolation even though processes affecting the stability of democracy unfold simultaneously at the various levels of analysis tapped by these variables. Thus, further progress on research on democratic stability is likely to require efforts to connect different types of explanatory factors and generate a more parsimonious and powerful theory that integrates the long list of explanatory factors highlighted by existing causal theory.[23]

A third challenge that scholars of democratic stability face concerns causal assessment. Statistical analysis has been more common in the study of democratic stability than that of democratic transition. Thus, the need to find ways to combine literatures using different methods is a prime concern. As with the literature on democratic transition, however, future research on democratic stability would still benefit from a multi-track approach. Specifically, qualitative researchers are likely to derive important payoffs from efforts to extend their comparative analyses beyond the current successes and failures to secure stable democracies. This might include comparisons with older positive experiences, especially the successful post-World War II record of Western Europe (Przeworski 1985, Maier 1987: Ch. 4).[24] Moreover, it might address older cases of democratic breakdown, either by revisiting the well-researched cases of interwar Europe (Linz and Stepan 1978, Luebbert 1991, Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992: Ch. 4[25]) and Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s (O'Donnell 1973, Collier 1979, Collier and Collier 1991, Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992: Ch. 5), or analyzing the failure to establish stable democracies in Africa and Asia in the early post-colonial period (Collier 1982, Young 1988).[26]

The tasks faced by researchers who use statistical methods are much the same as those they face in the context of the study of democratic transition. Indeed, a key problem is that quantitative research on democratic stability has assessed only a limited number of independent variables. Virtually all studies

23 Weingast (1997) offers a noteworthy effort from a game-theoretic perspective to the task of integration and synthesis. He interestingly frames the issue as a problem of credible commitment and stresses how democratic stability may be threatened by those who are in power. But his model fails to acknowledge that democracy can also be threatened from above or below. Yet another line of research is implied by Schmitter's (1995) suggestion that scholars might focus on "partial regimes," a proposal which would focus on the challenge of integration by considering the interaction among various sites of politics rather than levels of analysis. See also Mahoney and Snyder (1999).

24 For a study that begins to address this comparison, see Alexander (2001).

25 See also Kurth (1979), Zimmermann (1988), Zimmermann and Saalfeld (1988), Linz (1992), Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (1994), and Ertman 1998).

26 For examples that revisit European and Latin American cases, see Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell (2000, 2002), Bermeo (2003), and Capoccia (2005).

concerned with democratic stability still consider the favorite factor of modernization theorists: level of socio-economic modernization. To this factor, others have been added. These include other facets of economic and social life, such as economic performance (Gasiorowski 1995, Gasiorowski and Power 1998), inequality (Midlarsky 1997) and political culture (Inglehart 1997). And, in what are probably the most significant departures, the quantitative literature has begun to consider political institutions (Stepan and Skach 1993, Mainwaring 1993, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 1996, Power and Gasiorowski 1997) and the international environment (Pevehouse 2005, Gleditsch and Ward 2006, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2007). In short, this literature is richer than the quantitative literature of the 1960s and 1970s.

However, statistical research on democratic stability has remained focused on easily measurable variables and has tended to ignore the role of actors and choices stressed by process-oriented theorists.[27] And, as a result, this research is unable to address the actor-centered theories that have been increasingly appreciated and theorized by qualitative researchers. Hence, the collection of data needed to assess the range of explanatory factors in the broader literature is an important task for quantitative scholars and one that would do much to foster a fruitful dialogue among quantitative and qualitative researchers about the causes of democratic stability.

3.2.3. The Quality of Democracy

The stability of democracy does not exhaust the post-transitions agenda of research. Rather, as numerous countries that democratized in the 1970s and 1980s faced no immediate threat of breakdown, scholars of democracy gradually began to suggest that other issues deserve attention. Essentially, even though more and more countries had made transitions to democracy and even though more and more countries remained democratic, these scholars sensed that they differed in quite fundamental ways and that these differences were not being captured by research on democratic transition and democratic stability. Thus, the need for a new agenda, on the quality of democracy, was recognized.[28]

This new agenda is at an early stage in its development compared with the well-established agendas of democratic transition and democratic stability. Thus, there is not much in terms of research and findings to report. Indeed,

27 A few attempts aside (see, for example, Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 1994: 270-74), most quantitative researchers have proceeded as though it were unfeasible to collect data on process-oriented factors (Gasiorowski and Power 1998: 742, 745).

28 A more extensive discussion of the points that follow is provided in Munck (2004: 450-56, 2007).

one of the most pressing challenges faced by scholars concerned with this line of thinking concerns the delimitation of the subject matter of research. This step in the research process is critical, in that the initial definition of the agenda charts out the boundaries of subsequent research, and demanding, in that it requires making complex conceptual choices in light of both theory and empirical information. Yet, some important clues regarding how to define this agenda are emerging and the steps needed to advance this agenda are also becoming clearer.

A key point of departure in the definition of a research agenda on the quality of democracy is that it addresses matters that go beyond a Schumpeterian conception of democracy. In other words, it differs from research on democratic transitions and stability, which focuses on the concept of electoral democracy, in that it seeks to address aspects of democracy that extend beyond the constitution of government and the question whether rulers gain access to office through free and fair elections. On this point, there is broad agreement: few dispute the need to broaden research so as to encompass more than electoral democracy. Moreover, even though differences remain concerning how far beyond electoral democracy this new agenda should go, current theory offers a basis for making such choices.

The work of Robert Dahl (1989) in particular offers a theoretical foundation for understanding the concept of democracy as involving governments constituted through free and fair elections, but also a process of public decision-making and the implementation of binding decisions that reflects the principle that voter preferences are weighed equally. Indeed, Dahl's concept of democracy, though procedural, is much broader than usually assumed and provides a theoretical basis for a research agenda that goes well beyond Schumpeterian-rooted agendas. And the question it gives rise to—why do the actions of states reflect the preferences of voters more or less equally?—is of utmost current political relevance. Thus, even as various conceptual questions are addressed, it is probably advisable that scholars start focusing on steps needed to empirically address this new question.

To this end, one key challenge concerns the production of data. Indeed, though a learning process regarding the measurement of electoral democracy is beginning to bear fruits, students of democracy have still to develop the measurement methodologies and measures needed to advance this agenda. Efforts to measure different aspects of democratic governance, including corruption, do offer some leads (Munck 2005). Thus, this work does not have to start from scratch. But the work to develop adequate measures to address this question has barely begun.

The other key challenge is the development of causal theory. Here again there are several useful leads in various literatures, and particularly those on corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999, Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002, Johnston 2005) and clientelism (Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981, Piattoni,

2001, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Moreover, the application of the principal-agent framework to the problem of democratic representation and accountability has yielded some valuable insights (Przeworski 2003, Shugart, Moreno and Crisp 2003). Yet some key issues remain to be tackled and hence further theorizing is called for. Most urgently, the interplay between politicians' preferences and their capacity to make and implement policies is a fundamental and complex issue that remains to be adequately treated.

But it is also important to note that this agenda is not only broader than the previous agendas on democratic transitions and stability but also subsumes these agendas. Thus, theorizing should build on and incorporate the explanatory factors that research on democratic transitions and stability has shown to be relevant. And theorizing should distinguish between questions of transition and stability, or change and order. Indeed, the goal of this new agenda should be to build a theory of democratization and democracy, much as the literature on democratic transitions and stability has done, but to anchor this theory in a broader concept of democracy, one that goes beyond democracy's electoral dimension.

3.3. Conclusion

The literature discussed in this chapter makes many valuable contributions to the study of politics around the world. It has addressed many normatively pressing problems and has produced many important findings. Even though it has not always focused on clearly articulated questions, as shown, it is possible to articulate its three core agendas in analytically tractable ways. Yet future progress in the field of democracy studies hinges on analysts' ability to face up to three closely interrelated challenges.

One challenge is the need to better measure the outcomes of interest. More pointedly, more disaggregated and more nuanced measures of dependent variables are needed. A second challenge is the development and especially the integration of causal theories. With regard to the study of the quality of democracy, developing theory is a key concern. But the study of democratic transitions and stability faces a different problem: the unwieldy proliferation of explanatory factors. Hence, the need for greater theoretical integration was stressed and three suggestions were offered: to rely on the lines along which theoretical debates have already been organized, to continue the search for theories that serve as unifying principles, and to recognize how analysts might integrate research findings regarding conceptually connected parts of a broad question.

Turning to the third challenge, concerning causal assessment, the ideal to be pursued in this field of studies is a multi-method approach that considers the trade-offs associated with small-N and large-N methods and taps into the

strengths of small-N methods (the generation of rich data, the sensitivity to the unfolding of processes over time, the focus on causal mechanisms) and of large-N methods (the emphasis on systematic cross-case and over-time comparison, the concern with generalizability, the formulation of precise estimates of causal effect and statistical significance). There are good reasons, however, why such a multi-method approach is hard to use in practice. Thus, the need for large-N data sets on key, processual variables, and for statistical analysis based on stronger research designs, was discussed. And some suggestions concerning small-N research projects that are most likely to yield important benefits were presented. Finally, the hope that a multi-track approach would give way to a genuine multi-method approach was expressed.

In sum, the field of democracy has made significant strides but still faces important challenges. In this sense, it constitutes an exciting research agenda. Researchers on democracy have opened up and continue to open up new substantive agendas and have generated some important findings. Moreover, the issues addressed by this field of study put it in dialogue with some of the main debates about theory and methods in comparative politics. Students of democracy focus consistently on core issues of modern politics, the conflict over how the power of the state is accessed and used. In turn, the study of democracy is a site of important methodological innovations and a substantive field where a range of methodological issues have come into sharp focus. In short, the study of democracy is a vibrant research program.

4. Determinants of Democratization: Taking Stock of the Large-*N* Evidence

Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius

4.1. Introduction

Since the third wave of democracy peaked some 10 years ago, large-*n* studies of the determinants of democratization have expanded across space and time, covering more countries and longer time periods. In terms of the theories tested and variables employed, however, most analyses have been highly specialized, focussing on the effects of but one or a few major explanatory factors. A large number of studies have assessed the effect on democracy of economic development and socioeconomic modernization (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994; Helliwell 1994; Londregan and Poole 1996; Barro 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix & Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006), whereas others have largely focused on the impact of economic crises (Gasiorowski 1995; Bernard et al. 2001, 2003), resource wealth (Ross 2001), colonial heritage (Bernard et al. 2004), or international factors such as globalization (Li and Reuveny 2003; Rudra 2005) and diffusion effects (O'Loughlin et al. 1998; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Brinks & Coppedge 2006).

Without denying the merits of specialization, we shall argue that this large-*n* literature has serious limitations. To begin with, the results pertaining to each determinant of democratization may be incorrect if the assessment is not performed in the context of all relevant controls. In other words, specialization may lead to erroneous conclusions even with respect to the one or few explanatory variables under study.

Second, and equally important, these previous studies do not address the question of how far all hypothesized determinants together can take us in explaining movements to and from democracy. The latest most comprehensive large-*n* study even reached the conclusion that, whereas democratic survival "is quite easily predictable", transitions to democracy appear to be explained by chance factors (Przeworski et al. 2000, 137). If that really proves to be the case, it would lend support to the anti-structural, actor-oriented, "no preconditions"-approach to democratization proffered in particular by Rustow (1970) and O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), an approach which played a key part in the "transition paradigm" recently proclaimed dead (Carothers 2002). Apart from the distinction between transitions toward

or away from democracy, however, the question of overall explanatory performance could critically hinge upon the time perspective applied. What may appear unpredictable and erratic in the short-run sometimes turn out to be stable and predictable in the long-run. As a matter of fact, O'Donnell and Schmitter were themselves well aware of this in that they did not deny "the long-run causal impact of 'structural' (including macroeconomic, world systemic, and social class) factors". Their assertions regarding the non-structural determinants of democratic transitions only concerned short-term dynamics (1986, 4–5).

In this chapter we propose to remedy the problem of specialization in the large-*n* literature on democratization by drawing on a considerably expanded range of available cross-sectional time-series data. Using a combination of two predominant democracy indices, we purport to explain variations in democracy over time across 142 countries over the period 1972-2000. These analyses break new ground on several accounts. First, in terms of the range of explanatory variables entered into our models, we outperform most, if not all, earlier studies in the field. Second, we present some novel findings pertaining to factors hitherto not tested on a global scale. This particularly concerns the democratizing effects of mass protest, a posited determinant of democratization which hitherto has attracted limited attention in large-*n* studies. Third, although we deploy a graded measure of democracy, we make an effort to test whether different determinants affect movements in different directions along the democracy scale. In other words, we endeavour to separate the effects on movements towards as well as reversals from the democratic end of the graded scale. Fourth, we systematically explore the effects as well as the overall predictive performance of these determinants in both the short-run and long-run perspective. To the best of our knowledge, the third and fourth endeavors have never before been systematically undertaken.

Our results indicate that the most important determinants of democratization or the lack thereof are the share of Muslims in the population, the degree of religious fractionalization, country size, the level of socioeconomic development, natural resource abundance in terms of oil, trade dependence, short-term economic performance, democratic diffusion among neighboring states, membership in democratic regional organizations, and the frequency of peaceful anti-government demonstrations. Taken together, however, these determinants display a strikingly poor explanatory performance in the short-run; this particularly concerns models of reversals toward authoritarianism, but applies for movements toward democracy as well. Yet in the long-run perspective the explanatory performance can be deemed fairly satisfactory. Thus, what were considered to be well-established structural predictors of democracy, these do not take us very far in understanding short-term changes. They do however help explain the long-run equilibrium levels of democracy towards which countries gravitate.

The chapter is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the previous research on explaining democratization. We then present our research design, followed by the results. We conclude by summing up and discussing implications for future work in the field.

4.2. Explaining Democratization

Theories purporting to explain why some countries develop and sustain democratic regimes whereas other remain or become authoritarian have not been cast in a single mold (see also chapter 1 above) .At least four theoretical approaches may be distinguished in the literature. The first, which we shall focus on here, is the structural perspective, seeking to locate the most significant triggers of democratic advancement outside the immediate reach of human agency: in the economy, in society at large, or in the international environment. Lipset (1959) stands out as the most important forerunner of this tradition. A second approach, which we have already touched upon, is the strategic approach, also dubbed the "transition paradigm" (Carothers 2002). According to this view, the installation of a democratic regime is largely explained through a process of strategic elite interaction, where the indeterminate process of democratization itself in large parts explains its outcome (see, e.g., Rustow 1970; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Casper and Taylor 1996). A third approach, emanating from the work of Moore (1966), is the "social forces" tradition (Bellin 2000). By locating the origins of democracy in organized interests and collective action in society, this approach blends structural with actor-centric perspectives (see, e.g., Rueschemeyer et al. 1994; Collier 1999). Fourth, in recent years a new approach to explaining democratization has appeared. Deploying theoretical tools common in economics, most notably by anchoring macro-level predictions in game theoretical models of self-interested economic micro behavior, this emerging literature has begun to cast new light on the determinants of democratization (see, in particular, Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).

We should make it clear from the outset that this review does not purport to pay equal attention to all these theoretical traditions, nor all hypothesized determinants of democratization. Our focus is limited to explanatory factors that have been put forward within the structural tradition, and that are amenable to testing in a cross-sectional time-series setting. We distinguish among three types of determinants of democratization to be reviewed below: domestic economic, domestic social, and international factors.[1]

1 We do not cover institutional determinants, neither democratic institutions such as electoral systems or forms of government, nor authoritarian institutions such as types of dictatorship. The reason is that these institutions are endogenous features of the two systems we want to explain shifts to and from. In a recent paper, however, we find that some types of authori-

We are thus not interested in testing or developing a particular theory of democratization, but in assessing a broad range of theories or empirical regularities that emerge from previous large-*n* studies on the topic. Having said this, we will in a way pay attention to the non-structural perspectives, too. The strategic approach will indirectly be assessed in terms of the residual variance in democratization that our long list of structural determinants does not explain. The social forces tradition will be assessed in terms of one of its key predictions: that democratization occurs as the response to large-scale popular mobilization. The economic approach, finally, will in the concluding section serve to illustrate the need for a more integrated theory of democratization to be developed in the future.

4.2.1. Domestic Economic Determinants

Since the seminal article by Lipset (1959), there have been countless studies confirming that one of the most stable determinants of democracy across the globe is the level of socioeconomic modernization. For the most part, this empirical support has been based on measures of modernization in terms of economic development, such as energy consumption and GDP per capita. This pertains both to earlier cross-sectional studies (for an overview, see Diamond 1992) and to the more recent tests based on pooled time-series data (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994; Helliwell 1994; Londregan and Poole 1996; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Barro 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix & Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006). In Lipset's (1959) original account, as well as in the early studies following in its wake (Cutright 1963; Neubauer 1967; Olsen 1968; Winham 1970), however, a much wider range of indicators of socioeconomic development was employed. Apart from national income they included industrialization, education, urbanization and communications. According to modernization theorists these developmental processes should be viewed as parts of one underlying syndrome, socioeconomic modernization, which eventually enhances democratic development (Lerner 1958; Deutsch 1961). This broader theoretical underpinning for the Lipset hypothesis has received surprisingly little attention by the more recent comparative democratization literature. In this chapter we try to remedy this situation by treating socioeconomic modernization as a coherent syndrome with multiple observable indicators.[2]

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tarian institutions, most notably limited multi-party systems, appear to enhance the prospects for democratization (Hadenius and Teorell 2007).

2 A particular version of the modernization hypothesis is Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) cultural theory of democratization. Apart from not being amenable to testing on time-series cross-section data, we question the tenacity of this theory elsewhere (Hadenius and Teorell 2005b; Teorell and Hadenius 2006).

We also attempt to reassess the widely cited finding by Przeworski et al. (2000) that socioeconomic modernization does not trigger transitions to democracy, but instead helps to sustain democracies once installed. This finding has been amply criticized on empirical grounds (Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006), but rarely without clinging to a discrete measure of dictatorships and democracies.[3] By separating the effects on upturns from downturns, as discussed below, we perform a systematic test of this finding using a graded democracy scale.

A theoretical argument that has developed alongside the modernization hypothesis has been concerned with the impact of economic performance (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 1997). The large-*n* empirical support for this contention has mostly been based on yearly growth rates as the measure of performance, and on dichotomous conceptions of the dependent variable, basically indicating whether regimes are authoritarian or democratic. Two findings have been predominant. On the one hand, that growth is negatively related to transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule, or, inversely, that authoritarian regimes fall under the pressure of economic crisis (Gasiorowski 1995; Remmer 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000). On the other hand, growth has been shown to positively affect democratic survival, implying that democracies too are vulnerable to economic crises (Przeworski et al. 2000; Bernard et al. 2001, 2003). These results do not translate easily into contexts where graded measures of democracy are being used. They could however imply that the coefficients for economic performance should be differently signed depending on the direction of change in the democracy scale, which might explain why the few studies that have tested them on graded measures have produced weak and inconsistent results.[4]

A more robust finding appears to be the anti-democratic effect of natural resource abundance. In a set of regressions predicting the development of democracy over time, Ross (2001) found that both the abundance of oil and of other non-fuel minerals as the primary sources of national exports had a markedly negative effect on the prospects for democratization. Earlier studies purporting to show the negative impact of oil had only made cursory remarks on the ill-performance of democratic governance in a few oil producing countries on the Arabian Peninsula (Helliwell 1994; Barro 1997, 1999). Ross (2001), by contrast, was able to show that the effect occurred on a global scale, and pertained to other sources of strongly profitable materials. Ac-

3 The one exception we are aware of is Acemoglu et al. (2005), who (in Table 12) make use of the same technique as we in order to separate the effects of transition toward and away from democracy.

4 Using the same democracy index (Polity), but different controls, Londregan and Poole (1996) found a negative but small short-term impact of growth on democratization, whereas Li and Reuveny (2003) found no effect of growth but a positive effect of inflation that decreased over time.

cording to Ross the relationship is due to the development of a "rentier state" in countries rich in natural resource wealth. Regimes that are predominantly reliant on such vast resources are capable of using both the carrot (tax cuts and patronage) and the stick (repression) to hold contestation at bay.

4.2.2. Domestic Social Determinants

Apart from the economic factors, a large number of other domestic determinants have been suggested in the literature. One is the sheer size of a country's population. There is an old school of thought arguing that democracy should be more likely to prosper in smaller countries. Another well-established presumption is that democracy's prospects are dimmed by social heterogeneity. Religiously or ethnically diverse societies, the argument goes, are more prone to intercommunal conflict and hence are less likely to democratize (see, e.g., Hadenius 1992, 112-4, 122-5; Fish and Brooks 2004).

A longstanding debate concerns the effects of colonialism on a country's prospects for democracy. This literature has pointed to the fact that colonialism has been associated with underdevelopment and high levels of social fractionalization, which in turn impede democratic development. Usually the effect of colonialism is not assumed constant across different colonial powers. Most importantly, a British colonial legacy has been assumed more conducive to democracy than the effect of other colonizers. On most accounts the Britons supposedly were better at nurturing self-government and a more independent civil society in their colonies (Bernard et al. 2004, 227-32).[5]

Yet another non-economic determinant of democracy is religious tradition. Various scholars have asserted that Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam and Confucianism should be expected to negatively impact on the prospects for democracy, whereas Protestantism should be positively linked with democracy. According to Lipset (1993, 5), "These differences have been explained by (1) the much greater emphasis on individualism in Protestantism and (2) the traditionally close links between religion and the state in the other four religions".

In a recent study Barro (1999) tested the effects on democratization of these non-economic determinants, once the level of socioeconomic development was controlled for. He found only a marginally significant negative effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and no effect of country size or

5 In two much-cited articles Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2002) argue that colonial origins determine a country's institutional quality and long-run levels of growth. There are two reasons why we do not address this theory. First, Acemoglu et al. only purport to explain variations among former colonies, whereas our assessment includes non-colonies as well. Second, Acemoglu et al. do not discuss different legacies of the colonizing countries, which is what the democratization literature on colonialism has been concerned with.

colonial history. The only significant predictor in this set of variables turned out to be the size of the Muslim population, which had a markedly negative impact. A negative impact of the size of the Muslim population was also found by Ross (2001), but vanished once he introduced a dummy for countries residing in the Middle East and Africa. Stepan and Robertson (2003, 2004) also urge us to rethink the seemingly negative impact of Muslim majority countries in terms of a contextual effect peculiar to the Arab world.

Before leaving the domestic scene, we shall take note of a possibly more proximate trigger of democratic transitions operating at the societal level: popular mobilization. In the founding texts of the transition literature, mainly derived from the experience of democratization in Southern Europe and Latin America, the analytical focus was almost entirely directed at the elite level. Democracy in these countries appeared to have been brought about in the context of demobilized masses (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Although this view has been challenged empirically in more recent accounts of the same region (Bermeo 1997; Collier 1999), the contrast still seems sharp in relation to the subsequent collapse of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. In these instances, collective action on behalf of the mass public appears to have been a widely occurring phenomenon, with allegedly democracy enhancing effects (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 83f.; Geddes 1999, 120; McFaul 2002, 222f.; Bunce 2003, 171-8). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that democratization in both Western Europe and Latin America in the early 20th century followed in the wake of social unrest and popular mass action (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 67-8, 71-3).

From a theoretical perspective, this is what we should expect if the "social forces" approach to explaining democratization should prove to be correct. Strike activity should thus be one form of popular mobilization predicted to impact on democratization, particularly within the strand of this tradition that emphasizes the importance of organized labor (Rueschemeyer et al. 1994; Collier 1999). But an effect of more general forms of protest activity undertaken by other groups in society, including both violent clashes and peaceful demonstrations, could also be conjectured (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Gill 2000; Wood 2001). Although less attention has been paid to the subject lately, there also seems to be a growing awareness of an older tradition claiming that popular mobilization may not be unreservedly beneficial for democracy (Bermeo 2003; Armony 2004).

In light of these observations there are surprisingly few large-*n* studies of the possible effect that popular mobilization may exert on democratization. To our knowledge only two other global studies relate to the effect of popular mobilization (Lipset et al. 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000), but neither of them makes this assessment in dynamic equations explaining regime change. We thus concur with Coppedge's verdict that "[t]he true impact of political mobilization … remains an open question" (2003, 125).

4.2.5. International Determinants

There is a large and growing literature on factors impeding or enhancing democratization at the international level. An old school of thought in this regard are the so-called dependency theorists (for an overview, see Hadenius 1992, 91-3). They claimed that international capitalist exchange involving trade and investments favored wealthy international "centers" at the expense of the poor "periphery", which was exploited. In order to maintain such relations democratic rule in peripheral countries is stifled, according to dependency theorists, since authoritarian leaders supposedly are more receptive to the interests of the international economic centers.

However, most of the early cross-sectional tests of the dependency predictions produced weak or inconsistent support. In a recent account—although couched in the language of "globalization", presently more in vogue—Li and Reuveny (2003) tested some of the old predictions in a cross-sectional time-series setting. Interestingly, their results by and large confirm dependency theory. According to their findings, both trade openness and portfolio investments inflows negatively affect democratization. And while foreign direct investment inflows—their third indicator of globalization—had a positive impact, it has weakened over time. They concluded by stating that "the economic aspects of integration into the world economy are beginning to cause a decline in national democratic governance" (2003, 53).

Li and Reuveny (2003), however, found a positive effect of another facet of international dependence: the spread of democratic ideas across countries, or what is usually referred to as democratic diffusion. To systematically assess such external diffusion or demonstration effects with large-*n* data is a fairly novel enterprise. Yet hitherto the evidence has by and large been confirming expectations. Diffusion has been showed to affect democratization both at the most proximate level of neighbour states, at the level of world regions, and at the global level (Starr 1991; O'Loughlin et al. 1998; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Gleditsch and Ward 2006).

In a recent book, Pevehouse (2005) suggests another potent non-domestic determinant of democratization: regional international organizations. With a mixture of case-study and statistical evidence, Pevehouse demonstrates that homogenously democratic regional organizations can pressure authoritarian member states to undertake democratic reforms, socialize military and economic elites into accepting democratic procedures, and bind newly elected elites in fledgling democracies to these reforms once committed. In this way, membership in democratic regional organizations, according to Pevehouse (2005), both precipitates movements toward democracy and enhances democratic survival.

Most of these studies of international determinants have, however, not assessed the impact of globalization, diffusion and regional organizations net of all other domestic influences of democratization. As should be evident, what appears to be a diffusion linkage between two countries could disappear once possible confounding factors simultaneously affecting democracy in both countries are taken into account. Basically the same goes for economic dependence and shared membership in regional international organizations. In this chapter we try to remedy this by assessing international effects in the context of more fully specified models.

In sum, there is a large literature specialized in different global determinants of democratization. What has gone missing along the road to specialized knowledge is a test of what effects remain in the presence of the full possible set of controls, and an overall assessment of how well all determinants, when taken as a whole, predict movements to and from democracy. Moreover, few studies have tried to separate direct from indirect effects, and short-run from long-run performance.[6] This is exactly the kind of assessment we purport to make in this chapter.

4.3. Data and Research Design

The dependent variable in our study is based on two well-established graded measures of democracy: the average scores of political rights and civil liberties reported by Freedom House (2003), and the revised combined autocracy and democracy scores derived from the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). A previous study has shown that despite their high inter-correlation the democracy indices reported by Freedom House and Polity may produce different results (Casper and Tufis 2003). Whereas Munck and Verkuilen (2002) limit their discussion to the methodological strengths and weaknesses of these indices (see also chapter 2), we show in a recent paper that both are actually subject to systematic measurement error. Polity tends to underestimate the limits of political freedoms, whereas Freedom House underestimates the freedom and fairness of elections. To mitigate these tendencies, it makes sense to combine the two indices (Hadenius & Teorell 2005a). Hence, we first transform the Freedom House and Polity to vary between 0 ("least democratic") and 10 ("most democratic"), and then average them.

Using this combined democracy index implies both space and time limitations. In terms of time, the Freedom House data only pertain to the period

6 Partial exceptions are Barro (1999) and Londregan and Poole (1996). Barro computes the long-run forecasts of democracy for each country, but without reporting the long-run parameters. Londregan and Poole (1996), by contrast, report the long-run effect parameters but without computing the equilibrium democracy levels. None of them assess the long-run predictive performance.

from 1972 onwards. In terms of space, the Polity scores only cover countries with a minimum population of 500,000 in 2002. After taking missing data in the explanatory variables into account, this leaves us with a data set of 2628 annual observations in 142 countries of the world from 1972-2000.[7]

The results reported below are based on regression analysis, using yearly changes in the combined democracy index as dependent variable, and a series of measures of potential determinants of democratization as independent variables (see Appendix A for a detailed description of the variables). Although we give a more detailed account of the statistical model used in Appendix B, we would like to highlight some critical features of this model here.

First, we make important use of the temporal dimension of the data. To begin with, for all years we include our measures of the independent variables from the year before the dependent variable is measured. This is done in order to mitigate the problem of "reversed causation", that is, that the explanatory variables at least in part are also being caused by the dependent variable. We also include measures from previous years of the dependent variable itself in the model. There are both theoretical and methodological reasons for this. Substantially it makes sense to include this control for the past experience of democracy in a country, since democracy is a fairly sticky phenomenon: neither democracy nor autocracy is invented anew each year in every country. There is a lingering presence of the past, or "path dependence": having democracy (or not) today positively impacts on the incidence of having democracy (or not) tomorrow. Methodologically, the presence of this control most importantly "proxies" for a host of other potential determinants of democratization that cannot be measured but still might have affected a country's level of democracy at earlier time points.

The inclusion of previous levels of democracy in the model is also the key to our distinction between short-term and long-term effects and explanatory performance. Since the level of democracy in the previous year represents all changes in the dependent variable up until that time point, our direct estimates of the effects of all other explanatory variables only pertain to the change in democracy over this last year. This is our definition of a short-term effect. Democracy being a sticky phenomenon, however, the effect of a change in one independent variable also makes itself felt in more years to come. If the system of government in a country is perturbed by a shock in a given year, say a deep recession, then the effect of this shock will slowly dissipate, being strongest at the outset and then slowly loosing its strength over the years. The sum of all these yearly effects of a hypothetical change in a given independent variable is our definition of a long-term effect. How long

7 With respect to countries that have merged or split during the period of observation, we treat Germany as a continuation of West Germany, and Ethiopia as a continuation of itself before the secession of Eritrea.

it takes for such an effect to reach its limit depends on the degree of stickiness in the dependent variable, and is thus an empirical question. According to our estimates in the analyses that follow, it takes approximately 40 years for the full long-run effects in our models to occur.

In order to compare the explanatory performance in the short-run and the long-run, we make use of this same distinction in time horizons. In order to assess short-term performance, we simply compute a standard measure of model fit, such as the explained variance. This measure compares the predictions our model yields over a one year period to the actual yearly change in the level of democracy. In order to assess long-term performance, we must instead compare the actual level of democracy in a given year with the level of democracy that would ensue if all variables were allowed to experience their full long-run effects. We may think of this later state as the long-run equilibrium to which a country is attracted. The question of long-run explanatory performance then pertains to how far from this long-run equilibrium the level of democracy is in each country.

Finally, we take a simple approach to comparing the effects on movements toward and reversals away from the democratic end of the scale. Since the yearly change in level of democracy may be either positive (upturns) or negative (downturns), we simply run the same analysis after having set all downturns to zero in order to estimate the effect on upturns, and by setting all the upturns to zero in order to estimate the effects on downturns. By comparing these results together with the result when both upturns and downturns are considered jointly, we draw conclusions as to whether a particular determinant exerts most of its influence in either or both directions.

4.4. Results

In order to save space and avoid too many technicalities, we will in this chapter not present any numerical coefficients or other statistical quantities of interest (these are available from the authors upon request). Instead we summarize our main findings in Figure 5.

4.4.1. Social and Demographic Determinants

Turning to our first determinant of democratization, religious denomination, our results show—contrary to the earlier literature summarized by Lipset (1993), but in line with Barro's (1999) findings—that there are no significant effects on democratization of different forms of Christianity. In other words, Protestant countries have no democratizing advantage. By contrast, societies dominated by Muslims have an evident anti-democratic propensity. This ef-

fect is fairly substantial. If we compare two hypothetical countries, one with 100 and one with 0 percent Muslims, the Muslim dominated country will have an estimated democratization rate of .311 less in the short-run, and a long-run equilibrium level of 3.47 less on the 0-10 democracy scale. In terms of the direction of change, it appears that Muslim societies are both significantly less likely to make upturns towards democracy, and significantly more likely to make downturns towards authoritarianism. Even more importantly, the negative impact of Islam holds even as we control for regions, that is, taking into account the difference between Middle Eastern and North African countries and the rest of the world. Thus, *pace* Ross (2001) and Stepan and Robertson (2003, 2004), the Muslim gap according to our estimates is not merely an "Arab" gap.[8]

Figure 5: Summary of robust statistical findings.

	TRIGGERS	**IMPEDIMENTS (to)**
Upturns	Neigbour diffusion Regional organizations Peaceful demonstrations	Muslim population Religious fractionalization Size Oil Trade dependence
Downturn	Muslim population Religious fractionalization Economic crisis	socioieconomic modernization

Having said this, we are the first to admit that we do not know why the Muslim effect appears. Fish's (2002) suggestion that the anti-democratic effect of Muslim countries would be due to female subordination finds no support in our data (cf. Donno and Russett 2004).[9] Moreover, cultural interpretations falter when checked against individual-level data, mostly showing that Muslims, if anything, are relatively *more* supportive of democracy than other people (Tessler 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Hofmann 2004). While statistically robust, then, the Muslim effect currently lacks an intelligible explanation.

8 We get the same finding as Barro (1999) with respect to the fraction of *non*-religious people in the population: although this factor at first seems to exert a significantly negative impact on democratization, the result vanishes once China, an extremely influential outlier, is excluded from the analysis. We also find that the proportion of orthodox Christians has a positive effect when only downturns are considered, but this effect is also due to the influence of one single outlying country: Cyprus.

9 We tested this by including the ratio of secondary school enrollment among women over men. This factor, if added to our range of determinants, is miniscule and not statistically significant in itself, and does not reduce the Muslim effect.

Yet religion also impinges on democratization in another way: the degree of religious *fractionalization* has a clearly significant and negative impact. Net of other influences, the more the population of a country is split among different religious denominations, the weaker are its chances to democratize and the larger is the risk that democracy will falter.[10] The impact of religious fractionalization in model (2) means that if a country would make the hypothetical move from having a population of a single religious denomination (perfect homogeneity) to one where each individual has his or her own denomination (perfect heterogeneity), the yearly democratization rate would decrease by –.194, whereas the long-run equilibrium level of democracy would be shifted downward by 2.17 on the 0-10 democracy scale. Countries with a population that is heterogeneous in terms of its ethnolinguistic composition, by contrast, are not significantly more prone to move in either direction on the democracy scale.[11]

Why are religiously heterogeneous societies less prone to democratize? Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that neither religious nor ethnolinguistic fractionalization increases the risk of civil war. Thus, the hypothesized link between fractionalization and resistance to democratization running through inter-communal conflict does not hold water. What the mechanism then might be is again an area worthy of further study.

With respect to colonial heritage we find, in line with Barro (1999), that democracy has not fared significantly better in former British colonies than in countries of other colonial origin. Nor do we find that there is any general negative democratic legacy of being a former Western overseas colony. Colonial heritage simply does no add to our understanding of third wave democratization.[12]

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10 Although the general effect of religious fractionalization is statistically significant, its effect on upturns is only marginally significant (p=.077) and its effect on downturns is insignificant (p=.129). The effect magnitude is however similar for its effect on both upturns and downturns (around –.10 in both cases). We interpret this as evidence that religious fractionalization has a general effect driven both by upturns and downturns, but that this effect is underestimated when these two directions of change are considered separately.

11 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) has a somewhat ambiguous effect when upturns and downturns are assessed separately: the effect is positive (!) on upturns, but negative on downturns; both these effects are however only marginally significant (p=.073 and .089, respectively).

12 There is one minor exception: former Spanish colonies have had significantly larger downturns in their democracy scores. It turns out, however, that if we enter the effects of colonial legacy without controlling for religion, the effect of being a former Spanish colony is miniscule and no longer significantly different from zero. Being confined to Latin America, the religious composition of the former Spanish colonies is of course almost exclusively Catholic, undisputedly a heritage from their colonial past. This situation is markedly different in the former French and British colonies, where the religious denomination of the colonizers (Catholicism and Protestantism) has left a relatively small imprint on society. In sheer numbers, the mean fraction of the population being Catholic is .91 in the Spanish colonies of our estimation sample, whereas the corresponding figure is .15 in the French colonies, and only

As opposed to Barro (1999), however, we find that small size—measured as the log of population—has a significant and positive, although not very substantial, impact on democratization. What drives this result turns out to be that fact that smaller and medium sized countries have had somewhat larger upturns in their democracy scores compared to larger countries. There is however no net association between size and downturns.

4.4.2. Modernization, Resource Wealth, and Economic Performance

In terms of economic determinants, we first replicate the finding from some 50 years of comparative research on the positive relationship between socio-economic modernization and democratization. It should be noted, however, that our result is based on a composite measure of the entire process of modernization, not only one of its macroeconomic sub-components. A standard deviation change in the modernization index—which is approximately equivalent to a move from the level of Somalia (at the very bottom) to the level of Namibia, or from El Salvador (at the mean) to the level of Ireland—results in an expected increase of .082 in the level of democracy the following year. The same shift amounts to about a unit increase in the long-run equilibrium level of democracy.

Interestingly, moreover, the effect of modernization according to our estimates is *not* propelled by a tendency among modernizing countries to advance towards democracy. Rather it is the tendency among less modernized countries to revert towards authoritarianism that drives the result. In other words, whereas we find a significant impact on (the absence of) downturns, we find no such relationship with respect to upturns. This pattern bears a striking resemblance to the finding by Przeworski et al (2000) that socio-economic modernization does not effect transitions to democracy, but hinders reversals to authoritarianism.

When looking at short-term macroeconomic performance, we find no effect of inflationary crisis on regime change. Recessionary crisis (measured as the yearly growth rate), however, basically performs according to expectations. Whereas growth recessions have a positive impact on upturns toward democracy, they also trigger downturns. The former effect (on upturns) is

.12 for Protestants in the British colonies. By way of comparison, the mean fraction of Muslims is 0 in the Spanish colonies, .35 in the British and .53 in the French colonies. As a result, there appears to be no net effect of Spanish colonialism after all. Although the Spanish colonial power left conditions in its wake that—net of all other influences—have negatively impacted on democratization (presumably unfavorable social and institutional conditions), they also left a religious composition that has enhanced democratic development to such extent that this negative impact is leveled out by now.

however weaker and only marginally significant. These results thus most closely confirm Gasiorowski's (1995) findings, that recessionary crises more strongly affect democratic breakdown than transition to democracy.

Despite the fact that we control for a much larger set of determinants, our results confirm Ross' (2001) findings on the anti-democratic effect of oil. According to our estimates the discovery of an oil find increasing the export share of oil from 0 to 100 percent of GDP would lead to an expected decrease of .323 in the level of democracy the following year, and to a downward shift of 3.61 in the long-run equilibrium level of democracy. This effect is primarily caused by a much larger share of upturns in the level of democracy among countries not dependent on oil relative to oil-rich countries. Probably due to the fact that so few oil-rich countries have reached higher levels of democracy, the effect of oil as a trigger of downturns is weak and insignificant.

Whereas we thus confirm Ross' primary finding with respect to the effect of natural resource wealth, there are two qualifications. The first is that we do not find any significant negative impact of non-fuel metals and ores. The second is that the oil effect is in our data more restricted to the Middle Eastern region. Although a substantial negative effect of oil on democratization remains after controlling for world regions, the effect is weakened (the short-term coefficient being -.278) and, more importantly, only marginally significant (p=.074).

4.4.3. International Determinants

Turning to international determinants of democratization, our results partly confirm the finding by Li and Reuveny (2003) that openness to trade impedes on democratization. We find no general effect of trade, however, but only when upturns in the level of democracy are being assessed.[13] This effect is primarily due to a relatively large share of democratic upturns among less or intermediately trading countries. This pattern would thus at face value seem to confirm the old prediction by dependency theory that largely trade dependent countries are hindered from democratizing. However, the assumption key to this theory—that the negative impact on democracy is due to trade with the international "centers" of the world system—does not hold water in our data.[14] In other words, this is yet another finding in want of theoretical explanation.

13 Although there is a significantly positive effect of trade when only downturns are being considered, this effect is solely due to two extremely influential outliers: Ghana in 1981 and Turkey in 1980 (that is, two relatively trade independent countries facing a military coup).

14 We tested this hypothesis by controlling for bilateral trade share, as a fraction of GDP, with the US, the UK, France, China and Soviet Union/Russia (based on data from Gleditsch

Moreover, larger integration into the World economy in terms of gross capital flows does not impact on democratization. Apart from being inconsistent with dependency theory, this contradicts Li and Reuveny's (2003) findings for both foreign direct investment and portfolio flows. Since both these forms of dependency measures are lumped together in our variable for gross capital flows, it would be worth further study to try to disentangle their effects with a more fully specified model and on a fuller sample of countries.

Our next set of international determinants aim at capturing diffusion effects—the spread of democracy or autocracy from one country to another. Of the three spatial levels included, only the most geographically proximate appears to have an effect. If the mean level of democracy among neighbouring countries is shifted upward one unit between time t–2 and t–1, the net expected change in democracy at time t is .139. The long-run equilibrium level of democracy, moreover, is increased by 1.55. This implies a fairly tight long-run adjustment of the levels of democracy among neighbouring states. At the regional and global level, however, there seem to be no diffusion effects at work net of other influences. In this regard our results differ from the existing literature on diffusion effects (see, e.g., O'Loughlin et al. 1998; Starr and Lindborg 2003), the probable reason being our more fully specified explanatory models.

Interestingly, our results confirm one key prediction of Pevehouse's (2005) argument on the importance of regional organizations: membership in relatively democratic regional organizations precipitates upturns in the level of democracy of a country. This is a noteworthy finding in light of the fuller set of determinants of democratization taken into account by our model. We find no support, however, for the flip side of Pevehouse's argument: that regional organizations also help democracies survive. In terms of our empirical strategy for assessing this, we find no effect of regional organizations on downturns (neither do we find a general effect when both upturns and downturns are being assessed jointly).

4.4.4. Popular Mobilization

Turning to the last group of determinants entered in our model, we are able to present some novel insights into the role played by popular mobilization. Confirming expectations, large numbers of peaceful anti-government demonstrations facilitate upturns toward democracy. It should be kept in mind that this variable, much as all the other time-varying determinants tested, is lagged one year. What we observe is thus *not* an upsurge of popular protest

2002). We found no significant effect of any of these five trading variables, and no change in the general trading variable once these sources of trade were controlled for.

that is an integral part of the democratization process. What is captured is instead the impact of popular mobilization in one year on the propensity to democratize the *following year*, all else being equal, which lends support to a causal interpretation of its impact. This estimated short-run increase in the rate of democratization is .030 per demonstration, whereas the long-run equilibrium level of democracy is increased by .340 per demonstration. This confirms, on systematic evidence, the observation referred to above by numerous observers of democratic transition processes in Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and even Latin America that popular mobilization played a more influential role for the outcome than "transition paradigm" theorists initially acknowledged (as they believed the process was mainly elite driven).

However, we do not observe homogeneous effects of all forms of popular mobilization. Neither riots (i.e., violent clashes involving the use of physical force) nor strikes aimed at national government policies or authority exert any impact on democratization. Thus, although the effect of demonstrations is consistent with the more general "social forces" approach to explaining democratization, we find no systematic evidence in favour of a special role played by labour through the organization of strike activity (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Collier 1999). Moreover, *pace* Bermeo's (2003) insightful analysis of the Latin American experience of the 1970s, no form of popular mobilization appears to work as triggers of downturns towards autocracy.

4.4.5. Explanatory Performance

We now turn to the question of how well these determinants, when taken together, explain the incidence of democratization. It is easily verified that the predictive performance of the short-run model is fairly modest. The R-squared reaches some 11 percent explained variance at its best. Interestingly, there is a large difference in explanatory performance of upturns versus downturns. Whereas the explained variance in upturns reaches some 13 percent at best, the corresponding figure for downturns is only 6 percent. In other words, although our model fairs rather poorly in both instances, it does a better job at explaining short-term movements upward on the democracy scale than at explaining movements downwards. This result clearly contradicts the pattern found by Przeworski et al. (2000) that transitions toward democracy are more or less a random process, whereas reversals to autocracy may be more easily predicted. The most likely reason for this difference is that we include a much broader array of explanatory factors that mainly affect the upturns, such as oil, regional organizations and popular mobilization.

More importantly, by looking at explanatory power in the long run the picture radically changes. In the full model the R-squared reaches its long-run

maximum of 64.5 percent explained variance.[15] This means that the actual level of democracy on average comes fairly close to the long-run equilibrium level determined by the explanatory variables. In sum, whereas our models explain little of the short-term dynamics, they fare considerably better in explaining regime change in the long-term.

4.5. Conclusions and Discussion

To sum up, neither economic, societal nor international determinants of democratization trump each other unequivocally in terms of explanatory performance. What we find is that a mixture of these different types of explanatory factors is needed in order to explain democratization. The most important impediments to democratization appear to be a large Muslim population, a high degree of religious fractionalization, natural resource abundance in terms of oil, and heavy dependence on trade. Although the evidence is somewhat weaker, we also find larger countries to have a smaller likelihood of moving towards democracy. Democratization is instead enhanced by democratic diffusion among neighboring states, membership in democratic regional organizations, and popular mobilization in terms of peaceful demonstrations. Socioeconomic modernization primarily works as an impediment to downturns, implying that more modernized countries are more likely to uphold the level of democracy already achieved. Short-term economic crisis also mostly works as a trigger of downturns toward autocracy. Finally, factors appearing to have no imprint on the incidence of democratization include: colonial origin, the form of non-Muslim religion, natural resource abundance in terms of minerals, gross capital flows, democratic diffusion at the regional and global level, inflation and popular mobilization in terms of riots and strikes.

Overall, these determinants perform rather poorly in explaining short-term democratization. This result is well in line with the uncertainty and unpredictability so much stressed by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and other adherents of the "no preconditions" paradigm. It also seems to support the chance argument as far as transitions go proffered by Przeworski et al (2000), although our results indicate that, albeit still at a low level, upturns are more easily explained than downturns.

15 We reach the same conclusion by looking at another measure of fit, the standard error of regression. In the short-run models this index is .643, which certainly is not a far cry from the standard deviation of .699 in the yearly democratization rate itself. This only amounts to an increase in predictive performance of (.699–.643) /.699 ≈ 8.0 percent. In the long-run model assessment, however, the standard error of regression is 2.0, which compared to the standard deviation of 3.38 in the democracy index itself amounts to an increase in predictive performance of (3.38–2.0)/3.38 ≈ 41 percent.

By contrast, our models do a fairly good job when trying to predict the long-term equilibrium levels of democracy. In other words, when projected against a longer time horizon democratic development is not as unpredictable as adherents of the voluntaristic or chance-oriented views have asserted. On the contrary, in this time perspective the structural approach to democratization performs relatively well. This might explain why, as noted by Carothers (2000), over the long haul the actor-oriented approach associated with the ”transition paradigm” has not been a very helpful theoretical lens through which to understand democratization.

In light of these findings, we recommend future studies on determinants of democratization to pay particular attention to the following two observations. The first concerns the need for a theoretical synthesis of the empirical regularities uncovered. We have already commented upon the lack of a viable causal mechanism accounting for the negative impact of the percentage of Muslims, religious fractionalization and trade dependence (after taking trading partners into account). We now turn to the want for a broader model that could fit the pieces together into a coherent theory of democratization. What is it about these factors, together with size, modernization, economic crises, resource abundance, democratic diffusion, regional organizations and peaceful mobilization that make them foster or hinder democratic development? And why do structural factors mostly exert their influence on a long-term basis, whereas the short-term dynamics appear more erratic?

In our view, the most promising approach to such theoretical integration to date is the work of Boix (2003). Firmly based in the tradition of formal economic theory, Boix assumes that people only care about their income, and hence evaluate their preferences for democracy or autocracy in terms of this. By implication, the fundamental struggle over democracy occurs between the rich and the poor. Since under democracy the poor set the tax rate in order to redistribute income, the poor generally prefer democracy whereas the rich prefer autocracy. Two fundamental parameters may, however, alter this scheme of things. The first is income inequality: the more equally distributed the level of income is to begin with, the less the rich have to fear from conceding democracy to the poor. The second is capital mobility, or asset specificity: the less productive an asset is at home relative to abroad, the lower will be the tax rate in order to avoid capital flight. This means that the burden of democracy to the rich decreases as asset specificity decreases.[16] From these simple assumptions, Boix develops a simple game theoretic model in which the rich may choose to repress (sustain autocracy) at a certain cost or not repress (allow democracy), and the poor may choose to revolt

16 Interestingly these two fundamental parameters parallel Bellin’s (2000) discussion of two factors that determine the stance toward democracy among the capital class: on the one hand fear (of redistribution) and state dependence (the latter, among other things, leading to low capital mobility).

(mobilize against the regime) or acquiesce. A key part of this setup is played by an informational asymmetry: the poor are uncertain about the likelihood that the rich will use repression.

A surprisingly large number of predictions ensuing from Boix's model concur with our findings. Popular mobilization, quite evidently, should increase the likelihood of democratization by increasing the repression costs of the rich (ibid., 44–46). The estimated probability on behalf of the poor that the rich will employ repression, moreover, may help explain two of our findings. The first concerns the apparently erratic nature of short-run changes in the level of democracy as compared to the more predictable long-run equilibria. By prompting citizens to update their beliefs on the likelihood that different courses of actions will have different consequences, short-term political events have more unpredictable consequences than the more slow-moving forces that shape the income distribution and the degree of asset specificity. The second concerns diffusion effects: the presence of information uncertainty helps explain why events in neighbouring countries, for example, may lead domestic actors to re-estimate the chances of achieving their goals in light of the recent experience of similar actors abroad (ibid., 29).

Although previous studies of the importance of income inequality for democratization have tended to produce mixed results (see, e.g., Bollen and Jackman 1985; Muller 1995; Burkhart 1997),[17] several others of our findings support Boix's conjectured importance of asset specificity. Socioeconomic modernization, to begin with, and even more notably the large spectrum of societal processes included in this phenomenon taken into account by our broader measurement strategy, should be expected to go hand in hand with decreased asset specificity. As countries industrialize and develop from rural to urban economies, and as people become more educated and informed through the mass media, productive capital may not be as easily taxed without the risk of moving abroad. Natural resource abundance, by contrast, is a fixed asset that may not be productively moved abroad. Country size, moreover, should be negatively linked to asset specificity since it increases the physical distance that has to be traversed in order to reach another country (ibid. 41-44). Hence, in line with Boix's predictions, socioeconomic modernization should increase, whereas oil wealth and country size should decrease, the chances of democracy.

17 We have not included income inequality among our determinants of democratization in this chapter due to the poor coverage of existing time-series cross-sectional data. If we replicate Boix's (2003, 76) measurement strategy, that is, by taking 5 year moving averages of Deininger and Squire's (1996) "high quality" observations, we get 1014 country year observations from 93 countries. The effect of income distribution (lagged one year) in this dataset is however insignificant (either with or without including all other determinants as controls).

Obviously, Boix's model cannot explain all our findings, nor are all of them consistent with his predictions. This is also not the place to make a full assessment of the strengths and drawbacks of Boix's theory of democratization. The purpose of the preceding discussion is merely to highlight the fruitful potential involved in trying to apply more integrated theories of democratization to future empirical assessments. As to date, the formal models based on the economic approach are the most suitable candidates for such an exercise.

A final observation concerns the methodological future of the field. We have in this chapter tried to show that the actor-centric and structure-centric approaches to democratization need not be incompatible; they simply speak to different factors operating at different time horizons. This has been done, however, on the basis of results produced completely within a statistical and large-*n* framework. The next generation of democratization studies ought to take this as cue for integrating small-*n* and large-*n* analysis into the same research program. Only in this way may the gap dividing the two approaches to democratization be bridged not only in theory but also in practice.

Appendix A: Definition of Variables

Democracy: The graded measure from Freedom House (2003) is computed by taking the average of their 1-7 ratings of *Political Rights* and *Civil Liberties*, and then inverting and transforming this scale to run from 0 to 10. The graded measure from Polity is the *Revised Combined Polity Score* (Marshall and Jaggers 2002, 15-16) transformed to run from 0 to 10. These two graded measures are then averaged into a combined index running from 0 to 10. We have imputed missing values by regressing the average FH/Polity index on the FH scores, which have better country coverage than Polity.

Religious denomination: The data on religious denominations have been collected from Barrett et al. (2001). The data are estimates of the fraction of the population as of 1970 being Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Other Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Other denomination (including miscellaneous East-Asian religions and Jews), and Nonreligious.

Fractionalization: We employ data on *ethnolinguistic* and *religious fractionalization* collected by Alesina et al. (2003), both reflecting the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups. The figures on ethnolinguistic fractionalization are based on 650 distinct ethnic groups (ethnicity being defined in either racial or linguistic terms), those on religious fractionalization on 294 different religions. Although the underlying data only pertain to one year for any given country (in most instances from the 1990s or around 2000), we treat these figures as constants over the entire time period 1972-2000. Although this of course might distort real world developments and cause problems of endogeneity, we concur with Alesina at al.'s claim that treating these figures as constants "seems a reasonable assumption at the 30 year horizon" (2001, 160).

Colonial heritage: We include five dummies for countries being a former Western overseas colony: British (including 39 states in the estimation sample), French (20 states), Spanish (17 states), Portuguese (4 states), and finally a collapsed residual category consisting of the former Dutch, Belgian and Italian colonies (including 6 states in the estimation sample). We thus follow the practice of Bernard et al. (2004) in exclusively focusing on a particular form of colonial legacy (Western overseas colonialism), and by excluding the "settler colonies" from the group of British colonies (including the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel). We coded as a colony each country that has been colonized since 1700. In cases of several colonial powers, the last one is counted, if it lasted for 10 years or longer. Source: *Encyclopedia Britannica* and *Atlas till Världshistorien* (Stockholm: Svenska bokförlaget, 1963).

Population: In order to measure country *size*, we use the logged population figures from WDI (2004).

Socioeconomic modernization: The indicators combined into this index are: (1) *industrialization*, measured as the net output of the *non*-agricultural sector expressed as a percentage of GDP; (2) *education*, measured as the gross secondary school enrollment ratio; (3) *urbanization*, measured as the urban percentage of the total population; (4) *life expectancy* at birth (in years); (5) the inverse of *infant mortality* (per 1000 live births); (6) the number of *radios* per capita; (7) the number of *Television* sets per capita; and (8) *newspaper* circulation per capita. The source of indicators (1)-(5) is WDI (2004), of indicators (6)-(8) Banks (2002). We used linear intrapolation, country by country, to fill in missing years for secondary school enrollment, life expectancy and infant mortality. We used the secondary school enrollment ratio since it has the strongest correlation with the Barro and Lee (2000) indicator "average years of primary schooling in the total population", although with more extensive country coverage. Our final indicator is (9) *GDP per capita*. In order to maximize country coverage, we used WDI (2004) data expressed in constant 1995 US dollars (thus *not* corrected for PPP), completed with WDI (2004) data expressed in current USD for Libya and Somalia.

The principal components factors loadings for these 9 indicators are (n=2965):

Industrialization	.83
Education	.91
Urbanization	.89
Life expectancy	.91
Inverse infant mortality	.90
Radios	.83
TVs	.88
Newspapers	.81
GDP/capita	.93

The eigenvalue of this first dimension is 6.94, explaining 77.1 percent of the variation in the indicators across time and space. The eigenvalue of the second component is .67, strongly supporting unidimensionality. The factor loadings are extremely similar if computed at any given year instead of pooled across all years. The index of socioeconomic modernization is computed by taking the factor scores of the above pooled solution, and then using imputation on the regression line with all 9 indicators as regressors.

Apart from the theoretical argument proffered in the text, there are two more technical reasons why we base our results on this summary measure instead of any or some of its constituent parts, which has been the dominant approach in the field. First, since our index is based on multiple indicators it should have a reliability edge over any of its sub-components. Second, all of the indicators used have a theoretical underpinning in the modernization literature. Yet were we to introduce them separately into a regression equation we would introduce huge amounts of multicollinearity. We avoid this by only including the summary index.

Economic performance: Following Gasiorowski (1995), we employ two measures of short-term economic performance (both based on WDI 2004): recessionary crises, measured as the annual *growth* rate of GDP per capita in fractions, and inflationary crises, measured as the annual *inflation* rate (based on the GDP deflator), also in fractions. This measure of inflation correlates at .98 with the one based on consumer price index, but has much larger country coverage.

Oil and Minerals: Following Ross (2001), *oil* is the export value of mineral-based fuels (petroleum, natural gas, and coal), *minerals* is the export value of nonfuel ores and metals, both expressed as fractions of GDP, based on data from WDI (2004). Also following Ross (2001, 358), we replaced the values for Singapore and Trinidad & Tobago by .001. We filled in missing values from Ross' original data set, which he generously made available to us, and by yearly linear imputation (country by country).

Trade openness: Defined as "the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product", expressed as a fraction of GDP. Source: WDI (2004).

Gross capital flows: Defined as "the sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows recorded in the balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities and general government", calculated as a fraction of GDP. This measure captures both of the two capital exchange variables tested by Li and Reuveny (2003)—i.e., foreign direct investment and portfolio investments—but with considerably improved country coverage. Source: WDI (2004).

Diffusion effects: We employ three proxies for diffusion effects. They are composed of mean scores of the combined democracy index computed at three different spatial levels. The most proximate level is that of neighbouring countries. Neighbours are defined as countries separated by a land or river border, or by 400 miles of water or less, using Stinnett et al.'s (2002) direct contiguity data. The rationale behind the water contiguity distance is that 400 miles is the maximum distance at which two 200-mile exclusive economic zones can intersect (ibid., 62). This criterion creates the maximum number of contiguous states in the world system, only leaving New Zealand (among the ones for which we have data on the dependent variable) without any defined neighbouring countries at any time. Beyond contiguous neighbours, we also test whether diffusion effects may operate at the regional (regions being defined below) and global level. Both these measures are computed as yearly means.

Regional organizations: Following Pevehouse (2005), we compute the average degree of democracy among the countries belonging to the same regional organization as a

country. For countries belonging to more than one regional organization, only the score for the most democratic regional organization is included. Countries not belonging to any regional organization a particular year are scored zero; instead, a dummy variable is entered scored 1 for these countries, zero for all others. Data on membership in regional organizations are provided by Pevehouse et al. (2004). Again following Pevehouse (2005, 49-50, 67-70), we have only included political, economic and/or military intra-regional organizations, thus excluding inter-regional organizations and international financial institutions, as well as cultural, technical and environmental organizations. To the list of regional organizations existing up until 1992 provided by Pevehouse, we have added a small number of organizations formed afterwards.

Popular mobilization: We used Banks' (2002) data on the yearly number of *demonstrations*, defined as "any peaceful gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature"; *riots*, defined as "any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force"; and *strikes*, defined as "any strike of 1000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority".

According to Banks (2002), all these figures are "derived from the daily files of The New York Times". This could be a source of bias, since press coverage of protest events are known to overestimate events in their geographical proximity, and underestimate events of minor intensity (see, e.g., Mueller 1997). In our case, however, we believe the potential geographical bias makes our tests of the mobilization variables conservative, since there is smaller variation in the dependent variable in the West. Moreover, the fact that minor protests are underreported might seem less of a problem from a theoretical point of view, since one could argue that only large-scale events should stand any chance to affect regime change.

Regional effects: As a check on the robustness of our findings, we include dummy variables for six world "regions": Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, Asia & the Pacific, the West, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Appendix B: Statistical Model

Let $D_{i,t}$ be the democracy index of country i at time t. We then model $(D_{i,t} - D_{i,t\text{-}1})$, or ΔD_i for short, as a function of $\mathbf{x}$, a vector of explanatory variables. Most of these variables vary over time, in which case we have lagged them one year as a partial check on endogeneity bias. Moreover, we control for previous levels of democracy, $D_{i,t\text{-}1...p}$, that is, $D_{i,t}$ lagged up to a maximum of p years.

There are numerous reasons to include lagged values of the dependent variable. First, as argued in the text above, a lagged dependent variable may work as an explanatory factor in itself. Second, including lagged values of the dependent variable in the model helps to control for the possibility of endogeneity bias, that is, causality

running in the direction from democracy to the explanatory variables instead of vice versa. Lagging the explanatory variables is only a first step towards this control. By also including lagged values of D_i on the right-hand side of the equation the model assures that any effects of D_i on $\mathbf{x}_i$ occurring previous to *t-p* is controlled for. For example, the inclusion of $D_{i,t}$-1 rules out any effects due to the path $D_{i,t} \leftarrow D_{i,t}$-1 $\leftarrow$ $D_{i,t}$-2$\rightarrow \mathbf{x}_{i,t}$-1 (see, e.g., Finkel 1995, 24-31). More generally, by controlling for the history of democracy in each country, including the lagged dependent variable works as a proxy control for other potential determinants not included in the model. Third, lagging the dependent variable helps to control for serial correlation in the error term (Beck and Katz 1996).

In sum, this yields the model

$$(D_{i,t} - D_{i,t}\text{-}1) = \sum_{n=1}^{p} \phi_n D_{i,t-n} + \mathbf{x}_{i,t}\text{-}1\beta + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where ϕ_n and the β-vector contain the short-run effect parameters to be estimated, and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term. It turns out that no less than three lagged values of the dependent variable are in our data required to purge the residuals from serial autocorrelation.[18] In other words, p=3 in the analyses reported here.

Although OLS should yield consistent estimates of β, there are a number of statistical problems involved in estimating its standard errors on time-series cross-section data: serial and spatial autocorrelation as well as panel heteroskedasticity (Beck and Katz 1995). We control for the first of these problems, as already noted, by controlling for lagged values of the dependent variable, and for the second and the third through panel corrected standard errors, as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995, 1996). Since we also model spatial dependence directly by controlling for diffusion effects, our reported estimates should err on the conservative side.

In order to gauge the long-run performance of our models, we make use of the fact that the lagged values of the dependent variable also affect the way our **x**-variables affect democracy over time. If we assume a sustained one unit increase at time *t* in one of these explanatory variables, say x_j, the immediate impact occurring over the following year *t* +1 is of course this variable's corresponding short-term β-coefficient, that is β_j. Due to the first lagged value of the dependent variable, however, an effect of the magnitude $(1+\phi_1)\times\beta_j$ will then be induced over the year *t*+2. In the following year (i.e., at *t*+3) up to two lagged values of the dependent variable will influence the effect, which now amounts to $[(1+\phi_1)^2 + \phi_2] \times\beta_j$ and so on. According to the estimates of our model, about 40 percent of the adjustment back to equilibrium occurs over a 5-year period, some 70 percent over a 10-year period, and around 90 percent over 20 years. Only after 40 years the adjustment reaches 99 percent. We may

18 The estimated value of ρ from the Lagrange multiplier test recommended by Beck and Katz (1996, 9) is .203 and .423 (p=.000), respectively, when one or two lags are added. When the third lag is entered ρ=-.329 (p=.143).

thus conclude that it takes approximately 40 years for the full long-run effects in our models to occur.[19]

In order to obtain the long-term estimates for each determinant we project the behavior of the short-run coefficients according to this logic as *t* goes to infinity. As long as the usual stationarity conditions are satisfied (i.e., that the roots of the characteristic equation for $\phi_{1...n}$ lie outside the unit root circle; see, e.g., Green 1997, 829), we may compute the long-run impact multipliers according to the formula

$$\theta = -\beta / \phi^*, \quad (2)$$

where $\phi^* = \sum_{n=1}^{p} \phi_n$, and β and $\phi_{1...n}$ are estimated through equation (1). Since θ is a ratio of coefficients there is no general formula for its exact variance. Following Bårdsen (1989) and Londregan and Poole (1996, 17)), a large sample approximation formula can however be obtained by

$$\text{var}(\theta) \cong (\phi^*)^{-2} [\text{var}(\beta) + \theta^2 \text{var}(\phi^*) + 2\theta \text{cov}(\beta,\phi^*)], \quad (3)$$

where the variances and covariances in our case are panel corrected.[20]

In order to assess long-term predictive performance, we proceed as follows. The long-term projections discussed above are based on the notion of a static equilibrium, determined by the **x**-vector of explanatory variables, towards which each system is attracted. We may think of such an equilibrium in terms of a state where any inherent tendency to change has ceased, that is, as the estimated level of democracy that would arise in the long run if all explanatory variables were held fixed at their current values. In the present context we can compute this long-run equilibrium level of democracy for each country and year as

$$D^*_{i,\,t} = \mathbf{x}_{i,t}\theta \quad (4)$$

We then simply regress the actual level of democracy for each country and year on this projected long-run equilibrium level, and assess model fit.

We compute two fit indices in order to guide this assessment. The first (and the only reported in the main body of the text) is the ordinary explained variance, adjusted for the degrees of freedom. It should be noted that since we have put the first difference of the democracy index on the left-hand side of our equations, we avoid inflating the R-squared by the static variance common to both $D_{i,t}$ and its lagged values (cf. Li and Reuveny 2003, for example, who report levels of explained variance well above 90 percent for this simple reason). The second estimate is the standard error of the regression (also known as the root mean squared error). It is simply the standard deviation of the residuals, that is, the unexplained part of the dependent variable. Being expressed in the same measurement units as the dependent variable, its minimum value is zero, indicating perfect fit, but unlike the R-squared, it lacks a normed upper bound. In order to ease its interpretation, we compare it to the actual variance in the

19 These calculations were made by plugging in the coefficients for the lags of the dependent variable in our estimated model into a purely autoregressive equation, and then simulate the projected response to a one-unit change at time *t*=0 as *t* goes from 0 to 50.

20 The estimates reported in this chapter have been computed by the xtpcse and nlcom commands of Stata 9.2.

dependent variable. In the estimation sample of 2628 observations the standard deviation of $\Delta D_{i,t}$ is .694, and of $D_{i,t}$ 3.38.

Finally, there is the issue of how to separate effects on movements toward versus away from democracy. With a dichotomous measure of democracy, this is straightforward. By limiting the sample of cases to countries that are authoritarian at time *t*-1, the results that ensue pertain to effects on transitions toward democracy. Similarly, when the results are based on countries that are democratic at time *t*-1, the estimates pertain to transitions toward autocracy, that is, on democratic survival. With a graded measure of democracy, however, things are not quite as simple since change may now both start and end at various levels of democracy, whereas stability might imply that either high, low or intermediate levels of democracy are being sustained. In this chapter we take a simple approach to this problem by simply distinguishing cases of $\Delta D_i > 0$ (upturns) from cases of $\Delta D_i < 0$ (downturns). When the former are being modeled, we simply set all cases of downturns to zero, and vice versa.

5. Successes and Failures of the New Democracies

Axel Hadenius and Dirk Berg-Schlosser

In this chapter we examine the five regions affected most strongly by Huntington's "Third Wave" (see also chapter 1 above). In doing so, we shall apply four basic criteria of democratic "consolidation" or its lack, i.e. 1) an unbroken series of free and fair elections, 2) institutionalized changes of government, 3) the absence of significant anti-democratic forces, 4) mass support for democratic principles (see also Linz and Stepan 1996, Schedler 1998, Diamond 1999 and chapter 4 above). Where all of these criteria are fulfilled, it may be said that democracy has become "the only game in town"[1]. This means that the practice of democracy is maintained, procedurally speaking. Democratic elections are held and changes of government take place. Among all actors—on both elite and mass levels—a broad consensus prevails that political conflicts are to be settled by democratic means.

Furthermore, we shall assess some of the major factors contributing to this state of affairs. These include the overall level of socio-economic development or "modernization", the existence of "civil society", strong social cleavages, institutional setups, and external influences (for a discussion of these and similar factors, the respective theoretical approaches and some of the main authors see also chapters 1 and 4 above).

5.1. Southern Europe

The "third wave" of democratization in Huntington's sense has begun with the downfall of authoritarian regimes in Portugal, Greece and Spain in the mid-1970s. Since then, in all of these countries a series of free and fair elections have been held. Several changes of government have taken place, and in ordered forms. In these cases, therefore, the elementary (procedural) criteria for consolidation are amply fulfilled.

How well, then, has democracy become rooted in public attitudes? Has it come to be "the only game in town"? In the years since democracy was in-

1 The expression is taken from Di Palma 1990.

troduced, there has been but a single serious attempt to destroy the new order. This took place in Spain in 1981, when elements in the military and police carried out a revolt. This action did not meet, however, with the approval of larger groups in society. The same has been documented in opinion polls. The principles of democracy enjoy very broad support—at both elite and mass levels. Popular support for the principles for democracy is at the same level as in Western Europe in general, which is 80 percent or above There are no significant political groups making an anti-democratic appeal. By contrast, however, citizens' evaluation of how democracy actually works in their country is not particularly high. In the cases of Spain and Portugal, only 40 percent of the population in the mid-1990s were content with how democracy functioned in their country. The level in Greece was just under 30 percent. All three of these countries came in well below the West European average which was 55 percent (Klingemann 1999, Rose 2001).

What is the reason for this dissatisfaction? To a degree, it reflects prevailing social and economic conditions. Economic growth, to be sure, has been strong. At the same time, however, unemployment is much higher than the European average. Furthermore, the citizens of these countries generally rate the efficiency of their public sector as low. They also express a low level of confidence in politicians and political institutions. Yet, such discontent does not result in anti-democratic tendencies. A great many citizens are critical of how democracy actually works in their country, but they do not wish to switch to another form of government. They simply want their democracy to work better.

That citizens express their dissatisfaction in this manner—even as they seek changes within the framework of the existing system—is a sign that democracy has indeed become "the only game in town".

If we consider the structural conditions, *modernization* has been marked. With respect to GNP and similar indicators of social and economic development, these countries are now substantially above the critical level (usually thought to be at around $ 6000 per capita).[2] *Civil society* has also been strengthened. In particular, the membership and organizational capacity of the parties has improved over the past decades. There is a vital and independent press as well. As far as *institutional conditions* are concerned, we can note that the legal institutions have become more efficient and have proved capable of defending their independence. Institutions wielding a considerable measure of local power have been built up (as have organs of regional power, in the case of Spain). *External conditions* may have contributed as well, particularly membership in the European Union. The statutes of the Union stipulate that a country must be a democracy if it is to become a member. This requirement—in combination

2 Per-capita GNP in Spain is around $ 14,000; in Portugal and Greece around $ 11,000 (World Bank 2000).

with the fact that the countries in question are (in net terms) the recipients of large amounts of aid from the EU—has been of considerable importance.

It is in Spain that democracy has encountered its most serious problems. Regional divisions—in turn rooted in long-standing *ethnic and linguistic cleavages*—have created tensions. This applies particularly to the Basque country, where a separatist movement has been prominent. The regional reform seems, however, to have satisfied aspirations in most of the regions. The fact that it was carried out asymmetrically—so that areas with an especially strong regional identity were able to obtain greater autonomy—has certainly contributed to the success of the reform. It was not enough, however, for the militant groups in the Basque country, who wish to form an independent Basque state (which would also include areas now in France). Periods of political murder and terror have followed. Yet, such developments do not seem able to dislodge the democratic order (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996, Morlino 1998).

5.2. Latin America

Democratization in Southern Europe was followed by comparable developments on the other side of the Atlantic. Within the course of a decade beginning in the late 1970s, all of the military regimes in Latin America disappeared. In the years since then, the countries in question have held a number of elections, which have in most cases fulfilled reasonable demands in respect of freedom and fairness. And there has been no shortage of government turnovers. These criteria for consolidation, then, are by and large well-satisfied.

As far as public support for democratic principles is concerned, there are significant variations across the continent. In such countries as Uruguay and Costa Rica, the level of approval is close to the average in Western Europe—the level is between 70 and 80 percent. By contrast, there are countries—such as Brazil, Paraguay, Honduras, and Guatemala—in which half the population (and in some cases quite a bit more) do *not* express support for democratic principles. When it comes to how people in the different countries assess the actual operations of democracy, we see a mixed picture. Uruguay and Costa Rica again follow the West European pattern: a good 50 percent give a positive reply. The average for the continent, however, is 30 percent. In several countries, like Guatemala and Colombia, approval falls to some 15 percent. In these countries, then, a large majority of citizens expresses dissatisfaction with how democracy actually works in their country. Furthermore, the general trend at the start of the new millennium is in a downward direction. Support for the principles of democracy is on the decline in Latin America. In several countries the proportion of the population expressing sympathy for authoritarian, non-democratic alternatives is growing (Lagos 2001, Economist 2001).

Another bad sign is the fact that, in many countries, encroachments on democracy have met with little opposition. In certain widely noted cases, such as Peru and Venezuela, it may even be said that measures of this kind have enjoyed far-reaching popular support. When Agusto Fujimori, Peru's president, closed parliament in the early 1990s (and then ruled for a year alone, during which time a new constitution was drafted), few popular protests were to be seen. On the contrary, he obtained a ringing endorsement in a subsequent referendum. In Venezuela, Colonel Hugo Chávez attempted a coup in the early 1990s. He did not succeed, because critical elements in the military stood behind the existing regime. However, opinion polls carried out in connection with these events showed that a clear majority of the population supported Chávez's actions. When, some years later, Chávez ran for the office of president, he won a convincing victory, and he has thereafter been re-elected in the same manner. He was also quick to dissolve parliament. Protests from the supreme court had no effect. The purpose—as in the case of Fujimori—was to make a "clean sweep" by introducing a new constitution greatly strengthening the powers of the president. In subsequent referenda and elections to parliament, Chávez has won brilliant victories.

Examples of violations of the constitutional order (and of the principles of democracy) can be found in other countries as well. In Ecuador, the political situation has at times been chaotic. Two presidents have been removed during the last ten years—in unconstitutional forms resembling a revolt. Here, as in several other cases, it has been possible to violate the constitution, and prevailing democratic norms, without encountering serious difficulties. The present order seems, in a fair number of countries, to have few adherents among the mass of the people. The political game, it appears, is for many citizens a distant activity, and one of which they are highly suspicious. Coup-plotters with a "popular" aura are thus able to garner great sympathy among the broad masses. The methods of democracy, evidently, are not "the only game in town".

What is the background to this? Let us first look at the economy. The military regimes, in most cases, had relinquished power in the midst of economic chaos. Budget deficits were enormous; currencies were declining sharply. Elected politicians have faced a difficult task in coming to terms with these problems. They have often been forced to impose harsh austerity measures, which have hit the poor hardest. Economic growth, finally, has been meager in many cases.

Turning now to the criteria for *modernization*, we may observe that literacy rates are relatively high in Latin America: on average about 80 percent. But GNP levels are still quite modest in many cases. The average comes to about $ 2800 per capita; however, the difference is great between the richer countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay ($ 6000–7500), and poor ones like Honduras and Nicaragua ($ 400–750; World Bank 2000).

What part does *civil society* play? Does it contribute to political pluralism and offer channels for popular participation? Not to any substantial extent. The infrastructure of civil society, like that of the political parties, is in many cases weakly developed. The organizations and parties are often structured in a clientelist or personalist fashion. To be sure, popularly rooted social movements with a more democratic structure are emerging. These movements tend, however, to work outside established political channels. Nor should their prominence be overstated.

What is the situation when it comes to social *cleavages*? Latin America is that part of the world in which class cleavages are the most pronounced, as measured by the distribution of incomes and property among the different social groups. There is a large poverty-stricken population, and a thin stratum of extremely wealthy persons. In recent years, moreover, class divisions—already very large—have increased further. The population in Latin America is strikingly homogeneous, linguistically and ethnically speaking. In certain countries, however, there is a large Indio population (with its own languages). Bolivia and Guatemala are examples. The Indios have been marginalized, both economically and culturally. Even so, for a long time no important political parties have emerged on the basis of this identity. The explanation lies presumably in the brutal repression of long standing to which the Indios have been subjected. For a long time, moreover, there were literacy-based restrictions on voting rights, which served to disenfranchise the poor in the countryside. These restrictions applied until the mid-20th century. In some cases, in fact—as in Guatemala and Brazil—they continued all the way up to the 1970s and 1980s. When at long last they were removed, the political mobilization of Indios took place primarily within the framework of the already established parties. Only very recently, with the victory of Evo Morales in Bolivia a new chapter in this respect has been opened.

Now to *institutional factors*. Political life in Latin America has traditionally been highly centralized. The state apparatus, moreover, has been "soft" (not rule-governed) in character. Popular organizations have often been weakly developed. These characteristics—which in large part apply still today—make for a fragile democracy with weak roots.

Political power in Latin America is to a great extent centered in the presidential office. Parliaments, courts, and other balancing organs find it hard to make themselves felt. A strong centralization prevails vertically as well. Local and regional bodies are typically weak. Resources and decision-making lie in the hands of the central administrative apparatus, which is controlled by the president and his party. Critics have claimed that the democracy practiced in Latin America is merely "electoral" or "delegative" (O'Donnell 1994). Elections are held and changes of government occur. It is at this point, however, that popular influence ends. Once elected, those holding power at the central level have a very free mandate, and can enjoy the fruits of power as they wish.

This enjoyment of the fruits of power is facilitated by the soft structure of the state. The lack of supervision and oversight makes possible far-reaching nepotism and corruption. This has several consequences. For one thing, the administrative capacity of the state is undermined. Less is accomplished, and what is accomplished is done poorly. Corruption and similar failures tend to cause annoyance among citizens. This gives public institutions (and the politicians who control them) a low level of legitimacy. Moreover, a soft state leaves its imprint on organizational life. It promotes clientelist forms of organization, together with their accompanying features: hierarchy and boss-rule. Organizations of this type leave very little room for popular influence. Populist challengers like Fujimori and Chávez have thus been able to win strong support with their harsh attacks on a closed and corrupt political order.

The problem is that politicians of this type seldom do anything to change the centralized and soft structure of the state. Nor do they lay the basis for a more open and democratic type of organizing. As a rule, rather, they tie the organs of public power tightly to themselves, and they exploit the soft state for their own (political as well as private) purposes. The popular suspicion that brought them to power tends, therefore, to return in time. Fujimori's rise and precipitous fall illustrate this pattern.

International influences can make a difference as well. For the last decade for example, an organization for economic cooperation (Mercosur) has existed in the Southern Cone. Among the members are Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. Only states which are democratic can be members. This makes, of course, for pressure on the states in question. But most of the other states are not members. In material terms, moreover, this is an organization with relatively little to offer. It is primarily a free-trade bloc. A more important factor is the pressure originating from outside the region. Since the late 1970s, the United States has actively supported the democratization which has taken place, and has at the same time endeavored to keep coup-plotters out in the cold (which was not the case earlier). The threat of economic sanctions has also been an effective weapon, in view of the difficult financial situation prevailing in many of the countries in question. Another instrument has been to cut off military cooperation. Such methods have sufficed to counteract military coups. This has helped to keep many of these fragile democracies going. By contrast, methods of this kind have had little effect on the type of coup-presidents described above. Threats and protests from Washington have not had much impact; indeed, defiance of the big neighbor in the north has yielded valuable political points for these regimes on the home front.

Mexico is a special case. It distinguished itself, over a long period, by an extremely stable political order. Since the 1920s, the country was governed by a single party: the Institutional Revolutionary Party (also known—by its Spanish initials—as PRI). PRI accomplished this feat through a combination of clientelism (in well-organized forms), rigged elections, and repression.

During the 1990s, however, a gradual democratization took place. The definitive sign of the old order's demise came in the presidential election of 2000, which was won by an opposition candidate. The subsequent elections in 2006 have been highly disputed, and the loser did not accept his defeat.

There is a better basis for judgment, however, in the case of some of the other countries (since a longer time has passed since democracy was introduced). In several instances, as in Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Chile, there is reason to believe that democracy can take root and achieve stability. Elsewhere in the continent, the situation is more difficult. Here it may be the populist coup-syndrome that sets the pattern. In Latin America, as we know from earlier periods, diffusion effects are strong: trends spread quickly and easily throughout the region. The question is whether the developments in Uruguay or in Venezuela will set the pattern for the other countries (Linz and Stepan 1996, Roberts 1997, Becker 1999, Diamond 1999, Franklin 2001, Hadenius 2001).

5.3. Eastern Europe

After 1989/90, democratization finally occurred also in Central and Eastern Europe. For roughly a decade now, the majority of these countries has tried their hand at democratic government. The major exceptions have been Belarus, Ukraine, and Serbia. Free and fair elections have otherwise been the rule, and many changes of government have taken place. As far as such indicators of democratic stability are concerned, the signals have been, on the whole, undeniably positive.

Another positive thing is the relative scarcity of markedly undemocratic groups. In virtually no country is a return to the old order (of Communist one-party dictatorship) presented as a real alternative. The most plainly undemocratic position was that taken by Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president, who moved against ethnic minorities and political opponents in an aggressive nationalist spirit. This took place, it should be noted, behind a façade of democratic elections. Beneath the surface, however, there was a far-reaching manipulation and control by the state. A similar façade is found in Belarus. This is not a model, however, which appears to have much potential for spreading. It has been associated with economic stagnation or even decline (the regimes in question having been the most unwilling to restructure the economy). Milosevic, moreover, was been forced from power by a popular uprising (Linz and Stepan 1996, Janos 2000, Zeilonka 2001). The final outcome of the "orange revolution" in Ukraine, which also resulted from such a pattern, still remains to be seen.

Central Europe

In the post-Communist countries of Central Europe,[3] support for democratic principles is now widespread, lying in general at 80 percent. But there is also considerable dissatisfaction in many of these countries with the actual functioning of democracy. In Hungary and Slovenia in the mid-1990s, for example, only about 20 percent gave a positive assessment; in Bulgaria the level was even lower: less then 10 percent. Most countries in the region, however, scored a level of around 40 percent—on a parity with Portugal and Spain (Klingemann 1999, Rose 2001) .

The economic situation has also been very difficult for the peoples of Central Europe. Yet, the downturn was not for the most part as sharp as that in Russia (see below), and a noticeable turnabout was evident in most cases beginning in the mid-1990s. During the difficult years in the beginning, a considerable portion of the population in many countries looked back with sympathy on the old order—especially in countries where the Communist regime had been fairly mild (as in Hungary). Even so, less than a fifth of the population of Central Europe desired—according to an opinion poll from 1993—to return to the Communist system. The proportion has since then diminished, in line with the gradual improvement in living standards (Rose et al. 1998).

Turning now to the level of *modernization*, we find that the general level of education is high. The economic level, however, remains modest in many cases. Per-capita GNP in the region is on average $ 3000—on a level, that is, with Latin America. In Central Europe, too, there is a considerable spread between countries. Slovenia and the Czech Republic are at the top ($ 8000 and $5000 respectively); Albania and Moldavia have the lowest figures ($ 900 and 400; World Bank 2000). In this respect, therefore, there is no secure basis as yet for democracy in these countries. In many cases, rather, it seems a long way to go.

Nor does the state of *civil society* give cause for optimism. Organizational life is but weakly developed. The parties have few members, and they have little in terms of an organizational apparatus. They are cadre parties in the main, and they owe their existence in many cases to the extensive public subsidies given to the parties in many of these countries. The *institutional structure*, on the other hand, is for the most part more favorable. The Russian pattern—with its strong centralization of powers in the hands of the president—again has no counterpart in the states of Central Europe that have undergone democratization. Parliament is stronger, and legal institutions tend to be better equipped and politically more independent. In several countries, moreover, a vital local democracy has developed. A continuing problem, however, is the often widespread corruption.

3 This refers to the countries in the area stretching from Estonia to Albania.

With regard to social *cleavages,* the main worry centers on nationality conflicts based on language (and sometimes religion as well). For example, there is a Turkish minority in Bulgaria, a Russian minority in the Baltic countries, a Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania, etc. In some cases separate parties have been formed on an ethnic basis—e.g., for Hungarians in Romania and Turks in Bulgaria. These parties were viewed, at first, with suspicion among the parties representing the linguistic and religious majority. In most cases they were politically excluded. Yet there are signs in several cases that a more generous attitude is now being taken towards the ethnic parties, while the willingness to include them in political decision-making is growing. Except for the former Yugoslavia, no acts of war have been under-taken, and no terrorist tendency is detectable. The tensions arising from distinct ethnic identities in the region, it seems, can be handled within the framework of democracy.

One factor conditioning the degree of democratic stability in Central Europe is a strong *pressure from the outside*. All states in the area have needed extensive loans and aid from the West. This aid has been tied to certain conditions—also as far as forms of government are concerned. Still more important, perhaps, has been the ambition of many states in the region to accede to the European Union. Any state entering the Union must fulfill democratic criteria. These external pressures contributed strongly to put the democratic system in these countries on a permanent basis (Dawisha and Parrott 1997, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Waldron-More 1999). In 2004, eight Central European states finally joined the EU and were followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.

Russia

Russia, as the major successor of the former Soviet Union and the region's long-time hegemon, is a very special case, which, in fact, in its territorial extension stretches beyond Europe's geographical area. In the mid-1990s less than 10 percent of citizens in Russia expressed satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. Only 5 in 10 agreed with the statement that democracy is the best form of government. There is still a widespread sympathy for the previous order. In a study done at the start of the new century, 51 percent took the view that the system of government applied in Soviet times was a good one; 33 % ventured a negative judgment[4]. Asked if it is best to have a strong leader who need not worry about parliaments and elections, a greater number concurred (44 %) than disagreed (39 %). Only 18 percent were satisfied with democracy's functioning, while 63 percent expressed dissatisfaction (Klingemann 1999, Teorell and Hadenius 2000).

4 The remaining 16 % answered "don't know".

In this period Russia has experienced severe problems. Over the course of the 1990s, the country was hit by an economic crisis with scarcely a counterpart in modern times. It was sharper and more sudden, for example, than the famous economic downturn that afflicted Germany in the 1920s and 1930s (and which is usually thought to have been an important reason for Hitler's success). For a large part of the Russian population, great social strains have followed these economic troubles. Corruption and lawlessness, moreover—already widespread during the last years of the Communist era—have accelerated greatly under the new regime.

With respect to indicators of *modernization*, educational levels have long been very high in Russia. Literacy is virtually universal. This of course is positive. The level of economic development, conversely, remains low. At about 2000 dollars per-capita, GNP is well below West European standards.

Civil society, as yet, is only weakly developed. During the long years of dictatorship, free organizations were not allowed. However, some of the party-controlled trade unions (which had not at the time been independent bodies) have survived and converted themselves into autonomous interest organizations for the pursuit of better wages and working conditions. But they are small and relatively powerless. There are also some veterans' associations with a certain importance. On the whole, however, the organizational arena is empty. The parties have shallow roots, too. The organizations formed in connection with elections are often composed of sundry parties and movements with only a temporary existence. Membership rolls are for the most part conspicuous by their absence. Outside the largest cities, moreover, parties scarcely exist (organizationally speaking). An exception in this regard is the Communist Party, which has a significant membership and an apparatus extending over the whole country. This organizational capacity represents a legacy from the autocratic Communist Party of former years.

As far as social *cleavages* are concerned, we can state that a sharp class division is developing between, on the one hand, a thin stratum (often with a background in the old nomenklatura) which has been greatly favored by the economic changes, and, on the other, the broad mass of the people whose living conditions have severely deteriorated. With regard to language and religion, the population is relatively homogenous. Yet the country does have minority problems occasioning considerable tensions, especially in its southern areas, where many Muslims are living. The bloody war in Chechnya must be seen in this context; it reflects the strong desire of the central power to prevent secession in these regions.

The *institutional structure* in Russia is hardly favorable from a democratic standpoint. Political life is largely stamped by the "delegative" form of democracy. It is the presidential power which dominates. The position of the parliament is a modest one, and the same can be said of various institutions of supervision and control. There is, however, nowadays a significant degree of

regional autonomy. Vertical centralization, in other words, is limited. To that extent a balance of power exists. There are strong governors who are capable of standing up to Moscow. The situation *within* the regions, on the other hand, is often far from favorable in respect of pluralism, political openness, and the presence of balancing powers. Many regions function as authoritarian enclaves.

If anything, it is in many ways astonishing that the democratic order—with regard to elections and political freedoms—has survived as well as it has. At the mass level, after all, democracy has not developed any deep roots. It is still, it appears, an elite project. Many political leaders have a democratic orientation. There is, furthermore, a broad consensus about the main lines of policy. The overriding objective is to get the economy going, and for that reason good relations with the West are a necessity (if loans and various types of assistance are to be obtained). On that point there is, under present circumstances, scarcely any alternative. And the continuation of such relations presumes, in turn, the maintenance of democratic institutions. Given the political orientation prevailing at present, then, the *international factor* must be considered to be important.

If, however, a more nationalist and militarist tendency (of which there are also some signs) were to become dominant, the situation could change. In such a political context, a "strong man" could well emerge. A leader of this type would be able to reckon, most likely, with substantial popular support. There are—aside from the country's degradation as a great power—many internal problems that need to be addressed; and democracy is not, among the broad masses, "the only game in town". In addition to the polling figures mentioned, it is important to note that public confidence in the parties and in many democratic institutions is extremely low. It is the president and the armed forces that command the greatest public confidence (Pammet 1999, McFaul 2001, Barany and Moser, Tikhomirov 2001).

With rising prices for oil and gas in the global economy, Russia under President Putin (since 2000) has become economically more stable, at least in the short run. Many problems persist, however, and some of the authoritarian tendencies, such as a stricter state control by the media, have been reinforced.

5.4. Africa

The dramatic events in Eastern Europe in 1989-90 also had repercussions in Africa. The effects, however, have been less widespread than those in Eastern Europe. Only in some countries has a series of free and fair elections been held. Still fewer countries have seen government turnovers. Benin and Ghana belong to the category of countries which fulfill both of these criteria of democratic consolidation. But the majority of the states south of the Sahara do not. Many of these states have remained—some more clearly and drasti-

cally, others less so—under some form of authoritarian rule. In some countries, war and anarchy prevail. And among the states which follow democratic rules of the game—such as Botswana and South Africa—several democratic elections have indeed taken place, but no changes of government have occurred (which would furnish extra proof of democratic validity).

Is this the case because democratic values are weakly rooted in the population? The data from studies done in six African countries in 1999/2000 hardly confirm such an assumption (Bratton and Mattes 2001). 70 percent of citizens on average agree that democracy is the best form of government. At the same time, support is weak for such well-known non-democratic alternatives as military rule and the one-party state. A little more than 10 percent, on average, prefer these alternatives; in other words, a strong majority opposes them. To the extent that its fortunes depend on popular attitudes, then, democracy would seem to have brighter prospects.

Africa, however, is an extremely poor continent. The level of *social and economic development* is low. Of the 48 states south of the Sahara, 15 have a per-capita GNP of $ 250 or lower. Another 15 states fall between $ 250 and $ 500. Only a few states exceed the $ 1000 level. Botswana and South Africa are the richest, at just over $ 3000. Educational levels are also low, the literacy rate being some 50 percent on average (World Bank 2000).

Democratic hopes, however, as the African experience shows, are cherished also by people who are very poor. Yet attitudes, of course, are only part of the equation—there must be resources and opportunities also. Due to the low level of economic development, political resources are weakly developed at the mass level. There are also certain other factors serving to complicate democratic efforts.

Civil society, for one thing, is only weakly developed. What is lacking above all are organizations—with a clear political focus—that link city and countryside, and which function in a nationally integrating manner. As a rule, parties are weakly organized; often, moreover, they have a distinct regional ethnic base. There are also sharp conflicts in many countries between different population groups. These conflicts are associated with traditional ethnic and linguistic *cleavages*. Democracy in Africa, to a great extent, has been about balancing ethnic demands and ensuring that a wider range of groups are included. In a good many cases, however, this has proved difficult.

Nor can the *institutional apparatus* be said to constitute a favorable factor. African states, on the whole, are highly centralized. The power of the president is dominant. Parliaments and other supervisory organs are scarcely capable of balancing presidential power. The same can be said of local and regional institutions (where they exist). The actions of the state rarely correspond to the concept of governance by rules. Administrative capacity is low, corruption is rife in many countries. The combination of heavy centralization and a soft state structure (which provides rich opportunities for the pursuit of

personal and political purposes) has contributed to a high level of political conflict. The soft state also constitutes an invitation to clientelist policies—carried out by networks of political bosses able to pass on advantages to their supporters. This kind of organizing—at once elitist and feeble—makes it hard to achieve bottom-up influence in the political system.

As far as *international influences* are concerned, there can be little doubt that the countries of Africa have been exposed to a heavy pressure to democratize. Many of these states depend heavily on aid; nowadays donors often place clear demands on their recipients with regard to the respect of human rights, free elections, etc. As mentioned before, however, such demands can be hard to realize unless strong domestic forces are also acting on behalf of political change.[5]

The popular support that exists for a democratic order is naturally a very positive factor. At the same time, however, opportunities for establishing such an order are limited. Political resources at the mass level, for example, are extremely sparse, due to the low level of development. The existing organizations and institutions offer small prospects for popular activation or the exercise of influence from below. To this must be added the sharp antagonisms between different population segments that can be found in many countries (Gyimah-Boadi 1996, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Reynolds 1999, Wiseman 1999, Hadenius 2001). At the beginning of this century, 14 out of 48 Sub-Saharan African states have become more successfully democratized. 10, however, are "failed" or "collapsed" states which continue to exist under "praetorian" conditions (see also Zartman 1995). The remaining 24 show a mixed pattern of authoritarian and largely "neo-patrimonial" rule (Berg-Schlosser 2004, Berg-Schlosser forthcoming).

5.5. Asia

But even under unfavorable circumstances, democracy can be established and can last. The example of India is illustrative here. It is a poor country, too, with a per-capita GNP of $ 500 and a literacy rate on a par with Africa's. Sharp divisions within the population—on the basis of ethnicity, language, and religion—also exist. Yet democracy has prevailed in India for most of the period since independence in the late 1940s.

One major difference is that in India there were opportunities for organization and representation already during the colonial period. Thus the country started out (at independence) in an appreciably better position than its counterparts in Africa. Its institutional structure, moreover, was different in

5 South Africa under Apartheid was an exception; here a combination of external and internal pressure served to bring the prevailing order down.

important respects. Federalism, together with a system of ever-stronger local self-government, has brought about a far-reaching dispersion of power, and has offered opportunities for a degree of self-rule to the different population groups. Instead of presidentialism—the rule in Africa—parliamentary government prevails in India. As a consequence, access to the executive power is more variable and widespread (especially given the wide range of parties). This reduces conflict and promotes a spirit of cooperation. Parliamentary government also helps to make the parties more cohesive. In general, India has unusually strong political parties, as compared with other countries in the Third World. The independence of the judiciary is another important component; legal institutions are thus better able to carry out their control functions vis-à-vis the political powers (Chhibbar 1999, Mitra 1999, Hadenius 2001, Nesiah 2001).

Most of India's neighbouring countries had more turbulent experiences with democratic governments, such as strife-torn Sri Lanka or Bangla Desh. Others, such as Pakistan, Myanmar (Burma) etc., were dominated by long periods of military rule. East and South East Asia, however, now has become also more strongly affected by the recent wave of democratization.

In the Philippines, in 1986 the authoritarian regime of President Marcos was brought down by a popular uprising. In Taiwan (1986-92)and South Korea (1987/88) relatively smooth transitions to more democratic forms of government have taken place. Since then, in all these countries regular elections have been held and in all of them a substantial change of government handing over power to former opposition forces (the latest in Taiwan in 2000) has occurred. Thus, procedurally speaking, democracy seems to be working.

Anti-democratic forces, by and large, also have been on the decline and popular support for democracy has been rising and has remained, as far as available data show, well above the 50% mark (see, e.g., Diamond 1999).The transition to democracy in Thailand (1992) has been less durable where the military had retained strong prerogatives and intervened again in 2006.

As far as the *supporting factors* of democratization are concerned, these show a more mixed picture. In the Philippines, it was the corrupt nature of the previous regime and its lackluster economic performance which was largely responsible for its downfall. The economic situation since then has remained relatively precarious with a level of GNP per capita around US$ 600.--. By contrast, in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand it was the spectacular economic success of these "Asian tigers" together with other aspects of socio-economic *modernization* which led to increasing demands by larger parts of the population for more meaningful forms of political participation as well (GNP p.c. levels are above U.S.$ 2.000 in Thailand, 5.000,-- in South Korea, and 10.000,-- in Taiwan, see also Merkel 1999).

In these countries, organizations of *civil society* also have become considerably stronger. This applies to the (relatively highly fragmented) trade

unions and their activities, but also many other civic groups. Some of the social conflicts have been carried out, however, (e.g. by student organizations and other more radical groups) in a more violent form leading to heavy clashes with the police and, sometimes, even the military. Political parties have remained relatively weak (with the exception of the long-time dominant Kuomintang in Taiwan). On the whole, relatively strong personalist and clientelist ties and patterns of behavior continue to prevail in the relationship between the political sphere and the society at large.

Social cleavages in an ethnic or religious sense have been not very pronounced with the significant exception of dissident Muslim groups in the Philippines. On Taiwan, there also is some tension between the indigenous inhabitants and the more recent immigrants from mainland China after the Communist revolution there. Certain class tensions are increasing, however. Again the Philippines display the strongest discrepancies of incomes and wealth, almost on a par with Latin American.

Institutionally, in the Philippines and South Korea relatively strong and centralized presidential regimes have been established. In Thailand, a parliamentary system is operating within the constitutional monarchy. In this country, as in the Philippines, extensive political corruption undermines the legitimacy of elected officials. The independence of the judiciary in all these countries also remains doubtful. The media, on the whole, however, have become relatively pluralist and vociferous.

All this, as in the other regions, has taken place in a relatively favorable international climate with the U.S., to a certain extent Japan, and other international bodies supporting these developments. Even the People's Republic of China has become less of a threat (or a model to follow) in this regard. Within the region, economic cooperation in organizations such as ASEAN has also been on the rise, and increasingly demands that such cooperation should also include political (democratic) criteria are being expressed. Thus, certain democratic "demonstration effects" have now also been felt in countries like Indonesia or Malaysia.

On balance, however, as in some of the other regions, these new democracies must still be considered as not fully consolidated and characterized by some specific "defects" (see also Cotton in Diamond et al. 1997).

6. Twenty-First Century Democratizations: Experience Versus Scholarship

Laurence Whitehead

6.1. Introduction

"Recent developments in the theatre of world politics continue to disturb the academic analysis of the processes of democratization". That is how I began the previous version of this paper, written for the International Political Science Association Congress of 2000, and published in the first edition of this volume. At the beginning of 2007 is it still appropriate to start in the same way? Both the theatre of world politics and the academic analysis of processes of democratization have moved on over the first few years of the new millennium. But the disconnect between the rapid changes and disturbing surprises affecting world politics, and the more gradual and stately progression of the academic debate, remains as substantial as before. This revised assessment incorporates a considerable proportion of the earlier material where that remains pertinent, adding some updated illustrations. But it also refers to the most important and unforeseen new developments in the politics of democratization that are unfolding around us, and attempts to draw some lessons about how the scholarly community might respond in order to stay in touch with political reality.

The underlying theme of the paper remains as before: processes of democratization are such prominent and striking features of international politics that they demand careful and thorough scholarly attention. However they are also diverse, often intractable, to standard academic treatment, and nearly always incomplete. They therefore keep springing surprises that force analysts back to the drawing board. The previous version of this chapter started from the observation that our interpretative schemas have been regularly overtaken by the flux of events almost before the ink had dried on the scholarly output. Whether we opt for defensive rigour or for more open-ended engagement with the fluidity of our material, the study of democratization will continue to be destabilized by further surprises and mutations. But on the other hand, it will also be enriched by the influx of new cases, more evidence, and fresh experiments.

A very broad and impressionistic survey of this kind is bound to raise questions more than it can provide answers. It points to the need for humility.

Both academic rigour and contemporary relevance are appropriate criteria for evaluating scholarship in this field, but the material we have to work with generates a considerable tension between them. Rigour at the expense of relevance involves retreat from the analytical tasks that are pressingly needed. Relevance without adequate scholarly discipline and perspective can lead not only to poor analysis but to disastrous policy recommendations. A gross misspecification of the dynamics of democratization in one particular country (for example a nation whose name begins with "I") can lead to consequences, both theoretical and practical, that destabilize expectations and alter collective perceptions and responses across a much wider terrain.

Reference has already been made to "rapid changes and disturbing surprises" that have seriously affected the course of democratization as a global process between 2000 and 2007. But this requires some explication. The aggregate data generated each year by Freedom House do not appear to support such claims. Between 1990 and 2000 the number of "electoral democracies" in their inventory rose from 76 to 120 (from 46% to 63% of the countries studied); whereas from 2000 to 2005 there was a virtual stagnation (122 countries or 64% of the universe were classified in this way). Similar status was observable in the threefold classification (89 were "free" in 2006—with 1.2 billion inhabitants; and 45 were "not free", with 2.3 billion people affected). Over the past three decades the number of countries and proportion of population classified as "free" has gradually drifted upwards, and the figures for the "not free" have slowly subsided, with not much change in the middle and no evidence of any new pattern in the twenty-first century. So on this basis, it might seem that there has been no powerful "wave" motion in global democratization since the mid-seventies (pace Huntington) and no reversal of the wave since the end of the 1990s either.

On the other hand, since September 11th 2001 world politics has been buffeted by what western leaders like to call the "global war on terror". According to the same authorities, Afghanistan and Iraq have been 'democratized' through massive foreign liberation and occupation. "Colour" revolutions have swept Georgia, the Ukraine, and Lebanon. The European Union has added 12 additional members to its community of democratic states. Even the Palestinian National Authority has held genuine competitive elections resulting in an alternation of officeholders. Thus below the threshold of the observations captured by the Freedom House annual surveys more localised processes of democratization have certainly displayed considerable vigour. Unfortunately for the backers of these processes, however, in none of the cases just listed is it possible to regard the results so far as decisive breakthroughs towards a more universal acceptance of democratic practices. To the contrary, the coercive democratizations seem destined to continue as they begin—i.e. coercively rather than democratically. The "colour" revolutions have tended to stagnate or even relapse under the weight of geopolitical

pressures from unenthusiastic authoritarian neighbours. The EU enlargement might seem the most genuine advance, were it not for the setbacks to political accountability in Europe arising from French and Dutch (democratic) decisions to block a new treaty and (implicitly) to turn away Turkey. The Palestinian process is worthy of note mainly because it produced what the western democracies have chosen to regard as the "wrong" result, and is therefore subject to savage sanctions. A global balance sheet would also need to consider a variety of other relatively discouraging developments (the entrenchment of the military regime in Pakistan, the strengthening of the security apparatus in Russia, the polarisation of opinion in Venezuela, etc. etc.).

The "rapid changes and surprises" of 2000-2007 are much more in evidence at the qualitative level than in terms of dichotomous tabulations of national regime types. The proclamation of a "war on terror' changed the climate of political interactions within and between states in ways that were not foreseen by most prior scholarship on democracy and democratization.[6] The rule of law and reliance on voluntary co-operation through multilateral organizations were both downgraded. Technologies of surveillance came to the fore and were allowed to encroach on pre-existing protections of individual rights. National security doctrines regained pre-eminence, and military and security forces were restored to centre stage after their post-Cold War demotions. The media adjusted to this anxious new *zeitgeist.* These tendencies were much more in evidence in the best established of western democracies, with far reaching consequences for the ways in which they interacted with more recent or prospectively democratic partners. Although most of the scholarly literature on democracy promotion continued to rest on the assumption that the most advanced democracies would set high standards and seek to promote their models of freedom throughout the world, much daily experience (from the Meneses killing on the London underground to the "extraordinary rendition" of miscellaneous terror suspects, to the constitutional "black hole" of Guantanamo Bay) most vividly contradicted that presupposition. It is in this respect, above all, that recent developments in the theatre of world politics have continued to disturb the academic analysis of processes of democratization.

6.2. "Stateness" and Democratization

Whereas the academic literature on democratization and, of course, the international rankings from Freedom House to the Bertelsmann Transformation

6 Huntington did anticipate a "clash of civilizations" of course, and he has also stressed problems of order, democratic overload, etc. But the dominant thrust of the literature in the 1990s was resolutely upbeat and liberal internationalist.

Index has tended to view the individual nation-state as the central, indeed almost exclusive, site of democratization processes, most recent experience has tended to undermine that assumption. The original 20000 version of this chapter drew attention to this problem, and it still seems appropriate to reiterate the major observations made at that time. Three paired comparisons may serve to illustrate the distortions that can arise from such an over-emphasis. i) Indonesia and Nigeria were selected as two major cases to illustrate the possibility that democratization might take place in the context of incomplete stateness. (Recent developments provide many further examples, but these two remain pertinent); ii) Colombia and Sri Lanka were selected as two major cases to illustrate the point that long after democracy had been established at the national level it might remain far from hegemonic ("the only game in town") in terms of local political actors and communities; and iii) Brazil and India were chosen to indicate that large and regionally disparate states might be democratized from the periphery rather than from the centre.

6.2.1 Indonesia and Nigeria

At the end of the 1990s both Indonesia and Nigeria embarked upon transitions to democracy. This was an unprecedented development in Indonesia, and a third attempt in Nigeria. In both cases the experience so far has been fraught with difficulties, including some large scale violence at the regional level, and severe problems in establishing a new balance between federal and state levels of political authority, and between the executive, the legislature, the courts, and the armed forces. Nevertheless in both countries democratisation remains in place, at least for now. These are both demographically weighty oil-dependent developing countries with large Muslim electorates, and both face severe regional imbalances. If they can be successfully democratised this will have major implications for the politics of their respective regions, and for democratisation as a worldwide project. Whichever way they turn out, the lessons for democratisation studies in general will have to be carefully pondered.

These recent developments bear on several different topics within the academic literature, but none more than on the question of 'stateness'. In the absence of consent concerning the boundaries and regional configurations of a state it is difficult to establish democratic institutions across its territory. The electorate, the legal system, taxation, and the projection of citizenship rights all require a pre-established unified field within which they can operate on something like a homogeneous basis. Schematically, then, we have the proposition that state formation must precede democratisation.

But, as the post-independence histories of Indonesia and Nigeria make clear, neither democratisation nor state formation invariably conform to a

very clear-cut pattern. These are both long-term, complex, and potentially contested dynamic processes. There can be no assurance that state formation will be terminated before democratisation must begin. Indeed, the legacy of authoritarian and personalist rule in these two countries lends some support to the opposite proposition, namely that it is only through the creation of a workable democratic regime that the otherwise unresolvable problems of uncompleted state formation may be overcome. (The third possibility, of course, is that neither centralisation imposed by force nor voluntary cooperation induced by constitutional agreement will suffice to resolve problems of state formation that are destined to recur and destabilise all variants of political regime.)

6.2.2. Colombia and Sri Lanka

Both Colombia and Sri Lanka appeared in the original Dahlian list of 'polyarchies', and both have held regular competitive elections and maintained a constitutional division of powers ever since. Compared to most of the 122 electoral democracies identified by Freedom House in 2006, these are among the more durable, resilient and securely entrenched of democratic regimes. Yet both have been wracked by violent civil insurgencies almost throughout their forty-year histories of unbroken institutional continuity, and far from being 'the only game in town', the game of electoral competition has often appeared more like a side show when compared to the struggle for political power, which is being waged through warfare. At least a tenth of the national territory is outside official control ('beyond the pale', as the English used to say of Ireland) and the loyalties of many more localities are an object of continuous contestation. In 2000 I referred to these two cases as evidence that apparently durable polyarchies, and even 'consolidated' democracies, can undergo progressive regression towards political deadlock and indeed social anarchy. In 2007 the situation in Colombia has improved somewhat, while that in Sri Lanka is even worse than before. Beyond such specific variations these two cases still support the more general point.

The prevalent assumption in the academic literature has been that democratic transitions occur in whole countries one at a time, and that in some circumstances a chain reaction of such transitions may constitute a 'wave' of democratization. Once a transition has occurred in any given country it is postulated that the persistence of this regime over time will lead to its progressive 'consolidation'. If polyarchical rules define the terms of access to public office and of influence over public policy, then in due course all those political actors who seek office or wish to exert influence will be constrained to pursue their objectives within the said rules. The electoral calendar will shape the timetable horizons of all power contenders, and the consolidation

of the regime will extend the time horizon of all citizens into a predictable sequence of electoral decisions. The political horizon will thereby be extended into the indefinite future.

However, recent elections in Sri Lanka have done nothing to settle the vital political issues confronting electors in that country, and there is no confidence that future elections will offer them any better prospects. As the FARC, in Colombia Tigers and in Sri Lanka the Tamil the other non-electoral power contenders persist and even intensify their military efforts there are ever fewer benefits available to those who try to live within the rules of the constitutional system, and the risks of so doing continue to escalate. The inhabitants of the contested zones face possible expulsion from their homes and workplaces at the shortest notice. Young men from across the entire territory face impressment into military or guerrilla service as the conflict requires, and all other aspects of public policy are held hostage to the exigencies of the armed struggle. Thus the time horizons of most citizens has been foreshortened to the limit. This was the pattern in Colombia until recently and after seven years of "Plan Colombia" it is still too early to tell whether this syndrome is in the course of being overcome there. The FARC remains in its strongholds, and the para-military are by no means dismantled.

Thus far the literature on democratization has tended to treat these two countries as 'deviant cases', and has tried to focus on the respects in which they are likely to correspond to normal experience once the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict have been resolved. But it is by no means clear that they are either so deviant or so transient as has been assumed to date, and this is one area where recent developments—both methodological and prospective—could soon force a reappraisal. At the methodological level the main challenges are likely to concern i) the assumption that 'whole countries' should constitute the essential unit of analysis, and ii) that the binary coding of national regimes by the year is an adequate procedure of categorization. On a more theoretical level, these cases raise significant doubts about the proposition that democratization typically stabilizes and extends the time horizons of all players and that regime consolidation necessarily socializes all players into observing the rules of 'the only game in town'. Recent developments in Colombia and Sri Lanka also point to the need for more clarity about the notions of 'regression', 'breakdown', and 'decay' as they apply to formally democratic regimes.

6.2.3. Brazil and India

Neither Brazil nor India figure among Gordon White's hypothetical list of democratic developmental states (Robinson and White 1998) , although he does concede that 'certain states within India might qualify. Similar claims

might be made on behalf of certain states within Brazil. Recent developments in these two continent-countries may remind us of classical political science debates about the relationship between democracy and 'size', and they also suggest parallels with Robert Putnam's much quoted work differentiating northern and southern Italy according to their distinctive endowments of 'social capital'. However, great extremes of regional diversity and social inequality within a given state do not necessarily justify disaggregating it into component parts, or attributing democratic characteristics only to certain locations or social sites and not to others. On the contrary, as for example John Markoff has indicated in his very wide ranging survey of the social history of democracy, democratic and undemocratic practices frequently exist side by side, with democratization generated by the interaction between established elites and social movement challengers, each invoking their own versions of democratic claims. As the product of such 'dialectical' interactions the geographical location and institutional content of democracy is not fixed. Hence pioneering experiments are by no means confined to the wealthiest or most powerful of countries or regions (Markoff 1996). In contrast to the 'prerequisites' approach of the social capital literature (and the earlier modernization literature to which it is related) this view of democratization as a creative product of dissatisfaction and competitive emulation would suggest that vast and internally differentiated societies such as Brazil and India could be particularly creative forcing grounds for democratic innovation.

From this standpoint, the key ingredients would have to include not only size and diversity, but also an institutional framework capable of providing enough stability for alternative overarching experiments to be undertaken, and enough common values for their lessons to seem communicable from one location to another. Brazil and India both sustain stable federalized authority structures which make it possible for self-styled Marxist parties to govern in huge urban agglomerations such as Calcutta and Sao Paulo, (or indeed in whole states such as West Bengal, Kerala, and Rio Grande do Sul) at the same time that much more conservative elites have the opportunity to demonstrate their alternative versions of democratic governance, for example in the Punjab, or in the state of Bahia. These are both examples of political competition and social emulation within a unified political system which nevertheless contains a multiplicity of sub-units or separate cells, each commanding sufficient resources and political authority to make them semi-autonomous polities in their own right.

Obviously party competition for electoral favour also strengthens the tendency to converge on politics acceptable to the 'median voter'. The existence of regional strongholds also means that neither 'ins' nor 'outs' are fully excluded from the exercise of public authority. These stabilizing features of federalism only work, however, when supported by societal reinforcements (which seem absent in Nigeria, for example). Recent developments in these

continent-countries can therefore be analyzed and compared from a 'bottom up' perspective that would focus on the uneven emergence of supportive forms of civil society and democratic norms, rather than the centralized and rational design of institutional solutions.

In addition to these dimensions of "stateness", developments in world politics since 2001 have directed much more attention to the incidence of "failing" or even "failed" states, and the academic literature has also begun to address the issues that arise. External vulnerability and the possibility of state 'failure' encompass a range of different conditions traceable to several distinct causes. What we are dealing with here is a negative condition—the absence of the full sovereignty, authority and external recognition theoretically attributable to a Westphalian or Weberian state. The point is that of the 192 members of the UN, and the 122 electoral democracies identified in current tabulations by Freedom House (1992ff), a high proportion falls short of the postulated conditions of effective state autonomy and full sovereignty. Therefore a major empirical theme for the comparative study of democratization should be possible transition paths, and the quality of democratic that is possible in the absence of full state-ness. In such conditions international factors can be expected to play a more directive role, and the stability and internal legitimacy of the ensuing regimes may well diverge from standard models. Even so, experience teaches us that democratizations can be achieved in such contexts. However, in contrast to the assumptions of mainstream transitology, comparative analysis needs to focus on how external direction is imposed on the requirements for subsequent withdrawal of international control, on the uncertain process by which relatively weak domestic forces acquire authenticity and succeed (or not) in disengaging themselves from their foreign protectors.

One cluster of experiences that has received serious attention are the "transitional administrations" that have been established in the wake of UN-sanctioned peace-keeping operations. Starting with Namibia and Cambodia at the end of the Cold War these have since proliferated to include Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Timor (together with long-standing areas subject to a lesser international presence, such as Cyprus, Palestine, etc.) The general pattern is that an international authority temporarily assumes some or all of the responsibilities normally assigned to the state, in order to create the conditions for a subsequent withdrawal and the restoration of "normal" state administration of the given territory. Since the negotiated withdrawal is supposed to leave behind a legitimate as well as a functioning government, it has become the norm for the international authority to either organise or at least promote a democratic election, prior to its departure. There is thus a temporal sequence that can be compared to the liberalization/transition/consolidation model of democratization in a sovereign state. In this way the democratization framework can be, and has been, extended to include an important

cluster of processes where "stateness" has failed, or has been temporarily suspended. This extension of our universe of cases has proved productive and relatively manageable so far. But it was not a standard process, and the resulting regime is far from a full "democracy". Moreover, the exemplary case in this cluster was supposed to be Timor, until it unexpectedly relapsed into armed conflict and required a renewed international peace force. Bosnia and Haiti have not even progressed that far, and the claim that Kosovo has been turned into a democracy that is entitled to a sovereign independence from Serbia remains highly contentious. More generally, it remains to be seen whether this cluster of territories affected by severe problems of state weakness or failure will in future conform to the standards attributable to any minimally stable and sovereign democracy, or whether they will continue to display recurrently deviant features derived from their distinctive histories and structural characteristics. The academic literature tends to treat the first outcome as the norm to be expected, but political experience suggests otherwise.

The main scholarly focus has been on those troubled territories where UN Transitional Administrations have been established (Newman and Rich 2004), but it is important to remember that the universe of precarious and failing states is much larger than that. There is another subset of Pacific island states, for example, whose fragile democratization processes are supervised not by the UN, but by Australia and New Zealand, through the 16 member Pacific Island Forum (Reilly 2006). Security assistance has recently been provided to the Soloman Islands, and this regional framework is currently being tested by a further military coup in Fiji. Here, as more generally, the academic literature struggles to keep pace with adverse surprises. In a similar vein, unrecognised small territories outside the conventional state structure have proliferated and challenged standard notions of democracy in parts of Europe (Turkish occupied North Cyprus, Transdinistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, etc). So although some aspects of weak and vulnerable "stateness" have been incorporated into the scholarly literature, experience and practice continue to run ahead of academic analysis. Since 2001 the international community has become much more preoccupied with the security implications of perceived or actual state weakness and failure, and has therefore become much more likely to suspend sovereignty in territories that are judged to be insecure. This shift in outlook runs strongly counter to the still prevalent assumption in the academic literature on democratization that the crucial unit of analysis is the nation state. The following section therefore reassesses the national/international divide, and highlights the centrality of international factors in contemporary democratization processes.

6.3. The Centrality of International Factors

The previous section surveyed the variability, and frequent inadequacy, of 'state-ness' as an empirical foundation for comparative theorizing about democratization. The apparently neat and clear-cut distinction between 'national' and 'international' factors may work when applied to many of the most prominent individual case histories of transition but is harder to sustain for more marginal cases, and liable to dissolve when working with comparative models. So, while analytical clarity requires the development of no more than a few, well demarcated series of alternative models, the empirical record continues to generate unexpected new patterns, borderline cases, and experiences straddle more than one model. An inductive taxonomy based on a small number of recurrent—primarily international—variables can provisionally order this potential confusion, but periodic revision is inevitable given new developments. Not every case will correspond neatly to a particular model, and existing models may need to be sub-categorized or otherwise modified as world politics generates further surprises and ideational shifts.

Although the three 'waves' of the Huntington schema were international in character, their theoretical foundations were cloudy, and the empirical basis for this taxonomy was extremely casual. By contrast, de-colonization, EU candidacy, military defeat, and transitional administrations all privilege rather precise international factors, and as I have argued elsewhere most democratization processes can be productively grouped and compared using a taxonomy that invokes well-delimited international determinants (Whitehead 2005).

These four clusters do not exhaust the universe of democratization processes but they do cover a high proportion of the total. What remains may be isolated outliers, or the earliest instances of what may prove to be another cluster. Or perhaps additional principles of classification will need to be developed as the universe of cases expands.

In 1983 a small US military operation in Grenada was sufficient to topple the Leninist rump of the 'New Jewel' government, which had just assassinated the relatively popular Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop. With less than 100,000 inhabitants and a capital city of only 5,000, the state of Grenada depended on the goodwill of its larger neighbors, and once factional divisions led to violence it was unable to resist external intervention. Moreover, the great majority of the population welcomed a 'rescue mission' to save it from ideological dogmatism and restore a standard Anglo-Caribbean style multi-party democracy. At the time it was easy to overlook the significance of this episode, but with hindsight it is clear that most subsequent democratizations occurred not in secure states like Brazil and Spain, but in vulnerable and even 'failing' states—including states as subject to external imposition as Grenada.

After Grenada came Panama and Haiti. Theoretically, the point is that many democratization processes have occurred in conditions where the balance between internal dynamics and external leverage is much more strongly tilted towards the latter than classical transitology allowed for. While scholary work and policy analysis is mainly based on cases of massive military defeat and extended foreign occupation (Germany, Italy and Japan after 1945 and now Afghanistan and Iraq), the more typical and frequent pattern of imposition has been briefer and more casual. Military imposition of democracy usually occurs after short wars or circumscribed episodes of resistance in states with a very limited capacity to hold out against determined neighbours or Great powers. The Caribbean is an example, the islands of the South Pacific may become a second, and there are more scattered episodes elsewhere (like the South African and Botswanan intervention in Lesotho in 1998).

Disengaging from foreign protectors and acquiring local legitimacy and authenticity is the essence of de-colonization, whether the end result is a sovereign democracy or not. Therefore, de-colonization can be contrasted with democratization-through-imposition in terms of external commitment. There are also major parallels between the two processes, which differentiate both from domestically driven transitions. Although there is a difference between the imposition of external control and its formal removal, in both cases the main initiative rests with the outside power. Domestic political forces react rather than control the agenda of regime change. This is not to say that everything is determined by imperial powers. But the formal locus of authority is important when determining the rules that will govern a new regime, and which local political factions will inherit, or be excluded from, new structures of power. In short, de-colonization privileges international factors that were screened out of initial democratization theory. The old European empires may have gone, but these lessons remain current in the context of twenty-first century neo-imperialism.

One international precipitant of democratic transition was acknowledged as a possible route to regime change in early transitology studies: *the external military defeat of authoritarian regimes*. However, democratization literature has usually regarded this as unlikely—an exceptional contingency rather than a serious prospect, although the Portuguese de-colonization-cum-democratization could be viewed as a product of a virtual defeat in African colonial wars, and there are also the cases of Greece (defeated by Turkey in 1974), and Argentina (which lost the Malvinas war in 1982). In all cases external intervention de-legitimized ruling military juntas and paved the way for the return of outlawed civilian political leaders and parties. So it had to be recognized that even long-established and highly structured Weberian states could be precipitated into democratic regime change by the most classical of international factors (military defeat), with domestic dynamics initiated or accelerated by an externally administered political shock. But in the twenty-

first century, although there will doubtless be more military defeats, it is by no means clear that they will necessarily pave the way to further democratizations.

In addition to the above cases, the empirical evidence of the 1990s shows clearly that there is a *further* possibility involving force and a leading role for external powers. Internal conflicts and civil wars may end as a result of multilateral *international mediation* that promotes compromise and reconciliation between domestic forces that are incapable of defeating each other or of ending conflict on their own. This was the case in El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in other Central American civil war-torn countries, the settlement of conflicts in southern Africa (Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa)—although the 'democratic' nature of outcomes is open to debate. What matters from a theoretical standpoint is that the sub-category of post-conflict democratic compromise has provided yet another path to democratization in which international factors—backed by some last resort possibility of force—may be critical, or even decisive.

In contrast with the above cases, there are others where the threat of force is imminent or latent. So long as international relations are essentially about the relationship between nationally 'sovereign' powers (in an 'anarchical' society of states) residual latency will always subsist. Liberal internationalists sometimes hypothesize that even latent force may be eliminated with strengthened supranational institutions and norms and increased economic and societal interdependence. But we are clearly far from achieving a Kantian state of 'perpetual peace', and 9/11 has dispelled earlier liberal optimism. In short, apart from the overt manifestation of the threat of force that typically supports de-colonization processes and post-conflict settlements, there is a second tier of international factors with this latent potential.

The Russian Federation's current stance toward pro-western democratic movements in its immediate neighbourhood provides a good illustration. A recent example is the Russian attitude to elections in the Ukraine. The West was never ready to deploy force against electoral fraud in Kiev, and economic sanctions would have been difficult to sustain. Moscow seemed to have the advantage: it could exercise a veto over undesired outcomes within its zone of influence, backed by a latent last resort capacity to use force—a capacity that it was most unlikely to have to activate in practice. This form of external 'veto power' without much risk of real action can be highly intimidating and therefore shape specific national processes of democratization. The vetoing power can threaten various lesser forms of sanction and ostracism that may be sufficient to produce the desired effect. As can be seen in the Ukraine and elsewhere, however, such effects tend to be polarizing. Different currents of national opinion may respond either by acquiescing or, alternatively, by becoming more defiant. Each outcome depends upon the precise configuration of local circumstances. Similarly Beijing may either

cow or provoke Taiwan—the dynamics are finely balanced. Other instances include the case of Turkey and Cyprus and the EU; that of the MERCOSUR and Paraguay; or that of Cuba and the Helms-Burton Act. Of course the Russian and Chinese examples are attempts to block democratization through the use of veto power, whereas in Cuba, Cyprus, and Paraguay external veto players claim that they are protecting democracy. The point is, however, that it is less the free play of domestic forces than the externally determined requirements of the vetoing power that drives the process and possibly shapes the outcome.

Factors of international power shaping democratizations can be strung out along a continuum—ranging from outright control, to constraining vetoes, to various gradations of political conditionality. Conditionality differs from control in that it engages with an acknowledged independent polity, which can in principle choose to accept prescribed conditions or suffer the consequences of declining. Burma and Cambodia are free of external power constraints: in the former, the governing junta explicitly rejects democratic conditionality and takes the consequences; and in the latter the Hun Sen regime attempts to benefit from the rewards of conditionality without conceding to foreign donors more than is strictly necessary.

Some forms of conditionality are highly intrusive and inflexible, like the conditions laid down by the US Congress before the elected Aristide government in Haiti could receive vitally needed economic assistance. Others are either more subject to administrative discretion in terms of timing, selective application, and interpretation, and may be more flexible, as is the Brussels interpretation of the Cotonou Agreement conditionality clause. There are also important differences between unilateral and multilateral variants of conditionality (the one-sided inflexibility of Helms-Burton and the more collaborative EU Copenhagen Criteria), and between short-term high impact pro-democratic interventions and long-term incentive structures. There is another important distinction between international conditions that are laid down before democratization begins and those elaborated once it is underway.

Once we recognize the frequently major contributory influence of demonstration and contagion effects, the apparently clear-cut distinction between the domestic and international components of democratization becomes far more elusive and less workable. Consider the role of US and some European universities in training and educating an international stratum of government, cultural, and business leaders who go on to act as opinion formers and conduits for western influence in the many undemocratically governed countries to which they return. Consider even the role of the English language in the dissemination of a specifically Anglo-Saxon variant of democratic discourse round the world. Consider the role of international legal practices, and of broader collective conventions and humanitarian norms in gradually reshap-

ing the professional practices of bureaucrats and judicial authorities in many authoritarian regimes. Consider, too, the impact of movies: in the South America of the 1970s local audiences assumed that the brutal military so powerfully exposed in Costa Gavras' film *Z* was their own. It may be hard to pin down the precise impact of such broad societal and cultural influences, but they are arguably as important a contributory cause of democratic transitions as any more directly observable political mechanisms. It may be that explicitly political causes only achieve their intended results when interpreted through an appropriate cultural lens that has to be explained as an 'international factor'. It may be, for example, that differential exposure and receptivity to such societal influences goes a long way to explain why the 'Arab world' has not been swept by the so-called 'third wave' as other large regions were. This would certainly provide at least a more fruitful line of research than Huntington's abstract and 'essentialist' 'clash of civilizations' hypothesis.

The doubted fate of the current US project to democratize the whole of the "Greater Middle East" invites more explicit scholarly reflection on why 'large regions' are considered relevant units of analysis for the comparative study of democratization. Regions are seldom defined by purely geographical criteria, and even when they are, outer boundaries and internal sub-categories require elaboration. The general point is, however, that these regions are clearly shaped and constrained by neighborhood influences that are a further variant of "international factors". It is rare to come across an instance of democratization in a single country where no substantial neighborhood effects are evident. Neighbourhood effects operate within a regional context, even if not all countries in the region are affected equally. Since rather different combinations of external effects are required to account for each regional cluster, the external factors concerned may be regionally specific rather than global in character. Understanding the shared traits of a large region can also help us understand the limits to each cluster, and the factors exempting some regions from developments occurring in others.

External influences operate within a broader global context whether they are filtered through large regions, neighborhood clusters, or more through direct interaction effects. During the Cold War almost all such currents were perceived through the lens of bi-polarity. An alternative interpretative framework emerged after the 1980s (and at least until 9/11), the general theme of which is conveyed by the loose terminology of 'globalization.' International institutions like the Bretton Woods twins and the UN and its regional organisations have acquired new mandates, enlarged memberships, and more authoritative roles. In other issue domains—environmental and labor standards, and accountancy and contract enforcement norms, for example—globalizing tendencies are also apparent.

Admittedly, it is debatable how far these economic and institutional components of globalization have really facilitated democratization. The rise of

communist China in tandem with the accentuation of these trends suggests the inadequacy of any naïve identification of the two processes. However, globalization almost certainly does tend to reinforce some key attitudes and assumptions that accompany the outward-looking, liberal internationalist variant of democratization most prevalent over the past twenty years. So if we are witnessing a backlash against this kind of 'globalization' after September 2001, this will probably generate a different, perhaps weaker, more illiberal, *zeitgeist*, with potentially powerful implications for future democratization processes. In the place of global liberalism we may be witnessing a resurgence of more traditional geopolitical power configurations. If that is how the theatre of world politics is developing, we need to consider how this affects scholarly analysis of democratization as a regionally or internationally co-ordinated phenomenon.

There is a substantial literature about the enlargement of the EU, including its democratizing potential. There is also rather more scattered but nevertheless useful literature on the democratization of Hong Kong and Taiwan, taking into account their relations with mainland China. But the more comparative and theoretical issues arising from such cases have tended to be discussed in terms of 'transnationalism', 'conditionality', and the growth of 'international civil society', rather than from a geopolitical perspective (Grugel 1999). Yet, when we consider world history over the twentieth century, it is apparent that all the major geopolitical conflicts—First World War, Second World War, and Cold War—were couched in terms of democracy versus its enemies and in each case the self-styled democratic alliance prevailed. This suggests that the claim to democratic legitimacy may be a powerful factor in international struggles for ascendancy, perhaps because it both motivates allies and supporters and reassures enemies that the consequences of defeat need not be intolerable. (It may be that such precedents have influenced Washington's assessment of the merits of leading an alliance to democratise "the Greater Middle East", although that geopolitical project could prove a serious case of over-reach).

Viewed from this standpoint, the EU's commitment to extend its frontiers must be understood as a heroic geopolitical initiative, with profound implications for the future of western democracy. This is equally true whether all potential European democracies are included or—as seems more likely—certain large major potentially democratic states are marginalised and discriminated against (Russia, Turkey, Ukraine).

Similarly, Beijing's successful reincorporation of Hong Kong, and its clear determination to achieve eventual reunification with Taiwan without abandoning its current political regime, must be understood as a second geopolitical initiative of 'world historical' significance. All of these projects are very long term, and their eventual outcomes are still uncertain. In both cases the desired outcome would be to consolidate a new force in world politics

with sufficient economic, demographic, and territorial weight to alter the overall balance of power in its favour. A successful EU composed of 27 plus democratic states, all solving their problems through peaceful co-operation and legal integration (and even converging their sovereignties in an 'ever closer union'), would be a historical accomplishment that would end centuries of internecine conflict in Europe and so restore the old continent to the centre of world affairs. It would also counterbalance the present unipolar ascendancy of the USA, and through partnership with Washington would reinforce the pre-eminence of liberal democracy as the template for political modernity. Equally, of course, a failure by the EU to deliver on this promise after raising such expectations would constitute a major defeat for liberal democracy as a global practice, and not just as a regional experiment. Similarly, a reunified China under Communist Party leadership would close the book on a century of external impositions and a half century of latent civil war, restoring a united China to the position of influence merited both by its demography and its economic potential. But this Beijing project is at least as long term and uncertain as that of the Helsinki summit. Moreover, Taiwan will deploy the moral authority of liberal democracy as a major weapon in its struggle to resist adverse incorporation. Not only does the democratic status of Taiwan elicit international support that would never have flowed to the KMT alone; also, the example of the Taiwanese regime both threatens Communist supremacy on the mainland, and offers reassurance to those tempted to break with one party dominance. In both these cases the geopolitical stakes are distinctly high, and the precise outcome remains uncertain. In both cases the success (or failure) of current processes of democratization is a critical component of a broader struggle for geopolitical ascendancy.

As for Washington's stated intention to democratize the Greater Middle East, this is a geopolitical project of even greater transformative ambition than either of the other two. (To judge from progress so far, it seems unlikely to prove achievable, at least given the means deployed, even over the long run). But whether a success or a failure, its repercussions on democratization as a global project can hardly be exaggerated. Once a dominant power has set course to bring about a geopolitical transformation of this scale there is little margin for error. Having destroyed Sunni autocracy in Iraq, the consequent empowerment of the Shia majority will generate its geopolitical effects throughout the Arab world. Washington's vision could prevail, or it could fail, but the option of returning to the previous equilibrium is no longer available. This has profound implications for US power in the world, as well as for the democratization of the Middle East.

From a power political perspective, as the scale and content of perceived threats to western hegemony fluctuates, so too does the margin of tolerance that a dominant power can afford to extend to potentially destabilizing experiments within its security sphere. Evidently, the US foreign policy

establishment has multiple responsibilities in widely divergent regions of the world, and has to contend with a domestic political process in which the balanced evaluation of complex external political realities is not the best way to elicit internal support. Thus, democracy is not the only key term in foreign policy analysis that may be selectively reinterpreted by western leaders and associated academic analysts as security priorities shift (terrorism, multilateralism and the national interest are other examples).

Except perhaps in rare moments of genuine and extreme emergency, there is latitude for diverse and partial interpretations to compete for ascendancy in the foreign policy sphere. Thus President Reagan chose to present the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua as a far greater threat to US security than other analysts would judge it to have been. President Clinton selectively interpreted other complex democratization issues (in Russia, Haiti and Mexico) with a similar degree of discretionality. And after 9/11, President Bush has chosen to interpret Middle Eastern politics in an even more simplified manner. The discipline of accurate international analysis competes with alternative requirements of political success—retaining the support of an inattentive electorate, resisting the accusation of over-indulgence to the wishes of foreign allies, for example, or remaining beyond the reach of potentially destructive media.

Given these three general tendencies, it has proved difficult for Washington to sustain a consistent and effective policy of generalized democracy promotion and equally difficult for it to tone down the evangelical rhetoric that so divides acolytes and radical dissenters. Challengers to the evangelical thrust of Washington foreign policy activists are liable to be treated not so much as helpful correctives but rather as dangerous assailants of the security of the world's 'one true hope' of democratic salvation. In reality the true story of the relationship between democratization and western hegemonic security interests has yet to be told. Would western security be enhanced today by the democratization of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, or the People's Republic of China? The official consensus is yes, but in practice, western policymakers remain very uncertain about when to promote or neglect democratization. And arguably with good reason. In sum, 9/11 is forcing the western security establishment to decide how to position itself so as to reconcile its immediate and primary task (maintaining international order and western hegemony) with the longer term and potentially conflicting objective of promoting universal democratization. Both theory and the empirical record since the 1970s suggest that this enterprise contains multiple pitfalls.

Theory and experience tells us that we are far from reaching the 'end of history' or enjoying a guaranteed and universal 'perpetual democratic peace'. On the contrary, as recent events demonstrate, political conflict in general, and the struggle between democratic and undemocratic political alternatives in particular, remain potent and unpredictable forces. Over the past thirty

years we have witnessed an extraordinary succession of experiments in regime change, none of which can be adequately explained in purely domestic terms. International factors, and causal processes that are not easily classifiable as either domestic or international, have invariably played a substantial role. The diversity and relative indeterminacy of most of these processes of political change is also striking. Looking towards the future, it is foreseeable that these extra-national patterns of conflict and flux will persist, and that not all the surprises lie behind us. Democratization has been a powerful and wide-ranging tendency, but it is far from overcoming all alternative political models. Without US strength and western security this tendency could rapidly dissipate. Even where it does come to prevail the outcomes are by no means uniform.

In these circumstances, theoretical exercises modeling processes of democratic change will continue to be necessary, and will have to incorporate a wide range of non-domestic influences and variables. New case material is likely to challenge and destabilize established academic models, and indeed our key analytical categories—democracy, regime, international, liberalism – are likely to be subjected to scrutiny and revision.

There is a further reason why the previously unproblematic distinction between the domestic and international dimensions is becoming inoperable. Diasporas and returning exiles may displace 'internal' political actors. The priority policy issues of newly enfranchised electors may become increasingly 'intermestic.' Dual nationality and the voting rights of overseas nationals may compete with or supplant more traditional themes of political representation.[7] Both people-expelling and people-receiving societies may find that their democratic politics are transformed. In short, societal globalization is another huge and under-theorized topic in the comparative politics of democratization.

6.5. International Norms, Values and Human Rights Discourse

The normative component of the international politics of democratization has been rather more fully developed in the academic literature than the previous two topics, particularly as regards international human rights law and the

7 Studies of emerging electoral democracies have yet to account fully for extra-territorial voting practices. The International Organization for Migration has operated Country Voting (OCV) programs in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan it enabled 850,000 voters in Iran and Pakistan to participate in the 2004 election. In the recent Iraqi election it attempted to register up to 1 million OCV voters in fourteen jurisdictions (Syria, the US, Jordan, and the UK being the four largest). There is also the Departamento 15 electorate of Salvadorans in the US.

propagation of democratic norms, and relevant empirical evidence is accumulating. The ranking, monitoring and auditing of democratic practices has generated an upsurge in expertise devoted to measurement, evaluation and policy prescription by foundations and governments and within the academic political science community. There is no homogeneous consensus, however, as a succession of partially overlapping and partially competitive norms have emerged with very geographically uneven enforcement that can also vary over time. Thus indigenous rights, gender equality before the law or press freedom all vie for attention within the basket of 'democratic rights'. This has offered many scholars the opportunity to become itinerant democratization 'money doctors' marketing different kinds of social science 'expertise.' What also needs to be underscored here is the inherently international and comparative content of all such endeavors. This is one area where academic theory and practice have surged ahead and where a single-country focus has been surpassed by cross-national work.

There is growing evidence since 9/11 that the previously emerging orthodoxy about cascading international human rights norms and the suppressed universality of liberal democratic values may have been more optimistic extrapolation than objective analysis. Some may have been lured out on this limb by the prospect of official recognition and increased funding. In time, perhaps, the liberal internationalists will reposition themselves and even recover lost ground but in the short run at least many of the governmental resources hitherto channeled in their direction has been redirected to finance the so-called 'war on terrorism'.

6.6. Tentative Conclusion About an Urgent but Uncertain Field of Enquiry

Recent developments present us with more questions than answers, more deviant cases than core ones, more complications and qualifications that confirmations, more independent variables than causal regularities. In order to map out this landscape in even the most provisional manner we need categories and concepts that are adaptable, although the dangers of 'concept stretching' are all too apparent. If we are to generate explanatory statements, however flexibly worded and probabilistic in form, we will have to simplify, streamline, and model our hypotheses independently from the evidence. But, of course, explanatory statements must at least in principle be falsifiable, and indeed in this line of work the most interesting and apparently well-supported hypotheses are all too likely to be overtaken by the flux of world political developments.

The evidence reviewed in this chapter points to the need for a considerable degree of humility over the achievements of the academic community

engaged in democratization studies. But before becoming too humble the practitioners of this branch of comparative politics might point out that international economics remains a highly prestigious branch of the social sciences, despite an analogous record of uncertain and even mistaken prognoses. Perhaps monitoring the real world in all its complexity is not a fair test of what insights can be delivered through rigorous conceptualization and precisely specified modelling backed by appropriate quantification. In this spirit recent scholarship has included a variety of exercises intended to promote more careful and precise specification of some key overarching categories and concepts (Munck forth.). A possibly more constructive approach has been to focus attention on certain sub-themes within the overall area of study that can be analyzed with relatively greater methodological rigour (e.g. the consequences of constitutional design, or the social bases of attitudes towards democratic performance). In certain areas this type of work seems capable of generating surprisingly clear and robust findings that hold across a broad range of cases (e.g. the comparative study of truth and reconciliation programmes, or the effectiveness of different types of international democracy promotion policies). Thus, humility about our ability to provide solid answers on the really important general questions may be qualified by a quiet sense of reassurance that through disaggregation of the issues and patient cumulative work it may be possible to improve overall understanding, one step at a time and within the limits set by 'best practice' social science methodology.

Naturally, as in any academic field, there will always be a place for the pursuit of analytical rigour, even to the apparent neglect of contemporary relevance. A healthy sub-field of comparative politics requires the input of those most committed to the clarification of hypotheses and the discarding of half-truths. But if precision is valued too highly above illumination the overall landscape may be left cloaked in darkness, with only a few misleading beams of penetrating light. A clearer view may be attainable when some specialize in precisely narrowly focused work while others undertake broader and more provisional surveys of the field, with each appreciating the best practices of the other. In any case the advocates of precision need to be precise. Is their claim that in due course, by pursuing their methods and only those, all worth knowing will be uncovered? If so, the other participants in the enterprise are entitled to enquire how long this will take, and how much will be set aside as unknowable (or at least beyond illumination by rigorous methods). The stricter the 'best practices' demands the longer most questions of the greatest interest—both to practitioners and indeed to dispassionate observers—are likely to be adjourned.

With this prospect in mind, other legitimate approaches to scholarship in this field could be to formulate more provisional and impressionistic hypotheses; to critique those already in circulation in the light of contemporary developments; and to accept relatively high degrees of approximation and

rough standards of comparison, with the objective of constituting an at least broad and provisional picture of the whole panorama of democratization processes. On the basis of such an approximate overall view it should then be feasible to focus in on some of the more significant issues and cases, using multiple methods to scan them, and situate them in their probable contexts. In other words, just as there should be no objection in principle to the pursuit of rigour in preference to relevance, so also there should be no objection in principle to an alternative procedure, namely the examination of issues of contemporary relevance, even to the apparent neglect of strict canons of analytical rigour.

The focus of this article has been on topics where scholars (while of course practising good scholarship within the limits of their power and the problems they are faced with) have sought to respond to recent developments in the theatre of world politics. The claim has been that this is also a legitimate and productive strategy for advancing understanding in our sub-field, and that in many cases the most worthwhile work seems to take this form. An illustration provided in the original version of this chapter seems to more pertinent than ever. It refers to Guillermo O'Donnell's work on "delegative democracy", as an example of academic work that proved well grounded in real world experience. Indeed it could be claimed the direction of response had been reversed. O'Donnell theorized 'delegative democracy' for example, before Hugo Chavez tried to exemplify his theory. But O'Donnell's work should figure prominently in this sketch of recent scholarship as a prime example of scholarship inspired by the turmoil of lived experience, rather than constrained by the prohibitions of orthodox disciplinarity.

Just as the retreat into rigour has its pros and also its cons, so also with the advance towards relevance. On the positive side, at least in our sub-field political science is concerned with issues that really matter to a larger community. Even provisional and approximate illumination may be better than raw empiricism. Indeed, the issues at stake extend far beyond the refinements of academic debate over such questions as institutional design (parliamentarism has proved far more fascinating to thesis committees than to constitutional committees). Citizens and political authorities are more absorbed with the 'quality' of democracy than with its hypothetical 'consolidation'. An emphasis on relevance directs the attention of scholars to such critical issues as the provision of security under the rule of law; socialization into an ethos of tolerance and respect for human rights; and how to make government work for the poor. These may be difficult issues to handle within the self-denying framework of an insistence on 'normal science' standards of validation, not least because of their normative connotations, but there is an untapped demand for them to be addressed with some seriousness and objectivity, and the broadly conceived comparative politics should not be completely bereft of pertinent ideas and findings. Nevertheless the pursuit of

relevance has its drawbacks. Not least, when processes of democratization are so amorphous and unstable as suggested in this paper, it is all too easy for good intentions to cloud clear vision, and indeed for overly prescriptive interpretations to generate far from desired results. More generally, concern with the 'quality' of democracy raises such a multiplicity of themes, many of them specific to each society, that it must be doubted how far an external and comparative framework of interpretation can go towards capturing the underlying realities. From the standpoint of democratic theory, it should be those most directly and permanently involved—the citizens of a given society or locality—who take the lead in evaluating and addressing such 'quality' issues, rather than carpet-bagging comparativists. And above all, from the standpoint of scholarship in our sub-field, too urgent a pursuit of relevance is likely to come at the expense of theoretical coherence. When the object of study is so sprawling and subject to further upheaval, the advance towards relevance is problematic, because it is both unparsimonious and open-ended.

Both in its original version and in this updated 2007 edition this whole book has been devoted to an assessment of the state of our sub-field, and presumably also to suggestions for how best to develop it. The main question arising from this chapter is how to proceed so that detachment and explanatory power can be maximized without blocking off the often disruptive feedback on our efforts generated by the flux of world political developments. Three main suggestions have structured this revised contribution. First the overall international political climate can shift dramatically (as it did not only in 1989, but again in 2001). When that happens scholars need to revisit their models and assumptions. It may seem rigorous, but it is not very relevant to continue deploying the concept categories and explanatory devices of an earlier period as if they are timeless and universal, when it fact they are clearly being superseded by a new matrix of interactions. Instead, practitioners of comparative politics in general, and of democratization studies in particular, need to scan the evidence for what was left out or underestimated in earlier interpretations. Second, this article has selected the theme of "stateness" as a crucial analytical variable that turns out to be of greater significance in a security-obsessed international climate than it was thought to be during a period dominated by liberal internationalism. The various dimensions and complexities of this stateness variable were sketched in section two above. Finally recent developments have also reinforced what was once a neglected theme in democratic studies: the centrality of international factors. Once it is recognised that many potentially democratizing states are weak and failing, then regional and international considerations are bound to acquire increased prominence in the analysis. This was already apparent in 2000. What has become much clearer since September 2001 is the persistence of geopolitical dynamics that compete with—or in an era of acute security anxieties may even over-ride—the prevalent liberal democratic normality of the immediate post-war years.

7. Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy

Juan J. Linz

7.1. Introduction

What do we mean by victory of democracy? First of all, the fact that in many countries authoritarian and post-totalitarian rulers have been replaced by elected governments—in an overwhelming number of cases without much bloodshed. Secondly, and most importantly, after the fall of the Berlin Wall no anti-democratic ideology appeals to politicians, intellectuals, religious leaders (with the possible exception of the situation in some Islamic countries) as an alternative to political democracy in the way that Bolshevik revolutionary dictatorship, Fascism, traditional authoritarianism, authoritarian corporativism or even the military as guarantors of the social order or revolutionary change did for much of the twentieth century. Ideologically developed alternatives have discredited themselves and are exhausted leaving the field free for the democrats. Even if we were to accept the caveats of Huntington (1993) about the undemocratic, if not anti-democratic, values of certain cultures, great civilizations, and religious traditions, they do not offer an alternative form of political institutionalization like the ideologies just mentioned. At the most, those values provide a ground in which non- democratic polities might take root if someone attempts to establish them or might, as in the case of some Islamic countries, even use democratic institutions and processes to fill them with an illiberal content claiming to be democratic since they are based on the will of the majority of the people. The radical Islamists ,in addition, want to constitutionalize Islamic principles beyond the reach of changing democratic majorities.

These facts should not lead us to ignore that the Communist Chinese leadership has yet to commit itself to a transition to democracy and that it might have reasons not to do so in view of the events in the former USSR. The incertitudes of democratization may be too great. In that case, it is more important than ever to keep the processes of liberalization distinct from democratization. There is little doubt that the economic changes taking place in China might lead to certain forms of liberalization but I am not yet certain that they will lead to democratization. In fact, a transition to democracy in China, after the totalitarian Communist rule and considering the cultural traditions, might be traumatic.

Nor should we forget the number of failed or extremely difficult transitions after the demise of regimes in the category that I have labeled „sultanistic“: Cuba after Batista, the Dominican Republic after Trujillo, Nicaragua after the Somozas, Iran after the Shah, Haiti after Baby Doc Duvalier and even Romania after Ceaucescu (Chehabi and Linz 1998). This experience also creates a caveat on a number of transitions to democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The difficulty of establishing or maintaining non-democratic rule after the delegitimation of such rule does not always assure a transition to democracy. In fact, in a number of countries it has led to political disintegration leading to a regression, to chaos. Civil war and political fractionalization make a transition to democracy particularly difficult. Countries such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia come to mind, to which many observers would quickly add Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo and others Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some of the successor states of the former USSR in the southern tier might not be far from such a situation.

These pessimistic considerations are, however, compensated by the hopeful process initiated in the Republic of South Africa (Friedman 1995). That process shows the enormous importance of leadership or, to use the language of the social science jargon, agency, when structure seems to lead to deterministic, pessimistic predictions.

In some countries with incomplete transitions, with non-consolidated democracies, and where—like in Central America—we had authoritarian regimes with pseudo- or semi-democratic forms we can expect what we might call „distorted“democracies. Such regimes hold competitive elections, but sometimes some parties are excluded and the „democratically“ elected leaders do not have full authority in the whole country or in some policy areas in which the military exercises decisive control under martial law, or those elected are unable to stop „private“ political violence linked with political parties or the security services. Strictly speaking, to call such regimes democracies is a misnomer (Di Palma 1986; Karl 1995; Panorama Centroamericano, Reporte Politico—a regular news-letter that gives an excellent account of the difficulties of building democracies in Central America). In fact, such a type of rule is likely to contribute to the alienation from democracy (O’Donnell 1999)

An analysis of the transitions to democracy and the ongoing consolidation of many of the new democracies lead us to a cautiously optimistic conclusion. It is almost totally unlikely that any of the democracies consolidated before the ”third wave”, as described by Huntington, will experience a breakdown and almost none will undergo serious crisis (Huntington 1991: 14-15). Those which have been established in Southern Europe, the Southern Cone of South America and more recently in Central Europe are likely to be on the way to full consolidation (if not already consolidated). In these two groups of democracies the relevant question, particularly for the second one,

is the *quality* of democracy not its persistence or stability and the possibility of a breakdown. It should be noted, however, that *no* democracy, even a consolidated one, is forever guaranteed to be crisis-free and even stable. Democracies in other parts of Latin America, in the Balkans, and Eastern Europe face serious problems in their consolidation and some of them may experience difficult crises. Those crises might result in making their democratic quality questionable, but even so, the likelihood of the establishment of authoritarian rule is not high.

Peru is described by some as an example of backsliding and even as a breakdown of democracy (Ferrero Costa 1992a and 1992b; McClintock 1993). Before reaching that conclusion, it is important to note that a democratically elected President acted in an anti-constitutional way closing the Congress, the other democratically elected body. As I have noted elsewhere, there is no democratic principle by which one can resolve the conflict in the case of dual legitimacy as we find it in presidential systems. It can even be argued that the decision of President Fujimori involved a reequilibration of a political system in deep trouble and that many citizens of Peru felt that way about his actions. Fujimori's anti-constitutional actions and authoritarian way of governing aroused an international reaction that obliged him to convene a constituent assembly and to obtain the approval of a new constitution in a referendum. The fragmentation of the opposition and the success of capturing the leader of the terrorist Sendero Luminoso allowed him to win reelection. The Peruvian crisis indirectly shows that even a ruler with authoritarian proclivities cannot dispense with democratic legitimacy.

The recent so-called transition from the first to the second republic in Italy, although worrisome, again shows that a discredited political class was not, as many thought years back, displaced by extremists of the left or the right and their violent actions against the system, but by the electorate choosing a new political class. Those pessimistic about the new democracies like to point to the electoral success of the more or less reformed Communist parties in Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary, forgetting that they did not come into power committed to change the regime, as the Nazis explicitly did in the early 1930s before assuming power .Furthermore, these recently elected Communist parties have not systematically pursued a change in the political institutions or limited the freedoms of the citizens. In the context of the 1990s, they felt and feel obliged to conform to democratic rules.

It is more questionable if the new states in the former Soviet Union which have given themselves democratic institutions and have held elections fit the definition of a democracy—particularly when their leader was the party Secretary General who exercised power as a Communist and now identifies himself as a nationalist. In a number of those new states, the question is not whether there will be a reversal of democracy. The question is has democracy really been established and is it now on the way to consolidation (Olcott

1993, McFaul 2002). The case of Russia is the most complex and important and it seems reasonable to withhold judgment about the ultimate outcome. It is even more difficult to argue that some of the new democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa are on the way to consolidation.

This overview of the crises of democratization and of the consolidation of democracies suggests that it would be dangerous to predict a third reverse wave. Still, it would be foolhardy to argue that there will be no reversals in the process of democratization. What any analysis of the new democracies tells us is that many of them will be far from satisfying ideal criteria of democratic political processes and quality of democratic politics. However, even bad democracies are better than authoritarian rule or chaos, since they may undergo processes of reequilibration, and with improved conditions and leadership they may become fully consolidated. Although, as Claus Offe(1994) puts it, there is a „tunnel at the end of the light", I would add that there is light at the end of that long and dark tunnel

In the future we will have to distinguish if a country satisfies the basic conditions to be a democracy and how liberal that state and its society will be. Certainly, every democracy has to guarantee basic freedoms in order to be a democracy, but the extent of freedoms and rights to be enjoyed by citizens are likely to vary considerably. Liberal democrats will have to fight for their expansion.

7.2. Structural problems in the new democracies

Alfred Stepan and I, along with other students of transitions, have rightly been accused of emphasizing the role of agency, leadership, and conjecture in the study of transitions. There is little doubt that structural factors—political, economic, social, and cultural—are of particular relevance in understanding the processes of consolidation and the tasks of democrats in that process. Since many of those structural conditions cannot be changed in the short run, we have to focus more on those amenable to political engineering (Sartori 1994). We have to pay particular attention to the ways in which the diversity of democratic institutions affects the quality of democracy: presidentialism, parliamentarism, federalism, electoral laws, rules regulating political parties, etc. The renewed attention paid to the social economic conditions, favorable or unfavorable to democracy, on which our knowledge is quite solid, is significant. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of transcending those conditioning factors through political leadership and political engineering. There is also a renewed emphasis on the role of political culture and values, although there is considerable evidence (and there could be in my view much more) that some of the values shared by most of mankind favor liberal, democratic institutions and that on that count there is less reason for pessimism (Inglehart 1997).

In any discussion of the importance of a democratic political culture, we must remember that many new democracies were not made by democrats but by people who had more or less passively supported non- democratic regimes. Non-democrats of yesterday can become democrats, even convinced democrats (Di Palma 1990: 210; Linz 1981: 142-144 tables 9 and 10). But here is a different question: does a transition to democracy, and, even more, the consolidation of a new democracy, require a leader committed to democracy and the basic liberal values sustaining it? That is a leader ready to abide by the rules of the democratic political game even when it means losing power.

There is also need to clarify what democracy can and cannot accomplish in different contexts, since many of the reasons for disenchantment result from false, magical conceptions of democracy. The problems linked with the consolidation of democracy in many parts of the world call for a much more thoughtful analysis of democratic institutions and their enormous variety, and for solid research on the implications of alternative institutions. There can be no question that democracies have been successful in capitalist economic systems, systems based on market and private property of means of production. But the mixture of non-market practices and public property in capitalist societies that are and have been democratic is much more complex than a vulgar neoliberalism would lead us to expect.

A hopeful sign is that in practically all the new democracies (perhaps with the exception of the former USSR, leaving aside the Baltic republics) people consider the new political institutions more positive than those existing before, and that in practically all the countries, the expectations some years later are more positive. The fact that the evaluation of the economic change—not only the reality of that change but the institutions of the new market economy—is in those countries (as it was in the older democracies) less positive and in some cases negative, should not obscure this: the expectations for the future seem to be positive (Rose/Mishler/Haerpfer 1998).

That difference between the evaluations of the political institutions and the economic institutions should give thought to those who believe that the legitimation of new political systems is dependent on the rapid success of the establishment of the market economy. It is misleading to believe that only the efficacy of the economic system is the basis for the legitimation of the new political institutions; there is sufficient evidence to argue that, conversely, the legitimation, the belief in those institutions and their success as institutions, will make possible the economic and social changes needed in many countries.[1]

1 There is evidence analyzed in detail in Linz and Stepan (1996: particularly in chapter 21) that there is no "tight coupling" between economic performance (and the perception of that performance) and the legitimacy of democracy and democratic institutions in Eastern Europe. The data from the Latinobarometro directed by Marta Lagos for the four Southern

It is interesting to note that there is a certain discrepancy between the many writings about the crisis of democracy and the data we have from public opinion research about how the people feel about democratic institutions. It is now more important than ever to distinguish in the democracies the response of people to the institutions and the response to the incumbents of office. This also allows us, for example, to distinguish between the awareness of the need for political parties and the critique of the existing parties. I hope that the talk of „desencanto" (disenchantment with democracy) does not become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Though there is a „tunnel at the end of the light",we can still be hopeful because at the end of any tunnel whose construction is finished there is also light.

The sociological theory of democracy has focused very much on the socio-economic structure of societies, the level of economic and social development and, to some extent although much less explicitly, on class conflict and democracy (Lipset 1959; Diamond 1992; Rueschemeyer/Huber Stephens/Stephens; Maravall 1995). Class conflict was one of the critical issues in the stability of democratic polities in the twentieth century. The Marxist theory of Fascism interpreted that complex phenomenon fundamentally in terms of social classes and the turn toward authoritarian solutions as a response to class conflict. Undoubtedly, in some societies, class warfare was a major cause of the breakdown of democracy. That approach, however, neglected the cumulation of conflicts in the economic sphere, between classes, and all the more cultural and ideological tensions like the fusion between leftist movements and anti-clericalism and even anti-religious sentiments.

In fact, if we look at European and Commonwealth democracies in the twentieth century, the most striking fact is that they were able to find solutions to the conflicts between capitalists, entrepreneurs, and the workers and the trade unions. What is more, many of them developed very stable patterns of negotiation, conflict resolution, and even cooperation within democratic politics. This is perhaps not surprising when we consider that, to a large extent, the conflicts were about divisible resources in which there was no need for a zero-sum conflict. This was not the case when the issues were more symbolic such as the nature of the political institutions, the place of religion in society, language policies, and national identity. It was the accumulation of such conflicts with those derived from class interests that contributed decisively to the instability of some democracies. In countries where the world economic crisis in the late 1920s and 1930s contributed to the breakdown of democracy, the lack of consensus on the legitimacy of the political institutions made those conflicts so damaging. In other countries, such as those of

Cone democracies that have just become available show the same pattern. The success of the Chilean economy and the many positive aspects of democracy in that country paradoxically have not resulted in a stronger commitment to democracy than in Uruguay, where people perceive the poorer performance of the economy and the weak prospects for the country.

Scandinavia and the Benelux as well as the United States,the dominant commitment to the democratic institutions allowed solutions to the class-based conflicts (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000 2002; Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1988; Zimmermann 1993).

In the post-1989 world, conflicts about the distribution of resources, the demands for greater equality and social justice, are likely to produce crises but the failure of the Marxist revolutionary utopia, which was so important for the labor movement up to the 1960s, has made those interest conflicts more manageable. In addition, it is difficult to articulate a conflict of social classes in the post-totalitarian, ex-Communist societies. In fact, it could be argued that the absence of structured social classes makes it difficult to articulate a party system homologous to the West until economic development would generate it.

The focus on economic interest conflicts has led sociologists studying the conditions for stable democracy to pay considerably less attention to other conflicts: those derived from clashes of identity, language policies, and the role of religion. Democratic theory has tended to work with a model of the nation-state and of a largely secularized society in which religion was pushed into the area of the private, or at the most was one more element in the social pluralism.

The expansion of democracy to multinational, multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural societies, and to those with a dominant religious tradition and only a secularized minority, has to be built into a theory of the conditions for democracy. From that perspective, the question of who constitutes the *demos*, the underlying sense of community that makes possible democratic decision making, has to be considered anew. We must reexamine the assumptions of a nation-state (let us not forget that, very often, the expression national sovereignty was used as equivalent to democracy) and the American and French revolutionary model of separation of church and state. We must question the traditional conception of nation-building as a basis of state-building and constituting the demos that would make decisions democratically in many parts of the world.

Efforts of the nationality controlling the state to use it in the nation-building as incompatible with the existence of any other national identity within its territory are now and in the future the major difficulty for the consolidation of many democracies. How multinational democratic states can be constructed is a major task for political (and constitutional) engineering. The same can be said about how the democratic state can recognize the religious identification and the role of religious institutions of the majority of citizens, while protecting religious freedom or freedom of non-religion of minorities (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 2000). To these two problems one has to add those derived from the demand for equality between the sexes, when the culture and/or the religion are not favorable to gender equality.

7.3. State, nation, and democracy

A number of new democracies are also new states: the fifteen former Soviet republics and the five that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia.— Several of them are simultaneously confronting the tasks of state-building and democratization. Many of them are also multinational states, whose leaders, identified with what in the Soviet language was called a titular nationality, are also committed to nation-building. There is, however, a serious tension and often a conflict between those three goals. In multinational states, the logic of nationalism and the logic of democracy are not always compatible. Several of those states have opted for „nation-building," sacrificing to that goal democracy and, in the process, even endangering „state-building" (Linz 1993 and 1995).

The state-builders in new states can pursue different policies toward ethnic, linguistic, cultural, national minorities: exclusionary policies (that is, to consider members of minorities not to be citizens or citizens with equal political rights) or inclusionary policies (that is, granting to all those in the territory full citizenship, except foreigners coming to the country knowing that they cannot expect automatic citizenship). They can also opt for a nation-building policy that will make the demos identical with the nation (either by exclusion or assimilation), accept the differentiation as a fact (a plural society), or recognize that fact as more or less valuable and aiming at creating a pluralistic society, even a multinational society and state.[2]

The combination of the two dimensions leads to four different types of polity, two of which can be democratic. In Type I, the identification of the demos with the nation and an exclusionary strategy toward citizenship of those defined as alien leads to expulsion, encouragement of emigration, or even more serious violation of human rights. It is difficult to conceive the building of democracy under such conditions.

In Type II, the acceptance of a differentiation between the demos and the nation, and the exclusionary strategy towards citizenship leads to a policy that residents who are not part of the nation will enjoy civil rights as resident aliens but not political rights. The result will be an ethnic democracy, that is democratic politics for the members of the dominant national or ethnic group.

In Type III, an inclusionary strategy toward citizenship, combined with an identification in principle between demos and nation, allows the minority or minorities to participate politically only if they assimilate into the dominant culture. In the absence of a positive value attached to diversity, the result will be a plural but not a pluralistic society. The assimilation strategy might involve considerable discrimination, second-class citizenship of those unable or

2 This section is taken from the book by Linz and Stepan 1996, where the argument is further developed.

unwilling to assimilate, and the denial of group rights. Only a small size of the minority, its lack of pride in its culture, or its sharing the dominant language and culture,or its incapacity or unwillingness to protest against the assimilationist policy, would allow for simultaneous state- and nation-building and democracy.

Figure 6: A typology of state, nation, and democracy-building strategies in multinational polities

Nation-building strategies: Ideology toward demos/nation relationship	State-building strategies: policies toward non-national minority or minorities	
	Exclusionary strategy	Inclusionary strategy
Demos and nation should be the same	Type I Expel or at least systematically encourage the "exit" option	Type III Make major effort to assimilate minorities into national culture and give no special recognition to minority political or cultural rights
Demos and nation can be different	Type II Isolate from political process by granting civil liberties but no political rights and thus discouraging "voice" option	Type IV Make major effort to accommodate minorities by crafting a series of political and civil arrangements which recognize minority rights

Type IV contains an inclusionary concept of citizenship and varying degrees of recognition of group rights for the minority or minorities: the acceptance of a pluralistic society in which diversity is not considered negative. There are many ways in which group and individual rights, bilingualism in education and the public sector, and rights of religious communities might be recognized. In some cases, patterns of consociational democracy and federalism might make possible a democratic multinational state based on a loyalty to the state without integration into a nation: a state-nation rather than a nation-state.

Types III and IV represent very different conceptions of democracy and their respective success depends on many factors. In the nineteenth century, Type III was a successful option; today it is, for reasons we cannot develop here, less likely to be so. An option is to try strategies associated with Type II, which might endanger democracy (or at least affect its quality),or turn to policies of Type IV.

To understand the problems of democracy in many countries and to predict the consolidation or crisis of democracy in many states we need to know much more about the conditions in which these different polity options are likely to succeed or fail

7.4. Religion, the secular state, and democracy

Western Europe and Latin America have largely secularized societies in which religion and the role of the churches are no longer a highly conflictual issue. Both democrats and religious leaders, at one point or another, believed that democracy and religion were incompatible. The conflict between anti-clericalism and clericalism in a number of Catholic countries played a role in destabilizing democracies and exacerbating social conflicts, although early on, in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Imperial and Weimar Germany, Catholics came to accept and support democracy. The same was true for the United States and the countries of the British Commonwealth.

The memory of those conflicts, the totalitarian experience or the costs of politicized religion in authoritarian regimes like Spain, and the United States model of friendly separation of church and state, ultimately led to religious peace and more friendly patterns of separation and even cooperation of church and state (Weigel 1990: 33). Certainly, contemporary democracies range widely in the patterns of church and state relations: from established churches in the Protestant monarchies, to the cooperative arrangements in the constitutions of the German Federal Republic and Spain, to the pro-religion separation based on religious pluralism (rather than secularism) of the United States, or the granting to religion a privileged position in Ireland and Israel. All these alter-natives have been supported or accepted by democratic electorates. Obviously there is room for conflict about specific issues and the interpretation of the constitutional principles, but the churches, including the Catholic Church and the Papacy, as well as most secularists, have concluded that democracy is compatible with religion. A publicly recognized role for religion and the churches is not perceived as incompatible with democracy.

Therefore, the problem of a conflict between religion and democracy has not arisen in the newly democratized Southern European and Latin American countries. In Eastern Europe the profound and massive secularization under Communism (with the significant exceptions of Poland and Lithuania), the national Orthodox churches and the traditions of Caesaro-papism have largely eliminated religion as a political factor. In fact, this has been and continues to be, in most of these countries, yet another factor in the weakness of „civil society".This is true even though in some of them the link between a national church and national identity has come to reinforce the upsurge of nationalism.

In this respect, the situation in many countries in Asia and the Islamic world is different: the masses tend to be strongly attached to their religious traditions, which provide a cultural identity in relation to an encroaching West (that often does not export the best of its culture and values). In addition, the secularized segment is often thin, socially and economically privileged, and sometimes alienated from the native culture. We can thus ex-

pect the question of the place of religion to be important in any process of democratization. Although the Turkish Ataturk secularizing revolution sometimes seems an ideal model, the specific character of Turkey as an emerging nation-state should not be forgotten, as well as the fact that these reforms took place in an authoritarian context. A similar attempt by the Pahlevi Shahs in Iran ultimately failed.

Therefore, we have to think of alternatives involving a constructive cooperation between religion and democracy, and religious leaders and democratic leaders, that also protect religious freedom for minorities and rights of the non-religious. Those issues probably have to be dealt with up-front in the constitutional debates, and many of the solutions will not be acceptable to members of the American Civil Liberties Union or Americans for Separation of Church and State, or to French proponents of *laicité*. The solutions will, however, fit with those who, like Lijphart, defend consociational or consensus democracy rather than majoritarian democracy. Democratic electorates may be willing to allocate a special place to religion, and to devote resources to religion resources which the secularists will feel could be better spent on public welfare activities) but this is neither anti-democratic nor ademocratic. The democratic state might, in the tradition of the Buddhist or Hindu kings and the raj and even the liberal Mogul shahs , assume the role of protector of religion and use that position to modernize discreetly the religious institutions. It might even enlist them in some of the modernization efforts like the Thai Dhammathud program. There is always the risk of fundamentalist extremism of religious demagogues, using the democratic freedoms to limit the freedom of others and ignite communal conflict, but the risk is not absent even in Western societies. To prevent it, the strengthening of constitutional restraints and the role of the courts is the only hope. An authoritarian alternative probably is not a long-term solution.

In the first half of the century, democrats developed institutions and policies that channeled, bridged, and moderated class conflict; democrats today would have to think about institutions and policies to deal with those other conflicts within a democratic and liberal framework. Just as the utopia of a classless society based on the socialization of the means of production became an obstacle to solving class conflicts in the context of democratic liberal politics, equally simple and utopian ideas, such as the indiscriminate invocation of the principle of national self-determination or the ideal of the nation-state, can be obstacles to democratization and the consolidation of democracy. The same would be true for the identification of democracy with a rigid separation of church and state and the secularization of society.

7.5. The new democracies are different

We should not expect new democracies to be like the old, established democracies. They are appearing in a different historical, social, and cultural context. To mention just one (rather significant) difference, they are being established in societies in which a large proportion of the population has access to television. In most of them, the industrial blue collar working class will be a smaller part of the population, and more of their citizens have considerable education. As a result of some of those changes, the new political parties are not likely to be mass membership parties, parties anchored in homogeneous and socially distinct electorates. They will be „catch-all parties" parties, less committed to integrate their supporters into a variety of mass organizations, and even less into an encapsulated subculture, as some socialist and Christian democratic parties did in the past. There will be fewer voters with a strong party identification, and more of them will be „floating voters".

This poses problems for democratic politicians and leads some scholars, nostalgic about the structured and stable parties and party systems of the past, to worry about the future of democracy. However, freedom from a socially structured constraining political climate might allow people to respond more readily to changing conditions and issues, to make politicians more accountable and to moderate the antagonism between social groups and their political representatives. In a sense, voters might be freer to choose, to reward and punish politicians, have more „exits" and „voice" and weaker loyalties (to use Albert Hirschman's (1970) terms).That makes a system far from less democratic. The question is the degree of „loyalty" that parties require in order to attain sufficient continuity to go on competing,, and to assure some permanency to elites with experience in politics and governing. We must notconfuse change in the way democracies work (and parties are organized and compete) with a lack of democratic consolidation or quality of democracy.

It can, however, also be argued that the greater freedom that voters have, the lesser loyalty to parties will affect politics negatively. Candidates with ambition, financial resources, or popularity gained outside of politics, combined with television (particularly in presidential systems [Linz 1994: 26-291) will be able to appeal to the voters without any experience in politics and government. Examples of these outsiders, with anti-party „antipolitics" platforms, include Timinski in Poland, Fujimori in Peru, or Ross Pero in the United States. In a presidential system, such candidates will not need to organize a party and to obtain the support of politicians with experience. This can open the door to demagogues using plebiscitarian appeals. The weakening of parties as organizations, channeling political ambitions and serving as a selection mechanism (from lower office, local, regional, national, up to the top), facilitates lateral entry of candidates but will have considerable impact on the process of recruitment of political elites.

There is an open question in democracies: Whom do we want as politicians: professionals who are devoted to a career in public office and have experience in different aspects of the role of politician, or amateurs ,who have a passing interest and might be involved only in single issues? Do we want legislators or officials who may serve for one or two terms, as proponents of term limits (so popular in the United States) advocate? Is it possible for the latter to acquire the knowledge of the issues and the capacity to articulate them? Would they be capable of working closely with others, learning to convince them, making compromises, accepting, and supporting leadership?

We need to know more about who goes into politics and who does not—or who leaves politics—in various democracies. Some of the questions raised by Max Weber (1922) on „dispensability" for politics are still relevant. Are some of the rules we are establishing, such as the incompatibility of politics and any other professional or business activity, forcing people to become full-time politicians dependent on the parties, party or interest group functionaries, and therefore with limited autonomy?

7.6. The quality of democracy

The quality of democracy is a complex problem that in coming years will demand both theoretical and systematic comparative analysis. We will have to specify standards—on which agreement will not always be easy—some weighting of different dimensions and ranges of tolerance of imperfection. We will also have to compare the by-now large number of democracies, both as objective, outsider scholarly observers, and by taking into account subjective perceptions of the citizens (Diamond/Morlino 2005). Both objective and subjective indicators, though, do not always coincide. For example, objective observers do not rate present Romanian democracy very high but the citizens in different surveys express a surprisingly positive response, particularly considering the much more critical opinions about democracy in a number of Central European countries. The task ahead, therefore, is gigantic and efforts such as reports from Freedom House and Amnesty International, and a few cross-national surveys are far from sufficient for our needs.

It has been noted that with the collapse of Communism and the transition from terrible authoritarian regimes to democracy, the arguments in favor of democracy by comparison have lost strength and that a more positive justification becomes imperative, that the performance of democracies on a variety of dimensions will have to serve to legitimize them. This is in part a fallacy. The positive aspects, stressed in the comparison with dictatorships, continue being important and deserve to be emphasized, particularly since they are inherent to any democratic regime. Many other positive aspects may be ex-

pected from democracy, but they are more dependent on other aspects of their democratic societies. They also depend on the choices the democrats might or might not make, and therefore are possible and probable, but are not inherent to political democracy.

Although it might appear to belabor on the obvious, let us note again the unique contributions of political democracy to a better society. Foremost is a consensus and certain guarantees that violence—revolutionary or military coups—are not the method to attain power, irrespective of the desirability of the goals to be achieved by those gaining power. Democracy substitutes ballots for bullets. Democracy also prevents anyone's attempt to stay in power beyond the time at which the voters should make again a choice of who shall govern. We often tend to take this for granted, but in many parts of the world for the majority of the people this is a real gain.

Democracy in societies with inequality, even great inequalities, introduces an element of fundamental equality, equality of citizenship in which the preferences of individuals can be expressed, and—unless electoral laws and political institutions are greatly distorted—the sum of those preferences can have some consequence. It also provides, in principle, some opportunity for all citizens to compete for some share in power. It is an old tradition of ademocratic and anti-democratic thought to stress the actual inequalities that affect the democratic process. This ignores the importance of a recognition of the principle of equality of citizens, irrespective of a whole range of inequalities, particularly ascriptive ones.

Democracy—the free competition for power—implies a whole list of freedoms and rights which citizens do not enjoy in other political systems and that are in themselves valuable (and based on all we know, valued by people unless they are abused grievously).

Democracy creates and legitimizes power, but it also allocates power as government only for a limited time between elections; it does not allow (except by free consent) the perpetuation in power. It allows those defeated the hope of gaining power the next time (this is the problem for permanent ascriptive minorities such as ethnic, religious, linguistic minorities that have little hope of becoming majorities by convincing the majority to support them). It also assures, unless power is used to destroy freedom and thereby democracy, the possibility of making those governing accountable for bad government and ousting them peacefully from power at the end of their mandate. Perhaps democracy is not government by the people or for the people, but it is government accountable at regular intervals to the people.

The characteristic of being government *pro tempore* (with the possibility of continuously consolidated support) is essential to democracy and cannot be democratically abolished since such a decision would deprive future voters (and those not agreeing with the decision to do so) of the right to be part of the demos. This is a defining characteristic of democracy that is often for-

gotten, but is absolutely essential (Linz 1986: 34-43). It is also the one that makes failures of democratic government tolerable and gives democracies a breathing space in bad times by at least allowing two successive governments of different parties (normally for eight years) to fail, before one could question the desirability of democratic institutions. This might be one of the explanations for the fact that low efficacy of democracies—that is, their incapacity to solve important problems—does not immediately affect the legitimacy of democratic institutions and lead to their breakdown.

Civil peace, reduction of political violence, basic civil liberties, temporal limits to power, possibility of accountability, a margin of tolerance for government failure: these are positive contributions to a better society (not without some elements of ambiguity). These and the many other positive gains, some almost inevitable, others probable, others possible, allow us to analyze qualitative differences between democracies.

Some of these are even basic criteria to consider a country a democracy, and are among those enumerated by Robert Dahl (1971: 2-3). Other criteria, such as those discussed by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), are necessary to consider a new democracy consolidated (and some authors include many more conditions for consolidation). On any of those criteria, there can be a range beyond which we might question whether a country is a democracy even if there has been a transfer of power to freely elected representatives and leaders. Within the positive range, very different ratings of particular states are possible.

When we explore the problem of the quality of democratic leadership, we have to ask ourselves to what extent are the failings due to the way in which institutions structure the political process and the recruitment of political elites. I have tried to do so in my comparison between presidential and parliamentary democracies. The populism in Latin American democracies is related to the style of politics made possible, even necessary, by presidentialism in view of the fractionalization and often irresponsibility of parties in Congress in such systems. The impact of electoral laws on party systems, the type of parliamentary leaders, etc., have often been noted while the impact of unenforceable and perhaps ill-advised laws about party financing in generating corruption remains to be analyzed. The consequences of democratization of many institutions—from saving banks to university trustees, from the judiciary to the boards of public enterprises—in creating what the Italians call „*partitocrazia* “, the patronage of parties and, with it, opportunities for corruption, is another example. The laws about incompatibility of office and private activities on the quality of recruitment deserve further analysis. The burdens we are ready to impose on politicians, including the strains on their private and family life, cannot be ignored when we ask about the quality of politicians.

Beyond those basic institutional dimensions and their behavioral manifestations we want to focus on several others, some more easy to define, operationalize, and even observe and measure, and some more intangible.

Foremost, I want to mention the quality of political personnel and leadership, not so much the quality of particular office holders (prime ministers and presidents) but what is sometimes called—with a term taken from Gaetano Mosca (1896) and Italian political discourse—the „political class." This refers to the great majority of those who at different levels, both in government and opposition, aspire to gain the support of the voters. Already Joseph A. Schumpeter (1947: 290-291), among his five requirements for the functioning of democracy, stressed this factor when he wrote:

"The conditions which I hold must be fulfilled for the democratic method to be a success […] The first condition is the human material of politics—the people who man the party machines, are elected to serve in parliament, rise to cabinet office—should be of sufficient high quality. This means more than that individuals of adequate ability and moral character must exist in sufficient numbers."

Indicators of the quality of the „political class" would be:

1. The proportion for whom politics is „a vocation" rather than just a way of making a living.
2. The commitment to some (obviously different for different parties) values or goals relevant for the collectivity, without, however, pursuing them irrespective of consequences. This means some mixture between being guided by a *Gesinnungsethik* and a *Verantwortungsethik* in Max Weber's sense.
3. The amount of political corruption, relatively narrowly defined, as the use of power for private-personal ends, specifically enrichment, or to illegally favor particular organizations or groups.
4. The use or tolerance of illegal violence even against enemies of the state and democracy, even when a majority of citizens are ready to condone it.
5. Willingness to play with or use the disloyal opposition, revolutionary extremists or putschists, against other democratic forces or the institutions, to blackmail them or gain power. Semi-loyal oppositions in my view have been more crucial in the breakdown of democracy than the openly disloyal oppositions (Linz 1978: 32-34, 75-76).

The style of political discourse in the competition for power is also likely to affect the quality of democracy. There are forms of political behavior which, although undesirable, are relatively „normal"in some democracies. However, when carried to extremes and displacing other forms of political debate, they contribute to destroy the trust in politicians, the confidence in parties (not just a particular party), and they even weaken the legitimacy of the democratic process. Those patterns might lead to the withdrawal from politics of qualified and potentially motivated persons, reducing the overall quality of the political class. I am thinking of levels of aggressiveness, unjustifiable lack of respect for opponents and their motivations, making cooperation and compro-

mise impossible, even in the case of threats to democracy; appeals to the baser sentiments of the electorate, to prejudices and hatred, activating memories of past conflicts and bloodshed, ethnic hatred; demagoguery and outbidding, attempting to deceive the voters rather than disagreement on policies or interests; some forms of populism, defining the issues as between the „people" and „them" as part of a conspiracy or traitors of the national interest. It is obviously difficult to define and measure tolerable rather than destructive adversary politics and even more difficult to devise mechanisms to prevent the sliding into such patterns. Responsible, independent, and quick action by the courts and constructive actions of the media are the obvious responses. However, even more important is the effort of moderate and prestigious leaders to dissociate themselves from such actions.

Even in the absence of such anti-democratic or destructive patterns of political competition, there are in modern democracies sufficient reasons for criticism or ambivalence of citizens about political parties and politicians. Some arise out of contradictory conceptions and expectations in principle compatible with democracy, often held simultaneously by the voters. I just want to mention a few. People want parties to be united and support the policies of a government distrusting intra-party debates and conflict, but at the same time they complain that politicians are obedient party loyalists without personality. Citizens want experienced leaders but at the same time they reject the idea of professional politicians, even advocating the principle of no reelection. The voters complain about the fact that their representatives do not represent their specific interests sacrificing them to broader policy considerations, the government policy, but also criticize them for representing special interests (obviously other than their own). People feel that politicians lose touch with society, that they live in a world of their own, dependent on the party or office for their living, but at the same time these people advocate the incompatibility between running for office, representative mandates, and any other professional activity (Pharr and Putnam 2000). We need to know more about how those contradictory images and expectations affect the perception of the quality of democracy.

Some of the quality of the political class will be determined by the „quality of the electorate", the readiness of the voters to support leaders with clearly negative characteristics on the one hand and on the other a public opinion disinterested in the quality of leaders. We could make a parallel list of negative characteristics of electorates in democracies. It is not always clear if undesirable leaders have „corrupted" the electorate, they often do, or if the voters for a variety of motives condone actions detrimental to the quality of democracy, not minding who would represent and govern them.

The political culture approach touches on some of these problems but ,having been developed in advanced stable democracies, has focused more on citizen participation, on the sense of political efficacy, and on the rights of

citizens than on the willingness to respond to, accept, or freely condone bad leadership.

Considering participation and contestation, the two basic dimensions of a democratic policy, the quality of democracy should be related to both. A democracy in which the right to participate in politics, from voting to other forms of legal participation, is limited unduly or subject to pressure or control by those in power or with power resources like employers (beyond the legitimate efforts to influence the voters) is deficient. Extremely high rates of participation *and* extraordinary majorities for one party or candidate (in presidential systems) are suspect. While the freedom not to participate, not to vote, or to vote blank should be respected, extremely low turnouts and many void votes can be indicators of a low level of support for democratic processes. Indeed, the two extremes of very high and very low participation can be signs of a crisis of democracy. Extreme levels of political mobilization may indicate that too much is at stake in an election, and very low levels indicate that leaders are not able to articulate the interests and preferences of citizens, or they are a sign of a passive rejection of the whole democratic process.

The distinction between loyal and disloyal opposition is central, to which semi-loyal should be added as an important category. The style of democratic politics is largely determined by the style of opposition. There are better forms of democratic contestation than existential conflict, the „friend-foe" distinction of Carl Schmitt; the me-too-ism in which parties become indistinguishable; party competition that becomes disaggregated into competition between individual candidates (making parties incoherent and undisciplined and representatives of a congery of local or special interests); or a party system based on fractions following personalities with few distinct policy positions. Without advocating „a responsible two-party system" as an ideal, certainly between systems producing either a hegemonic party or an extremely fractionalized party system, there is a middle ground of a limited, moderate multiparty system with responsible parties offering real choices to the voters.

One of the great questions we face as students of contemporary democracies is how to combine a critical analysis of their performance with a sense of proportion that would prevent us from delegitimizing them *in toto* in view of blatant and grievous failures. *Tout comprendre* is not *tout pardonner*, but the alternative is not to condemn everything. We should also be cautious not to be skeptical about the possible working of self-corrective mechanisms already in place or that can be introduced, including some constitutional changes, rather than looking for new utopian alternatives (after so much hope wasted over the 20th century we should be more than cautious) or quick fixes. Our task as scholars and democrats is far from easy.

Addendum to the second edition of this volume (provoked by Iraq, Afghanistan, and US policy):

Since I wrote this essay events in many countries have made me even more conscious that without a reasonably functioning state, democracy is not possible: No state, no democracy. Besides, it is unlikely that democratic procedures alone make state-building possible.

Democracy is a way of ruling a state, and therefore, if there is no state, democracy is not possible. A state implies the definition of a territory, of who are its citizens, a monopoly of legitimate violence (and reasonable control of illegitimate violence), an administration to collect taxes and support the activities of the state, a police and a judiciary to enforce compliance with the norms and protect basic freedoms of all citizens. Without this minimum of "stateness", democratic government is not possible and democratic institutions become a fiction, a sham, "for outsiders to see".

Furthermore, without some agreed upon political institutions (generally a constitution or basic law, even provisional, to make possible a regime transition), defining the offices or bodies to be elected, electoral procedures, and an administration able to implement those norms, a democracy is not possible (and even less legitimate). Sometimes, the "builders" of democracy believe that the transition from a non-democratic regime requires a radical purge of the state apparatus, dismissing civil servants, policemen, teachers, etc. This may, however, destroy structures needed to govern in the immediate future.

A national society, that is, a society in which a large majority of people identify with a nation, share an identity based on language, ethnicity, religion or culture, history and tradition, contributes to the strength of states or the possibility of state building. However, not all states have to be nation-states nor is the building of nations a prior to state-building, nor is it always possible today.

One may also wonder whether a political system based on quasi-feudal structures, on allegiance to local rulers, traditional rules, religious leaders, even when formally "legitimized" by democratic elections and recognized or tolerated by the "centre" of a "state", is really a state in the modern sense of the term?

Civil war is incompatible with democracy, even if one of the contenders derives its legitimacy and power from elections and presumably fights to defend democracy, since a significant segment of the society questions the institutional order and does not participate in the minimum consensus necessary for democracy. Until the assertion of control by a victor over the society or the division of the country into different states, and the subsequent creation of institutions and new democratic elections, we cannot consider such a country a democracy.

Recent events raise again the question of the relation between democracy and foreign policy and war-making. Certainly, some of the definitions of de-

mocracy that mostly emphasize "responsiveness" to the wishes and preferences of the citizens are not helpful to our understanding in this respect. There is a considerable difference in the knowledge or understanding that citizens may have or acquire before elections and the timing of decisions in the case of most "internal" policies, compared to foreign policies or war-making. The available and needed information as well as the constraints of timing are radically different and, therefore, most frequently citizens are limited to ex-post facto demands of accountability. For this reason, in facing such problems we are more dependent on representative institutions and leadership and their quality.

Equally, if not more troublesome is the fact that the fight against terrorism may lead a democratic electorate or the elected leaders to support policies that threaten liberal values. In that case, one has sometimes, at the extreme, to choose between being a liberal or a democrat, except that in a democracy there is the hope that those policies may be reversed at a later time. Moreover, the pluralism of institutions, not all swamped by temporary public opinion, can assure a resistance to such tendencies. We should, therefore, not give up a certain, Tocquevillian, critical perspective towards democracy and not fall into a "pan-democratic" utopian ideology.

Since democracy is largely government by amateurs, they inevitably depend on civil servants, legal experts, economists, military officers, etc. for information and advice in decision making. The elected officials certainly are free to make whatever decisions on the basis of their democratic legitimation, within the limits of the law and basic morality, but there should be also some guarantee that their advisers and those in charge of executing the decisions should have considerable autonomy and consequently accountability. They should have some freedom to speak up to their superiors, if necessary even turn to the public and be encouraged to resign in case of serious disagreement. The Clausewitzian conception of war as a continuation of politics with other means and the subordination of the military to the elected officials is essential to democracy, but also the duty of the military officers to call attention to the impossibility to execute policies unless given the necessary means. Besides, even in democracies, and not only in non-democratic regimes, obedience should have limits.

The democratic source of power, particularly when the popular vote is for a person rather than an organization like a party and its parliamentary representation, does not protect us against the abuse of power. Majoritarianism without institutional constraints after elections, without advisors who have to be listened to, advisors who cannot be dismissed, is a danger to responsible government and even democratic institutions.

A problem that democracies face is the weakening of collective bodies: party conventions, parliaments, cabinets, that goes with the personalization of politics, particularly in presidential democracies but also of party leaders in

parliamentary regimes. The direct relations established between voters and elected leader, without the mediation of collective bodies (fostered by TV), the independence of the leaders from them, are a threat to responsible (rather than just responsive) democratic government.

I consider as a real problem for contemporary democracies that politicians, elected leaders, see their major role in being responsive to the opinions of the voters. Public opinion research presumably enables them to know that opinion and to be conscious of what the voters may not want to hear, what could endanger their chances of re-election. Responsiveness rather than responsibility, responsiveness rather than leadership, instead of changing opinions and educating the electorate, seems to be the defining characteristic of democratic politics in many countries today. Even the opposition is cautious of not questioning the public, to stand up to the climate of opinion. Elections then become instruments for plebiscitarian legitimation rather than an instrument to elect representatives to make decisions for which they later will be made accountable.

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

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